

Reading List

1. A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy **Karl Marx** 1859
2. Europeanization and the Ancient Culture of India, **Lala Lajpat Rai**
3. Update on the Aryan Invasion Debate **Koenraad Elst**
4. Indian Administrative Service Meets Big Data, **Milan Vaishnav & Saksham Khosla**
5. Civil Services and Current Challenges **Gautam Pingle**
6. Evidence Based Policy: Whence it Came and Where it's Going **William Solesbury**
7. A Memorandum to the Government of India 1955 **Milton Friedman**
8. Minute On Indian Education,1835 **Lord Macaulay**
9. A Speech on India Bill 1833 **Lord Macaulay**
10. The Power Of Myth **Joseph Campbell and Bill Moyers**
11. The Great Transformation **Karl Polyani**
12. On Governance **Jean-Jacques Rousseau**
13. Russia At The Turn Of The Millennium **Vladimir Putin**
14. The Capacity To Govern **Yehezkel Dror**
15. The Indian Civil Service in the Era of Competitive Examination **C. J. Dewey**
16. The Good Administrator **C. Rajagopalachari**
17. The Indus-Sarasvati Civilization and its Bearing on the Aryan Question **Michel Danino**
18. The Aryan Issue **Michel Danino**
19. On the Duties of a King **Manu Shastra**
20. On Varna **Manu Shastra**
21. Santi Parva **The Mahabharata**
22. The Moral Basis of a Backward Society **Edward C. Banfield**
23. The New Liberal Imperialism **Robert Cooper**
24. Wealth of Nations **Adam Smith**
25. The Myth of the "Third-way" **Ludwig Von Mises**
26. We Must Build States And Not Nations **Carl Bildt**
27. What is a Nation? **George Kennan**
28. What is a Nation? Ernst Renan
29. Pakistan or The Partition Of India **Dr Ambedkar**
30. State and Market: Altering the Boundaries **Dr Y. V. Reddy**

A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy

Karl Marx 1859

<https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1859/critique-pol-economy/preface.htm>

From the Preface

The general conclusion at which I arrived and which, once reached, became the guiding principle of my studies can be summarised as follows.

In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of production.

The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness.

The mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness.

At a certain stage of development, the material productive forces of society come into conflict with the existing relations of production or – this merely expresses the same thing in legal terms – with the property relations within the framework of which they have operated hitherto. From forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an era of social revolution. The changes in the economic foundation lead sooner or later to the transformation of the whole immense superstructure.

In studying such transformations it is always necessary to distinguish between the material transformation of the economic conditions of production, which can be determined with the precision of natural science, and the legal, political, religious, artistic or philosophic – in short, ideological forms in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out.

Just as one does not judge an individual by what he thinks about himself, so one cannot judge such a period of transformation by its consciousness, but, on the contrary, this consciousness must be explained from the contradictions of material life, from the conflict existing between the social forces of production and the relations of production.

No social order is ever destroyed before all the productive forces for which it is sufficient have been developed, and new superior relations of production never replace older ones before the material conditions for their existence have matured within the framework of the old society.

Mankind thus inevitably sets itself only such tasks as it is able to solve, since closer examination will always show that the problem itself arises only when the material conditions for its solution are already present or at least in the course of formation. In broad outline, the Asiatic, ancient,[A] feudal and modern bourgeois modes of production may be designated as epochs marking progress in the economic development of society. The bourgeois mode of production is the last antagonistic form of the social process of production – antagonistic not in the sense of individual antagonism but of an antagonism that emanates from the individuals' social conditions of existence – but the productive forces developing within bourgeois society create also the material conditions for a solution of this antagonism. The prehistory of human society accordingly closes with this social formation.

**A Speech delivered in the House of Commons on the 10th of July, 1833.
LORD MACAULAY**

On Wednesday, the tenth of July 1833, Mr Charles Grant, President of the Board of Control, moved that the Bill for effecting an arrangement with the India Company, and for the better government of His Majesty's Indian territories, should be read a second time. The motion was carried without a division, but not without a long debate, in the course of which the following Speech was made.

(Concluding extract) (EMPHASIS ADDED)

I have detained the House so long, Sir, that I will defer what I had to say on some parts of this measure, important parts, indeed, but far less important, as I think, than those to which I have adverted, till we are in Committee. There is, however, one part of the bill on which, after what has recently passed elsewhere, I feel myself irresistibly impelled to say a few words. **I allude to that wise, that benevolent, that noble clause, which enacts that no native of our Indian empire shall, by reason of his colour, his descent, or his religion, be incapable to holding office. As the risk of being called that nickname which is regarded as the most opprobrious of all nicknames by men of selfish hearts and contracted minds, at the risk of being called a philosopher¹, I must say that, to the last day of my life, I shall be proud of having been one of those who assisted in the framing of the bill which contains that clause.** We are told, that the time can never come when the natives of India can be admitted to high civil and military office. We are told that this is the condition on which we hold our power. We are told, that we are bound to confer on our subjects every benefit - which they are capable of enjoying? - no; - which it is in our power to confer on them? - no; - but which we can confer on them without hazard to the perpetuity of our own domination. Against that proposition I solemnly protest as inconsistent alike with sound policy and sound morality.

I am far, very far, from wishing to proceed hastily in this most delicate matter. I feel that, for the good of India itself, the admission of natives to high office must be effected by slow degrees. But that, when the fulness of time is come, when the interest of India requires the change, we ought to refuse to make that change lest we should endanger our own power, this is a doctrine of which I cannot think without indignation. Governments, like men, may buy existence too dear. 'Propter vitam vivendi perdere causas,' is a despicable policy both in individuals and in states. In the present case, such a policy would not only be despicable, but absurd. **The mere extent of empire is not necessarily an advantage. Too many governments it has been cumbersome; to some it has been fatal. It will be allowed by every statesman of our time that the prosperity of a community is made up of the prosperity of those who compose the community, and that it is the most childish ambition to covet dominion, which adds to no man's**

¹ [This echoes Canning's defence of Huskisson in 1826. 'Why is it to be supposed that to apply the refinement of philosophy to the affairs of common life indicates obduracy of feeling or obtuseness of sensibility?']

comfort or security. To the great trading nation, to the great manufacturing nation, no progress which any portion of the human race can make in knowledge, in taste for the conveniences of life, or in the wealth by which those conveniences are produced, can be matter of indifference. It is scarcely possible to calculate the benefits, which we might derive from the diffusion of European civilisation among the vast population of the East. It would be, on the most selfish view of the case, far better for us that the people of India were well governed and independent of us, than ill governed and subject to us; that they were ruled by their own kings, but wearing our broadcloth, and working with our cutlery, than that they were performing their salams to English collectors and English magistrates, but were too ignorant to value, or too poor to buy, English manufacturers. To trade with civilised men is infinitely more profitable than to govern savages. That would, indeed, be a doting wisdom, which, in order that India might remain a dependency, would make it an useless and costly dependency, which would keep a hundred millions of men from being our customers in order that they might continue to be our slaves.

It was, as Bernier tells us, the practice of miserable tyrants whom he found in India, when they dreaded the capacity and spirit of some distinguished subject, and yet could not venture to murder him, to administer to him a daily dose of the pousa, a preparation of opium, the effect of which was in a few months to destroy all the bodily and mental powers of the wretch who was drugged with it, and to turn him into a helpless idiot. The detestable artifice, more horrible than assassination itself, was worthy of those who employed it. It is no model for the English nation. **We shall never consent to administer the pousa to a whole community, to stupify and paralyse a great people whom God has committed to our charge, for the wretched purpose of rendering them more amenable to our control. What is power worth if it is founded on vice, on ignorance, and on misery; if we can hold it only by violating the most sacred duties which as governors we owe to the governed, and which, as a people blessed with far more than an ordinary measure of political liberty and of intellectual light, we owe to a race debased by three thousand years of despotism and priest-craft? We are free, we are civilised, to little purpose, if we grudge to any portion of the human race an equal measure of freedom and civilisation.**

Are we to keep the people of India ignorant in order that we may keep them submissive? Or do we think that we can give them knowledge without awakening ambition? Or do we mean to awaken ambition and to provide it with no legitimate vent? Who will answer any of these questions in the affirmative? Yet one of them must be answered in the affirmative, by every person who maintains that we ought permanently to exclude the natives from high office. I have no fears. The path of duty is plain before us: and it is also the path of wisdom, of national prosperity, of national honour.

The destinies of our Indian empire are covered with thick darkness. It is difficult to form any conjecture as to the fate reserved for a state which resembles no other in history, and which forms by itself a separate class of political phenomena. The laws, which regulate its growth and its decay, are still unknown to us. It may be that the public mind of India may expand under our system till it has outgrown that system;

that by good government we may educate our subjects into a capacity for better government; that, having become instructed in European knowledge, they may, in some future age, demand European institutions. Whether such a day will ever come I know not. But never will I attempt to avert or to retard it. Whenever it comes, it will be the proudest day in English history. To have found a great people sunk in the lowest depths of slavery and superstition, to have so ruled them as to have made them desirous and capable of all the privileges of citizens, would indeed be a title to glory all our own. The sceptre may pass away from us. Unforeseen accidents may derange our most profound schemes of policy. Victory may be inconstant to our arms. But there are triumphs, which are followed by no reverse. There is an empire exempt from all natural causes of decay. Those triumphs are the pacific triumphs of reason over barbarism; that empire is the imperishable empire of our arts and our morals, our literature and our laws.

PAKISTAN OR THE PARTITION OF INDIA

By Dr. B.R. Ambedkar

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PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION

The problem of Pakistan has given a headache to everyone, more so to me than to anybody else. I cannot help recalling with regret how much of my time it has consumed when so much of my other literary work of greater importance to me than this is held up for want of it. I therefore hope that this second edition will also be the last I trust that before it is exhausted either the question will be settled or withdrawn.

There are four respects in which this second edition differs from the first.

*[f1] The first edition contained many misprints which formed the subject of complaints from many readers as well as reviewers. In preparing this edition, I have taken as much care as is possible to leave no room for complaint on this score. The first edition consisted only of three parts. Part V is an addition. It contains my own views on the various issues involved in the problem of Pakistan. It has been added because of the criticism levelled against the first edition that while I wrote about Pakistan I did not state what views I held on the subject. The present edition differs from the first in another respect. The maps contained in the first edition are retained but the number of appendices have been enlarged. In the first edition there were only eleven appendices. The present edition has twenty-five. To this edition I have also added an index which did not find a place in the first edition.

The book appears to have supplied a real want. I have seen how the thoughts, ideas and arguments contained in it have been pillaged by authors, politicians and editors of newspapers to support their sides. I am sorry they did not observe the decency of acknowledging the source even when they lifted not merely the argument but also the language of the book. But that is a matter I do not mind. I am glad that the book has been of service to

Indians who are faced with this knotty problem of Pakistan. The fact that Mr. Gandhi and Mr. Jinnah in their recent talks cited the book as an authority on the subject which might be consulted with advantage bespeaks the worth of the book.

The book by its name might appear to deal only with the X. Y. Z. of Pakistan. It does more than that. It is an analytical presentation of Indian history and Indian politics in their communal aspects. As such, it is intended to explain the A. B. C. of Pakistan also. The book is more than a mere treatise on Pakistan. The material relating to Indian history and Indian politics contained in this book is so large and so varied that it might well be called Indian Political What is What.

The book has displeased both Hindus as well as Muslims though the reasons for the dislike of the Hindus are different from the reasons for the dislike of the Muslims. I am not sorry' for this reception given to my book. That it is disowned by the Hindus and unowned by the Muslims is to me the best evidence that it has the vices of neither and that from the point of view of independence of thought and fearless presentation affects the book is not a party production.

Some people are sore because what I have said has hurt them. I have not, I confess, allowed myself to be influenced by fears of wounding either individuals or classes, or shocking opinions however respectable they may be. I have often felt regret in pursuing this course, but remorse never. Those whom I may have offended must forgive me, in consideration of the honesty and disinterestedness of my aim. I do not claim to have written dispassionately though I trust I have written without prejudice. It would be hardly possible—I was going to say decent—for an Indian to be calm when he talks of his country and thinks of the times. In dealing with the question of Pakistan my object has been to draw a perfectly accurate, and at the same time, a suggestive picture of the situation as I see it. Whatever points of strength and weakness I have discovered on either side I have brought them boldly forward. I have taken pains to throw light on the mischievous effects that are likely to proceed from an obstinate and impracticable course of action.

The witness of history regarding the conflict between the forces of the authority of the State and of anti-State nationalism within, has been uncertain, if not equivocal. As Prof. Friedmann* [f2] observes:—

" There is not a single modern State which has not, at one time or another, forced a recalcitrant national group to live under its authority. Scots, Bretons, Catalans, Germans, Poles, Czechs, Finns, all have, at some time or another, been compelled to accept the authority of a more powerful State whether they liked it or not. Often, as in Great Britain or France, force eventually led to co-operation and a co-ordination of State authority and national cohesion. But in many cases, such as those of Germany, Poland, Italy and a host of Central European and Balkan countries, the forces of Nationalism did not rest until they had thrown off the shackles of State Power and formed a State of their own "

In the last edition, I depicted the experience of countries in which the State engaged itself in senseless suppression of nationalism and weathered away in the attempt. In this edition I have added by way of contrast the experience of other countries to show that given the will to live together it is not impossible for diverse communities and even for diverse nations to live in the bosom of one

State. It might be said that in tendering advice to both sides I have used terms more passionate than they need have been. If I have done so it is because I felt that the manner of the physician who tries to surprise the vital principle in each paralyzed organ in order to goad it to action was best suited to stir up the average Indian who is complacent if not somnolent, who is unsuspecting if not ill-informed, to realize what is happening. I hope my effort will have the desired effect.

I cannot close this preface without thanking Prof. Manohar B. Chitnis of the Khalsa College, Bombay, and Mr. K. V. Chitre for their untiring labours to remove all printer's and clerical errors that had crept into the first edition and to see that this edition is free from all such blemishes. I am also very grateful to Prof. Chitnis for the preparation of the Index which has undoubtedly enhanced the utility of the book.

1st January 1945,
22, Prithviraj Road,

B.R.AMBEDKAR
New Delhi.

PROLOGUE

It can rightly be said that the long introduction with which this treatise opens leaves no excuse for a prologue. But there is an epilogue which is affixed to the treatise. Having done that, I thought of prefixing a prologue, firstly, because an epilogue needs to be balanced by a prologue, and secondly, because the prologue gives me room to state in a few words the origin of this treatise to those who may be curious to know it and to impress upon the readers the importance of the issues raised in it. For the satisfaction of the curious it may be stated that there exists, at any rate in the Bombay Presidency, a political organization called the Independent Labour Party (abbreviated into I.L.P.) for the last three years. It is not an ancient, hoary organization which can claim to have grown grey in politics. The I.L.P. is not in its dotage and is not overtaken by senility, for which second childhood is given as a more agreeable name. Compared with other political organizations, the I.L.P. is a young and fairly active body, not subservient to any clique or interest. Immediately after the passing of the Lahore Resolution on Pakistan by the Muslim League, the Executive Council of the I.L.P. met to consider what attitude it should adopt towards this project of Pakistan. The Executive Council could see that there was underlying Pakistan an idea to which no objection could be taken. Indeed, the Council was attracted to the scheme of Pakistan inasmuch as it meant the creation of ethnic states as a solution of the communal problem. The Council, however, did not feel competent to pronounce at that stage a decided opinion on the issue of Pakistan. The Council, therefore, resolved to appoint a committee to study the question and make a report on it. The committee consisted of my self as the Chairman, and Principal M. V. Donde, B.A.; Mr. S. C. Joshi, M.A., LL.B., Advocate (O.S.), M.L.C.; Mr. R. R. Bhole, B.Sc., LL.B., M.L.A.; Mr. D. G. Jadhav, B.A., LL.B., M.L.A., and Mr. A. V. Chitre, B.A., M.L.A., all belonging to the I.L.P., as members of the committee. Mr. D. V. Pradhan, Member, Bombay Municipal Corporation, acted as Secretary to the committee. The committee asked me to prepare a report on Pakistan which I did. The same was submitted to the Executive Council of the I.L.P., which resolved that the report should be published. The treatise now published is that report.

The book is intended to assist the student of Pakistan to come to his own conclusion. With that object in view, I have not only assembled in this volume all the necessary and relevant data but have also added 14 appendices and 3 maps, which in my judgement, form an important accompaniment to the book.

It is not enough for the reader to go over the material collected in the following pages. He must also reflect over it. Let him take to heart the warning which Carlyle gave to Englishmen of his generation. He said:

"The Genius of England no longer soars Sunward, world-defiant, like an Eagle through the storms, "

mewing her mighty youth,'..... the Genius of England—much like a greedy Ostrich intent on provender and a whole skin; with its Ostrich-head stuck into whatever sheltering Fallacy there may be, and so awaits the issue. The issue has been slow; but it now seems to have been inevitable. No Ostrich, intent on gross terrene provender and sticking its head into Fallacies, but will be awakened one day—in a terrible a posteriori manner if not otherwise! Awake before it comes to that. Gods and men did us awake! The Voices of our Fathers, with thousand fold stern monition to one and all, bid us awake".

This warning, I am convinced, applies to Indians in their present circumstances as it once did to Englishmen, and Indians, if they pay no heed to it, will do so at their peril.

Now, a word for those who have helped me in the preparation of this report. Mr. M. G. Tipnis, D.C.E., (Kalabhuwan, Baroda), and Mr. Chhaganlal S. Mody have rendered me great assistance, the former in preparing the maps and the latter in typing the manuscript. I wish to express my gratitude to both for their work which they have done purely as a labour of love. Thanks are also due in a special measure to my friends Mr. B. R. Kadrekar and Mr. K. V. Chitre for their labours in undertaking the most uninteresting and dull task of correcting the proof and supervising the printing.

28th December, 1940,

'Rajagrah
14.

B.R. AMBEDKAR. Dadar, Bombay,

INTRODUCTION

The Muslim Leagued Resolution on Pakistan has called forth different reactions. There are some who look upon it as a case of political measles to which a people in the infancy of their conscious unity and power are very liable. Others have taken it as a permanent frame of the Muslim mind and not merely a passing phase and have in consequence been greatly perturbed.

The question is undoubtedly controversial. The issue is vital and there is no argument which has not been used in the controversy by one side to silence the other. Some argue that this demand for partitioning India into two political entities under separate national states staggers their imagination ; others are so choked with a sense of righteous indignation at this wanton attempt to break the unity of a country, which, it is claimed, has stood as one for centuries, that their rage prevents them from giving expression to their thoughts. Others think that it need not be taken seriously. They treat it as a trifle and try to destroy it by shooting into it similes and metaphors. " You don't cut your head to cure your headache," " you don't cut a baby into two because two women are engaged in fighting out a claim as to who its mother is," are some of the analogies which are used to prove the absurdity of Pakistan. In a controversy carried on the plane of pure sentiment, there is nothing surprising if a dispassionate student finds more stupefaction and less understanding, more heat and less light, more ridicule and less seriousness.

My position in this behalf is definite, if not singular. I do not think the demand for Pakistan is the result of mere political distemper, which will pass away with the efflux of time. As I read the situation, it seems to me that it is a characteristic in the biological sense of the term, which the Muslim body politic has developed in the same manner as an organism develops a characteristic. Whether it will survive or not, in the process of natural selection, must depend upon the forces that may become operative in the struggle for existence between Hindus and Musalmans. I am not staggered by Pakistan; I am not indignant about it ; nor do I believe that it can be smashed by shooting into it similes and metaphors. Those who believe in shooting it by similes should remember that nonsense does not cease to be nonsense because it is put in. rhyme, and that a metaphor is no argument though it be sometimes the gunpowder to drive one home and imbed it in memory. I believe that it would be neither wise nor possible to reject summarily a scheme if it has behind it the sentiment, if not the passionate support, of 90 p.c. Muslims of India. I have no doubt that the only proper attitude to Pakistan is to study it in all its aspects, to understand its implications and to form an intelligent judgement about it.

With all this, a reader is sure to ask : Is this book on Pakistan seasonable in the sense that one must read it, as one must eat the fruits of the season to keep oneself in health ? If it is seasonable, is it readable ? These are natural queries and an author, whose object is to attract readers, may well make use of the introduction to meet them.

As to the seasonableness of the book there can be no doubt. The way of looking at India by Indians themselves must be admitted to have undergone a complete change during the last 20 years. Referring to India Prof. Arnold Toynbee wrote in 1915—

" British statesmanship in the nineteenth century regarded India as a 'Sleeping Beauty,' whom Britain had a prescriptive right to woo when she awoke; so it hedged with thorns the garden where she lay, to safeguard her from marauders prowling in the desert without Now the princess is awake, and is claiming the right to dispose of her own hand, while the marauders have transformed themselves into respectable gentlemen diligently occupied in turning the desert into a garden too, but grievously impeded by the British thorn-hedge. When they politely request us to remove it, we shall do well to consent, for they will not make the demand till they feel themselves strong enough to enforce it, and in the tussle that will follow if we refuse, the sympathies of the Indian princess will not be on our side. now that she is awake, she wishes to walk abroad among her neighbours; she feels herself capable of rebuffing without our countenance any blandishments or threats they may offer her, and she is becoming as weary as they of the thorn-hedge that confines her to her garden.

"If we treat her with tact, India will never wish to secede from the spiritual brotherhood of the British Empire, but it is inevitable that she should lead a more and more independent life of her own, and follow the example of Anglo-Saxon Commonwealths by establishing direct relations with her neighbours....."

Although the writer is an Englishman, the view expressed by him in 1915 was the view commonly held by all Indians irrespective of caste or creed. Now that India the " Sleeping Beauty " of Prof. Toynbee is awake, what is the view of the Indians about her ? On this question, there can be no manner of doubt that those who have observed this Sleeping Beauty behave in recent years, feel she is a strange being quite different from the angelic princess that she was supposed to be. She is a mad maiden having a dual personality, half human, half animal, always in convulsions because of her two natures in perpetual conflict. If there is any doubt about her dual personality, it has now been dispelled by the Resolution of the Muslim League demanding the cutting up of India into two, Pakistan and Hindustan, so that these conflicts and convulsions due to a dual personality having been bound in one may cease forever, and so freed from each other, may dwell in separate homes congenial to their respective cultures, Hindu and Muslim.

It is beyond question that Pakistan is a scheme which will have to be taken into account. The Muslims will insist upon the scheme being considered. The British will insist upon some kind of settlement being reached between the Hindus and the Muslims before they consent to any devolution of political power. There is no use blaming the British for insisting upon such a settlement as a condition precedent to the transfer of power. The British cannot consent to settle power upon an aggressive Hindu majority and make it its heir, leaving it to deal with the minorities at its sweet pleasure. That would not be ending imperialism. It would be creating another imperialism. The Hindus, therefore, cannot avoid coming to grips with Pakistan, much as they would like to do.

If the scheme of Pakistan has to be considered, and there is no escape from it, then there are certain points which must be borne in mind.

The first point to note is that the Hindus and Muslims must decide the question themselves. They cannot invoke the aid of anyone else. Certainly, they cannot expect the British to decide it for them. From the point of view of the Empire, it matters very little to the British whether India remains one undivided whole, or is partitioned into two parts, Pakistan and Hindustan, or into twenty linguistic fragments as planned by the Congress, so long as all of them are content to live within the Empire. The British need not interfere for the simple reason that they are not affected by such territorial divisions.

Further, if the Hindus are hoping that the British will use force to put down Pakistan, that is impossible. In the first place, coercion is no remedy. The futility of force and resistance was pointed out by Burke long ago in his speeches relating to the coercion of the American colonies. His memorable words may be quoted not only for the benefit of the Hindu Maha Sabha but also for the

benefit of all. This is what he said:

" The use of force alone is temporary. It may endure a moment but it does not remove the necessity of subduing again : a nation is not governed which is perpetually to be conquered. The next objection to force is its uncertainty. Terror is not always the effect of force, and an armament is not a victory. If you do not succeed you are without resource; for conciliation failing, force remains; but force failing, no further hope of reconciliation is left. Power and Authority are sometimes bought by kindness, but they can never be begged as alms by an impoverished and defeated violence. A further objection to force is that you impair the object by your very endeavours to preserve it. The thing you fought for (to wit the loyalty of the people) is not the thing you recover, but depreciated, sunk, wasted and consumed in the contest."

Coercion, as an alternative to Pakistan, is therefore unthinkable.

Again, the Muslims cannot be deprived of the benefit of the principle of self-determination. The Hindu Nationalists who rely on self-determination and ask how Britain can refuse India what the conscience of the world has conceded to the smallest of the European nations, cannot in the same breath ask the British to deny it to other minorities. The Hindu Nationalist who hopes that Britain will coerce the Muslims into abandoning Pakistan, forgets that the right of nationalism to freedom from an aggressive foreign imperialism and the right of a minority to freedom from an aggressive majority's nationalism are not two different things; nor does the former stand on a more sacred footing than the latter. They are merely two aspects of the struggle for freedom and as such equal in their moral import. Nationalists, fighting for freedom from aggressive imperialism, cannot well ask the help of the British imperialists to thwart the right of a minority to freedom from the nationalism of an aggressive majority. The matter must, therefore, be decided upon by the Muslims and the Hindus alone. The British cannot decide the issue for them. This is the first important point to note.

The essence of Pakistan is the opposition to the establishment of one Central Government having supremacy over the whole of India. Pakistan contemplates two Central Governments, one for Pakistan and the other for Hindustan. This gives rise to the second important point which Indians must take note of. That point is that the issue of Pakistan shall have to be decided upon before the plans for a new constitution are drawn and its foundations are laid. If there is to be one Central Government for India, the design of the constitutional structure would be different from what it would be if there is to be one Central Government for Hindustan and another for Pakistan. That being so, it will be most unwise to postpone the decision. Either the scheme should be abandoned and another substituted by mutual agreement or it should be decided upon. It will be the greatest folly to suppose that if Pakistan is buried for the moment, it will never raise its head again. I am sure, burying Pakistan is not the same thing as burying the ghost of Pakistan. So long as the hostility to one Central Government for India, which is the ideology underlying Pakistan, persists, the ghost of Pakistan will be there, casting its ominous shadow upon the political future of India. Neither will it be prudent to make some kind of a make-shift arrangement for the time being, leaving the permanent solution to some future day. To do so would be something like curing the symptoms without removing the disease. But, as often happens in such cases, the disease is driven in, thereby making certain its recurrence, perhaps in a more virulent form.

I feel certain that whether India should have one Central Government is not a matter which can be taken as settled; it is a matter in issue and although it may not be a live issue now, some day it will be.

The Muslims have openly declared that they do not want to have any Central Government in India and they have given their reasons in the most unambiguous terms. They have succeeded in bringing into being five provinces which are predominantly Muslim in population. In these provinces, they see the possibility of the Muslims forming a government and they are anxious to see that the independence of the Muslim Governments in these provinces is preserved. Actuated by these considerations, the Central Government is an eyesore to the Muslims of India. As they visualize the scene, they see their Muslim Provinces made subject to a Central Government predominantly Hindu and endowed with powers of supervision over, and even of interference in, the administration of these Muslim Provinces. The Muslims feel that to accept one Central Government for the whole of India is to consent to place the Muslim Provincial Governments under a Hindu Central Government and to see the gain secured by the creation of Muslim Provinces lost by subjecting them to a Hindu Government at the Centre. The Muslim way of escape from this tyranny of a Hindu Centre is to have

no Central Government in India at all.*[\[f3\]](#)

Are the Musalmans alone opposed to the existence of a Central Government ? What about the Hindus ? There seems to be a silent premise underlying all political discussions that are going on among the Hindus that there will always be in India a Central Government as a permanent part of her political constitution. How far such a premise can be taken for granted is more than I can say. I may, however, point out that there are two factors which are dormant for the present but which some day may become dominant and turn the Hindus away from the idea of a Central Government.

The first is the cultural antipathy between the Hindu Provinces. The Hindu Provinces are by no means a happy family. It cannot be pretended that the Sikhs have any tenderness for the Bengalees or the Rajputs or the Madrasis. The Bengalee loves only himself. The Madrasi is bound by his own world. As to the Mahratta, who does not recall that the Mahrattas, who set out to destroy the Muslim Empire in India, became a menace to the rest of the Hindus whom they harassed and kept under their yoke for nearly a century. The Hindu Provinces have no common traditions and no interests to bind them. On the other hand, the differences of language, race, and the conflicts of the past have been the most powerful forces tending to divide them. It is true that the Hindus are getting together and the spirit moving them to become one united nation is working on them. But it must not be forgotten that they have not yet become a nation. They are in the process of becoming a nation and before the process is completed, there may be a setback which may destroy the work of a whole century.

In the second place, there is the financial factor. It is not sufficiently known what it costs the people of India to maintain the Central Government and the proportionate burden each Province has to bear.

The total revenue of British India comes to Rs. 194,64,17,926 per annum. Of this sum, the amount raised by the Provincial Governments from provincial sources, comes annually to Rs. 73,57,50,125 and that raised by the Central Government from central sources of revenue comes to Rs. 121,06,67,801. This will show what the Central Government costs the people of India. When one considers that the Central Government is concerned only with maintaining peace and does not discharge any functions which have relation to the progress of the people, it should cause no surprise if people begin to ask whether it is necessary that they should pay annually such an enormous price to purchase peace. In this connection, it must be borne in mind that the people in the provinces are literally starving and there is no source left to the provinces to increase their revenue.

This burden of maintaining the Central Government, which the people of India have to bear, is most unevenly distributed over the different provinces. The sources of central revenues are (1) Customs, (2) Excise, (3) Salt, (4) Currency, (5) Posts and Telegraphs, (6) Income Tax and (7) Railways. It is not possible from the accounts published by the Government of India to work out the distribution of the three sources of central revenue, namely Currency, Posts and Telegraphs and Railways. Only the revenue raised from other sources can be worked out province by province. The result is shown in the following table :—

Provinces	Revenue raised by Provincial Government from provincial sources	Revenue raised by Central Government from central sources
	Rs.	Rs.
1 Madras	16,13,44,520	9,53,26,745
2 Bombay	12,44,59,553	22,53,44,247
3 Bengal	12,76,60,892	23,79,01,583
4 U.P.	12,79,99,851	4,05,53,030
5 Bihar	5,23,83,030	1,54,37,742
6 C. P. & Berar	4,27,41,280	31,42,682
7 Assam	2,58,48,474	1,87,55,967
8 Orissa	1,81,99,823	5,67,346
9 Punjab	11,35,86,355	1,18,01,385

10 N.W.F.P.	1,80,83,548	9,28,294
11 Sind	3,70,29,354	5,66,46,915

It will be seen from this table that the burden of maintaining the Central Government is not only heavy but falls unequally upon the different provinces. The Bombay Provincial Government raises Rs. 12,44,59,553; as against this, the Central Government raises Rs. 22,53,44,247 from Bombay. The Bengal Government raises Rs. 12,76,60,892; as against this, the Central Government raises Rs. 23,79,01,583 from Bengal. The Sind Government raises Rs. 3,70,29,354; as against this, the Central Government raises Rs. 5,66,46,915 from Sind. The Assam Government raises nearly Rs. 2 1/2 crores; but the Central Government raises nearly Rs. 2 crores from Assam. While such is the burden of the Central Government on these provinces, the rest of the provinces contribute next to nothing to the Central Government. The Punjab raises Rs. 11 crores for itself but contributes only Rs. 1 crore to the Central Government. In the N.W.F.P. the provincial revenue is Rs. 1,80,83,548; its total contribution to the Central Government however is only Rs. 9,28,294. U.P. raises Rs. 13 crores but contributes only Rs. 4 crores to the Centre. Bihar collects Rs. 5 crores for itself; she gives only 1 1/2 crores to the Centre. C.J.P. and Berar levy a total of 4 crores and pay to the Centre 31 lakhs.

This financial factor has so far passed without notice. But time may come when even to the Hindus, who are the strongest supporters of a Central Government in India, the financial considerations may make a greater appeal than what purely patriotic considerations do now. So, it is possible that some day the Muslims, for communal considerations, and the Hindus, for financial considerations, may join hands to abolish the Central Government.

If this were to happen, it is better if it happens before the foundation of a new constitution is laid down. If it happens after the foundation of the new constitution envisaging one Central Government were laid down, it would be the greatest disaster. Out of the general wreck, not only India as an entity will vanish, but it will not be possible to save even the Hindu unity. As I have pointed out, there is not much cement even among the Hindu Provinces, and once that little cement which exists is lost, there will be nothing with which to build up even the unity of the Hindu Provinces. It is because of this that Indians must decide, before preparing the plans and laying the foundations, for whom the constitutional structure is to be raised and whether it is temporary or permanent. After the structure is built as one whole, on one single foundation, with girders running through from one end to the other; if, thereafter, a part is to be severed from the rest, the knocking out of the rivets will shake the whole building and produce cracks in other parts of the structure which are intended to remain as one whole. The danger of cracks is greater, if the cement which binds them is, as in the case of India, of a poor quality. If the new constitution is designed for India as one whole and a structure is raised on that basis, and thereafter the question of separation of Pakistan from Hindustan is raised and the Hindus have to yield, the alterations that may become necessary to give effect to this severance may bring about the collapse of the whole structure. The desire of the Muslim Provinces may easily infect the Hindu Provinces and the spirit of disruption generated by the Muslim Provinces may cause all round disintegration.

History is not wanting in instances of constitutions threatened with disruption. There is the instance of the Southern States of the American Union. Natal has always been anxious to get out from the Union of South Africa and Western Australia recently applied, though unsuccessfully, to secede from the Australian Commonwealth.

In these cases actual disruption has not taken place and where it did, it was soon healed. Indians, however, cannot hope to be so fortunate. Theirs may be the fate of Czechoslovakia. In the first place, it would be futile to entertain the hope that if a disruption of the Indian constitution took place by the Muslim Provinces separating from the Hindu Provinces, it would be possible to win back the seceding provinces as was done in the U.S.A. after the Civil War. Secondly, if the new Indian constitution is a Dominion Constitution, even the British may find themselves powerless to save the constitution from such a disruption, if it takes place after its foundations are laid. It seems to be, therefore, imperative that the issue of Pakistan should be decided upon before the new constitution is devised.

If there can be no doubt that Pakistan is a scheme which Indians will have to resolve upon at the next revision of the constitution and if there is no escape from deciding upon it, then it would be a fatal mistake for the people to approach it without a proper understanding of the question. The ignorance of some of the Indian delegates to the Round Table Conference of constitutional law, I

remember, led Mr. Garvin of the *Observer* to remark that it would have been much better if the Simon Commission, instead of writing a report on India, had made a report on constitutional problems of India and how they were met by the constitutions of the different countries of the world. Such a report I know was prepared for the use of the delegates who framed the constitution of South Africa. This is an attempt to make good that deficiency and as such I believe it will be welcomed as a seasonable piece.

So much for the question whether the book is seasonable. As to the second question, whether the book is readable no writer can forget the words of Augustine Birrell when he said:

" Cooks, warriors, and authors must be judged by the effects they produce; toothsome dishes, glorious victories, pleasant books, these are our demands. We have nothing to do with ingredients, tactics, or methods. We have no desire to be admitted into the kitchen, the council, or the study. The cook may use her saucepans how she pleases, the warrior place his men as he likes, the author handle his material or weave his plot as best he can; when the dish is served we only ask. Is it good ?; when the battle has been fought. Who won ? ; when the book comes out. Does it read ?

" Authors ought not to be above being reminded that it is their first duty to write agreeably. Some very disagreeable men have succeeded in doing so, and there is, therefore, no need for anyone to despair. Every author, be he grave or gay, should try to make his book as ingratiating as possible. Reading is not a duty, and has consequently no business to be made disagreeable. Nobody is under any obligation to read any other man's book."

I am fully aware of this. But I am not worried about it. That may well apply to other books but not to a book on Pakistan. Every Indian must read a book on Pakistan, if not this, then some other, if he wants to help his country to steer a clear path.

If any book does not read well, i.e., its taste be not good, the reader will find two things in it which, I am sure, are good.

The first thing he will find is that the ingredients are good. There is in the book material which will be helpful and to gain access to which he will have to labour a great deal. Indeed, the reader will find that the book contains an epitome of India's political and social history during the last twenty years, which it is necessary for every Indian to know.

The second thing he will find is that there is no partisanship. The aim is to expound the scheme of Pakistan in all its aspects and not to advocate it. The aim is to explain and not to convert. It would, however, be a pretence to say that I have no views on Pakistan. Views I have. Some of them are expressed, others may have to be gathered. Two things, however, may well be said about my views. In the first place, wherever they are expressed, they have been reasoned out. Secondly, whatever the views, they have certainly not the fixity of a popular prejudice. They are really thoughts and not views. In other words, I have an open mind, though not an empty mind. A person with an open mind is always the subject of congratulations. While this may be so, it must, at the same time, be realized that an open mind may also be an empty mind and that such an open mind, if it is a happy condition, is also a very dangerous condition for a man to be in. A disaster may easily overtake a man with an empty mind. Such a person is like a ship without ballast and without a rudder. It can have no direction. It may float but may also suffer a shipwreck against a rock for want of direction. While aiming to help the reader by placing before him all the material, relevant and important, the reader will find that I have not sought to impose my views on him. I have placed before him both sides of the question and have left him to form his own opinion.

The reader may complain that I have been provocative in stating the relevant facts. I am conscious that such a charge may be levelled against me. I apologize freely and gladly for the same. My excuse is that I have no intention to hurt. I had only one purpose, that is, to force the attention of the indifferent and casual reader to the issue that is dealt with in the book. I ask the reader to put aside any irritation that he may feel with me and concentrate his thoughts on this tremendous issue : Which is to be, Pakistan or no Pakistan ?

PART I

[f1] * In the first edition there unfortunately occurred through oversight in proof correction a discrepancy between the population figures in the different districts of Bengal and the map showing the lay-out of Pakistan as applied to Bengal which had resulted in two districts which should have been included in the Pakistan area being excluded from it. In this edition, this error has been rectified and the map and the figures have been brought into conformity.

[f2] * *The Crisis of (he National State* (1943), p. 4.

[f3] * This point of view was put forth by Sir Muhammad Iqbal at the Third Round Table Conference.

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PART 1 : MUSLIM CASE FOR PAKISTAN

The Muslim Case for Pakistan is sought to be justified on the following grounds:—

- (i) What the Muslims are asking for is the creation of administrative areas which are ethnically more homogeneous.
- (ii) The Muslims want these homogeneous administrative areas which are predominantly Muslim to be constituted into separate States,
 - (a) because the Muslims by themselves constitute a separate nation and desire to have a national home, and
 - (b) because experience shows that the Hindus want to use their majority to treat the Muslims as though they were second-class citizens in an alien State.

This part is devoted to the exposition of these grounds.

CHAPTER I

WHAT DOES THE LEAGUE DEMAND ?

I

On the 26th of March 1940, Hindu India was startled to attention as it had never been before. On that day, the Muslim League at its Lahore Session passed the following Resolution :—

" 1. While approving and endorsing the action taken by the Council and the Working Committee of the All-India Muslim League as indicated in their resolutions dated the 27th of August, 17th and 18th of September and 22nd of October 1939 and 3rd of February 1940 on the constitutional issue, this Session of the All-India Muslim League emphatically reiterates that the Scheme of Federation embodied in the Government of India Act, 1935, is totally unsuited to, and unworkable in the peculiar conditions of this country and is altogether unacceptable to Muslim India;

" 2. It further records its emphatic view that while the declaration dated the 18th of October 1939 made by the Viceroy on behalf of His Majesty's Government is reassuring in as far as it declares that the policy and plan on which the Government of India Act, 1935, is based will be reconsidered in consultation with the various parties, interests and communities in India, Muslim India will not be satisfied unless the whole constitutional plan is reconsidered de novo and that no revised plan would be acceptable to the Muslims, unless it is framed with their approval and consent;

" 3. Resolved that it is the considered view of this Session of the All-India Muslim League that no constitutional plan would be workable in this country or acceptable to the Muslims unless it is designated on the following basic principle, viz. that geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so constituted with such territorial readjustments as may be necessary, that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority

as in the North-Western and Eastern Zones of India should be grouped to constitute "Independent States" in which the Constituent Units shall be autonomous and sovereign;

" 4. That adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards should be specifically provided in the constitution for minorities in these units and in the regions for the protection of their religious, cultural, economic, political, administrative and other rights, and interests in consultation with them ; and in other parts of India where the Musalmans are in a minority, adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards shall be specifically provided in the constitution for them and other minorities for the protection of their religious, cultural, economic, political, administrative and other rights, and interests in consultation with them ;

" 5. This Session further authorizes the Working Committee to frame a Scheme of Constitution in accordance with these basic principles, providing for the assumption Finally by the respective regions of all powers such as defence, external affairs, communication, customs, and such other matters as may be necessary."

What does this Resolution contemplate ? A reference to para 3 of the Resolution will show that the Resolution contemplates that the areas in which Muslims predominate shall be incorporated into independent States. In concrete terms, it means that the Punjab, the North-Western Frontier Province, Baluchistan and Sind in the North-West and Bengal in the East instead of remaining as the provinces of British India shall be incorporated as independent States outside of British India. This is the sum and substance of the Resolution of the Muslim League.

Does the Resolution contemplate that these Muslim provinces, after being incorporated into States, will remain each an independent sovereign State or will they be joined together into one constitution as members of a single State, federal or unitary ? On this point, the Resolution is rather ambiguous, if not self-contradictory. It speaks of grouping the zones into " Independent States in which the Constituent Units shall be autonomous and sovereign." The use of the term " Constituent Units " indicates that what is contemplated is a Federation. If that is so, then, the use of the word " sovereign " as an attribute of the Units is out of place. Federation of Units and sovereignty-of Units are contradictions. It may be that what is contemplated is a confederation. It is, however, not very material for the moment whether these Independent States are to form into a federation or a confederation. What is important is the basic demand, namely, that these areas are to be separated from India and formed into Independent States.

The Resolution is so worded as to give the idea that the scheme adumbrated in it is a new one. But, there can be no doubt that the Resolution merely resuscitates a scheme which was put forth by Sir Mahomed Iqbal in his Presidential address to the Muslim League at its Annual Session held at Lucknow in December 1930. The scheme was not then adopted by the League. It was, however, taken up by one Mr. Rehmat Ali who gave it the name, Pakistan, by which it is known. Mr. Rehmat Ali, M. A., LL.B., founded the Pakistan Movement in 1933. He divided India into two, namely, Pakistan and Hindustan. His Pakistan included the Punjab, N. W. F. Province, Kashmir, Sind and Baluchistan. The rest to him was Hindustan. His idea was to have an " independent and separate Pakistan " composed of five Muslim provinces in the North as an independent State. The proposal was circulated to the members of the Round Table Conference but never officially put forth. It seems an attempt was made privately to obtain the assent of the British Government, who, however, declined to consider it because they thought that this was a " revival of the old Muslim Empire." ¹[\[f.1\]](#)

The League has only enlarged the original scheme of Pakistan. It has sought to create one more Muslim State in the East to include the Muslims in Bengal and Assam. Barring this, it expresses in its essence and general outline the scheme put forth by Sir Mahomed Iqbal and propagated by Mr. Rehmat Ali. There is no name given to this new Muslim State in the East. This has made no difference in the theory and the issues involved in the ideology of Mr. Rehmat Ali. The only difficulty one feels is that the League, while enlarging the facets, has not christened the two Muslim States with short and sweet names as it might have been expected to do. That it did not do and we are left to carry on the discussion with two long jaw-breaking names of Muslim State in the West and Muslim State in the East. I propose to solve this difficulty by reserving the name Pakistan to express the ideology underlying the two-nation theory and its consequent effect, namely, partition, and by designating the two Muslim States in the North-West and North-East as Western Pakistan and Eastern Pakistan.

The scheme not only called Hindu India to attention but it shocked Hindu India. Now it is natural to ask, what is there that is new or shocking in this scheme ?



Is the idea of linking up of the provinces in the North-West a shocking idea ? If so, let it be remembered that the linking of these provinces is an age-old project put forth by successive Viceroy, Administrators and Generals. Of the Pakistan provinces in the North-West, the Punjab and N. W. F. P. constituted a single province ever since the Punjab was conquered by the British in 1849. The two continued to be a single province till 1901. It was in 1901 that Lord Curzon broke up their unity and created the present two provinces. As to the linking up of the Punjab with Sind, there can be no doubt that had the conquest of Sind followed and not preceded the conquest of the Punjab, Sind would have been incorporated into the Punjab, for the two are not only contiguous but are connected by a single river which is the most natural tie between them. Although Sind was joined to Bombay, which in the absence of the Punjab was the only base from which it could be governed, the idea of disconnecting Sind from Bombay and joining it to the Punjab was not given up and projects in that behalf were put forth from time to time. It was first put forth during the Governor-Generalship of Lord Dalhousie; but for financial reasons, was not sanctioned by the Court of Directors. After the mutiny, the question was reconsidered but owing to the backward state of communications along the Indus, Lord Canning refused to give his consent. In 1876, Lord Northbrook was of the opinion that Sind should be joined to the Punjab. In 1877, Lord Lytton, who succeeded Northbrook, sought to create a trans-indus province, consisting of the six frontier districts of the Punjab and of the transindus districts of Sind. This would have included the six Frontier districts of the Punjab, namely, Hazara, Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu (except the Cis-indus tracts), Dera Ismail Khan (with the same exception), Dera Ghazi Khan, and trans-Indus Sind (with the exception of Karachi). Lytton also proposed that Bombay should receive the whole or part of the Central Provinces, in order to compensate it for the loss of trans-indus Sind. These proposals were not acceptable to the Secretary of State. During the Vice-royalty of Lord Lansdowne (1888—94), the same project was revived in its original form, namely, the transfer of Sind to the Punjab, but owing to the formation of the Baluchistan Agency, Sind had ceased to be a Frontier district and the idea which was military in its motive, lost its force and Sind remained without being incorporated in the Punjab. Had the British not acquired Baluchistan and had Lord Curzon not thought of carving out the N. W. F. P. out of the Punjab, we would have witnessed long ago the creation of Pakistan as an administrative unit.

With regard to the claim for the creation of a National Muslim State in Bengal, again, there is nothing new in it. It will be recalled by many that in 1905, the province of Bengal and Assam was divided by the then Viceroy, Lord Curzon into two provinces :

(1) Eastern Bengal and Assam with Dacca as its capital and

(2) Western Bengal with Calcutta as its capital. The newly-created province of Eastern Bengal and Assam included Assam and the following districts of the old province of Bengal and Assam: (1) Dacca, (2) Mymensingh, (3) Faridpur, (4) Backergunge, (5) Tippera, (6) Noakhali, (7) Chittagong, (8) Chittagong Hill Tracts, (9) Rajshahi, (10) Dinajpur, (11) Jalpaiguri, (12) Rangpur, (13) Bogra, (14) Pabna and (15) Malda. Western Bengal included the remaining districts of the old Province of Bengal and Assam with the addition of the district of Sambalpur which was transferred from C. P. to Western Bengal.

This division of one province into two, which is known in Indian history as the Partition of Bengal, was an attempt to create a Muslim State in Eastern Bengal, inasmuch as the new province of Eastern Bengal and Assam was, barring parts of Assam, a predominantly Muslim area. But, the partition was abrogated in 1911 by the British who yielded to the Hindus, who were opposed to it and did not care for the wishes of the Muslims, as they were too weak to make themselves felt. If the partition of Bengal had not been annulled, the Muslim State in Eastern Bengal, instead of being a new project, would now have been 39 years old. ²[f.2]

III

Is the idea of separation of Pakistan from Hindustan shocking ? If so, let me recall a few facts which are relevant to the issue and which form the basic principles of the Congress policy. It will be remembered that as soon as Mr. Gandhi captured the Congress, he did two things to popularize it. The first thing he did was to introduce Civil Disobedience.

Before Mr. Gandhi's entry into the politics of India, the parties contending for power were the Congress, the Liberals and the Terrorists of Bengal. The Congress and the Liberals were really one party and there was no distinction between them such as divides them today. We can, therefore, safely say that there were only two parties in India, the Liberals and the Terrorists. In both, the conditions for admission were extremely difficult. In the Liberal Party, the condition for admission was not merely education but a high degree of learning. Without first establishing a reputation for study, one could never hope to obtain admission to the Liberal Party. It effectively excluded the uneducated from rising to political power. The Terrorists had prescribed the hardest test conceivable. Only those who were prepared to give their lives for the cause, not in the sense of dedicating them but in the sense of dying for

it, could become members of their organization. No knave could, therefore, get an entry into the Terrorists' organization. Civil disobedience does not require learning. It does not call for the shedding of life. It is an easy middle way for that large majority who have no learning and who do not wish to undergo the extreme penalty and at the same time obtain the notoriety of being patriots. It is this middle path which made the Congress more popular than the Liberal Party or the Terrorist Party.

The second thing Mr. Gandhi did was to introduce the principle of Linguistic Provinces. In the constitution that was framed by the Congress under the inspiration and guidance of Mr. Gandhi, India was to be divided into the following Provinces with the language and headquarters as given below :—

Province	Language	Headquarters
Ajmere-Merwara	Hindustani	Ajmere.
Andhra	Telegu	Madras.
Assam	Assamese	Gauhati
Bihar	Hindustani	Patna.
Bengal	Bengali	Calcutta.
Bombay (City)	Marathi-Gujarati	Bombay.
Delhi	Hindustani	Delhi.
Gujarat	Gujarati	Ahmedabad.
Kamatak	Kannada	Dharwar
Kerala	Malayalam	Calicut
Mahakosal	Hindustani	Jubbulpore
Maharashtra	Marathi	Poona.
Nagpur	Marathi	Nagpur.
N. W. F. P.	Pushtu	Peshawar.
Punjab	Punjabi	Lahore.
Sind	Sindhi	Karachi.
Tamil Nadu	Tamil	Madras.
United Provinces	Hindustani	Lucknow
Utkal	Oriya	Cuttack.
Vidarbha(Berar)	Marathi	Akola.

In this distribution no attention was paid to considerations of area, population or revenue. The thought that every administrative unit must be capable of supporting and supplying a minimum standard of civilized life, for which it must have sufficient area, sufficient population and sufficient revenue, had no place in this scheme of distribution of areas for provincial purposes. The determining factor was language. No thought was given to the possibility that it might introduce a disruptive force in the already loose structure of the Indian social life. The scheme was, no doubt, put forth with the sole object of winning the people to the Congress by appealing to their local patriotism. The idea of linguistic provinces has come to stay and the demand for giving effect to it has become so insistent and irresistible that the Congress, when it came into power, was forced to put it into effect. Orissa has already been separated from Bihar. ³[f.3] Andhra is demanding separation from Madras. Kamatak is asking for separation from Maharashtra. ⁴[f.4] The only linguistic province that is not demanding separation from Maharashtra is Gujarat Or rather, Gujarat has given up for the moment the idea of separation. That is probably because Gujarat has realized that union with Maharashtra is, politically as well as commercially, a better investment.

Be. that as it may, the fact remains that separation on linguistic basis is now an accepted principle with the Congress. It is no use saying that the separation of Karnatak and Andhra is based on a linguistic difference and that the claim to separation of Pakistan is based on a cultural difference. This is a distinction without difference. Linguistic difference is simply another name for cultural difference.

If there is nothing shocking in the separation of Karanatak and Andhra, what is there to shock in the demand for the separation of Pakistan ? If it is disruptive in its effect, it is no more disruptive than the separation of Hindu provinces such as Karnatak from Maharashtra or Andhra from Madras. Pakistan is merely another manifestation of a cultural unit demanding freedom for the growth of its own distinctive culture.

CHAPTER II

A NATION CALLING FOR A HOME

That there are factors, administrative, linguistic or cultural, which are the predisposing causes behind these demands for separation, is a fact which is admitted and understood by all. Nobody minds these demands and many are prepared to concede them. But, the Hindus say that the Muslims are going beyond the idea of separation and questions, such as what has led them to take this course, why are they asking for partition, for the annulment of the common tie by a legal divorce between Pakistan and Hindustan, are being raised.

The answer is to be found in the declaration made by the Muslim League in its Resolution that the Muslims of India are a separate nation. It is this declaration by the Muslim League, which is both resented and ridiculed by the Hindus.

The Hindu resentment is quite natural. Whether India is a nation or not, has been the subject-matter of controversy between the Anglo-Indians and the Hindu politicians ever since the Indian National Congress was founded. The Anglo-Indians were never tired of proclaiming that India was not a nation, that 'Indians' was only another name for the people of India. In the words of one Anglo-Indian "to know India was to forget that there is such a thing as India." The Hindu politicians and patriots have been, on the other hand, equally persistent in their assertion that India is a nation. That the Anglo-Indians were right in their repudiation cannot be gainsaid. Even Dr. Tagore, the national poet of Bengal, agrees with them. But, the Hindus have never yielded on the point even to Dr. Tagore.

This was because of two reasons. Firstly, the Hindu felt ashamed to admit that India was not a nation. In a world where nationality and nationalism were deemed to be special virtues in a people, it was quite natural for the Hindus to feel, to use the language of Mr. H. G. Wells, that it would be as improper for India to be without a nationality as it would be for a man to be without his clothes in a crowded assembly. Secondly, he had realized that nationality had a most intimate connection with the claim for self-government. He knew that by the end of the 19th century, it had become an accepted principle that the people, who constituted a nation, were entitled on that account to self-government and that any patriot, who asked for self-government for his people, had to prove that they were a nation. The Hindu for these reasons never stopped to examine whether India was or was not a nation in fact. He never cared to reason whether nationality was merely a question of calling a people a nation or was a question of the people being a nation. He knew one thing, namely, that if he was to succeed in his demand for self-government for India, he must maintain, even if he could not prove it, that India was a nation.

In this assertion, he was never contradicted by any Indian. The thesis was so agreeable that even serious Indian students of history came forward to write propagandist literature in support of it, no doubt out of patriotic motives. The Hindu social reformers, who knew that this was a dangerous delusion, could not openly contradict this thesis. For, anyone who questioned it was at once called a tool of the British bureaucracy and enemy of the country. The Hindu politician was able to propagate his view for a long time. His opponent, the Anglo-Indian, had ceased to reply to him. His propaganda had almost succeeded. When it was about to succeed comes this declaration of the Muslim League— this rift in the lute. Just because it does not come from the Anglo-Indian, it is a deadlier blow. It destroys the work which the Hindu politician has done for years. If the Muslims in India are a separate nation, then, of course, India is not a nation. This assertion cuts the whole ground from under the feet of the Hindu politicians. It is natural that they should feel annoyed at it and call it a stab in the back.

But, stab or no stab, the point is, can the Musalmans be said to constitute a nation? Everything else is beside the point. This raises the question: What is a nation? Tomes have been written on the subject. Those who are curious may go through them and study the different basic conceptions as well as the different aspects of it. It is, however, enough to know the core of the subject and that can be set down in a few words. Nationality is a social feeling. It is a feeling of a corporate sentiment of oneness which makes those who are charged with it feel that they are kith and kin. This national feeling is a double edged feeling. It is at once a feeling of fellowship for one's own kith and kin and an anti-fellowship feeling for those who are not one's own kith and kin. It is a feeling of "consciousness of kind" which on the one hand binds together those who have it, so strongly that it over-rides all differences arising out of economic conflicts or social gradations and, on the other, severs them from those who are not of their kind. It is a longing not to belong to any other group. This is the essence of what is called a nationality and national feeling.

Now apply this test to the Muslim claim. Is it or is it not a fact that the Muslims of India are an exclusive group? Is it or is it not a fact that they have a consciousness of kind? Is it or is it not a fact that every Muslim is possessed by a longing to belong to his own group and not to any non-Muslim group?

If the answer to these questions is in the affirmative, then the controversy must end and the Muslim claim that they are a nation must be accepted without cavil.

What the Hindus must show is that notwithstanding some differences, there are enough affinities between Hindus and Musalmans to constitute them into one nation, or, to use plain language, which make Muslims and Hindus long to belong together.

Hindus, who disagree with the Muslim view that the Muslims are a separate nation by themselves, rely upon certain features of Indian social life which seem to form the bonds of integration between Muslim society and Hindu society.

In the first place, it is said that there is no difference of race between the Hindus and the Muslims. That the Punjabi Musalman and the Punjabi Hindu, the U. P. Musalman and the U. P. Hindu, the Bihar Musalman and the Bihar Hindu, the Bengal Musalman and the Bengal Hindu, the Madras Musalman and the Madras Hindu, and the Bombay Musalman and the Bombay Hindu are racially of one stock. Indeed there is more racial affinity between the Madras Musalman and the Madras Brahmin than there is between the Madras Brahmin and the Punjab Brahmin. In the second place, reliance is placed upon linguistic unity between Hindus and Muslims. It is said that the Musalmans have no common language of their own which can mark them off as a linguistic group separate from the Hindus. On the contrary, there is a complete linguistic unity between the two. In the Punjab, both Hindus and Muslims speak Punjabi. In Sind, both speak Sindhi. In Bengal, both speak Bengali. In Gujarat, both speak Gujarati. In Maharashtra, both speak Marathi. So in every province. It is only in towns that the Musalmans speak Urdu and the Hindus the language of the province. But outside, in the mofussil, there is complete linguistic unity between Hindus and Musalmans. Thirdly, it is pointed out that India is the land which the Hindus and Musalmans have now inhabited together for centuries. It is not exclusively the land of the Hindus, nor is it exclusively the land of the Mahomedans.

Reliance is placed not only upon racial unity but also upon certain common features in the social and cultural life of the two communities. It is pointed out that the social life of many Muslim groups is honeycombed with Hindu customs. For instance, the Avans of the Punjab, though they are nearly all Muslims, retain Hindu names and keep their genealogies in the Brahmanic fashion. Hindu surnames are found among Muslims. For instance, the surname Chaudhari is a Hindu surname but is common among the Musalmans of U.P. and Northern India. In the matter of marriage, certain groups of Muslims are Muslims in name only. They either follow the Hindu form of the ceremony alone, or perform the ceremony first by the Hindu rites and then call the Kazi and have it performed in the Muslim form. In some sections of Muslims, the law applied is the Hindu Law in the matter of marriage, guardianship and inheritance. Before the Shariat Act was passed, this was true even in the Punjab and the N. W. F. P. In the social sphere the caste system is alleged to be as much a part of Muslim society as it is of Hindu society. In the religious sphere, it is pointed out that many Muslim pirs had Hindu disciples ; and similarly some Hindu yogis have had Muslim chelas. Reliance is placed on instances of friendship between saints of the rival creeds. At Girota, in the Punjab, the tombs of two ascetics, Jamali Sultan and Diyal Bhawan, who lived in close amity during the early part of the nineteenth century, stand close to one another, and are revered by Hindus and Musalmans alike. Bawa Fathu, a Muslim saint, who lived about 1700 A.D. and whose tomb is at Ranital in the Kangra District, received the title of prophet by the blessing of a Hindu saint, Sodhi Guru Gulab Singh. On the other hand, Baba Shahana, a Hindu saint whose cult is observed in the Jang District, is said to have been the chela of a Muslim pir who changed the original name (Mihra), of his Hindu follower, into Mir Shah.

All this, no doubt, is true. That a large majority of the Muslims belong to the same race as the Hindus is beyond question. That all Mahomedans do not speak a common tongue, that many speak the same language as the Hindus cannot be denied. That there are certain social customs which are common to both cannot be gainsaid. That certain religious rites and practices are common to both is also a matter of fact. But the question is : can all this support the conclusion that the Hindus and the Mahomedans on account of them constitute one nation or these things have fostered in them a feeling that they long to belong to each other ?

There are many flaws in the Hindu argument. In the first place, what are pointed out as common features are not the result of a conscious attempt to adopt and adapt to each other's ways and manners to bring about social fusion. On the other hand, this uniformity is the result of certain purely mechanical causes. They are partly due to incomplete conversions. In a land like India, where the majority of the Muslim population has been recruited from caste and out-caste Hindus, the Muslimization of the convert was neither complete nor effectual, either from fear of revolt or because of the method of persuasion or insufficiency of preaching due to insufficiency of priests. There is, therefore, little wonder if great sections of the Muslim community here and there reveal their Hindu origin in their religious and social life. Partly it is to be explained as the effect of common environment to which both Hindus and Muslims have been subjected for centuries. A common environment is bound to produce common reactions, and reacting constantly in the same way to the same environment is bound to produce a common type. Partly are these common features to be explained as the remnants of a period of religious amalgamation between the Hindus and the Muslims inaugurated by the Emperor Akbar, the result of a dead past which has no present and no future.

As to the argument based on unity of race, unity of language and inhabiting a common country, the matter stands on a different footing. If these considerations were decisive in making or unmaking a nation, the Hindus would be right in saying that by reason of race, community of language and habitat the Hindus and Musalmans form one nation. As

a matter of historical experience, neither race, nor language, nor country has sufficed to mould a people into a nation. The argument is so well put by Renan that it is impossible to improve upon his language. Long ago in his famous essay on Nationality, Renan observed :—

" that race must not be confounded with nation. The truth is that . there is no pure race; and that making politics depend upon ethnographical analysis, is allowing it to be borne upon a chimera . . . Racial facts, important as they are in the beginning, have a constant tendency to lose their importance. Human history is essentially different from zoology. Race is not everything, as it is in the sense of rodents and felines."

Speaking about language, Renan points out that :—

" Language invites re-union ; it does not force it. The United States and England, Spanish America and Spain speak the same languages and do not form single nations. On the contrary, Switzerland which owes her stability to the fact that she was founded by the assent of her several parts counts three or four languages. In man there is something superior to language, —will. The will of Switzerland to be united, in spite of the variety of her languages,' is a much more important fact than a similarity of language, often obtained by persecution."

As to common country, Renan argued that :—

" It is no more the land than the race that makes a nation. The land provides a substratum, the field of battle and work; man provides the soul ; man is everything in the formation of that sacred thing which is called a people. Nothing of material nature suffices for it"

Having shown, that race, language, and country do not suffice to create a nation, Renan raises in a pointed manner the question, what more, then, is necessary to constitute a nation ? His answer may be given in his own words :—

" A nation is a living soul, a spiritual principle. Two things, which in truth are but one, constitute this soul, this spiritual principle. One is in the past, the other in the present. One is the common possession of a rich heritage of memories ; the other is the actual consent, the desire to live together, the will to preserve worthily the undivided inheritance which has been handed down. Man does not improvise. The nation, like the individual, is the outcome of a long past of efforts, and sacrifices, and devotion. Ancestor-worship is therefore, all the more legitimate ; for our ancestors have made us what we are. A heroic past, great men, glory,—I mean glory of the genuine kind,—these form the social capital, upon which a national idea may be founded. To have common glories in the past, a common will in the present; to have done great things together, to will to do the like again,—such are the essential conditions for the . making of a people. We love in proportion to the sacrifices we have consented to make, to the sufferings we have endured. We love the house that we have built, and will hand down to our descendant. The Spartan hymn, ' We are what you were ; we shall be what you are,' is in its simplicity the national anthem of every land.

" In the past an inheritance of glory and regrets to be shared, in the future a like ideal to be realised ; to have suffered, and rejoiced, and hoped together; all these things are worth more than custom houses in common, and frontiers in accordance with strategical ideas; all these can be understood in spite of diversities of race and language. I said just now, ' to have suffered together ' for indeed, suffering in common is a greater bond of union than joy. As regards national memories, mournings are worth more than triumphs; for they impose duties, they demand common effort."

Are there any common historical antecedents which the Hindus and Muslims can be said to share together as matters of pride or as matters of sorrow ? That is the crux of the question. That is the question which the Hindus must answer, if they wish to maintain that Hindus and Musalmans together form a nation. So far as this aspect of their relationship is concerned, they have been just two armed battalions warring against each other. There was no common cycle of participation for a common achievement. Their past is a past of mutual destruction—a past of mutual animosities, both in the political as well as in the religious fields. As Bhai Parmanand points out in his pamphlet called " The Hindu National Movement":—"In history the Hindus revere the memory of Prithvi Raj, Partap, Shivaji and, Beragi Bir, who fought for the honour and freedom of this land (against the Muslims), while the Mahomedans look upon the invaders of India, like Muhammad Bin Qasim and rulers like Aurangzeb as their national heroes." In the religious field, the Hindus draw their inspiration from the Ramayan, the Mahabharat, and the Geeta. The Musalmans, on the other hand, derive their inspiration from the Quran and the Hadis. Thus, the things that divide are far more vital than the things which unite. In depending upon certain common features of Hindu and Mahomedan social life, in relying upon common language, common race and common country, the Hindu is mistaking what is accidental and superficial for what is essential and fundamental. The political and religious antagonisms divide the Hindus and the Musalmans far more deeply than the so-called common things are able to bind them together. The prospects might perhaps be different if the past of the two communities can be forgotten by both, Renan points out the importance of forgetfulness as a factor in building up a nation :—

" Forgetfulness, and I shall even say historical error, form an essential factor in the creation of a nation; and thus it is that the progress of historical studies may often be dangerous to the nationality. Historical research, in fact, brings

back to light the deeds of violence that have taken place at the commencement of all political formations, even of those the consequences of which have been most beneficial. Unity is ever achieved by brutality. The union of Northern and Southern France was the result of an extermination, and of a reign of terror that lasted for nearly a hundred years. The king of France who was, if I may say so, the ideal type of a secular crystalliser, the king of France who made the most perfect national unity in existence, lost his prestige when seen at too close a distance. The nation that he had formed cursed him ; and today the knowledge of what he was worth, and what he did, belongs only to the cultured.

" It is by contrast that these great laws of the history of Western Europe become apparent. In the undertaking which the king of France, in part by his justice, achieved so admirably, many countries came to disaster. Under the crown of St. Stephen, Magyars and Slavs have remained as distinct as they were eight hundred years ago. Far from combining the different elements in its dominions, the house of Hapsburg has held them apart and often opposed to one another. In Bohemia, the Czech element and the German element are superimposed like oil and water in a glass. The Turkish policy of separation of nationalities according to religion has had much graver results. It has brought about the ruin of the East. Take a town like Smyrna or Salonica; you will find there five or six communities each with its own memories, and possessing among them scarcely anything in common. But the essence of the nation is, that all its individual members should have things in common; and also, that all of them should hold many things in oblivion. No French citizen knows whether he is a Burgundian, an Alan, or a Visigoth; every French citizen ought to have forgotten St. Bartholomew, and the massacres of the South in the thirteenth century. There are not ten families in France able to furnish proof of a French origin; and yet, even if such a proof were given it would be essentially defective, in consequence of a thousand unknown crosses, capable of deranging all genealogical systems."

The pity of it is that the two communities can never forget or obliterate their past. Their past is imbedded in their religion, and for each to give up its past is to give up its religion. To hope for this is to hope in vain.

In the absence of common historical antecedents, the Hindu view that Hindus and Musalmans form one nation falls to the ground. To maintain it is to keep up a hallucination. There is no such longing between the Hindus and Musalmans to belong together as there is among the Musalmans of India.

It is no use saying that this claim of the Musalmans being a nation is an after-thought of their leaders. As an accusation, it is true. The Muslims were hitherto quite content to call themselves a community. It is only recently that they have begun to style themselves a nation. But an accusation, attacking the motives of a person, does not amount to a refutation of his thesis. To say that because the Muslims once called themselves a community, they are, therefore, now debarred from calling themselves a nation is to misunderstand the mysterious working of the psychology of national feeling. Such an argument presupposes that wherever there exist a people, who possess the elements that go to the making up of a nation, there must be manifested that sentiment of nationality which is their natural consequence and that if they fail to manifest it for sometime, then that failure is to be used as evidence showing the unreality of the claim of being a nation, if made afterwards. There is no historical support for such a contention. As Prof. Toynbee points out :—

"It is impossible to argue a priori from the presence of one or even several of these factors to the existence of a nationality; they may have been there for ages and kindled no response and it is impossible to argue from one case to another; precisely the same group of factors may produce nationality here, and there have no effect."

This is probably due to the fact, as pointed out by Prof. Barker, that it is possible for nations to exist and even for centuries, in unreflective silence, although there exists that spiritual essence of a national life of which many of its members are not aware. Some such thing has no doubt happened in the case of the Musalmans. They were not aware of the fact that there existed for them the spiritual essence of a national life. This explains why their claim to separate nationality was made by them so late. But, it does not mean that the spiritual essence of a national life had no existence at all.

It is no use contending that there are cases where a sense of nationality exists but there is no desire for a separate national existence. Cases of the French in Canada and of the English in South Africa, may be cited as cases in point. It must be admitted that there do exist cases, where people are aware of their nationality, but this awareness does not produce in them that passion which is called nationalism. In other words, there may be nations conscious of themselves without being charged with nationalism. On the basis of this reasoning, it may be argued that the Musalmans may hold that they are a nation but they need not on that account demand a separate national existence ; why can they not be content with the position which the French occupy in Canada and the English occupy in South Africa ? Such a position is quite a sound position. It must, however, be remembered that such a position can only be taken by way of pleading with the Muslims not to insist on partition. It is no argument against their claim for partition, if they insist upon it.

Lest pleading should be mistaken for refutation, it is necessary to draw attention to two things. First, there is a difference between nationality and nationalism. They are two different psychological states of the human mind.

Nationality means

" consciousness of kind, awareness of the existence of that tie of kinship." Nationalism means " the desire for a separate national existence for those who are bound by this tie of kinship." Secondly, it is true that there cannot be nationalism without the feeling of nationality being in existence. But, it is important to bear in mind that the converse is not always true. The feeling of nationality may be present and yet the feeling of nationalism may be quite absent. That is to say, nationality does not in all cases produce nationalism. For nationality to flame into nationalism two conditions must exist. First, there must arise the " will to live as a nation. Nationalism is the dynamic expression of that desire. Secondly, there must be a territory which nationalism could occupy and make it a state, as well as a cultural home of the nation. Without such a territory, nationalism, to use Lord Acton's phrase, would be a " soul as it were wandering in search of a body in which to begin life over again and dies out finding none." The Muslims have developed a " will to live as a nation." For them nature has found a territory which they can occupy and make it a state as well as a cultural home for the new-born Muslim nation. Given these favourable conditions, there should be no wonder, if the Muslims say that they are not content to occupy the position which the French choose to occupy in Canada or the English choose to occupy in South Africa, and that they shall have a national home which they can call their own.

CHAPTER III

ESCAPE FROM DEGRADATION

"What justification have the Musalmans of India for demanding the partition of India and the establishment of separate Muslim States ? Why this insurrection ? What grievances have they ?"—ask the Hindus in a spirit of righteous indignation.

Anyone, who knows history, will not fail to realize that it has now been a well established principle that nationalism is a sufficient justification for the creation of a national state. As the great historian Lord Acton points out :—

" In the old European system, the rights of nationalities were neither recognised by Governments nor asserted by the people. The interest of the reigning families, not those of the nations, regulated the frontiers, and the administration was conducted generally without any reference to popular desires. Where all liberties were suppressed, the claims of national independence were necessarily ignored, and a princess, in the words of Fenelon, carried a monarchy in her wedding portion. "

Nationalities were at first listless. When they became conscious—

" They first rose against their conquerors in defence of their legitimate rulers. They refused to be governed by usurpers. Next came a time when they revolted because of the wrongs inflicted upon them by their rulers. The insurrections were provoked by particular grievances justified by definite complaints. Then came the French Revolution which effected a complete change. It taught the people to regard their wishes and wants as the supreme criterion of their right to do what they liked to do with themselves. It proclaimed the idea of the sovereignty of the people uncontrolled by the past and uncontrolled by the existing state. This text taught by the French Revolution became an accepted dogma of all liberal thinkers. Mill gave it his support. ' One hardly knows, ' says Mill, ' what any division of the human race should be free to do, if not to determine with which of the various collective bodies of human beings they choose to associate themselves.' "

He even went so far as to hold that—

" It is in general a necessary condition of free institutions that the boundaries of governments should coincide in the main with those of nationalities. "

Thus history shows that the theory of nationality is imbedded in the democratic theory of the sovereignty of the will of a people. This means that the demand by a nationality for a national state does not require to be supported by any list of grievances. The will of the people is enough to justify it.

But, if grievances must be cited in support of their claim, the Muslims say that they have them in plenty. They may be summed up in one sentence, that constitutional safeguards have failed to save them from the tyranny of the Hindu majority.

At the Round Table Conference, the Muslims presented their list of safeguards, which were formulated in the well-known fourteen points. The Hindu representatives at the Round Table Conference would not consent to them. There was an impasse. The British Government intervened and gave what is known as " the Communal decision ". By that decision, the Muslims got all their fourteen points. There was much bitterness amongst the Hindus against

the Communal Award. But, the Congress did not take part in the hostility that was displayed by the Hindus generally towards it, although it did retain the right to describe it as anti national and to get it changed with the consent of the Muslims. So careful was the Congress not to wound the feelings of the Muslims that when the Resolution was moved in the Central Assembly condemning the Communal Award, the Congress, though it did not bless it, remained neutral, neither opposing nor supporting it. The Mahomedans were well justified in looking upon this Congress attitude as a friendly gesture.

The victory of the Congress at the polls in the provinces, where the Hindus are in a majority, did not disturb the tranquillity of the Musalmans. They felt they had nothing to fear from the Congress and the prospects were that the Congress and the Muslim League would work the constitution in partnership. But, two years and three months of the Congress Government in the Hindu Provinces have completely disillusioned them and have made them the bitterest enemies of the Congress. The Deliverance Day celebration held on the 22nd December 1939 shows the depth of their resentment. What is worse, their bitterness is not confined to the Congress. The Musalmans, who at the Round Table Conference joined in the demand for Swaraj, are today the most ruthless opponents of Swaraj.

What has the Congress done to annoy the Muslims so much ? The Muslim League has asserted that under the Congress regime the Muslims were actually tyrannized and oppressed. Two committees appointed by the League are said to have investigated and reported on the matter. But apart from these matters which require to be examined by an impartial tribunal, there are undoubtedly two things which have produced the clash: (1) the refusal by the Congress to recognize the Muslim League as the only representative body of the Muslims, (2) the refusal by the Congress to form Coalition Ministries in the Congress Provinces.

On the first question, both the Congress and the League are adamant. The Congress is prepared to accept the Muslim League as one of the many Muslim political organizations, such as the Ahrars, the National Muslims and the Jamiat-ul-Ulema. But it will not accept the Muslim League as the only representative body of the Muslims. The Muslim League, on the other hand, is not prepared to enter into any talk unless the Congress accepts it as the only representative body of the Musalmans of India. The Hindus stigmatize the claim of the League as an extravagant one and try to ridicule it. The Muslims may say that if the Hindus would only stop to inquire how treaties between nations are made, they would realize the stupidity of their view. It may be argued that when a nation proceeds to make a treaty with another nation, it recognizes the Government of the latter as fully representing it. In no country does the Government of the day represent the whole body of people. Everywhere it represents only a majority. But nations do not refuse to settle their disputes because the Governments, which represent them, do not represent the whole people. It is enough if each Government represents a majority of its citizens. This analogy, the Muslims may contend, must apply to the Congress-League quarrel on this issue. The League may not represent the whole body of the Muslims but if it represents a majority of them, the Congress should have no compunction to deal with -it for the purpose of effecting a settlement of the Hindu-Muslim question. Of course, it is open to the Government of a country not to recognize the Government of another country where there is more than one body claiming to be the Government. Similarly, the Congress may not recognize the League. It must, however, recognize either the National Muslims or the Ahrars or the Jamiat-ul-Ulema and fix the terms of settlement between the two communities. Of course, it must act with the full knowledge as to which is more likely to be repudiated by the Muslims—an agreement with the League or an agreement with the other Muslim parties. The Congress must deal with one or the other. To deal with neither is not only stupid but mischievous. This attitude of the Congress only serves to annoy the Muslims and to exasperate them. The Muslims rightly interpret this attitude of the Congress as an attempt to create divisions among them with a view to cause confusion in their ranks and weaken their front.

On the second issue, the Muslim demand has been that in the cabinets there shall be included Muslim Ministers who have the confidence of the Muslim members in the Legislature. They expected that this demand of theirs would be met by the Congress if it came in power. But, they were sorely disappointed. With regard to this demand, the Congress took a legalistic attitude. The Congress agreed to include Muslims in their cabinets, provided they resigned from their parties, joined the Congress and signed the Congress pledge. This was resented by the Muslims on three grounds.

In the first place, they regarded it as a breach of faith. The Muslims say that this demand of theirs is in accordance with the spirit of the Constitution. At the Round Table Conference, it was agreed that the cabinets shall include representatives of the minority communities. The minorities insisted that a provision to that effect should be made a part of- the statute. The Hindus, on the other hand, desired that the matter should be left to be regulated by convention. A via media was found. It was agreed that the provision should find a place in the Instrument of Instructions to the

Governors of the provinces and an obligation should be imposed upon them to see that effect was given to the convention in the formation of the cabinets. The Musalmans did not insist upon making this provision a part of the statute because they depended upon the good faith of the Hindus. This agreement was broken by a party which had given the Muslims to understand that towards them its attitude would be not only correct but considerate.

In the second place, the Muslims felt that the Congress view was a perversion of the real scope of the convention. They rely upon the text of the clause ⁵[f.5] in the Instrument of Instructions and argue that the words " member of a minority community " in it can have only one meaning, namely, a person having the confidence of the community. The position taken by the Congress is in direct contradiction with the meaning of this clause and is indeed a covert attempt to break all other parties in the country and to make the Congress the only political party in the country. The demand for signing the Congress pledge can have no other intention. This attempt to establish a totalitarian state may be welcome to the Hindus, but it meant the political death of the Muslims as a free people.

This resentment of the Muslims was considerably aggravated when they found the Governors, on whom the obligation was imposed to see that effect was given to the convention, declining to act. Some Governors declined, because they were helpless by reason of the fact that the Congress was the only majority party which could produce a stable government, that a Congress Government was the only government possible and that there was no alternative to it except suspending the constitution. Other Governors declined, because they became active supporters of the Congress Government and showed their partisanship by praising the Congress or by wearing Khadi which is the official party dress of the Congress. Whatever be the reasons, the Muslims discovered that an important safeguard had failed to save them.

The Congress reply to these accusations by the Muslims is twofold. In the first place, they say that coalition cabinets are inconsistent with collective responsibility of the cabinets. This, the Muslims refuse to accept as an honest plea. The English people were the first and the only people, who made it a principle of their system of government. But even there it has been abandoned since. The English Parliament debated ⁶[f.6] the issue and came to the conclusion that it was not so sacrosanct as it was once held and that a departure from it need not necessarily affect the efficiency or smooth working of the governmental machine. Secondly, as a matter of fact, there was no collective responsibility in the Congress Government. It was a government by departments. Each Minister was independent of the other and the Prime Minister was just a Minister. For the Congress to talk about collective responsibility was really impertinent. The plea was even dishonest, because it is a fact that in the provinces where the Congress was in a minority, they did form Coalition Ministries without asking the Ministers from other parties to sign the Congress pledge. The Muslims are entitled to ask ' if coalition is bad, how can it be good in one place and bad in another ? '

The second reply of the Congress is that even if they take Muslim Ministers in their cabinet who have not the confidence of the

majority of the Muslims, they have not failed to protect their interests. Indeed they have done every thing to advance the interests of the Muslims. This no doubt rests on the view Pope held of government when he said :

" For forms of government let fools contest ; What is best administered is best. "

In making this reply, the Congress High Command seems to have misunderstood what the main contention of the Muslims and the minorities has been. Their quarrel is not on the issue whether the Congress has or has not done any good to the Muslims and the minorities. Their quarrel is on an issue which is totally different. Are the Hindus to be a ruling race and the Muslims and other minorities to be subject races under Swaraj ? That is the issue involved in the demand for coalition ministries. On that, the Muslims and other minorities have taken a definite stand. They are not prepared to accept the position of subject races.

That the ruling community has done good to the ruled is quite beside the point and is no answer to the contention of the minority communities that they refuse to be treated as a subject people. The British have done many good things in India for the Indians. They have improved their roads, constructed canals on more scientific principles, effected their transport by rail, carried their letters by penny post, flashed their messages by lightning, improved their currency, regulated their weights and measures, corrected their notions of geography, astronomy and medicine, and stopped their internal quarrels and effected some advancement in their material conditions. Because of these acts of good government, did anybody ask the Indian people to remain grateful to the British and give up their agitation for self-government ? Or because of these acts of social uplift, did the Indians give up their protest against being treated as a subject race by the British ? The Indians did nothing of the kind. They refused to be satisfied with these good deeds and continued to agitate for their right to rule themselves. This is as it should be. For, as was said by Curran,

the Irish patriot, no man can be grateful at the cost of his self-respect, no woman can be grateful at the cost of her chastity and no nation can be grateful at the cost of its honour. To do otherwise is to show that one's philosophy of life is just what Carlyle called ' pig philosophy '. The Congress High Command does not seem to realize that the Muslims and other minorities care more for the recognition of their self-respect at the hand of the Congress than for mere good deeds on the part of the Congress. Men, who are conscious of their being, are not pigs who care only for fattening food. They have their pride which they will not yield even for gold. In short " life is more than the meat ".

It is no use saying that the Congress is not a Hindu body. A body which is Hindu in its composition is bound to reflect the Hindu mind and support Hindu aspirations. The only difference between the Congress and the Hindu

Maha Sabha is that the latter is crude in its utterances and brutal in its actions while the Congress is politic and polite. Apart from this difference of fact, there is no other difference between the Congress and the Hindu Maha Sabha.

Similarly, it is no use saying that the Congress does not recognize the distinction between the ruler and the ruled. If this is so, the Congress must prove its bonafides by showing its readiness to recognize the other communities as free and equal partners. What is the test of such recognition? It seems to me that there can be only one—namely, agreeing to share power with the effective representatives of the minority communities. Is the Congress prepared for it? Everyone knows the answer. The Congress is not prepared to share power with a member of a community who does not owe allegiance to the Congress. Allegiance to the Congress is a condition precedent to sharing power. It seems to be a rule with the Congress that if allegiance to the Congress is not forthcoming from a community, that community must be excluded from political power.

Exclusion from political power is the essence of the distinction between a ruling race and a subject race; and inasmuch as the Congress maintained this principle, it must be said that this distinction was enforced by the Congress while it was in the saddle. The Musalmans may well complain that they have already suffered enough and that this reduction to the position of a subject race is like the proverbial last straw. Their decline and fall in India began ever since the British occupation of the country. Every change, executive, administrative, or legal, introduced by the British, has inflicted a series of blows upon the Muslim Community. The Muslim rulers of India had allowed the Hindus to retain their law in civil matters. But, they abrogated the Hindu Criminal Law and made the Muslim Criminal Law the law of the State, applicable to all Hindus as well as Muslims. The first thing the British did was to displace gradually the Muslim Criminal Law by another of their making, until the process was finally completed by the enactment of Macaulay's Penal Code. This was the first blow to the prestige and position of the Muslim community in India. This was followed by the abridgement of the field of application of the Shariat or the Muslim Civil Law. Its application was restricted to matters concerning personal relations, such as marriage and inheritance, and then only to the extent permitted by the British. Side by side came the abolition, in 1837, of Persian as the official language of the Court and of general administration and the substitution of English and the vernaculars in place of Persian. Then came the abolition of the Qazis, who, during the Muslim rule, administered the Shariat. In their places, were appointed law officers and judges, who might be of any religion but who got the right of interpreting Muslim Law and whose decisions became binding on Muslims. These were severe blows to the Muslims. As a result, the Muslims found their prestige gone, their laws replaced, their language shelved and their education shorn of its monetary value. Along with these came more palpable blows in the shape of annexation of Sind and Oudh and the Mutiny. The last, particularly, affected the higher classes of Muslims, who suffered enormously by the extensive confiscation of property inflicted upon them by the British, as a punishment for their suspected complicity in the Mutiny. By the end of the Mutiny, the Musalmans, high and low, were brought down by these series of events to the lowest depths of broken pride, black despair and general penury. Without prestige, without education and without resources, the Muslims were left to face the Hindus. The British, pledged the neutrality, were indifferent to the result of the struggle between the two communities. The result was that the Musalmans were completely worsened in the struggle. The British conquest of India brought about a complete political revolution in the relative position of the two communities. For six hundred years, the Musalmans had been the masters of the Hindus. The British occupation brought them down to the level of the Hindus. From masters to fellow subjects was degradation enough, but a change from the status of fellow subjects to that of subjects of the Hindus is really humiliation. Is it unnatural, ask the Muslims, if they seek an escape from so intolerable a position by the creation of separate national States, in which the Muslims can find a peaceful home and in which the conflicts between a ruling race and a subject race can find no place to plague their lives?

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[f.1] Halide Edib— Inside India, p. 355.

[f.2] Government of India Gazette Notification No. 2832, dated 1st September 1905. The two provinces became separate administrative units from 16th October 1905.

[f.3] This was done under the Government of India Act, 1935.

[f.4] Kamatak also wants some districts from the Madras Presidency.

[f.5]" In making appointments to his Council of Ministers, our Governor shall use his best endeavours to select his Ministers in the following manner, that is to say, to appoint in consultation with the person who in his judgement is

most likely to command a stable majority in the Legislature, those persons (including so far as practicable, members of important minority communities) who will best be in a position collectively to command the confidence of the Legislature. In so acting, he shall bear constantly in mind the need for fostering a sense of joint responsibility among his Ministers. "

[\[f.6\]](#)See the announcement on 22nd January 1932 by the British Prime Minister on the decision of the cabinet to agree to differ on the Tariff Question and the debate on it in Parliament.

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HINDU CASE AGAINST PAKISTAN

There seem to be three reasons present to the mind of the Hindus who are opposing this scheme of Pakistan. They object to the scheme :—

1. *Because it involves the breaking-up of the unity of India.*
2. *Because it weakens the defence of India.*
3. *Because it fails to solve the communal problem.*

Is there any substance in these objections ? This part is concerned with an examination of the validity of these objections.

CHAPTER IV

BREAK-UP OF UNITY

I

Before the Hindus complain of the destruction of the unity of India, let them make certain that the unity they are harping upon does exist. What unity is there between Pakistan and Hindustan?

Those Hindus, who maintain the affirmative, rely chiefly upon the fact that the areas which the Muslims want to be separated from India have always been a part of India. Historically this is, no doubt, true. This area was a part of India when Chandragupta was the ruler; it continued to be a part of India when Hsuan Tsang, the Chinese pilgrim,

visited India in the 7th century A. D. In his diary, Hsuan Tsang has recorded that India was divided into five divisions or to use his language, there were ' five Indies '¹[f.1] : (1) Northern India, (2) Western India, (3) Central India, (4) Eastern India and (5) Southern India and that these five divisions contained 80 kingdoms. According to Hsuan Tsang, Northern India comprised the Punjab proper, including Kashmir and the adjoining hill States with the whole of Eastern Afghanistan beyond the Indus, and the present Cis-Satlaj States to the west of the Sarasvati river. Thus, in Northern India there were included the districts of Kabul, Jallalabad, Peshawar, Ghazni and Bannu, which were all subject to the ruler of Kapisa, who was a Hindu Kshatriya and whose capital was most probably at Charikar, 27 miles from Kabul. In the Punjab proper, the hilly districts Taxila, Singhapura, Urasa, Punch and Rajaori, were subject to the Raja of Kashmir; while the whole of the plains, including Multan and Shorkot, were dependent on the ruler of Taki or Sangala, near Lahore. Such was the extent of the northern boundary of India at the time when Hsuan Tsang came on his pilgrimage. But as Prof. Toynbee points out :

" We must be on our guard against ' historical sentiment ', that is against arguments taken from conditions which once existed or were supposed to exist, but which are no longer real at the present moment They are most easily illustrated by extreme examples. Italian newspapers have described the annexation of Tripoli as recovering the soil of the Fatherland because it was once a province of the Roman Empire; and the entire region of Macedonia is claimed by Greek Chauvinists on the one hand, because it contains the site of Pella, the cradle of Alexandar the Great in the fourth century B.C. and by Bulgarians on the other, because Ochrida, in the opposite corner, was the capital of the Bulgarian Tzardom in the tenth century A. D., though the drift of time has buried the tradition of the latter almost as deep as the achievements of the ' Emathian Conqueror ' on which the modem Greek nationalists insist so strongly. "

The same logic applies here. Here also arguments are taken from conditions which once existed but which are no longer real and which omit to take into consideration later facts which history has to record during practically one thousand years—after the return of Hsuan Tsang.

It is true that when Hsuan Tsang came, not only the Punjab but what is now Afghanistan was part of India and further, the people of the Punjab and Afghanistan were either Vedic or Buddhist by religion. But what has happened since Hsuan Tsang left India ?

The most important thing that has happened is the invasion of India by the Muslim hordes from the north-west. The first Muslim invasion of India was by the Arabs who were led by Mahomammad Bin Qasim. It took place in 711 A. D. and resulted in the conquest of Sind. This first Muslim invasion did not result in a permanent occupation of the country because the Caliphate of Baghdad, by whose order and command the invasion had taken place, was obliged by the middle of the 9th century A. D. to withdraw ²[f.2] its direct control from this distant province of Sind. Soon after this withdrawal, there began a series of terrible invasions by Muhammad of Ghazni in 1001 A. D. Muhammad died in 1030 A. D., but within the short span of 30 years, he invaded India 17 times. He was followed by Mahomammad Ghori who began his career as an invader in 1173. He was killed in 1206. For thirty years had Muhammad of Ghazni ravaged India and for thirty years Mahomammad Ghori harried the same country in the same way. Then followed the incursions of the Moghul hordes of Chenghiz Khan. They first came in 1221. They then only wintered on the border of India but did not enter it. Twenty years after, they marched on Lahore and sacked it. Of their inroads, the most terrible was under Taimur in 1398. Then comes on the scene a new invader in the person of Babar who invaded India in 1526. The invasions of India did not stop with that of Babar. There occurred two more invasions. In 1738 Nadirshah's invading host swept over the Punjab like a flooded river " furious as the ocean ". He was followed by Ahmadshah Abdalli who invaded India in 1761, smashed the forces of the Mahrattas at Panipat and crushed for ever the attempt of the Hindus to gain the ground which they had lost to their Muslim invaders.

These Muslim invasions were not undertaken merely out of lust for loot or conquest. There was another object behind them. The expedition against Sind by Mahomammad bin Qasim was of a punitive character and was undertaken to punish Raja Dahir of Sind who had refused to make restitution for the seizure of an Arab ship at Debul, one of the sea-port towns of Sind. But, there is no doubt that striking a blow at the idolatry and polytheism of Hindus and establishing Islam in India was also one of the aims of this expedition. In one of his dispatches to Hajjaj, Mahomammad bin Qasim is quoted to have said :

" The nephew of Raja Dahir, his warriors and principal officers have been dispatched, and the infidels converted to Islam or destroyed. Instead of idol-temples, mosques and other places of worship have been created, the Kulbah it read, the call to prayers is raised, so that devotions are performed at staled hours. The Takbir and praise to the Almighty God are offered every morning and evening. " ³[f.3]

After receiving the above dispatch, which had been forwarded with the head of the Raja, Hajjaj sent the following reply to his general:

" Except that you give protection to all, great and small alike, make no difference between enemy and friend. God, says, ' Give no quarter to infidels but cut their throats '. Then know that this is the command of the great God. You shall not be too ready to grant protection, because it will prolong your work. After this give no quarter to any enemy except those who are of rank." ⁴[\[f.4\]](#)

Muhammad of Ghazni also looked upon his numerous invasions of India as the waging of a holy war. Al' Utbi, the historian of Muhammad, describing his raids writes :

" He demolished idol temples and established Islam. He captured cities, killed the polluted wretches, destroying the idolaters, and gratifying Muslims. ' He then returned home and promulgated accounts of the victories obtained for Islam. and vowed that every year he would undertake a holy war against Hind ⁵[\[f.5\]](#) . " Mahommed Ghori was actuated by the same holy zeal in his invasions of India. Hasan Nizami, the historian, describes his work in the following terms :

" He purged by his sword the land of Hind from the filth of infidelity and vice, and freed the whole of that country from the thorn of God-plurality and the impurity of idol-worship, and by his royal vigour and intrepidity left not one temple standing ⁶[\[f.6\]](#)

Taimur has in his Memoir explained what led him to invade India. He says:

" My object in the invasions of Hindustan is to lead a campaign against the infidels, to convert them to the true faith according to the command of Muhammad (on whom and his family be the blessing and peace of God), to purify the land from the defilement of misbelief and polytheism, and overthrow the temples and idols, whereby we shall be *Ghazis* and *Mujahids*, companions and soldiers of the faith before God. " ⁷[\[f.7\]](#)

These invasions of India by Muslims were as much invasions of India as they were wars among the Muslims themselves. This fact has remained hidden because the invaders are all lumped together as Muslims without distinction. But as a matter of fact, they were Tartars, Afghans and Mongols. Muhammad of Ghazni was a Tartar, Mahommed of Ghori was an Afghan, Taimur was a Mongol, Babar was a Tartar, while Nadirshah and Ahmadshah Abdalli were Afghans. In invading India, the Afghan was out to destroy the Tartar and the Mongol was out to destroy the Tartar as well as the Afghan. They were not a loving family cemented by the feeling of Islamic brotherhood. They were deadly rivals of one another and their wars were often wars of mutual extermination. What is, however, important to bear in mind is that with all their internecine conflicts they were all united by one common objective and that was to destroy the Hindu faith.

The methods adopted by the Muslim invaders of India are not less significant for the subsequent history of India than the object of their invasions.

Mahommed bin Qasim's first act of religious zeal was forcibly to circumcise the Brahmins of the captured city of Debul ; but on discovering that they objected to this sort of conversion, he proceeded to put all above the age of 17 to death, and to order all others, with women and children, to be led into slavery. The temple of the Hindus was looted, and the rich booty was divided equally among the soldiers, after one-fifth, the legal portion for the government, had been set aside.

Muhammad of Ghazni from the first adopted those plans that would strike terror into the hearts of the Hindus. After the defeat of Raja Jaipal A.D. 1001, Muhammad ordered that Jaipal " be paraded about in the streets so that his sons and chieftains might see him in that condition of shame, bonds and disgrace; and that fear of Islam might fly abroad through the country of the infidels. "

"The slaughtering of ' infidels' seemed to be one thing that gave Muhammad particular pleasure. In one attack on Chand Rai, in A. D. 1019, many infidels were slain or taken prisoners, and the Muslims paid no regard to booty until they had satiated themselves with the slaughter of the infidels and worshippers of the sun and fire. The historian naively adds that the elephants of the Hindu armies came to Muhammad of their own accord, leaving idols, preferring the service of the religion of Islam. " ⁸[\[f.8\]](#)

Not infrequently, the slaughter of the Hindus gave a great setback to the indigenous culture of the Hindus, as in the conquest of Bihar by Muhammad Bakhtyar Khilji. When he took Nuddea (Bihar) the Tabaquat-i-Nasiri informs us that:

" great plunder fell into the hands of the victors. Most of the inhabitants were Brahmins with shaven heads. They were put to death. Large number of books were found..... but none could explain their contents as all the men had been killed, the whole fort and city being a place of study. " ⁹[\[f.9\]](#)

Summing up the evidence on the point. Dr. Titus concludes :

" Of the destruction of temples and the desecration of idols we have an abundance of evidence. Mahommed bin Qasim carried out his plan of destruction systematically in Sind, we have seen, but he made an exception of the famous temple at Multan for purposes of revenue, as this temple was a place of resort for pilgrims, who made large gifts to the idol. Nevertheless, while he thus satisfied his avarice by letting the temple stand, he gave vent to his malignity by having a piece of cow's flesh tied around the neck of the idol.

" Minhaj-as-Siraj further tells how Mahommed became widely known for having destroyed as many as a thousand temples, and of his great feat in destroying the temple of Somnath and carrying off its idol, which he asserts was broken into four parts. One part he deposited in the Jami Masjid of Ghazni, one he placed at the entrance of the royal palace, the third he sent to Mecca, and the fourth to Medina. ¹⁰[\[f.10\]](#) "

It is said by Lane Poole that Muhammad of Ghazni " who had vowed that every year should see him wage a holy war against the infidels of Hindustan " could not rest from his idol-breaking campaign so long as the temple of Somnath remained inviolate. It was for this specific purpose that he, at the very close of his career, undertook his arduous march across the desert from Multan to Anhalwara on the coast, fighting as he went, until he saw at last the famous temple:

" There a hundred thousand pilgrims were wont to assemble, a thousand Brahmins served the temple and guarded its treasures, and hundreds of dancers and singers played before its gates. Within stood the famous linga, a rude pillar stone adorned with gems and lighted by jewelled candelabra which were reflected in rich hangings, embroidered with precious stones like stars, that decked the shrine..... Its ramparts were swarmed with incredulous Brahmins, mocking the vain arrogance of foreign infidels whom the God of Somnath would assuredly consume. The foreigners, nothing daunted, scaled the walls; the God remained dumb to the urgent appeals of his servants; fifty thousand Hindus suffered for their faith and the sacred shrine was sacked to the joy of the true believers. The great stone was cast down and its fragments were carried off to grace the conqueror's palace. The temple gates were setup at Ghazni and a million pounds worth of treasure rewarded the iconoclast " ¹¹[\[f.11\]](#) "

The work done by Muhammad of Ghazni became a pious tradition and was faithfully followed by those who came after him. In the words of Dr. Titus ¹²[\[f.12\]](#)

"Mahommed Ghori, one of the enthusiastic successors of Muhammad of Ghazni, in his conquest of Ajmir destroyed pillars and foundations of the idol-temples, and built in their stead mosques and colleges, and the precepts of Islam and the customs of the law were divulged and established. At Delhi, the city and its vicinity were freed from idols and idol worship, and in the sanctuaries of the images of the Gods mosques were raised by the worshippers of the one God.

" Qutb-ud-Din Aybak also is said to have destroyed nearly a thousand temples, and then raised mosques on their foundations. The same author states that he built the Jami Masjid, Delhi, and adorned it with the stones and gold obtained from the temples which had been demolished by elephants, and covered it with inscriptions (from the Quran) containing the divine commands. We have further evidence of this harrowing process having been systematically employed from the inscription extant over the eastern gateway of this same mosque at Delhi, which relates that the materials of 27 idol temples were used in its construction.

" Ala-ud-Din, in his zeal to build a second Minar to the Jami Masjid, to rival the one built by Qulb-ud-Din, is said by Amir Khusru not only to have dug stones out of the hills, but to have demolished temples of the infidels to furnish a supply. In his conquests of South India the destruction of temples was carried out by Ala-ud-Din as it had been in the north by his predecessors.

" The Sultan Firoz Shah, in his Futuhat, graphically relates how he treated Hindus who had dared to build new temples. ' When they did this in the city (Delhi) and the environs, in opposition to the law of the Prophet, which declares that such are not to be tolerated, under Divine guidance I destroyed these edifices. I killed these leaders of infidelity and punished others with stripes, until this abuse was entirely abolished and where infidels and idolaters worshipped idols, Musalmans now by God's mercy perform their devotions to the true God."

Even in the reign of Shah Jahan, we read of the destruction of the temples that the Hindus had started to rebuild, and the account of this direct attack on the piety of the Hindus is thus solemnly recorded in the Badshah-namah :

" It had been brought to the notice of His Majesty, says the historian, that during the late reign (of Akbar) many idol-temples had been begun but remained unfinished at Benares, the great stronghold of infidelity. The infidels were now desirous of completing them. His Majesty, the defender of the faith, gave orders that at Benares and throughout all his dominions in every place all temples that had been begun should be cast down. It was reported from the Province of Allahabad that 76 temples had been destroyed in the district of Benares. " ¹³[\[f.13\]](#)

It was left to Aurangzeb to make a final attempt to overthrow idolatry. The author of ' *Ma' athir-i-Alamgiri* dilates upon his efforts to put down Hindu teaching, and his destruction of temples in the following terms :

" In April, A. D. 1669, Aurangzib learned that in the provinces of Thatta, Multan and Benares, but especially in the latter, foolish Brahmins were in the habit of expounding frivolous books in their schools, and that learners, Muslims as well as Hindus, went there from long distances.... The ' Director of the Faith ' consequently issued orders to all the governors of provinces to destroy with a willing hand the schools and temples of the infidels; and they were enjoined to put an entire stop to the teaching and practising of idolatrous worship.. ...Later it was reported to his religious Majesty that the Government officers had destroyed the temple of Bishnath at Benares. " ¹⁴[\[f.14\]](#)

As Dr. Titus observes ¹⁵ [\[f.15\]](#) —

" Such invaders as Muhammad and Timur seem to have been more concerned with iconoclasm, the collection of booty, the enslaving of captives, and the sending of infidels to hell with the ' proselytizing sword ' than they were with the conversion of them even by force. But when rulers were permanently established the winning of converts became a matter of supreme urgency. It was a part of the stale policy to establish Islam as the religion of the whole land.

"Qutb-ud-Din, whose reputation for destroying temples was almost as great as that of Muhammad, in the latter part of the twelfth century and early years of the thirteenth, must have frequently resorted to force as an incentive to conversion. One instance may be noted: when he approached Koil (Aligarh) in A. D. 1194, ' those of the garrison who were wise and acute were converted to Islam, but the others were slain with the sword '.

" Further examples of extreme measures employed to effect a change of faith are all too numerous. One pathetic case is mentioned in the lime of the reign of Firoz Shah (A. D. 1351—1388). An old Brahmin of Delhi had been accused of worshipping idols in his house, and of even leading Muslim women to become infidels. He was sent for and his case placed before the judges, doctors, elders and lawyers. Their reply was that the provisions of the law were clear. The Brahmin must either become a Muslim or be burned. The true faith was declared to him and the right course pointed out, but he refused to accept it. Consequently he was burned by the order of the Sultan, and the commentator adds, ' Behold the Sultan's strict adherence to law and rectitude, how he would not deviate in the least from its decrees ' . "

Muhammad not only destroyed temples but made it a policy to make slaves of the Hindus he conquered. In the words of Dr. Titus:

" Not only was slaughter of the infidels and the destruction of their temples resorted to in earlier period of Islam's contact with India, but as we have seen, many of the vanquished were led into slavery. The dividing up of booty was one of the special attractions, to the leaders as well as to the common soldiers in these expeditions. Muhammad seems to have made the slaughter of infidels, the destruction of their temples, the capturing of slaves, and the plundering of the wealth of the people, particularly of the temples and the priests, the main object of his raids. On the occasion of his first raid he is said to have taken much booty ; and half a million Hindus, ' beautiful men and women ' , were reduced to slavery and taken back to Ghazni. " ¹⁶[\[f.16\]](#)

When Muhammad later took Kanauj, in A. D. 1017, he took so much booty and so many prisoners that * the fingers of those who counted them would have tired '. Describing how common Indian slaves had become in Ghazni and Central Asia after the campaign of A. D. 1019, the historian of the times says ¹⁷[\[f.17\]](#) :

"The number of prisoners may be conceived from the fact that each was sold for from two to ten dirhams. These were afterwards taken to Ghazni, and merchants came from far distant cities to purchase them ;.and the fair and the dark, the rich and the poor were commingled in one common slavery.

" In the year A.D. 1202, when Qulb-ud-Din captured Kalinjar, after the temples had been converted into mosques, and the very name of idolatry was annihilated, fifty thousand men came under the collar of slavery and the plain became black as pitch with Hindus. "

Slavery was the fate of those Hindus who were captured in the holy war. But, when there was no war the systematic abasement of the Hindus played no unimportant part in the methods adopted by the Muslim invaders. In the days of Ala-ud-Din, at the beginning of the fourteenth century, the Hindus had in certain parts given the Sultan much trouble. So, he determined to impose such taxes on them that they would be prevented from rising in rebellion.

" The Hindu was to be left unable to keep a horse to ride on, to carry arms, to wear fine clothes, or to enjoy any of the luxuries of life. " ¹⁸[\[f.18\]](#)

Speaking of the levy of Jizyah Dr. Titus says ¹⁹[\[f.19\]](#) "

" The payment of the Jizyah by the Hindus continued throughout the dominions of the sultans, emperors, and kings in various parts of India with more or less regularity, though often, the law was in force in theory only ; since it depended entirely on the ability of the sovereign to enforce his demands. But, finally, it was abolished throughout the Moghul Empire in the ninth year of the enlightened Akbar's reign (A. D. 1665), after it had been accepted as a fundamental part of Muslim government policy in India for a period of more than eight centuries. "

Lane Poole says that

" the Hindu was taxed to the extent of half the produce of his land, and had to pay duties on all his buffaloes, goats, and other milk-cattle. The taxes were to be levied equally on rich and poor, at so much per acre, so much per animal. Any collectors or officers taking bribes were summarily dismissed and heavily punished with sticks, pincers, the rack, imprisonment and chains. The new rules were strictly carried out, so that one revenue officer would string together 20 Hindu notables and enforce payment by blows. No gold or silver, not even the betelnut, so cheering and stimulative to pleasure, was to be seen in a Hindu house, and the wives of the impoverished native officials were reduced to taking service in Muslim families. Revenue officers came to be regarded as more deadly than the plague; and to be a government clerk was disgrace worse than death, in so much that no Hindu would marry his daughter to such a man. " ²⁰[\[f.20\]](#)

These edicts, says the historian of the period,

" were so strictly carried out that the *chaukidars* and *khuts* and *muqad-dims* were not able to ride on horseback, to find weapon, to wear fine clothes, or to indulge in betel. No Hindu could hold up his head. Blows, confinement in the stocks, imprisonment and chains were all employed to enforce payment. "

All this was not the result of mere caprice or moral perversion. On the other hand, what was done was in accordance with the ruling ideas of the leaders of Islam in the broadest aspects. These ideas were well expressed by the Kazi in reply to a question put by Sultan Ala-ud-Din wanting to know the legal position of the Hindus under Muslim law. The Kazi said :—

" They are called payers of tribute, and when the revenue officer demands silver from them they should without question, and with all humility and respect, tender gold. If the officer throws dirt in their mouths, they must without reluctance open their mouths wide to receive it.... The due subordination of the Dhimmi is exhibited in this humble payment, and by this throwing of dirt into their mouths. The glorification of Islam is a duty, and contempt for religion is vain. God holds them in contempt, for he says, ' Keep them in subjection '. To keep the Hindus in abasement is especially a religious duty, because they are the most inveterate enemies of the Prophet, and because the Prophet has commanded us to slay them, plunder them, and make them captive, saying, ' Convert them to Islam or kill them, and make them slaves, and spoil their wealth and properly '. No doctor but the great doctor (Hani-fah), to whose school we belong, has assented to the imposition of jizya on Hindus ; doctors of other schools allow no other alternative but ' Death or Islam '. " ²¹[\[f.21\]](#)

Such is the story of this period of 762 years which elapsed between the advent of Muhammad of Ghazni and the return of Ahmadshah Abdalli.

How far is it open to the Hindus to say that Northern India is part of Aryavarta ? How far is it open to the Hindus to say because once it belonged to them, therefore, it must remain for ever an integral part of India ? Those who oppose separation and hold to the ' historic sentiment ' arising out of an ancient fact that Northern India including Afghanistan was once part of India and that the people of that area were either Buddhist or Hindus, must be asked whether the events of these 762 years of incessant Muslim invasions, the object with which they were launched and the methods adopted by these invaders to give effect to their object are to be treated as though they were matters of no account ?

Apart from other consequences which have flowed from them these invasions have, in my opinion, so profoundly altered the ' culture and character of the northern areas, which it is now proposed to be included in a Pakistan, that there is not only no unity between that area and the rest of India but that there is as a matter of fact a real antipathy between the two.

The first consequence of these invasions was the breaking up of the unity of Northern India with the rest of India. After his conquest of Northern India, Muhammad of Ghazni detached it from India and ruled it from Ghazni. When Mahommed Ghori came in the field as a conqueror, he again attached it to India and ruled it from Lahore and then from Delhi. Hakim, the brother of Akbar, detached Kabul and Kandahar from Northern India. Akbar again attached

it to Northern India. They were again detached by Nadirshah in 1738 and the whole of Northern India would have been severed from India had it not been for the check provided by the rise of the Sikhs. Northern India, therefore, has been like a wagon in a train, which can be coupled or uncoupled according to the circumstances of the moment. If analogy is wanted, the case of Alsace-Lorraine could be cited. Alsace-Lorraine was originally part of Germany, like the rest of Switzerland and the Low Countries. It continued to be so till 1680, when it was taken by France and incorporated into French territory. It belonged to France till 1871, when it was detached by Germany and made part of her territory. In 1918, it was again detached from Germany and made part of France. In 1940, it was detached from France and made part of Germany.

The methods adopted by the invaders have left behind them their aftermath. One aftermath is the bitterness between the Hindus and the Muslims which they have caused. This bitterness, between the two, is so deep-seated that a century of political life has neither succeeded in assuaging it, nor in making people forget it. As the invasions were accompanied with destruction of temples and forced conversions, with spoliation of property, with slaughter,, enslavement and abasement of men, women and children, what wonder if the memory of these invasions has ever remained green, as a source of pride to the Muslims and as a source of shame to the Hindus ? But these things apart, this north-west corner of India has been a theatre in which a stern drama has been played. Muslim hordes, in wave after wave, have surged down into this area and from thence scattered themselves in spray over the rest of India. These reached the rest of India in thin currents. In time, they also receded from their farthest limits ; while they lasted, they left a deep deposit of Islamic culture over the original Aryan culture in this north-west corner of India which has given it a totally different colour, both in religious and political outlook. The Muslim invaders, no doubt, came to India singing a hymn of hate against the Hindus. But, they did not merely sing their hymn of hate and go back burning a few temples on the way. That would have been a blessing. They were not content with so negative a result. They did a positive act, namely, to plant the seed of Islam. The growth of this plant is remarkable. It is not a summer sapling. It is as great and as strong as an oak. Its growth is the thickest in Northern India. The successive invasions have deposited their ' silt ' more there than anywhere else, and have served as watering exercises of devoted gardeners. Its growth is so thick in Northern India that the remnants of Hindu and Buddhist culture are just shrubs. Even the Sikh axe could not fell this oak. Sikhs, no doubt , became the political masters of Northern India, but they did not gain back Northern India to that spiritual and cultural unity by which it was bound to the rest of India before HsuanTsang. The Sikhs coupled it back to India. Still, it remains like Alsace-Lorraine politically detachable and spiritually alien so far as the rest of India is concerned. It is only an unimaginative person who could fail to take notice of these facts or insist in the face of them that Pakistan means breaking up into two what is one whole.

What is the unity the Hindu sees between Pakistan and Hindustan ? If it is geographical unity, then that is no unity. Geographical unity is unity intended by nature. In building up a nationality on geographical unity, it must be remembered that it is a case where Nature proposes and Man disposes. If it is unity in external things, such as ways and habits of life, that is no unity. Such unity is the result of exposure to a common environment. If it is administrative unity, that again is no unity. The instance of Burma is in point. Arakan and Tenasserim were annexed in 1826 by the treaty of Yendabu. Pegu and Martaban were annexed in 1852. Upper Burma was annexed in 1886. The administrative unity between India and Burma was forged in 1826. For over 110 years that administrative unity continued to exist. In 1937, the knot that tied the two together was cut asunder and nobody shed a tear over it. The unity between India and Burma was not less fundamental. If unity is to be of an abiding character, it must be founded on a sense of kinship, in the feeling of being kindred. In short, it must be spiritual. Judged in the light of these considerations, the unity between Pakistan and Hindustan is a myth. Indeed, there is more spiritual unity between Hindustan and Burma than there is between Pakistan and Hindustan. And if the Hindus did not object to the severance of Burma from India, it is difficult to understand how the Hindus can object to the severance of an area like Pakistan, which, to repeat, is politically detachable from, socially hostile and spiritually alien to, the rest of India.

CHAPTER V

WEAKENING OF THE DEFENCES

How will the creation of Pakistan affect the question of the Defence of Hindustan ? The question is not a very urgent one. For, there is no reason to suppose that Pakistan will be at war with Hindustan immediately it is brought into being. Nevertheless, as the question is sure to be raised, it is better to deal with it.

The question may be considered under three heads: (1) Question of Frontiers, (2) Question of Resources and (3) Question of Armed Forces.

I

QUESTION OF FRONTIERS

It is sure to be urged by the Hindus that Pakistan leaves Hindustan without a scientific frontier. The obvious reply, of course, is that the Musalmans cannot be asked to give up their right to Pakistan, because it adversely affects the Hindus in the matter of their boundaries. But banter apart, there are really two considerations, which, if taken into account, will show that the apprehensions of the Hindus in this matter are quite uncalled for.

In the first place, can any country hope to have a frontier which may be called scientific? As Mr. Davies, the author of *North-West Frontier*, observes:

" It would be impossible to demarcate on the North-West of our Indian Empire a frontier which would satisfy ethnological, political and military requirements. To seek for a zone which traverses easily definable geographical features; which does not violate ethnic considerations by cutting through the territories of closely related tribes; and which at the same time serves as a political boundary, is Utopian."

As a matter of history, there has been no one scientific boundary for India and different persons have advocated different boundaries for India. The question of boundaries has given rise to two policies, the " Forward " Policy and the " Back to the Indus " Policy. The " Forward " Policy had a greater and a lesser intent, to use the language of Sir George Macmunn. In its greater intent, it meant active control in the affairs of Afghanistan as an *Etat Tampion* to India and the extension of Indian influence up to the Oxus. In its lesser intent, it was confined to the absorption of the tribal hills between the administered territory (*i.e.* the Province of N.-W.F.) and Afghanistan as defined by the Durand Line and the exercise of British control right up to that line. The greater intent of the Forward Policy, as a basis for a safe boundary for India, has long been abandoned. Consequently, there remain three possible boundary lines to choose from: (1) the Indus River, (2) the present administrative boundary of the N.-W. F. P. and (3) the Durand Line. Pakistan will no doubt bring the boundary of Hindustan Back to the Indus, indeed behind the Indus, to the Sutlej. But this " Back to the Indus " policy was not without its advocates. The greatest exponent, of the Indus boundary was Lord Lawrence, who was strongly opposed to any forward move beyond the trans-indus foot-hills. He advocated meeting any invader in the valley of the Indus. In his opinion, it would be an act of folly and weakness to give battle at any great distance from the Indus base ; and the longer the distance an invading army has to march through Afghanistan and the tribal country, the more harassed it would be. Others, no doubt, have pointed out that a river is a weak line of defence. But the principal reason for not retiring to the Indus boundary seems to lie elsewhere. Mr. Davies gives the real reason when he says that the

" ' Back to Indus ' cry becomes absurd when it is examined from the point of view of the inhabitants of the modern North-West Frontier Province. Not only would withdrawal mean loss of prestige, but it would also be a gross betrayal of those peoples to whom we have extended our beneficent rule."

In fact, it is no use insisting that any particular boundary is the safest, for the simple reason that geographical conditions are not decisive in the world today and modern technique has robbed natural frontiers of much of their former importance, even where they are mighty mountains, the broadest streams, widest seas or far stretching deserts.

In the second place, it is always possible for nations with no natural boundaries to make good this defect. Countries are not wanting which have no natural boundaries. Yet, all have made good the deficiencies of nature, by creating artificial fortifications as barriers, which can be far more impregnable than natural barriers. There is no reason to suppose that the Hindus will not be able to accomplish what other countries similarly situated have done. Given the resources, Hindus need have no fear for want of a naturally safe frontier.

II

QUESTION OF RESOURCES

More important than the question of a scientific frontier, is the question of resources. If resources are ample for the necessary equipment, then it is always possible to overcome the difficulties created by an unscientific or a weak frontier. We must, therefore, consider the comparative resources of Pakistan and Hindustan. The following figures are intended to convey an idea of their comparative resources:—

Resources of Pakistan

Provinces	Area	Population	Revenues ²² [f.22]
			Rs.
N.-W. F. P.	13,518	2,425,003	1,90,11,842
Punjab	91,919	23,551,210	12,53,87,730
Sind	46,378	3,887,070	9,56,76,269

Baluchistan ..	54,228	420,648	
Bengal	82,955	50,000,000	36,55,62,485
Total ..	288,998	80,283,931	60,56,38,326

Resources of Hindustan

Provinces	Area	Population	Revenues ²³ [f.23]
			Rs.
Ajmer-Merwara	2,711	560,292	21,00,000
Assam	55,014	8,622,251	4,46,04,441
Bihar	69,348	32,371,434	6,78,21,588
Bombay	77,271	18,000,000	34,98,03,800
C. P. & Berar	99,957	15,507,723	4,58,83,962
Coorg	1,593	163,327	11,00,000
Delhi	573	636,246	70,00,000
Madras	142,277	46,000,000	25,66,71,265
Orissa	32,695	8,043,681	87,67,269
U.P.	206,248	48,408,763	16,85,52,881
Total	607,657	178,513,919	96,24,05,206

These are gross figures. They are subject to certain additions and deductions. Revenues derived by the Central Government from Railways, Currency and Post and Telegraphs are not included in these figures, as it is not possible to ascertain how much is raised from each Province. When it is done, certain additions will have to be made to the figures under revenue. There can be no doubt that the share from these heads of revenue that will come to Hindustan, will be much larger than the share that will go to Pakistan. Just as additions will have to be made to these figures, so also deductions will have to be made from them. Most of these deductions will, of course, fall to the lot of Pakistan. As will be shown later, some portion of the Punjab will have to be excluded from the scheme of Western Pakistan. Similarly, some portion of Bengal will have to be excluded from the proposed Eastern Pakistan, although a district from Assam will have to be added to it. According to me, fifteen districts will have to be excluded from Bengal and thirteen districts shall have to be excluded from the Punjab. Sufficient data are not available to enable any one to give an exact idea of what would be the reduction in the area, population and revenue, that would result from the exclusion of these districts. One may, however, hazard the guess that so far as the Punjab and Bengal are concerned, their revenues would be halved. What is lost by Pakistan by this exclusion, will of course be gained by Hindustan. To put it in concrete terms, while the revenues of Western and Eastern Pakistan will be 60 crores *minus* 24 crores, i.e., 36 crores, the revenues of Hindustan will be about 96 crores *plus* 24 crores, i.e., 120 crores.

The study of these figures, in the light of the observations I have made, will show that the resources of Hindustan are far greater than the resources of Pakistan, whether one considers the question in terms of area, population or revenue. There need, therefore, be no apprehension on the score of resources. For, the creation of Pakistan will not leave Hindustan in a weakened condition.

III

QUESTION OF ARMED FORCES

The defence of a country does not depend so much upon its scientific frontier as it does upon its resources. But more than resources does it depend upon the fighting forces available to it.

What are the fighting forces available to Pakistan and to Hindustan ?

The Simon Commission pointed out, as a special feature of the Indian Defence Problem, that there were special areas which alone offered recruits to the Indian Army and that there were other areas which offered none or if at all, very few. The facts revealed in the following table, taken from the Report of the Commission, undoubtedly will come as a most disagreeable surprise to many Indians, who think and care about the defence of India :

Areas of Recruitment	Number of Recruits drawn
1 N.-W. Frontier Province	5,600
2 Kashmir	6,500
3 Punjab	86,000
4 Baluchistan	300
5 Nepal	19,000
6 United Provinces	16,500
7 Rajputana	7,000
8 Central India	200
9 Bombay	7,000
10 Central Provinces	100
11 Bihar & Orissa	300
12 Bengal	Nil
13 Assam	Nil
14 Burma	3,000
15 Hyderabad	700
16 Mysore	100
17 Madras	4,000
18 Miscellaneous	1,900
TOTAL	158,200

The Simon Commission found that this state of affairs was natural to India, and in support of it, cited the following figures of recruitment from the different Provinces of India during the Great War especially because " it cannot be suggested that any discouragement was offered to recruitment in any area ":

Province	Combatants Recruits Enlisted	Non-combatants Recruits Enlisted	Total
Madras Bombay	51,223	41,117	92,340
Bengal	41,272	30,211	71,483
United Provinces	7,117	51,935	59,052
Punjab	163,578	117,565	281,148
North-West Frontier	349,688	97,288	446,976
Baluchistan	32,181	13,050	45,231
Burma	1,761	327	2,088
Bihar and Orissa	14,094	4,579	18,673
Central Provinces	8,576	32,976	41,552
Assam	5,376	9,631	15,007
Ajmer-Marwar	942	14,182	15,124
Nepal	7,341	1,632	8,973
Total	58,904	-	58,904
	742,053	414,493	1,156,546



These data reveal in a striking manner that the fighting forces available for the defence of India mostly come from areas which are to be included in Pakistan. From this it may be argued, that without Pakistan, Hindustan cannot defend itself.

The facts brought out by the Simon Commission are, of course, beyond question. But they cannot be made the basis of a conclusion, such as is suggested by the Simon Commission, namely, that only Pakistan can produce soldiers and that Hindustan cannot. That such a conclusion is quite untenable will be seen from the following considerations.

In the first place, what is regarded by the Simon Commission as something peculiar to India is not quite so peculiar. What appears to be peculiar is not due to any inherent defect in the people. The peculiarity arises because of the policy of recruitment followed by the British Government for years past. The official explanation of this predominance in the Indian Army of the men of the North-West is that they belong to the Martial Classes. But Mr. Chaudhari ²⁴ [f.24] has demonstrated, by unimpeachable data, that this explanation is far from being true. He has shown that the predominance in the Army of the men of the North-West took place as early as the Mutiny of 1857, some 20 years before the theory of Martial and Non-martial Classes was projected in an indistinct form for the first time in 1879 by the Special Army Committee ²⁵ [f.25] appointed in that year, and that their predominance had nothing to do with their alleged fighting qualities but was due to the fact, that they helped the British to suppress the Mutiny in which the Bengal Army was so completely involved. To quote Mr. Chaudhari :

" The pre-Mutiny army *of* Bengal was essentially a Brahmin and Kshatriya army of the Ganges basin. All the three Presidency Armies of those days, as we have slated in the first part of this article, were in a sense quite representative of the military potentialities of the areas to which they belonged, though none of them could, strictly speaking, be correctly described as national armies of the provinces concerned, as there was no attempt to draw upon any but the traditional martial elements of the population. But they all got their recruits mainly from their natural areas of recruitment, *viz.*, the Madras Army from the Tamil and Telugu countries, the Bombay Army from Western India, and the Bengal Army from Bihar and U. P. and to a very limited extent from Bengal. There was no official restriction on the enrolment of men of any particular tribe or caste or region, provided they were otherwise eligible. Leaving aside for the moment the practice of the Bombay and the Madras Armies, the only exception to this general rule in the Bengal Army was that which applied to the Punjabis and Sikhs, who, inspite of their magnificent military traditions, were not given a fair representation in the Army of Northern India. Their

recruitment, on the contrary, was placed under severe restrictions by an order of the Government, which laid down that ' the number of Punjabis in a regiment is never to exceed 200, nor are more than 100 of them lobe Sikhs'. It was only the revolt of the Hindustani regiments of the Bengal Army that gave an opportunity to the Punjabis to rehabilitate themselves in the eyes of the British authorities. Till then, they remained suspect and under a ban, and the Bengal Army on the eve of the Mutiny was mainly recruited from Oudh, North and South Bihar, especially the latter, principally Shahabad and Bhojpur, the Doab of the Ganges and Jumna and Rohilkhund. The soldiers recruited from these areas were mostly high-caste men. Brahmins of all denominations, Kshatriyas, Rajputs and Ahirs. The average proportion in which these classes were enrolled in a regiment was: (1) Brahmin 7/24, (2) Rajputs 1/4, (3) Inferior Hindus 1/6, (4) Musalmans 1/6, (5) Punjabis 1/8.

"To this army, the area which now-a-days furnishes the greatest number of soldiers—the Punjab, Nepal, N.-W. F. Province, the hill tracts of Kumaon and Garhwal, Rajpulana,—furnished very few recruits or none at all. There was practical exclusion in it of all the famous fighting castes of India,—Sikhs, Gurkhas, Punjabi Musalmans, Dogras, Jats, Pathans, Garhwalis, Rajpulana Rajpuls, Kumaonis, Gujars, all the tribes and seels, in fact, which are looked upon today as atower of strength of the Indian Army. A single year and a single rebellion was, however, to change all this. The Mutiny, which broke out in 1857, blew up the old Bengal Army and brought into existence a Punjabized and barbarized army, resembling the Indian Army of today in broad lines and general proportions of its composition.

" The gaps created by the revolt of the Hindustani regiments (of the Bengal Army) were at once filled up by Sikhs and other Punjabis, and hillmen eager for revenge and for the loot of the cities of Hindustan. They had all been conquered and subjugated by the British with the help of the Hindustani soldiers, and in their ignorance, they regarded the Hindustanis, rather the handful of British, as their real enemies. This enmity was magnificently exploited by the British authorities in suppressing the Mutiny. When the news of the enlistment of Gurkhas reached Lord Dalhousie in England he expressed great satisfaction and wrote to a friend: ' Against the Oudh Sepoys they may confidently be expected to fight like devils'. And after the Mutiny, General Mansfield, the Chief of the Staff of the Indian Army, wrote about the Sikhs: ' It was not because they loved us, but because they hated Hindustan and haled the Bengal Army that the Sikhs had flocked to our standard instead of seeking the opportunity to strike again for their freedom. They wanted to revenge themselves and to gain riches by the plunder of Hindustani cities. They were not attracted by mere daily pay, it was rather the prospect of wholesale plunder and stamping on the heads of their enemies. In short, we turned to profit the *esprit de corps* of the old Khalsa Army of Ranjit Singh, in the manner which for a time would most effectually bind the Sikhs to us as long as the active service against their old enemies may last ".

" The relations thus established were in fact to last much longer. The services rendered by the Sikhs and Gurkhas during the Mutiny were not forgotten and henceforward the Punjab and Nepal had the place of honour in the Indian Army."

That Mr. Chaudhari is right when he says that it was the Mutiny of 1857 which was the real cause of the preponderance in the Indian Army of the men of the North-West is beyond the possibility of doubt. Equally incontrovertible is the view of Mr. Chaudhari that this preponderance of the men of the North-West is not due to their native superiority in fighting qualities, as the same is amply borne out by the figures which he has collected, showing the changes in the composition of the Indian Infantry before and after the Mutiny.

CHANGES IN THE COMPOSITION OF THE INDIAN INFANTRY

Percentage of men from different Paris

Year	North-West India		North-East India	South India	Burma
	Punjab, N.-W. F., Kashmir	Nepal, Garhwal, Kumaon	U. P, Bihar		
1856	Less than 10	Negligible	Not less than 90		Nil
1858	47	6	47		
1883	48	17	35		
1893	53	24	23		
1905	47	15	22	16	

1919	46	14.8	25.5	12	1.7
1930	58.5	22	11.0	5.5	3

These figures show that in 1856, one year before the Mutiny, the men from the North-West were a negligible factor in the Indian Army. But in 1858, one year after the Mutiny, they had acquired a dominant position which has never received a setback.

It will thus be seen that the distinction between Martial and Non-martial Classes, which was put forth for the first time in 1879, as a matter of principle, which was later on insisted upon as a matter of serious consideration by Lord Roberts ²⁶ [f.26] and which was subsequently recognised by Lord Kitchener as a principle governing recruitment to the Indian Army, had nothing to do with the origin of this preponderance of the men of the North-West in the Indian Army. No doubt, the accident that the people from North-West India had the good luck of being declared by the Government as belonging to the Martial Class, while most of the classes coming from the rest of India had the ill-luck of being declared Non-martial Classes had important consequences. Being regularly employed in the Army, the people of North-West India came to look upon service in the Army as an occupation with a security and a career which was denied to men from the rest of India. The large number of recruits drawn from North-West India, therefore, indicates nothing more than this—namely, owing to the policy of the British Government, service in the Army has become their occupation and if people in other parts of India do not readily come forth to enlist in the Army, the reason is that Government did not employ them in the Army. People follow their ancestral occupations whether they like it or not. When a people do not take to a new occupation it does not necessarily mean that they are not fit for it. It only means that it is not their ancestral occupation.

This division between Martial and Non-martial Classes is, of course, a purely arbitrary and artificial distinction. It is as foolish as the Hindu theory of caste, making birth instead of worth, the basis for recognition. At one time, the Government insisted that the distinction they had adopted was a real distinction and that in terms of fighting qualities, it meant so much fighting value. In fact, this was their justification for recruiting more men from the North-West of India. That this distinction has nothing to do with any difference in fighting qualities has now been admitted. Sir Phillip Chetwode, ²⁷[f27] late Commander-in-Chief of India, broadcasting from London on the constitution of the Indian Army, took pains to explain that the recruitment of a larger proportion of it from the Punjab, did not mean that the people of the Peninsula were without martial qualities. Sir Phillip Chetwode explained that the reason why men of the North were largely recruited for the Indian Army was chiefly climatic, as the men from the South cannot stand the extremes of heat and cold of North India. No race can be permanently without martial spirit. Martial spirit is not a matter of native instinct. It is a matter of training and anybody can be trained to it.

But apart from this, there is enough fighting material in Hindustan, besides what might be produced by special training. There are the Sikhs, about whose fighting equalities nothing need be said. There are the Rajputs who are even now included in the category of Martial Classes. In addition to these, there are the Mahrattas who proved their calibre as a fighting race during the last European War. Even the people of the Madras Presidency can be depended upon for military purposes. Speaking of the Madrasis as soldiers, General Sir Frederick P. Haines, at one time Commander-in-Chief in India, observed :

" It has been customary to declare that the Madras Army is composed of men physically inferior to those of the Bengal Army, and if stature alone be taken into consideration, this is true. It is also said that by the force of circumstances the martial feeling and the characteristics necessary to the real soldier are no longer to be found in its ranks. I feel bound to reject the above assertions and others which ascribe comparative inefficiency to Madras troops. It is true that in recent years they have seen but little service; for, with the exception of the sappers, they have been specially excluded from all participation in work in the field. I cannot admit for one moment that anything has occurred to disclose the fact that the Madras Sepoy is inferior as a fighting man. The facts of history warrant us in assuming the contrary. In drill training and discipline, the Madras Sepoy is inferior to none; while in point of health, as exhibited by returns, he compares favourably with his neighbours. This has been manifested by the sappers and their followers in the Khyber; and the sappers are of the same race as the Sepoys."

Hindustan need, therefore, have no apprehension regarding the supply of an adequate fighting force from among its own people. The separation of Pakistan cannot weaken her in that respect.

The Simon Commission drew attention to three features of the Indian Army, which struck them as being special and peculiar to India. It pointed out that the duty of the Army in India was two-fold; firstly, to prevent the independent tribes on the Indian side of the Afghan frontier from raiding the peaceful inhabitants of the plains below. Secondly, to protect India against invasion by countries lying behind and beyond this belt of unorganized territories. The Commission took note of the fact that from 1850 to 1922, there were 72 expeditions against the

independent tribes, an average of one a year, and also of the fact that in the countries behind and beyond this belt of unorganized territory, lies the direction from which, throughout the ages, the danger to India's territorial integrity has come. This quarter is occupied by " States which according to the Commission are not members of the League of Nations " and is, therefore, a greater danger to India now than before. The Commission insisted on emphasizing that these two facts constituted a peculiar feature of the problem of military defence in India and so far as the urgency and extent of the problem is concerned, they are " without parallel elsewhere in the Empire, and constituted a difficulty in developing self-government which never arose in any comparable degree in the case of the self-governing Dominions " .

As a second unique feature of the Indian Army, the Commission observed:

" The Army in India is not only provided and organized to ensure against external dangers of a wholly exceptional character: it is also distributed and habitually used throughout India for the purpose of maintaining or restoring internal peace. In all countries . . . the military is not normally employed in this way, and certainly is not organized for this purpose. But the case of India is entirely different. Troops are employed many times a year to prevent internal disorder and, if necessary, to quell it. Police forces, admirably organized as they are, cannot be expected in all cases to cope with the sudden and violent outburst of a mob driven frantic by religious frenzy. It is, therefore, well understood in India both by the police and by the military—and, what is even more to the point, by the public at large—that the soldiers may have to be sent for. . . This Use of the Army for the purpose of maintaining or restoring internal order was increasing rather than diminishing, and that on these occasions the practically universal request was for British troops. The proportion of the British to Indian troops allotted to this duty has in fact risen in the last quarter of a century. The reason, of course, is that the British soldier is a neutral, and is under no suspicion of favouring Hindus against Mahomedans or Mahomedans against Hindus Inasmuch as the vast majority of the disturbances which call for the intervention of the military have a communal or religious complexion, it is natural and inevitable that the intervention which is most likely to be authoritative should be that which has no bias, real or suspected, to either side. It is a striking fact in this connection that, while in regular units of the Army in India as a whole British soldiers are in a minority of about 1 to 21/2, in the troops allotted for internal security the preponderance is reversed, and for this purpose a majority of British troops is employed—in the troops car-marked (or internal security the proportion is about eight British to seven Indian soldiers."

Commenting upon this feature of the Indian Army the Commission said:

" When, therefore, one contemplates a future for India in which, in place of the existing Army organization, the country is defended and pacified by exclusively Indian units, just as Canada relies on Canadian troops and Ireland on Irish troops, it is essential to realize and bear in mind the dimensions and character of the Indian problem of internal order and the part which the British soldier at present plays (to the general satisfaction of the country-side) in supporting peaceful government."

The third unique feature of the Indian Army, which was pointed out by the Simon Commission, is the preponderance in it of the men from the North-West. The origin of this preponderance and the reasons underlying the official explanation given therefor have already been examined.

But, there is one more special feature of the Indian Army to which the Commission made no reference at all. The commission either ignored it or was not aware of it. It is such an important feature that it overshadows all the three features to which the Commission refers, in its importance and in its social and political consequences.

It is a feature which, if widely known, will set many people to think furiously. It is sure to raise questions which may prove insoluble and which may easily block the path of India's political progress—questions of far greater importance and complexity than those relating to Indianization of the Army.

This neglected feature relates to the communal composition of the Indian Army. Mr. Chaudhari has collected the relevant data in his articles, already referred to, which throws a flood of light on this aspect of the Indian Army. The following table shows the proportion of soldiers serving in the Indian Infantry, according to the area and the community from which they are drawn:

Changes in the Communal Composition of the Indian Army

Area and Communities	Percentage in 1914	Percentage in 1918	Percentage in 1919	Percentage in 1930
I. The Punjab, N.-W. F. P. and Kashmir	47	46.5	46	58.5
(1) Sikhs	19.2	17.4	15.4	13.58
(2) Punjabi Musalmans	11.1	11.3	12.4	22.6
(3) Pathans	6.2	5.42	4.54	6.35
II. Nepal, Kumaon, Garhwal	15	18.9	14.9	22.0
(1) Gurkhas	13.1	16.6	12.2	16.4
III. Upper India	22	22.7	25.5	11.0
(1) U.P.Rajputs	6.4	6.8	7.7	2.55
(2) Hindustani Musalmans	4.1	3.42	4.45	Nil
(3) Brahmins	1.8	1.86	2.5	Nil
IV. South India	16	11.9	12	5.5
(1) Mahrattas	4.9	3.85	3.7	5.33
(2) Madras! Musalmans	3.5	2.71	2.13	Nil
(3) Tamils	2.5	2.0	1.67	Nil
V. Burma				
(1) Burmans	Nil	Negligible	1.7	3.0

This table brings out in an unmistakable manner the profound changes which have been going on in the communal composition of the Indian Army particularly after 1919. They are (1) a phenomenal rise in the strength of the Punjabi Musalman and the Pathan, (2) a substantial reduction in the position of Sikhs from first to third, (3) the degradation of the Rajputs to the fourth place, and (4) the shutting out of the U. P. Brahmins, the Madras! Musalmans, and the Tamilians, both Brahmins and Non-Brahmins.

A further analysis of the figures for 1930, which discloses the communal composition of the Indian Infantry and Indian Cavalry, has been made by Mr. Chaudhari in the following table. ²⁸[\[f.28\]](#)

Communal Composition of the Indian Army in 1930

Class	Areas	Percentage in Infantry		Percentage in Cavalry
		Excluding Gurkhas	Including Gurkhas	
1. Punjabi Musalman	Punjab	27	22.6	14.28
2. Gurkhas	Nepal		16.4	
3. Sikhs	Punjab	16.24	13.58	23.81
4. Dogras	North Punjab and	11.4	9.54	9.53

	Kashmir			
5. Jats	Rajputana, U. P.,	9.5	7.94	19.06
	Punjab			
6. Pathans	N.-W. F. Province	7.57	6.35	4.76
7. Mahrattas	Konkan	6.34	5.33	
8. Garhwalis	Garhwal	4.53	3.63	
9. U. P. Rajputs	U. P.	3.04	2.54	
10. Rajputana Rajputs	Rajputana	2.8	2.35	
11. Kumaonis	Kumaon	2.44	2.05	
12. Gujars	N. E. Rajputana	1.52	1.28	
13. Punjabi Hindus	Punjab	1.52	1.28	
14. Ahirs	Do.	1.22	1.024	
15. Musalmans, Rajputs, Ranghars.	Neighbourhood of Delhi	1.22	1.024	7.14
16. Kaimkhanis	Rajputana			4.76
17. Kachins	Burma	1.22	1.024	
18. Chins	Do.	1.22	1.024	
19. Karens	Do.	1.22	1.024	
20. Dekhani Musalmans	Deccan			4.76
21. Hindustani Musalmans	U. P.			2.38

Reducing these figures in terms of communities, we get the following percentage as it stood in 1930 :—

Communities	Percentage in Infantry		Percentage -in Cavalry
	Including Gurkhas	Excluding Gurkhas	
1. Hindus and Sikhs	60.55	50.554	61.92
2. Gurkhas		16.4	
3. Muhammadans	35.79	29.974	30.08
4. Burmans	3.66	3.072	

These figures show the communal composition of the Indian Army. The Musalmans according to Mr. Chaudhari formed 36% of the Indian Infantry and 30% of the Indian Cavalry.

These figures relate to the year 1930. We must now find out what changes have taken place since then in this proportion.

It is one of the most intriguing things in the Military history of India that no information is available on this point after 1930. It is impossible to know what the proportion of the Muslims in the Indian Army at present is. There is no Government publication from which such information can be gathered. In the past, there was no dearth of publications giving this information. It is very surprising that they should have now disappeared, or if they do appear, that they should cease to contain this information. Not only is there no Government publication containing information on this point, but Government has refused to give any information on the point when asked by members of the Central Legislative Assembly. The following questions and answers taken from the proceedings of the Central Legislative Assembly show how Government has been strenuously combating every attempt to obtain information on the point :

There was an interpellation on 15th September 1938, when the following questions were asked and replies as stated below were given:—

Arrangements for the Defence of India. ²⁹[f.29]

Q. 1360: *Mr. Badri Dull Pande* (on behalf of Mr. Amarendra Nath Chattopadhyya).

- (a) x x x x
- (b) x x x x
- (c) x x x x

(d) How many Indians have been recruited during 1937 and 1938 as soldiers and officers during 1937-38 for the Infantry and Cavalry respectively? Amongst the soldiers and officers recruited, how many are Punjabi Sikhs, Pathans, Garhwalis, Mahrattas, Madrasis, Biharis, Bengalis and Hindustanis of the United Provinces and Gurkhas ?

(e) If none but the Punjabi Sikhs, Pathans and Garhwalis have been recruited, is it in contemplation of the Honourable Member to recruit from all the Provinces for the defence of India and give them proper military training ?

(f) Will the Defence Secretary be pleased to state if Provincial Governments will be asked to raise Provincial Regiments, trained and fully mechanised, for the defence of India? If not, what is his plan of raising an efficient army for the defence of India ?

Mr. C.M.G.Oglvie:

(a) The Honourable Member will appreciate that it is not in the public interest to disclose the details of such arrangements.

(b) 5 cadets and 33 Indian apprentices were recruited for the Indian Air Force during 1937-38.

(c) During 1937-38, 5 Indians have already been recruited to commissioned ranks in the Royal Indian Navy, 4 will be taken by competitive examination in October 1938, and 3 more by special examination of " Dufferin " cadets only. During the same period, 314 Indians were recruited to different non-commissioned categories in the Royal Indian Navy.

(d) During the year ending the 31st March 1938, 54 Indians were commissioned as Indian Commissioned Officers. They are now attached to British units for training, and it is not yet possible to say what proportion will be posted to infantry and cavalry, respectively. During the same period, 961 Indian soldiers were recruited for cavalry, and 7,970 for infantry. Their details by classes are not available at Army Headquarters and to call for them from the recruiting officers all over India would not justify the expenditure of time and labour involved.

(e) No.

(f) The reply to the first portion is in the negative. The reply to the second portion is that India already possesses an efficient army and so far as finances permit, every effort is made to keep it up-to-date in all respects. *Mr. S. Satyamurti:* With reference to the answers to clauses (d) and (e) of the question taken together, may I know whether the attention of Government has been drawn to statements made by many public men that the bulk of the army is from the Punjab and from one community ? Have Government considered those facts and will Government also consider the desirability of making the army truly national by extending recruitment to all provinces and communities, so as to avoid the danger present in all countries of a military dictatorship seizing political power ?

Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie : I am not sure how that arises from this question, but I am prepared to say that provincial boundaries do not enter into Government's calculations at all. The best soldiers are chosen to provide the best army for India and not for any province, and in this matter national considerations must come above provincial considerations. Where the bulk of best military material is found, there we will go to get it, and not elsewhere.

Mr. S. Saty'amurti : May I know whether the bulk of the army is from the Punjab and whether the Government have forgotten the experience of the brave exploits of men from my province not very long ago in the Indian Army, and may I know if Madrasis are practically kept out and many other provinces are kept out of the army altogether ?

Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie : Madras is not practically kept out of the army. Government gladly acknowledge the gallant services of the Madrasis in the army and they are now recruited to those Units where experience has proved them to be best. There are some 4,500 serving chiefly in the Sappers and Miners and Artillery.

Mr. S. Sayamurti : Out of a total of 120,000 ?

Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie : About that.

Mr. S. Satyamurti : May I take it, that, that is a proper proportion, considering the population of Madras, the revenue that Madras pays to the Central exchequer, and the necessity of having a national army recruited from all the provinces ?

Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie : The only necessity we recognise is to obtain the best possible army.

Mr. S. Satyamurti : May I know by what tests Government have come to the conclusion that provinces other than the Punjab cannot supply the best elements in the Indian Army ?

Mr. Ogilvie : By experience.

Dr. Sir Ziauddin Ahmed: May I ask if it is not a fact that all branches of Accounts Department are monopolised by the Madras and will Government immediately reduce the number in proportion to their numerical strength in India?

Mr. Ogilvie : I do not see how that arises from this question either, but the Government are again not prepared to sacrifice efficiency for any provincial cause.

Indian Regiment consisting of Indians belonging to Different Castes ³⁰[\[f.30\]](#)

Q. 1078 : *Mr. M. Anantasayanam Ayyangar* (on behalf of Mr. Manu Subedar):

(a) Will the Defence Secretary state whether any experiment has ever been made under British rule of having an Indian regiment consisting of Indians recruited from different provinces and belonging to the different castes and sections, such as Sikhs, Mahrattas, Rajputs, Brahmins and Muslims ?

(b) If the reply to part (a) be in the negative, can a statement of Government's policy in this regard be made giving reasons why it has not been considered proper to take such action ?

(c) Is His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief prepared to take up this matter with His Majesty's Government ?

(d) Are Government aware that in the University Corps and in the Bombay Scout Movement, and in the Police Forces of the country, there is no separation by caste or creed ?

Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie :

(a) No.

(b) Government regard it as a fundamental principle of organization that Military Sub-Units, such as companies and squadrons, must be homogeneous.

(c) No, for the reason just mentioned.

(d) Yes.

Mr. S. Satyamurti: May I know the meaning which Government attach to the word " homogeneous " ? Does it mean from the same province or the same community ?

Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie : It means that they must belong to the same class of persons.

Mr. S. Satyamurti : May I ask for some elucidation of this point ? Do they make distinction between one class and another ?

Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie : Certainly.

Mr. S. Satyamurti: On what basis ? Is it religious class or racial class or provincial class ? .

Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie : Neither. It is largely racial class.

Mr. S. Satyamurti: Which races are preferred and which are not preferred ?

Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie: I refer the Honourable Member to the Army List. *Recruitment to the Indian Army* ³¹[\[f.31\]](#)

Q. 1162: *Mr. Brojendra Narayan Chaudhary*: Will the Defence Secretary please state :—

(a) Whether the attention of Government has been drawn to the address of the Punjab's Premier, the Hon'ble Sir Sikander Hyat Khan to his brother soldiers, in these words : " No patriotic Punjabi would wish to impair Punjab's position of supremacy in the Army," as reported by the Associated Press of India in *the Hindustan Times* of the 5th September 1938; and

(b) Whether it is the policy of Government to maintain the supremacy of Punjabis in the army by continuing to recruit the major portion from the Punjab ; or to attempt recruitment of the Army from all the provinces without racial or provincial considerations ?

Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie :

(a) Yes.

(b) I refer the Honourable Member to replies I gave to the supplementary questions arising from starred question No. 1060 asked by Mr. Amarendra Nath Chattopadhyaya on 15th September 1938.

Mr. S. Satyamurti : With reference to the answer to part (a) of the question, my Honourable friend referred to previous answers. As far as I remember, they were not given after this statement was brought before this House. May I know if the Government of India have examined this statement of the Punjab Premier, " No patriotic Punjabi would wish to impair Punjab's position of supremacy in the Army" ? May I know whether Government have considered the dangerous implications of this statement and will they take steps to prevent a responsible Minister going about and claiming provincial or communal supremacy in the Indian Army, which ought to remain Indian first and Indian last ?

Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie : I can only answer in exactly the same words as I answered to a precisely similar question of the Hon'ble Member on the 15th September last. The policy of Government with regard to the recruitment has been repeatedly stated and is perfectly clear.

Mr. S. Satyamurti : That policy is to get the best material and I am specifically asking my Honourable friend—I hope he realises the implications of that statement of the Punjab Premier. I want to know whether the Government have examined the dangerous implications of any provincial Premier claiming provincial supremacy in the Indian Army and whether they propose to take any steps to correct this dangerous misapprehension ?

Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie : Government consider that there are no dangerous implications whatever but rather the reverse.

Mr. Satyamurti : Do Government accept the supremacy of any province or any community as desirable consideration, even if it is a fact, to be uttered by responsible public men and do not the Government consider that this will give rise to communal and provincial quarrels and jealousies inside the army and possibly a military dictatorship in this country ?

Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie : Government consider that none of these foreboding have any justification at all.

Mr. M. S. Aney : Do the Government subscribe to the policy implied in the statement of Sir Sikander Hyat Khan ?

Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie : Government's policy has been repeatedly stated and made clear.

Mr. M. S. Aney : Is it the policy that the Punjab should have its supremacy in the Army ?

Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie : The policy is that the best material should be recruited for the Army.

Mr. M. S. Aney : I again repeat the question. Is it the policy of Government that Punjab should have supremacy in the Army ?

Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie : I have repeatedly answered that question. The policy is that the Army should get the best material from all provinces and Government are quite satisfied that it has the best material at present.

Mr. M. S. Aney : Is it not, therefore, necessary that Government should make a statement modifying the policy suggested by Sir Sikander Hyat Khan ?

Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie : Government have no intention whatever of changing their policy in particular.

Another interpolation took place on 23rd November 1938 when the question stated below was asked :—

Recruitment to the Indian Army from the Central Provinces and Berar ³²[\[f.32\]](#)

Q. 1402 : Mr. Govind V. Deshmukh : Will the Defence Secretary please state :—

(a) The centres in the Central Provinces and Berar for recruiting men for the Indian Army ;

(b) The classes from which such men are recruited;

(c) The proportion of the men from the C. P. & Berar in the Army to the total strength of the Army, as well as to the population of these provinces ; and

(d) The present policy of recruitment, and if it is going to be revised; if not, why not?

Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie :

(a) There are no recruiting centres in the C. P. or Berar. Men residing in the C. P. are in the area of the Recruiting Officer, Delhi, and those of Berar in the area of the Recruiting Officer, Poona.

(b) Mahrattas of Berar are recruited as a separate class. Other Hindus and Mussalmans who are recruited from the C. P. and Berar are classified as " Hindus " or " Musalmans ", and are not entered under any class denomination.

(c) The proportion to the total strength of the Army is .03 per cent. and the proportion to the total male population of these provinces is .0004 per cent.

(d) There is at present no intention of revising the present policy, the reasons for which were stated in my reply to a supplementary question arising out of Mr. Satyamurti's starred question No. 1060, on the 15th September 1938, and in answer to part (a) of starred question No. 1086 asked by Mian Ghulam Kadir Muhammad Shahban on the same date, and in the reply of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief to the debates in the Council of State on the Honourable Mr. Sushil Kumar Roy Chaudhary's Resolution regarding military training for Indians on the 21st February 1938 and on the Honourable Mr. P. N. Saprú's Resolution on the recruitment of all classes to the Indian Army in April 1935.

This was followed by an interpellation on 6th February 1939, when the below mentioned question was asked :—

Recruitment to the Indian Army ³³[f.33]

Q. 729; Mr. S. Satyamurti: Will the Defence Secretary be pleased to state:

(a) Whether Government have since the last answer on this question reconsidered the question of recruiting to the Indian Army from all provinces and from all castes and communities;

(b) Whether they have come to any conclusion ;

(c) Whether Government will categorically state the reasons as to why other provinces and communities are not allowed to serve in the army ; and

(d) What are the tests by which they have come to the conclusion that other provinces and other communities than those from whom recruitment is made to the Indian Army to-day cannot come up to the standard of efficiency required of the Indian Army ?

Mr. C.M.G.Ogilvie:

(a) No.

(b) Does not arise.

(c) and

(d) The reasons have been categorically stated in my replies to starred questions Nos. 1060 and 1086 of 15th September 1938, No. 1162 of 20th September 1938 and No. 1402 of 23rd November 1938 and also in the replies of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in the Council of State to the debates on the Honourable Mr. P. N. Saprú's Resolution regarding recruitment of all classes to the Indian Army and the Honourable Mr. Sushil Kumar Roy Chaudhary's Resolution regarding Military training for Indians, on the 13th March 1935 and 21st February 1938 respectively.

This conspiracy of silence on the part of the Government of India, was quite recently broken by the Secretary of State for India, who came forward to give the fullest information on this most vital and most exciting subject, in

answer to a question in the House of Commons. From his answer given on 8th July 1943 we know the existing communal and provincial composition of the Indian Army to be as follows :—

1. Provincial Composition of the Indian Army

Province	Percentage	Province	Percentage
1. Punjab	50	7. Bengal Presidency	2
2. U. P.	15	8. C. P. & Berar	
3. Madras Presidency	10	9. Assam	5
4. Bombay Presidency	10	10. Bihar	
5. N. W. F. Province	5	11. Orissa	
6. Ajmere & Merwara	3	12. Nepal	8

II. Communal Composition of the Indian Army

1. Muslims	34 p.c.
2. Hindus & Gurkhas	50 p.c.
3. Sikhs	10 p.c.
4. Christians & The Rest	6 p.c.

The information given by the Secretary of State is indeed very welcome. But, this is the war-time composition of the Indian Army. The peace-time composition must be very different. It rested on the well-known distinction between the Martial and Non-Martial Races. That distinction was abolished during the War. There is, however, no certainty that it will not be revived now that peace has returned. What we want to know is the peacetime communal composition of the Indian Army. That still remains an unknown fact and a subject of speculation.

Some say that the normal pre-war proportion of Muslims was between 60 and 70 p.c. Others say that it is somewhere in the neighbourhood of 50 p.c. In the absence of exact information, one could well adopt the latter figure as disclosing the true situation especially, when on inquiry, it happens to be confirmed by those who are in a position to form some idea on the matter. Even if the proportion be 50% it is high enough to cause alarm to the Hindus. If this is true, it is a flagrant violation of well established principles of British Army policy in India, adopted after the Mutiny.

After the Mutiny, the British Government ordered two investigations into the organization of the Indian Army. The first investigation was carried out by the Peel Commission which was appointed in 1859. The second investigation was undertaken by a body, called the Special Army Committee, appointed in 1879 to which reference has already been made.

The principal question considered by the Peel Commission was to find out the weaknesses in the Bengal Army, which led to the Mutiny of 1857. The Peel Commission was told by witness after witness that the principal

weakness in the Bengal Army which mutinied was that

" In the ranks of the regular Army men stood mixed up as chance might befall. There was no separating by class and clan into companies..... In the lines, Hindu and Mahomedan, Sikh and Poorbeah were mixed up, so that each and all lost to some extent their racial prejudice and became inspired with one common sentiment." ³⁴[\[f.34\]](#)

It was, therefore, proposed by Sir John Lawrence that in organizing the Indian Army care should be taken " to preserve that distinctiveness which is so valuable, and while it lasts, makes the Mahomedan of one country despise, fear or dislike the Mahomedan of another; Corps should in future be provincial, and adhere to the geographical limits within which differences and rivalries are strongly marked. Let all races, Hindu or Mahomedan of one province be enlisted in one regiment and no others, and having created distinctive regiments, let us keep them so, against the hour of need. . . . By the system thus indicated two great evils are avoided : firstly, that community of feeling throughout the native army and that mischievous political activity and intrigue which results from association with other races and travel in other Indian provinces." ³⁵[\[f.35\]](#)

This proposal was supported by many military men before the Peel Commission and was recommended by it as a principle of Indian Army Policy. This principle was known as the principle of Class Composition.

The Special Army Committee of 1879 was concerned with quite a different problem. What the problem was, becomes manifest from the questionnaire issued by the Committee. The questionnaire included the following question :—

"If the efficient and available reserve of the Indian Army is considered necessary for the safety of the Empire, should it not be recruited and maintained from those parts of the country which give us best soldiers, rather than among the weakest and least warlike races of India, due regard, of course, being had to the necessity of not giving too great strength or prominence to any particular race or religious group and with due regard to the safety of the Empire ? "

The principal part of the question is obviously the necessity or otherwise of " not giving too great strength or prominence to any particular race or religious group ". On this question official opinion expressed before the Committee was unanimous.

Lt.-General H. J. Warres, Commander-in-Chief of the Bombay Army, stated:—

" I consider it is not possible to recruit the reserve of the Indian Army altogether from those parts of India which are said to produce best soldiers, without giving undue strength and prominence to the races and religions of these countries."

The Commander-in-Chief, Sir Frederick P. Haines, said:—

" Distinct in race, language and interests from the more numerous Army of Bengal, it is, in my opinion, eminently politic and wise to maintain these armies (the Madras and Bombay Armies) as a counterpoise to it, and I would in no way diminish their strength in order that a reserve composed of what is called ' the most efficient fighting men whom it is possible to procure ' may be established. If by this it is meant to replace Sepoys of Madras and Bombay by a reserve of men passed through the ranks of the Bengal Army and composed of the same classes of which it is formed, I would say, that anything more unwise or more impolitic could hardly be conceived."

The Lt-Governor of the Punjab also shared this view. He too declared that he was " opposed to having one recruiting field for the whole armies " in India. " It will be necessary," he added, " for political reasons, to prevent preponderance of one nationality."

The Special Committee accepted this view and recommended that the composition of the Indian Army should be so regulated that there should be no predominance of any one community or nationality in the Army.

These two principles have the governing principles of Indian Army policy. Having regard to the principle laid down by the Special Army Committee of 1879, the changes that have taken place in the communal composition of the Indian Army amount to a complete revolution. How this revolution was allowed to take place is beyond comprehension. It is a revolution which has taken place in the teeth of a well-established principle. The principle was really suggested by the fear of the growing predominance of the men of the North-West in the Indian Army and was invoked with the special object of curbing that tendency. The principle was not only enunciated as a rule of guidance but was taken to be rigorously applied. Lord Roberts, who was opposed to this principle because it set a limit upon the recruitment of his pet men of the North-West, had to bow to this principle during his regime as the Commander-in-Chief of India. So well was the principle respected that when in 1903, Lord Kitchener entered upon the project of converting fifteen regiments of Madras into Punjab regiments, he immediately setup a counterpoise

to the Sikhs and the Punjabi Musalmans by raising the proportion of the Gurkhas and the Pathans. As Sir George Arthur, his biographer, says:—

" The Government, mindful of the lesson taught by the Mutiny, was alive to the danger of allowing any one element in the Indian Army to preponderate unduly. An increase in the Punjabee infantry had as its necessary sequel a further recruitment of the valuable Gurkha material and the enlistment of more trans-border Pathans in the Frontier Militia."

That a principle, so unanimously upheld and so rigorously applied upto the period of the Great War, should have been thrown to the wind after the Great War, without ceremony and without compunction and in a clandestine manner, is really beyond comprehension. What is the reason which has led the British to allow so great a preponderance of the Muslims in the Indian Army ? Two explanations are possible. One is that the Musalmans really proved, in the Great War, that they were better soldiers than the Hindus. The second explanation is that the British have broken the rule and have given the Musalmans such a dominating position in the Army because they wanted to counteract the forces of the Hindu agitation for wresting political power from the hands of the British.

Whatever be the explanation, two glaring facts stand out from the above survey. One is that the Indian Army today is predominantly Muslim in its composition. The other is that the Musalmans who predominate are the Musalmans from the Punjab and the N. W. F. P. Such a composition of the Indian Army means that the Musalmans of the Punjab and the N. W. F. P. are made the sole defenders of India from foreign invasion. So patent has this fact become that the Musalmans of the Punjab and the N. W. F. P. are quite conscious of this proud position which has been assigned to them by the British, for reasons best known to them. For, one often hears them say that they are the ' gatekeepers ' of India. The Hindus must consider the problem of the defence of India in the light of this crucial fact.

How far can the Hindus depend upon these ' gate-keepers' to hold the gate and protect the liberty and freedom of India ? The answer to this question must depend upon who comes to force the gate open. It is obvious that there are only two foreign countries which are likely to force this gate from the North-West side of India, Russia or Afghanistan, the borders of both of which touch the border of India. Which of them will invade India and when, no one can say definitely. If the invasion came from Russia, it may be hoped that these gate-keepers of India will be staunch and loyal enough to hold the gate and stop the invader. But suppose the Afghans singly or in combination with other Muslim States march on India, will these gate-keepers stop the invaders or will they open the gates and let them in ? This is a question which no Hindu can afford to ignore. This is a question on which every Hindu must feel assured, because it is the most crucial question.

It is possible to say that Afghanistan will never think of invading India. But a theory is best tested by examining its capacity to meet the worst case. The loyalty and dependability of this Army of the Punjabi and N. W. F. P. Muslims can only be tested by considering how it will behave in the event of an invasion by the Afghans. Will they respond to the call of the land of their birth or will they be swayed by the call of their religion, is the question which must be faced if ultimate security is to be obtained. It is not safe to seek to escape from these annoying and discomforting questions by believing that we need not worry about a foreign invasion so long as India is under the protection of the British. Such a complacent attitude is unforgivable to say the least. In the first place, the last war has shown that a situation may arise when Great Britain may not be able to protect India, although, that is the time when India needs her protection most. Secondly, the efficiency of an institution must be tested under natural conditions and not under artificial conditions. The behaviour of the Indian soldier under British control is artificial. His behaviour when he is under Indian control is his natural behaviour. British control does not allow much play to the natural instincts and natural sympathies of the men in the Army. That is why the men in the Army behave so well. But that is an artificial and not a natural condition. That the Indian Army behaves well under British control is no guarantee of its good behaviour under Indian control. A Hindu must be satisfied that it will behave as well when British control is withdrawn.

The question how this army of the Punjabi and the N. W. F. P. Muslims will behave if Afghanistan invades India, is a very pertinent and crucial question and must be faced, however unpleasant it may be.

Some may say—why assume that the large proportion of Muslims in the Army is a settled fact and that it cannot be unsettled ? Those who can unsettle it are welcome to make what efforts they can. But, so far as one can see, it is not going to be unsettled. On the contrary, I should not be surprised if it was entered in the constitution, when revised, as a safeguard for the Muslim Minority. The Musalmans are sure to make this demand and as against the Hindus, the Muslims somehow always succeed. We must, therefore, proceed on the assumption that the composition of the Indian Army will remain what it is at present. The basis remaining the same, the question to be pursued remains what it was : Can the Hindus depend upon such an Army to defend the country against the invasion of Afghanistan ? Only the so-called Indian Nationalists will say * yes * to it. The boldest among the realists must stop to think before he can give an answer to the question. The realist must take note of the fact that the Musalmans look upon

the Hindus as Kaffirs, who deserve more to be exterminated than protected. The realist must take note of the fact that while the Musalman accepts the European as his superior, he looks upon the Hindu as his inferior. It is doubtful how far a regiment of Musalmans will accept the authority of their Hindu officers if they be placed under them. The realist must take note that of all the Musalmans, the Musalman of the North-West is the most disaffected Musalman in his relation with the Hindus. The realist must take note that the Punjabi Musalman is fully susceptible to the propaganda in favour of Pan-Islamism. Taking note of all these considerations, there can be very little doubt that he would be a bold Hindu who would say that in any invasion by Muslim countries, the Muslims in the Indian Army would be loyal and that there is no danger of their going over to the invader. Even Theodore Morrison ³⁶[f.36] writing in 1899, was of the opinion that—

" The views held by the Mahomedans (certainly the most aggressive and truculent of the peoples of India) are alone sufficient to prevent the establishment of an independent Indian Government Were the Afghan to descend from the north upon an autonomous India, the Mahomedans, instead of uniting with the Sikhs and the Hindus to repel him, would be drawn by all the ties of kinship and religion to join his flag."

And when it is recalled that in 1919 the Indian Musalmans who were carrying on the Khilafat movement actually went to the length of inviting the Amir of Afghanistan to invade India, the view expressed by Sir Theodore Morrison acquires added strength and ceases to be a matter of mere speculation.

How this Army composed of the Muslims of the Punjab and N. W. F. P. will behave in the case of an invasion by Afghanistan is not the only question which the Hindus are called upon to consider. There is another and equally important question on which the Hindus must ponder. That question is: Will the Indian Government be free to use this Army, whatever its loyalties, against the invading Afghans ? In this connection, attention must be drawn to the stand taken by the Muslim League. It is to the effect that the Indian Army shall not be used against Muslim powers. There is nothing new in this. This principle was enunciated by the Khilafat Committee long before the League. Apart from this, the question remains how far the Indian Muslims will, in future, make it their article of faith. That the League has not succeeded in this behalf against the British Government does not mean that it will not succeed against an Indian Government. The chances are that it will, because, however unpatriotic the principle may be from the standpoint of the Hindus, it is most agreeable to the Muslim sentiment and the League may find a sanction for it in the general support of the Muslim community in India. If the Muslim League succeeds in enforcing this limitation upon Indians right to use her fighting forces, what is going to be the position of the Hindus ? This is another question which the Hindus have to consider.

If India remains politically one whole and the two-nation mentality created by Pakistan continues to be fostered, the Hindus will find themselves between the devil and the deep sea, so far as the defence of India is concerned. Having an Army, they will not be free to use it because the League objects. Using it, it will not be possible to depend upon it because its loyalty is doubtful. This is a position which is as pathetic as it is precarious. If the Army continues to be dominated by the Muslims of the Punjab and the N. W. F. P., the Hindus will have to pay it but will not be able to use it and even if they were free to use it against a Muslim invader, they will find it hazardous to depend upon it. If the Hague view prevails and India does not remain free to use her Army against Muslim countries, then, even if the Muslims lose their predominance in the Army, India on account of these military limitations, will have to remain on terms of subordinate co-operation with the Muslim countries on her border, as do the Indian States under British paramountcy.

The Hindus have a difficult choice to make: to have a safe Army or a safe border. In this difficulty, what is the wisest course for the Hindus to pursue ? Is it in their interest to insist that the Muslim India should remain part of India so that they may have a safe border, or is it in their interest to welcome its separation from India so that they may have a safe Army ? The Musalmans of this area are hostile to the Hindus. As to this, there can be no doubt. Which is then better for the Hindus : Should these Musalmans *be without and against or should they be within and against* ? If the question is asked to any prudent man, there will be only one answer, namely, that if the Musalmans are to be against the Hindus, it is better that they should be without and against, rather than within and against. Indeed, it is a consummation devoutly to be wished that the Muslims should be without. That is the only way of getting rid of the Muslim preponderance in the Indian Army.

How can it be brought about ? Here again, there is only one way. to bring it about and that is to support the scheme of Pakistan. Once Pakistan is created, Hindustan, having ample resources in men and money, can have an Army which it can call its own and there will be nobody to dictate as to how it should be used and against whom it should be used. The defence of Hindustan, far from being weakened by the creation of Pakistan, will be infinitely improved by it.

The Hindus do not seem to realize at what disadvantage they are placed from the point of view of their defence, by their exclusion from the Army. Much less do they know that, strange as it may appear, they are in fact purchasing this disadvantage at a very heavy price.

The Pakistan area which is the main recruiting ground of the present Indian Army, contributes very little to the Central Exchequer as will be seen from the following figures :—

Contribution to the Central Exchequer

	Rs.
Punjab	1,18,01,385
North-West Frontier	9,28,294
Sind	5,86,46,915
Baluchistan	Nil
Total	7,13,76,594

As against this the provinces of Hindustan contribute as follows:—

	Rs.
Madras	9,53,26,745
Bombay	22,53,44,247
Bengal ³⁷ [f.37]	12,00,00,000
U.P.	4,05,53,000
Bihar	1,54,37,742
C.P. & Berar	31,42,682
Assam	1,87,55,967
Orissa	5,67,346
Total	51,91,27,729

The Pakistan Provinces, it will be seen, contribute very little. The main contribution comes from the Provinces of Hindustan. In fact, it is the money contributed by the Provinces of Hindustan which enables the Government of India to carry out its activities in the Pakistan Provinces. The Pakistan Provinces are a drain on the Provinces of Hindustan. Not only do they contribute very little to the Central Government but they receive a great deal from the Central Government. The revenue of the Central Government amounts to Rs.121 crores. Of this, about Rs. 52 crores are annually spent on the Army. In what area is this amount spent ? Who pays the bulk of this amount of Rs. 52 crores ? The bulk of this amount of Rs. 52 crores which is spent on the Army is spent over the Muslim Army drawn from the Pakistan area. Now the bulk of this amount of Rs. 52 crores is contributed by the Hindu Provinces and is spent on an Army which for the most part consists of non-Hindus !! How many Hindus are aware of this tragedy ? How many know at whose cost this tragedy is being enacted ? Today the Hindus are not responsible for it because they cannot prevent it. The question is whether they will allow this tragedy to continue. If they mean to stop it, the surest way of putting an end to it is to allow the scheme of Pakistan to take effect. To oppose it, is to buy a sure weapon of their own destruction. A safe Army is better than a safe border.

CHAPTER VI

PAKISTAN AND COMMUNAL PEACE

Does Pakistan solve the Communal Question is a natural question which every Hindu is sure to ask. A correct answer to this question calls for a close analysis of what is involved in it. One must have a clear idea as to what is exactly meant, when the Hindus and Muslims speak of the Communal Question. Without it, it will not be possible to say whether Pakistan does or does not solve the Communal Question.

It is not generally known that the Communal Question like the " Forward Policy " for the Frontier has a " greater " and a " lesser intent, " and that in its lesser intent it means one thing, and in its greater intent it means quite a different thing.

I

To begin with the Communal Question in its " lesser intent ". In its lesser intent, the Communal Question relates to the representation of the Hindus and the Muslims in the Legislatures. Used in this sense, the question involves the settlement of two distinct problems :—

- (1) The number of seats to be allotted to the Hindus and the Muslims in the different legislatures, and
- (2) The nature of the electorates through which these seats are to be filled in.

The Muslims at the Round Table Conference claimed :—

- (1) That their representatives in all the Provincial as well as in the Central Legislatures should be elected by separate electorates ;
- (2) That they should be allowed to retain the weightage in representation given to Muslim minorities in those Provinces in which they were a minority in the population, and that in addition, they should be given in those Provinces where they were a majority such as the Punjab, Sind, North-West Frontier Province and Bengal, a guaranteed statutory majority of seats.

The Hindus from the beginning objected to both these Muslim demands. They insisted on joint electorates for Hindus and Muslims in all elections to all the Legislatures, Central and Provincial, and on population ratio of representation, for both minorities, Hindus and Muslims, wherever they may be, and raised the strongest objections to a majority of seats being guaranteed to any community by statute.

The Communal Award of His Majesty's Government settled this dispute by the simple, rough and ready method of giving the Muslims all that they wanted, without caring for the Hindu opposition. "The Award allowed the Muslims to retain weight-age and separate electorates, and in addition, gave them the statutory majority of seats in those provinces where they were a majority in the population.

What is it in the Award that can be said to constitute a problem ? Is there any force in the objections of the Hindus to the Communal Award of His Majesty's Government ? This question must be considered carefully to find out whether there is substance in the objections of the Hindus to the Award.

Firstly, as to their objection to the weightage to Muslim minorities in the matter of representation. Whatever may be the correct measure of allotting representation to minorities, the Hindus cannot very well object to the weightage given to Muslim minorities, because similar weightage has been given to the Hindus in those Provinces in which they are a minority and where there is sufficient margin for weightage to be allowed. The treatment of the Hindu minorities in Sind and the North-West Frontier Province is a case in point.

Secondly, as to their objection to a statutory majority. That again does not appear to be well founded. A system of guaranteed representation may be wrong and vicious and quite unjustifiable on theoretical and philosophical grounds. But considered in the light of circumstances, such as those obtaining in India, the system of statutory majority appears to be inevitable. Once it is granted that the representation to be given to a minority must not reduce the majority to minority, that very provision creates, as a mere counterpart, a system of statutory majority to the majority community. For, fixing the seats of the minority involves the fixation of the seats of the majority. There is, therefore, no escape from the system of statutory majority, once it is conceded that the minority is not entitled to representation which would convert a majority into a minority. There is, therefore, no great force in the objections of the Hindus to a statutory majority of the Muslims in the Punjab, the North-West Frontier Province, Sind and Bengal. For, even in the Provinces where the Hindus are in a majority and the Muslims are in minority, the Hindus have got a statutory majority over the Muslims. At any rate, there is a parity of position and to that extent there can be said to be no ground for complaint.

This does not mean that because the objections set forth by the Hindus have no substance, there are no real grounds for opposing the Communal Award. There does exist a substantial ground of objection to the Communal Award, although, it does not appear to have been made the basis of attack by the Hindus.

This objection may be formulated in order to bring out its point in the following manner. The Muslim minorities in the Hindu Provinces insisted on separate electorates. The Communal Award gives them the right to determine that issue. This is really what it comes to when one remembers the usual position taken, viz., that the Muslim minorities could not be deprived of their separate electorates without their consent, and the majority community of the Hindus has been made to abide by their determination. The Hindu minorities in Muslim Provinces insisted that there should be joint electorates. Instead of conceding their claim, the Communal Award forced upon them the system of separate electorates to which they objected. If in the Hindu Provinces, the Muslim minorities are allowed the right of self-determination in the matter of electorates, the question arises : Why are not the Hindu minorities in the Muslim Provinces given the right of self-determination in the matter of their electorates ? What is the answer to this question ? And, if there is no answer, there is undoubtedly a deep seated inequity in the Communal Award of His Majesty's Government, which calls for redress.

It is no answer that the Hindus also have a statutory majority based on separate electorates ³⁸[\[f.38\]](#) in those

Provinces where the Musalmans are in a minority. A little scrutiny will show that there is no parity of position in these two cases. The separate electorates for the Hindu majorities in the Hindu Provinces are not a matter of their choice. It is a consequence resulting from the determination of the Muslim minorities who claimed to have separate electorates for themselves. A minority in one set of circumstances may think that separate electorates would be a better method of self-protection and may have no fear of creating against itself and by its own action a statutory majority based on separate electorates for the opposing community. Another minority or, for the matter of that, the same minority in a different set of circumstances would not like to create by its own action and against itself a statutory majority based upon separate electorates and may, therefore, prefer joint electorates to separate electorates as a better method of self-protection. Obviously the guiding principle, which would influence a minority, would be : Is the majority likely to use its majority in a communal manner and purely for communal purposes ? If it felt certain that the majority community is likely to use its communal majority for communal ends, it may well choose joint electorates, because it would be the only method by which it would hope to take away the communal cement of the statutory majority by influencing the elections of the representatives of the majority community in the Legislatures. On the other hand, a majority community may not have the necessary communal cement, which alone would enable it to use its communal majority for communal ends, in which case a minority, having no fear from the resulting statutory majority and separate electorates for the majority community, may well choose separate electorates for itself. To put it concretely, the Muslim minorities in choosing separate electorates are not afraid of the separate electorates and the statutory majority of the Hindus, because they feel sure that by reason of their deep-seated differences of caste and race the Hindus will never be able to use their majorities against the Muslims. On the other hand, the Hindu minorities in the Muslim Provinces have no doubt that, by reason of their social solidarity, the Muslims will use their statutory majority to set into operation a "Resolute Muslim Government", after the plan proposed by Lord Salisbury for Ireland as a substitute for Home Rule; with this difference, that Salisbury's Resolute Government was to last for twenty years only, while the Muslim Resolute Government was to last as long as the Communal Award stood. "The situations, therefore, are not alike. The statutory majority of the Hindus based on separate electorates is the result of the choice made by the Muslim minority. The statutory majority of the Muslims based on separate electorates is something which is not the result of the choice of the Hindu minority. In one case, the Government of the Muslim minority by a Hindu communal majority is the result of the consent of the Muslim minority, In the other case, the Government of the Hindu minority by the Muslim majority is not the result of the consent of the Hindu minority, but is imposed upon it by the might of the British Government.

To sum up this discussion of the Communal Award, it may be said that, as a solution of the Communal Question in its " lesser intent ", there is no inequity in the Award on the ground that it gives weightage to the Muslim minorities in the Hindu Provinces. For, it gives weightage also to Hindu minorities in Muslim Provinces. Similarly, it may be said that there is no inequity in the Award, on the ground that it gives a statutory majority to the Muslims in Muslim Provinces in which they are a majority. If there is any, the statutory limitation put upon the Muslim number of seats, also gives to the Hindus in Hindu Provinces a statutory majority. But the same cannot be said of the Award in the matter of the electorates. The Communal Award is iniquitous inasmuch as it accords unequal treatment to the Hindu and Muslim minorities in the matter of electorates. It grants the Muslim minorities in the Hindu Provinces the right of self-determination in the matter of electorates, but it does not grant the same right to the Hindu minorities in the Muslim Provinces. In the Hindu Provinces, the Muslim minority is allowed to choose the kind of electorates it wants and the Hindu majority is not permitted to have any say in the matter. But in the Muslim Provinces, it is the Muslim majority which is allowed to choose the kind of electorates it prefers and the Hindu minority is not permitted to have any say in the matter. Thus , the Muslims in the Muslim Provinces having been given both statutory majority and separate electorates, the Communal Award must be said to impose upon the Hindu minorities Muslim rule, which they can neither alter nor influence.

This is what constitutes the fundamental wrong in the Communal Award. That this is a grave wrong must be admitted. For, it offends against certain political principles, which have now become axiomatic. First is, not to trust any one with unlimited political power. As has been well said,

" If in any state there is a body of men who possess unlimited political power, those over whom they rule can never be free. For, the one assured result of historical investigation is the lesson that uncontrolled power is invariably poisonous to those who possess it. They are always tempted to impose their canon of good upon others, and in the end, they assume that the good of the community depends upon the continuance of their power. Liberty always demands a limitation of political authority....."

The second principle is that, as a King has no Divine Right to rule, so also a majority has no Divine Right to rule. Majority Rule is tolerated only because it is for a limited period and subject to the right to have it changed, and secondly because it is a rule of a political majority, i.e., majority which has submitted itself to the suffrage of a minority and not a communal majority. If such is the limited scope of authority permissible to a political majority over a political minority, how can a minority of one community be placed under the perpetual subjection of a majority of another community ? To allow a majority of one community to rule a minority of another community without requiring the majority to submit itself to the suffrage of the minority, especially when the minority demands

it, is to enact a perversion of democratic principles and to show a callous disregard for the safety and security of the Hindu minorities.

II

To turn to the Communal Question in its " greater intent ". What is it, that the Hindus say is a problem ? In its greater intent the Communal Question relates to the deliberate creation of Muslim Provinces. At the time of the Lucknow Pact, the Muslims only raised the Communal Question in its lesser intent. At the Round Table Conference, the Muslims put forth, for the first time, the plan covered by the Communal Question in its greater intent. Before the Act of 1935, there were a majority of Provinces in which the Hindus were in a majority and the Muslims in a minority. There were only three Provinces in which the Muslims were in a majority and the Hindus in a minority. They were the Punjab, Bengal and the North-West Frontier Province. Of these, the Muslim majority in the North-West Frontier Province was not effective, because there was no responsible government in that province, the Montagu-Chemsford Scheme of Political Reforms not being extended to it. So, for all practical purposes, there were only two provinces—the Punjab and Bengal—wherein the Muslims were in majority and the Hindus in minority. The Muslims desired that the number of Muslim Provinces should be increased. With this object in view, they demanded that Sind should be separated from the Bombay Presidency and created into a new self-governing Province, and that the North-West Frontier Province, which was already a separate Province, should be raised to the status of a self-governing Province. Apart from other considerations, from a purely financial point of view, it was not possible to concede this demand. Neither Sind nor the North-West Frontier Province were financially self-supporting. But in order to satisfy the Muslim demand, the British Government went to the length of accepting the responsibility of giving an annual subvention to Sind ³⁹[f.39] and North-West Frontier Province ⁴⁰[f.40] from the Central Revenues, so as to bring about a budgetary equilibrium in their finances and make them financially self-supporting.

These four Provinces with Muslims in majority and Hindus in minority, now functioning as autonomous and self-governing Provinces, were certainly not created for administrative convenience, nor for purposes of architectural symmetry—the Hindu Provinces poised against the Muslim Provinces. It is also true that the scheme of Muslim Provinces was not a matter of satisfying Muslim pride which demanded Hindu minorities under Muslim majorities to compensate the humiliation of having Muslim minorities under Hindu majorities. What was then, the motive underlying this scheme of Muslim Provinces ? The Hindus say that the motive for the Muslim insistence, both on statutory majority and separate electorates, was to enable the Muslims in the Muslim Provinces to mobilize and make effective Muslim power in its exclusive form and to the fullest extent possible. Asked what could be the purpose of having the Muslim political power mobilized in this fashion, the Hindus answer that it was done to place in the hands of the Muslims of the Muslim Provinces an effective weapon to tyrannize their Hindu minorities, in case the Muslim minorities in the Hindu Provinces were tyrannized by their Hindu majorities. The scheme thus became a system of protection, in which blast was to be met by counter-blast, terror by terror and tyranny by tyranny. The plan is undoubtedly, a dreadful one, involving the maintenance of justice and peace by retaliation, and providing an opportunity for the punishment of an innocent minority, Hindus in Muslim Provinces and Muslims in Hindu Provinces, for the sins of their co-religionists in other Provinces. It is a scheme of communal peace through a system of communal hostages.

That the Muslims were aware from the very start, that the system of communal Provinces was capable of being worked in this manner, is clear from the speech made by Maulana Abul Kalam Azad as President of the Muslim League Session held in Calcutta in 1927. In that speech the Maulana declared:—

" That by the Lucknow Pact they had sold away their interests. The Delhi proposals of March last opened the door for the first time to the recognition of the real rights of Musalmans in India. The separate electorates granted by the Pact of 1916 only ensured Muslim representation, but what was vital for the existence of the community was the recognition of its numerical strength. Delhi opened the way to the creation of such a state of affairs as would guarantee to them in the future of India a proper share. Their existing small majority in Bengal and the Punjab was only a census figure, but the Delhi proposals gave them for the first time five provinces of which no less than three (Sind, the Frontier Province and Baluchistan) contained a real overwhelming Muslim majority. If the Muslims did not recognise this great step they were not fit to live. There would now be nine Hindu provinces against five Muslim provinces, and whatever treatment Hindus accorded in the nine provinces, Muslims would accord the same treatment to Hindus in the five Provinces. Was not this a great gain ? Was not a new weapon gained for the assertion of Muslim rights ? "

That those in charge of these Muslim provinces know the advantage of the scheme, and do not hesitate to put it to the use for which it was intended, is clear from the speeches made not long ago by Mr. Fazl-ul-Huq, as Prime Minister of Bengal.

That this scheme of Communal Provinces, which constitutes the Communal Question in its larger intent, can be used as an engine of communal tyranny, there can be no doubt. The system of hostages, which is the essence of the

scheme of communal provinces, supported by separate electorates, is indeed insupportable on any ground. If this is the underlying motive of the demand for the creation of more Muslim Provinces, the system resulting from it is undoubtedly a vicious system.

This analysis leaves no doubt that the communal statutory majority based on separate communal electorates and the communal provinces, especially constituted to enable the statutory majority to tyrannize the minority, are the two evils which compose what is called, ' the Communal Problem '.

For the existence of this problem the Hindus hold the Muslims responsible and the Muslims hold the Hindus responsible. The Hindus accuse the Muslims of contumacy. The Muslims accuse Hindus of meanness. Both, however, forget that the communal problem exists not because the Muslims are extravagant and insolent in their demands and the Hindus are mean and grudging in their concessions. It exists and will exist wherever a hostile majority is brought face to face against a hostile minority. Controversies relating to separate *vs.* joint electorates, controversies relating to population ratio *vs.* weightage are all inherent in a situation where a minority is pitted against a majority. The best solution of the communal problem is not to have two communities facing each other, one a majority and the other a minority, welded in the steel-frame of a single government.

How far does Pakistan approximate to the solution of the Communal Question?

The answer to this question is quite obvious. If the scheme of Pakistan is to follow the present boundaries of the Provinces in the North-West and in Bengal, certainly it does not eradicate the evils which lie at the heart of the Communal Question. It retains the very elements which give rise to it, namely, the pitting of a minority against a majority. The rule of the Hindu minorities by the Muslim majorities and the rule of the Muslim Minorities by the Hindu majorities are the crying evils of the present situation. This very evil will reproduce itself in Pakistan, if the provinces marked out for it are incorporated into it as they are, i.e., with boundaries drawn as at present. Besides this, the evil which gives rise to the Communal Question in its larger intent, will not only remain as it is but will assume a new malignity. Under the existing system, the power centered in the Communal Provinces to do mischief to their hostages is limited by the power which the Central Government has over the Provincial Governments. At present, the hostages are at least within the pale of a Central Government which is Hindu in its composition and which has power to interfere for their protection. But, when Pakistan becomes Muslim State with full sovereignty over internal and external affairs, it would be free from the control of the Central Government. The Hindu minorities will have no recourse to an outside authority with overriding powers, to interfere on their behalf and curb this power of mischief, as under the scheme, no such overriding authority is permitted to exist. So, the position of the Hindus in Pakistan may easily become similar to the position of the Armenians under the Turks or of the Jews in Tsarist Russia or in Nazi Germany. Such a scheme would be intolerable and the Hindus may well say that they cannot agree to Pakistan and leave their co-religionist as a helpless prey to the fanaticism of a Muslim National State.

III

This, of course, is a very frank statement of the consequences which will flow from giving effect to the scheme of Pakistan. But care must be taken to locate the source of these consequences. Do they flow from the scheme of Pakistan itself or do they flow from particular boundaries that may be fixed for it. If the evils flow from the scheme itself, i.e., if they are inherent in it, it is unnecessary for any Hindu to waste his time in considering it. He will be justified in summarily dismissing it. On the other hand, if the evils are the result of the boundaries, the question of Pakistan reduces itself to a mere question of changing the boundaries.

A study of the question amply supports the view that the evils of Pakistan are not inherent in it. If any evil results follow from it they will have to be attributed to its boundaries. This becomes clear if one studies the distribution of population. The reasons why these evils will be reproduced within Western and Eastern Pakistan is because, with the present boundaries, they do not become single ethnic states. They remain mixed states, composed of a Muslim majority and a Hindu minority as before. The evils are the evils which are inseparable from a mixed state. If Pakistan is made a single unified ethnic state, the evils will automatically vanish. There will be no question of separate electorates within Pakistan, because in such a homogeneous Pakistan, there will be no majorities to rule and no minorities to be protected. Similarly, there will be no majority of one community to hold, in its possession, a minority of an opposing community.

The question, therefore, is one of demarcation of boundaries and reduces itself to this : Is it possible for the boundaries of Pakistan to be so fixed, that instead of producing a mixed state composed of majorities and minorities, with all the evils attendant upon it, Pakistan will be an ethnic state composed of one homogeneous community, namely Muslims ? The answer is that in a large part of the area affected by the project of the League, a homogeneous state can be created by shifting merely the boundaries, and in the rest, homogeneity can be produced by shifting only the population.

In this connection, I invite the reader to study carefully the figures given in the Appendices V, X, XI showing the distribution of the population in the areas affected, and also the maps showing how new boundaries can create homogeneous Muslim States. Taking the Punjab, two things will be noted :—

- (i) There are certain districts in which the Musalmans predominate. There are certain districts in which the Hindus predominate. There are very few in which the two are, more or less, evenly distributed; and
- (ii) The districts in which Muslims predominate and the districts in which the Hindus predominate are not interspersed. The two sets of districts form two separate areas.

For the formation of the Eastern Pakistan, one has to take into consideration the distribution of population in both the Provinces of Bengal and Assam. A scrutiny of the population figures shows—

- (i) In Bengal, there are some districts in which the Muslims predominate. In others, the Hindus predominate.
- (ii) In Assam also, there are some districts in which the Muslims predominate. In others, the Hindus predominate.
- (iii) Districts in which the Muslims predominate and those in which the Hindus predominate are not interspersed. They form separate areas.
- (iv) The districts of Bengal and Assam in which the Muslims predominate are contiguous.

Given these facts, it is perfectly possible to create homogeneous Muslim States out of the Punjab, Bengal and Assam by drawing their boundaries in such a way that the areas which are predominantly Hindu shall be excluded. That this is possible is shown by the maps given in the appendix.

In the North-West Frontier Province and Sind, the situation is rather hard. How the matter stands in the North-West Frontier Province and Sind may be seen by an examination of the figures given in the appendices VI to IX. As may be seen from the appendices, there are no districts in which the Hindus in the North-West Frontier Province and Sind are concentrated. They are scattered and are to be found in almost every district of the two provinces in small, insignificant numbers. These appendices show quite unmistakably that the Hindus in Sind and the North-West Frontier Province are mostly congregated in urban areas of the districts. In Sind, the Hindus outnumber the Muslims in most of the towns, while the Muslims outnumber the Hindus in villages. In the North-West Frontier Province, the Muslims outnumber the Hindus in towns as well as in villages.

The case of the North-West Frontier Province and Sind, therefore, differs totally from the case of the Punjab and Bengal. In the Punjab and Bengal, owing to the natural segregation of the Hindus and Muslims in different areas, it is possible to create a homogeneous State by merely altering their boundaries, involving the shifting of the population in a very small degree. But in the North-West Frontier Province and Sind, owing to the scattered state of the Hindu population, alteration of boundaries cannot suffice for creating a homogeneous State. There is only one remedy and that is to shift the population.

Some scoff at the idea of the shifting and exchange of population. But those who scoff can hardly be aware of the complications, which a minority problem gives rise to and the failures attendant upon almost all the efforts made to protect them. The constitutions of the post-war states, as well as of the older states in Europe which had a minority problem, proceeded on the assumption that constitutional safeguards for minorities should suffice for their protection and so the constitutions of most of the new states with majorities and minorities were studded with long lists of fundamental rights and safeguards to see that they were not violated by the majorities. What was the experience? Experience showed that safeguards did not save the minorities. Experience showed that even a ruthless war on the minorities did not solve the problem. The states then agreed that the best way to solve it was for each to exchange its alien minorities within its border, for its own which was without its border, with a view to bring about homogeneous States. This is what happened in Turkey, Greece and Bulgaria. Those, who scoff at the idea of transfer of population, will do well to study the history of the minority problem, as it arose between Turkey, Greece and Bulgaria. If they do, they will find that these countries found that the only effective way of solving the minorities problem lay in exchange of population. The task undertaken by the three countries was by no means a minor operation. It involved the transfer of some 20 million people from one habitat to another. But undaunted, the three shouldered the task and carried it to a successful end because they felt that the considerations of communal peace must outweigh every other consideration.

That the transfer of minorities is the only lasting remedy for communal peace is beyond doubt. If that is so, there is no reason why the Hindus and the Muslims should keep on trading in safeguards which have proved so unsafe. If small countries, with limited resources like Greece, Turkey and Bulgaria, were capable of such an undertaking, there is no reason to suppose that what they did cannot be accomplished by Indians. After all, the population

involved is inconsiderable and because some obstacles require to be removed, it would be the height of folly to give up so sure a way to communal peace.

There is one point of criticism to which no reference has been made so far. As it is likely to be urged, I propose to deal with it here. It is sure to be asked, how will Pakistan affect the position of the Muslims that will be left in Hindustan ? The question is natural because the scheme of Pakistan does seem to concern itself with the Muslim majorities who do not need protection and abandons the Muslim minorities who do. But the point is : who can raise it ? Surely not the Hindus. Only the Muslims of Pakistan or the Muslims of Hindustan can raise it. The question was put to Mr. Rehmat Ali, the protagonist of Pakistan and this is the answer given by him :—

"How will it affect the position of the forty five million Muslims in Hindustan proper ?

" The truth is that in this struggle their thought has been more than a wrench to me. They are the flesh of our flesh and the soul of our soul. We can never forget them ; nor they, us. Their present position and future security is, and shall ever be, a matter of great importance to us. As things are at present, Pakistan will not adversely affect their position in Hindustan. On the basis of population (one Muslim to four Hindus), they will still be entitled to the same representation in legislative as well as administrative fields which they possess now. As to the future, the only effective guarantee we can offer is that of reciprocity, and, therefore, we solemnly undertake to give all those safeguards to non-Muslim minorities in Pakistan which will be conceded to our Muslim minority in Hindustan.

" But what sustains us most is the fact that they know we are proclaiming Pakistan in the highest interest of the ' Millet'. It is as much theirs as it is ours. While for us it is a national citadel, for them it will ever be a moral anchor. So long as the anchor holds, everything is or can be made safe. But once it gives way, all will be lost ".

The answer given by the Muslims of Hindustan is equally clear. They say, " We are not weakened by the separation of Muslims into Pakistan and Hindustan. We are better protected by the existence of separate Islamic States on the Eastern and Western borders of Hindustan than we are by their submersion in Hindustan. " Who can say that they are wrong ? Has it not been shown that Germany as an outside state was better able to protect the Sudeten Germans in Czechoslovakia than the Sudetens were able to do themselves ? ⁴¹[\[f.41\]](#)

Be that as it may, the question does not concern the Hindus. The question that concerns the Hindus is : How far does the creation of Pakistan remove the communal question from Hindustan ? That is a very legitimate question and must be considered. It must be admitted that by the creation of Pakistan, Hindustan is not freed of the communal question. While Pakistan can be made a homogeneous state by redrawing its boundaries, Hindustan must remain a composite state. The Muslims are scattered all over Hindustan—though they are mostly congregated in towns—and no ingenuity in the matter of redrawing of boundaries can make it homogeneous. The only way to make Hindustan homogeneous is to arrange for exchange of population. Until that is done, it must be admitted that even with the creation of Pakistan, the problem of majority vs. minority will remain in Hindustan as before and will continue to produce disharmony in the body politic of Hindustan.

Admitting that Pakistan is not capable of providing a complete solution of the Communal Problem within Hindustan, does it follow that the Hindus on that account should reject Pakistan ? Before the Hindus draw any such hasty conclusion, they should consider the following effects of Pakistan.

First, consider the effect of Pakistan on the magnitude of the communal Problem. That can be best gauged by reference to the Muslim population as it will be grouped within Pakistan and Hindustan.

Muslim Population in Pakistan.		Muslim Population in India	
1. Punjab	13,332,460	1. Total Muslim Population in British India (Excluding Burma and Aden).	66,442,766
2. N.W.F.P.	2,227,303		
3. Sind	2,830,800		
4. Baluchistan	405,309	2. Muslim Population grouped in Pakistan and Eastern Bengal State.	47,897,301
5. Eastern Bengal	27,497,624		
Muslim States		3. Balance of Muslims in British Hindustan	18,545,465
(i) Eastern Bengal	27,497,624		
(ii) Sylhet	1,603,805		
Total	47,897,301		

What do these figures indicate ? What they indicate is that the Muslims who will be left in British Hindustan will be only 18,545,465 and the rest 47,897,301, forming a vast majority of the total Muslim population, will be out of it and will be the subjects of Pakistan States. This distribution of the Muslim population, in terms of the communal problem, means that while without Pakistan the communal problem in India involves 6 1/2 crores of Muslims, with the creation of Pakistan it will involve only 2 crores of Muslims. Is this to be no consideration for Hindus who want communal peace ? To me, it seems that if Pakistan does not solve the communal problem within Hindustan, it substantially reduces its proportion and makes it of minor significance and much easier of peaceful solution.

In the second place, let the Hindus consider the effect of Pakistan on the communal representation in the Central Legislature. The following table gives the distribution of seats in the Central Legislature, as prescribed under the Government of India Act, 1935 and as it would be, if Pakistan came into being.

Name of the Chamber	Distribution of seats.			Distribution of seats.		
	I—As at present.			II.—After Pakistan.		
	Total seats.	Non-Muslim (Hindu) Territorial Seats.	Muslim Territorial Seats.	Total seats.	Non-Muslim (Hindu) Territorial Seats.	Muslim Territorial Seats.
Council of State.	150	75	49	126	75	25
Federal Assembly.	250	105	82	211	105	43

To bring out clearly the quantitative change in the communal distribution of seats, which must follow the establishment of Pakistan, the above figures are reduced to percentage in the table that follows:—

Name of the Chamber.	Distribution of seats.		Distribution of seats.	
	1.—As at present.		II.—After Pakistan	
	Percentage of Muslim seats to Hindu seats.	Percentage of Muslim seats to total seats.	Percentage of Muslim seats to Hindu seats.	Percentage of Muslim seats to total seats.
Council of State	33	66	25	33 1/3,
Federal Assembly	33	80	21	40

From this table one can see what vast changes must follow the establishment of Pakistan. Under the Government of India Act, the ratio of Muslim seats to the total is 33% in both the Chambers, but to the Hindu seats, the ratio is 66% in the Council of State and 80% in the Assembly—almost a position of equality with the Hindus. After Pakistan, the ratio of Muslim seats to the total seats falls from 33 1/3 % to 25% in the Council and to 21% in the Assembly, while the ratio to Hindu seats falls from 66% to 33 1/3 % in the Council and from 80% to 40% in the Assembly. The figures assume that the weightage given to the Muslims will remain the same, even after Hindustan is separated from Pakistan. If the present weightage to Muslims is cancelled or reduced, there would be further improvement in the representation of the Hindus. But assuming that no change in weightage is made, is this a small

gain to the Hindus in the matter of representation at the Centre ? To me, it appears that it is a great improvement in the position of the Hindus at the Centre, which would never come to them, if they oppose Pakistan.

These are the material advantages of Pakistan. There is another which is psychological. The Muslims, in Southern and Central India, draw their inspiration from the Muslims of the North and the East. If after Pakistan there is communal peace in the North and the East, as there should be, there being no majorities and minorities therein, the Hindus may reasonably expect communal peace in Hindustan. This severance of the bond between the Muslims of the North and the East and the Muslims of Hindustan is another gain to the Hindus of Hindustan.

Taking into consideration these effects of Pakistan, it cannot be disputed that if Pakistan does not wholly solve the communal problem within Hindustan, it frees the Hindus from the turbulence of the Muslims as predominant partners. It is for the Hindus to say whether they will reject such a proposal, simply because it does not offer a complete solution. Some gain is better than much harm.

IV

One last question and this discussion of Pakistan in relation to communal peace may be brought to a close. Will the Hindus and the Muslims of the Punjab and Bengal agree to redraw the boundaries of their provinces to make the scheme of Pakistan as flawless as it can be made ?

As for the Muslims, they ought to have no objection to redrawing the boundaries. If they do object, it must be said that they do not understand the nature of their own demand. This is quite possible, since the talk that is going on among Muslim protagonists of Pakistan, is of a very loose character. Some speak of Pakistan as a Muslim National State, others speak of it as a Muslim National Home. Neither care to know whether there is any difference between a National State and a National Home. But there can be no doubt that there is a vital difference between the two. What that difference is was discussed at great length at the time of constituting in Palestine a Jewish National Home. It seems that a clear conception of what this difference is, is necessary, if the likely Muslim opposition to the redrawing of the boundaries is to be overcome.

According to a leading authority :—

" A National Home connotes a territory in which a people, without receiving the rights of political sovereignty, has nevertheless a recognised legal position and receives the opportunity of developing its moral, social and intellectual ideals. "

The British Government itself, in its statement on Palestine policy issued in 1922, defined its conception of the National Home in the following terms :—

" When it is asked what is meant by the development of the Jewish National Home in Palestine, it may be answered that it is not the imposition of a Jewish nationality upon the inhabitants of Palestine as a whole, but the further development of the existing Jewish Community, with the assistance of Jews in other parts of the world, in order that it may become a centre in which the Jewish people as a whole may take, on grounds of religion and race, an interest and a pride. But in order that this community should have the best prospect of free development and provide a full opportunity for the Jewish people to display its capacities, it is essential that it should be known that it is in Palestine as of right and not on sufferance. This is the reason why it is necessary that the existence of a Jewish National Home in Palestine should be internationally guaranteed, and that it should be formally recognized to rest upon ancient historic connection. "

From this, it will be clear that there is an essential difference between a National Home and a National State. The difference consists in this : in the case of a National Home, the people who constitute it do not receive the right of Political sovereignty over the territory and the right of imposing their nationality on others also living in that territory. All that they get, is a recognized legal position guaranteeing them the right to live as citizens and freedom to maintain their culture. In the case of a National State, people constituting it, receive the rights of political sovereignty with the right of imposing their nationality upon the rest.

This difference is very important and it is in the light of this that one must examine their demand for Pakistan. What do the Muslim want Pakistan for ? If they want Pakistan to create a National Home for Muslims, there is no necessity for Pakistan. In the Pakistan Provinces, they already have their National Home with the legal right to live and advance their culture. If they want Pakistan to be a National Muslim State, they are claiming the right of political sovereignty over the territory included in it. This they are entitled to do. But the question is : Should they be allowed to retain, within the boundaries of these Muslim States, Non-Muslim minorities as their subjects, with a right to impose upon them the nationality of these Muslim States ? No doubt, such a right is accepted to be an accompaniment of political sovereignty. But it is equally true that in all mixed States, this right has become a source of mischief in modern times. To ignore the possibilities of such mischief in the creation of Pakistan will be

to omit to read the bloody pages of recent history on which have been recorded the atrocities, murders, plunders and arsons committed by the Turks, Greeks, Bulgars and the Czechs against their minorities. It is possible to take away from a state this right of imposing its nationality upon its subjects, because it is incidental to political sovereignty. But it is possible not to provide any opportunity for the exercise of such a right. This can be done by allowing the Muslims to have such National Muslim States as are strictly homogeneous, strictly ethnic states. Under no circumstances can they be allowed to carve out mixed states composed of Muslims opposed to Hindus, with the former superior in number to the latter.

This is probably not contemplated by the Muslims who are the authors of Pakistan. It was certainly not contemplated by Sir M. Iqbal, the originator of the scheme. In his Presidential address to the Muslim League in 1930, he expressed his willingness to agree to " the exclusion of Ambala Division and perhaps of some other districts where non-Muslims predominate " on the ground that such exclusion " will make it less extensive and more Muslim in population ". On the other hand, it may be that those who are putting forth the Scheme of Pakistan, do contemplate that it will include the Punjab and Bengal with their present boundaries. To them it must become clear, that to insist upon the present boundaries is sure to antagonise even those Hindus who have an open mind on the question. The Hindus can never be expected to consent to the inclusion of the Hindus in a Muslim State deliberately created for the preservation and propagation of Muslim faith and Muslim culture. The Hindus will no doubt oppose. Muslims must not suppose that it will take long to find them out. Muslims, if they insist upon the retention of the present boundaries, will open themselves to the accusation that behind their demand for Pakistan there is something more sinister than a mere desire to create a National Home or a National State. They will be accused of a design to perfect the scheme of Hindu hostages in Muslim hands by increasing the balance of Muslim majorities against Hindu minorities in the Muslim areas.

So much, for considerations which ought to weigh with the Muslims in the matter of changing the provincial boundaries to make Pakistan.

Now, as to the considerations which ought to weigh with the Hindus of the Punjab and Bengal. The Hindus are the more difficult of the two parties to the question. In this connection it is enough to consider the reaction of the high caste Hindus only. For, it is they who guide the Hindu masses and form Hindu opinion. Unfortunately, the high caste Hindus are bad as leaders. They have a trait of character which often leads the Hindus to disaster. This trait is formed by their acquisitive instinct and aversion to share with others the good things of life. They have a monopoly of education and wealth, and with wealth and education they have captured the State. To keep this monopoly to themselves has been the ambition and goal of their life. Charged with this selfish idea of class domination, they take every move to exclude the lower classes of Hindus from wealth, education and power, the surest and the most effective being the preparation of scriptures, inculcating upon the minds of the lower classes of Hindus the teaching that their duty in life is only to serve the higher classes. In keeping this monopoly in their own hands and excluding the lower classes from any share in it, the high caste Hindus have succeeded for a long time and beyond measure, it is only recently that the lower class Hindus rose in revolt against this monopoly by starting the Non-Brahmin Parties in the Madras and the Bombay Presidencies and the C. P. Still the high caste Hindus have successfully maintained their privileged position. This attitude of keeping education, wealth and power as a close preserve for themselves and refusing to share it, which the high caste Hindus have developed in their relation with the lower classes of Hindus, is sought to be extended by them to the Muslims. They want to exclude the Muslims from place and power, as they have done to the lower class Hindus. This trait of the high caste Hindus is the key to the understanding of their politics.

Two illustrations reveal this trait of theirs. The Hindus in 1929 opposed the separation of Sind from the Bombay Presidency before the Simon Commission, strenuously and vehemently. But in 1915, the Hindus of Sind put forth the opposite plea and wanted Sind to be separated from Bombay. The reason in both the cases was the same. In 1915, there was no representative Government in Sind, which, if there was one would have undoubtedly been a Muslim Government. The Hindus advocated separation because in the absence of a Muslim Government, they could obtain jobs in Government in a greater degree. In 1929, they objected to the separation of Sind because they knew that a separate Sind would be under a Muslim Government, and a Muslim Government was sure to disturb their monopoly and displace them to make room for Muslim candidates. The opposition of the Bengali Hindus to the Partition of Bengal is another illustration of this trait of the high caste Hindus. The Bengali Hindu had the whole of Bengal, Bihar, Orissa, Assam and even U. P. for his pasture. He had captured the civil service in all these Provinces. The partition of Bengal meant a diminution in the area of this pasture. It means that the Bengali Hindu was to be ousted from Eastern Bengal to make room for the Bengali Musalman who had so far no place in the civil service of Bengal. The opposition to the partition of Bengal on the part of the Bengali Hindus, was due principally to their desire not to allow the Bengal Musalmans to take their place in Eastern Bengal. Little did the Bengali Hindus dream that by opposing partition and at the same time demanding Swaraj they were preparing the way for making the Musalmans the rulers of both Eastern as well as Western Bengal.

These thoughts occur to one's mind because one fears that the high caste Hindus, blinded by their hereditary trait,

might oppose Pakistan for no other reason except that it limits the field for their self-seeking careers. Among the many reasons that might come in the way of Pakistan, one need not be surprised, if one of them happens to be the selfishness of the high caste Hindus.

There are two alternatives for the Hindus of the Punjab and Bengal and they may be asked to face them fairly and squarely. The Muslims in the Punjab number 13,332,460 and the Hindus, with Sikhs and the rest, number 11,392,732. The difference is only 1,939,728. This means that the Muslim majority in the Punjab is only a majority of 8 p.c. Given these facts, which is better: To retain the unity of the Punjab and allow the Muslim majority of 54 p.c. to rule the Hindu minority of 46 p.c. or to redraw the boundaries, to allow the Muslims and the Hindus to be under separate national states, and thus rescue the whole body of Hindus from the terrors of the Muslim rule ?

The Muslims in Bengal number 27,497,624 and the Hindus number 21,570,407. The difference is only of 5,927,217. This means that the Muslim majority in Bengal is only a majority of 12 p.c. Given these facts, which is better : To oppose the creation of a National Muslim State out of Eastern Bengal and Sylhet by refusing to redraw the boundaries and allow the Muslim majority of only 12 p.c. to rule the Hindu minority of 44 p.c.; or to consent to redraw the boundaries, to have Muslims and Hindus placed under separate National States, and thus rescue the 44 p.c. of the Hindus from the horrors of the Muslim rule ?

Let the Hindus of Bengal and the Punjab consider which alternative they should prefer. It seems to me that the moment has come when the high caste Hindus of Bengal and the Punjab should be told that if they propose to resist Pakistan, because it cuts off a field for gainful employment, they are committing the greatest blunder. The time for successfully maintaining in their own hands a monopoly of place and power is gone. They may cheat the lower orders of the Hindus in the name of nationalism, but they cannot cheat the Muslim majorities in the Muslim Provinces and keep their monopoly of place and power. The resolution of the Hindus—if their cry against Pakistan can be regarded as such— to live under a Muslim majority and oppose self-determination may be a very courageous thing. But it will not be a very wise thing if the Hindus believe that they will be able to maintain their place and power by fooling the Musalmans. As Lincoln said, it is not possible to fool all people for all times. If the Hindus choose to live under a Muslim majority the chances are that they may lose all. On the other hand, if the Hindus of Bengal and the

Punjab agree to separate, true, they will not get more, but they will certainly not lose all.

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PART III

[f.1]Cunnigham's *Ancient Geography of India* (Ed. Majumdar), pp. 13-14. The writers of the Puranas divided India into nine divisions.

[f.2]Sind was reoccupied by Mahommed Ghori.

[f.3]Indian Islam by Dr. Titus, p. 10.

[f.4]Quoted by Dr. Titus—Ibid., p. 10.

[f.5]Ibid.,p.11

[f.6]Ibid.,p.11.

[f.7]Quoted by Lane Poole in *Medieval India*, p. 155.

[f.8]Dr. Titus : *Indian Islam*, p. 22

[f.9]Dr. Titus : *Indian Islam*,

[f.10]p. 22. Ibid., pp. 22-23.

[f.11]Lane Poole: *Medieval India*, p. 26

[f.12]Dr. Titus : *Indian Islam*, pp. 23-24.

[f.13]Dr. Titus : *Indian Islam*, p. 24.

[f.14]Ibid.,p.22

[f.15]Ibid.. pp. 31-32.

[f.16]Quoted by Dr. Titus—*Indian Islam*, p. 24.

[f.17]Ibid.,p.26 [f.17]

[f.18]Dr. Titus : *Indian Islam*, p. 29

[f.19]Ibid., p. 30.

[f.20]Lane Poole : *Medieval India*, p. 104.

[f.21]Quoted by Dr. Titus—*Indian Islam*, p. 29.

[f.22]Revenues include revenue raised both by Provincial Government in the Provinces from provincial sources and by the Central Government from Central revenues.

[f.23]Revenues include revenue raised both by Provincial Government in the Provinces from provincial sources and by the Central Government from Central revenues.

[f.24]See his series of articles on " The Martial Races of India " published in the *Modern Review* for July 1930, September 1930, January 1931 and February 1931.

[f.25]The Questionnaire circulated by the Committee included the following question:— " If an efficient and available reserve of the Indian Army be considered necessary for the safety of the Empire, should it not be recruited and maintained from those parts of the country which give us best soldiers, rather than amongst the weakest and least warlike races of India ?".....

[f.26]In his *Forty-One Years* he wrote: " Each cold season, I made long lours in order to acquaint myself with the needs and capabilities of the men of the Madras Army. I tried hard to discover in them those fighting qualities which had distinguished their forefathers during the wars of the last and the beginning of the present century. . . And I was forced to the conclusion that the ancient military spirit had died in them, as it had died in the ordinary Hindustani of Bengal and the Mahratta of Bombay, and that they could no longer with safely be pitted against warlike races, or employed outside the limit of Southern India."

[f.27]*Indian Social Reformer*, January 27lh, 1940.

[f.28]This table shows the percentage of men of each eligible class in the Indian Infantry (82 active and 18 training battations), the Indian Cavalry (21 regiments), and the 20 battalions of the Gurkha infantry. This table does not include the Indian personnel of (a) the 19 ballerics of Indian Mountain Artillery, and (b) 3 regiments of Sappers and Miners, (c) the Indian Signal Corps, and (d) the Corps of Indian Pioneers, all of which are composed of different proportions of the Punjabi Musalmans, Sikhs, Pathans, Hindustani Ilindus and Musalmans, Madrasis of all classes and Hazra Afghans, either in class units or class companies. Except that some units in these arms of the service are composed of the Madrasis and Hazras, now enrolled in other units of the Indian Army, the class composition of these units docs not materially alter the proportion of the classes as given in the table. This table does not also include the Indian personnel attached to the British Infantry and Artillery units.

[f.29]Legislative Assembly Debales, 1938 Vol. VI, page 2462.

[f.30]Legislative Assembly Debates, 193S, Vol. VI, page 2478.

[f.31]Legislative Assembly Debates, 1938, Vol. VI, page 2754.

[f.32]Legislative Assembly Debates, 1938, Vol.VII, page 3313.

[f.33]Legislative Assembly Debates, 1939, Vol. I, page 253.

[f.34]MacMunn and Lovett, *The Armies of India*, pp. 84-85, quoted by Chaudhari

[f.35]As quoted by Chaudhari

[f.36] *Imperial Rule in India*, page 5.

[f.37] Only 1/2 revenue is shown because nearly 1/2 population is Hindu.

[f.38] It is perhaps not quite correct to speak of a Hindu Electorate. The Electorate is a General Electorate consisting of all those who are not included in any separate electorate. But as the majority in the General Electorate consists of Hindus, it is called a Hindu Electorate

[f.39] Sind gets an annual subvention of Rs. 1.05,00,000.

[f.40] North-West Frontier Province gets an annual subvention of Rs. 1,00,00,000

[f.41] The leaders of the Muslim League seem to have studied deeply Hitler's bullying tactics against Czechoslovakia in the interest of the Sudeten Germans and also learned the lessons which those tactics teach. See their threatening speeches in the Karachi Session of the League held in 1937.

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Part III

WHAT IF NOT PAKISTAN ?

Having stated the Muslim case for Pakistan and the Hindu case against it, it is necessary to turn to the alternatives to Pakistan, if there be any. In forming one's judgement on Pakistan, one must take into account the alternatives to it. Either there is no alternative to Pakistan : or there is an alternative to Pakistan, but it is worse than Pakistan. Thirdly, one must also take into consideration what would be the consequences, if neither Pakistan nor its alternative is found acceptable to the parties concerned. The relevant data, having a bearing on these points, are presented in this part under the following heads :—

- 1 *Hindu alternative to Pakistan.*
- 2 *Muslim alternative to Pakistan.*
- 3 *Lessons from abroad.*

CHAPTER VII

HINDU ALTERNATIVE TO PAKISTAN

I

Thinking of the Hindu alternative to Pakistan, the scheme that at once comes to one's mind is the one put forth by the late Lala Hardayal in 1925. It was published in the form of a statement which appeared in the *Pratap* of Lahore. In this statement, which he called his political testament, Lala Hardayal said:—

" I declare that the future of the Hindu race, of Hindustan and of the Punjab, rests on these four pillars: (1) Hindu Sangalhan, (2) Hindu Raj, (3) Shuddhi of Moslems, and (4) Conquest and Shuddhi of Afghanistan and the Frontiers. So long as the Hindu nation does not accomplish these four things, the safety of our children and great-grandchildren will be ever in danger, and the safety of the Hindu race will be impossible. The Hindu race has but one history, and its institutions are homogeneous. But the Musalmans and Christians are far removed from the confines of Hindustan, for their religions are alien and they love Persian, Arab and European institutions. Thus, just as one removes foreign matter from the eye, Shuddhi must be made of these two religions. Afghanistan and the hilly regions of the frontier were formerly part of India, but are at present under the

domination of Islam..... Just as there is Hindu religion in Nepal, so there must be Hindu institutions in Afghanistan and the frontier territory; otherwise it is useless to win Swaraj. For mountain tribes are always warlike and hungry. If they become our enemies, the age of Nadirshah and Zamanshah will begin anew. At present English officers are protecting the frontiers; but it cannot always be..... If Hindus want to protect themselves, they must conquer Afghanistan and the frontiers and convert all the mountain tribes."

I do not know how many Hindus would come forward to give their support to this scheme of Lala Hardayal as an alternative to Pakistan. ¹[\[f.1\]](#)

In the first place, Hindu religion is not a proselytising religion. Maulana Mahomed Ali was quite right when, in the course of his address as President of the Congress, he said:

" Now, this has been my complaint for a long lime against Hinduism, and on one occasion, lecturing at Allahabad in 1907,I had pointed out the contrast between Musalmans and Hindus, by saying that the worst that can be said of a Muslim was that he had a tasteless mess which he called a dish fit for kings, and wanted all to share it with him, thrusting it down the throats of such as did not relish it and would rather not have it, while his Hindu brother, who prided himself on his cookery, retired into the privacy of his kitchen and greedily devoured all that he had cooked, without permitting even the shadow of his brother to fall on his food, or sparing even a crumb for him. This was said not altogether in levity; and in fact, I once asked Mahatma Gandhi to justify this feature of his faith to me. "

What answer the Mahatma gave to his question, Mr. Mahmed Ali did not disclose. The fact is that however much the Hindus may wish, Hindu religion cannot become a missionary religion like Islam or Christianity. It is not that the Hindu religion was never a missionary religion. On the contrary, it was once a missionary religion—indeed could not but have been a missionary religion, otherwise it is difficult to explain how, it could have spread over an area so vast as the Indian continent. ²[\[f.2\]](#) But once a missionary religion, Hinduism perforce ceased to be a missionary religion after the time when the Hindu society developed its system of castes. For, caste is incompatible with conversion. To be able to convert a stranger to its religion, it is not enough for a community to offer its creed. It must be in a position to admit the convert to its social life and to absorb and assimilate him among its kindred. It is not possible for the Hindu society to satisfy this prerequisite of effective conversion. There is nothing to prevent a Hindu, with a missionary zeal, to proceed to convert an alien to the Hindu faith. But before he converts the alien, he is bound to be confronted with the question: What is to be the caste of the convert ? According to the Hindus, for a person to belong to a caste he must be born in it. A convert is not born in a caste, therefore he belongs to no caste. This is also an important question. More than political or religious, man is a social animal. He may not have, need not have, religion ; he may not have, need not have, politics. He must have society; he cannot do without society. For a Hindu to be without caste is to be without society. Where there is no society for the convert, how can there be any conversion ? So long as Hindu society is fragmented in autonomous and autogenic castes, Hindu religion cannot be a missionary religion. The conversion of the Afghans and the frontier tribes to Hinduism is, therefore, an idle dream.

In the second place, Lala Hardayal's scheme must call for financial resources the immensity of which it is hardly possible to compute. , Who can furnish the funds necessary for the conversion of the Afghans and the Frontier Tribesmen to Hinduism ? The Hindus, having ceased to convert others to their faith for a long time, have also lost the. zeal for conversion. Want of zeal is bound to affect the question of finances. Further, Hindu society being moulded in the cast of the *Chaturvarna*, wealth has, from very ancient times, been most unevenly distributed. It is only the Baniya who is the heir to wealth and property among the Hindus. There are, of course, the landlords who are the creation of foreign invaders or native rebels, but they are not as numerous as the Baniya. The Baniya is money-made and his pursuits are solely for private gain. He knows no other use of money except to hold it and to transmit it to his descendants. Spread of religion or

acquisition and promotion of culture do not interest him. Even decent living has no place in his budget. This has been his tradition for ages. If money is expected, he is not much above the brute in the conception and manner of life. Only one new service, on the expenditure side, has found a place in his budget. That service is politics. This happened since the entry of Mr. Gandhi as a political leader. That new service is the support of Gandhian politics. Here again, the reason is not love of politics. The reason is to make private gain out of public affairs. What hope is there that such men will spend money on such a bootless cause as the spread of Hindu religion among the Afghans and Frontier Tribes ?

Thirdly, there is the question of facilities for conversion that may be available in Afghanistan. Lala Hardayal evidently thought that it is possible to say in Afghanistan, with the same impunity as in Turkey, that the Koran is wrong or out of date. Only one year before the publication of his political testament by Lala Hardayal, i.e., in 1924; one Niamatulla—a follower of Mirza Ghulam Ahamed of Quadiyan—who claimed to be the messiah and Mahdi and a prophet of a sort—was stoned to death ³[f.3] at Kabul by the order of the highest ecclesiastical tribunal of Afghanistan. The crime of this man was, as reported by a Khilafat paper, that he was professing and preaching ideas and beliefs, inconsistent with Islam and Shariat. This man, says the same paper, was stoned to death according to the agreeing judgements of the first Shariat (canon) Court, the Central Appellate Court and the Ulema and Divines of the final Appellate Committee of the Ministry of Justice. In the light of these difficulties, the scheme must be said to be wild in its conception and is sure to prove ruinous in its execution. It is adventurous in character and is too fantastic to appeal to any reasonable man except perhaps some fanatical Arya Samajists of the Punjab.

II

The stand taken by Hindu Mahasabha has been defined by Mr. V. D. Savarkar, the President of the Sabha, in his presidential addresses at the annual sessions of the Sabha. As defined by him, the Hindu Maha Sabha is against Pakistan and proposes to resist it by all means. What these means are we do not know. If they are force, coercion and resistance, they are only negative alternatives and Mr. Savarkar and the Hindu Maha Sabha alone can say how far these means will succeed.

It would, however, not be fair to Mr. Savarkar to say that he has only a negative attitude towards the claim put forth by the Muslims of India. He has put forth his positive proposals in reply to them.

To understand his positive proposals, one must grasp some of his basic conceptions. Mr. Savarkar lays great stress on a proper understanding of the terms, Hinduism, Hindutva and Hindudom. He says : ⁴[f.4]

" In expounding the ideology of the Hindu movement, it is absolutely necessary to have a correct grasp of the meaning attached to these three terms. From the word " Hindu" has been coined the word "Hinduism " in English. It means the schools or system of Religion the Hindus follow. The second word " Hindutva " is far more comprehensive and refers not only to the religious aspects of the Hindu people as the word " Hinduism " does but comprehend even their cultural, linguistic, social and political aspects as well. It is more or less akin to " Hindu Polity " and its nearly exact translation would be " Hinduness ". The third word " Hindudom " means the Hindu people spoken of collectively. It is a collective name for the Hindu World, just as Islam denotes the Moslem World."

Mr. Savarkar takes it as a gross misrepresentation to say that the Hindu Maha Sabha is a religious body. In refutation of this misrepresentation, Mr. Savarkar says : ⁵[f.5]

" It has come to my notice that a very large section of the English educated Hindus hold back from joining the Hindu Maha Sabha.... under the erroneous idea that it is an exclusively Religious

organization— something like a Christian Mission. Nothing could be far from truth. The Hindu Maha Sabha is not a Hindu Mission. It leaves Religious questions regarding theism, monotheism, Pantheism or even atheism to be discussed and determined by the different Hindu schools of religious persuasions. It is not a Hindu Dharma Maha Sabha, but a Hindu National Maha Sabha. Consequently by its very constitution it is debarred to associate itself exclusively as a partisan with any particular religious school or sect even within the Hindu fold. As a national Hindu body it will of course propagate and defend the National Hindu Church comprising each and all religions of Hindusthani origin against any non-Hindu attack or encroachment. But the sphere of its activity is far more comprehensive than that of an exclusively religious body. The Hindu Maha Sabha identifies itself with the National life of Hindudom in all its entirety, in all its social, economical, cultural and above all political aspects and is pledged to protect and promote all that contributes to the freedom, strength and glory of the Hindu Nation; and as an indispensable means to that end to attain Purna Swarajya, absolute political Independence of Hindusthan by all legitimate and proper means. "

Mr. Savarkar does not admit that the Hindu Maha Sabha is started to counteract the Muslim League and that as soon as the problems arising out of the Communal Award are solved to the satisfaction of both Hindus and Musalmans, the Hindu Maha Sabha will vanish. Mr. Savarkar insists that the Hindu Maha Sabha must continue to function even after India becomes politically free. He says :

⁶[\[f.6\]](#)

"..... Many a superficial critic seems to fancy that the Maha Sabha was only contrived to serve as a make-weight, as a reaction checkmating the Moslem League or the anti-Hindu policy of the present leaders of the Congress and will be out of court or cease automatically to function as soon as it is shorn of this spurious excuse to exist. But if the aims and object of the Maha Sabha mean anything it is clear that it was not the outcome of any frothy effusion, any fussy agitation to remove a grievance here or oppose a seasonal party there. The fact is that every organism whether, individual or social which is living and deserves to survive throws out offensive and defensive organs as soon as it is brought to face adversely changing environments. The Hindu Nation too as soon as it recovered and freed itself from the suffocating grip of the pseudo-nationalistic ideology of the Congress brand developed a new organ to battle in the struggle for existence under the changed conditions of modern age. This was the Hindu Maha Sabha. It grew up of a fundamental necessity of the National life and not of any ephemeral incident. The constructive side of its aims and objects make it amply clear that its mission is as abiding as the life of the Nation itself. But that apart, even the day to day necessity of adapting its policy to the ever changing political currents makes it incumbent on Hindudom to have an exclusively Hindu organization independent of any moral or intellectual servility or subservience to any non-Hindu or jointly representative institution, to guard Hindu interests and save them from being jeopardised. It is not so, only under the present political subjection of Hindustan but it will be all the more necessary to have some such exclusively Hindu organization, some such Hindu Maha Sabha in substance whether it is identical with this present organization or otherwise to -serve as a watchtower at the gates of Hindudom for at least a couple of centuries to come, even after Hindustan is partially or wholly free and a National Parliament controls its political destiny.

" Because, unless something altogether cataclysmic in nature upsets the whole political order of things in the world which practical politics cannot envisage today, all that can be reasonably expected in immediate future is that we Hindus may prevail over England and compel her to recognise India as a self-governing unit with the status contemplated in the Westminster Statute. Now a National Parliament in such a self-governing India can only reflect the electorate as it is, the Hindus and the Moslems as we find them, their relations a bit bettered, perhaps a bit worsened. No realist can be blind to the probability that the extraterritorial designs and the secret urge goading on the Moslems to transform India into a Moslem state may at any time confront the Hindustani state even under self-government either with a Civil War or treacherous overtures to alien invaders by the Moslems. Then again there is every likelihood that there will ever continue at least for a century to come a danger of fanatical riots, the scramble for services, legislative seats, weightages out of

proportion to their population on the part of the Moslem minority and consequently a constant danger threatening internal peace. To checkmate this probability which if we are wise we must always keep in view even after Hindustan attains the status of a self-governing country, a powerful and exclusive organization of Hindudom like the Hindu Maha Sabha will always prove a sure and devoted source of strength, a reserve force for the Hindus to fall back upon to voice their grievances more effectively than the joint Parliament can do, to scent danger ahead, to warn the Hindus in time against it and to fight out if need be any treacherous design to which the joint state itself may unwittingly fall a victim.

"The History of Canada, of Palesline, of the movement of the Young Turks will show you that in every slate where two or more such conflicting elements as the Hindus and Moslems in India happen to exist as constituents, the wiser of them has to keep its exclusive organization intact, strong and watchful to defeat any attempt at betrayal or capture of the National State by the opposite party; especially so if that party has extra-territorial affinities, religious or cultural, with alien bordering states."

Having stated what is Hindustan, and what is Hindu Maha Sabha, Mr. Savarkar next proceeds to define his conception of Swaraj. According to Mr. Savarkar : [7\[f.7\]](#)

" Swaraj to the Hindus must mean only that in which their " Swaraj ", their " Hindutva " can assert itself without being overlorded by any non-Hindu people, whether they be Indian Territorials or extra-Territorials—some Englishmen are and may continue to be territorially born Indians. Can, therefore, the overlords of these Anglo-indians be a " Swarajya " to the Hindus ? Aurangzeb or Tipu were hereditary Indians, nay, were the sons of converted Hindu mothers. Did that mean that the rule of Aurangzeb or Tipu was a " Swarajya " to the Hindus ? No ! Although they were territorially Indians they proved to be the worst enemies of Hindudom and therefore, a Shivaji, a Gobindsingh, a Pratap or the Peshwas had to fight against the Moslem domination and establish real Hindu Swarajya. "

As part of his Swaraj Mr. Savarkar insists upon two things.

Firstly, the retention of the name Hindustan as the proper name for India [8\[f.8\]](#) " The name " Hindustan " must continue to be the appellation of our country. Such other names as India, Hind, etc., being derived from the same original word Sindhu may be used but only to signify the same sense—the land of the Hindus, a country which is the abode of the Hindu Nation. Aryavarta, Bharat-Bhumi and such other names are of course the ancient and the most cherished epithets of our Mother Land and will continue to appeal to the cultured elite. In this insistence that the Mother Land of the Hindus must be called but " Hindustan ", no encroachment or humiliation is implied in connection with any of our non-Hindu countrymen. Our Parsee and Christian countrymen are already too akin to us culturally and .arc too patriotic and the Anglo-indians too sensible to refuse to fall in line with us Hindus on so legitimate a ground. So far as our Moslem countrymen are concerned it is useless to conceal the fact that some of them are already inclined to look upon this molehill also as an insuperable mountain in their way to Hindu-Moslem unity. But they should remember that the Moslems do not dwell only in India nor are the Indian Moslems the only heroic remnants of the Faithful in Islam. China has crores of Moslems. Greece, Palestine and even Hungary and Poland have thousands of Moslems amongst their nationals. But being there a minority, only a community, their existence in these countries has never been advanced as a ground to change the ancient names of these countries which indicate the abodes of those races whose overwhelming majority owns the land. The country of the Poles continues to be Poland and of the Grecians as Greece. *The* Moslems there did not or dared not to distort them but are quite content to distinguish themselves as Polish Moslems or Grecian Moslems or Chinese Moslems when occasion arises, so also our Moslem countrymen may distinguish themselves nationally or territorially whenever they want, as " Hindustance Moslems " without compromising in the least their separateness as Religious or Cultural entity. Nay, the Moslems have been calling themselves as " Hindustanis " ever since their advent in India, of their own accord.

" But if inspite of it all some irascible Moslem sections amongst our countrymen object even to this name of our Country, that is no reason why we should play cowards to our own conscience. We Hindus must not betray or break up the continuity of our Nation from the Sindhus. in Rigvedic days to the Hindus of our own generation which is implied in " Hindustan ", the accepted appellation of our Mother Land. Just as the land of the Germans is Germany, of the English England, of the Turks Turkistan, of the Afghans Afghanistan—even so we must have it indelibly impressed on the map of the earth for all times to come a " Hindustan "—the land of the " Hindus ".

The second is the retention of Sanskrit as sacred language, Hindi as national language and Nagari as the script of Hindudom. ⁹[\[f.9\]](#)

"The Sanskrit shall be our " Deva Bhasha)" ¹⁰[\[f.10\]](#) our sacred language and the "Sanskrit Nishtha" ¹¹[\[f.11\]](#) Hindi, the Hindi which is derived from Sanskrit and draws its nourishment from the latter, is our ' mr' ' (Rashtra Bhasha) ¹²[\[f.12\]](#) our current national language—besides being the richest and the most cultured of the ancient languages of the world, to us Hindus the Sanskrit is the holiest tongue of tongues. Our scriptures, history, philosophy and culture have their roots so deeply imbedded in the Sanskrit literature that it forms veritably the brain of our Race. Mother of the majority of our mother tongues, she has suckled the rest of them at her breast. All Hindu languages current today whether derived from Sanskrit or grafted on to it can only grow and flourish on the sap of life they imbibe from Sanskrit. The Sanskrit language therefore must ever be an indispensable constituent of the classical course for Hindu youths.

" In adopting the Hindi as the National tongue of Hindudom no humiliation or any invidious distinction is implied as regards other provincial tongues. We are all as attached to our provincial tongues as to Hindi and they will all grow and flourish in their respective spheres. In fact some of them are today more progressive and richer in literature. But nevertheless, taken all in all the Hindi can serve the purpose of a National Pan-Hindu language best. It must also be remembered that the Hindi is not made a National Language to order. The fact is that long before either the English or even the Moslems stepped in India the Hindi in its general form had already come to occupy the position of a National tongue throughout Hindustan. The Hindu pilgrim, the tradesman, the tourist, the soldier, the Pandit travelled up and down from Bengal to Sind and Kashmere to Rameshwar by making himself understood from locality to locality through Hindi. Just as the Sanskrit was the National Language of the Hindu intellectual world even so Hindi has been for at least a thousand years in the past the National Indian Tongue of the Hindu community.....

"By Hindi we of course mean the pure "Sanskrit Nistha" Hindi, as we find it for example in the " Satyarth Prakash " written by Maharsi Dayananda Saraswati. How simple and untainted with a single unnecessary foreign word is that Hindi and how expressive withal ! It may be mentioned in passing that Swami Dayanandaji was about the first Hindu leader who gave conscious and definite expression to the view that Hindi should be the Pan-Hindu National language of India. " This Sanskrit Nistha " Hindi has nothing to do with that hybrid, the so-called Hindusthani which is being hatched up by the Wardha scheme. It is nothing short of a linguistic monstrosity and must be ruthlessly suppressed. Not only that but it is our bounden duty to oust as ruthlessly all unnecessary alien words whether Arabian or English, from every Hindu tongue—whether provincial or dialectal.

"..... Our Sanskrit alphabetical order is phonetically about the most perfect which the world has yet devised and almost all our current Indian scripts already follow it. The Nagari Script too follows this order. Like the Hindi language the Nagari Script too has already been current for centuries all over India amongst the Hindu literary circles for some two thousand years at any rate in the past and was even popularly nick-named as the " Shastri Lipi " the script of our Hindu Scriptures.It is a matter of common knowledge that if Bengali or Gujarathi is printed in Nagari it is more or less understood by readers in several other provinces. To have only one common language throughout Hindustan at a stroke is impracticable and unwise. But to have the Nagari script as the only common script throughout Hindudom is much more feasible. Nevertheless, it

should be borne in mind that the different Hindu scripts current in our different provinces have a future of their own and may flourish side by side with the Nagari. All that is immediately indispensable in the common interest of Hindudom as a whole is that the Nagari Script must be made a compulsory subject along with the Hindi language in every school in the case of Hindu students. "

What is to be the position of the Non-Hindu minorities under the Swaraj as contemplated by Mr. Savarkar ? On this question, this is what Mr. Savarkar has to say : ¹³[\[f.13\]](#)

"When once the Hindu Maha Sabha not only accepts but maintains the principles of " one man one vote " and the public services to go by merit alone added to the fundamental rights and obligations to be shared by all citizens alike irrespective of any distinction of Race or Religion . . . any further mention of minority rights is on the principle not only unnecessary but self-contradictory. Because it again introduces a consciousness of majority and minority on Communal basis. But as practical politics requires it and as the Hindu Sanghatanists want to relieve our non-Hindu countrymen of even a ghost of suspicion, we are prepared to emphasise that the legitimate rights of minorities with regard to their Religion, Culture, and Language will be expressly guaranteed: on one condition only that the equal rights of the majority also must not in any case be encroached upon or abrogated. Every minority may have separate schools to train up their children in their own tongue, their own religious or cultural institutions and can receive Government help also for these,—but always in proportion to the taxes they pay into the common exchequer. The same principle must of course hold good in case of the majority too.

"Over and above this, in case the constitution is not based on joint electorates and on the unalloyed National principle of one man one vote, but is based on the communal basis then those minorities who wish to have separate electorate or reserve seats will be allowed to have them,—but always in proportion to their population and provided that it does not deprive the majority also of an equal right in proportion of its population too."

That being the position assigned to the minorities, Mr. Savarkar concludes ¹⁴ [\[f.14\]](#) that under his scheme of Swaraj :

"The Moslem minority in India will have the right to be treated as equal citizens, enjoying equal protection and civic rights in proportion to their population. The Hindu majority will not encroach on the legitimate rights of any non-Hindu minority. But in no case can the Hindu majority resign its right which as a majority it is entitled to exercise under any democratic and legitimate constitution. The Moslem minority in particular has not obliged the Hindus by remaining in minority and therefore, they must remain satisfied with the status they occupy and with the legitimate share of civic and political rights that is their proportionate due. It would be simply preposterous to endow the Moslem minority with the right of exercising a practical veto on the legitimate rights and privileges of the majority and call it a " Swarajya ". The Hindus do not want a change of masters, are not going to struggle and fight and die only to replace an Edward by an Aurangzeb simply because the latter happens to be born within Indian borders, but they want henceforth to be masters themselves in their own house, in their own Land. " And it is because he wants his Swaraj to bear the stamp of being a Hindu Raj that Mr. Savarkar wants that India should have the appellation of Hindustan.

This structure has been reared by Mr. Savarkar on two propositions which he regards as fundamental.

The first is that the Hindu are a nation by themselves. He enunciates this proposition with great elaboration and vehemence. Says ¹⁵[\[f.15\]](#) Mr. Savarkar :

" In my Presidential speech at Nagpur I had, for the first time in the history of our recent politics pointed out in bold relief that the whole Congress ideology was vitiated *ab initio* by its unwitting

assumption that the territorial unity, a common habitat, was the only factor that constituted and ought to and must constitute a Nation. This conception of a Territorial Nationality has since then received a rude shock in Europe itself from which it was imported wholesale to India and the present War has justified my assertion by exploding the myth altogether. All Nations carved out to order on the Territorial design without any other common bond to mould each of them into a national being have gone to rack and ruin, tumbled down like a house of cards. Poland and Czechoslovakia will ever serve as a stern warning against any such efforts to frame heterogeneous peoples into such hotch-potch Nation, based only on the shifting sands of the conception of Territorial Nationality, not cemented by any cultural, racial or historical affinities and consequently having no common will to incorporate themselves into a Nation. These treaty-Nations broke up at the first opportunity they got: The German part of them went over to Germany, the Russian to Russia, Czechs to Czechs and Poles to Poles. The cultural, linguistic, historical and such other organic affinities proved sponger than the Territorial one. Only those Nations have persisted in maintaining their National unity and identity during the last three to four centuries in Europe which had developed racial, linguistic cultural and such other organic affinities in addition to their Territorial unity or even at times in spite of it and consequently willed to be homogeneous National units—such as England, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, etc.

" Judged by any and all of these tests which go severally and collectively to form such a homogeneous and organic Nation, in India we Hindus are marked out as an abiding Nation by ourselves. Not only do we own a common Fatherland, a Territorial unity, but what is scarcely found anywhere else in the world, we have a common Holy Land which is identified with our common Fatherland. This Bharat Bhumi, this Hindustan, India is both our 1^^ and gi^. Our patriotism therefore is doubly sure. Then, we have common affinities, cultural, religious, historical, linguistic, and racial which through the process of countless centuries of association and assimilation moulded us into a homogeneous and organic nation and above all induced a will to lead a corporate and common national life. The Hindus are no treaty Nation—but an organic National Being.

" One more pertinent point must be met as it often misleads our Congressite Hindu brethren in particular. The homogeneity that welds a people into a National Being does not only imply the total absence of all internal differences, religious, racial or linguistic, of sects and sections amongst themselves. It only means that they differ more from other people as a national unit than they differ amongst themselves. Even the most unitarian nations of today—say the British or the French—cannot be free from any religious, linguistic, cultural, racial or other differences, sects or sections or even some antipathies existing amongst themselves. National homogeneity connotes oneness of a people in relation to the contrast they present to any other people as a whole.

" We Hindus, in spite of thousand and one differences within our fold, are bound by such religious, cultural, historical, racial, linguistic and other affinities in common as to stand out as a definitely homogeneous people as soon as we are placed in contrast with any other non-Hindu people— say the English or Japanese or even the Indian Moslems. That is the reason why today we the Hindus from Cashmere to Madras and Sindh to Assam will have to be a Nation by ourselves ". . .

The second proposition on which Mr. Savarkar has built up his scheme relates to the definition of the term Hindu. According to Mr. Savarkar a Hindu is a person:

" who regards-and owns this Bharat Bhumi, this land from the Indus to the Seas, as his Fatherland as well as his Holy Land;—i.e., the land of the origin of his religion, the cradle of his faith.

The followers therefore of Vaidicism, SanaUmism, Jainism, Buddhism, Lingaitism, Sikhism, the Arya Samaj, the Brahmosamaj, the Devasamaj, the Prarlhana Samajandsucholherreligionsofindianorigin are Hindus and constitute Hindudom, i.e., Hindu people as a whole.

Consequently the so-called aboriginal or hill-tribes also are Hindus : because India is their Fatherland as well as their Holy Land whatever form of religion or worship they follow. The definition rendered in Sanskrit stands thus:

ASINDHU SINDH PANYANTA YSMA BHARAT BHUMIKA I

PRITIBHU H PUNDYABHOOSHRAIV SA VAI HINDURITISMRTAH II

This definition , therefore, should be recognized by the Government and made the test of ' Hindutva * in enumerating the population of Hindus in the Government census to come. "

This definition of the term Hindu has been framed with great care and caution. It is designed to serve two purposes which Mr. Savarkar has in view. First, to exclude from it Muslims, Christians, Parsis and Jews by prescribing the recognition of India as a Holy Land as a qualification for being a Hindu. Secondly, to include Buddhists, Jains, Sikhs, etc., by not insisting upon belief in the sanctity of the Vedas as an element in the qualifications.

Such is the scheme of Mr. Savarkar and the Hindu Maha Sabha. As must have been noticed, the scheme has some disturbing features.

One is the categorical assertion that the Hindus are a nation by themselves. This, of course, means that the Muslims are a separate nation by themselves. That this is his view, Mr. Savarkar does not leave to be inferred. He insists upon it in no uncertain terms and with the most absolute emphasis he is capable of. Speaking at the Hindu Maha Sabha Session held at Ahmedabad in 1937, Mr. Savarkar said :—

" Several infantile politicians commit the serious mistake in supposing that India is already welded into a harmonious nation, or that it could be welded thus for the mere wish to do so. These our well-meaning but unthinking friends take their dreams for realities. That is why they are impatient of communal tangles and attribute them to communal organizations. But the solid fact is that the so-called communal questions are but a legacy handed down to us by centuries of a cultural, religious and national antagonism between the Hindus and the Muslims. When the time is ripe you can solve them; but you cannot suppress them by merely refusing recognition of them. It is safer to diagnose and treat deep-seated disease than to ignore it. Let us bravely face unpleasant facts as they are. India cannot be assumed today to be a unitarian and homogeneous nation, but on the contrary these are two nations in the main, the Hindus and the Muslims in India. "

Strange as it may appear, Mr. Savarkar and Mr. Jinnah instead of being opposed to each other on the one nation *versus* two nations issue are in complete agreement about it. Both agree, not only agree but insist that there are two nations in India—one the Muslim nation and the other the Hindu nation. They differ only as regards the terms and conditions on which the two nations should live. Mr. Jinnah says India should be cut up into two, Pakistan and Hindustan, the Muslim nation to occupy Pakistan and the Hindu nation to occupy Hindustan. Mr. Savarkar on the other hand insists that, although there are two nations in India, India shall not be divided into two parts, one for Muslims and the other for the Hindus ; that the two nations shall dwell in one country and shall live under the mantle of one single constitution; that the constitution shall be such that the Hindu nation will be enabled to occupy a predominant position that is due to it and the Muslim nation made to live in the position of subordinate co-operation with the Hindu nation. In the struggle for political power between the two nations the rule of the game, which Mr. Savarkar prescribes, is to be one man one vote, be the man Hindu or Muslim. In his scheme a Muslim is to have no advantage which a Hindu does not have. Minority is to be no justification for privilege and majority is to be no ground for penalty. The State will guarantee the Muslims any defined measure of political power in the form of Muslim religion and Muslim culture. But the State will not guarantee secured seats in

the Legislature or in the Administration and, if such guarantee is insisted upon by the Muslims, ¹⁶[f.16] such guaranteed quota is not to exceed their proportion to the general population. Thus by confiscating its weightages, Mr. Savarkar would even strip the Muslim nation of all the political privileges it has secured so far.

This alternative of Mr. Savarkar to Pakistan has about it a frankness, boldness and definiteness which distinguishes it from the irregularity, vagueness and indefiniteness which characterizes the Congress declarations about minority rights. Mr. Savarkar's scheme has at least the merit of telling the Muslims, thus far and no further. The Muslims know where they are with regard to the Hindu Maha Sabha. On the other hand, with the Congress the Musalmans find themselves nowhere because the Congress has been treating the Muslims and the minority question as a game in diplomacy, if not in duplicity.

At the same time, it must be said that Mr. Savarkar's attitude is illogical, if not queer. Mr. Savarkar admits that the Muslims are a separate nation. He concedes that they have a right to cultural autonomy. He allows them to have a national flag. Yet he opposes the demand of the Muslim nation for a separate national home. If he claims a national home for the Hindu nation, how can he refuse the claim of the Muslim nation for a national home ?

It would not have been a matter of much concern if inconsistency was the only fault of Mr. Savarkar. But Mr. Savarkar in advocating his scheme is really creating a most dangerous situation for the safety and security of India. History records two ways as being open to a major nation to deal with a minor nation when they are citizens of the same country and are subject to the same constitution. One way is to destroy the nationality of the minor nation and to assimilate and absorb it into the major nation, so as to make one nation out of two. This is done by denying to the minor nation any right to language, religion or culture and by seeking to enforce upon it the language, religion and culture of the major nation. The other way is to divide the country and to allow the minor nation a separate, autonomous and sovereign existence, independent of the major nation. Both these ways were tried in Austria and Turkey, the second after the failure of the first.

Mr. Savarkar adopts neither of these two ways. He does not propose to suppress the Muslim nation. On the contrary he is nursing and feeding it by allowing it to retain its religion, language and culture, elements which go to sustain the soul of a nation. At the same time he does not consent to divide the country so as to allow the two nations to become separate, autonomous states, each sovereign in its own territory. He wants the Hindus and the Muslims to live as two separate nations in one country, each maintaining its own religion, language and culture. One can understand and even appreciate the wisdom of the theory of suppression of the minor nation by the major nation because the ultimate aim is to bring into being one nation. But one cannot follow what advantage a theory has which says that there must ever be two nations but that there shall be no divorce between them. One can justify this attitude only if the two nations were to live as partners in friendly intercourse with mutual respect and accord. But that is not to be, because Mr. Savarkar will not allow the Muslim nation to be co-equal in authority with the Hindu nation. He wants the Hindu nation to be the dominant nation and the Muslim nation to be the servient nation. Why Mr. Savarkar, after sowing this seed of enmity between the Hindu nation and the Muslim nation should want that they should live under one constitution and occupy one country, is difficult to explain.

One cannot give Mr. Savarkar credit for having found a new formula. What is difficult to understand is that he should believe that his formula is the right formula. Mr. Savarkar has taken old Austria and old Turkey as his model and pattern for his scheme of Swaraj. He sees that in Austria and Turkey there lived one major nation *juxtaposed* to other minor nations bound by one constitution with the major nation dominating the minor nations and argues that if this was possible in Austria and Turkey, why should it not be possible for the Hindus to do the same in India.

That Mr. Savarkar should have taken old Austria and old Turkey as his model to build upon is really very strange. Mr. Savarkar does not seem to be aware of the fact that old Austria and old Turkey are no more. Much less does he seem to know the forces which have blown up old Austria

and old Turkey to bits. If Mr. Savarkar instead of studying the past—of which he is very fond—were to devote more attention to the present, he would have learnt that old Austria and old Turkey came to ruination for insisting upon maintaining the very scheme of things which Mr. Savarkar has been advising his " Hindudom " to adopt, namely, to establish a Swaraj in which there will be two nations under the mantle of one single constitution in which the major nation will be allowed to hold the minor nation in subordination to itself.

The history of the disruption of Austria, Czechoslovakia and Turkey is of the utmost importance to India and the members of the Hindu Maha Sabha will do well to peruse the same. I need say nothing here about it because I have drawn attention to lessons from their fateful history in another chapter. Suffice it to say that the scheme of Swaraj formulated by Mr. Savarkar will give the Hindus an empire over the Muslims and thereby satisfy their vanity. and their pride in being an imperial race. But it can never ensure a stable and peaceful future for the Hindus, for the simple reason that the Muslims will never yield willing obedience to so dreadful an alternative.

III

Mr. Savarkar is quite unconcerned about the Muslim reaction to his scheme. He formulates his scheme and throws it in the face of the Muslims with the covering letter ' take it or leave it '. He is not perturbed by the Muslim refusal to join in the struggle for Swaraj. He is quite conscious of the strength of the Hindus and the Hindu Maha Sabha and proposes to carry on the struggle in the confident hope that, alone and unaided, the Hindus will be able to wrest Swaraj from the British. Mr. Savarkar is quite prepared to say to the Musalmans :

"If you come, with you, if you don't, without you; and if you oppose, in spite of you—the Hindus will continue to fight for their national freedom as best as they can. "

Not so Mr. Gandhi. At the very commencement of his career as a political leader of India when Mr. Gandhi startled the people of India by his promise to win Swaraj within six months, Mr. Gandhi said that he could perform the miracle only if certain conditions were fulfilled. One of these conditions was the achievement of Hindu-Muslim unity. Mr. Gandhi is never tired of saying that there is no Swaraj without Hindu-Muslim unity. Mr. Gandhi did not merely make this slogan the currency of Indian politics but he has strenuously worked to bring it about. Mr. Gandhi, it may be said, began his career as a political leader of India with the manifesto dated 2nd March 1919 declaring his intention to launch Satyagraha against the Rowlatt Act and asking those who desired to join him to sign the Satyagraha pledge. That campaign of Satyagraha was a short-lived campaign and was suspended by Mr. Gandhi on 18th April 1919. As a part of his programme Mr. Gandhi had fixed ¹⁷[\[f.17\]](#) the 6th March 1919 to be observed all over India as a day of protest against the Rowlatt Act. Mass meetings were to be held on that day and Mr. Gandhi had prescribed that the masses attending the meetings should take a vow in the following terms :

" With God as witness, we Hindus, and Mahomedans declare that we shall behave towards one another as children of the same parents, that we shall have no differences, that the sorrows of each shall be the sorrows of the other and that each shall help the other in removing them. We shall respect each other's religion and religious feelings and shall not stand in the way of our respective religious practices. We shall always refrain from violence to each other in the name of religion. " There was nothing in the campaign of Satyagraha against the Rowlatt Act which could have led to any clash between the Hindus and Muslims. Yet Mr. Gandhi asked his followers to take the vow. This shows how insistent he was from the very beginning upon Hindu-Muslim unity.

The Mahomedans started the Khilafat movement in 1919. The objective of the movement was two-fold; to preserve the Khilafat and to maintain the integrity of the Turkish Empire. Both these objectives were unsupportable. The Khilafat could not be saved simply because the Turks, in whose interest this agitation was carried on, did not want the Sultan. They wanted a republic and it was quite unjustifiable to compel the Turks to keep Turkey a monarchy when they wanted to convert it into a republic. It was not open to insist upon the integrity of the Turkish Empire because it meant

the perpetual subjection of the different nationalities to the Turkish rule and particularly of the Arabs, especially when it was agreed on all hands that the doctrine of self-determination should be made the basis of the peace settlement.

The movement was started by the Mahomedans. It was taken up by Mr. Gandhi with a tenacity and faith which must have surprised many Mahomedans themselves. There were many people who doubted the ethical basis of the Khilafat movement and tried to dissuade Mr. Gandhi from taking any part in a movement the ethical basis of which was so questionable. But Mr. Gandhi had so completely persuaded himself of the justice of the Khilafat agitation that he refused to yield to their advice. Time and again he argued that the cause was just and it was his duty to join it. The position taken up by him may be summed up in his own words. ¹⁸[\[f18\]](#)

" (1) In my opinion, the Turkish claim is not only not immoral and unjust, but it is highly equitable, only because Turkey wants to retain what is her own. And the Mahomedan manifesto has definitely declared that whatever guarantee may be necessary to be taken for the protection of the non-Muslim and non-Turkish races, should be taken so as to give the Christians theirs and the Arabs their self-government under the Turkish suzerainty;

(2) I do not believe the Turk to be weak, incapable or cruel. He is certainly disorganised and probably without good generalship. The argument of weakness, incapacity and cruelty one often hears quoted in connection with those from whom power is sought to be taken away. About the alleged massacres a proper commission has been asked for, but never granted. And in any case security can be taken against oppression;

(3) I have already stated that, if I were not interested in the Indian Mahomedans, I would not interest myself in the welfare of the Turks any more than I am in that of the Austrians or the Poles. But I am bound as an Indian to share the sufferings and trials of fellow-Indians. If I deem the Mahomedan to be my brother, it is my duty to help him in his hour of peril to the best of my ability, if his cause commends itself to me as just;

(4) The fourth refers to the extent Hindus should join hands with the Mahomedans. It is, therefore, a matter of feeling and opinion. It is expedient to suffer for my Mahomedan brother to the utmost in a just cause and I should, therefore, travel with him along the whole road so long as the means employed by him are as honourable as his end. I cannot regulate the Mahomedan feeling. I must accept his statement that the Khilafat is with him a religious question in the sense that it binds him to reach the goal even at the cost of his own life. "

Mr. Gandhi not only agreed with the Muslims in the Khilafat cause but acted as their guide and their friend. The part played by Mr. Gandhi in the Khilafat agitation and the connection between the Khilafat agitation and the Non-co-operation Movement has become obscure by the reason of the fact that most people believed that it was the Congress which initiated the Non co-operation Movement and it was done as a means for winning Swaraj. That such a view should prevail is quite understandable because most people content themselves with noting the connection between the Non-co-operation Movement and the special session of the Congress held at Calcutta on 7th and 8th September 1920. But anyone, who cares to go behind September 1920 and examine the situation as it then stood, will find that this view is not true. The truth is that the non-co-operation has its origin in the Khilafat agitation and not in the Congress Movement for Swaraj : that it was started by the Khilafatists to help Turkey and adopted by the Congress only to help the Khilafatists : that Swaraj was not its primary object, but its primary object was Khilafat and that Swaraj was added as a secondary object to induce the Hindus to join it will be evident from the following facts.

The Khilafat movement may be said to have begun on 27th October 1919 when the day was observed as the Khilafat Day all over India. On 23rd November 1919 the first Khilafat Conference met at Delhi. It was at this session that the Muslims considered the feasibility of non-co-operation as a means of compelling the British Government to redress the Khilafat wrong. On 10th March 1920 the Khilafat Conference met at Calcutta and decided upon non-co-operation as the best

weapon to further the object of their agitation.

On 9th June 1920 the Khilafat Conference met at Allahabad and unanimously reaffirmed their resolve to resort to non-co-operation and appointed an Executive Committee to enforce and lay down a detailed programme. On 22nd June 1920 the Muslims sent a message to the Viceroy stating that they would start non-co-operation if the Turkish grievances were not redressed before 1st August 1920. On 30th June 1920 the Khilafat Committee meeting held at Allahabad resolved to start non-co-operation, after a month's notice to the Viceroy. Notice was given on 1st July 1920 and non-co-operation commenced on 1st August 1920. This short resume shows that the non-co-operation was started by the Khilafat Committee and all that the Congress special session at Calcutta did was to adopt what the Khilafat Conference had already done and that too not in the interest of Swaraj but in the interest of helping the Muslims in furthering the cause of Khilafat. This is clear from the perusal of the Congress Resolution [19 \[f.19\]](#) passed at the special session held at Calcutta.

Although the Non-co-operation Movement was launched by the Khilafat Committee and merely adopted by the Congress primarily to help the Khilafat cause, the person who suggested it to the Khilafat Committee and who identified himself with the Committee and took the responsibility of giving effect to it and who brought about its adoption by the Congress was Mr. Gandhi. At the first Khilafat Conference held at Delhi on 23rd November

1919 Mr. Gandhi was present. Not only was Mr. Gandhi present but also it was he who advised the Muslims to adopt non-co-operation as a method for forcing the British to yield to their demands regarding the Khilafat. The joining of Mr. Gandhi in the Khilafat movement is full of significance. The Muslims were anxious to secure the support of the Hindus in the cause of Khilafat. At the Conference held on 23rd November 1919 the Muslims had invited the Hindus. Again on 3rd June 1920 a joint meeting of the Hindus and the Khilafatist Muslims was held at Allahabad. This meeting was attended among others by Sapru, Motilal Nehru and Annie Besant. But the Hindus were hesitant in joining the Muslims. Mr. Gandhi was the only Hindu who joined the Muslims. Not only did he show courage to join them, but also he kept step with them, nay, led them. On 9th June

1920 when the Khilafat Conference met at Allahabad and formed an Executive Committee to prepare a detailed programme of non co-operation and give effect to it, Mr. Gandhi was the only Hindu on that Executive Committee. On 22nd June 1920 the Muslims sent a message to the Viceroy that they would start non-co-operation if the Turkish grievances were not redressed before 1st August 1920. On the same day Mr. Gandhi also sent a letter to the Viceroy explaining the justice of the Khilafat cause, the reasons why he has taken up the cause and the necessity of satisfying the hands of the Khilafatists. For instance the notice given to the Viceroy on 1st July 1920 that non-co-operation will be started on 1st August was given by Mr. Gandhi and not by the Khilafatists. Again when non-co-operation was started by the Khilafatist on 31st August 1920 Mr. Gandhi was the first to give a concrete shape to it by returning his medal. After inaugurating the Non-co-operation Movement as an active member of the Khilafat Committee Mr. Gandhi next directed his energy to the cause of persuading the Congress to adopt non-co-operation and strengthen the Khilafat movement. With that object in view Mr. Gandhi toured the country between 1st August and 1st September 1920 in the company of the Ali Brothers who were the founders of the Khilafat movement impressing upon the people the necessity of non-co-operation. People could notice the disharmony in the tune of Mr. Gandhi and the Ali Brothers. As the *Modern Review* pointed out: " Reading between the lines of their speeches, it is not difficult to see that with one of them the sad plight of the Khilafat in distant Turkey is the central fact, while with the other attainment of Swaraj here in India is the object in view ". This dichotomy ²⁰[\[f.20\]](#) of interest did not augur well for the success of the ultimate purpose. Nonetheless Mr. Gandhi succeeded in carrying the Congress with him in support of the Khilafat cause. ²¹[\[f.21\]](#)

For a long time the Hindus had been engaged in wooing the Muslims to their side. The Congress was very anxious to bridge the gulf between itself and the Muslim League. The ways and means

adopted in 1916 for bringing about this consummation and which resulted in the Lucknow Pact signed between the Congress and the Muslim League have been graphically told by Swami Shradhanand in his impressions of the Congress Session held in that year at Lucknow. Says the Swami ²²[\[f.22\]](#) :

" On sitting on the dias (Lucknow Congress platform) the first thing that I noticed was that the number of Moslem delegates was proportionately fourfold of what it was at Lahore in 1893. The majority of Moslem delegates had donned gold, silver and silk embroidered chogas (flowing robes) over their ordinary coarse suits of wearing apparel. It was rumoured that these ' chogas ' had been put by Hindu moneyed men for Congress Tamasha. Of some 433 Moslem delegates only some 30 had come from outside, the rest belonging to Lucknow City. And of these majority was admitted free to delegate seals, board and lodging. Sir Syed Ahmad's anti-Congress League had tried in a public meeting to dissuade Moslems from joining the Congress as delegates. As a countermove the Congress people lighted the whole Congress camp some four nights before the session began and advertised that that night would be free. The result was that all the " Chandul Khanas " of Lucknow were emptied and a huge audience of some thirty thousand Hindus and Moslems was addressed from half a dozen platforms. It was then that the Moslem delegates were elected or selected. All this was admitted by the Lucknow Congress organisers to me in private.

" A show was being made of the Moslem delegates. Moslem delegate gets up to second a resolution in Urdu. He begins : ' Hozarat, I am a Mahomedan delegate '. Some Hindu delegate gets up and calls for three cheers for Mahomedan delegates and the response is so enthusiastic as to be beyond description. "

In taking up the cause of Khilafat Mr. Gandhi achieved a double purpose. He carried the Congress Plan of winning over the Muslims to its culmination. Secondly he made the Congress a power in the country, which it would not have been, if the Muslims had not joined it. The cause of the Khilafat appealed to the Musalmans far more than political safeguards, with the result that the Musalmans who were outside it trooped into the Congress. The Hindus welcomed them. For, they saw in this a common front against the British, which was their main aim. The credit for this must of course go to Mr. Gandhi. For there can be no doubt that this was an act of great daring.

When the Musalmans in 1919 approached the Hindus for participation in the Non-co-operation Movement which the Muslims desired to start for helping Turkey and the Khilafat, the Hindus were found to be divided in three camps. One was a camp of those who were opposed to non-co-operation in principle. A second camp consisted of those Hindus who were prepared to join the Muslims in their campaign of non-co-operation provided the Musalmans agreed to give up Cow Slaughter. A third group consisted of the Hindus who feared that the Mahomedans might extend their non-co-operation to inviting the Afghans to invade India, in which case the movement instead of resulting in Swaraj might result in the subjection of India to Muslim Raj.

Mr. Gandhi did not care for those Hindus who were opposed to joining the Muslims in the Non-co-operation Movement. But with regard to the others he told them that their attitude was unfortunate.

To those Hindus who wanted to give their support on the condition that the Muslims give up cow killing, Mr. Gandhi said ²³[\[f.23\]](#) :

" I submit that the Hindus may not open the Goraksha (cow protection) question here. The test of friendship is assistance in adversity, and that too, unconditional assistance. Co-operation that needs consideration is a commercial contract and not friendship. Conditional co-operation is like adulterated cement which does not bind. It is the duty of the Hindus, if they see the justice of the Mahomedan cause to render co-operation. If the Mahomedans feel themselves bound in honour to spare the Hindu's feelings and to stop cow killing, they may do so, no matter whether the Hindus co-operate with them or not. Though therefore, I yield to no Hindu in my worship of the cow, I do not want to make the stopping of cow killing a condition precedent to co-operation. Unconditional

co-operation means the protection of the cow."

To those Hindus who feared to join the Non-co-operation Movement for the reasons that Muslims may invite the Afghans to invade India, Mr. Gandhi said ²⁴[\[f.24\]](#) :

" It is easy enough to understand and justify the Hindu caution. It is difficult to resist the Mahomedan position. In my opinion, the best way to prevent India from becoming the battle ground between the forces of Islam and those of the English is for Hindus to make non-co-operation a complete and immediate success, and I have little doubt that, if the Mahomedans remain true to their declared intention and are able to exercise self-restraint and make sacrifices, the Hindus will ' play the game ' and join them in the campaign of non-co-operation. I feel equally certain that Hindus will not assist Mahomedans in promoting or bringing about an armed conflict between the British Government and their allies, and Afghanistan. British forces are too well organised to admit of any successful invasion of the Indian frontier. The only way, therefore, the Mahomedans can carry on an effective struggle on behalf of the honour of Islam is to take up non-co-operation in real earnest. It will not only be completely effective if it is adopted by the people on an extensive scale, but it will also provide full scope for individual conscience. If I cannot bear an injustice done by an individual or a corporation, and, I am directly or indirectly instrumental in upholding that individual or corporation, I must answer for it before my Maker; but I have done all that is humanly possible for me to do consistently with the moral code that refuses to injure even the wrong-doers, if I cease to support the injustice in the manner described above. In applying, therefore, such a great force, there should be no haste, there should be no temper shown. Non-co-operation must be and remain absolutely a voluntary effort. The whole thing, then, depends upon Mahomedans themselves. If they will but help themselves, Hindu help will come and the Government, great and mighty though it is, will have to bend before the bloodless opposition of a whole nation. "

Unfortunately, the hope of Mr. Gandhi that ' no Government can possibly withstand the bloodless opposition of a whole nation ' did not come true. Within a year of the starting of the Non-co-operation Movement, Mr. Gandhi had to admit that the Musalmans had grown impatient and that :

" In their impatient anger, the Musalmans ask for more energetic and more prompt action by the Congress and Khilafat organisations. To the Musalmans, Swaraj means, as it must mean, India's ability to deal effectively with the Khilafat question. The Musalmans, therefore, decline to wait if the attainment of Swaraj means indefinite delay of a programme that may require the Musalmans of India to become impotent witnesses of the extinction of Turkey in European waters.

" It is impossible not to sympathise with this attitude. I would gladly recommend immediate action if I could think of any effective course. I would gladly ask for postponement of Swaraj activity if thereby we could advance the interest of Khilafat. I could gladly take up measures outside non-co-operation, if I could think of any, in order to assuage the pain caused to the millions of the Musalmans.

" But, in my humble opinion, attainment of Swaraj is the quickest method of righting the Khilafat wrong. Hence it is, that for me the solution of the Khilafat question is attainment of Swaraj and *vice versa*. The only way to help the affiliated Turks is for India to generate sufficient power to be able to assert herself. If she cannot develop that power in time, there is no way out for India and she must resign herself to the inevitable. What can a paralytic do to stretch forth a helping hand to a neighbour but to try to cure himself of his paralysis ? Mere ignorant, thoughtless and angry outburst of violence may give vent to pent-up rage but can bring no relief to Turkey. "

The Musalmans were not in a mood to listen to the advice of Mr. Gandhi. They refused to worship the principle of non-violence. They were not prepared to wait for Swaraj. They were in a hurry to find the most expeditious means of helping Turkey and saving the Khilafat. And' the Muslims in their impatience did exactly what the Hindus feared they would do, namely, invite the Afghans to

invade India. How far the Khilafatists had proceeded in their negotiations with the Amir of Afghanistan it is not possible to know. But that such a project was entertained by them is beyond question. It needs no saying that the project of an invasion of India was the most dangerous project and every sane Indian would dissociate himself from so mad a project. What part Mr. Gandhi played in this project it is not possible to discover. Certainly he did not dissociate himself from it. On the contrary his misguided zeal for Swaraj and his obsession on Hindu-Moslem unity as the only means of achieving it, led him to support the project. Not only did he advise ²⁵[\[f.25\]](#) the Amir not to enter into any treaty with the British Government but declared:

" I would, in a sense, certainly assist the Amir of Afghanistan if he waged war against the British Government. That is to say, I would openly tell my countrymen that it would be a crime to help a government which had lost the confidence of the nation to remain in power ".

Can any sane man go so far, for the sake of Hindu-Moslem unity ? But, Mr. Gandhi was so attached to Hindu-Moslem unity that he did not stop to enquire what he was really doing in this mad endeavour. So anxious was Mr. Gandhi in laying the foundation of Hindu-Moslem unity well and truly, that he did not forget to advise his followers regarding the national crisis. In an Article in *Young India* of 8th September 1920 Mr. Gandhi said :

" During the Madras tour, at Bezwada I had occasion to remark upon the national crisis and suggested that it would be better to have cries about ideals than men. I asked the audience to replace Mahatma Gandhi-ki-jai and Mahomed Ali Shoukat Ali-ki-jai by Hindu-Musalman-ki-jai. Brother Shoukat Ali, who followed, positively laid down the law. In spite of the Hindu-Muslim unity, he had observed that, if Hindus shouted Bande Mataram, the Muslims rang out with Allaho Akbar and *vice versa*. This, he rightly said jarred on the ear and still showed that the people did not act with one mind. There should be therefore only three cries recognised. Allaho Akbar to be joyously sung out by Hindus and Muslims, showing that God alone was great and no other. The second should be Bande Malaram (Hail Motherland) or Bharat Mata-ki-jai (Victory to Mother Hind). The third should be Hindu-Musalman-ki-jai without which there was no victory for India, and no true demonstration of the greatness of God.. I do wish that the newspapers and public men would take up the Maulana's suggestion and lead the people only to use the three cries. They are full of meaning. The first is a prayer and confession of our littleness and therefore a sign of humility. It is a cry in which all Hindus and Muslims should join in reverence and prayfulness. Hindus may not fight shy of Arabic words, when their meaning is not only totally inoffensive but even ennobling. God is no respecter of any particular tongue. Bande Mataram, apart from its wonderful associations, expresses the one national wish—the rise of India to her full height. And I should prefer Bande Mataram to Bharat Mata-ki-jai, as it would be a graceful recognition of the intellectual and emotional superiority of Bengal. Since India can be nothing without the union of the Hindu and the Muslim heart, Hindu-Musalman-ki-jai is a cry which we may never forget.

" There should be no discordance in these cries. Immediately some one has taken up any of the three cries, the rest should take it up and not attempt to yell out their favourite. Those, who do not wish to join, may refrain, but should consider it a breach of etiquette to interpolate their own when a cry has already been raised. It would be better too, always to follow out the three cries in the order given above. "

These are not the only things Mr. Gandhi has done to build up Hindu-Moslem unity. He has never called the Muslims to account even when they have been guilty of gross crimes against Hindus.

It is a notorious fact that many prominent Hindus who had offended the religious susceptibilities of the Muslims either by their writings or by their part in the Shudhi movement have been murdered by some fanatic Musalmans. First to suffer was Swami Shradhanand, who was shot by Abdul Rashid on 23rd December 1926 when he was lying in his sick bed. This was followed by the murder of Lala Nanakchand, a prominent Arya Samajist of Delhi. Rajpal, the author of the *Rangila Rasool*, was stabbed by Ilaudin on 6th April 1929 while he was sitting in his shop. Nathuramal Sharma was murdered by Abdul Qayum in September 1934. It was an act of great daring. For

Sharma was stabbed to death in the Court of the Judicial Commissioner of Sind where he was seated awaiting the hearing of his appeal against his conviction under Section 195, 1. P. C., for the publication of a pamphlet on the history of Islam. Khanna, the Secretary of the Hindu Sabha, was severely assaulted in 1938 by the Mahomedans after the Session of the Hindu Maha Sabha held in Ahmedabad and very narrowly escaped death.

This is, of course, a very short list and could be easily expanded. But whether the number of prominent Hindus killed by fanatic Muslims is large or small matters little. What matters is the attitude of those who count, towards these murderers. The murderers paid the penalty of law where law is enforced. The leading Moslems, however, never condemned these criminals. On the contrary, they were hailed as religious martyrs and agitation was carried on for clemency being shown to them. As an illustration of this attitude, one may refer to Mr. Barkat Alli, a Barrister of Lahore, who argued the appeal of Abdul Qayum. He went to the length of saying that Qayum was not guilty of murder of Nathuramal because his act was justifiable by the law of the Koran. This attitude of the Moslems is quite understandable. What is not understandable is the attitude of Mr. Gandhi.

Mr. Gandhi has been very punctilious in the matter of condemning any and every act of violence and has forced the Congress, much against its will to condemn it. But Mr. Gandhi has never protested against such murders. Not only have the Musalmans not condemned ²⁶[\[f.26\]](#) these outrages but even Mr. Gandhi has never called upon the leading Muslims to condemn them. He has kept silent over them. Such an attitude can be explained only on the ground that Mr. Gandhi was anxious to preserve Hindu-Moslem unity and did not mind the murders of a few Hindus, if it could be achieved by sacrificing their lives.

This attitude to excuse the Muslims any wrong, lest it should injure the cause of unity, is well illustrated by what Mr. Gandhi had to say in the matter of the Mopla riots.

The blood-curdling atrocities committed by the Moplas in Malabar against the Hindus were indescribable. All over Southern India, a wave of horrified feeling had spread among the Hindus of every shade of opinion, which was intensified when certain Khilafat leaders were so misguided as to pass resolutions of " congratulations to the Moplas on the brave fight they were conducting for the sake of religion". Any person could have said that this was too heavy a price for Hindu-Moslem unity. But Mr. Gandhi was so much obsessed by the necessity of establishing Hindu-Moslem unity that he was prepared to make light of the doings of the Moplas and the Khilafats who were congratulating them. He spoke of the Moplas as the " brave God-fearing Moplas who were fighting for what they consider as religion and in a manner which they consider as religious ". Speaking of the Muslim silence over the Mopla atrocities Mr. Gandhi told the Hindus:

" The Hindus must have the courage and the faith to feel that they can protect their religion in spite of such fanatical eruptions. A verbal disapproval by the Mussalmans of Mopla madness is no test of Mussalman friendship. The Mussalmans must naturally feel the shame and humiliation of the Mopla conduct about forcible conversions and looting, and they must work away so silently and effectively that such a thing might become impossible even on the part of the most fanatical among them. My belief is that the Hindus as a body have received the Mopla madness with equanimity and that the cultured Mussalmans are sincerely sorry of the Mopla's perversion of the teaching of the Prophet"

The Resolution ²⁷[\[f.27\]](#) passed by the Working Committee of the Congress on the Mopla atrocities shows how careful the Congress was not to hurt the feelings of the Musalmans.

" The Working Committee places on record its sense of deep regret over the deeds of violence done by Moplas in certain areas of Malbar, these deeds being evidence of the fact that there are still people in India who have not understood the message of the Congress and the Central Khilafat Committee, and calls upon every Congress and Khilafat worker to spread the said message of non-violence even under the gravest provocation throughout the length and breadth of India.

" Whilst, however, condemning violence on the part of the Moplas, the working Committee desires it to be known that the evidence in its possession shows that provocation beyond endurance was given to the Moplas and that the reports published by and on behalf of the Government have given a one-sided and highly exaggerated account of the wrongs done by the Moplas and an understatement of the needless destruction of life resorted to by the Government in the name of peace and order.

" The Working Committee regrets to find that there have been instances of so-called forcible conversion by some fanatics among Moplas, but warns the public against believing in the Government and inspired versions. The Report before the Committee says:

" The families, which have been reported to have been forcibly converted into Mahomedanism, lived in the neighbourhood of Manjeri. It is clear that conversions were forced upon Hindus by a fanatic gang which was always opposed to the Khilafat and Non-co-operation Movement and there were only three cases so far as our information goes. ' "

The following instances of Muslim intransigence, over which Mr. Gandhi kept mum are recorded by Swami Shradhanand in his weekly journal called the *Liberator*. Writing in the issue of 30th September 1926 the Swamiji says :

" As regards the removal of untouchability it has been authoritatively ruled several times that it is the duty of Hindus to expiate for their past sins and non-Hindus should have nothing to do with it But the Mahomedan and the Christian Congressmen have openly revolted against the dictum of Mr. Gandhi at Vaikorn and other places. Even such an unbiased leader as Mr. Yakub Hassan, presiding over a meeting called to present an address to me at Madras, openly enjoined upon Musalmans the duty of converting all the untouchables in India to Islam. "

But Mr. Gandhi said nothing by way of remonstrance either to the Muslims or to the Christians.

In his issue of July 1926 the Swami writes :

" There was another prominent fact to which I drew the attention of Mahatma Gandhi. Both of us went together one night to the Khilafat Conference at Nagpur. The Ayats (verses) of the Quran recited by the Maulanas on that occasion, contained frequent references to Jihad and killing of the Kaffirs. But when I drew his attention to this phase of the Khilafat movement, Mahatmaji smiled and said, ' They are alluding to the British Bureaucracy '. In reply I said that it was all subversive of the idea of non-violence and when the reversion of feeling came the Mahomedan Maulanas would not refrain from using these verses against the Hindus. "

The Swami 's third instance relates to the Mopla riots. Writing in the *Liberator* of 26th August 1926 the Swami says :

"The first warning was sounded when the question of condemning the Moplas for their atrocities on Hindus came up in the Subjects Committee. The original resolution condemned the Moplas wholesale for the killing of Hindus and burning of Hindu homes and the forcible conversion to Islam. The Hindu members themselves *proposed* amendments till it was reduced to condemning only certain individuals who had been guilty of the above crimes. But some of the Moslem leaders could not bear this even. Maulana Fakir and other Maulanas, of course, opposed the resolution and there was no wonder. But I was surprised, an out-and-out Nationalist like Maulana Hasrat Mohani opposed the resolution on the ground that the Mopla country no longer remained Dar-ul-Aman but became Dar-ul-Harab and they suspected the Hindus of collusion with the British enemies of the Moplas. Therefore, the Moplas were right in presenting the Quran or sword to the Hindus. And if the Hindus became Mussalmans to save themselves from death, it was a voluntary change of faith and not forcible conversion—Well, even the harmless resolution condemning some of the Moplas was not unanimously passed but had to be accepted by a majority of votes only. There were other

indications also, showing that the Mussalmans considered the Congress to be existing on their sufferance and if there was the least attempt to ignore their idiosyncracies the superficial unity would be scrapped asunder. "

The last one refers to the burning of the foreign cloth started by Mr. Gandhi. Writing in the *Liberator* of 31st August 1926 the Swamiji says:

" While people came to the conclusion, that the burning of foreign cloth was a religious duty of Indians and Messrs. Das, Nehru and other topmost leaders made bon-fire of cloth worth thousands, the Khilafat Musalmans got permission from Mahatmaji to *send all foreign cloth for the use* of the Turkish brethren. This again was a great shock to me. While Mahatmaji stood adamant and did not have the least regard for Hindu feelings when a question of principle was involved, for the Moslem dereliction of duty, there was always a soft corner in his heart "

In the history of his efforts to bring about Hindu-Moslem unity mention must be made of two incidents. One is the Fast, which Mr. Gandhi underwent in the year 1924. It was a fast of 21 days. Before undertaking the fast Mr. Gandhi explained the reasons for it in a statement from which the following extracts are taken:

" The fact that Hindus and Musalmans, who were only two years ago apparently working together as friends, are now fighting like cats and dogs in some places, shows conclusively that the non-co-operation they offered was not non-violent. I saw the symptoms in Bombay, Chauri Chaura and in a host of minor cases. I did penance then. It had its effects *protanto*. But this Hindu-Muslim tension was unthinkable. It became unbearable on hearing of the Kohat tragedy. On the eve of my departure from Sabarmati for Delhi, Sarojinj Devi wrote to me that speeches and homilies on peace would not do. I must find out an effective remedy. She was right in saddling the responsibility on me. Had I not been instrumental in bringing into being the vast energy of the people? I must find the remedy if the energy proved self-destructive.

* * *

" I was violently shaken by Amethi, Sambhal and Gulbarga. I had read the reports about Amelhi and Sambhal prepared by Hindu and Musalman friends. I had learnt the joint finding of Hindu and Musalman friends who went to Gulbarga. I was writhing in deep pain and yet I had no remedy. The news of Kohal set the smouldering mass aflame. Something had got to be done. I passed two nights in restlessness and pain. On Wednesday I knew the remedy. I must do penance.

"It is a warning to the Hindus and Musalmans who have professed to love me. If they have loved me truly and if I have been deserving of their love, they will do penance with me for the grave sin of denying God in their hearts.

" The penance of Hindus and Mussalmans is not falling but retracting their steps. It is true penance for a Mussalman to harbour no ill-will for his Hindu brother and an equally true penance for a Hindu to harbour none for his Mussalman brother.

" I did not consult friends—not even Hakim Saheb who was close with me for a long time on Wednesday—not Maulana Mahomed Ali under whose roof I am enjoying the privilege of hospitality.

"But was it right for me to go through the last under a Mussalman roof? (Gandhi was at that time the guest of Mr. Mahomed Ali at Delhi). Yes, it was. The fast is not born out of ill-will against a single soul. My being under a Mussalman roof ensures it against any such interpretation. It is in the fitness of things that this fast should be taken up and completed in a Mussalman house.

" And who is Mahomed Ali ? Only two days before the fast we had a discussion about a private

matter in which I had told him what was mine was his and what was his was mine. Let me gratefully tell the public that I have never received warmer or teller treatment than under Mahomed Ali's roof. Every want of mine is anticipated. The dominant thought of every one of his household is to make me and mine happy and comfortable. Doctors Ansari and Abdur Rehman have constituted themselves my medical advisers. They examine me daily. I have had many a happy occasion in my life. This is no less happy than the previous ones. Bread is not everything. I am experiencing here the richest love. It is more than bread *for* me.

" It has been whispered that by going so much with Mussalman friends, I make myself unfit to know the Hindu mind. The Hindu mind is myself. Surely I do not live amidst Hindus to know the Hindu mind when every fibre of my being is Hindu. My Hinduism must be a very poor thing if it cannot flourish under influences the most adverse. I know instinctively what is necessary for Hinduism. But I must labour to discover the Mussalman mind. The closer I come to the best of Mussalmans, the juster I am likely to be in my estimate of the Mussalmans and their doings. I am striving to become the best cement between the two communities. My longing is to be able to cement the two with my blood, if necessary. But, before I can do so, I must prove to the Mussalmans that I love them as well as I love the Hindus. My religion teaches me to love all equally. May God help me to do so I My fast among other things is meant to qualify me for achieving that equal and selfless love. "

The fast produced Unity Conferences. But the Unity Conferences produced nothing except pious resolutions which were broken as soon as they were announced.

This short historical sketch of the part Mr. Gandhi played in bringing about Hindu-Moslem unity may be concluded by a reference to the attitude of Mr. Gandhi in the negotiations about the Communal Settlement. He offered the Muslims a blank cheque. The blank cheque only served to exasperate the Muslims as they interpreted it as an act of evasion. He opposed the separate electorates at the Round Table Conference. When they were given to the Muslims by the Communal Award, Mr. Gandhi and the Congress did not approve of them. But when it came to voting upon it, they took the strange attitude of neither approving it nor opposing it.

Such is the history of Mr. Gandhi's efforts to bring about Hindu-Moslem unity. What fruits did these efforts bear? To be able to answer this question it is necessary to examine the relationship between the two communities during 1920-40, the years during which Mr. Gandhi laboured so hard to bring about Hindu-Moslem unity. The relationship is well described in the Annual Reports on the affairs of India submitted year by year to Parliament by the Government of India under the old Government of India Act. It is on these reports ²⁸[\[f.28\]](#) that I have drawn for the facts recorded below.

Beginning with the year 1920 there occurred in that year in Malabar what is known as the Mopla Rebellion. It was the result of the agitation carried out by two Muslim organizations, the Khuddam-i-Kaba (servants of the Mecca Shrine) and the Central Khilafat Committee. Agitators actually preached the doctrine that India under the British Government was Dar-ul-Harab and that the Muslims must fight against it and if they could not, they must carry out the alternative principle of *Hijrat*. The Moplas were suddenly carried off their feet by this agitation. The outbreak was essentially a rebellion against the British Government The aim was to establish the kingdom of Islam by overthrowing the British Government. Knives, swords and spears were secretly manufactured, bands of desperadoes collected for an attack on British authority. On 20th August a severe encounter took place between the Moplas and the British forces at Pinmangdi Roads were blocked, telegraph lines cut, and the railway destroyed in a number of places. As soon as the administration had been paralysed, the Moplas declared that Swaraj had been established. A certain Ali Mudaliar was proclaimed Raja, Khilafat flags were flown, and Ernad and Wallurana were declared Khilafat Kingdoms. As a rebellion against the British Government it was quite understandable. But what baffled most was the treatment accorded by the Moplas to the Hindus of Malabar. The Hindus were visited by a dire fate at the hands of the Moplas. Massacres, forcible

conversions, desecration of temples, foul outrages upon women, such as ripping open pregnant women, pillage, arson and destruction—in short, all the accompaniments of brutal and unrestrained barbarism, were perpetrated freely by the Moplas upon the Hindus until such time as troops could be hurried to the task of restoring order through a difficult and extensive tract of the country. This was not a Hindu-Moslem riot. This was just a Bartholomew. The number of Hindus who were killed, wounded or converted, is not known. But the number must have been enormous.

In the year 1921-22 communal jealousy did not subside. The Muharram Celebrations had been attended by serious riots both in Bengal and in the Punjab. In the latter province in particular, communal feeling at Multan reached very serious heights, and although the casualty list was comparatively small, a great deal of damage to property was done.

Though the year 1922-23 was a peaceful year the relations between the two communities were strained throughout 1923-24. But in no locality did this tension produce such tragic consequences as in the city of Kohat. The immediate cause of the trouble was the publication and circulation of a pamphlet containing a virulently anti-Islamic poem. Terrible riots broke out on the 9th and 10th of September 1924, the total casualties being about 155 killed and wounded. House property to the estimated value of Rs. 9 lakhs was destroyed, and a large quantity of goods were looted. As a result of this reign of terror the whole Hindu population evacuated the city of Kohat. After protracted negotiations an agreement of reconciliation was concluded between the two communities. Government giving an assurance that, subject to certain reservations, the prosecution pending against persons concerned in rioting should be dropped. With the object of enabling the sufferers to restart their businesses and rebuild their houses. Government sanctioned advances, free of interest in certain instances, amounting to Rs. 5 lakhs. But even after the settlement had been reached and evacuees had returned to Kohat there was no peace and throughout 1924-25 the tension between the Hindu and Musalman masses in various parts of the country increased to a lamentable extent. In the summer months, there was a distressing number of riots. In July, severe fighting broke out between Hindus and Musalmans in Delhi, which was accompanied by serious casualties. In the same month, there was a bad outbreak at Nagpur. August was even worse. There were riots at Lahore, at Lucknow, at Moradabad, at Bhagalpur and Nagpur in British India ; while a severe affray took place at Gulbarga in the Nizam's Dominions. September-October saw severe fighting at Lucknow, Shahajahanpur, Kankinarah and at Allahabad. The most terrible outbreak of the year being the one that took place at Kohat which was accompanied by murder, arson and loot.

In 1925-26 the antagonism between the Hindus and the Muslims became widespread. Very significant features of the Hindu-Muslim rioting, which took place during this year were its wide distribution and its occurrence, in some cases, in small villages. Calcutta, the United Provinces, the Central Provinces and the Bombay Presidency were all scenes of riots, some of which led to regrettable losses of life. Certain minor and local Hindu festivals which occurred at the end of August, gave rise to communal trouble in Calcutta, in Berar, in Gujarat in the Bombay Presidency, and in the United Provinces. In some of these places there were actual clashes between the two communities, but elsewhere, notably at Kankinarah—one of the most thickly populated jute mill centres of Calcutta—serious rioting was prevented by the activity of the police. In Gujarat, Hindu-Muslim feeling was running high in these days and was marked by at least one case of temple desecration. The important Hindu festival of Ramlila, at the end of September, gave rise to acute anxiety in many places, and at Aligarh, an important place in the United Provinces, its celebration was marked by one of the worst riots of the year. The riot assumed such dangerous proportions that the police were compelled to fire in order to restore order, and five persons were killed, either by the police or by riots. At Lucknow, the same festival gave rise at one time to a threatening situation, but the local authorities prevented actual rioting. October saw another serious riot at Sholapur in the Bombay Presidency. There, the local Hindus were taking a car with Hindu idols through the city, and when they came near a mosque, a dispute arose between them and certain Muslims, which developed into a riot.

A deplorable rioting started in Calcutta in the beginning of April as an affray outside a mosque between Muslims and some Arya Samajists and continued to spread until 5th April, though there

was only one occasion on which the police or military were faced by a crowd which showed determined resistance, namely, on the evening of the 5th April, when fire had to be opened. There was also a great deal of incendiarism and in the first three days of this incendiarism, the Fire Brigade had to deal with 110 fires. An unprecedented feature of the riots was the attacks on temples by Muslims and on mosques by Hindus which naturally led to intense bitterness. There were 44 deaths and 584 injured. There was a certain amount of looting and business was suspended, with great economic loss to Calcutta. Shops began to reopen soon after the 5th, but the period of tension was prolonged by the approach of a Hindu festival on the 13th of April, and of the Id on the 14th. The Sikhs were to have taken out a procession on the 13th, but Government were unable to give them the necessary license. The apprehensions with regard to the 13th and 14th of April, fortunately, did not materialise and outward peace prevailed until 22nd April when it was abruptly broken as a result of a petty quarrel in a street, which restarted the rioting. Fighting between the mobs of the two communities, generally on a small scale, accompanied by isolated assaults and murders continued for six days. During this period there were no attacks on the temples and mosques and there was little arson or looting. But there were more numerous occasions, on which the hostile mobs did not immediately disperse on the appearance of the police and on 12 occasions it was necessary to open fire. The total number of casualties during this second phase of the rioting was 66 deaths and 391 injured. The dislocation of business was much more serious during the first riots and the closing of Marwari business houses was not without an effect on European business firms. Panic caused many of the markets to be wholly or partially closed and for two days the meat supply was practically stopped. So great was the panic that the removal of refuse in the disturbed area was stopped. Arrangements were, however, made to protect supplies, and the difficulty with the Municipal scavengers was overcome, as soon as the Municipality had applied to the police for protection. There was slight extension of the area of rioting, but no disturbances occurred in the mill area around Calcutta. Systematic raiding of the portions of the disturbed area, the arrest of hooligans, the seizure of weapons and the re-inforcement of the police by the posting of British soldiers to act as special police officers had the desired effect, and the last three days of April, in spite of the continuance of isolated assaults and murders, witnessed a steady improvement in the situation. Isolated murders were largely attributable to hooligans of both communities and their persistence during the first as well as the second outbreak induced a general belief that these hooligans were hired assassins. Another equally persistent feature of the riots, namely, the distribution of inflammatory printed leaflets by both sides, together with the employment of hired roughs, strengthened the belief that money had been spent to keep the riots going.

The year 1926-27 was one continuous period of communal riots. Since April 1926, every month witnessed affrays more or less serious between partisans of the two communities and only two months passed without actual rioting in the legal sense of the word. The examination of the circumstances of these numerous riots and affrays shows that they originated either in utterly petty and trivial disputes between individuals, as, for example, between a Hindu shopkeeper and a Mahomedan customer, or else, the immediate cause of trouble was the celebration of some religious festival or the playing of music by Hindu processionists in the neighbourhood of Mahomedan places of worship. One or two of the riots, indeed, were due to nothing more than strained nerves and general excitement. Of these, the most striking example occurred in Delhi on 24th June, when the bolting of a pony in a crowded street gave the impression that a riot had started, upon which both sides immediately attacked each other with brickbats and staves.

Including the two outbursts of rioting in Calcutta during April and May 1926, 40 riots took place during the twelve months ending with April 1st 1927, resulting in the death of 197 and injuries, more or less severe, to 1,598 persons. These disorders were widespread, but Bengal, the Punjab, and the United Provinces were the parts of India most seriously affected. Bengal suffered most from rioting, but on many occasions during the year, tension between Hindus and Mahomedans was high in the Bombay Presidency and also in Sind. Calcutta remained uneasy throughout the whole of the summer. On 1st June a petty dispute developed into a riot in which forty persons were hurt. After this, there was a lull in overt violence until July 15th on which day fell an important Hindu religious festival. During its celebration the passage of a procession, with bands playing in

the neighbourhood of certain mosques, resulted in a conflict, in which 14 persons were killed and 116 injured. The next day saw the beginning of the important Mahomedan festival of Muharram. Rioting broke out on that day and, after a lull, was renewed on the 19th, 20th, 21st and 22nd. Isolated assaults and cases of stabbing occurred on the 23rd, 24th and 25th. The total ascertained casualties during this period of rioting were 28 deaths and 226 injured. There were further riots in Calcutta on the 15th September and 16th October and on the latter day there was also rioting in the adjoining city of Howrah, during which one or two persons were killed and over 30 injured. The April and May riots had been greatly aggravated by incendiarism, but, happily, this feature was almost entirely absent from the later disorders and during the July riots, for example, the Fire Brigade was called upon to deal with only four incendiary fires.

Coming to the year 1927-28 the following facts stare us in the face. Between the beginning of April and the end of September 1927, no fewer than 25 riots were reported. Of these 10 occurred in the United Provinces, six in the Bombay Presidency, 2 each in the Punjab, the Central Provinces, Bengal, and Bihar and Orissa, and one in Delhi. The majority of these riots occurred during the celebration of a religious festival by one or other of the two communities, whilst some arose out of the playing of music by Hindus in the neighbourhood of mosques or out of the slaughter of cows by the Muslims. The total casualties resulting from the above disorders were approximately 103 persons killed and 1,084 wounded.

By far the most serious riot reported during the year was that which took place in Lahore between the 4th and 7th of May 1927. Tension between the two communities had been acute for some time before the outbreak, and the trouble when it came was precipitated by a chance collision between a Mahomedan and two Sikhs. The disorder spread with lightning speed and the heavy casualty list—27 killed 272 injured—was largely swollen by unorganised attacks on individuals. Police and troops were rushed to the scene of rioting quickly and it was impossible for clashes on a big scale to take place between hostile groups. Casual assassinations and assaults were however, reported, for two or three days longer before the streets and lanes of Lahore became safe for the solitary passerby.

After the Lahore riot in May, there was a lull for two months in inter-communal rioting, if we except a minor incident, which happened about the middle of June in Bihar and Orissa ; but July witnessed no fewer than eight riots of which the most serious occurred in Multan in the Punjab, on the occasion of the annual Muharram celebrations. Thirteen killed and twenty-four wounded was the toll taken by this riot. But August was to see worse rioting still. In that month, nine riots occurred, two of them resulting in heavy loss of life. In a riot in Bettiah, a town in Bihar and Orissa, arising out of a dispute over a religious procession, eleven persons were killed and over a hundred injured, whilst the passage of a procession in front of a mosque in Bareilly in the United Provinces was the occasion of rioting in which fourteen persons were killed and 165 were injured. Fortunately, this proved to be the turning point in inter-communal trouble during the year, and September witnessed only 4 riots. One of these, however, the riot in Nagpur in the Central Provinces on September 4th was second only to Lahore riot in seriousness and in the damage which it caused. The spark, which started the fire, was the trouble in connection with a Muslim procession, but the materials for the combustion had been collected for some time. Nineteen persons were killed and 123 injured were admitted to hospitals as a result of this riot, during the course of which many members of the Muslim community abandoned their homes in Nagpur.

A feature of Hindu-Muslim relations during the year which was hardly less serious than the riots was the number of murderous outrages committed by members of one community against persons belonging to the other. Some of the most serious of these outrages were perpetrated in connection with the agitation relating to *Rangila Rasul* and *Risala Vartman*, two publications containing most scurrilous attack on the Prophet Muhammed and as a result of them, a number of innocent persons lost their lives, sometimes in circumstances of great barbarity. In Lahore a series of outrages against individuals led to a state of great excitement and insecurity during the summer of 1927.

The excitement over the *Rangila Rasul* ²⁹[f.29] case had by now travelled far from its original centre and by July had begun to produce unpleasant repercussions on and across the North-West Frontier. The first signs of trouble in this region became apparent early in June, and by the latter part of July the excitement had reached its height. On the British side of the border, firm and tactful handling of the situation by the local authorities averted, what would have been a serious breach of the peace. Economic boycott of Hindus was freely advocated in the British Frontier Districts, especially in Peshawar, but this movement met with little success, and although the Hindus were maltreated in one or two villages, the arrest of the culprits, together with appropriate action under the Criminal Law, quickly restored order. Across the border however, the indignation, aroused by these attacks on the Prophet, gave rise to more serious consequences. The Frontier tribesmen are acutely sensitive to the appeal of religion and when a well-known Mullah started to preach against the Hindus among the Afridis and Shinwaris in the neighbourhood of the Khyber Pass, his words fell on fruitful ground. He called upon the Afridis and Shinwaris to expel all the Hindus living in their midst unless they declared in writing that they dissociated themselves from the doings of their co-religionists down country. The first to expel their Hindu neighbours were two clans of the Khyber Afridis, namely the Kuikhel and Zakkakhel, on the 22nd July. From these, the excitement spread among their Shinwari neighbours, who gave their Hindu neighbours notice to quit a few days later. However, after the departure of some of the Hindus, the Shinwaris agreed to allow the remainder to stay on. Some of the Hindus on leaving the Khyber were roughly handled. In two cases, stones were thrown, though happily without any damage resulting. In a third case, a Hindu was wounded and a large amount of property carried off, but this was recovered by Afridi Khassadars in full, and the culprits were fined for the offence. Thereafter, arrangements were made for the picketing of the road for the passage of any Hindu evacuating tribal territory. Under pressure from the Political Agent an Afridi *jirga* decided towards the end of July to suspend the Hindu boycott pending a decision in the Risala Vartman case. In the following week, however, several Hindu families, who had been living at Landi Kotal at the head of the Khyber Pass moved to Peshawar refusing to accept assurances of the tribal chiefs but leaving one person from each family behind to watch over their interests. All told, between four hundred and fifty Hindus, men, women and children, had come into Peshawar by the Middle of August, when the trouble was definitely on the wane. Some of the Hindus were definitely expelled, some were induced to leave their homes by threats, some left from fear, some no doubt from sympathy with their neighbours. This expulsion and voluntary exodus from tribal territory were without parallel. Hindus had lived there for more generations than most of them could record as valued and respected, and, indeed, as essential members of the tribal system, for whose protection the tribesmen had been jealous, and whose blood feuds they commonly made their own. In all, about 450 Hindus left the Khyber during the excitement ; of these, about 330 had returned to their homes in tribal territory by the close of the year 1927. Most of the remainder had decided to settle, at any rate for the present, amid the more secure conditions of British India.

The year 1928-29 was comparatively more peaceful than the year 1927-28. His Excellency Lord Irwin, by his speeches to the Central Legislature and outside, had given a strong impetus to the attempts to find some basis for agreement between the two communities, on those questions of political importance, which were responsible for the strained relations between them. Fortunately the issues arising out of the inquiry by the Simon Commission which was appointed in 1929, absorbed a large part of the energy and attention of the different communities, with the result that less importance came to be attached to local causes of conflict, and more importance to the broad question of constitutional policy. Moreover, the legislation passed during the autumn session of the Indian Legislature in 1927 penalising the instigation of inter-communal hostility by the press, had some effect in improving the inter-communal disturbances. The number of riots during the twelve months ending with March 31st, 1929, was 22. Though the number of riots was comparatively small, the casualties,—swelled heavily by the Bombay riots,—were very serious, no fewer than 204 persons having been killed and nearly a thousand injured. Of these, the fortnight's rioting in Bombay accounts for 149 killed and 739 injured. Seven of these 22 riots, or roughly one-third of them, occurred on the day of the celebration of the annual Muslim festival of Bakr-i-Id at the end of May. The celebration of this festival is always a dangerous time in Hindu-Muslim relations. The

Muslim regard it as a day of animal sacrifice, and as the animal chosen is almost always a cow the slightest tension between the two communities is apt to produce an explosion. Of the Bakr-i-Id riots only two were serious and both of them took place in the Punjab. The first took place in a village in the Ambala District in which ten people were killed and nine injured. The other riot which took place in Softa village in the Gurgaon District in the Southern Punjab, attained considerable notoriety because of its sensational features. The village of Softa is about 27 miles south of Delhi and is inhabited by Muslims. This village is surrounded by villages occupied by Hindu cultivators who, on hearing that the muslims of Softa intended to sacrifice a cow on the ' Id Day ', objected to the sacrifice of the particular cow selected on the ground that it had been accustomed to graze in fields belonging to the Hindu cultivators. The dispute over the matter assumed a threatening aspect and the Superintendent of Police of the district accordingly went with a small force of police, about 25 men in all, to try to keep peace. He took charge of the disputed cow and locked it up, but his presence did not deter the Hindu cultivators of a few neighbouring villages from collecting about a thousand people armed with pitchforks, spears and staves, and going to Softa. The Superintendent of Police and an Indian Revenue official, who were present in the village, assured the crowd that the cow, in connection with which the dispute had arisen would not be sacrificed, but this did not satisfy the mob which threatened to burn the whole village if any cow was sacrificed, and also demanded that the cow should be handed over to them. The Superintendent of Police refused to agree to this demand, whereupon the crowd became violent and began to throw stones at the police and to try to get round the latter into the village. The Superintendent of Police warned the crowd to disperse, but to no effect. He, therefore, fired one shot from his revolver as a further warning. Notwithstanding the crowd still continued to advance and the Superintendent had to order his party of police to fire. Only one volley was fired at first, but as this did not cause the retreat of the mob, two more volleys had to be fired before the crowd slowly dispersed, driving off some cattle belonging to the village.

While the police were engaged in this affair a few Hindu cultivators got into Softa at another place and tried to set fire to the village. They were, however, driven away by the police after they had inflicted injuries on three or four men. In all 14 persons were killed and 33 were injured. The Punjab Government deputed a judicial officer to enquire into this affair. His report, which was published on 6th July, justified the action of the police in firing on the mob and recorded the opinion that there was no reason to suppose that the firing was excessive or was continued after the mob had desisted from its unlawful aggression. Had the police not opened fire, the report proceeds, their own lives would have been in immediate danger, as also the lives of the people of Softa. Lastly, in the opinion of the officer writing the report, had Softa village been sacked, there would certainly have broken up, within 24 hours, a terrible communal conflagration in the whole of the surrounding country-side.

The riots of Kharagpur, an important railway centre not far from Calcutta, also resulted in serious loss of life. Two riots took place at Kharagpur, the first on the occasion of the Muharram celebration at the end of June and the second on the 1st September 1928, when the killing of a cow served as a cause. In the first riot 15 were killed and 21 injured, while in the second riot, the casualties were 9 killed and 35 wounded. But none of these riots is to be compared with those that raged in Bombay from the beginning to the middle of February, when, as we have seen, 149 persons were killed and well over 700 injured.

During the year 1929-30 communal riots, which had been so conspicuous and deplorable a feature of public life during the preceding years, were very much less frequent. Only 12 were of sufficient importance to be reported to Government of India, and of these only the disturbances in the City of Bombay were really serious. Starting on the 23rd of April they continued sporadically until the middle of May, and were responsible for 35 deaths and about 200 other casualties. An event which caused considerable tension in April was the murder at Lahore of Rajpal, whose pamphlet *Rangila Rasul*, containing a scurrilous attack on the Prophet of Islam, was responsible for much of the communal trouble in previous years, and also for a variety of legal and political complications. Fortunately, both communities showed commendable restraint at the time of the murder, and again

on the occasion of the execution and funeral of the convicted man ; and although feelings ran high no serious trouble occurred.

The year 1930-31 saw the eruption of the Civil Disobedience Movement It gave rise to riots and disturbances all over the country. They were mostly of a political character and the parties involved in them were the police and the Congress volunteers. But, as it always happens in India, the political disturbances took a communal twist. This was due to the fact that the Muslims refused to submit to the coercive methods used by Congress volunteers to compel them to join in Civil Disobedience. The result was that although the year began with political riots it ended in numerous and quite serious communal riots. The worst of these communal riots took place in and around Sukkur in Sind between the 4th and 11th of August and affected over a hundred villages. The outbreak in the Kishoreganj subdivision of Mymensingh District (Bengal) on the 12th/15th of July was also on a large scale. In addition, there were communal disturbances on the 3rd of August in Ballia (United Provinces) ; on the 6th of September in Nagpur, and on the 6th/7th September in Bombay ; and a Hindu-Christian riot broke out near Tiruchendur (Madras) on the 31st of October. On the 12th of February, in Amritsar, an attempt was made to murder a Hindu cloth merchant who had defied the picketers, and a similar outrage which was perpetrated the day before in Benares had very serious consequences. On this occasion, the victim was a Muslim trader, and the attack proved fatal; as a result, since Hindu-Muslim relations throughout most of Northern India were by this time very strained, a serious communal riot broke out and continued for five days, causing great destruction of property and numerous casualties. Among the other communal clashes during this period were the riots at Nilphamari (Bengal) on the 25th of January and at Rawalpindi on the 31st. Throughout Northern India communal relations had markedly deteriorated during the first two months of 1931, and already, in February, there had been serious communal rioting in Benares, This state of affairs was due chiefly to the increasing exasperation created among Muslims by the paralysis of trade and the general atmosphere of unrest and confusion that resulted from Congress activities. The increased importance which the Congress seemed to be acquiring as a result of the negotiations with the Government aroused in the Muslims serious apprehensions and had the effect of worsening the tension between the two communities. During March, this tension, in the United Provinces at any rate, became greatly increased. Between the 14th and 16th there was serious rioting in the Mirzapur District, and on the 17th, trouble broke out in Agra and continued till the 20th. There was also a communal riot in Dhanbad (Bengal) on the 28th, and in Amritsar District on the 30th ; and in many other parts of the country, the relations between members of the two communities had become extremely strained.

In Assam, the communal riot which occurred at Digboi in Lakhimpur District, resulted in deaths of one Hindu and three Muslims. In Bengal, a communal riot took place in the Asansol division during the Muharram festival. In Bihar and Orissa there was a certain amount of communal tension during the year, particularly in Saran. Altogether there were 16 cases of communal rioting and unlawful assembly. During the Bakr-i-Id festival a clash occurred in the Bhabua sub-division of Shahabad. Some 300 Hindus collected in the mistaken belief that a cow had been sacrificed. The local officers had succeeded in pacifying them when a mob of about 200 Muhammedans armed with lathis, spears and swords, attacked the Hindus, one of whom subsequently died. The prompt action of the police and the appointment of a conciliation committee prevented the spread of the trouble. The Muharram festival was marked by two small riots in Monghyr, the Hindus being the aggressors on one occasion and the Muslims on the other. In the Madras Presidency there were also several riots of a communal nature during the year and the relations between the communities were in places distinctly strained. The most serious disturbance of the year occurred at Vellore on the 8th of June, as a result of the passage of a Muslim procession with Tazias near a Hindu temple ; so violent was the conflict between members of the two communities that the police were compelled to open fire in order to restore order ; and sporadic fighting continued in the town during the next two or three days. In Salem town, owing to Hindu-Muslim tension a dispute arose on the 13th of July, as to who had been the victor at a largely attended Hindu-Muslim wrestling match at Shevapet. Another riot occurred in October at Kitchipalayam near Salem town ; the trouble arose from a few Muslims disturbing a street game played by some young Hindus. Hindu-Muslim

disturbances also arose in Polikal village, Kurnool District, on the 15th of March, owing to a dispute about the route of a Hindu procession, but the rioters were easily dispersed by a small force of police. In the Punjab there were 907 cases of rioting during the year as compared with 813 in 1929. Many of them were of a communal character, and the tension between the two principal communities remained acute in many parts of the Province. In the United Provinces, although communal tension during 1930 was not nearly so acute as during the first 3 months of 1931, and was for a while overshadowed by the excitement engendered by the Civil Disobedience Movement, indications of it were fairly numerous, and the causes of disagreement remained as potent as ever. In Dehra Dun and Bulandshahr there were communal riots of the usual type, and a very serious riot occurred in Ballia city as a result of a dispute concerning the route taken by a Hindu procession, which necessitated firing by the police. Riots also occurred in Muttra, Azamgarh, Mainpuri and several other places.

Passing on to the events of the year 1931-32, the progress of constitutional discussions at the R. T. C. had a definite reaction in that it bred a certain nervousness among the Muslim and other minority communities as to their position under a constitution functioning on the majority principle. The first session of the Round Table Conference afforded the first "close-up" of the constitutional future. Until then the ideal of Dominion Status had progressed little beyond a vague and general conception, but the declaration of the Princes at the opening of the Conference had brought responsibility at the Centre, in the form of a federal government, within definite view. The Muslims, therefore, felt that it was high time for them to take stock of their position. This uneasiness was intensified by the Irwin-Gandhi settlement, which accorded what appeared to be a privileged position to the Congress, and Congress elation and pose of victory over the Government did not tend to ease Muslim misgivings. Within three weeks of the "pact" occurred the savage communal riots at Cawnpore, which significantly enough began with the attempts of Congress adherents to force Mahomedan shopkeepers to observe a *hartal* in memory of Bhagat Singh who was executed on 23rd March. On 24th March began the plunder of Hindu shops. On the 25th there was a blaze. Shops and temples were set fire to and burnt to cinders. Disorder, arson, loot, murder, spread like wild fire. Five hundred families abandoned their houses and took shelter in villages. Dr. Ramchandra was one of the worst sufferers. All members of his family, including his wife and aged parents, were killed and their bodies thrown into gutters. In the same slaughter Mr. Ganesh Shankar Vidyardhi lost his life. The Cawnpore Riots Inquiry Committee in its report states that the riot was of unprecedented violence and peculiar atrocity, which spread with unexpected rapidity through the whole city and even beyond it. Murders, arson and looting were widespread for three days, before the rioting was definitely brought under control. Afterwards it subsided gradually. The loss of life and property was great. The number of verified deaths was 300; but the death roll is known to have been larger and was probably between four and five hundred. A large number of temples and mosques were desecrated or burnt or destroyed and a very large number of houses were burnt and pillaged.

This communal riot, which need never have occurred but for the provocative conduct of the adherents of the Congress, was the worst which India has experienced for many years. The trouble, moreover, spread from the city to the neighbouring villages, where there were sporadic communal disturbances for several days afterwards.

The year 1932-33 was relatively free from communal agitations and disturbances. This welcome improvement was doubtless in some measure due to the suppression of lawlessness generally and the removal of uncertainty in regard to the position of the Muslims under the new constitution.

But in 1933-34 throughout the country communal tension had been increasing and disorders which occurred not only on the occasion of such festivals as Holi, Id and Muharram, but also many resulting from ordinary incidents of every-day life indicated, that there had been a deterioration in communal relations since the year began. Communal riots during Holi occurred at Benares and Cawnpore in the United Provinces, at Lahore in the Punjab, and at Peshawar. Bakr-i-Id was marked by serious rioting at Ayodhya, in the United Provinces over cow sacrifice, also at Bhagalpore in Bihar and Orissa and at Cannanore in Madras. A serious riot in the Ghazipur District of the United

Provinces also resulted in several deaths. During April and May there were Hindu-Muslim riots at several places in Bihar and Orissa, in Bengal, in Sind and Delhi, some of them provoked by very trifling incidents, as for instance, the unintentional spitting by a Muslim shopkeeper of Delhi upon a Hindu passer-by. The increase in communal disputes in British India was also reflected in some of the States where similar incidents occurred.

The position with regard to communal unrest during the months from June to October was indicative of the normal, deep-seated antagonism between the two major communities. June and July months, in which no Hindu or Muhammedan festival of importance took place, were comparatively free from riots, though the situation in certain areas of Bihar necessitated the quartering of additional police. A long-drawn-out dispute started in Agra. The Muslims of this city objected to the noise of religious ceremonies in certain Hindu private houses which they said disturbed worshippers at prayers in a neighbouring mosque. Before the dispute was settled, riots occurred on the 20th July and again on the 2nd September, in the course of which 4 persons were killed and over 80 injured. In Madras a riot, on the 3rd September resulting in one death and injuries to 13 persons was occasioned by a book published by Hindus containing alleged reflections on the Prophet. During the same month minor riots occurred in several places in the Punjab and the United Provinces.

In 1934-35 serious trouble arose in Lahore on the 29th June as a result of a dispute between Muslims and Sikhs about a mosque situated within the precincts of a Sikh temple known as the Shahidganj Gurudwara. Trouble had been brewing for some time. Ill-feeling became intensified when the Sikhs started to demolish the Mosque despite Muslim protests. The building had been the subject of prolonged litigation, which has confirmed the Sikh right of possession.

On the night of the 29th June a crowd of 3 or 4 thousand Muslims assembled in front of the Gurudwara. A struggle between this crowd and the Sikhs inside the Gurudwara was only averted by the prompt action of the local authorities. They subsequently obtained an undertaking from the Sikhs to refrain from further demolition. But during the following week, while strenuous efforts were being made to persuade the leaders to reach an amicable settlement, the Sikhs under pressure of extremist influence again set about demolishing the mosque. This placed the authorities in a most difficult position. The Sikhs were acting within their legal rights. Moreover the only effective method of stopping demolition would have been to resort to firing. As the building was full of Sikhs and was within the precincts of a Sikh place of worship, this would not only have caused much bloodshed but, for religious reasons, would have had serious reactions on the Sikh population throughout the Province. On the other hand, inaction by Government was bound to cause great indignation among the Muslims, for religious reasons : and it was expected that this would show itself in sporadic attacks on the Sikhs and perhaps on the forces of Government.

It was hoped that discussions between leaders of the two communities would effect some rapprochement, but mischief-makers inflamed the minds of their co-religionists. Despite the arrest of the chief offenders, the excitement increased. The Government's gesture in offering to restore to the Muslims another mosque which they had purchased years ago proved unavailing. The situation took a further turn for the worse on the 19th July and during the following two days the situation was acutely dangerous. The Central Police station was practically besieged by the huge crowds, which assumed a most menacing attitude. Repeated attempts to disperse them without the use of firearms failed and the troops had to fire twice on the 20th July and eight times on the 21st. In all 23 rounds were fired and 12 persons killed. Casualties, mostly of a minor nature, were numerous amongst the military and police.

As a result of the firing, the crowds dispersed and did not reassemble. Extra police were brought in from other Provinces and the military garrisons were strengthened. Administrative control was re-established rapidly, but the religious leaders continued to fan the embers of the agitation. Civil litigation was renewed and certain Muslim organisations framed some extravagant demands.

The situation in Lahore continued to cause anxiety up to the close of the year. On the 6th

November, a Sikh was mortally wounded by a Muslim. Three days later a huge Sikh-Hindu procession was taken out. The organisers appeared anxious to avoid conflict but nonetheless one serious clash occurred. This was followed by further rioting on the next day. But for the good work of the police and the troops, in breaking up the fights quickly, the casualties might have been very large.

On the 19th March 1935 a serious incident occurred in Karachi after the execution of Abdul Quayum, the Muslim who had murdered Nathuramal, a Hindu, already referred to as the writer of a scurrilous pamphlet about the Prophet. Abdul Quayum's body was taken by the District Magistrate, accompanied by a police party, to be handed over to the deceased's family for burial outside the city. A huge crowd, estimated to be about 25,000 strong, collected at the place of burial. Though the relatives of Abdul Quayum wished to complete the burial at the cemetery, the most violent members of the mob determined to take the body in procession through the city. The local authorities decided to prevent the mob entering, since this would have led to communal rioting. All attempts of the police to stop the procession failed, so a platoon of the Royal Sussex Regiment was brought in to keep peace. It was forced to open fire at short range to stop the advance of the frenzied mob and to prevent itself from being overwhelmed. Forty-seven rounds were fired by which 47 people were killed and 134 injured. The arrival of reinforcements prevented further attempts to advance. The wounded were taken to the Civil Hospital and the body of Abdul Quayum was then interred without further trouble.

On the 25th August 1935 there was a communal riot at Secunderabad.

In the year 1936 there were four communal riots. On the 14th April there occurred a most terrible riot at Firozabad in the Agra District. A Muslim procession was proceeding along the main bazar and it is alleged that bricks were thrown from the roofs of Hindu houses. This enraged the Muslims in the procession who set fire to the house of a Hindu, Dr. Jivaram, and the adjacent temple of Radha Krishna. The inmates of Dr. Jivaram's house in addition to 11 Hindus including 3 children were burnt to death. A second Hindu-Muslim riot broke out in Poona in the Bombay Presidency on 24th April 1936. On the 27th April there occurred a Hindu-Muslim riot in Jamalpur in the Monghyr District. The fourth Hindu-Muslim riot of the year took place in Bombay on the 15th October 1936.

The year 1937 was full of communal disturbances. On the 27th March 1937 there was a Hindu-Muslim riot at Panipat over the Holi procession and 14 persons were killed. On the 1st May 1937 there occurred a communal riot in Madras in which 50 persons were injured. The month of May was full of communal riots which took place mostly in the C. P. and the Punjab. One that took place in Shikarpur in Sind caused great panic. On 18th June there was a Sikh-Muslim riot in Amritsar. It assumed such proportions that British troops had to be called out to maintain order.

The year 1938 was marked by two communal riots—one in Allahabad on 26th March and another in Bombay in April.

There were 6 Hindu-Muslim riots in 1939. On the 21st January there was a riot at Asansol in which one was killed and 18 injured. It was followed by a riot in Cawnpore on the 11th February in which 42 were killed, 200 injured and 800 arrested. On the 4th March there was a riot at Benares followed by a riot at Cassipore near Calcutta on the 5th March. On 19th June there was again a riot at Cawnpore over the Rathajatra procession.

A serious riot occurred on 20th November 1939 in Sukkur in Sind. The riot was the culmination of the agitation by the Muslims to take possession, even by force, of a building called Manzilgah which was in the possession of Government as Government property and to the transfer of which the Hindus had raised objections. Mr. E. Weston—now a judge of the Bombay High Court—who was appointed to investigate into the disturbances gives ³⁰[\[f.30\]](#) the following figures of the murdered and the wounded :

Taluka.	Murders committed.		Persons injured.		Persons Subsequently died from injuries.	
	Hindus.	Mdns.	Hindus.	Mdns.	Hindus.	Mdns.
Sukkur Town	20	12	11	11	1	
Sukkur Taluka	2	2	23		5	
Shikarpur Taluka	5		11		2	
Garhi Yasin Taluka	24		4			
Rohri Taluka	10		3			
Pano Akil Taluka	6		1			
Ghorki Taluka	1		1			
Mirpur Mathelo Taluka			1			
Ubauro Taluka	4		3	1	1	
	142	14	58	12	9	

Of the many gruesome incidents recorded by him the following may be quoted:

" The most terrible of all the disturbances occurred on the night of the 20th at Gosarji village which is eight miles from Sukkur and sixteen from Shikarpur. According to an early statement sent by the District Magistrate to Government, admittedly incomplete, 27 Hindus were murdered there that night. According to the witnesses examined the number was 37.

" Pamanmal, a contractor of Gosarji states that at the time of satyagraha the leading Hindus of Gosarji came in deputation to the leading zemindar of the locality Khan Sahib Amirbux who was then at Sukkur. He reassured them and said he was responsible for their safety. On the 20th Khan Sahib Amirbux was at Gosarji, and that morning Mukhi Mahrumul was murdered there. The Hindus went to Khan Sahib Amirbux for protection and were again reassured, but that night wholesale murder and looting took place. Of the 37 murdered, seven were women. Pamanmal states that the following morning he went to the Sub-Inspector of Bagerji, which is one mile from Gosarji, but he was abused and driven from the thana. He then went to Shikarpur and complained to the panchayat, but did not complain to any officer there. I may mention that the Sub-Inspector of Bagerji was afterwards prosecuted under section 211, Indian Penal Code, and has been convicted for failure to make arrests in connection with murders at Gosarji.

" As Khan Sahib Amirbux, the zemindar, who was said to have given assurance of protection to the Hindus of Bagerji, was reported to be attending the Court, he was called and examined as a Court witness. He states that he lives half a mile from Gosarji village. The Sub-Inspector of Bagerji came to Gosarji on the 20th after the murder of Mehrumul, and he acted as a mashir. He says that the Hindus did not ask for help and there was no apprehension of trouble. On the night of the 20th he was not well, and he heard nothing of the murders. He admits that he had heard of the Manzilgah evacuation. Later in his evidence he admits that he told the villagers of Gosarji to be on the alert as there was trouble in Sukkur, and he says he had called the panchayat on the evening of the 19th. He went to Gosarji at sunrise on the 21st after the murders. He admits that he is regarded as the protector of Gosarji. "

Mr. Weston adds ³¹[\[f.31\]](#) :—

" I find it impossible to believe the evidence of this witness. I have no doubt that he was fully aware that there was trouble in Gosarji on the night of 20th and preferred to remain in his house. "

Who can deny that this record of rioting presents a picture which is grim in its results and sombre in its tone ? But being chronological in order, the record might fail to give an idea of the havoc these riots have caused in any given Province and the paralysis it has brought about in its social and economic life. To give an idea of the paralysis caused by the recurrence of riots in a Province I have recast the record of riots for the Province of Bombay. When recast the general picture appears as follows :

Leaving aside the Presidency and confining oneself to the City of Bombay, there can be no doubt that the record of the city is the blackest. The first Hindu-Muslim riot took place in 1893. This was followed by a long period of communal peace which lasted upto 1929. But the years that have followed have an appalling story to tell. From February 1929 to April 1938—a period of nine years—there were no less than 10 communal riots. In 1929 there were two communal riots. In the first, 149 were killed and 739 were injured and it lasted for 36 days. In the second riot 35 were killed, 109 were injured and it continued for 22 days. In 1930 there were two riots. Details as to loss of life and its duration are not available. In 1932 there were again two riots. The first was a small one. In the second 217 were killed, 2,713 were injured and it went on for 49 days. In 1933 there was one riot, details about which are not available. In 1936 there was one riot in which 94 were killed, 632 were injured and it continued to rage for 65 days. In the riot of 1937, 11 were killed, 85 were injured and it occupied 21 days. The riot of 1938 lasted for 2 1/2 hours only but within that time 12 were killed and a little over 100 were injured. Taking the total period of 9 years and 2 months from February 1929 to April 1938 the Hindus and Muslims of the City of Bombay alone were engaged in a sanguinary warfare for 210 days during which period 550 were killed and 4,500 were wounded. This does not of course take into consideration the loss of property which took place through arson and loot.

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Such is the record of Hindu-Muslim relationship from 1920 to 1940. Placed side by side with the frantic efforts made by Mr. Gandhi to bring about Hindu-Muslim unity, the record makes most painful and heart-rending reading. It would not be much exaggeration to say that it is a record of twenty years of civil war between the Hindus and the Muslims in India, interrupted by brief intervals of armed peace.

In this civil war men were, of course, the principal victims. But women did not altogether escape molestation. It is perhaps not sufficiently known how much women have suffered in communal hostilities. Data relating to the whole of India are not available. But some data relating to Bengal exist.

On the 6th September 1932 questions were asked in the old Bengal Legislative Council regarding the abduction of women in the Province of Bengal. In reply, the Government of the day stated that between 1922 to 1927, the total number of women abducted was 568. Of these, 101 were unmarried and 467 were married. Asked to state the community to which the abducted women belonged, it was disclosed that out of 101 unmarried women 64 were Hindus, 29 Muslims, 4 Christians, and 4 non-descript : and that out of 467 married women 331 were Hindus, 122 Muslims, 2 Christians and 12 non-descript. These figures relate to cases which were reported or if reported were not detected. Usually, about 10 p.c. of the cases are reported or detected and 90 p.c. go undetected. Applying this proportion to the facts disclosed by the Bengal Government, it may be said that about 35,000 women were abducted in Bengal during the short period of five years between 1922-27.

The attitude towards women-folk is a good index of the friendly or unfriendly attitude between the two communities. As such, the case which happened on 27th June 1936 in the village of Govindpur in Bengal makes very instructive reading. The following account of it is taken from the opening speech ³²[f.32] of the Crown counsel when the trial of 40 Mahomedan accused began on the 10th August 1936. According to the prosecution :

" There lived in Govindpur a Hindu by name Radha Vallabh. He had a son Harendra. There lived also in Govindpur a Muslim woman whose occupation was to sell milk. The local Musalmans of the village suspected that Harendra had illicit relationship with this Muslim milk woman. They resented that a Muslim woman should be in the keeping of a Hindu and they decided to wreak their vengeance on the family of Radha Vallabh for this insult. A meeting of the Musalmans of Govindpur was convened and Harendra was summoned to attend this meeting. Soon after Harendra went to the meeting, cries of Harendra were heard. It was found that Harendra was assaulted and was lying senseless in the field where the meeting was held. The Musalmans of Govindpur were not satisfied with this assault. They informed Radha Vallabh that unless he, his wife and his children embraced Islam the Musalmans did not feel satisfied for the wrong his son had done to them. Radha Vallabh was planning to send away to another place his wife and children. The Musalmans came to know this plan. Next day when Kusum, the wife of Radha Vallabh, was sweeping the courtyard of her house, some Mahomedans came, held down Radha Vallabh and some spirited away Kusum, After having taken her to some distance two Mahomedans by name Laker and Mahaxar raped her and removed her ornaments. After some time, she came to her senses and ran towards her home. Her assailants again pursued her. She succeeded in reaching her home and locking herself in. Her Muslim assailants broke open the door, caught hold of her and again carried her away on the road. It was suggested by her assailants that she should be again raped on the street. But with the help of another woman by name Rajani, Kusum escaped and took shelter in the house of Rajani. While she was in the house of Rajani the Musalmans of Govindpur paraded her husband Radha Vallabh in the streets in complete disgrace. Next day the Musalmans kept watch on the roads to and from Govindpur to the Police Station to prevent Radha Vallabh and Kusum from giving information of the outrage to the Police. "

These acts of barbarism against women, committed without remorse, without shame and without condemnation by their fellow brethren show the depth of the antagonism which divided the two communities. The tempers on each side were the tempers of two warring nations. There was carnage, pillage, sacrilege and outrage of every species, perpetrated by Hindus against Musalmans and by Musalmans against Hindus—more perhaps by Musalmans against Hindus than by Hindus against Musalmans. Cases of arson have occurred in which Musalmans have set fire to the houses of Hindus, in which whole families of Hindus, men, women and children were roasted alive and consumed in the fire, to the great satisfaction of the Muslim spectators. What is astonishing is that these cold and deliberate acts of rank cruelty were not regarded as atrocities to be condemned but were treated as legitimate acts of warfare for which no apology was necessary. Enraged by these hostilities, the editor of the *Hindustan*—a Congress paper—writing in 1926 used the following language to express the painful truth of the utter failure of Mr. Gandhi's efforts to bring about Hindu-Muslim unity. In words of utter despair the editor said ³³[\[f.33\]](#) :

" There is an immense distance between the India of to-day and India a nation, between an uncouth reality which expresses itself in murder and arson and that fond fiction which is in the imagination of patriotic if self-deceiving men. To talk about Hindu-Muslim unity from a thousand platforms or to give it blazoning headlines is to perpetrate an illusion whose cloudly structure dissolves itself at the exchange of brick-bats and the desecration of tombs and temples. To sing a few pious hymns of peace and goodwill *a la Naidu*. . . . will not benefit the country. The President of the Congress has been improvising on the theme of Hindu-Muslim unity, so dear to her heart, with brilliant variations, which does credit to her genius but leaves the problem untouched. The millions in India can only respond when the unity song is not only on the tongues of the leaders but in the hearts of the millions of their countrymen. "

Nothing I could say can so well show the futility of any hope of Hindu-Muslim unity. Hindu-Muslim unity upto now was at least in sight although it was like a mirage. Today it is out of sight and also out of mind. Even Mr. Gandhi has given up what, he perhaps now realizes, is an impossible task.

But there are others who notwithstanding the history of the past twenty years, believe in the

possibility of Hindu-Muslim unity. This belief of theirs seems to rest on two grounds. Firstly/they believe in the efficacy of a Central Government to mould diverse set of people into one nation. Secondly, they feel that the satisfaction of Muslim demands will be a sure means of achieving Hindu-Muslim unity.

It is true that Government is a unifying force and that there are many instances where diverse people have become unified into one homogeneous people by reason of their being subjected to a single Government. But the Hindus, who are depending upon Government as a unifying force seem to forget that there are obvious limits to Government acting as a unifying force. The limits to Government working as a unifying force are set by the possibilities of fusion among the people. In a country where race, language and religion do not stand in the way of fusion. Government is most effective as a unifying force. On the other hand, in a country where race, language and religion put an effective bar against fusion, Government can have no effect as a unifying force. If the diverse people in France, England, Italy and Germany became unified nations by reason of a common Government, it was because neither race, language nor religion obstructed the unifying process of Government. On the other hand, if the people in Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Turkey failed to be unified, although under a common Government, it was because race, language and religion were strong enough to counter and nullify the unifying power of Government. No one can deny that race, language and religion have been too dominant in India to permit the people of India to be welded into a nation by the unifying force of a common Government. It is an illusion to say that the Central Government in India has moulded the Indian people into a nation. What the Central Government has done, is to tie them together by one law and to house them together in one place, as the owner of unruly animals does, by tying them with one rope and keeping them in one stable. All that the Central Government has done is to produce a kind of peace among Indians. It has not made them one nation.

It cannot be said that time has been too short for unification to take place. If one hundred and fifty years of life under a Central Government does not suffice, eternity will not suffice. For this failure the genius of the Indians alone is responsible. There is among Indians no passion for unity, no desire for fusion. There is no desire to have a common dress. There is no desire to have a common language. There is no will to give up what is local and particular for something which is common and national. A Gujarati takes pride in being a Gujarati, a Maharashtrian in being a Maharashtrian, a Punjabi in being a Punjabi, a Madrasi in being a Madrasi and a Bengali in being a Bengali. Such is the mentality of Hindus, who accuse the Musalman of want of national feeling when he says "I am a Musalman first and Indian afterwards ". Can any one suggest that there exists anywhere in India even among the Hindus an instinct or a passion that would put any semblance of emotion behind their declaration " *Civis Indianus sum* ", or the smallest consciousness of a moral and social unity, which desires to give expression by sacrificing whatever is particular and local in favour of what is common and unifying ? There is no such consciousness and no such desire. Without such consciousness and no such desire, to depend upon Government to bring about unification is to deceive oneself.

Regarding the second, it was no doubt the opinion of the Simon Commission:

"That the communal riots were a manifestation of the anxieties and ambitions aroused in both the communities by the prospects of India's political Future. So long as authority was firmly established in British hands and self-government was not thought of, Hindu-Muslim rivalry was confined within a narrower field. This was not merely because the presence of a neutral bureaucracy discouraged strife. A further reason was that there was little for members of one community to fear from the predominance of the other. The comparative absence of communal strife in the Indian States today may be similarly explained. Many, who are well acquainted with conditions in British India a generation ago, would testify that at that epoch so much good feeling had been engendered between the two sides that communal tension as a threat to civil peace was at a minimum. But the coming of the Reforms and the anticipation of what may follow them have given new point to Hindu-Muslim competition. The one community naturally lays claim to the rights of a majority and relies upon its qualifications of better education and greater wealth ; the

other is all the more determined on those accounts to secure effective protection for its members, and does not forget that it represents the previous conquerors of the country. It wishes to be assured of adequate representation and of a full share of official posts. "

Assuming that to be a true diagnosis, assuming that Muslim demands are reasonable, assuming that the Hindus were prepared to grant them—and these are all very big assumptions—it is a question whether a true union between Hindus and Muslims can take place through political unity, resulting from the satisfaction of Muslim political demands. Some people seem to think that it is enough if there is a political unity between Hindus and Muslims. I think this is the greatest delusion. Those who take this view seem to be thinking only of how to bring the Muslims to join the Hindus in their demands on the British for Dominion Status or Independence as the mood of the moment be. This, to say the least, is a very shortsighted view. How to make the Muslims join the Hindus in the latter's demands on the British is comparatively a very small question. In what spirit will they work the constitution ? Will they work it only as aliens by an unwanted tie or will they work it as true kindreds, is the more important question. For working it as true kindreds, what is wanted is not merely political unity but a true union of heart and soul, in other words, social unity. Political unity is worth nothing, if it is not the expression of real union. It is as precarious as the unity between persons, who without being friends become allies of each other. How very precarious it always is, is best illustrated by what has happened between Germany and Russia. Personally, I do not think that a permanent union can be made to depend upon the satisfaction of mere material interests. Pacts may produce unity. But that unity can never ripen into union. A pact as a basis for a union is worse than useless. As its very nature indicates, a pact is separative in character. A pact cannot produce the desire to accommodate, it cannot instil the spirit of sacrifice, nor can it bind the parties to the main objective. Instead of accommodating each other, parties to a pact strive to get, as much as possible, out of each other. Instead of sacrificing for the common cause, parties to the pact are constantly occupied in seeing that the sacrifice made by one is not used for the good of the other. Instead of fighting for the main objective, parties to the pact are for ever engaged in seeing that in the struggle for reaching the goal the balance of power between the parties is not disturbed. Renan spoke the most profound truth when he said :

"Community of interests is assuredly a powerful bond between men. But nevertheless can interests suffice to make a nation ? I do not believe it. Community of interests make commercial treaties. There is a sentimental side to nationality; it is at once body and soul ; a Zollverein is not a fatherland. "

Equally striking is the view of James Bryce, another well-known student of history. According to Bryce,

" The permanence of an institution depends not merely on the material interests that support it, but on its conformity to the deep-rooted sentiment of the men for whom it has been made. When it draws to itself and provides a fitting expression for that sentiment, the sentiment becomes thereby not only more vocal but actually stronger, and in its turn imparts a fuller vitality to the institution. "

These observations of Bryce were made in connection with the foundation of the German Empire by Bismarck who, according to Bryce, succeeded in creating a durable empire because it was based on a sentiment and that this sentiment was fostered

" most of all by what we call the instinct or passion for nationality, the desire of a people already conscious of a moral and social unity, to see such unity expressed and realize under a single government, which shall give it a place and name among civilized states " .

What is it that produces this moral and social unity which gives permanence and what is it that drives people to see such unity expressed and realized under a single government, which shall give it a place and a name among civilized states ?

No one is more competent to answer this question than James Bryce. It was just such a question he

had to consider in discussing the vitality of the Holy Roman Empire as contrasted with the Roman Empire. If any Empire can be said to have succeeded in bringing about political unity among its diverse subjects it was the Roman Empire. Paraphrasing for the sake of brevity the language of Bryce :—The gradual extension of Roman citizenship through the founding of colonies, first throughout Italy and then in the provinces, the working of the equalized and equalizing Roman Law, the even pressure of the government on all subjects, the movements of population, caused by commerce and the slave traffic, were steadily assimilating the various peoples. Emperors, who were for the most part natives of the provinces, cared little to cherish Italy or even after the days of the Antonines, to conciliate Rome. It was their policy to keep open for every subject a career by whose freedom they had themselves risen to greatness. Annihilating distinctions of legal status among freemen, it completed the work, which trade and literature and toleration to all beliefs but one were already performing. No quarrel of race or religions disturbed that calm, for all national distinctions were becoming merged in the idea of a common Empire.

This unity produced by the Roman Empire was only a political unity. How long did this political unity last ? In the words of Bryce:

"Scarcely had these slowly working influences brought about this unity, when other influences began to threaten it. New foes assailed the frontiers ; while the loosening of the structure within was shown by the long struggles for power which followed the death or deposition of each successive emperor. In the period of anarchy after the fall of Valerian, generals were raised by their armies in every part of the Empire, and ruled great provinces as monarchs apart, owning no allegiance to the possessor of the capital. The breaking-up of the western half of the Empire into separate kingdoms might have been anticipated by two hundred years, had there not arisen in Diocletian a prince active and skilful enough to bind up the fragments before they had lost all cohesion, meeting altered conditions by new remedies. The policy he adopted by dividing and localizing authority recognized the fact that the weakened heart could no longer make its pulsations felt to the body's extremities. He parcelled out the supreme power among four monarchs, ruling as joint emperors in four capitals, and then sought to give it a fictitious strength by surrounding it with an oriental pomp which his earlier predecessors would have scorned. . . . The prerogative of Rome was menaced by the rivalry of Nicomedia, and the nearer greatness of Milan. "

It is, therefore, evident that political unity was not enough to give permanence and stability to the Roman Empire and as Bryce points out that " the breaking-up of the western half (of the Roman Empire) into separate kingdoms might have been anticipated by two hundred years, had the barbarian tribes on the border been bolder, or had there not arisen in Diocletian a prince active and skilful enough to bind up the fragments before they had lost all cohesion, meeting altered conditions by new remedies ". But the fact is that the Roman Empire which was tottering and breaking into bits and whose political unity was not enough to bind it together did last for several hundred years as one cohesive unit after it became the Holy Roman Empire. As Prof. Marvin points out ³⁴[f.34] :

" The unity of the Roman Empire was mainly political and military. It lasted for between four and Five hundred years. The unity which supervened in the Catholic Church was religious and moral and endured for a thousand years. "

The question is what made the Holy Roman Empire more stable than the Roman Empire could ever hope to be ? According to Bryce it was a common religion in the shape of Christianity and a common religious organization in the shape of the Christian Church which supplied the cement to the Holy Roman Empire and which was wanting in the Roman Empire. It was this cement which gave to the people of the Empire a moral and social unity and made them see such unity expressed and realized under a single government.

Speaking of the unifying effect of Christianity as a common religion Bryce says:

" It is on religion that the in most and deepest life of a nation rests. Because Divinity was divided,

humanity had been divided, likewise ; the doctrine of the unity of God now enforced the unity of man, who had been created in His image. The first lesson of Christianity was love, a love that was to join in one body those whom suspicion and prejudice and pride of race had hitherto kept apart. There was thus formed by the new religion a community of the faithful, a Holy Empire, designed to gather all men into its bosom, and standing opposed to the manifold polytheisms of the older world, exactly as the universal sway of the Caesars was contrasted with the innumerable kingdoms and city republics that had gone before it " ³⁵[\[f.35\]](#)

If what Bryce has said regarding the instability of the Roman Empire and the comparatively greater stability of its successor, the Holy Roman Empire, has any lesson for India and if the reasoning of Bryce that the Roman Empire was unstable because it had nothing more than political unity to rely on, and that the Holy Roman Empire was more stable, because it rested on the secure foundation of moral and social unity, produced by the possession of a common faith, is valid reasoning and embodies human experience, then it is obvious that there can be no possibility of a union between Hindus and Muslims. The cementing force of a common religion is wanting. From a spiritual point of view, Hindus and Musalmans are not merely two classes or two sects such as Protestants and Catholics or Shaivas and Vaishnavas. They are two distinct species. In this view, neither the Hindu nor the Muslim can be expected to recognize that humanity is an essential quality present in them both, and that they are not many but one and that the differences between them are no more than accidents. For them Divinity is divided and with the division of Divinity their humanity is divided and with the division of humanity they must remain divided. There is nothing to bring them in one bosom.

Without social union, political unity is difficult to be achieved. If achieved, it would be as precarious as a summer sapling, liable to be uprooted by the gust of a hostile wind. With mere political unity, India may be a State. But to be a State is not to be a nation and a State, which is not a nation, has small prospects of survival in the struggle for existence. This is especially true where nationalism—the most dynamic force of modern times—is seeking everywhere to free itself by the destruction and disruption of all mixed states. The danger to a mixed and composite state, therefore, lies not so much in external aggression as in the internal resurgence of nationalities which are fragmented, entrapped, suppressed and held against their will. Those who oppose Pakistan should not only bear this danger in mind but should also realize that this attempt on the part of suppressed nationalities to disrupt a mixed state and to found a separate home for themselves, instead of being condemned, finds ethical justification from the principle of self-determination.

CHAPTER VII

MUSLIM ALTERNATIVE TO PAKISTAN

I

The Hindus say they have an alternative to Pakistan. Have the Muslims also an alternative to Pakistan? The Hindus say yes, the Muslims say no. The Hindus believe that the Muslim proposal for Pakistan is only a bargaining manoeuvre put forth with the object of making additions to the communal gains already secured under the Communal Award. The Muslims repudiate the suggestion. They say there is no equivalent to Pakistan and, therefore, they will have Pakistan and nothing but Pakistan. It does seem that the Musalmans are devoted to Pakistan and are determined to have nothing else and that the Hindus in hoping for an alternative are merely indulging in wishful thinking. But assuming that the Hindus are shrewd enough in divining what the Muslim game is, will the Hindus be ready to welcome the Muslim alternative to Pakistan? The answer to the question must, of course, depend upon what the Muslim alternative is.

What is the Muslim alternative to Pakistan? No one knows. The Muslims, if they have any, have not disclosed it and perhaps will not disclose it till the day when the rival parties meet to revise and settle the terms on which the Hindus and the Muslims are to associate with each other in the future. To be forewarned is to be forearmed. It is, therefore, necessary for the Hindus to have some idea of

the possible Muslim alternative to enable them to meet the shock of it; for the alternative cannot be better than the Communal Award and is sure to be many degrees worse.

In the absence of the exact alternative proposal one can only make a guess. Now one man's guess is as good as that of another, and the party concerned has to choose on which of these he will rely. Among the likely guesses, my guess is that the Muslims will put forth as their alternative some such proposal as the following :—

"That the future constitution of India shall provide:

(i) That the Muslims shall have 50% representation in the Legislature, Central as well as Provincial, through separate electorates.

(ii) That 50% of the Executive in the Centre as well as in the Provinces shall consist of Muslims.

(iii) That in the Civil Service 50% of the posts shall be assigned for the Muslims.

(iv) That in the Fighting Forces the Muslim proportion shall be one half, both in the ranks and in the higher grades.

(v) That Muslims shall have 50% representation in all public bodies, such as councils and commissions, created for public purposes.

(vi) That Muslims shall have 50% representation in all international organizations in which India will participate.

(vii) That if the Prime Minister be a Hindu, the Deputy Prime Minister shall be a Muslim.

(viii) That if the Commander-in-Chief be a Hindu, the Deputy Commander-in-Chief shall be a Muslim.

(ix) That no changes in the Provincial boundaries shall be made except with the consent of 66% of the Muslim members of the Legislature.

(x) That no action or treaty against a Muslim country shall be valid unless the consent of 66% of the Muslim members of the Legislature is obtained.

(xi) That no law affecting the culture or religion or religious usage of Muslims shall be made except with the consent of 66% of the Muslim members of the Legislature.

(xii) That the national language for India shall be Urdu. (xiii) That no law prohibiting or restricting the slaughter of cows or the propagation of and conversion to Islam shall be valid unless it is passed with the consent of 66% of the Muslim members of the Legislature.

(xiv) That no change in the constitution shall be valid unless the majority required for effecting such changes also includes a 66% majority of the Muslim members of the Legislature.

This guess of mine is not the result of imagination let loose. It is not the result of a desire to frighten the Hindus into an unwilling and hasty acceptance of Pakistan, If I may say so, it is really an intelligent anticipation based upon available data coming from Muslim quarters.

An indication of what the Muslim alternative is likely to be, is obtainable from the nature of the Constitutional Reforms which are contemplated for the Dominions of His Exalted Highness the Nizam of Hyderabad.

The Hyderabad scheme of Reforms is a novel scheme. It rejects the scheme of communal representation obtaining in British India. In its place is substituted what is called Functional Representation, i.e. representation by classes and by professions. The composition of the

Legislature which is to consist of 70 members is to be as follows :—

<i>Elected</i>		<i>Nominated</i>	
Agriculture	12	Illakas	8
Patidars 8		Sarf-i-Khas 2	
Tenants 4		Paigahs 3	
Women	1		
Graduates	1	Peshkari 1	
University	1		
Jagirdars	2	Salar Jung 1	
Maashdars	1		
Legal	2	Samasthans 1	
Medical	2		
Western 1		Officials	18
		Rural Arts and Crafts	1
Oriental 1		Backward Classes	1
Teaching	1	Minor Unrepresented	3
Commerce	1	Classes.	
Industries	2	Others	6
Banking	2		
Indigenous 1	1		
Co-operative and			
Joint Stock 1	1		
Organized Labour	1		
Harijan	1		
District Municipalities	1		
City Municipality	1		
Rural Boards	1		
Total	33	Total	37

Whether the scheme of functional representation will promote better harmony between the various classes and sections than communal representation does is more than doubtful. In addition to perpetuating existing social and religious divisions, it may quite easily intensify class struggle by emphasizing class consciousness. The scheme appears innocuous but its real character will come out when every class will demand representation in proportion to its numbers. Be that as it may, functional representation is not the most significant feature of the Hyderabad scheme of Reforms. The most significant feature of the scheme is the proposed division of seats between Hindus and Muslims in the new Hyderabad Legislature. Under the scheme as approved by H. E. H. the Nizam, communal representation is not altogether banished. It is retained along with functional representation. It is to operate through joint electorates. But there is to be equal representation for "the two majority communities" on every ³⁶[f.36] elective body including the legislature and no candidate can succeed unless, he secures 40 percent, of the votes polled by members of his community. This principle of equal representation to Hindus and Muslims irrespective of their numbers ³⁷[f.37] is not only to apply to every elective body but it is to apply to both elected as well as nominated members of the body.

In justification of this theory of equal representation it is stated that:

" The importance of the Muslim community in the state, by virtue of its historical position and its status in the body politic, is so obvious that it cannot be reduced to the status of a minority in the Assembly."

Quite recently there have appeared in the press ³⁸[f.38] the proposals formulated by one Mr. Mir Akbar Ali Khan calling himself the leader of the Nationalist Party as a means of settling the Hindu-Muslim problem in British India. They are as follows :—

(1) The future Constitution of India must rest upon the broad foundation of adequate military defence of the country and upon making the people reasonable military minded. The Hindus must have the same military mindedness as the Muslims.

(2) The present moment offers a supreme opportunity for the two communities to ask for the defence of India *bang* made over to them. The Indian Army must consist of an equal number of Hindus and Muslims and no regiment should be *cm* a communal, as distinguished from regional basis.

(3) The Governments in the Provinces and at the Centre should be wholly National Governments composed of men who are reasonable military minded. Hindu and Muslim Ministers should be equal in number in the Central as well as all Provincial cabinets; other important minorities might wherever necessary be given special representation. This scheme will function most satisfactorily with joint electorates, but in the present temper of the country separate electorates might be continued. The Hindu Ministers must be elected by the Hindu members of the legislature and the Muslim Ministers by the Muslim members.

(4) The Cabinet is to be removable only *on* an express vote of no-confidence, against the Cabinet as a whole, passed by a majority of 2/3rd of the whole house which majority must be of Hindus and Muslims taken separately.

(5) The religion, language, script and personal law of each community should be safeguarded by a paramount constitutional check enabling the majority of members, representing that community in the legislature to place a veto on any legislative or other measure affecting it. A similar veto must be provided against any measure designed or calculated to affect adversely the economic well-being of any community.

(6) An adequate communal representation in the services must be agreed to as a practical measure of justice in administration and in the distribution patronage.

If the proposals put forth by a Muslim leader of the Nationalist Party in Hyderabad State is an indication of the direction in which the mind of the Muslims in British India is running, then, the guess I have made as to what is likely to be the alternative to Pakistan derives additional support.

II

It is true that in the month of April 1940 a Conference of Muslims was held in Delhi under the grandiloquent name of " The Azad Muslim Conference." The Muslims who met in the Azad Conference were those who were opposed to the Muslim League as well as to the Nationalist Muslims. They were opposed to the Muslim League firstly, because of their hostility to Pakistan and secondly because they did not want to depend upon the British Government for the protection of their rights ³⁹[f.39] They were also opposed to the Nationalist Musalmans (i. e. Congressites out and out) because they were accused of indifference to the cultural and religious rights of the Muslims. ⁴⁰[f.40]

With all this the Azad Muslim Conference was hailed by the Hindus as a Conference of friends. But the resolutions passed by the Conference leave very little to choose between it and the League. Among the resolutions passed by the Azad Muslim Conference the following three bear directly upon the issue in question.

The first of these runs as follows :—

" This conference, representative of Indian Muslims who desire to secure the fullest freedom of the country, consisting of delegates and representatives of every province, after having given its fullest and most careful consideration to all the vital questions affecting the interest of the Muslim community and the country as a whole declares the following:—

" India will have geographical and political boundaries of an individual whole and as such is the common homeland of all the citizens irrespective of race or religion who are joint owners of its resources. All nooks and comers of the country are hearths and homes of Muslims who cherish the historic eminence of their religion and culture which are dearer to them than their lives. From the national point of view every Muslim is an Indian. The common rights of all residents of the country and their responsibilities, in every walk of life and in every sphere of human activity are the same. The Indian Muslim by virtue of these rights and responsibilities, is unquestionable an Indian national and in every part of the country is entitled to equal privileges with that of every Indian national in every sphere of governmental, economic and other national activities and in public services. For that very reason Muslims own equal responsibilities with other Indians for striving and making sacrifices to achieve the country's independence. This is a self-evident proposition, the truth of which no right thinking Muslim will question. This Conference declares unequivocally and with all emphasis at its command that the goal of Indian Muslims is complete independence along with protection of their religion and communal rights, and that they are anxious to attain this goal as early as possible. Inspired by this aim they have in the past made great sacrifices and are ever ready to make greater sacrifices.

"The Conference unreservedly and strongly repudiates the baseless charge levelled against Indian Muslims by the agents of British Imperialism and others that they are an obstacle in the path of Indian freedom and emphatically declares that the Muslims are fully alive to their responsibilities and consider *it* inconsistent with their traditions and derogatory to their honour to lag behind others in the struggle for independence."

By this Resolution they repudiated the scheme of Pakistan. Their second Resolution was in the following terms:—

"This is the considered view of this Conference that only that constitution for the future Government of India would be acceptable to the people of India which is framed by the Indians themselves elected by means of adult franchise. The constitution should fully safeguard all the legitimate interests of the Muslims in accordance with the recommendations of the Muslim members of the Constituent Assembly. The representatives of other communities or of an outside power would have no right to interfere in the determination of these safeguards."

By this Resolution the Conference asserted that the safeguards for the Muslims must be determined by the Muslims alone. Their third Resolution was as under:—

" Whereas in the future constitution of India it would be essential, in order to ensure stability of government and preservation of security, that every citizen and community should feel satisfied, this Conference considers it necessary that a scheme of safeguards as regards vital manors mentioned below should be prepared to the satisfaction of the Muslims.

" This Conference appoints a board consisting of 27 persons. This board, after the fullest investigation, consultation and consideration, shall make its recommendations for submission to the next session of this Conference, so that the Conference may utilise the recommendations as a

means of securing a permanent national settlement of the communal question. This recommendation should be submitted within two months. The matters referred to the board are the following:

"1. The protection of Muslim culture, personal law and religious rights.

" 2. Political rights of Muslims and their protection.

" 3. The formation of future constitution of India to be non-unitary and federal, with absolutely essential and unavoidable powers for the Federal Government.

"The provision of safeguards for the economic, social and cultural rights of Muslims and for their share in public services

" The board will be empowered to fill up any vacancy in a suitable manner. The board will have the right to co-opt other members. It will be empowered also to consult other Muslim bodies and if it considers necessary, any responsible organisation in the country. The 27 members of the board will be nominated by the president.

"The quorum for the meeting will be nine.

" Since the safeguards of the communal rights of different communities will be determined in the constituent assembly referred to in the resolution which this Conference has passed, this Conference considers it necessary to declare that Muslim members of this constituent will be elected by Muslims themselves."

We must await the report ⁴¹[f.41] of this board to know what safeguards the Azad Muslim Conference will devise for the safety and protection of Muslims. But there appears no reason to hope that they will not be in favour of what I have guessed to be the likely alternative for Pakistan. It cannot be overlooked that the Azad Muslim Conference was a body of Muslims who were not only opposed to the Muslim League but were equally opposed to the Nationalist Muslims. There is, therefore, no ground to trust that they will be more merciful to the Hindus than the League has been or will be.

Supposing my guess turns out to be correct, it would be interesting to know what the Hindus will have to say in reply. Should they prefer such an alternative to Pakistan ? Or should they rather prefer Pakistan to such an alternative ? Those are questions which I must leave the Hindus and their leaders to answer. All I would like to say in this connection is that the Hindus before determining their attitude towards this question should note certain important considerations.

In particular they should note that there is a difference between *Macht Politic* ⁴² [f.42] and *Gravamin Politic* ⁴³[f.43] ; that there is a difference between *Communitas Communitatum* and a nation of nations; that there is a difference between safeguards to allay apprehensions of the weak and contrivances to satisfy the ambition for power of the strong: that there is a difference between providing safeguards and handing over the country. Further, they should also note that what may with safety be conceded to *Gravamin Politic* may not be conceded to *Macht Politic*. What may be conceded with safety to a community may not be conceded to a nation and what may be conceded with safety to the weak to be used by it as a weapon of defence may not be conceded to the strong who may

use it as a weapon of attack.

These are important considerations and, if the Hindus overlook them, they will do so at their peril. For the Muslim alternative is really a frightful and dangerous alternative.

CHAPTER IX

LESSONS FROM ABROAD

Hindus who will not yield to the demand of the Muslims for the division of India into Pakistan and Hindustan and would insist upon maintaining the geographical unity of India without counting the cost will do well to study the fate that has befallen other countries which, like India, harboured many nations and sought to harmonise them.

It is not necessary to review the history of all such countries. It is enough to recount here the story of two, Turkey and Czechoslovakia.

I

To begin with Turkey. The emergence of the Turks in history was due to the fact that they were driven away by the Mongols from their home in Central Asia, somewhere between 1230-40 A.D., which led them to settle in north-west Anatolia. Their career as the builders of the Turkish Empire began in 1326 with the conquest of Brusa. In 1360-61, they conquered Thrace from the Aegean to the Black Sea; in 1361-62, the Byzantine Government of Constantinople accepted their supremacy. In 1369 Bulgaria followed suit. In 1371-72 Macedonia was conquered. In 1373 Constantinople definitely accepted Ottoman sovereignty. In 1389 Serbia was conquered, in 1430 Salonica, in 1453 Constantinople, in 1461 Trebizond, in 1465 Quraman, and in 1475 Kaffa and Tana were annexed. After a short lull, they conquered Mosul in 1514, Syria, Egypt, the Hiaz and the Yaman in 1516-17 and Belgrade in 1521. This was followed in 1526 by victory over the Hungarians at Mohacz. In 1554 took place the first conquest of Baghdad and in 1639 the second Conquest of Baghdad. Twice they laid siege to Vienna, first in 1529 and again in 1683 with a view to extend their conquest beyond. But on both occasions they were repulsed with the result that their expansion in Europe was completely checked forever.

Still the countries they conquered between 1326 and 1683 formed a vast empire. A few of these territories the Turks had lost to their enemies thereafter, but taking the extent of the Turkish Empire as it stood in 1789 on the eve of the French Revolution, it comprised (1) the Balkans, south of the Danube, (2) Asia Minor, the Levant and the neighbouring islands (i.e., Cyprus), (3) Syria and Palestine, (4) Egypt, and (5) North Africa from Egypt to Morocco.

The tale of the disruption of the Turkish Empire is easily told. The first to break away *de facto*, if not *de jure*, was Egypt in 1769. The next were the Christians in the Balkans. Bessarabia was taken by Russia in 1812 after a war with Turkey. In 1812 Serbia rebelled with the aid of Russia and the Turks were obliged to place Serbia under a separate government. In 1829 similar concessions were granted to two other Danubian provinces, Moldavia and Wallachia. As a result of the Greek war of independence which lasted between 1822-29, Greece was completely freed from the Turkish rule and the Greek independence was recognised by the Powers in 1832. Between 1875-77 there was turmoil amongst the Balkans. There was a revolt in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Bulgarians resorted to atrocities against the Turks, to which the Turks replied with atrocities in equal measure. As a result, Serbia and Montenegro declared war on Turkey and so did Russia. By the Treaty of Berlin, Bulgaria was given self-government under Turkey and Eastern Rumania was to be ruled by Turkey under a Christian Governor. Russia gained Kars and Batourn. Dobrudja was given to Rumania. Bosnia and Herzegovina were assigned to Austria for administration and England occupied Cyprus. In 1881 Greece gained Thessaly and France occupied Tunis. In 1885 Bulgaria and Eastern Rumania were united into one state.

The story of the growth and decline of the Turkish Empire upto 1906 has been very graphically described by Mr. Lane Poole in the following words ⁴⁴[\[f.44\]](#) :—

"In its old extent, when the Porte ruled not merely the *narrow* territory now called Turkey in Europe, but Greece, Bulgaria and Eastern Rumania, Rumania, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina,

with the Crimea and a portion of Southern Russia, Egypt, Syria, Tripoli, Tunis, Algiers and numerous islands in the Mediterranean, not counting the vast but mainly desert tract of Arabia, the total population (at the present time) would be over fifty millions, or nearly twice that of Europe without Russia. One by one her provinces have been taken away. Algiers and Tunis have been incorporated with France, and this 175,000 square miles and five million inhabitants have transferred their allegiance. Egypt is practically independent, and this means a loss of 500,000 miles and over six millions of inhabitants. Asiatic Turkey alone has suffered comparatively little diminution. This forms the bulk of *tier* present dominions, and comprises about 680,000 square miles, and over sixteen millions of population. In Europe her losses have been almost as severe as in Africa where Tripoli alone remains to her. Serbia and Bosnia are administered by Austria and thereby nearly 40,000 miles and three and a half millions of peoples have become Austrian subjects. Wallachia and Moldavia are united in the independent kingdom of Rumania, diminishing the extent of Turkey by 46,000 miles and over five millions of inhabitants. Bulgaria is a dependent state over which the Porte has no real control and Eastern Rumania has lately *de facto* become part of Bulgaria and the two contain nearly 40,000 square miles, and three millions of inhabitants. The kingdom of Greece with its 25,000 miles and two million population has long been separated from its parent. In Europe where the Turkish territory once extended to 230,000 miles, with a population of nearly 20 millions, it now reaches only the total of 66 thousand miles and a population of four and a half millions. It has lost nearly three-fourths of its land, and about the same proportion of its people."

Such was the condition of Turkey in 1907. What has befallen her since then is unfortunately the worst part of her story. In 1908 taking advantage of the revolution brought about by the Young Turks, Austria annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina and Bulgaria declared her independence. In 1911 Italy took possession of Tripoli and in 1912 France occupied Morocco. Encouraged by the successful attack of Italy in 1912, Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia and Montenegro formed themselves into a Balkan League and declared war on Turkey. In this war, known as the first Balkan War, Turkey was completely defeated. By the Treaty of London (1913) the Turkish territory in Europe was reduced to a narrow strip round Constantinople. But the treaty could not take effect because the victors could not agree on the distribution of the spoils of victory. In 1913 Bulgaria declared war on the rest of the Balkan League and Rumania declared war on Bulgaria in the hope of extending her territory. Turkey also did the same. By the Treaty of Bucharest (1913), which ended the second Balkan War, Turkey recovered Adrianople and got Thrace from Bulgaria. Serbia obtained Northern Macedonia and Greece obtained Southern Macedonia (including Salonika), while Montenegro enlarged her territory at the expense of Turkey. By 1914 when the Great European War came on, the Balkans had won their independence from Turkey and the area in Europe that remained under the Turkish Empire was indeed a very small area round about Constantinople and her possessions in Asia. So far as the African continent is concerned, the Sultan's power over Egypt and the rest of North Africa was only nominal, for the European Powers had established real control therein. In the Great War of 1914 the overthrow of Turkey was complete. All the provinces from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf were overrun, and the great cities of Baghdad, Jerusalem, Damascus and Aleppo were captured. In Europe the allied troops occupied Constantinople. The Treaty of Sevres, which brought the war with Turkey to a close, sought to deprive her of all her outlying provinces and even of the fertile plains of Asia Minor. Greek claim for territory was generously allowed at the expense of Turkey in Macedonia, Thrace and Asia Minor and Italy was to receive Adalia and a large tract in the South. Turkey was to be deprived of all her Arab provinces in Asia, Iraq, Syria, Palestine, Hedjaz and Nejd. There was left to Turkey only the capital, Constantinople, and separated from this city, by a "neutral zone of the straits," part of the barren plateau of Anatolia. The treaty though accepted by the Sultan was fiercely attacked by the Nationalist Party under Kemal Pasha. When the Greeks advanced to occupy their new territory, they were attacked and decisively beaten. At the end of the war with Greece, which went on from 1920 to 1922, the Turks had reoccupied Smyrna. As the allies were not prepared to send armies to help the Greeks, they were forced to come to terms with the Nationalist Turks. At the conference at Mudania the Greeks agreed to revise the terms of the Treaty of Sevres, which was done by the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 which granted the demands of Turkey except in Western Thrace. The

rest of the Treaty of Sevres was accepted by the Turks which meant the loss of her Arab provinces in Asia. Before the War of 1914, Turkey had lost all her provinces in Europe. After the War, she lost her provinces in Asia. As a result of the dismemberment of the old Turkish Empire, what now remains of it is the small state called the Republic of Turkey with an area which is a minute fraction of the old Empire ⁴⁵[\[f.45\]](#) .

II

Take the case of Czechoslovakia. It is the creation of the Treaty of Trianon which followed the European War of 1914. None of the peace treaties was more drastic in its terms than the Treaty of Trianon. Says Prof. Macartney, " By it Hungary was not so much mutilated as dismembered. Even if we exclude Croatia, Slavonia, which had stood only in a federal relationship to the other lands of the Holy Crown—although one of eight hundred years' standing—Hungary proper was reduced to less than one-third (32.6 per cent.) of her pre-war area, and a little over two-fifths (41.6 per cent.) of her population. Territories and peoples formerly Hungarian were distributed among no less than seven states." Of these states, there was one which did not exist before. It was a new creation. That was the state of Czechoslovakia.

The area of the Republic of Czechoslovakia was 54,244 square miles and the population was about 13,613,172. It included the territories formerly known as Bohemia, Moravia, Slovakia and Ruthenia. It was a composite state which included in its bosom three principal nationalities, (i) Czechs occupying Bohemia and Moravia, (ii) Slovaks occupying Slovakia and (iii) Ruthenians in occupation of Ruthenia.

Czechoslovakia proved to be a very short-lived state. It lived exactly for two decades. On the 15th March 1939 it perished or rather was destroyed as an independent state. It became a protectorate of Germany. The circumstances attending its expiry were of a very bewildering nature. Her death was brought about by the very Powers which had given it birth. By signing the Munich Pact on 30th September 1938—of which the protectorate was an inevitable consequence. Great Britain, France and Italy assisted Germany, their former enemy of the Great War, to conquer Czechoslovakia, their former ally. All the work of the Czechs of the past century to gain freedom was wiped off. They were once more to be the slaves of their former German overlords.

III

What are the reasons for the disruption of Turkey ?

Lord Eversley in his *Turkish Empire* ⁴⁶[\[f.46\]](#) has attempted to give reasons for the decay of Turkey, some internal, some external. Among the internal causes there were two. First the degeneracy of the Ottoman dynasty. The supreme power fell into the hands either of the Vazirs of the Sultans or more often in the hands of women of the harem of the Sultan. The harem was always in antagonism to the official administration of the Porte, which ostensibly carried on the administration of the state under the direction of the Sultan. The officials of every degree from the highest to the lowest were interested in the sale of all offices, civil and military, to the highest bidders. For securing their object, they found it expedient to bribe the inmates of the harem and thereby win the assent of the Sultans. The harem thus became the centre from which corruption spread throughout the Turkish Empire and which was one of the main causes of its decay. The second main cause of the decadence of the Turkish Empire was the deterioration of its armies due to two causes. During the last 300 years the army had lost the elan and the daring by which the Ottomans won their many victories in the early period of their career. The loss of this elan and daring by the Turkish army was due to the composition of the army, recruitment to which was restricted to Turks and Arabs, and also to the diminution of opportunities of plunder and the hope of acquiring lands for distribution among the soldiers as an incentive to victory and valour in the latter period when the Empire was on the defensive and when it was no longer a question of making fresh conquests, but of retaining what had already been won,

Among the external causes of the disruption of Turkey, the chief one is said to be the rapacity of the European nations. But this view omits to take note of the true cause. The true and the principal cause of the disruption of Turkey was the growth of the spirit of nationalism among its subject peoples. The Greek revolt, the revolts of the Serbs, Bulgarians and other Balkans against the Turkish authority were no doubt represented as a conflict between Christianity and Islam. That is one way of looking at it, but only a superficial way. These revolts were simply the manifestations of the spirit of nationalism by which they were generated. These revolts no doubt had for their immediate causes Turkish misrule, Christian antipathy to Islam and the machinations of European nations. But this does not explain the real force which motivated them. The real motive force was the spirit of nationalism and their revolts were only a manifestation of this inner urge brought on by it. That it was nationalism which had brought about the disruption of Turkey is proved by the revolt of the Arabs in the last war and their will to be independent. Here there was no conflict between Islam and Christianity, nor was the relationship between the two that of the oppressor and the oppressed. Yet, the Arab claimed to be freed from the Turkish Empire. Why ? Because he was moved by Arab nationalism and preferred to be an Arab nationalist to being a Turkish subject. What is the cause of the destruction of Czechoslovakia ?

The general impression is that it was the result of German aggression. To some extent that is true. But it is not the whole truth. If Germany was the only enemy of Czechoslovakia, all that she would have lost was the fringe of her borderland which was inhabited by the Sudeten Germans. German aggression need have cost her nothing more. Really speaking the destruction of Czechoslovakia was brought about by an enemy within her own borders. That enemy was the intransigent nationalism of the Slovaks who were out to break up the unity of the state and secure the independence of Slovakia.

The union of the Slovaks with the Czechs, as units of a single state, was based upon certain assumptions. First, the two were believed to be so closely akin as to be one people, and that the Slovaks were only a branch of Czechoslovaks. Second, the two spoke a single * Czechoslovak * language. Third, there was no separate Slovak national consciousness. Nobody examined these assumptions at the time, because the Slovaks themselves desired this union, expressing their wish in 1918 by formal declaration of their representatives at the Peace Conference. This was a superficial and hasty view of the matter. As Prof. Macartney ⁴⁷[\[f.47\]](#) points out.

". . . ' the central political fact which emerges from the consideration of this history (of the relations between the Czechs and Slovaks) for the purposes of the present age is the final crystallization of a Slovak national consciousness . . . ' The genuine and uncompromising believers in a single indivisible Czechoslovak language and people were certainly never so large, at least in Slovakia, as they were made to appear. Today they have dwindled to a mere handful, under the influence of actual experience of *the* considerable differences which exist between the Czechs and the Slovaks. At present Slovak is in practice recognized by the Czechs themselves as the official language of Slovakia. The political and national resistance has been no less tenacious, and to-day the name of 'Czechoslovakia' is practically confined to official documents and to literature issued for the benefit of foreigners. During many weeks in the country I only remember hearing one person use the term for herself; this was a half German, half-Hungarian girl, who used it in a purely political sense, meaning that she thought irridentism futile. No Czech and no Slovak feels or calls himself, when speaking naturally, anything but a Czech or a Slovak as the case may be."

This national consciousness of the Slovaks, which was always alive, began to burst forth on seeing that the Sudeten Germans had made certain demands on Czechoslovakia for autonomy. The Germans sought to achieve their objective by the application of gangster morality to international politics, saying " Give us what we ask or we shall burst up your shop." The Slovaks followed suit by making their demands for autonomy but with a different face. They did not resort to gangster methods but modulated their demands to autonomy only. They had eschewed all idea of independence, and, in the proclamation issued on October 8 by Dr. Tiso, the leading man in the autonomist movement in Slovakia, it was said " We shall proceed in the spirit of our motto, for God

and the Nation, in a Christian and national spirit." Believing in their *bona fides* and desiring to give no room to the *Gravamin Politic* of which the Slovaks were making full use to disturb the friendly relations between the Czechs and the Slovaks, the National Assembly in Prague passed an Act in November 1938—immediately after the Munich Pact—called the "Constitutional Act on the Autonomy of Slovakia." Its provisions were of a far-reaching character. There was to be a separate parliament for Slovakia and this parliament was to decide the constitution of Slovakia within the framework of the legal system of the Czechoslovak Republic. An alteration in the territory of Slovakia was to be with the consent of the two-third majority in the Slovak parliament. The consent of the Slovak parliament was made necessary for international treaties which exclusively concerned Slovakia. Officials of the central state administration in Slovakia were to be primarily Slovaks. Proportional representation of Slovakia was guaranteed in all central institutions, councils, commissions and other organizations. Similarly, Slovakia was to be proportionally represented on all international organizations in which the Czechoslovak Republic was called upon to participate. Slovak soldiers, in peace time, were to be stationed in Slovakia as far as possible. As far as legislative authority was concerned all subjects which were strictly of common concern were assigned to the parliament of Czechoslovakia. By way of guaranteeing these rights to the Slovaks, the Constitution Act provided that the decision of the National Assembly to make constitutional changes shall be valid only if the majority constitutionally required for such changes includes also a proportionate majority of the members of the National Assembly elected in Slovakia. Similarly, the election of the President of the Republic required the consent not merely of the constitutionally determined majority of the members of the parliament, but also of a proportionate majority of the Slovak members. Further to emphasize that the central government must enjoy the confidence of the Slovaks it was provided by the constitution that one-third of the Slovak members of parliament may propose a motion of 'No Confidence.'

These constitutional changes introduced, much against the will of the Czechs, a hyphen between the Czechs and the Slovaks which did not exist before. But it was done in the hope that, once the relatively minor quarrels between the two were got out of the way, the very nationalism of the Slovaks was more likely to bring them closer to the Czechs than otherwise. With the constitutional changes guaranteeing an independent status to Slovakia and the fact that the status so guaranteed could not be changed without the consent of the Slovaks themselves, there was no question of the Slovaks ever losing their national identity through submergence by the Czechs. The autonomy introduced by the hyphen separated the cultural waters and saved the Slovaks from losing their colour.

The first Slovak parliament elected under the new constitution was opened on January 18, 1939, and Dr. Martin Sokol, the President of the parliament, declared, "The period of the Slovak's struggle for freedom is ended. Now begins the period of national rebirth." Other speeches made on the occasion indicated that now that Slovakia had its autonomy the Slovaks would never feel animosity towards the Czechs and that both would loyally abide by the Czecho-Slovak State.

Not even a month elapsed since the inauguration of the Slovak parliament before the Slovak politicians began their battle against the hyphen and for complete separation. They made excited speeches in which they attacked the Czechs, talked about Czech oppression and demanded a completely independent Slovakia. By the beginning of March, the various forms of separatism in Slovakia were seriously threatening the integrity of the Czechoslovak State. On March 9 it was learnt that Tiso, the Slovak Premier, had decided to proclaim the independence of Slovakia. On the 10th, in anticipation of such an act, troops were moved in Slovakia and Tiso, the Prime Minister, was dismissed along with other Slovak ministers by the President of the Republic, Dr. Hacha. On the next day Tiso, supposed to be under police supervision, telephoned to Berlin and asked for help. On Monday Tiso and Hitler met and had an hour and a half talk in Berlin. Immediately after the talk with Hitler, Tiso got on the phone to Prague and passed on the German orders.

They were:—

- (i) All Czech troops to be withdrawn from Slovakia;

- (ii) Slovakia to be an independent state under German protection;
- (iii) The Slovak parliament to be summoned by President Hacha to hear the proclamation of independence.

There was nothing that President Hacha and the Prague Government could do except say ' yes ' for they knew very well that dozens of divisions of German troops were massed round the defenceless frontiers of Czechoslovakia ready to march in at any moment if the demands made by Germany in the interest of and at the instance of Slovakia were refused. Thus ended the new state of Czechoslovakia.

IV

What is the lesson to be drawn from the story of these two countries ?

There is some difference as to how the matters should be put. Mr. Sydney Brooks would say that the cause of these wars of disruption is nationalism, which according to him is the enemy of the universal peace. Mr. Norman Angell, on the other hand, would say it is not nationalism but the threat to nationalism which is the cause. To Mr. Robertson nationalism is an irrational instinct, if not a positive hallucination, and the sooner humanity got rid of it the better for all.

In whatever way the matter is put and howsoever ardently one may wish for the elimination of nationalism, the lesson to be drawn is quite clear: that nationalism is a fact which can neither be eluded nor denied. Whether one calls it an irrational instinct or positive hallucination, the fact remains that it is a potent force which has a dynamic power to disrupt empires. Whether nationalism is the cause or the threat to nationalism is the cause, is a difference of emphasis only. The real thing is to recognize, as does Mr. Toynbee, that " nationalism is strong enough to produce war in spite of us. It has terribly proved itself to be no outworn creed, but a vital force to be reckoned with." As was pointed out by him, " the right reading of nationalism has become an affair of life and death." It was not only so for Europe. It was so for Turkey. It was so for Czechoslovakia. And what was a question of life and death to them could not but be one of life and death to India. Prof. Toynbee pleaded, as was done before him by Guizot, for the recognition of nationality as the necessary foundation of European peace. Could India ignore to recognize this plea ? If she does, she will be acting at her peril. That nationalism is a disruptive force is not the only lesson to be learnt from the history of these two countries. Their experience embodies much else of equal if not of greater significance. What that is, will be evident if certain facts are recalled to memory.

The Turks were by no means as illiberal as they are painted. They allowed their minorities a large measure of autonomy. The Turks had gone far towards solving the problem of how people of different communities with different social heritages are to live together in harmony when they are geographically intermingled. The Ottoman Empire had accorded, as a matter of course, to the non-Muslim and non-Turkish communities within its frontiers a degree of territorial as well as cultural autonomy which had never been dreamt of in the political philosophy of the West. Ought not the Christian subjects to have been satisfied with this ? Say what one may, the nationalism of Christian minorities was not satisfied with this local autonomy. It fought for complete freedom and in that fight Turkey was slit open.

The Turks were bound to the Arabs by the tie of religion. The religious tie of Islam is the strongest known to humanity. No social confederacy can claim to rival the Islamic brotherhood in point of solidarity-. Add to this the fact that while the Turk treated his Christian subjects as his inferior, he acknowledged the Arab as his equal. All non-Muslims were excluded from the Ottoman army. But the Arab soldiers and officers served side by side with Turks and Kurds. The Arab officer class, educated in Turkish school, served in military and civil capacities on the same terms as the Turks. There was no derogating distinction between the Turk and the Arab, and there was nothing to prevent the Arab from rising to the highest rank in the Ottoman services. Not only politically but

even socially the Arab was treated as his equal by the Turk and Arabs married Turkish wives and Turks married Arab wives. Ought not the Arabs to have been satisfied with this Islamic brotherhood of Arabs and Turks based on fraternity, liberty and equality ? Say what one may, the Arabs were not satisfied. Arab nationalism broke the bonds of Islam and fought against his fellow Muslim, the Turk, for its independence. It won, but Turkey was completely dismantled.

As to Czechoslovakia, she began with the recognition that both the Czechs and the Slovaks were one people. Within a few years, the Slovaks claimed to be a separate nation. They would not even admit that they were a branch of the same stock as the Czechs. Their nationalism compelled the Czechs to recognize the fact that they were a distinct people. The Czechs sought to pacify the nationalism of the Slovaks by drawing a hyphen as a mark indicating distinctness. In place of Czechoslovakia they agreed to have Czecho-Slovakia. But even with the hyphen the Slovak nationalism remained discontented. The act of autonomy was both, a hyphen separating them from the Czechs as well as a link joining them with the Czechs. The hyphen as making separation was welcome to the Slovaks but as making a link with the Czechs was very irksome to them. The Slovaks accepted the autonomy with its hyphen with great relief and promised to be content and loyal to the state. But evidently this was only a matter of strategy. They did not accept it as an ultimate end. They accepted it because they thought that they could use it as a vantage ground for destroying the hyphen which was their main aim and convert autonomy into independence. The nationalism of the Slovaks was not content with a hyphen. It wanted a bar in place of the hyphen. Immediately the hyphen was introduced, they began their battle to replace the hyphen between the Czechs and the Slovaks by a bar. They did not care what means they should employ. Their nationalism was so wrong-headed and so intense that when they failed they did not hesitate to call the aid of the Germans.

Thus a deeper study of the disruption of Turkey and Czechoslovakia shows that neither local autonomy nor the bond of religion is sufficient to withstand the force of nationalism, once it is set on the go.

This is a lesson which the Hindus will do well to grasp. They should ask themselves : if the Greek, Balkan and Arab nationalism has blown up the Turkish State and if Slovak nationalism has caused the dismantling of Czechoslovakia, what is thereto prevent Muslim nationalism from disrupting the Indian State ? If experience of other countries teaches that this is the inevitable consequence of pent-up nationalism, why not profit by their experience and avoid the catastrophe by agreeing to divide India into Pakistan and Hindustan ? Let the Hindus take the warning that if they refuse to divide India into two before they launch on their career as a free people, they will be sailing in those shoal waters in which Turkey, Czechoslovakia and many others have foundered. If they wish to avoid shipwreck in mid-ocean, they must lighten the draught by throwing overboard all superfluous cargo. They will ease the course of their voyage considerably if they—to use the language of Prof. Toynbee—reconcile themselves to making jetsam of less cherished and more combustible cargo.

V

Will the Hindus really lose if they agree to divide India into two, Pakistan and Hindus'?

With regard to Czechoslovakia it is instructive to note the real feelings of its government on the loss of their territory caused by the Munich Pact. They were well expressed by the Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia in his message to the people of Czechoslovakia. In it he said ⁴⁸[f.48] :—

" Citizens and soldiers.... I am living through the hardest hour of my life; I am carrying out the most painful task, in comparison with which death would be easy. But precisely because I have flight and because I know under what conditions a war is won, must tell you frankly... that the forces opposed to us at this moment compel us to recognize their superior strength and to act accordingly....

"In Munich four European Great Powers met and decided to demand of us the acceptance of new frontiers, according to which the German areas of our State would be taken away. We had the choice between desperate and hopeless defence, which would have meant the sacrifice not only of the adult generation but also of women and children, and the acceptance of conditions which in their ruthlessness, and because they were imposed by pressure without war, have no parallel in history. We desired to make a contribution to peace; we would gladly have made it But not by any means in the way it has been fenced upon us.

" But we were abandoned, and were alone.... Deeply moved, all your leaders considered, together with the army and the President of the Republic, all the possibilities which remained. *They recognized that in choosing between narrower frontiers and the death of the nation it was their sacred duty to save the life of our people, so that we may not emerge weakened from these terrible limes, and so that we may remain certain that our nation will gather itself together again, as it has done so often in the past. Let us all see that our State re-establishes itself soundly within its new frontiers, and that its population is assured of a new life of peace and fruitful labour. With your help we shall succeed. We rely upon you, and you have confidence in us.*"

It is evident that the Czechs refused to be led by the force of historic sentiment. They were ready to have narrower frontiers and a smaller Czechoslovakia to the ultimate destruction of their people.

With regard to Turkey the prevalent view was the one that was expressed in 1853 by the Czar Nicholas I, during a conversation with British Ambassador in St. Petersburg in which he said " We have on our hand a sick man—a very sick man He may suddenly die upon our hands." From that day the imminent decease of Turkey, the sick man of Europe was awaited by all his neighbours. The shedding of the territories was considered as the convulsions of a dying man who is alleged to have breathed his last by affixing his signature to the Treaty of Sevres.

Is this really a correct view to take of Turkey in the process of dissolution? It is instructive to note the comments of Arnold Toynbee on this view. Referring to the Czar's description of Turkey as the sick man who may suddenly die, he says ⁴⁹[f.49] :

" In this second and more sensational part of his diagnosis Czar Nicholas went astray because he did not understand the nature of the symptoms. If a person totally ignorant of natural history stumbled upon a snake in course of shedding its skin, he would pronounce dogmatically that the creature could not possibly recover. He could point out that when a man (or other mammal) has the misfortune to lose his skin, he is never known to survive. Yet while it is perfectly true that the leopard cannot change his spots nor the Ethiopian his skin, a wider study would have informed our amateur naturalist that a snake can do both and does both habitually. Doubtless, even for the snake, the process is awkward and uncomfortable. He becomes temporarily torpid, and in this condition he is dangerously at the mercy of his enemies. Yet, if he escapes the kites and crows until his metamorphosis is complete, he not only recovers his health but renews his youth with the replacement of his mortal coils. This is the recent experience of the Turk, and ' moulting snake ' is better simile than sick man for a description of his distemper."

In this view, the loss of her possessions by Turkey is the removal of an anomalous excrescence and the gain of a new skin. Turkey is certainly homogeneous and has no fear of any disruption from within.

The Muslim areas are an anomalous excrescence on Hindustan and Hindustan is an anomalous excrescence on them. Tied together they will make India the sick man of Asia. Welded together they will make India a heterogeneous unit. If Pakistan has the demerit of cutting away parts of India, it has also the merit of introducing harmony in place of conflict.

Severed into two, each becomes a more homogeneous unit. The homogeneity of the two areas is obvious enough. Each has a cultural unity. Each has a religious unity. Pakistan has a linguistic unity. If there is no such unity in Hindustan, it is possible to have it without any controversy as to

whether the common language should be Hindustani, Hindi or Urdu. Separated, each can become a strong and well-knit state. India needs a strong Central Government. But it cannot have it so long as Pakistan remains a part of India. Compare the structure of the Federal Government as embodied in the Government of India Act, 1935, and it will be found, that the Central Government as constituted under it is an effete ramshackle thing with very little life in it. ⁵⁰[f.50] As has already been pointed out, this weakening of the Central Government is brought about by the desire to placate the Muslim Provinces who wish to be independent of the authority of the Central Government on the ground that the Central Government is bound to be predominantly Hindu in character and composition. When Pakistan comes into being these considerations can have no force. Hindustan can then have a strong Central Government and a homogeneous population, which are necessary elements for the stability of the state and neither of which will be secured unless there is severance of Pakistan from Hindustan.

Contents

PART IV

[f.1] See *Times of India* dated 25-7-1925, "Through Indian Eyes".

[f.2] On the question whether the Hindu Religion was a missionary Religion and if it was, why it ceased to be so, see my essay on *Carte and Conversion* in the Annual Number of the *Telugu Samachar* for 1926.

[f.3] See *Report in Times of India* 27-11-24, "Through Indian Eyes

[f.4] Speech at the Calcutta Session of the Hindu Maha Sabha held in December 1939, p. 14.

[f.5] Speech *Ibid.*, p. 25.

[f.6] *Ibid.*, pp. 24—27

[f.7] Speech 1939, *Ibid.*, p. 18.

[f.8] *Ibid.*, pp. 19-20.

[f.9] Speech 1939, pp. 21, 22, 23.

[f.10] Language of Gods

[f.11] Basically Sanskrit

[f.12] National Language

[f.13] *Ibid.*, p. 4.

[f.14] *Ibid.*, p. 16.

[f.15] *Ibid.*, pp. 14-17

[f.16] It should be noted that Mr. Savarkar is not opposed to separate electorates for the Muslims. It is not clear whether he is in favour of separate electorates for Muslims even where they are in a majority

[f.17] See his Manifesto dated 23rd March 1919

[f18] *Young India*, 2nd June 1920.

[f.19]" In view of the fact that on the Khilafat question both the Indian and Imperial Governments have signally failed in their duty towards the Muslims of India and the Prime Minister has deliberately broken his pledged word given to them, and that it is the duty of every non-Muslim Indian in every legitimate manner to assist his Muslim brother in his attempt to remove the religious calamity that has overtaken him;

" And in view of the fact that, in the matter of the events of the April of 1919, both the said Governments have grossly neglected or failed to protect the innocent people of the Punjab and punish officers guilty of unsoldierly and barbarous behaviour towards them, and have exonerated Sir Michael O'Dwyer who proved himself directly responsible for most of the official crimes and callous to the sufferings of the people placed under his administration, and that the debate in the House of Lords betrayed a woeful lack of sympathy with the people of India, and systematic terrorism and frightfulness adopted in the Punjab, and that the latest Viceregal pronouncement is proof of entire absence of repentance in the matters of the Khilafat and the Punjab ;

" This Congress is of opinion that there can be no contentment in India without redress of the two aforementioned wrongs, and that the only effectual means to vindicate national honour and to prevent a repetition of similar wrongs in future is the establishment of Swarajya.

" This Congress is further of opinion that there is no course left open for the people of India but to approve of and adopt the policy of progressive non-violent non-co-operation inaugurated by Mahatma Gandhi, until the said wrongs are righted and Swarajya is established. "

Mrs. Annie Besant says : " It will be remembered that Mr. Gandhi, in March 1920, had forbidden the mixing up of non-co-operation in defence of the Khilafat with other questions ; but it was found that the Khilafat was not sufficiently attractive to Hindus ", so at the meeting of the All-India Congress Committee held at Benares on May 30 and 31, the Punjab atrocities and the deficiencies of the Reforms Act were added to the list of provocative causes.—*The Future of Indian Politics*, p. 250.

[f.20]Mr. Gandhi repudiated the suggestion of the *Modern Review* and regarded it as " crudest cut ". Dealing with the criticism of the *Modern Review* in his Article in *Young India* for 20th October 1921 Mr. Gandhi said " I claim that with us both the Khilafat is the central fact, with Maulana Mahomed Ali because it is his religion, with me because, in laying down my life for the Khilafat, I ensure safety of the cow, that is my religion, from the Musalman knife. "

[f.21]The Resolution of non-co-operation was carried by 1886 votes against 884. The late Mr. Tairsee once told me that a large majority of the delegates were no others than the taxi drivers of Calcutta who were paid to vote for the non-co-operation resolution

[f.22]*Liberator* 22nd April 1926.

[f.23]*Young India*, 10th December 1919.

[f.24]*Young India*. 9th June 1920

[f.25]*Young India* dated 4th May 1921

[f.26]It is reported that for earning merit for the soul of Abdul Rashid, the murderer of Swami Shradhanand, in the next world, the students and professors of the famous theological college at Deoband finished five complete recitations of the Koran and had planned to finish daily a lakh and a quarter recitations of Koranic verses. Their prayer was " God Almighty may give the marhoom (Le.. Rashid) a place in the ' a ' ala-e-illeyeen (the summit of the seventh heaven) "— *Times of*

India. 30-11-27 Through Indian Eyes columns.

[f.27]The resolution says that *then* were only three cases of forcible conversion ! ! In reply to a question in the Central Legislature (Debates 16th January 1922) Sir William Vincent replied: - The Madras Government report that the number of forcible conversions probably runs to thousands but that for obvious reasons it will never be possible to obtain anything like an accurate estimate " .

[f.28]The series is known as " India in 1920 " & so on.

[f.29]*Rangila Rasul* was written in reply to *Sitaka Chinala*—a pamphlet written by a Muslim alleging that Sita, wife of Rama, the hero of Ramayana, was a prostitute.

[f.30]Report of the Court of Inquiry appointed under section 3 of the Sind Public Inquiries Act to inquire into the riots which occurred at Sukkur in 1939, p. 65. The total of 142 Hindus under ' murdered ' seems to be a mistake. It ought to be 72.

[f.31]Ibid., pp. 66-67.

[f.32]This is an English version of the report which appeared in *the Savadhan*, a Marathi weekly of Nagpur, in its issue of 25th August 1936

[f.33]Quoted in " Through Indian Eyes " columns of the *Times of India*, dated 16-8-26.

[f.34]*The Unity of Western Civilization* (4th Ed.,) p. 27.

[f.35]The Christian Church did not play a passive part in the process of unification of the Holy Roman Empire, It took a very active part in bringing it about. " Seeing one institution after another falling to pieces around her, seeing how countries and cities were being severed from each other by the eruption of strange tribes and the increasing difficulty of communication the Christian Church, " says Bryce, " strove to save religious fellowship by strengthening the ecclesiastical organization, by drawing tighter every bond of outward union. Necessities of faith were still more powerful. Truth, it was said, is one, and as it must bind into one body all who hold it, so it is only by continuing in that body that they can preserve it. There is one Flock and one Shepherd. "

[f.36]Beside the Central Legislature there are to be constituted under the scheme of Reforms other popular bodies such as Panchayats, Rural Boards, Municipalities and Town Committees.

[f.37]The distribution of population of Hyderabad State (excluding Berar) is according to the census of 1931 as follows;—

"Hindus	Untouchables	Muslims	Christians	Others	Total
96,99,615	24,73,230	15,34,666	1,51,382	5,77,255	1,44,36,148

[f.38]See *Bombay Sentinel*, June 22nd, 1940. Mr. Mir Akbar Ali Khan says that he discussed his proposals with Mr. Srinivas Iyengar, ex-president of the Congress and the proposals published by him are really proposals as approved by Mr. Iyengar.

[f.39]Mufti Kifay at Ullah, a prominent member of the conference, in the course of his speech is reported to have said : "*They* had to demonstrate that they were not behind any other community in the fight for freedom, He wished to declare in clear terms that they did not rely on the British Government for the protection of their rights. They would themselves chalk out the safeguards necessary for the protection of their religious rights and would fight out any party, however powerful, that would refuse to accept those safeguards as they would fight the Government for freedom " (Prolonged cheers.) *Hindustan times*. April 30, 1940.

[f.40] See the speeches of Maulana Hafizul Rehman and Dr. K. M. Ashraf in the same issue of the *Hindustan Times*.

[f.41] This report has not appeared *even* now

[f.42] *Macht Politic* means Power Politics.

[f.43] *Gravamin Politic* mews in which the main strategy is to gain power by manufacturing grievances.

[f.44] *Turkey*, pp. 363-64.

[f.45] The area of Turkey is 294,492 square miles exclusive of 3,708 square miles of lakes and swamps. The area of Turkey in Europe is only 9,257 square miles.

[f.46] See abridgement by Sheikh Abdur Rashid.

[f.47] C. A. Macartney—*Hungary and Her Successors* (Oxford), 1937, p. 136.

[f.48] Alexander Henderson—*Eye-witness in Czechoslovakia* (Harrap. 1939). pp. 229-30.

[f.49] Amold Toynbee—*Turkey*, p. 141

[f.50] For further light on this topic, mx my tract on *Federation vs. Freedom*

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PART IV

PAKISTAN AND THE MALAISE

The Hindu-Muslim problem has tow aspects to it. In its first aspect, the problem that presents itself is the problem of two separate communities facing each other and seeking adjustment of their respective right and privileges. In its other aspect, the problem is the problem of the reflex influences which this separation and conflict produces upon each of them. In the course of the foregoing discussion we have looked at the project of Pakistan in relation to the first of the aspects of the Hindu-Muslim problem. We have not examined the project of Pakistan in relation to the second aspect of that problem. Yet, such an examination is necessary because that aspect of the Hindu-Muslim problem is not unimportant. It is a very superficial if not an incomplete view to stop with the problem of the adjustment of their claims. It cannot be overlooked that their lot is cast together as such they have to participate in a course of common activity whether they like it or not. And if in this common activity they face each other as two combatants do, then their actions and reactions are worth study, for they affect both and produce a state of affairs from which if it is a deceased state, the question of escape must be faced. A study of the situation shows that the actions and reactions have produced a malaise which exhibits itself in three ways :(1) Social Stagnation, (2) Communal Aggression, and (3) National Frustration of Political 'Destiny. This malaise is a grave one. Will Pakistan he a remedy for the malaise ? Or, will it aggravate the malaise ? The following chapters are devoted to the consideration of these questions.

CHAPTER X

SOCIAL STAGNATION

I

The social evils which characterize the Hindu Society, have been well known. The publication of *Mother India* by Miss Mayo gave these evils the widest publicity. But while *Mother India* served the purpose of exposing the evils and calling their authors at the bar of the world to answer for their sins, it created the unfortunate impression throughout the world that while the Hindus were grovelling in the mud of these social evils and were conservative, the Muslims in India were free from them, and as compared to the Hindus, were a progressive people. That, such an impression should prevail, is surprising to those who know the Muslim Society in India at close quarters.

One may well ask if there is any social evil which is found among the Hindus and is not found among the Muslims ?

Take child-marriage. The Secretary of the Anti-Child-marriage Committee, constituted by the All-India Women's Conference, published a bulletin which gives the extent of the evil of child-marriage in the different communities in the country. The figures which were taken from the Census Report of 1931 areas follows :—

TABLE

MARRIED FEMALES AGED 0-15 PER 1000 FEMALES OF THAT AGE

	Hindus	Muslims	Jains	Sikhs	Christians
1881	208	153	189	170	33
1891	193	141	172	143	37
1901	186	131	164	101	38

1911	184	123	130	88	39
1921	170	III	117	72	32
2931	199	186	125	80	43

Can the position among the Musalmans so far as child-marriage goes, be considered better than the position among the Hindus ?

Take the position of women. It is insisted by Muslims that the legal rights given to Muslim women, ensure them a greater measure of independence than allowed to other Eastern women, for example, Hindu women, and are in excess of the rights given to women in some Western countries. Reliance is placed on some of the provisions of the Muslim Law.

Firstly, it is said the Muslim Law does not fix any age for marriage, and recognizes the right of a girl to marry any time. Further, except where the marriage is celebrated by the father or the grandfather, a Muslim girl, if given in marriage in childhood, has the power to repudiate her marriage on attaining puberty.

Secondly, it is held out that marriage among the Musalmans is a contract. Being a contract, the husband has a right to divorce his wife and the Muslim Law has provided ample safeguards for the wife which, if availed of, would place the Muslim wife on the same footing as the husband in the matter of divorce. For, it is claimed that the wife under the Muslim Law can, at the time of the marriage, or even thereafter in some cases, enter into a contract by which she may under certain circumstances obtain a divorce.

Thirdly, the Mahomedan Law requires that a wife can claim from her husband, by way of consideration for the surrender of her person, a sum of money or other property—known as her " dower ". The dower may be fixed even after marriage and if no amount is fixed, the wife is entitled to proper dower. The amount of dower is usually split into two parts, one is called " prompt " which is payable on demand, and the other " deferred " which is payable on dissolution of marriage by death or divorce. Her claim for dower will be treated as a debt against the husband's estate. She has complete dominion over her dower which is intended to give her economic independence. She can remit it or she can appropriate the income of it as she pleases.

Granting all these provisions of law in her favour, the Muslim woman is the most helpless person in the world. To quote an Egyptian Muslim leader :—

" Islam has set its seal of inferiority upon her, and given the sanction of religion to social customs which have deprived her of the full opportunity for self-expression and development of personality."

No Muslim girl has the courage to repudiate her marriage, although it may be open to her on the ground that she was a child and that it was brought about by persons other than her parents. No Muslim wife will think it proper to have a clause entered into her marriage contract reserving her the right to divorce. In that event, her fate is " once married, always married." She cannot escape the marriage tie, however irksome it may be. While she cannot repudiate the marriage, the husband can always do it without having to show any cause. Utter the word " *Tallak* " and observe continence for three weeks and the woman is cast away. The only restraint on his caprice is the obligation to pay dower. If the dower has already been remitted, his right to divorce is a matter of his sweet will.

This latitude in the matter of divorce destroys that sense of security which is so fundamental for a full, free and happy life for a woman. This insecurity of life, to which a Muslim woman is exposed, is greatly augmented by the right of polygamy and concubinage, which the Muslim Law gives to the husband.

Mahomedam Law allows a Muslim to marry four wives at a time. It is not unoften said that this is an improvement over the Hindu Law which places no restriction on the number of wives a Hindu can have at any given time. But it is forgotten that in addition to the four legal wives, the Muslim Law permits a Mahomedan to cohabit with his female slaves. In the case of female slaves nothing is said as to the number. They are allowed to him without any restriction whatever and without any obligation to marry them.

No words can adequately express the great and many evils of polygamy and concubinage and especially as a source of misery to a Muslim woman. It is true that because polygamy and concubinage are sanctioned, one must not suppose they are indulged in by the generality of Muslims; still the fact remains that they are privileges which are easy for a Muslim to abuse to the misery and unhappiness of his wife. Mr. John J. Pool, no enemy of Islam, observes [f1] ¹:—

"This latitude in the matter of divorce is very greatly taken advantage of by some Mohamedans. Slohart, commenting on this subject in his book, *Islam, and its Founder*, says: ' Some Mohamodans make a habit of continually changing their wives. We read of young men who have had twenty and thirty wives, a new one every three months: and thus it comes about that women are liable to be indefinitely transferred from one man to another, obliged to accept a husband

and a home whenever they can find one, or in case of destitution, to which divorce may have driven them, to resort to other more degrading means of living. Thus while keeping the strict letter of the law, and possessing only one or certainly not more than four wives, unscrupulous characters may yet by divorce obtain in a lifetime as many wives as they please.

" In another way also a Mohammedan may really have more than four wives, and yet keep within the law. This is by means of living with concubines, which the Koran expressly permits. In that *sura* which allows four wives, the words are added, ' of the slaves which ye shall have acquired.' Then *in* the 70th *suru*. it is revealed that it is no sin to live with slaves. The very words are: ' The slaves which their right hands possess, as to them they shall be blameless.' At the present day, as in days past, in multitudes of Mohamedan homes, slaves are found; as Muir says, in his *Life of Mahomet* ' so long as this unlimited permission of living with their female slaves continues, it cannot be expected that there will be any hearty attempt to put a stop to slavery in Mohamedan countries.' Thus the Koran, in this matter of slavery, is the enemy of the mankind. And women, as usual, are the greater sufferers.'

Take the caste system. Islam speaks of brotherhood. Everybody infers that Islam must be free from slavery and caste. Regarding slavery nothing needs to be said. It stands abolished now by law. But while it existed much of its support was derived from Islam and Islamic countries.^[f2] ² While the prescriptions by the Prophet regarding the just and humane treatment of slaves contained in the Koran are praiseworthy, there is nothing whatever in Islam that lends support to the abolition of this curse. As Sir W. Muir has well said ³[f.3] :—

"...rather, while lightening, lie riveted the fetter.... There is no obligation on a Muslim to release his slaves. ... "

But if slavery has gone, caste among Musalmans has remained. As an illustration one may take the conditions prevalent among the Bengal Muslims. The Superintendent of the

Census for 1901 for the Province of Bengal records the following interesting facts regarding the Muslims of Bengal :—

" The conventional division of the Mahomedans into four tribes— Sheikh, Saiad, Moghul and Pathan—has very little application to this Province (Bengal). The Mahomedans themselves recognize two main social divisions, (1) Ashraf or Sharaf and (2) Ajlaf. Ashraf means ' noble ' and includes all undoubted descendants of foreigners and converts from high caste Hindus. All other Mahomedans including the occupational groups and all converts of lower ranks, are known by the contemptuous terms, ' Ajlaf ', ' wretches ' or ' mean people ': they are also called Kamina or Itar, ' base ' or Rasil, a corruption of Rizal, ' worthless '. In some places a third class, called Arzal or ' lowest of all ', is added. With them no other Mahomedan would associate, and they are forbidden to enter the mosque to use the public burial ground.

"Within these groups there are castes with social precedence of exactly the same nature as one finds among the Hindus.

' 1. *Ashraf* or better class Mahomedans.

- (1) Saiads.
- (2) Sheikhs.
- (3) Pathans.
- (4) Moghul.
- (5) Mallik.
- (6) Mirza.

II. *Ajlaf* or lower class Mahomedans.

- (1) Cultivating Sheikhs, and others who were originally Hindus but who do not belong to any functional group, and have not gained admittance to the Ashraf Community, e.g. Piral and Thakrai.
- (2) Darzi, Jolaha, Fakir, and Rangrez.
- (3) Barhi, Bhalhiara, Chik, Churihar, Dai, Dhawa, Dhunia, Gaddi, Kalal, Kasai, Kula Kunjara, Laheri, Mahifarosh, Mallah, Naliya, Nikari.
- (4) Abdal, Bako, Bediya, Bhal, Chamba, Dafali, Dhobi, Hajjam, Mucho, Nagarchi, Nal, Panwaria, Madaria, Tunlia.

III. *Arzal* or degraded class. Bhanar, Halalkhor, Hijra, Kasbi, Lalbegi, Maugia, Mchlar. "

The Census Superintendent mentions another feature of the Muslim social system, namely, the prevalence of the " panchayat system." He states :—

" The authority of the panchayat extends to social as well as trade matters and... marriage with people of other communities is one of offences of which the governing body takes cognizance. The result is that these groups are often as strictly endogamous as Hindu castes. The prohibition on inter-marriage extends to higher as well as to lower castes, and a Dhuina, for example, may marry no one but a Dhuina. If this rule is transgressed, the offender is at once hauled up before the panchayat and ejected ignominiously from his community. A member of one such group cannot ordinarily gain admission to another, and he retains the designation of the community in which he was born even if he abandons its distinctive occupation and takes to other means of livelihood.... thousands of Jolahas are butchers, yet they are still known as Jolahas."

Similar facts from other Provinces of India could be gathered from their respective Census Reports and those who are curious may refer to them. But the facts for Bengal are enough to show that the Mahomedans observe not only caste but also untouchability.

There can thus be no manner of doubt that the Muslim Society in India is afflicted by the same social evils as afflict the Hindu Society. Indeed, the Muslims have all the social evils of the Hindus and something more. That something more is the compulsory system of *pardah* for Muslim women.

As a consequence of the *pardah* system a segregation of the Muslim women is brought about. The ladies are not expected to visit the outer rooms, verandahs or gardens, their quarters are in the back-yard. All of them, young and old, are confined in the same room. No male servant can work in their presence. A woman is allowed to see only her sons, brothers, father, uncles and husband, or any other near relation who may be admitted to a position of trust. She cannot go even to the mosque to pray and must wear *burka* (veil) whenever she has to go out. These *burka* women walking in the streets is one of the most hideous sights one can witness in India. Such seclusion cannot but have its deteriorating effects upon the physical constitution of Muslim women. They are usually victims to anaemia, tuberculosis and pyorrhoea. Their bodies are deformed, with their backs bent, bones protruded, hands and feet crooked. Ribs, joints and nearly all their bones ache. Heart palpitation is very often present in them. The result of this pelvic deformity is untimely death at the time of delivery. *Pardah* deprives Muslim women of mental and moral nourishment. Being deprived of healthy social life, the process of moral degeneration must and does set in. Being completely secluded from the outer world, they engage their minds in petty family quarrels with the result that they become narrow and restricted in their outlook.

They lag behind their sisters from other communities, cannot take part in any outdoor activity and are weighed down by a slavish mentality and an inferiority complex. They have no desire for knowledge, because they are taught not to be interested in anything outside the four walls of the house. *Pardah* women in particular become helpless, timid, and unfit for any fight in life. Considering the large number of *pardah* women among Muslims in India, one can easily understand the vastness and seriousness of the problem of *pardah* ⁴[f.4]

The physical and intellectual effects of *pardah* are nothing as compared with its effects on morals. The origin of *pardah* lies of course in the deep-rooted suspicion of sexual appetites in both sexes and the purpose is to check them by segregating the sexes. But far from achieving the purpose, *pardah* has adversely affected the morals of Muslim men. Owing to *pardah* a Muslim has no contact with any woman outside those who belong to his own household. Even with them his contact extends only to occasional conversation. For a male there is no company of and no commingling with the females except those who are children or aged. This isolation of the males from females is sure to produce bad effects on the morals of men. It requires no psychoanalyst to say that a social system which cuts off all contact between, the two sexes produces an unhealthy tendency towards sexual excesses and unnatural and other morbid habits and ways.

The evil consequences of *pardah* are not confined to the Muslim community only. It is responsible for the social segregation of Hindus from Muslims which is the bane of public life in India. This argument may appear far fetched and one is inclined to attribute this segregation to the unsociability of the Hindus rather than to *pardah* among the Muslims. But the Hindus are right when they say that it is not possible to establish social contact between Hindus and Muslims because such contact can only mean contact between women from one side and men from the other ⁵ [f.5]

Not that *pardah* and the evils consequent thereon are not to be found among certain sections of the Hindus in certain parts of the country. But the point of distinction is that among the Muslims, *pardah* has a religious sanctity which it has not with the Hindus. *Pardah* has deeper roots among the Muslims than it has among the Hindus and can only be removed by facing the inevitable conflict between religious injunctions and social needs. The problem of *pardah* is a real problem with the Muslims—apart from its origin—which it is not with the Hindus. Of any attempt by the Muslims to do away with it, there is no evidence.

There is thus a stagnation not only in the social life but also in the political life of the Muslim community of India. The Muslims have no interest in politics as such. Their predominant interest is religion. This can be easily seen by the

terms and conditions that a Muslim constituency makes for its support to a candidate fighting for a seat. The Muslim constituency does not care to examine the programme of the candidate. All that the constituency wants from the candidate is that he should agree to replace the old lamps of the masjid by supplying new ones at his cost, to provide a new carpet for the masjid because the old one is torn, or to repair the masjid because it has become dilapidated. In some places a Muslim constituency is quite satisfied if the candidate agrees to give a sumptuous feast and in other if he agrees to buy votes for so much a piece. With the Muslims, election is a mere matter of money and is very seldom a matter of social programme of general improvement. Muslim politics takes no note of purely secular categories of life, namely, the differences between rich and poor, capital and labour, landlord and tenant, priest and layman, reason and superstition. Muslim politics is essentially clerical and recognizes only one difference, namely, that existing between Hindus and Muslims. None of the secular categories of life have any place in the politics of the Muslim community and if they do find a place—and they must because they are irrepressible—they are subordinated to one and the only governing principle of the Muslim political universe, namely, religion.

II

The existence of these evils among the Muslims is distressing enough. But far more distressing is the fact that there is no organized movement of social reform among *the* Musalmans of India on a scale sufficient to bring about their eradication. The Hindus have their social evils. But there is this relieving feature about them—namely, that some of them are conscious of their existence and a few of them are actively agitating for their removal. The Muslims, on the other hand, do not realize that they are evils and consequently do not agitate for their removal. Indeed, they oppose any change in their existing practices. It is noteworthy that the "Muslims opposed the Child-Marriage Bill brought in the Central Assembly in 1930, whereby the age for marriage of a girl was raised to 14 and of a boy to 18 on the ground that it was opposed to the Muslim canon law. Not only did they oppose the bill at every stage but that when it became law they started a campaign of Civil Disobedience against that Act. Fortunately the Civil Disobedience campaign of the Muslims against the Act did not swell and was submerged in the Congress Civil Disobedience campaign which synchronized with it. But the campaign only proves how strongly the Muslims are opposed to social reform.

The question may be asked why are the Muslims opposed to social reform ?

The usual answer given is that the Muslims all over the world are an unprogressive people. This view no doubt accords with the facts of history. After the first spurts of their activity the scale of which was undoubtedly stupendous leading to the foundations of vast empires—the Muslims suddenly fell into a strange condition of torpor, from which they never seem to have become awake. The cause assigned for this torpor by those, who have made a study of their condition, is said to be the fundamental assumption made by all Muslims that Islam is a world religion, suitable for all people, for all times and for all conditions. It has been contended that :—

"The Musalman, remaining faithful to his religion, has not progressed; he has remained stationary in a world of swiftly moving modern forces. It is, indeed, one of the salient features of Islam that it immobilizes in their native barbarism, the races whom it enslaves. It is fixed in a crystallization, inert and impenetrable. It is unchangeable; and political, social or economic changes have no repercussion upon it.

" Having been taught that outside Islam there can be no safety; outside its law no truth and outside its spiritual message there is no happiness, the Muslim has become incapable of conceiving any other condition than his own, any other mode of thought than the Islamic thought. He firmly believes that he has arrived at an unequalled pitch of perfection; that he is the sole possessor of true faith, of the true doctrine, the true wisdom ; that he alone is in possession of the truth—no relative truth subject to revision, but absolute truth.

" The religious law of the Muslims has had the effect of imparting to the very diverse individuals of whom the world is composed, a unity of thought, of feeling, of ideas, of judgement."

It is urged that this uniformity is deadening and is not merely imparted to the Muslims, but is imposed upon them by a spirit of intolerance which is unknown anywhere outside the Muslim world for its severity and its violence and which is directed towards the suppression of all rational thinking which is in conflict with the teachings of Islam. As Renan observes ⁶[f.6] :—

" Islam is a close union of the spiritual and the temporal; it is the reign of a dogma, it is the heaviest chain that humanity has ever borne.... Islam has its beauties as a religion;.... But to the human reason Islamism has only been injurious. The minds that it has shut from the light were, no doubt, already closed in their own internal limits; but it has persecuted free thought, I shall not say more violently than other religions, but more effectually. It has made of the countries that it has conquered 9 closed field to the rational culture of the mind. What is, in fact -essentially distinctive of the Musalman is his hatred of science, his persuasion that research is useless, frivolous, almost impious—the natural sciences, because they are attempts at rivalry with God; the historical sciences, because they apply to times anterior to Islam, they may revive ancient heresies. Renan concludes by saying:—

"Islam, in treating science as an enemy, is only consistent, but it is a dangerous thing to be consistent. To its own misfortune Islam has been successful. By slaying science it has slain itself; and is condemned in the world to a

complete inferiority."

This answer though obvious, cannot be the true answer. If it were the true answer, how are we to account for the stir and ferment that is going on in all Muslim countries outside India, where the spirit of inquiry, the spirit of change and the desire to reform are noticeable in every walk of life. Indeed, the social reforms which have taken place in Turkey have been of the most revolutionary character. If Islam has not come in the way of the Muslims of these countries, why should it come in the way of the Muslims of India? There must be some special reason for the social and political stagnation of the Muslim community in India.

What can that special reason be? It seems to me that the reason for the absence of the spirit of change in the Indian Musalman is to be sought in the peculiar position he occupies in India. He is placed in a social environment which is predominantly Hindu. That Hindu environment is always silently but surely encroaching upon him. He feels that it is de-musalmanizing him. As a protection against this gradual weaning away he is led to insist on preserving everything that is Islamic without caring to examine whether it is helpful or harmful to his society. Secondly, the Muslims in India are placed in a political environment which is also predominantly Hindu. He feels that he will be suppressed and that political suppression will make the Muslims a depressed class. It is this consciousness that he has to save himself from being submerged by the Hindus socially and politically, which to my mind is the primary cause why the Indian Muslims as compared with their fellows outside are backward in the matter of social reform. Their energies are directed to maintaining a constant struggle against the Hindus for seats and posts in which there is no time, no thought and no room for questions relating to social reform. And if there is any, it is all overweighed and suppressed by the desire, generated by pressure of communal tension, to close the ranks and offer a united front to the menace of the Hindus and Hinduism by maintaining their socio-religious unity at any cost.

The same is the explanation of the political stagnation in the Muslim community of India. Muslim politicians do not recognize secular categories of life as the basis of their politics because to them it means the weakening of the community in its fight against the Hindus. The poor Muslims will not join the poor Hindus to get justice from the rich. Muslim tenants will not join Hindu tenants to prevent the tyranny of the landlord. Muslim labourers will not join Hindu labourers in the fight of labour against capital. Why? The answer is simple. The poor Muslim sees that if he joins in the fight of the poor against the rich, he may be fighting against a rich Muslim. The Muslim tenant feels that if he joins in the campaign against the landlord, he may have to fight against a Muslim landlord. A Muslim labourer feels that if he joins in the onslaught of labour against capital, he will be injuring a Muslim mill-owner. He is conscious that any injury to a rich Muslim, to a Muslim landlord or to a Muslim mill-owner, is a disservice to the Muslim community, for it is thereby weakened in its struggle against the Hindu community.

How Muslim politics has become perverted is shown by the attitude of the Muslim leaders to the political reforms in the Indian States. The Muslims and their leaders carried on a great agitation for the introduction of representative government in the Hindu State of Kashmir. The same Muslims and their leaders are deadly opposed to the introduction of representative governments in other Muslim States. The reason for this strange attitude is quite simple. In all matters, the determining question with the Muslims is how it will affect the Muslims *vis-a-vis* the Hindus. If representative government can help the Muslims, they will demand it, and fight for it. In the State of Kashmir the ruler is a Hindu, but the majority of the subjects are Muslims. The Muslims fought *for* representative government in Kashmir, because representative government in Kashmir meant the transfer of power from a Hindu king to the Muslim masses. In other Muslim States, the ruler is a Muslim but the majority of his subjects are Hindus. In such States representative government means the transfer of power from a Muslim ruler to the Hindu masses, and that is why the Muslims support the introduction of representative government in one case and oppose it in the other. The dominating consideration with the Muslims is not democracy. The dominating consideration is how democracy with majority rule will affect the Muslims in their struggle against the Hindus. Will it strengthen them or will it weaken them? If democracy weakens them, they will not have democracy. They will prefer the rotten state to continue in the Muslim States rather than weaken the Muslim ruler in his hold upon his Hindu subjects.

The political and social stagnation in the Muslim community can be explained by one and only one reason. The Muslims think that the Hindus and Muslims must perpetually struggle; the Hindus to establish their dominance over the Muslims and the Muslims to establish their historical position as the ruling community—that in this struggle the strong will win, and to ensure strength they must suppress or put in cold storage everything which causes dissension in their ranks.

If the Muslims in other countries have undertaken the task of reforming their society and the Muslims of India have refused to do so, it is because the former are free from communal and political clashes with rival communities, while the latter are not.

III

It is not that this blind spirit of conservatism which does not recognize the need of repair to the social structure has taken hold of the Muslims only. It has taken hold of the Hindus also. The Hindus at one time did recognize that without social efficiency no permanent progress in other fields of activity was possible, that, owing to the mischief wrought by

evil customs Hindu Society was not in a state of efficiency and that ceaseless efforts must be made to eradicate these evils. It was due to the recognition of this fact that the birth of the National Congress was accompanied by the foundation of the Social Conference. While the Congress was concerned with defining the weak points in the political organisation of the country, the Social Conference was engaged in removing the weak points in the social organisation of the Hindu Society. For some time, the Congress and the Conference worked as two wings of one common body and held their annual sessions in the same pandal. But soon the two wings developed into two parties, a Political Reform Party and a Social Reform Party, between whom raged fierce controversy. The Political Reform Party supported the National Congress and the Social Reform Party supported the Social Conference. The two bodies became two hostile camps. The point at issue was whether social reform should precede political reform. For a decade the forces were evenly balanced and the battle was fought without victory to either side. It was, however, evident that the fortunes of the Social Conference were ebbing fast. The gentlemen who presided over the sessions of the Social Conference lamented that the majority of the educated Hindus were for political advancement and indifferent to social reform and that while the number of those who attended the Congress was very large and the number who did not attend but who sympathized with it even larger, the number of those who attended the Social Conference was very much smaller. This indifference, this thinning of its ranks was soon followed by active hostility from the politicians, like the late Mr. Tilak. In course of time, the party in favour of political reform won and the Social Conference vanished and was forgotten,⁷ [f7] With it also vanished from the Hindu Society the urge for social reform. Under the leadership of Mr. Gandhi, the Hindu Society, if it did not become a political mad-house, certainly became mad after politics. Non-co-operation, Civil Disobedience, and the cry for Swaraj took the place which social reform once had in the minds of the Hindus. In the din and dust of political agitation, the Hindus do not even know that there are any evils to be remedied. Those who are conscious of it, do not believe that social reform is as important as political reform, and when forced to admit its importance argue that there can be no social reform unless political power is first achieved. They are so eager to possess political power that they are impatient even of propaganda in favour of social reform, as it means so much time and energy deducted from political propaganda. A correspondent of Mr. Gandhi put the point of view of the Nationalists very appropriately, if bluntly, when he wrote ⁸[f.8] to Mr. Gandhi, saying:—

" Don't you think that it is impossible to achieve any great reform without winning political power ? The present economic structure has got to be tackled? No reconstruction is possible without political reconstruction and I am afraid all this talk of polished and unpolished rice, balanced diet and so on and so forth is mere moonshine."

The Social Reform Party, led by Ranade, died leaving the field to the Congress. There has grown up among the Hindus another party which is also a rival to the Congress. It is the Hindu Maha Sabha. One would expect from its name that it was a body for bringing about the reform of Hindu Society. But it is not. Its rivalry with the Congress has nothing to do with the issue of social reform vs. political reform. Its quarrel with the Congress has its origin in the pro-Muslim policy of the Congress. It is organized for the protection of Hindu rights against Muslim encroachment. Its plan is to organize the Hindus for offering a united front to the Muslims. As a body organized to protect Hindu rights it is all the time engaged in keeping an eye on political movements, on seats and posts. It cannot spare any thought for social reform. As a body keen on bringing about a united front of all Hindus, it cannot afford to create dissensions among its elements which would be the case if it undertook to bring about social reforms. For the sake of the consolidation of the Hindu rank and file, the Hindu Maha Sabha is ready to suffer all social evils to remain as they are. For the sake of consolidation of the Hindus, it is prepared to welcome the Federation as devised by the Act of 1935 in spite of

its many iniquities and defects. For the same purpose, the Hindu Maha Sabha favours the retention of the Indian States, with their administration as it is. ' Hands off the Hindu States ' has been the battle-cry of its President. This attitude is stranger than that of the Muslims. Representative government in Hindu States cannot do harm to the Hindus. Why then should the President of the Hindu Maha Sabha oppose it ? Probably because it helps the Muslims, whom he cannot tolerate.

IV

To what length this concern for the conservation of their forces can lead the Hindus and the Musalmans cannot be better illustrated than by the debates on the Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act VIII of 1939 in the Central Assembly. Before 1939, the law was that apostasy of a male or a female married under the Muslim law *ipso facto* dissolved the marriage with the result that if a married Muslim woman changed her religion, she was free to marry a person professing her new religion. This was the rule of law enforced by the courts, throughout India at any rate, for the last 60 years.[f9] ⁹

This law was annulled by Act VIII of 1939, section 4 of which reads as follows:—

" The renunciation of Islam by a married Muslim woman or her conversion to a faith other than Islam shall not by itself operate to dissolve her marriage:

Provided that after such renunciation or conversion the woman shall be entitled to obtain a decree for the dissolution of marriage on any of the grounds mentioned in section 2:

Provided further that the provision of' this section shall not apply to a woman converted to Islam from some other faith who re-embraces her former faith."

According to this Act, the marriage of a married Muslim woman is not dissolved by reason of her conversion to another religion. All that she gets is a right of divorce. It is very intriguing to find that section 2 does not refer to conversion or apostasy as a ground for divorce. The effect of the law is that a married Muslim woman has no liberty of conscience and is tied for ever to her husband whose religious faith may be quite abhorrent to her.

The grounds urged in support of this change are well worth attention. The mover of the Bill, Quazi Kazmi, M.L.A. adopted a very ingenious line of argument in support of the change. In his speech ¹⁰[f.10] on the motion to refer the Bill he said:—

" Apostasy was considered by Islam, as by any other religion, as a great crime, almost amounting to a crime against the State. It is not novel for the religion of Islam to have that provision. If we look up the older Acts of any nation, we will find that similar provision also exists in other Codes as well. For the male a severer punishment was awarded, that of death, and for females, only the punishment of imprisonment was awarded. This main provision was that because it was a sin, it was a crime, it was to be punished, and the woman was to be deprived of her status as wife. It was not only this status that she lost, but she lost all her suit us in society; she was deprived of her properly and civil rights as well. But we find that as early as 1850 an Act was passed here, called the Caste Disabilities Removal Act of 1850, Act XXI of 1850.....

" by this Act, the forfeiture of civil rights that could be imposed on a woman on her apostasy has been taken away. She can no longer be subjected to any forfeiture of properly or her right of inheritance or anything of the kind. The only question is that the Legislature has come to her help, it has given her a certain amount of liberty of thought, some kind of liberty of religion to adopt any faith she likes, and has removed the forfeiture clause from which she could suffer, and which was a restraint upon her changing the faith. The question is how far we are entitled after that to continue placing the restriction on her status as a wife. Her status as a wife is of some importance in society. She belongs to some family, she has got children, she has got other connections too. If she has got a liberal mind, she may not like to continue the same old religion. If she changes her religion, why should we, according to our modern ideas, inflict upon her a further penalty that she will cease to be the wife of her husband. I submit, in these days when we are advocating freedom of thought and freedom of religion, when we are advocating inter-marriages between different communities, it would be inconsistent for us to support a provision that a mere change of faith or change of religion would entail forfeiture of her rights as the wife of her husband. So, from a modern point of view, I have got no hesitation in saying that we cannot, in any way, support the contrary proposition that apostasy must be allowed to finish her relationship with her husband. But that is only one part of the argument.

"Section 32 of the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, 1936, is to the effect that a married woman may sue for divorce on the grounds 'that the defendant has ceased to be a Parsi'

" There are two things apparent from this. the first is, that it is a ground for dissolution, not from any religious idea or religious sentiment, because, if two years have passed after the conversion and if plaintiff does not object, then either the male or female has no right to sue for dissolution of marriage. The second thing is, that it is the plaintiff who has got the complaint that the other party has changed the religion, who has got the right of getting the marriage dissolved..... In addition to this Act, as regards other communities we can have an idea of the effect of conversion on marriage tie from the Native Converts ' Marriage Dissolution Act, Act XXI of 1886 It applies to all the communities of India, and this legislation recognises the fact that mere conversion of an Indian to Christianity would not dissolve the marriage but he will have the right of going to a law court and saying that the other party., who is not converted, must perform the marital duties in respect of him..... then they are given a year's time and the judge directs that they shall have an interview with each other in the presence of certain other persons to induce them to resume their conjugal relationship, and if they do not agree, then on the ground of desecration the marriage is dissolved. The marriage is dissolved no doubt, but not on the ground of change of faith. . . . So, every community in India has got this accepted principle that conversion to another religion cannot amount to a dissolution of marriage."

Syed Gulam Bikh Nairang, another Muslim member of the Assembly and a protagonist of the Bill, was brutally frank. In support of the principle of the Bill he said ¹¹[f.11] :—

" For a very long lime the courts in British India have held without reservation and qualification that under all circumstances apostasy automatically and immediately puts an end to the married slate without any judicial proceedings, any decree of court, or any other ceremony. That has been the position which was taken up by the Courts. Now, there are three distinct views of *Hanafi jurists* on the point. One view which is attributed to the Bokhara jurists was adopted and even that not in its entirety but in what I may call a mutilated and maimed condition. What that Bokhara view is has been already stated by Mr. Kazmi and some other speakers. The Bokhara jurists say that marriage is dissolved by apostasy. In fact, I should be more accurate in saying—I have got authority for that—that it is, according to the Bokhara view, not dissolved but suspended. The marriage is suspended but the wife is then kept in custody or confinement till she repents and embraces Islam again, and then she is induced to marry the husband, whose

marriage was only suspended and not put an end to or cancelled. The second view is that on apostasy a married Muslim woman ceases to be the wife of her husband but becomes his bond woman. One view, which is a sort of corollary to this view, is that she is not necessarily the bond woman of her ex-husband but she becomes the bond woman of the entire Muslim community and anybody can employ her as a bond woman. The third view, that of the Ulema of Samarkand and Baikh, is that the marriage tie is not affected by such apostasy and that the woman still continues to be the wife of the husband. These are the three views. A portion of the first view, the Bokhara view, was taken hold of by the Courts and rulings after rulings were based on that portion.

" This House is well aware that it is not only in this solitary instance that judicial error is sought to be corrected by legislation, but in many other cases, too, there have been judicial errors or conflicts of judicial opinion or uncertainties and vagueness of law. Errors of judicial view are being constantly corrected by legislation. In this particular matter there has been an error after error and a tragedy of errors. To show me those rulings is begging the question. Surely, it should be realized that it is no answer to my Bill that because the High Courts have decided against me, I have no business to come to this House and ask it to legislate this way or that way."

Having regard to the profundity of the change, the arguments urged in support of it were indeed very insubstantial. Mr. Kazmi failed to realize that if there was a difference between the divorce law relating to Parsis, Christians and Muslims, once it is established that the conversion is genuine, the Muslim law was in advance of the Parsi and the Christian law and instead of making the Muslim law retrograde, the proper thing ought to have been to make the Parsi and the Christian law progress. Mr. Nairang did not stop to inquire that, if there were different schools of thought among the Muslim jurists, whether it was not more in consonance with justice to adopt the more enlightened view which recognized the freedom of the Muslim woman and not to replace it by the barbaric one which made her a bonds-woman.

Be that as it may, the legal arguments had nothing to do with the real motive underlying the change. The real motive was to put a stop to the illicit conversion of women to alien faiths, followed by immediate and hurried marriages with some one professing the faith she happened to have joined, with a view to locking her in the new community and preventing her from going back to the community to which she originally belonged. The conversion of Muslim woman to Hinduism and of Hindu woman to Islam looked at from a social and political point of view cannot but be fraught with tremendous consequences. It means a disturbance in the numerical balance between the two communities. As the disturbance was being brought about by the abduction of women, it could not be overlooked. For woman is at once the seed-bed of and the hothouse for nationalism in a degree that man can never be.¹² [f12] These conversions of women and their subsequent marriages were therefore regarded, and rightly, as a series of depredations practised by Hindus against Muslims and by Muslims against Hindus with a view to bringing about a change in their relative numerical strength. This abominable practice of woman-lifting had become as common as cattle-lifting and, with its obvious danger to communal balance, efforts had to be made to stop it. That this was the real reason behind this legislation can be seen from the two provisions to section 4 of the Act. In proviso I the Hindus concede to the Musalmans that if they convert a woman who was originally a Muslim she will remain bound to her former Muslim husband notwithstanding her conversion. By proviso 2 the Muslims concede to the Hindus that if they convert a Hindu married woman and she is married to a Musalman, her marriage will be deemed to be dissolved if she renounces Islam and she will be free to return to her Hindu fold. Thus what underlies the change in law is the desire to keep the numerical balance and it is for this purpose that the rights of women were sacrificed.

There are two other features of this malaise which have not been sufficiently noted.

One such feature is the jealousy with which one of them looks upon any reform by the other in its social system. If the effect of such reform is to give it increase of strength for resistance, it at once creates hostility.

Swami Shradhanand relates a very curious incident which well illustrates this attitude. Writing in the *Liberator* ¹³[f.13] his recollections, he refers to this incident. He says :—

" Mr. Ranade was there. . . . to guide the Social Conference to which the title of ' National ' was for the first and last time given. It was from the beginning a Hindu Conference in all walks of life. The only Mahomedan delegate who joined the National Social Conference was a Mufti Saheb of Barreilly. Well! The conference began when the resolution in favour of remarriage of child-widows was moved by a Hindu delegate and by me. Sanalanist Pandits opposed it. Then the Mufti asked permission to speak. The laic Baijnath told Mufti Saheb that as the resolution concerned the Hindus only, he need not speak. At this the Mufti flared up.

" There was no loophole left for the President and Mufti Saheb was allowed to have his say. Mufti Saheb's argument was that as Hindu Shastras did not allow remarriage, it was a sin to press for it. Again, when the resolution about the reconversion of those who had become Christians and Musalmans came up. Mufti Saheb urged that when a man abandoned the Hindu religion he ought not to be allowed to come back."

Another illustration would be the attitude of the Muslims towards the problem of the Untouchables. The Muslims have always been looking at the Depressed Classes with a sense of longing and much of the jealousy between Hindus and

Muslims arises out of the fear of the latter that the former might become stronger by assimilating the Depressed Classes. In 1909 the Muslims took the bold step of suggesting that the Depressed Classes should not be enrolled in the census as Hindus. In 1923 Mr. Mahomed Ali in his address as the President of the Congress went much beyond the position taken by the Muslims in 1909. He said:—

"The quarrels about ALAMS and PIPAL trees and musical processions are truly childish ; but there is one question which can easily furnish a ground for complaint of unfriendly action if communal activities are not amicably adjusted. It is the question of the conversion of the Suppressed Classes, if Hindu society does not speedily absorb them. The Christian missionary is already busy and no one quarrels with him. But the moment some Muslim Missionary Society is organized for the same purpose there is every likelihood of an outcry in the Hindu press. It has been suggested to me by an influential and wealthy gentleman who is able to organize a Missionary Society on a large scale for the conversion of the Suppressed Classes, that it should be possible to reach a settlement with leading Hindu gentlemen and divide the country into separate areas where Hindu and Muslim missionaries could respectively work, each community preparing for each year, or longer unit of time if necessary, an estimate of the numbers it is prepared to absorb or convert. These estimates would, of course, be based on the number of workers and funds each had to spare, and tested by the actual figures of the previous period. In this way each community would be free to do the work of absorption and conversion, or rather, of reform without chances of collision with one another. I cannot say in what light my Hindu brethren will take it and I place this suggestion tentatively in all frankness and sincerity before them. All that I say for myself is that I have seen the condition of the ' Kali Praja ' in the Baroda Slate and of the Gonds in the Central Provinces and I frankly confess it is a reproach to us all. If the Hindus will not absorb them into their own society, others will and must, and then the orthodox Hindu loo will cease to treat them as untouchables. Conversion seems to transmute them by a strong alchemy. But does this not place a premium upon conversion ?"

The other feature is the " preparations " which the Muslims and Hindus are making against each other without abatement. It is like a race in armaments between two hostile nations. If the Hindus have the Benares University, the Musalmans must have the Aligarh University. If the Hindus start Shudhi movement, the Muslims must launch the Tablig movement. If the Hindus start Sangathan, the Muslims must meet it by Tanjim. If the Hindus have the R. S. S.,¹⁴[\[f.14\]](#) the Muslims must reply by organizing the Khaksars. This race in social armament and equipment is run with the determination and apprehension characteristic of nations which are on the war path. The Muslims fear that the Hindus are subjugating them. The Hindus feel that the Muslims are engaged in reconquering them. Both appear to be preparing for war and each is watching the " preparations " of the other.

Such a state of things cannot but be ominous. It is a vicious circle. If the Hindus make themselves stronger, the Musalmans feel menaced. The Muslims endeavour to increase their forces to meet the menace and the Hindus then do the same to equalize the position. As the preparations proceed, so does the suspicion, the secrecy, and the plotting. The possibilities of peaceful adjustment are poisoned at the source and precisely because everyone is fearing and preparing for it that " war " between the two tends to become inevitable. But in the situation in which they find themselves, for the Hindus and the Muslims not to attend to anything, except to prepare themselves to meet the challenge of each other, is quite natural. It is a struggle for existence and the issue, that counts, is survival and not the quality or the plane of survival.

Two things must be said to have emerged from this discussion. One is that the Hindus and the Muslims regard each other as a menace. The second is that to meet this menace, both have suspended the cause of removing the social evils with which they are infested. Is this a desirable state of things ? If it is not how then can it be ended ?

No one can say that to have the problems of social reform put aside is a desirable state of things. Wherever there are social evils, the health of the body politic requires that they shall be removed before they become the symbols of suffering and injustice. For it is the social and economic evils which everywhere are the parent of revolution or decay. Whether social reform should precede political reform or political reform should precede social reform may be a matter of controversy. But there can be no two opinions on the question that the sole object of political power is the use to which it can be put in the cause of social and economic reform. The whole struggle for political power would be a barren and bootless effort if it was not justified by the feeling that, because of the want of political power, urgent and crying social evils are eating into the vitals of society and are destroying it. But suppose the Hindus and the Muslims somehow come into possession of political power, what hope is there that they will use it for purposes of social reform ? There is hardly any hope in that behalf. So long as the Hindus and the Muslims regard each other as a menace, their attention will be engrossed in preparations for meeting the menace. The exigencies of a common front by Musalmans against Hindus and by Hindus against Musalmans generate—and is bound to generate—a conspiracy of silence over social evils. Neither the Muslims nor the Hindus will attend to them even though the evils may be running sores and requiring immediate attention, for the simple reason that they regard every measure of social reform as bound to create dissension and division and thereby weaken the ranks when they ought to be closed to meet the menace of the other community. It is obvious that so long as one community looks upon the other as a menace there will be no social progress and the spirit of conservatism will continue to dominate the thoughts and actions of both.

How long will this menace last ? It is sure to last as long as the Hindus and Muslims are required to live as members of one country under the mantle of a single constitution. For, it is the fear of the single constitution with the possibility of

the shifting of the balance—for nothing can keep the balance at the point originally fixed by the constitution—which makes the Hindus a menace to the Muslims and the Muslims a menace to the Hindus. If this is so, Pakistan is the obvious remedy. It certainly removes the chief condition which makes for the menace. Pakistan liberates both the Hindus and the Muslims from the fear of enslavement of and encroachment against each other. It removes, by providing a separate constitution for each, Pakistan and Hindustan, the very basis which leads to this perpetual struggle for keeping a balance of power in the day-to-day life and frees them to take in hand those vital matters of urgent social importance which they are now forced to put aside in cold storage, and improve the lives of their people, which after all is the main object of this fight for Swaraj.

Without some such arrangement, the Hindus and the Muslims will act and react as though they were two nations, one fearing to be conquered by the other. Preparations for aggression will 'always have precedence over social reform, so that the social stagnation which has set in must continue. This is quite natural and no one need be surprised at it. For, as Bernard Shaw pointed out:—

" A conquered nation is like a man with cancer ; he can think of nothing else . . . A healthy nation is as unconscious of its nationality as a healthy man of his bones. But if you break a nation's nationality it will think of nothing else but getting it set again. It will listen to no reformer, to no philosopher, to no preacher until the demand of the nationalist is granted. It will attend to no business, however vital, except the business of unification and liberation."

Unless there is unification of the Muslims who wish to separate from the Hindus and unless there is liberation of each from the fear of domination by the other, there can be no doubt that this malaise of social stagnation will not be set right.

CHAPTER XI

COMMUNAL AGGRESSION

Even a superficial observer cannot fail to notice that a spirit of aggression underlies the Hindu attitude towards the Muslim and the Muslim attitude towards the Hindu. The Hindu's spirit of aggression is a new phase which he has just begun to cultivate. The Muslim's spirit of aggression is his native endowment and is ancient as compared with that of the Hindu. It is not that the Hindu, if given time, will not pick up and overtake the Muslim. But as matters stand to-day, the Muslim in this exhibition of the spirit of aggression leaves the Hindu far behind.

Enough has been said about the social aggression of the Muslims in the chapter dealing with communal riots. It is necessary to speak briefly of the political aggression of the Muslims. For this political aggression has created a malaise which cannot be overlooked.

Three things are noticeable about this political aggression of the Muslims.

First is the ever-growing catalogue of the Muslim's political demands. Their origin goes back to the year 1892.

In 1885 the Indian National Congress was founded. It began with a demand for good government as distinguished from self-government. In response to this demand the British Government felt the necessity of altering the nature of the Legislative Councils, Provincial and Central, established under the Act of 1861. In that nascent stage of Congress agitation, the British Government did not feel called upon to make them fully popular. It thought it enough to give them a popular colouring. Accordingly the British Parliament passed in 1892 what is called the Indian Councils Act. This Act is memorable for two things. It was in this Act of 1892 that the British Government for the first time accepted the semblance of the principle of popular representation as the basis for the constitution of the Legislatures in India. It was not a principle of election. It was a principle of nomination, only it was qualified by the requirement that before nomination a person must be selected by important public bodies such as municipalities, district boards, universities and the associations of merchants, etc. Secondly, it was in the legislatures that were constituted under this Act that the principle of separate representation for Musalmans was for the first time introduced in the political constitution of India.

The introduction of this principle is shrouded in mystery. It is a mystery because it was introduced so silently and so stealthily. The principle of separate representation does not find a place in the Act. The Act says nothing about it. It was in the directions—but not in the Act—issued to those charged with the duty of framing regulations as to the classes and interests to whom representation was to be given that the Muslims were named as a class to be provided for.

It is a mystery as to who was responsible for its introduction. This scheme of separate representation was not the result of any demand put forth by any organized Muslim association. In whom did it then originate ? It is suggested ¹[f.15] ⁵ that it originated with the Viceroy, Lord Dufferin, who, as far back as the year 1888, when dealing with the question of representation in the Legislative Councils, emphasized the necessity that in India representation will have to be, not in the way representation is secured in England, but representation by interests. Curiosity leads to a further question, namely, what could have led Lord Dufferin to propose such a plan ? It is suggested ¹⁶[f.16] that the idea was to wean

¹⁷[f.17] away the Musalmans from the Congress which had already been started three years before. Be that as it may, it is certain that it is by this Act that separate representation for Muslims became, for the first time, a feature of the Indian Constitution. It should, however, be noted that neither the Act nor the Regulations conferred any right of selection upon the Muslim community, nor did the Act give the Muslim community a right to claim a fixed number of seats. All that it did was to give the Muslims the right to separate representation.

Though, to start with, the suggestion of separate representation came from the British, the Muslims did not fail to appreciate the social value of separate political rights with the result that when in 1909 the Muslims came to know that the next step in the reform of the Legislative Councils was contemplated, they waited of their own accord in deputation ¹⁸[f.18] upon the Viceroy, Lord Minto, and placed before him the following demands :—

- (i) Communal representation in accordance with their numerical strength, social position and local influence, on district and municipal boards.
- (ii) An assurance of Muhammadan representation on the governing bodies of Universities.
- (iii) Communal representation on provincial councils, election being by special electoral colleges composed of Muhammadan landlords, lawyers, merchants, and representatives of other important interests, University graduates of a certain standing and members of district and municipal boards.
- (iv) The number of Muhammadan representatives in the Imperial Legislative Council should not depend on their numerical strength, and Muhammadans should never be in an ineffective minority. They should be elected as far as possible (as opposed to being nominated), election being by special Muhammadan colleges composed of landowners, lawyers, merchants, members of provincial councils, Fellows of Universities, etc.

These demands were granted and given effect to in the Act of 1909. Under this Act the Muhammadans were given (1) the right to elect their representatives, (2) the right to elect their representatives by separate electorates, (3) the right to vote in the general electorates as well, and (4) the right to weightage in representation. The following table shows the proportion of representation- secured to the Muslims in the Legislatures by the Act of 1909 and the Regulations made thereunder :—

Composition of Legislative Councils under the act of 1909 showing Communal Proportion between Hindus and Muslims

Province	Maximum number of additional Members prescribed by the Act of 1909	Maximum number of Additional Members allowed by Regulatory columns 5 and 12	Ex-officio Members	Strength of the Councils under the Regulations								Total strength columns 4, 5, 12
				Elected Members			Nominated Members					
				Total	Non-Muslims	Muslims	Officials		Non officials	Experts	Total	
							Law Officials	Others				
								19				
								[f.19]				
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
India	60	60	8	27	22	5	--	28	5	--	33	63
Madras	50	45	4	21	19	2	--	16	5	2	24	49
Bombay	50	45	4	21	17	4	1	14	7	2	24	49
Bengal	50	50	4	28	23	5	1	16	4	2	22	54
Bihar	50	41	4	21	17	4	--	15	4	1	20	45
U.P.	50	49	1	21	17	4	--	20	6	2	28	50
Punjab	30	26	1	8	8	none	--	10	6	2	18	27
Burma	30	17	1	1	1	none	--	6	8	2	16	18
Assam	30	25	1	11	9	2	--	9	4	1	14	25

The provisions were applied to all Provinces except the Punjab and the C. P. It was not applied to the Punjab because such special protection was considered unnecessary for the Musalmans of the Punjab and it was not applied to the C. P. because it had no Legislative Council at the time. ²⁰[\[f.20\]](#)

In October 1916, 19 members of the Imperial Legislative Council presented the Viceroy (Lord Cheirnsford) a memorandum demanding a reform of the Constitution. Immediately the Muslims came forward with a number of demands on behalf of the Muslim community. These were :—

- (i) The extension of the principle of separate representation to the Punjab and the C. P.
- (ii) Fixing the numerical strength of the Muslim representatives in the Provincial and Imperial Legislative Councils.
- (iii) Safeguards against legislation affecting Muslims, their religion and religious usages.

The negotiations following upon these demands resulted in agreement between the Hindus and the Muslims which is known as the Lucknow Pact. It may be said to contain two clauses. One related to legislation, under which it was agreed that :—

" No Bill, nor any clause thereof, nor a resolution introduced by a nonofficial affecting one or other community (which question is to be determined by the members of that community in the Legislative Council concerned) shall be' proceeded with, if three-fourths of the members of that community in the particular Council, Imperial and Provincial, oppose the Bill or any clause thereof or the resolution."

The other clause related to the proportion of Muslim representation. With regard to the Imperial Legislative Council the Pact provided :—

"That one-third of the Indian elected members should be Muhammadans, elected by separate electorates in the several Provinces, in the proportion, as nearly as might be, in which they were represented on the provincial legislative councils by separate Muhammadan electorates."

In the matter of Muslim representation in the Provincial Legislative Councils it was agreed that the proportion of Muslim representation should be as follows ²¹ [\[f.21\]](#) :—

Percentage of elected Indian

Members to the Provincial

Legislature

Punjab	50
United Provinces	30
Bengal	40
Bihar and Orissa	25
Central Province	15
Madras	15
Bombay	33

While allowing this proportion of seats to the Muslims, the right to second vote in the general electorates which they had under the arrangement of 1909 was taken away.

The Lucknow Pact was adversely criticized by the Montagu Chelmsford Report. But being an agreement between the parties Government did not like to reject it and to substitute in its place its own decision. Both clauses of the agreement were accepted by Government and embodied in the Government of India Act of 1919. The clause relating to legislation was given effect to but in a different form. Instead of leaving it to the members of the Legislature to oppose it, it was provided' ²² [\[f.22\]](#) ' that legislation affecting the religion or religious rites and usages of any class of British subjects in India shall not be introduced at any meeting of either Chamber of the Indian Legislature without the previous sanction of the Governor-General.

The clause relating to representation was accepted by the Government, though in the opinion of the Government the Punjab and Bengal Muslims were not fairly treated.

The effect of these concessions can be seen by reference to the composition of the Legislatures constituted under the Government of India Act, 1919, which was as follows :—

Composition of the Legislatures

	Statutory Minimum	Elected Members			Nominated Members		Actual Total
		Total	Muslims	Non-Muslims	Officials	Non-officials	
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Legislative Assembly	145	104	52	52	26	15	145
Council of State	60	33	11	22	17	10	60
Madras Provincial Council	118	98	13	85	11	23	132
Bombay Provincial Council	III	86	27	59	19	9	114
Bengal Provincial Council	125	114	39	75	16	10	140
U. P. Provincial Council	118	110	29	71	17	6	123
Punjab Provincial Council	83	71	32	39	15	8	94
Bihar Provincial Council	98	76	18	58	15	12	103
C. P. Provincial Council	70	55	7	48	10	8	73
Assam Provincial Council	53	39	12	27	7	7	53

The extent of representation secured by the Muslims by the Lucknow Pact can be seen from the following table ²³[f.23] :—

	Percentage of Muslims to total population of the electoral area (1921 Census)	Percentage of Muslim Members to total No. of Members	Percentage of Muslim Members to total No. of elected Indian Members' ²⁴ [f.24]	Percentage of Muslim Members in seats filled by election from Indian general (communal) constituencies	Lucknow Pact Percentage
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Punjab	55.2	40	48.5	50	50
United Provinces	14.3	25	30	32.5	30
Bengal	54.6	30	40.5	46	40
Bihar and Orissa	10.9	18.5	25	27	25
Central Provinces	4.4	9.5	13	14.5	15

Madras	6.7	10.5	14	16.5	15
Bombay	19.8	25.5	35	37	33.3
Assam	32.2	30	35.5	37.5	No. provision
Legislative Assembly	24.0	26	34	38	33.3

This table does not show quite clearly the weightage obtained by the Muslims under the Lucknow Pact. It was worked out by the Government of India in their despatch ²⁵ [f.25] on the Report of Franchise Committee of which Lord Southborough was the Chairman. The following table is taken from that despatch which shows that the Muslims got a weightage under the Lucknow Pact far in excess of what Government gave them in 1909.

	Muslim percentage of Population	Percentage of Muslim seats Proposed	Percentage (2) of (1)
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Bengal	52.6	40	76
Bihar and Orissa	10.5	25	238
Bombay	20.4	33.3	163
Central Provinces	4.3	15	349
Madras	6.5	15	231
Punjab	54.8	50	91
United Provinces	14.0	30	214

In 1927 the British Government announced the appointment of the Simon Commission to examine the working of the Indian Constitution and to suggest further reforms. Immediately the Muslims came forward with further political demands. These demands were put forth from various Muslim platforms such as the Muslim League, All-India Muslim Conference, All-Parties Muslim Conference, Jamiat-ul-Ulema and the Khilafat Conference. The demands were substantially the same. It would suffice to state those that were formulated by Mr. Jinnah ²⁶[f.26] on behalf of the Muslim League.

They were in the following terms :—

1. The form of the future Constitution should be federal with residuary powers vested in the provinces.
2. A uniform measure of autonomy should be granted to all provinces.
3. All legislatures in the country and other elected bodies should be reconstituted on the definite principle of adequate and effective representation of minorities in every province without reducing the majority of any province to a minority or even equality.
4. In the Central Legislature, Muslim representation should not be less than one-third.
5. The representation of communal groups should continue to be by means of separate electorates as at present, provided that it should be open to any community at any time to abandon its separate electorate in favour of joint electorates.
6. Any territorial redistribution that might at any time be necessary should not in any way affect the Muslim majority in the Punjab, Bengal and North-West Province.
7. Full religious liberty, that is, liberty of belief, worship, observances, propaganda, association and education should be guaranteed to all communities.
8. No bill or resolution, or any part thereof, should be passed in any legislature or any other elected body if three-fourths of the members of any community in that particular body oppose such bill or resolution or part thereof on the ground that it would be injurious to the interests of that community or, in the alternative, such other method as may be devised or as may be found feasible and practicable to deal with such cases.
9. Sind should be separated from the Bombay Presidency.

10. Reforms should be introduced in the North-West Frontier Province and Baluchistan on the same footing as in other provinces.

11. II. Provision should be made in the Constitution giving the Muslims an adequate share along with other Indians in all the Services of the State and in self-governing bodies, having due regard to the requirements of efficiency.

12. The constitution should embody adequate safeguards for the protection of Muslim religion, culture and personal law, and the promotion of Muslim education, language, religion, personal laws, Muslim charitable institutions, and for their due share in grants-in-aid given by the State and by self-governing bodies.

13. No Cabinet, either Central or Provincial, should be formed without there being a proportion of Muslim Ministers of at least one-third.

14. No change to be made in the Constitution by the Central Legislature except with the concurrence of the States constituting the Indian Federation.

15. That in the present circumstances the representation of Musalmans in the different legislatures of the country and of the other elected bodies through separate electorates is inevitable, and, further, Government being pledged not to deprive the Musalmans of this right, it cannot be taken away without their consent, and so long as the Musalmans are not satisfied that their rights and interests are safeguarded in the manner specified above (or herein) they would in no way consent to the establishment of joint electorates with or without conditions.

Note:—The question of excess representation of Musalmans over and above their population in the provinces where they are in minority to be considered hereafter.

This is a consolidated statement of Muslim demands. In it there are some which are old, and some which are new. The old ones are included because the aim is to retain the advantages accruing therefrom. The new ones are added in order to remove the weaknesses in the Muslim position. The new ones are five in number: (1) Representation in proportion to population to Muslim majorities in the Punjab and Bengal, (2) One-third representation to Muslims in the cabinets both Central and Provincial, (3) Adequate representation of Muslims in the Services, (4) Separation of Sind from the Bombay Presidency and the raising of N.-W. F. P. and Baluchistan to the status of self-governing provinces, and (5) Vesting of residuary powers in the provinces instead of in the Central Government.

These new demands are self-explanatory except perhaps I, 4 and 5. The object of demands I and 4 was to place, in four provinces, the Muslim community in a statutory majority where it had only communal majority, as a force counteracting the six provinces in which the Hindu community happened to be in a majority. This was insisted upon as a guarantee of good treatment by both the communities of its minorities. The object of demand No. 5 was to guarantee Muslim rule in Sind, N.-W. F. P., the Punjab and Bengal. But a Muslim majority rule in these Muslim Provinces, it was feared, would not be effective if they remained under the control of the Central Government which could not but be in the hand of the Hindus. To free the Muslim Provinces from the control of the Hindu Government at the Centre was the object for which demand No. 5 was put forth.

These demands were opposed by the Hindus. There may not be much in this. But what is significant is that they were also rejected by the Simon Commission. The Simon Commission, which was by no means unfriendly to the Muslims, gave some very cogent reasons for rejecting the Muslim demands. It said ²⁷[f.27] :—

" This claim goes to the length of seeking to preserve the full security for representation now provided for Muslims in these six provinces and at the same time to enlarge in Bengal and the Punjab the present proportion of seats secured to the community by separate electorates to figures proportionate to their ratio of population. This would give Muhammadans a fixed and unalterable majority of the general constituency seats in both provinces. We cannot go so far. The continuance of the present scale of weightage in the six provinces could not—in the absence of a new general agreement between the communities—equitably be combined with so great a departure from the existing allocation in Bengal and the Punjab.

" It would be unfair that Muhammadans should retain the very considerable weightage they enjoy in the six provinces, and that there should at the same time be imposed, in face of Hindu and Sikh opposition, a definite Muslim majority in the Punjab and Bengal unalterable by any appeal to the electorate..... "

Notwithstanding the opposition of the Hindus and the Sikhs and the rejection by the Simon Commission, the British Government when called upon to act as an arbiter granted the Muslims all their demands old and new.

By a Notification ²⁸[f.28] in the *Gazette of India* 25th January 1932 the Government of India, in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (2) of section 52 A of the Government of India Act, 1916, declared that the N.-W. F. Province shall be treated as a Governor's Province. ²⁹[f.29] By an Order in Council, issued under the provisions contained in sub-section (1) of section 289 of the Government of India Act of 1935, Sind was separated from Bombay

as from 1st April 1936 and declared to be a Governor's Province to be known as the province of Sind. By the Resolution issued by the Secretary of State for India and published on 7th July 1934 the Muslim share in the public services was fixed at 25 per cent. of all appointments Imperial and Provincial. With regard to residuary powers, it is true that the Muslim demand that they should be vested in the Provinces was not accepted. But in another sense the Muslim demand in this respect may be deemed to have been granted. The essence of the Muslim demand was that the residuary powers should not be vested in the Centre, which, put in different language, meant that they should not be in the hands of the Hindus. This is precisely what is done by section 104 of the Government of India Act, 1935, which vests the residuary powers in the Governor-General to be exercised in his discretion. The demand for 33 1/3 per cent. representation in the Cabinets, Central and Provincial, was not given effect to by a legal provision in the Act. The right of Muslims to representation in the Cabinets was however accepted by the British Government and provision for giving effect to it was made in the Instruments of Instructions issued to the Governors and Governor-General. As to the remaining demand which related to a statutory majority in the Punjab and Bengal, the demand was given effect to by the Communal Award. True, a statutory majority in the whole House has not been given to the Muslims and could not be given having regard to the necessity for providing representation to other interests. But a statutory majority as against Hindus has been given to the Muslims of the Punjab and Bengal without touching the weightages obtained by the Muslim minorities under the Lucknow Pact.

These political grants to the Muslim community by the British Government lacked security and it was feared by the Muslims that pressure might be brought upon them or upon His Majesty's Government by the Hindus to alter the terms of the grants to the prejudice of the Muslims. This fear was due to two reasons. One was the success of Mr. Gandhi in getting that part of the Award which related to the Depressed Classes revised by means of the pressure of a fast unto death.³⁰[f.30] Some people encouraged by this success actually agitated for revision of that part of the Award which related to the Muslims and some Muslims were even found to be in favour of entering into such negotiations³¹[f.31]. This alarmed the Muslim community. The other reason for the fear of revision of the terms of the grants arose out of certain amendments in the clauses in the Government of India Bill which were made in the House of Commons permitting such revision under certain conditions. To remove these fears and to give complete security to the Muslims against hasty and hurried revision of the grants, His Majesty's Government authorized the Government of India to issue the following communiqué³²[f.32] :—

" It has come to the notice of His Majesty's Government that the impression is prevalent that what is now Clause 304 of the Government of India Bill (numbered 285 in the Bill as first introduced and 299 in the Bill as amended by the Commons in Committee) has been amended during the passage of the Bill through the Commons in such a way as to give His Majesty's Government unfettered power to alter at any time they may think fit the constitutional provisions based upon what is commonly known as Government's Communal Award.

" His Majesty's Government think it desirable to give the following brief explanation both of what they consider is the practical effect of Clause 304 in relation to any change in the Communal Award and of their own policy in relation to any such change.

- "Under this Clause there is conferred on the Governments and Legislatures in India, after the expiry of ten years, the right of initiating a proposal to modify the provisions and regulating various matters relating to the constitution of the Legislature, including such questions as were covered by the Communal Award.

"The Clause also imposes on the Secretary of State the duty of laying before Parliament from the Governor-General or the Governor as the case may be his opinion as to the proposed amendment and in particular as to the effect which it would have on the interests of any minority and of informing Parliament of any action which he proposed to take.

"Any change in the constitutional provisions resulting from this procedure can be effected by an Order in Council, but this is subject to the proviso that the draft of the proposed Order has been affirmatively approved by both Houses of Parliament by a resolution. The condition is secured by Clause 305 of the Bill.

" Before the expiry of ten years there is no similar constitutional initiative residing in the Governments and the Legislatures of India. Power is, however, conferred by the Clause to make such a change by an Order in Council (always with the approval of both Houses of Parliament) even before the end of ten years, but within the first ten years (and indeed subsequently, if the initiative has not come from the Legislatures of India) it is incumbent upon the Secretary of State to consult the Governments and the Legislatures of India who will be affected (unless the change is of a minor character) before any Order in Council is laid before Parliament for its approval.

" The necessity for the powers referred to in the preceding paragraph is due to such reasons as the following :—

" (a) It is impossible to foresee when the necessity may arise for amending minor details connected with the franchise and the constitution of legislatures, and for such amendment it will be clearly disadvantageous to have no method available short of a fresh amending Act of Parliament, nor is it practicable statutorily to separate such details from the more important matter such as the terms of the Communal Award;

" (b) It might also become desirable, in the event of a unanimous agreement between the communities in India, to make a modification in the provisions based on the Communal Award ; and for such an agreed change it would also be disadvantageous to have no other method available than an amending Act of Parliament.

" Within the range of the Communal Award His Majesty's Government would not propose, in the exercise of any power conferred by this Clause, to recommend to Parliament any change unless such changes had been agreed to between the communities concerned.

" In conclusion. His Majesty's Government would again emphasise the fact that none of the powers in Clause 304 can, in view of the provisions in Clause 305, be exercised unless both Houses of Parliament agreed by an affirmative resolution."

.After taking into account what the Muslims demanded at the R. T. C. and what was conceded to them, any one could have thought that the limit of Muslim demands was reached and that the 1932 settlement was a final settlement. But, it appears that even with this the Musalmans are not satisfied. A further list of new demands for safeguarding the Muslim position seems to be ready. In the controversy that went on between Mr. Jinnah and the Congress in the year 1938, Mr. Jinnah was asked to disclose his demands which he refused to do. But these demands have come to the surface in the correspondence that passed between Pandit Nehru and Mr. Jinnah in the course of the controversy and they have been tabulated by Pandit Nehru in one of his letters to Mr. Jinnah. His tabulation gives the following items as being matters of disputes and requiring settlement ³³ [f.33] :—

- (1) The fourteen points formulated by the Muslim League in 1929.
- (2) The Congress should withdraw all opposition to the Communal Award and should not describe it as a negation of nationalism.
- (3) The share of the Muslims in the state services should be definitely fixed in the constitution by statutory enactment.
- (4) Muslim personal law and culture should be guaranteed by statute.
- (5) The Congress should take in hand the agitation in connection with the Sahidganj Mosque and should use its moral pressure to enable the Muslims to gain possession of the Mosque.
- (6) The Muslims' right to call Azan and perform their religious ceremonies should not be fettered in any way.
- (7) Muslims should have freedom to perform cow-slaughter.
- (8) Muslim majorities in the Provinces, where such majorities exist at present, must not be affected by any territorial re-distribution or adjustments.
- (9) The ' Bande Mataram' song should be given up.
- (10) Muslims want Urdu to be the national language of India and they desire to have statutory guarantees that the use of Urdu shall not be curtailed or damaged.
- (11) Muslim representation in the local bodies should be governed by the principles underlying the Communal Award, that is, separate electorates and population strength.
- (12) The tricolour flag should be changed or alternately the flag of the Muslim League should be given equal importance.
- (13) Recognition of the Muslim League as the one authoritative and representative organization of Indian Muslims.
- (14) Coalition Ministries should be formed.

With this new list, there is no knowing where the Muslims are going to stop in their demands. Within one year, that is, between 1938 and 1939, one more demand and that too of a substantial character, namely 50 per cent. share in every thing, has been added to it. In this catalogue of new demands there are some which on the face of them are extravagant and impossible, if not irresponsible. As an instance, one may refer to the demand for fifty-fifty and the demand for the recognition of Urdu as the national language of India. In 1929, the Muslims insisted that in allotting seats in Legislatures, a majority shall not be reduced to a minority or equality. ³⁴ [f34] This principle, enunciated by themselves, it is now demanded, shall be abandoned and a majority shall be reduced to equality. The Muslims in 1929 admitted that the other minorities required protection and that they must have it in the same manner as the Muslims. The only distinction made between the Muslims and other minorities was as to the extent of the protection. The Muslims claimed a higher degree of protection than was conceded to the other minorities on the ground of their political importance. The necessity and adequacy of protection for the other minorities the Muslims never denied. But with this new demand of 50 per cent. the Muslims are not only seeking to reduce the Hindu majority to a minority but

they are also cutting into the political rights of the other minorities. The Muslims are now speaking the language of Hitler and claiming a place in the sun as Hitler has been doing for Germany. For their demand for 50 per cent. is nothing but a counterpart of the German claims for *Deutschland Uber Alles and Lebensraum for Themselves*, irrespective of what happens to other minorities.

Their claim for the recognition of Urdu as the national language of India is equally extravagant. Urdu is not only not spoken all over India but is not even the language of all the Muslims of India. Of the 68 millions of Muslims ³⁵[f.35] only 28 millions speak Urdu. The proposal of making Urdu the national language means that the language of 28 millions of Muslims is to be imposed particularly upon 40 millions of Muslims or generally upon 322 millions of Indians.

It will thus be seen that every time a proposal for the reform of the constitution comes forth, the Muslims are there, ready with some new political demand or demands. The only check upon such indefinite expansion of Muslim demands is the power of the British Government, which must be the final arbiter in any dispute between the Hindus and the Muslims. Who can confidently say that the decision of the British will not be in favour of the Muslims if the dispute relating to these new demands was referred to them for arbitration? The more the Muslims demand the more accommodating the British seem to become. At any rate, past experience shows that the British have been inclined to give the Muslims more than what the Muslims had themselves asked. Two such instances can be cited.

One of these relates to the Lucknow Pact. The question was whether the British Government should accept the Pact. The authors of the Montagu-Chelmsford Report were disinclined to accept it for reasons which were very weighty. Speaking of the weightages granted to the Muslims by the Lucknow Pact, the authors' of the Joint Report observed ³⁶[f.36] :—

" Now a privileged position of this kind is open to the objection, that if any other community here after makes good a claim to separate representation, it can be satisfied only by deducting the non-Muslim seats, or by a rateable deduction from both Muslim and non-Muslim ; and Hindu and Muslim opinion are not likely to agree which process should be adopted. While, therefore, for reasons that we explain subsequently we assent to the maintenance of separate representation for Muhammadans, we are bound to reserve our approval of the particular proposals set before us, until we have ascertained what the effect upon other interests will be, .. and have made fair provision for them."

Notwithstanding this grave flaw in the Lucknow Pact, the Government of India, in its despatch referred to above, recommended that the terms of the Pact should be improved in so far as it related to the Muslims of Bengal. Its reasons make a strange reading. It argued that :—

" The Muhammadan representation which they the authors of the Pact] propose for Bengal is manifestly insufficient It is questionable whether the claims of the Muhammadan population of Eastern Bengal were adequately pressed when the Congress-League compact was in the making. They are conspicuously a backward and impoverished community. The repartition of the presidency in 1912 came as a severe disappointment to them, and we should be very loath to fail in seeing that their interests are now generously secured. In order to give the Bengal Muslims a representation proportionate to their numbers, and no more, we should allot them 44 instead of 34 seats [due to them under the Pact]."

This enthusiasm for the Bengal Muslims shown by the Government of India was not shared by the British Government. It felt that as the number of seats given to the Bengal Muslims was the result of an agreement, any interference to improve the bargain when there was no dispute about the genuineness of the agreement, could not but create the impression that the British Government was in some special sense and for some special reason the friend of the Muslims. In suggesting this augmentation in the seats, the Government of India forgot to take note of the reason why the Muslims of the Punjab and Bengal were not given by the Pact seats in proportion to their population. The Lucknow Pact was based upon the principle, now thrown to the winds, that a community as such was not entitled to political protection. A community was entitled to protection when it was in a minority. That was the principle underlying the Lucknow Pact. The Muslim community in the Punjab and Bengal was not in a minority and, therefore, was not entitled to the same protection which it got in other Provinces where it was in a minority. Notwithstanding their being in a majority, the Muslims of the Punjab and Bengal felt the necessity of separate electorates. According to the principle underlying the Pact they could qualify themselves for this only by becoming a minority which they did by agreeing to a minority of seats. This is the reason why the Muslims of Bengal and the Punjab did not get the majority of seats they were entitled to on the population basis. ³⁷[f.37]

The proposal of the Government of India to give to the Bengal Muslims more than what they had asked for did not go through. But the fact that they wanted to do so remains as evidence of their inclinations.

The second occasion when the British Government as an arbiter gave the Muslims more than they asked for was when the Communal Decision was given in 1932. Sir Muhammad Shafi made two different proposals in the Minorities Sub-Committee of the R. T. C. In his speech on 6th January 1931, Sir Muhammad Shafi put forth the following proposal as a basis for communal settlement ³⁸[f.38] :—

" We are prepared to accept joint electorates on the conditions named by me : Firstly, that the rights at present enjoyed by the Musalmans in the minority Provinces should be continued to them; that in the Punjab and in Bengal they should have two joint electorates and representation on a population basis; that there should be the principle of reservation of seats coupled with Maulana Mahomed Ali's condition. ³⁹[f.39]

In his speech on 14th January 1931 before the same Committee he made a different offer. He said ⁴⁰[f.40] :—

" To-day I am authorized to make this offer : that in the Punjab the Musalmans should have through communal electorates 49 per cent. of the entire number of seats in the whole House, and should have liberty to contest the special constituencies which it is proposed to create in that Province : so far as Bengal is concerned that Musalmans should have through communal electorates 46 percent, representation in the whole House, and should have the liberty to contest the special constituencies which it is proposed to create in that Province; in so far as the minority Provinces are concerned, the Musalmans should continue to enjoy the weightage which they have at present through separate electorates, similar weightage to be given to our Hindu brethren in Sind, and to our Hindu and Sikh brethren in the North-West Frontier Province. If at any time hereafter two-thirds of the representatives of any community in any Provincial Legislative Council or in the Central Legislative Council desire to give up communal electorates and to accept joint electorates then there after the system of joint electorates should come into being."

The difference between the two proposals is clear. "Joint electorates, if accompanied by statutory majority. If statutory majority was refused, then a minority of seats with separate electorates." The British Government took statutory majority from the first demand and separate electorates from the second demand and gave the Muslims both when they had not asked for both.

The second thing that is noticeable among the Muslims is the spirit of exploiting the weaknesses of the Hindus. If the Hindus object to anything, the Muslim policy seems to be to insist upon it and give it up only when the Hindus show themselves ready to offer a price for it by giving the Muslims some other concessions. As an illustration of this, one can refer to the question of separate and joint electorates. The Hindus have been to my mind utterly foolish in fighting over joint electorates especially in Provinces in which the Muslims are in a minority. Joint electorates can never suffice for a basis for nationalism. Nationalism is not a matter of political nexus or cash nexus, for the simple reason that union cannot be the result of calculation of mere externals. Where two communities live a life which is exclusive and self-enclosed for five years, they will not be one, because, they are made to come together on one day in five years for the purposes of voting in an election. Joint electorates may produce the enslavement of the minor community by the major community : but by themselves they cannot produce nationalism. Be that as it may, because the Hindus have been insisting upon joint electorates the Muslims have been insisting upon separate electorates. That this insistence is a -matter of bargain only can be seen from Mr. Jinnah's 14 points ⁴¹[f.41] and the solution ⁴² [f.42] passed in the Calcutta session of the All-India Muslim League held on 30th December 1927. Therein it was stipulated that only when the Hindus agreed to the separation of Sind and to the raising of the N.-W. F. P. to the status of a self-governing Province the Musalmans would consent to give up separate electorates. ⁴³[f.43] The Musalmans evidently did not regard separate electorates as vital. They regarded them as a good *quid pro quo* for obtaining their other claims.

Another illustration of this spirit of exploitation is furnished by the Muslim insistence upon cow-slaughter and the stoppage of music before mosques. Islamic law does not insist upon the slaughter of the cow for sacrificial purposes and no Muslim, when he goes to Haj, sacrifices the cow in Mecca or Medina. But in India they will not be content with the sacrifice of any other animal. Music may be played before a mosque in all Muslim countries without any objection. Even in Afghanistan, which is not a secularized country, no objection is taken to music before a mosque. But in India the Musalmans must insist upon its stoppage for no other reason except that the Hindus claim a right to it.

The third thing that is noticeable is the adoption by the Muslims of the gangster's method in politics. The riots are a sufficient indication that gangsterism has become a settled part of their strategy in politics. They seem to be consciously and deliberately imitating the Sudeten Germans in the means employed by them against the Czechs. ⁴⁴[f.44] So long as the Muslims were the aggressors, the Hindus were passive, and in the conflict they suffered more than the Muslims did. But this is no longer true. The Hindus have learned to retaliate and no longer feel any compunction in knifing a Muslim. This spirit of retaliation bids fair to produce the ugly spectacle of gangsterism against gangsterism.

How to meet this problem must exercise the minds of all concerned. There are the simple-minded Hindu Maha Sabha patriots who believe that the Hindus have only to make up their minds to wipe the Musalmans and they will be brought to their senses. On the other hand, there are the Congress Hindu Nationalists whose policy is to tolerate and appease the Musalmans by political and other concessions, because they believe that they cannot reach their cherished goal of independence unless the Musalmans back their demand. The Hindu Maha Sabha plan is no way to unity. On the contrary, it is a sure block to progress. The slogan of the Hindu Maha Sabha President— Hindustan for Hindus— is not merely arrogant but is arrant nonsense. The question, however, is : is the Congress way the right way ? It seems to me that the Congress has failed to realize two things. The first thing which the Congress has failed to realize is that there is a difference between appeasement and settlement, and that the difference is an essential one. Appeasement

means buying off the aggressor by conniving at his acts of murder, rape, arson and loot against innocent persons who happen for the moment to be the victims of his displeasure. On the other hand, settlement means laying down the bounds which neither party to it can transgress. Appeasement sets no limits to the demands and aspirations of the aggressor. Settlement does. The second thing the Congress has failed to realize is that the policy of concession has increased Muslim aggressiveness, and what is worse, Muslims interpret these concessions as a sign of defeatism on the part of the Hindus and the absence of the will to resist. This policy of appeasement will involve the Hindus in the same fearful situation in which the Allies found themselves as a result of the policy of appeasement which they adopted towards Hitler. This is another malaise, no less acute than the malaise of social stagnation. Appeasement will surely aggravate it. The only remedy for it is a settlement. If Pakistan is a settlement, it is a proposition worth consideration. As a settlement it will do away with this constant need of appeasement and ought to be welcomed by all those who prefer the peace and tranquillity of a settlement to the insecurity due to the growing political appetite shown by the Muslims in their dealings with the Hindus.

Contents

Continued...

[f1] *Studies in Mahetnedamsm*, pp. 34-35

[f2] *Ibid.*, Chapter XXXIX.

[f.3] *The Koran, its Composition and Teaching* . p. 58.

[f.4] For the position of Muslim women, see *Our Cause*, edited by Shyam Kumar Nehru.

[f.5] It is interesting to note the argument which the Europeans who are accused by Indians for not admitting them to their clubs use to defend themselves. They say, " We bring our women to the clubs. If you agree to bring your women to the club, you can be admitted. We can't expose our women to your company if you deny us the company of your women. Be ready to go fifty-fifty. them ask for entry in our clubs."

[f.6] *Nationality and other Essays*.

[f7] For a more detailed statement, see my tract on *Annihilation of caste*.

[f.8] *Harijan*—11th January 1936.

[f9] The earliest retried decision was that given by the high Court of the North-West Province in 1870 in the case of *Zabaroast Kluin vs. His wife*

[f.10] *Legislative Assembly Debates*. 1938, Vol. V. pp. 1980 -1101.

[f.11] *Legislative Assembly Debates*, 1938. Vol. V. pp. 1953-55.

[f12] The part played by woman in sustaining nationalism has not been sufficiently noticed. See the observations of Renan on this point in his *Essay on Nationality*.

[f.13] 26th April 1926.

[f.14] Short for the *Rashtriya Swayam Sevaka Sangh* which is a Hindu volunteer corps. *Khaksar* is a Muslim volunteer corps.

[f.15] See the speech of Sir Mahomad Shaif in the Minorities Sub-committee of the first R.T.C. (Indian Edition). p. 57.

[f.16] See the speech of Raja Narendranath, *Ibid.*, p. 65.

[f.17] The Musalinans had already been told by Sir Sayad Ahmad not to join the Congress in the two speeches, one delivered at Lucknow on 28th December 1887, and the other at Meerut on 16th March 1888. Mr. Mahomed Ali in his presidential address speaks of them as historic speeches.

[f.18] Mr' Mahomed Ali in his speech as the President of the Congress said that this deputation was a " command performance."

[f.19] The number in column 9 represents the maximum of Official members permitted under the Regulations.

[f.20]The C.P. Legislative Council was established in 1914.

[f.21]For some reason the pact did not settle the proportion of Muslim representation in Assam.

[f.22]Government of India Act, 1919, section 67(2) (h).

[f.23]Statutory Commission, 1929, Report, Vol. I, p. 189.

[f.24]Column 3 includes Indians elected by special constituencies, e.g. Commerce, whose communal proportions may of course vary slightly from time to time. Similarly column 2, including also officials and nominated non-officials, will show slightly different results at different periods.

[f.25]* Fifth despatch on Indian Constitutional Reforms (Franchises) dated 23rd April 1919, para 21.

[f.26]The demands are known as Mr. Jinnah's 14 points. As a matter of fact they are 15 in number and were formulated at a meeting of Muslim leaders of all shades of opinion held at Delhi in March 1927 and were known as the Delhi Proposals, for Mr. Jinnah's explanation of the origin of his 14 points, see *All-India Register*, 1929, Vol. 1., p. 367.

[f.27]Report, Vol. II, p. 71.

[f.28]Notification No. F. 173/31-R in the *Gazette of India Extraordinary*, dated 25th January 1932.

[f.29]The Simon Commission had rejected the claim saying: " We entirely share the view of the Bray Committee that provision ought now to be made for the constitutional advance of the N.-W. F. P. But we also agree that the situation of the Province and its intimate relation with the problem of Indian defence are such that special arrangements are required. . It is not possible, therefore, to apply to it automatically proposals which may be suited for provincial areas in other parts of India. " They justified it by saying: " The inherent right of a man to smoke a cigarette must necessarily be curtailed if he lives in a powder magazine."—Report, Vol. H. paras 120-121.

[f.30]This resulted in the Poona Pact which was signed on 24th September 1932.

[f.31]For the efforts to get the Muslim part of the Award revised, see *All-India Register*. 1932 Vol. II, pp. 281-315.

[f.32]The communique is dated Simla July 2, 1935.

[f.33]*Indian Annual Register*. 1938. Vol. I, p. 369.

[f.34]* See points no 3 in Mr. Jinnah's 14 points

[f.35]These figures relate to the Census of 1921.

[f.36]* Montagu-Chelmsford Report, 1918, para 163.

The Government of India felt that injustice was done to the Punjab as well. But as there was no such special reason as there was in the case of Bengal, namely, the unsettling of the partition, they did not propose any augmentation in its representation as settled by the Pact.

[f.37]There is no doubt that this was well understood by the Muslims who were parties to the Pact. This is what Mr. Jinnah said as a witness appearing before the Joint Select Committee appointed by Parliament on the Government of India Bill, 1919, in reply to question No. 3808: " The position of Bengal was this: In Bengal the Muslims are in a majority, and the argument was advanced that any section or any community which is in the majority cannot claim a separate electorate: separate electorate is to protect the minority. But the counter-argument was perfectly true that numerically we are in a majority but as voters we are in the minority in Bengal, because of poverty and backwardness and so on. It was said: Very well, then fix 40 per cent., because if you are really put to test you will not get 40 per cent. because you will not be qualified as voters. Then we had the advantage in other Provinces."

[f.38]Report of the Minorities Sub-Committee of the first R.T.C. (Indian Edition), p. 96

[f.39] Mr. Mahomed Ali's formula was for Joint Electorates and Reserved Seats with this proviso that no candidate shall be declared elected unless he had secured at least 40 per cent. of the votes of his own community and at least 5 or 10 per cent. of the votes of the other community.

[f.40]Ibid., p. 123.

[f.41] See point No. 15 in Mr. Jinnah's points.

[f.42] + For the resolution and the speech of Mr. Baikal Ali thereon, see the *Indian Quarterly Register*. 1927. Vol. II. pp. 447-48.

[f.43] The unfortunate thing for the Hindus is that they did not get joint electorates although the Muslims got the concessions.

[f.44] In the Karachi session of the All-India Muslim League both Mr. Jinnah and Sir Abdurrahman Haroon compared the Muslims of India to the " Sudeten " of the Muslim world and capable of doing what the Sudeten Germans did to Czechoslovakia.

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EPILOGUE

PART V

Different people have thought differently of what has been said in the foregoing pages on the question of 'Pakistan. One set of people have alleged that I have only stated the two sides of the issue and the problems arising out of it but have not expressed my personal views on either of them. This is not correct. Anyone who has read the preceding parts will have to admit that I have expressed my views in quite positive terms, if not on all, certainly on many questions. In particular I may refer to two of the most important ones in the controversy, namely, Are the Muslims a Nation, and Have they a case for Pakistan. There are others whose line of criticism is of a different sort. They do not complain that I have failed to express my personal views. What they complain is that in coming to my conclusions I have relied on propositions as though they were absolute in their application and have admitted no exception. I am told, " Have you not stated your conclusions in too general terms ? Is not a general proposition subject to conditions and limitations ? Have you not disposed of certain complicated problems in a brief and cavalier fashion ? Have you shown how Pakistan can be brought into existence in a just and peaceful manner ?" Even this criticism is not altogether correct. It is not right to say that I have omitted to deal with these points. It may be that my treatment of them is brief, and scattered. However, I am prepared to admit that there is much force in this criticism and I am in duty bound to make good the default. This part is therefore intended and is devoted to the consideration of the following subjects :—

- 1. What are the limiting considerations which affect the Muslim case for Pakistan ?*
- 2. What are the problems of Pakistan ? and what is their solution ?*
- 3. Who has the authority to decide the issue of Pakistan ?*

CHAPTER XIII

MUST THERE BE PAKISTAN ?

I

With all that has gone before, the sceptic, the nationalist, the conservative and the old-world Indian will not fail to ask " Must there be Pakistan ?" No one can make light of such an attitude. For the problem of Pakistan is indeed very grave and it must be admitted that the question is not only a relevant and fair one to be put to the Muslims and to their protagonists but it is also important. Its importance lies in the fact that the limitations on the case for Pakistan are so considerable in their force that they can never be easily brushed aside. A mere statement of these limitations should be enough to make one feel the force they have. It is writ large on the very face of them. That being so, the burden of proof on the Muslims for establishing an imperative need in favour of Pakistan is very heavy. Indeed the issue of Pakistan or to put it plainly of partitioning India, is of such a grave character that the Muslims will not only have to discharge this burden of proof but they will have to adduce evidence of such a character as to satisfy the conscience of an international tribunal before they can win their case. Let us see how the case for Pakistan stands in the light of these limitations.

II

Must there be Pakistan because a good part of the Muslim population of India happens to be concentrated in certain defined areas which can be easily severed from the rest of India ? Muslim population is admittedly concentrated in certain well defined areas and it may be that these areas are severable. But what of that ? In considering this question one must never lose sight of the fundamental fact that nature has made India one single geographical unit. Indians are of course quarrelling and no one can prophesy when they will stop quarrelling. But granting the fact, what does it establish ? Only that Indians are a quarrelsome people. It does not destroy the fact that India is a single geographical unit. Her unity is as ancient as Nature. Within this geographic unit and covering the whole of it there has been a cultural unity from time immemorial. This cultural unity has defied political and racial divisions. And at any rate for the last hundred and fifty years all institutions—cultural, political, economic, legal and administrative—have been working on a single, uniform spring of action. In any discussion of Pakistan the fact cannot be lost sight of, namely, that the starting point, if not the governing factor, is the fundamental unity of India. For it is necessary to grasp the fact that there are really two cases of partition which must be clearly distinguished. There is a case in which the starting point is a pre existing state of separation so that partition is only a dissolution of parts which were once separate and which were subsequently joined together. This case is quite different from another in which the starting point at all times is a state of unity. Consequently partition in such a case is the severance of a territory which has been one single whole into separate parts. Where the starting point is not unity of territory, i.e., where there was disunity before there was unity, partition—which is only a return to the original—may not give a mental shock. But in India the starting point is unity. Why destroy its unity now, simply because some Muslims are dissatisfied ? Why tear it when the unit is one single whole from historical times ?

III

Must there be Pakistan because there is communal antagonism between the Hindus and the Muslims ? That the communal antagonism exists nobody can deny. The question however is, is the antagonism such that there is no will to live together in one country and under one constitution ? Surely that will to live together was not absent till 1937. During the formulation of the provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935, both Hindus and Musalmans accepted the view that they must live together under one constitution and in one country and participated in the discussions that preceded the passing of the Act. And what was the state of communal feeling in India

between—say 1920 and 1935 ? As has been recorded in the preceding pages, the history of India from 1920 up to 1935 has been one long tale of communal conflict in which the loss of life and loss of property had reached a most shameful limit. Never was the communal situation so acute as it was between this period of 15 years preceding the passing of the Government of India Act, 1935, and yet this long tale of antagonism did not prevent the Hindus and the Musalmans from agreeing to live in a single country and under a single constitution. Why make so much of communal antagonism now ?

Is India the only country where there is communal antagonism ? What about Canada ? Consider what Mr. Alexander Brady ¹[\[f.1\]](#) has to say on the relations between the English and the French in Canada :—

" Of the four original provinces, three. Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Ontario had populations substantially of the same Anglo-Saxon stock and traditions. Originally a by-product of the American Revolution, these colonies were established by the 50,000 United Empire Loyalists who trekked north from persecution and cut their settlements out of the wilderness. Previous to the American Revolution, Nova Scotia had received a goodly number of Scotch and American settlers, and in all the colonies after the Revolution the Loyalist settlements were reinforced by immigrants from Great Britain and Ireland."

* * * *

" Very different was the province of Quebec. French Canada in 1867 was a cultural unit by itself, divorced from the British communities, by the barriers of race, language and religion. Its life ran in a different mould. Stirred by a Catholic faith mediaeval in its intensity, it viewed with scant sympathy the mingled Puritanism and other-worldliness of a Protestantism largely Calvinistic. The religious faiths of the two peoples were indeed poles apart. In social, if not always in religious, outlook, English Protestantism tended towards democracy, realism and modernism: the Catholicism of the French leaned to paternalism, idealism and a reverence for the past."

* * * *

" What French Canada was in 1867 it remains substantially today. It still cherishes beliefs, customs, and institutions which have little hold on the English provinces. It has distinctive thought and enthusiasm, and its own important values. Its attitude, for example, on marriage and divorce is in conflict with the dominant view, not merely of the rest of Canada, but of the remainder of Anglo-Saxon-North-America."

* * * *

" The infrequency of intercourse between the two peoples is illustrated in Canada's largest city, Montreal. About 63 per cent. of the population is French and 24 per cent British. Here, if anywhere, is ample scope for association, but in fact they remain apart and distinct except where business and politics force them together. They have their own residential sections; their own shopping centres, and if either is more notable for racial reserve, it is the English."

* * * *

" The English-speaking residents of Montreal, as a whole, have made no effort to know their

French-speaking fellow citizens, to learn their language, to understand their traditions and their aspirations, to observe with a keen eye and a sympathetic mind their qualities and their defects. The separation of the two peoples is encouraged by the barrier of language. There is a wealth of significance in the fact revealed by the census of 1921 ; viz., that about 50 per cent. of the Canadians of French origin were unable to speak English and 95 per cent. of those of British origin were unable to speak French. Even in Montreal, 70 per cent. of the British could not speak French and 34 per cent. of the French could not speak English. The absence of a common language maintains a chasm between the two nationalities and prevents fusion.

" The significance of Confederation is that it provided an instrument of government which enabled the French, while retaining their distinct national life, to become happy partners with the British and attain a Canadian super-nationality, embracing a loyalty extending beyond their own group to that of the Dominion as a whole."

* * * *

" While the federal system successfully opened the path for a wider nationality in Canada, the co-operation which it sponsored has at times been subjected to severe strain by the violent clash of opinion between the French and the British. The super-nationality has indeed often been reduced to a shadow."

What about South Africa ? Let those who do not know the relationship between the Boers and the British ponder over what ,Mr. E. H. Brooks ² [\[f2\]](#) has to say :—

" How far is South African nationalism common to both the white races of South Africa ? There is, of course, a very real and intense Afrikaner nationalism ; but it is, generally speaking, a sentiment confined to one of the white races, and characterised, significantly enough, by a love of the Afrikaners language, the tongue of the early settlers from Holland, as modified slightly by Huguenot and German influence, and greatly by the passage of time. Afrikaner nationalism has a tendency to be exclusive, and has little place for the man who, while in every way a devoted son of South Africa, is wholly or mainly English-speaking."

* * * *

" Is there a South African nation today ?

" There are certain factors in South African life which militate against an affirmative answer."

* * * *

" Among English-speaking South Africans there are found many tendencies inclined to hinder the cause of national unity. With all the great virtues of the race they have its one cardinal defect—a lack of imagination, a difficulty in putting one's self in the other man's place. Nowhere does this come out more clearly than in the language question. Until recently comparatively few English-speaking South Africans have studied Africans except as a business proposition or (as in the Civil Service) more or less under compulsion; and fewer still have used it conversationally. Many have treated it with open contempt—a contempt in inverse proportion to their knowledge of it—and the majority with mere tolerance, exasperated or amused according to temperament."

Another witness on the same point may be heard. He is Mr. Manfred Nathan. ³ [\[f3\]](#) This is what he has to say on the relations between the Boers and the British in South Africa :—

" They are also, in the main, both of them Protestant peoples—although this is not of too great importance nowadays, when differences of religion do not count for much. They engage freely in commercial transactions with each other."

* * * *

" Nevertheless it cannot with truth be said that hitherto there has been absolutely free social intercourse between these two great sections of the white population. It has been suggested that this is partly due to the fact that in the large urban centres the population is predominantly English, and that the townfolk know little of the people in the country and their ways of life. But even in the country towns, though there is, as a rule, much greater friendliness, and much hospitality shown by Boers to visitors, there is not much social intercourse between the two sections apart from necessary business or professional relationship, and such social functions, charitable or public, as require co-operation."

Obviously India is not the only place where there is communal antagonism. If communal antagonism does not come in the way of the French in Canada living in political unity with the English, if it does not come in the way of the English in South Africa living in political unity with the Dutch, if it does not come in the way of the French and the Italians in Switzerland living in political unity with the Germans why then should it be impossible for the Hindus and the Muslims to agree to live together under one constitution in India?

IV

Must there be Pakistan because the Muslims have lost faith in the Congress majority ? As reasons for the loss of faith Muslims cite some instances of tyranny and oppression practised by the Hindus and connived at by the Congress Ministries during the two years and three months the Congress was in office. Unfortunately Mr. Jinnah did not persist in his demand for a Royal Commission to inquire into these grievances. If he had done it we could have known what truth there was in these complaints. A perusal of these instances, as given in the reports ⁴[\[f.4\]](#) of the Muslim League Committees, leaves upon the reader the impression that although there may be some truth in the allegations there is a great deal which is pure exaggeration. The Congress Ministries concerned have issued statements repudiating the charges. It may be that the Congress during the two years and three months that it was in office did not show statesmanship, did not inspire confidence in the minorities, nay tried to suppress them. But can it be a reason for partitioning India ? Is it not possible to hope that the voters who supported the Congress last time will grow wiser and not support the Congress ? Or may it not be that if the Congress returns to office it will profit by the mistakes it has made, revise its mischievous policy and thereby allay the fear created by its past conduct ?

V

Must there be Pakistan because the Musalmans are a nation ? It is a pity that Mr. Jinnah should have become a votary and champion of Muslim Nationalism at a time when the whole world is decrying against the evils of nationalism and is seeking refuge in some kind of international organization. Mr. Jinnah is so obsessed with his new-found faith in Muslim Nationalism that he is not prepared to see that there is a distinction between a society, parts of which are disintegrated, and a society parts of which have become only loose, which no sane man can ignore. When a society is disintegrating—and the two nation theory is a positive disintegration of society and country—it is evidence of the fact that there do not exist what Carlyle calls " organic filaments "—i.e., the vital forces which work to bind together the parts that are cut asunder. In such cases

disintegration can only be regretted. It cannot be prevented. Where, however, such organic filaments do exist, it is a crime to overlook them and deliberately force the disintegration of society and country as the Muslims seem to be doing. If the Musalmans want to be a different nation it is not because they have been but because they want to be. There is much in the Musalmans which, if they wish, can roll them into a nation. But isn't there enough that is common to both Hindus and Musalmans, which if developed, is capable of moulding them into one people ? Nobody can deny that there are many modes, manners, rites and customs which are common to both. Nobody can deny that there are rites, customs and usages based on religion which do divide Hindus and Musalmans. The question is, which of these should be emphasized. If the emphasis is laid on things that are common, there need be no two nations in India. If the emphasis is laid on points of difference, it will no doubt give rise to two nations. The view that seems to guide Mr. Jinnah is that Indians are only a people and that they can never be a nation. This follows the line of British writers who make it a point of speaking of Indians as the people of India and avoid speaking of the Indian nation. Granted Indians are not a nation, that they are only a people. What of that ? History records that before the rise of nations as great corporate personalities, there were only peoples. There is nothing to be ashamed if Indians are no more than a people. Nor is there any cause for despair that the people of India—if they wish—will not become one nation. For, as Disraeli said, a nation is a work of art and a work of time. If the Hindus and Musalmans agree to emphasize the things that bind them and forget those that separate them there is no reason why in course of time they should not grow into a nation. It may be that their nationalism may not be quite so integrated as that of the French or the Germans. But they can easily produce a common state of mind on common questions which is the sum total which the spirit of nationalism helps to produce and for which it is so much prized. Is it right for the Muslim League to emphasize only differences and ignore altogether the forces that bind ? Let it not be forgotten that if two nations come into being it will not be because it is predestined. It will be the result of deliberate design.

The Musalmans of India as I have said are not as yet a nation in the de jure or de facto sense of the term and all that can be said is that they have in them the elements necessary to make them a nation. But granting that the Musalmans of India are a nation, is India the only country where there are going to be two nations ? What about Canada ? Everybody knows that there are in Canada two nations, the English and the French. Are there not two nations in South Africa, the English and the Dutch ? What about Switzerland ? Who does not know that there are three nations living in Switzerland, the Germans, the French and the Italians ? Have the French in Canada demanded partition because they are a separate nation ? Do the English claim partition of South Africa because they are a distinct nation from the Boers ? Has anybody ever heard that the Germans, the French and the Italians have ever agitated for the fragmentation of Switzerland because they are all different nations ? Have the Germans, the French and the Italians ever felt that they would lose their distinctive cultures if they lived as citizens of one country and under one constitution ? On the contrary, all these distinct nations have been content to live together in one country under one constitution without fear of losing their nationality and their distinctive cultures. Neither have the French in Canada ceased to be French by living with the English, nor have the English ceased to be English by living with the Boers in South Africa. The Germans, the French and the Italians have remained distinct nations notwithstanding their common allegiance to a common country and a common constitution. The case of Switzerland is worthy of note. It is surrounded by countries, the nationalities of which have a close religious and racial affinity with the nationalities of Switzerland. Notwithstanding these affinities the nationalities in Switzerland have been Swiss first and Germans, Italians and French afterwards.

Given the experience of the French in Canada, the English in South Africa and the French and the Italians in Switzerland, the questions that arise are, why should it be otherwise in India ? Assuming that the Hindus and the Muslims split into two nations, why cannot they live in one country and under one constitution ? Why should the emergence of the two-nation theory make partition necessary ? Why should the Musalmans be afraid of losing their nationality and national culture by living with the Hindus ? If the Muslims insist on separation, the cynic may well conclude that there is so much that is common between the Hindus and the Musalmans that the Muslim leaders are

afraid that unless there is partition whatever little distinctive Islamic culture is left with the Musalmans will eventually vanish by continued social contact with the Hindus with the result that in the end instead of two nations there will grow up in India one nation. If the Muslim nationalism is so thin then the motive for partition is artificial and the case for Pakistan loses its very basis.

VI

Must there be Pakistan because otherwise Swaraj will be a Hindu Raj ? The Musalmans are so easily carried away by this cry that it is necessary to expose the fallacies underlying it.

In the first place, is the Muslim objection to Hindu Raj a conscientious objection or is it a political objection. If it is a conscientious objection all one can say is that it is a very strange sort of conscience. There are really millions of Musalmans in India who are living under unbridled and uncontrolled Hindu Raj of Hindu Princes and no objection to it has been raised by the Muslims or the Muslim League. The Muslims had once a conscientious objection to the British Raj. Today not only have they no objection to it but they are the greatest supporters of it. That there should be no objection to British Raj or to undiluted Hindu Raj of a Hindu Prince but that there should be objection to Swaraj for British India on the ground that it is Hindu Raj as though it was not subjected to checks and balances is an attitude the logic of which it is difficult to follow.

The political objections to Hindu Raj rest on various grounds. The first ground is that Hindu society is not a democratic society. True, it is not. It may not be right to ask whether the Muslims have taken any part in the various movements for reforming Hindu society as distinguished from proselytising. But it is right to ask if the Musalmans are the only sufferers from the evils that admittedly result from the undemocratic character of Hindu society. Are not the millions of Shudras and non-Brahmins or millions of the Untouchables, suffering the worst consequences of the undemocratic character of Hindu society ? Who benefits from education, from public service and from political reforms except the Hindu governing class—composed of the higher castes of the Hindus—which form not even 10 per cent. of the total Hindu population ? Has not the governing class of the Hindus, which controls Hindu politics, shown more regard for safeguarding the rights and interests of the Musalmans than they have for safeguarding the rights and interests of the Shudras and the Untouchables ? Is not Mr. Gandhi, who is determined to oppose any political concession to the Untouchables, ready to sign a blank cheque in favour of the Muslims ? Indeed, the Hindu governing class seems to be far more ready to share power with the Muslims than it is to share power with the Shudras and the Untouchables. Surely, the Muslims have the least ground to complain of the undemocratic character of Hindu society.

Another ground on which the Muslim objection to Hindu Raj rests is that the Hindus are a majority community and the Musalmans are a minority community. True. But is India the only country where such a situation exists ? Let us compare the conditions in India with the conditions in Canada, South Africa and Switzerland. First, take the distribution of population. In Canada ⁵[\[f.5\]](#) out of a total population of 10,376,786 only 2,927,990 are French. In South Africa ⁶ [\[f6\]](#) the Dutch number 1,120,770 and the English are only 783,071. In Switzerland ⁷[\[f.7\]](#) out of the total population of 4,066,400 the Germans are 2,924,313, the French 831,097 and the Italians 242,034.

This shows that the smaller nationalities have no fear of being placed under the Raj of a major community. Such a notion seems to be quite foreign to them. Why is this so? Is it because there is no possibility of the major nationality establishing its supremacy in those centres of power and authority, namely the Legislature and in the Executive ? Quite the contrary. Unfortunately no figures are available to show the actual extent of representation which the different major and minor nationalities have in Switzerland, Canada and South Africa. That is because there is no communal reservation of seats such as is found in India. Each community is left to win in a general contest what number of seats it can. But it is quite easy to work out the probable number of seats which each nationality can obtain on the basis of the ratio of its population to the total seats in the Legislature. Proceeding on this basis what do we find? In Switzerland the total representatives in the

Lower House is 187. Out of them the German population has a possibility of winning 138, French 42 and Italians only 7 seats. In South Africa out of the total of 153, there is a possibility of the English gaining 62, and the Dutch 94 seats. In Canada the total is 245. Of these the French ⁸ [f.8] have only 65. On this basis it is quite clear that in all these countries there is a possibility of the major nationality establishing its supremacy over the minor nationalities. Indeed, one may go so far as to say that speaking de jure and as a mere matter of form in Canada the French are living under the British Raj, the English in South Africa under the Dutch Raj, and the Italians and French in Switzerland under the German Raj. But what is the position de facto ? Have Frenchmen in Canada raised a cry that they will not live under British Raj ? Have Englishmen in South Africa raised a cry that they will not live under Dutch Raj ? Have the French and Italians in Switzerland any objection to living under the German Raj ? Why should then the Muslims raise this cry of Hindu Raj ?

Is it proposed that the Hindu Raj should be the rule of a naked communal majority ? Are not the Musalmans granted safeguards against the possible tyranny of the Hindu majority ? Are not the safeguards given to the Musalmans of India wider and better than the safeguards which have been given to the French in Canada, to the English in South Africa and to the French and the Italians in Switzerland? To take only one item from the list of safeguards. Haven't the Musalmans got an enormous degree of weightage in representation in the Legislature ? Is weightage known in Canada, South Africa or Switzerland ? And what is the effect of this weightage to Muslims ? Is it not to reduce the Hindu majority in the Legislature? What is the degree of reduction? Confining ourselves to British India and taking account only of the representation granted to the territorial constituencies, Hindu and Muslim, in the Lower House in the Central Legislature under the Government of India Act, 1935, it is clear that out of a total of 187, the Hindus have 105 seats and the Muslims have 82 seats. Given these figures one is forced to ask where is the fear of the Hindu Raj ?

If Hindu Raj does become a fact, it will, no doubt, be the greatest calamity for this country. No matter what the Hindus say, Hinduism is a menace to liberty, equality and fraternity. On that account it is incompatible with democracy. Hindu Raj must be prevented at any cost. But is Pakistan the true remedy against it ? What makes communal Raj possible is a marked disproportion in the relative strength of the various communities living in a country. As pointed out above, this disproportion is not more marked in India than it is in Canada, South Africa and Switzerland. Nonetheless there is no British Raj in Canada, no Dutch Raj in South Africa, and no German Raj in Switzerland. How have the French, the English and the Italians succeeded in preventing the Raj of the majority community being established in their country ? Surely not by partition : What is their method ? Their method is to put a ban on communal parties in politics. No community in Canada, South Africa or Switzerland ever thinks of starting a separate communal party. What is important to note is that it is the minority nations which have taken the lead in opposing the formation of a communal party. For they know that if they form a communal political party the major community will also form a communal party and the majority community will thereby find it easy to establish its communal Raj. It is a vicious method of self-protection. It is because the minority nations are fully aware how they will be hoisted on their own petard that they have opposed the formation of communal political parties.

Have the Muslims thought of this method of avoiding Hindu Raj. Have they considered how easy it is to avoid it ? Have they considered how futile and harmful the present policy of the League is ? The Muslims are howling against the Hindu Maha Sabha and its slogan of Hindudom and Hindu Raj. But who is responsible for this ? Hindu Maha Sabha and Hindu Raj are the inescapable nemesis which the Musalmans have brought upon themselves by having a Muslim League. It is action and counter-action. One gives rise to the other. Not partition, but the abolition, of the Muslim League and the formation of a mixed party of Hindus and Muslims is the only effective way of burying the ghost of Hindu Raj. It is, of course, not possible for Muslims and other minority parties to join the Congress or the Hindu Maha Sabha so long as the disagreement on the question of constitutional safeguards continues. But this question will be settled, is bound to be settled and there is every hope that the settlement will result in securing to the Muslims and other minorities

the safeguards they need. Once this consummation, which we so devoutly wish, takes place nothing can stand in the way of a party re-alignment, of the Congress and the Maha Sabha breaking up and of Hindus and Musalmans forming mixed political parties based on an agreed programme of social and economic regeneration, and thereby avoid the danger of both Hindu Raj or Muslim Raj becoming a fact. Nor should the formation of a mixed party of Hindus and Muslims be difficult in India. There are many lower orders in the Hindu society whose economic, political and social needs are the same as those of the majority of the Muslims and they would be far more ready to make a common cause with the Muslims for achieving common ends than they would with the high caste of Hindus who have denied and deprived them of ordinary human rights for centuries. To pursue such a course cannot be called an adventure. The path along that line is a well trodden path. Is it not a fact that under the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms in most Provinces, if not in all, the Muslims, the Non-Brahmins and the Depressed Classes united together and worked the reforms as members of one team from 1920 to 1937 ? Herein lay the most fruitful method of achieving communal harmony among Hindus and Muslims and of destroying the danger of a Hindu Raj. Mr. Jinnah could have easily pursued this line. Nor was it difficult for Mr. Jinnah to succeed in it. Indeed Mr. Jinnah is the one person who had all the chances of success on his side if he had tried to form such a united non-communal party. He has the ability to organize. He had the reputation of a nationalist. Even many Hindus who were opposed to the Congress would have flocked to him if he had only sent out a call for a united party of like-minded Hindus and Muslims. What did Mr. Jinnah do ? In 1937 Mr. Jinnah made his entry into Muslim politics and strangely enough he regenerated the Muslim League which was dying and decaying and of which only a few years ago he would have been glad to witness the funeral. However regrettable the starting of such a communal political party may have been, there was in it one relieving feature. That was the leadership of Mr. Jinnah. Everybody felt that with the leadership of Mr. Jinnah the League could never become a merely communal party. The resolutions passed by the League during the first two years of its new career indicated that it would develop into a mixed political party of Hindus and Muslims. At the annual session of the Muslim League held at Lucknow in October 1937 altogether 15 resolutions were passed. The following two are of special interest in this connection.

Resolution ⁹[\[f.9\]](#) No. 7:

" This meeting of the All India Muslim League deprecates and protests against the formation of Ministries in certain Provinces by the Congress parties in flagrant violation of the letter and the spirit of the Government of India Act, 1935, and Instrument of Instructions and condemns the Governors for their failure to enforce the special powers entrusted to them for the safeguards of the interest of the Musalmans and other important minorities"

Resolution* No. 8:

" Resolved that the object of the All India Muslim League shall be the establishment in India of Full Independence in the form of federation of free democratic states in which the rights and interests of the Musalmans and other minorities are adequately and effectively safeguarded in the constitution."

Equal number of resolutions were passed at the next annual session of the League held at Patna in December 1938. Resolution* No. 10 is noteworthy. It reads as follows :—

"The All India Muslim League reiterates its view that the scheme of Federation embodied in the Government of India Act, 1935, is not acceptable, but in view of the further developments that have taken place or may take place from time to time it hereby authorises the President of the All India Muslim League to adopt such course as may be necessary with a view to explore the possibility of a suitable alternative which will safeguard the interests of the Musalmans and other minorities in India." By these resolutions Mr. Jinnah showed that he was for a common front between the Muslims and other non-Muslim minorities. Unfortunately the catholicity and statesmanship that underlies these resolutions did not last long. In 1939 Mr. Jinnah took a somersault and outlined the dangerous and disastrous policy of isolation of the Musalmans by passing that notorious resolution

in favour of Pakistan. What is the reason for this isolation ? Nothing but the change of view that the Musalmans were a nation and not a community ! ! One need not quarrel over the question whether the Muslims are a nation or a community. But one finds it extremely difficult to understand how the mere fact that the Muslims are a nation makes political isolation a safe and sound policy ? Unfortunately Muslims do not realize what disservice Mr. Jinnah has done to them by this policy. But let Muslims consider what Mr. Jinnah has achieved by making the Muslim League the only organization for the Musalmans. It may be that it has helped him to avoid the possibility of having to play the second fiddle. For inside the Muslim camp he can always be sure of the first place for himself. But how does the League hope to save by this plan of isolation the Muslims from Hindu Raj ? Will Pakistan obviate the establishment of Hindu Raj in Provinces in which the Musalmans are in a minority ? Obviously it cannot. This is what would happen in the Muslim minority Provinces if Pakistan came. Take an all-India view. Can Pakistan prevent the establishment of Hindu Raj at the centre over Muslim minorities that will remain Hindustan? It is plain that it cannot. What good is Pakistan then ? Only to prevent Hindu Raj in Provinces in which the Muslims are in a majority and in which there could never be Hindu Raj ! ! To put it differently Pakistan is unnecessary to Muslims where they are in a majority because there, there is no fear of Hindu Raj. It is worse than useless to Muslims where they are in a minority, because Pakistan or no Pakistan they will have to face a Hindu Raj. Can politics be more futile than the politics of the Muslim League ? The Muslim League started to help minority Muslims and has ended by espousing the cause of majority Muslims. What a perversion in the original aim of the Muslim League ! What a fall from the sublime to the ridiculous ! Partition as a remedy against Hindu Raj is worse than useless.

VI

These are some of the weaknesses in the Muslim case for Pakistan which have occurred to me. There might be others which have not struck me. But the list as it is, is quite a formidable one. How do the Muslims propose to meet them ? That is a question for the Muslims and not for me. My duty as a student of the subject extends to setting forth these weaknesses. That I have done. I have nothing more to answer for.

There are, however, two other questions of such importance that this discussion cannot be closed with any sense of completeness without reference to them. The purpose of these questions is to clear the ground between myself and my critics. Of these questions, one I am entitled to ask the critics, the other the critics are entitled to ask me.

Beginning with the first question, what I feel like asking the critics is, what good do they expect from a statement of these weaknesses ? Do they expect the Musalmans to give up Pakistan if they are defeated in a controversy over the virtues of Pakistan ? That of course depends upon what method is adopted to resolve this controversy. The Hindus and the Musalmans may follow the procedure which Christian missionaries had set up in early times in order to secure converts from amongst the Hindus. According to this procedure a day was appointed for a disputation, which was open to public, between a Christian missionary and a Brahmin, the former representing the Christian religion and the latter holding himself out as the protagonist of the Hindu religion with the condition that whoever failed to meet the case against his religion was bound to accept the religion of the other. If such a method of resolving the dispute between the Hindus and the Muslims over the issue of Pakistan was agreed upon there may be some use in setting out this string of weaknesses. But let it not be forgotten that there is another method of disposing of a controversy which maybe called Johnsonian after the manner which Dr. Johnson employed in dealing with arguments of Bishop Berkeley. It is recorded by Boswell that when he told Dr. Johnson that the doctrine of Bishop Berkeley that matter was non-existent and that everything in the universe was merely ideal, was only an ingenious sophistry but that it was impossible to refute it. Dr. Johnson with great alacrity answered, striking his foot with mighty force against a large stone, till he rebounded from it saying, " I refute it thus." It may be that the Musalmans will agree, as most rational people do, to have their case for Pakistan decided by the tests of reason and argument. But I should not be surprised if the Muslims decided to adopt the method of Dr. Johnson and say " Damn your arguments ! We want Pakistan." In that event the critic must realize that any reliance

placed upon the limitations for destroying the case for Pakistan will be of no avail. It is therefore no use being jubilant over the logic of these objections to Pakistan.

Let me now turn to the other question which I said the critic is entitled to put to me. What is my position regarding the issue of Pakistan in the light of the objections, which I have set out ? I have no doubts as to my position. I hold firmly that, subject to certain conditions, detailed in the chapters that follow, if the Musalmans are bent on having Pakistan then it must be conceded to them. I know my critics will at once accuse me of inconsistency and will demand reasons for so extraordinary a conclusion— extraordinary because of the view expressed by me in the earlier part of this chapter that the Muslim case for Pakistan has nothing in it which can be said to carry the compelling force which the decree of an inexorable fate may be said to have. I withdraw nothing from what I have said as to the weaknesses in the Muslim case for Pakistan. Yet I hold that if the Muslims must have Pakistan there is no escape from conceding it to them. As to the reasons which have led me to that conclusion I shall not hesitate to say that the strength or weakness of the logic of Pakistan is not one of them. In my judgement there are two governing factors which must determine the issue. First is the defence of India and second is the sentiment of the Muslims. I will state why I regard them as decisive and how in my opinion they tell in favour of Pakistan.

To begin with the first. One cannot ignore that what is important is not the winning of independence but the having of the sure means of maintaining it. The ultimate guarantee of the independence of a country is a safe army—an army on which you can rely to fight for the country at all time and in any eventuality. The army in India must necessarily be a mixed army composed of Hindus and Muslims. If India is invaded by a foreign power, can the Muslims in the army be trusted to defend India ? Suppose invaders are their co-religionists. Will the Muslims side with the invaders or will they stand against them and save India ? This is a very crucial question. Obviously, the answer to this question must depend upon to what extent the Muslims in the army have caught the infection of the two-nation theory, which is the foundation of Pakistan. If they are infected, then the army in India cannot be safe. Instead of being the guardian of the independence of India, it will continue to be a menace and a potential danger to its independence. I confess I feel aghast when I hear some Britishers argue that it is for the defence of India that they must reject Pakistan. Some Hindus also sing the same tune. I feel certain that either they are unaware as to what the determining factor in the independence of India is or that they are talking of the defence of India not as an independent country responsible for its own defence but as a British possession to be defended by them against an intruder. This is a hopelessly wrong angle of vision. The question is not whether the British will be able to defend India better if there was no partition of India. The question is whether Indians will be able to defend a free India. To that, I repeat, the only answer is that Indians will be able to defend a free India on one and one condition alone—namely, if the army in India remains non-political, unaffected by the poison of Pakistan. I want to warn Indians against the most stupid habit that has grown up in this country of discussing the question of Swaraj without reference to the question of the army. Nothing can be more fatal than the failure to realize that a political army is the greatest danger to the liberty of India. It is worse than having no army.

Equally important is the fact that the army is the ultimate sanction which sustains Government in the exercise of its authority inside the country, when it is challenged by a rebellious or recalcitrant element. Suppose the Government of the day enunciates a policy which is vehemently opposed by a section of the Muslims. Suppose the Government of the day is required to use its army to enforce its policy. Can the Government of the day depend upon the Muslims in the army to obey its orders and shoot down the Muslim rebels ? This again depends upon to what extent the Muslims in the army have caught the infection of the two-nation theory. If they have caught it, India cannot have a safe and secure Government.

Turning to the second governing factor the Hindus do not seem to attach any value to sentiment as a force in politics. The Hindus seem to rely upon two grounds to win against the Muslims. The first is that even if the Hindus and the Muslims are two nations, they can live under one state. The other is that the Muslim case for Pakistan is founded on strong sentiment rather than upon clear argument. I don't know how long the Hindus are going to fool themselves with such arguments. It

is true that the first argument is not without precedent. At the same time it does not call for much intelligence to see that its value is extremely limited. Two nations and one state is a pretty plea. It has the same attraction which a sermon has and may result in the conversion of Muslim leaders. But instead of being uttered as a sermon if it is intended to issue it as an ordinance for the Muslims to obey it will be a mad project to which no sane man will agree. It will, I am sure, defeat the very purpose of Swaraj. The second argument is equally silly. That the Muslim case for Pakistan is founded on sentiment is far from being a matter of weakness; it is really its strong point. It does not need deep understanding of politics to know that the workability of a constitution is not a matter of theory. It is a matter of sentiment. A constitution like clothes must suit as well as please. If a constitution does not please, then, however perfect it may be, it will not work. To have a constitution which runs counter to the strong sentiments of a determined section is to court disaster if not to invite rebellion.

It is not realized by the Hindus that, assuming there is a safe army, rule by armed forces is not the normal method of governing a people. Force, it cannot be denied, is the medicine of the body politic and must be administered when the body politic becomes sick. But just because force is the medicine of the body politic it cannot be allowed to become its daily bread. A body politic must work as a matter of course by springs of action which are natural. This can happen only when the different elements constituting the body politic have the will to work together and to obey the laws and orders passed by a duly constituted authority. Suppose the new constitution for a United India contained in it all the provisions necessary to safeguard the interests of the Muslims. But suppose the Muslims said " Thank you for your safeguards, we don't want to be ruled by you " ; and suppose they boycott the Legislatures, refuse to obey laws, oppose the payment of taxes ; what is to happen ? Are the Hindus prepared to extract obedience from Muslims by the use of Hindu bayonets ? Is Swaraj to be an opportunity to serve the people or is it to be an opportunity for Hindus to conquer the Musalmans and for the Musalmans to conquer the Hindus ? Swaraj must be a Government of the people by the people and for the people. This is the *raison d'être* of Swaraj and the only justification for Swaraj. If Swaraj is to usher in an era in which the Hindus and the Muslims will be engaged in scheming against each other, the one planning to conquer its rival, why should we have Swaraj and why should the democratic nations allow such a Swaraj to come into existence ? It will be a snare, a delusion and a perversion.

The non-Muslims do not seem to be aware that they are presented with a situation in which they are forced to choose between various alternatives. Let me state them. In the first place they have to choose between Freedom of India and the Unity of India. If the non-Muslims will insist on the Unity of India they put the quick realization of India's freedom into jeopardy. The second choice relates to the surest method of defending India, whether they can depend upon Muslims in a free and united India to develop and sustain along with the non-Muslims the necessary will to defend the common liberties of both: or whether it is better to partition India and thereby ensure the safety of Muslim India by leaving its defence to the Muslims and of non-Muslim India by leaving its defence to non-Muslims.

As to the first, I prefer Freedom of India to the Unity of India. The Sinn Feinners who were the staunchest of nationalists to be found anywhere in the world and who like the Indians were presented with similar alternatives chose the freedom of Ireland to the unity of Ireland. The non-Muslims who are opposed to partition may well profit by the advice tendered by the Rev. Michael O'Flanagan, at one time Vice-President of the Feinns to the Irish Nationalists on the issue of the partition of Ireland. ¹⁰[f.10] Said the Rev. Father :—

" If we reject Home Rule rather than agree to the exclusion of the Unionist parts of Ulster, what case have we to put before the world ? We can point out that Ireland is an island with a definite geographical boundary. That argument might be all right if we were appealing to a number of Island nationalities that had themselves definite geographical boundaries. Appealing, as we are, to continental nations with shifting boundaries, that argument will have no force whatever. National and geographical boundaries scarcely ever coincide. Geography would make one nation of Spain

and Portugal; history has made two of them. Geography did its best to make one nation of Norway and Sweden ; history has succeeded in making two of them. Geography has scarcely anything to say to the number of nations upon the North American continent; history has done the whole thing. If a man were to try to construct a political map of Europe out of its physical map, he would find himself groping in the dark. Geography has worked hard to make one nation out of Ireland; history has worked against it. The island of Ireland and the national unit of Ireland simply do not coincide. In the last analysis the test of nationality is the wish of the people."

These words have emanated from a profound sense of realism which we in India so lamentably lack.

On the second issue I prefer the partitioning of India into Muslim India and non-Muslim India as the surest and safest method of providing for the defence of both. It is certainly the safer of the two alternatives. I know it will be contended that my fears about the loyalty of the Muslims in the army to a Free and United India arising from the infection of the two nation theory is only an imaginary fear. That is no doubt true. That does not militate against the soundness of the choice I have made. I may be wrong. But I certainly can say without any fear of contradiction that, to use the words of Burke, it is better to be ridiculed for too great a credulity than to be ruined by too confident a sense of security. I don't want to leave things to chance. To leave so important an issue, as the defence of India, to chance is to be guilty of the grossest crime.

Nobody will consent to the Muslim demand for Pakistan unless he is forced to do so. At the same time, it would be a folly not to face what is inevitable and face it with courage and common sense. Equally would it be a folly to lose the. Part one can retain in the vain attempt of preserving the whole.

These are the reasons why I hold that if the Musalman will not yield on the issue of Pakistan then Pakistan must come. So far as I am concerned the only important question is : Are the Musalmans determined to have Pakistan ? Or is Pakistan a mere cry ? Is it only a passing mood ? Or does it represent their permanent aspiration ? On this there may be difference of opinion. Once it becomes certain that the Muslims want Pakistan there can be no doubt that the wise course would be to concede the principle of it.

CHAPTER XIV

THE PROBLEMS OF PAKISTAN

I

Among the many problems to which the partition of India into Pakistan and Hindustan must give rise will be the following three problems:—

- (1) The problem of the allocation of the financial assets and liabilities of the present Government of India,
- (2) The problem of the delimitation of the areas, and
- (3) The problem of the transfer of population from Pakistan to Hindustan and vice versa.

Of these problems the first is consequential, in the sense, that it would be worth while to consider it only when the partition of India has been agreed to by the parties concerned. The two other problems stand on a different footing. They are conditions precedent to Pakistan in the sense that there are many people who will not make up their mind on Pakistan unless they are satisfied that some reasonable and just solution of them is possible. I will, therefore, confine myself to the consideration only of the last two problems of Pakistan.

II

On the question of the boundaries of Pakistan we have had so far no clear and authoritative statement from the Muslim League. In fact it is one of the complaints made by the Hindus that while Mr. Jinnah has been carrying on a whirlwind campaign in favour of Pakistan, which has resulted in fouling the political atmosphere in the country, Mr. Jinnah has not thought fit to inform his critics of the details regarding the boundaries of his proposed Pakistan. Mr. Jinnah's argument has all along been that any discussion regarding the boundaries of Pakistan is premature and that the boundaries of Pakistan will be a matter for discussion when the principle of Pakistan has been admitted. It may be a good rhetorical answer, but it certainly does not help those who wish to apply their mind without taking sides to offer whatever help they can to bring about a peaceful solution of this problem. Mr. Jinnah seems to be under the impression that if a person is committed to the principle of Pakistan he will be bound to accept Mr. Jinnah's plan of Pakistan. There cannot be a greater mistake than this. A person may accept the principle of Pakistan, which only means the partition of India. But it is difficult to understand how the acceptance of this principle can commit him to Mr. Jinnah's plan of Pakistan. Indeed if no plan of Pakistan is satisfactory to him he will be quite free to oppose any form of Pakistan although he may be in favour of the principle of Pakistan. The plan of Pakistan and the principle of Pakistan are therefore two quite distinct propositions. There is nothing wrong in this view. By way of illustration it may be said that the principle of self-determination is like an explosive substance. One may agree in principle to its use when the necessity and urgency of the occasion is proved. But no one can consent to the use of the dynamite without first knowing the area that is intended to be blown up. If the dynamite is going to blow up the whole structure or if it is not possible to localize its application to a particular part he may well refuse to apply the dynamite and prefer to use some other means of solving the problem. Specifications of boundary lines seem therefore to be an essential preliminary for working out in concrete shape the principle of Pakistan. Equally essential it is for a bona fide protagonist of Pakistan not to hide from the public the necessary particulars of the scheme of Pakistan. Such contumacy and obstinacy as shown by Mr. Jinnah in refusing to declare the boundaries of his Pakistan is unforgivable in a statesman. Nevertheless those who are interested in solving the question of Pakistan need not wait to resolve the problems of Pakistan until Mr. Jinnah condescends to give full details. Only one has to carry on the argument on the basis of certain assumptions. In this discussion I will assume that what the Muslim League desires is that the boundaries of the Western Pakistan should be the present boundaries of the Provinces of the North-West Frontier, the Punjab, Sind and Baluchistan, and that the boundaries of Eastern Pakistan should be the boundaries of the present Province of Bengal with a few districts of Assam thrown in.

III

The question for consideration therefore is : Is this a just claim ? The claim is said to be founded on the principle of self-determination. To be able to assess the justice of this claim it is necessary to have a clear understanding of the scope and limitations of the principle of self-determination. Unfortunately, there seems to be a complete lack of such an understanding. It is therefore necessary to begin with the question : What is the de facto and de jure' connotation of this principle of self-determination ? The term self-determination has become current since the last few years. But it describes something which is much older. The idea underlying self-determination has developed along two different lines. During the 19th century self-determination meant the right to establish a form of government in accordance with the wishes of the people. Secondly, self-determination has meant the right to obtain national independence from an alien race irrespective of the form of government. The agitation for Pakistan has reference to self-determination in its second aspect.

Confining the discussion to this aspect of Pakistan it seems to me essential that the following points regarding the issue of self-determination should be borne in mind.

In the first place, self-determination must be by the people. This point is too simple even to need mention. But it has become necessary to emphasize it. Both the Muslim League and the Hindu

Maha Sabha seem to be playing fast and loose with the idea of self-determination. An area is claimed by the Muslim League for inclusion in Pakistan because the people of the area are Muslims. An area is also claimed for being included in Pakistan because the ruler of the area is a Muslim though the majority of the people of that area are non-Muslims. The Muslim League is claiming the benefit of self-determination in India. At the same time the League is opposed to self-determination being applied to Palestine. The League claims Kashmir as a Muslim State because the majority of people are Muslims and also Hyderabad because the ruler is Muslim. In like manner the Hindu Maha Sabha claims an area to be included in Hindustan because the people of the area are non-Muslims. It also comes forward to claim an area to be a part of Hindustan because the ruler is a Hindu though the majority of the people are Muslims. Such strange and conflicting claims are entirely due to the fact that either the parties to Pakistan, namely, the Hindus and the Muslims do not understand what self-determination means or are busy in perverting the principle of self-determination to enable them to justify themselves in carrying out the organized territorial loot in which they now seem to be engaged. India will be thrown into a state of utter confusion whenever the question of reorganization of its territories comes up for consideration if people have no exact notions as to what self-determination involves and have not the honesty to stand by the principle and take the consequences whatever they be. It is, therefore, well to emphasize what might be regarded as too simple to require mention, namely, that self-determination is a determination by the people and by nobody else.

The second point to note is the degree of imperative character with which the principle of self-determination can be said to be invested. As has been said by Mr. O' Connor ¹¹[\[f.11\]](#) :

" The doctrine of self-determination is not a universal principle at all. The most that can be said about it is that generally speaking, it is a sound working rule, founded upon justice, making for harmony and peace and for the development of people in their own fashion, which, again generally speaking, is the best fashion. But it must yield to circumstances, of which size and geographical situation are some of the most important. Whether the rule should prevail against the circumstances or the circumstances against the rule can be determined only by the application of one's common sense or sense of justice, or, as a Benthamite would prefer to put it, by reference to the greatest good of the greatest number— all these three, if properly understood, are really different methods of expressing the same thing. In solving a particular case very great difficulties may arise. There are facts one way and facts another way. Facts of one kind may make a special appeal to some minds, little or none to others. The problem may be of the kind that is called imponderable, that is to say, no definite conclusion that will be accepted by the generality of the mankind may be possible. There are cases in which it is no more possible to say that a nation is right in its claim to interfere with the self-determination of another nation than that it is to say that it is wrong. It is a matter of opinion, upon which honest and impartial minds may differ."

There are two reasons why this must be so. Firstly, nationality is not such a sacrosanct and absolute principle as to give it the character of a categorical imperative, over-riding every other consideration. Secondly, separation is not quite so essential for the maintenance and preservation of a distinct nationality.

There is a third point to be borne in mind in connection with the issue of self-determination. Self-determination for a nationality may take the form of cultural independence or may take the form of territorial independence. Which form it can take must depend upon the territorial layout of the population. If a nationality lives in easily severable and contiguous areas, other things being equal, a case can be made out for territorial independence. But where owing to an inextricable intermingling the nationalities are so mixed up that the areas they occupy are not easily severable, then all that they can be entitled to is cultural independence. Territorial separation in a case like this is an impossibility. They are doomed to live together. The only other alternative they have is to migrate.

Having defined the scope and limitations of the idea of self-determination we can now proceed to deal with the question of boundaries of Pakistan. How does the claim of the Muslim League for the present boundary to remain the boundaries of Pakistan stand in the light of these considerations ? The answer to this question seems to me quite clear. The geographical layout seems to decide the issue. No special pleading of any kind is required. In the case of the North-West Frontier Province, Baluchistan and Sind, the Hindus and the Muslims are intermixed. In these Provinces a case for territorial separation for the Hindus seems to be impossible. They must remain content with cultural independence and such political safeguards as may be devised for their safety. The case of the Punjab and Bengal stands on a different footing. A glance at the map shows that the layout of the population of the Hindus and the Muslims in these two Provinces is totally different from what one finds in the other three Provinces. The non-Muslims in the Punjab and Bengal are not found living in small islands in the midst of and surrounded by a vast Muslim population spread over the entire surface as is the case with the North-West Frontier Province, Baluchistan and Sind. In Bengal and the Punjab the Hindus occupy two different areas contiguous and severable. In these circumstances, there is no reason for conceding what the Muslim League seems to demand, namely, that the present boundaries of the Punjab and Bengal shall continue to be the boundaries of Western Pakistan and Eastern Pakistan.

Two conclusions necessarily follow from the foregoing discussion. One is that the non-Muslims of the Punjab and Bengal have a case for exclusion from Pakistan by territorial severance of the areas they occupy. The other is that the non-Muslims of North-West Frontier Province, Baluchistan and Sind have no case for exclusion and are only entitled to cultural independence and political safeguards. To put the same thing in a different way it may be said that the Muslim League claim for demanding that the boundaries of Sind, North-West Frontier and Baluchistan shall remain as they are cannot be opposed. But that in the case of the Punjab and Bengal such a claim is untenable and that the non-Muslims of these Provinces, if they desire, can claim that the territory they occupy should be excluded by a redrawing of the boundaries of these two Provinces.

V

One should have thought that such a claim by the non-Muslim minorities of the Punjab and Bengal for the redrawing of the boundaries would be regarded by the Muslim League as a just and reasonable claim. The possibility of the redrawing of boundaries was admitted in the Lahore Resolution of the Muslim League passed in March 1940. The Resolution ¹²[\[f.12\]](#) said :—

" The establishment of completely independent States formed by demarcating geographically contiguous units into regions which shall be so constituted, with such territorial readjustments as may be necessary, that the areas in which the Musalmans are numerically in a majority, as in the north-western and eastern zones of India, shall be grouped together to constitute independent States as Muslim free national homelands in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign."

That this continued to be the position of the Muslim League is clear from the resolution passed by the Muslim League on the Cripps Proposals as anyone who cares to read it will know. But there are indications that Mr. Jinnah has changed his view. At a public meeting held on 16th November 1942 in Jullunder Mr. Jinnah is reported to have expressed himself in the following terms:—

" The latest trick—1 call it nothing but a trick—to puzzle and to mislead the ignorant masses purposely, and those playing the game understand it, is, why should the right of self-determination be confined to Muslims only and why not extend it to other communities ? Having said that all have the right of self-determination, they say the Punjab must be divided into so many bits ; likewise the North-West Frontier Province and Sind. Thus there will be hundreds of Pakistans.

" Who is the author of this new formula that every community has the right of self-determination all over India ? Either it is colossal ignorance or mischief and trick. Let me give them a reply, that the Musalmans claim the right of self-determination because they are a national group on a given territory which is their homeland and in the zones where they are in a majority. Have you known anywhere in history that national groups scattered all over have been given a State ? Where are you going to get a State for them ? In that case you have got 14 per cent. Muslims in the United Provinces. Why not have a State for them ? Muslims in the United Provinces are not a national group; they are scattered. Therefore in constitutional language they are characterized as a sub-national group who cannot expect anything more than what is due from any civilized Government to a minority. I hope I have made the position clear. The Muslims are not a sub-national group; it is their birthright to claim and exercise the right of self-determination."

Mr. Jinnah has completely missed the point. The point raised by his critics was not with regard to the non-Muslim minorities in general. It had reference to the non-Muslim minorities in the Punjab and Bengal. Does Mr. Jinnah propose to dispose of the case of non-Muslim minorities who occupy a compact and an easily severable territory by his theory of a sub-nation ? If that is so, then one is bound to say that a proposition cruder than his it would be difficult to find in any political literature. The concept of a sub-nation is unheard of. It is not only an ingenious concept but it is also a preposterous concept. What does the theory of a subnation connote ? If I understand its implications correctly, it means a sub-nation must not be severed from the nation to which it belongs even when severance is possible: it means that the relations between a nation and a sub-nation are no higher than the relations which subsist between a man and his chattels, or between property and its incidents. Chattels go with the owner, incidents go with property, so a sub-nation goes with a nation. Such is the chain of reasoning in Mr. Jinnah's argument. But does Mr. Jinnah seriously wish to argue that the Hindus of the Punjab and Bengal are only chattels so that they must always go wherever the Muslims of the Punjab and the Muslims of Bengal choose to drive them ? Such an argument will be too absurd to be entertained by any reasonable man. It is also the most illogical argument and certainly it should not be difficult for so mature a lawyer as Mr. Jinnah, to see the illogicality of it. If a numerically smaller nation is only a sub-nation in relation to a numerically larger nation and has no right to territorial separation, why can it not be said that taking India as a whole the Hindus are a nation and the Muslims a sub-nation and as a sub-nation they have no right to self-determination or territorial separation ?

Already there exists a certain amount of suspicion with regard to the banafides of Pakistan. Rightly or wrongly, most people suspect that Pakistan is pregnant with mischief. They think that it has two motives, one immediate, the other ultimate. The immediate motive, it is said, is to join with the neighbouring Muslim countries and form a Muslim Federation. The ultimate motive is for the Muslim Federation to invade Hindustan and conquer or rather reconquer the Hindu and re-establish Muslim Empire in India. Others think that Pakistan is the culmination of the scheme of hostages which lay behind the demand, put forth by Mr. Jinnah in his fourteen points, for the creation of separate Muslim Provinces. Nobody can fathom the mind of the Muslims and reach the real motives that lie behind their demand for Pakistan. The Hindu opponents of Pakistan if they suspect that the real motives of the Muslims are different from the apparent ones, may take note of them and plan accordingly. They cannot oppose Pakistan because the motives behind it are bad. But they are entitled to ask Mr. Jinnah, Why does he want to have a communal problem within Pakistan ? However vicious may be the motives behind Pakistan it should possess at least one virtue. The ideal of Pakistan should be not to have a communal problem inside it. This is the least of virtues one can expect from Pakistan. If Pakistan is to be plagued by a communal problem in the same way as India has been, why have Pakistan at all ? It can be welcomed only if it provides an escape from the communal problem. The way to avoid it is to arrange the boundaries in such a way that it will be an ethnic State without a minority and a majority pitched against each other. Fortunately it can be made into an ethnic State if only Mr. Jinnah will allow it. Unfortunately Mr. Jinnah objects to it. Therein lies the chief cause for suspicion and Mr. Jinnah, instead of removing it, is deepening it by such absurd, illogical and artificial distinctions as nations and sub-nations.

Rather than resort to such absurd and illogical propositions and defend what is indefensible and oppose what is just, would it not be better for Mr. Jinnah to do what Sir Edward Carson did in the matter of the delimitation of the boundaries of Ulster ? As all those who know the vicissitudes through which the Irish Home Rule question passed know that it was at the Craigavon meeting held on 23rd September 1911 that Sir Edward Carson formulated his policy that in Ulster there will be a government of Imperial Parliament or a Government of Ulster but never a Home Rule Government. As the Imperial Parliament was proposing to withdraw its government, this policy meant the establishment of a provisional government for Ulster. This policy was embodied in a resolution passed at a joint meeting of delegates representing the Ulster Unionist Council, the County Grand Orange Lodges and Unionist Clubs held in Belfast on 25th September 1911. The Provisional Government of Ulster was to come into force on the day of the passing of the Home Rule Bill. An important feature of this policy was to invest the Provisional Government with a jurisdiction over all " those districts which they (Ulsterites) could control."

The phrase " those districts which they could control " was no doubt meant to include the whole of the administrative division of Ulster. Now this administrative division of Ulster included nine counties. Of these three were overwhelmingly Catholic. This meant the compulsory retention of the three Catholic counties under Ulster against their wishes. But what did Sir Edward Carson do in the end ? It did not take long for Sir Edward Carson to discover that Ulster with three overwhelmingly Catholic districts would be a liability, and with all the courage of a true leader he came out with a declaration that he proposed to cut down his losses and make Ulster safe. In his speech in the House of Commons on the 18th of May 1920 he announced that he was content with six counties only. The speech that he made on that occasion giving his reasons why he was content only with six counties is worth quoting. This is what he said ¹⁴[\[f.14\]](#) :—

" The truth is that we came to the conclusion after many anxious hours and anxious days of going into the whole matter, almost parish by parish and townland by townland, that we would have no chance of successfully starting a Parliament in Belfast which would be responsible for the government of Donegal, Caven and Monaghan. It would be perfectly idle for us to come here and pretend that we should be in a position to do so. We should like to have the very largest areas possible, naturally. That is a system of land grabbing that prevails in all countries for widening the jurisdiction of the various governments that are set up ; but there is no use in our undertaking a government which we know would be a failure if we were saddled with these three counties."

These are wise, sagacious and most courageous words. The situation in which they were uttered has a close parallel with the situation that is likely to be created in the Punjab and Bengal by the application of the principle of Pakistan. The Muslim League and Mr. Jinnah if they want a peaceful Pakistan should not forget to take note of them. It is no use asking the non-Muslim minorities in the Punjab and Bengal to be satisfied with safeguards. If the Musalmans are not prepared to be content with safeguards against the tyranny of Hindu majority why should the Hindu minorities be asked to be satisfied with the safeguards against the tyranny of the Muslim majority ? If the Musalmans can say to the Hindus " Damn your safeguards, we don't want to be ruled by you "—an argument which Carson used against Redmond—the same argument can be returned by the Hindus of the Punjab and Bengal against the Muslim offer to be content with safeguards.

The point is that this attitude is not calculated to lead to a peaceful solution of the problem of Pakistan. Sabre-rattling or show of force will not do. In the first place, this is a game which two can play. In the second place, arms may be an element of strength. But to have arms is not enough. As Rousseau said : " The strongest is never strong enough to be always master, unless he transforms his might into right, and obedience into duty." Only ethics can convert might into right and obedience into duty. The League must see that its claim for Pakistan is founded on ethics.

VI

So much for the problem of boundaries. I will now turn to the problem of the minorities which must remain within Pakistan even after boundaries are redrawn. There are two methods of

protecting their interests.

First is to provide safeguards in the constitution for the protection of the political and cultural rights of the minorities. To Indians this is a familiar matter and it is unnecessary to enlarge upon it.

Second is to provide for their transfer from Pakistan to Hindustan. Many people prefer this solution and would be ready and willing to consent to Pakistan if it can be shown that an exchange of population is possible. But they regard this as a staggering and a baffling problem. This no doubt is the sign of a panic-stricken mind. If the matter is considered in a cool and calm temper it will be found that the problem is neither staggering nor baffling.

To begin with consider the dimensions of the problem. On what scale is this transfer going to be? In determining the scale one is bound to take into account three considerations. In the first place, if the boundaries of the Punjab and Bengal are redrawn there will be no question of transfer of population so far as these two Provinces are concerned. In the second place, the Musalmans residing in Hindustan do not propose to migrate to Pakistan nor does the League want their transfer. In the third place, the Hindus in the North-West Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan do not want to migrate. If these assumptions are correct, the problem of transfer of population is far from being a staggering problem. Indeed it is so small that there is no need to regard it as a problem at all.

Assuming it does become a problem, will it be a baffling problem? Experience shows that it is not a problem which it is impossible to solve. To devise a solution for such a problem it might be well to begin by asking what are the possible difficulties that are likely to arise in the way of a person migrating from one area to another on account of political changes. The following are obvious enough: (1) The machinery for effecting and facilitating the transfer of population. (2) Prohibition by Government against migration. (3) Levy by Government of heavy taxation on the transfer of goods by the migrating family. (4) The impossibility for a migrating family to carry with it to its new home its immovable property. (5) The difficulty of obviating a resort to unfair practices with a view to depress unduly the value of the property of the migrating family. (6) The fear of having to make good the loss by not being able to realize the full value of the property by sale in the market. (7) The difficulty of realizing pensionary and other charges due to the migrating family from the country of departure. (8) The difficulty of fixing the currency in which payment is to be made. If these difficulties are removed the way to the transfer of population becomes clear.

The first three difficulties can be easily removed by the two States of Pakistan and Hindustan agreeing to a treaty embodying an article in some such terms as follows:—

" The Governments of Pakistan and Hindustan agree to appoint a Commission consisting of equal number of representatives and presided over by a person who is approved by both and who is not a national of either.

" The expense of the Commission and of its Committees both on account of its maintenance and its operation shall be borne by the two Governments in equal proportion.

" The Government of Pakistan and the Government of Hindustan hereby agree to grant to all their nationals within their territories who belong to ethnic minorities the right to express their desire to emigrate.

" The Governments of the States above mentioned undertake to facilitate in every way the exercise of this right and to interpose no obstacles, directly or indirectly, to freedom of emigration. All laws and regulations whatsoever which conflict with freedom of emigration shall be considered as null and void."

The fourth and the fifth difficulties which relate to transfer of property can be effectually met by including in the treaty articles the following terms:

" Those who, in pursuance of these articles, determine to take advantage of the right to migrate shall have the right to carry with them or to have transported their movable property of any kind without any duty being imposed upon them on this account.

"So far as immovable property is concerned it shall be liquidated by the Commission in accordance with the following provisions:

(1) The Commission shall appoint a Committee of Experts to estimate the value of the immovable property of the emigrant. The emigrant interested shall have a representative chosen by him on the Committee.

(2) The Commission shall take necessary measures with a view to the sale of immovable property of the emigrant"

As for the rest of the difficulties relating to reimbursement for loss, for payment of pensionary and charges for specifying the currency in which payments are to be made the following articles in the treaty should be sufficient to meet them :

" (1) The difference in the estimated value and the sale price of the immovable property of the emigrant shall be paid in to the Commission by the Government of the country of departure as soon as the former has notified it of the resulting deficiency. One-fourth of this payment may be made in the money of the country of departure and three-fourths in gold or short term gold bonds.

" (2) The Commission shall advance to the emigrants the value of their immovable property determined as above.

" (3) All civil or military pensions acquired by an emigrant at the date of the signature of the present treaty shall be capitalized at the charge of the debtor Government, which must pay the amount to the Commission for the account of its owners.

" (4) The funds necessary to facilitate emigration shall be advanced by the States interested in the Commission."

Are not these provisions sufficient to overcome the difficulties regarding transfer of population ? There are of course other difficulties. But even those are not insuperable. They involve questions of policy. The first question is : is the transfer of population to be compulsory or is it to be voluntary ? The second is : is this right to State-aided transfer to be open to all or is it to be restricted to any particular class of persons ? The third is : how long is Government going to remain liable to be bound by these provisions, particularly the provision for making good the loss on the sale of immovable property ? Should the provisions be made subject to a time limit or should the liability be continued indefinitely ?

With regard to the first point, both are possible and there are instances of both having been put into effect. The transfer of population between Greece and Bulgaria was on a voluntary basis while that between Greece and Turkey was on a compulsory basis. Compulsory transfer strikes one as being prima facie wrong. It would not be fair to compel a man to change his ancestral habitat if he does not wish to, unless the peace and tranquility of the State is likely to be put in jeopardy by his continuing to live where he is or such transfer becomes necessary in his own interest. What is required is that those who want to transfer should be able to do so without impediment and without loss. I am therefore of opinion that transfer should not be forced but should be left open for those who declare their intention to transfer.

As to the second point, it is obvious that only members of a minority can be allowed to take advantage of the scheme of State-aided transfer. But even this restriction may not be sufficient to exclude all those who ought not to get the benefit of this scheme. It must be confined to certain well defined minorities who on account of ethnic or religious differences are sure to be subjected to discrimination or victimization.

The third point is important and is likely to give rise to serious difference of opinion. On a fair view of the matter it can be said that it is quite unreasonable to compel a Government to keep open for an indefinite period the option to migrate at Government cost. There is nothing unfair in telling a person that if he wants to take advantage of the provisions of the scheme of State-aided migration contained in the foregoing articles, he must exercise his option to migrate within a stated period and that if he decides to migrate after the period has elapsed he will be free to migrate but it will have to be at his own cost and without the aid of the State. There is no inequity in thus limiting the right to State aid. State-aid becomes a necessary part of the scheme because the migration is a resultant consequence of political changes over which individual citizens have no control. But migration may not be the result of political change. It may be for other causes, and when it is for other causes, aid to the emigrant cannot be an obligation on the State. The only way to determine whether migration is for political reasons or for private reasons is to relate it to a definite point of time. When it takes place within a defined period from the happening of a political change it may be presumed open for an indefinite period the option to migrate at Government cost. There is nothing unfair in telling a person that if he wants to take advantage of the provisions of the scheme of State-aided migration contained in the foregoing articles, he must exercise his option to migrate within a stated period and that if he decides to migrate after the period has elapsed he will be free to migrate but it will have to be at his own cost and without the aid of the State. There is no inequity in thus limiting the right to State-aid. State-aid becomes a necessary part of the scheme because the migration is a resultant consequence of political changes over which individual citizens have no control. But migration may not be the result of political change. It may be for other causes, and when it is for other causes, aid to the emigrant cannot be an obligation on the State. The only way to determine whether migration is for political reasons or for private reasons is to relate it to a definite point of time. When it takes place within a defined period from the happening of a political change it may be presumed to be political. When it occurs after the period it may be presumed to be for private reasons. There is nothing unjust in this. The same rule of presumption governs the cases of civil servants who, when a political change takes place, are allowed to retire on proportionate pensions if they retire within a given period but not if they retire after it has lapsed.

If the policy in these matters is as I suggest it should be, it may be given effect to by the inclusion of the following articles in the treaty:

" The right to voluntary emigration may be exercised under this treaty by any person belonging to an ethnic minority who is over 18 years of age.

" A declaration made before the Commission shall be sufficient evidence of intention to exercise the right.

" The choice of the husband shall carry with it that of the wife, the option of parents or guardians that of their children or wards aged less than 18 years.

" The right to the benefit provided by this treaty shall lapse if the option to migrate is not exercised within a period of 5 years from the date of signing the treaty.

" The duties of the Commission shall be terminated within six months after the expiration of the period of five years from the date when the Commission starts to function."

What about the cost ? The question of cost will be important only if the transfer is to be compulsory. A scheme of voluntary transfer cannot place a very heavy financial burden on the State. Men love property more than liberty. Many will prefer to endure tyranny at the hands of their political masters than change the habitat in which they are rooted. As Adam Smith said, of all the things man is the most difficult cargo to transport. Cost therefore need not frighten anybody.

What about its workability ? The scheme is not new. It has been tried and found workable. It was put into effect after the last European War, to bring about a transfer ¹⁵ [\[f.15\]](#) of population between

Greece and Bulgaria and Turkey and Greece. Nobody can deny that it has worked, has been tried and found workable. The scheme I have outlined is a copy of the same scheme. It had the effect of bringing about a transfer* of population between Greece and Bulgaria and Turkey and Greece. Nobody can deny that it was worked with signal success. What succeeded elsewhere may well be expected to succeed in India.

The issue of Pakistan is far from simple. But it is not so difficult as it is made out to be provided the principle and the ethics of it are agreed upon. If it is difficult it is only because it is heart-rending and nobody wishes to think of its problems and their solutions as the very idea of it is so painful. But once sentiment is banished and it is decided that there shall be Pakistan, the problems arising out of it are neither staggering nor baffling.

CHAPTER XV

WHO CAN DECIDE ?

There are two sides to the question of Pakistan, the Hindu side and the Muslim side. This cannot be avoided. Unfortunately however the attitude of both is far from rational. Both are deeply embedded in sentiment. The layers of this sentiment are so thick that reason at present finds it extremely difficult to penetrate. Whether these opposing sentiments will wither away or they will thicken, time and circumstances alone can tell. How long Indians will have to wait for the melting of the snow no one can prophesy. But one thing is certain that 'until this snow melts freedom will have to be put in cold storage. I am sure there must be many millions of thinking Indians who are dead opposed to this indefinite postponement of Indian freedom till an ideal and a permanent solution of Pakistan is found. I am one of them. I am one of those who hold that if Pakistan is a problem and not a pose there is no escape and a solution must be found for it. I am one of those who believe that what is inevitable must be faced. There is no use burying one's head in the sand and refusing to take notice of what is happening round about because the sound of it hurts one's sentiments. I am also one of those who believe that one must, if one can, be ready with a solution long before the hour of decision arrives. It is wise to build a bridge if one knows that one will be forced to cross the river.

The principal problem of Pakistan is : who can decide whether there shall or shall not be Pakistan ? I have thought over the subject for the last three years, and I have come to some conclusions as to the proper answer to this question. These conclusions I would like to share with others interested in the solution of the problem so that they may be further explored. To give clarity to my conclusions, I have thought that it would serve the purpose better if I were to put them, in the form of an Act of Parliament. The following is the draft of the Act which embodies my conclusions:—

Government of India (Preliminary Provisions) Act

Be it enacted by the King's most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same as follows :—

I.—(1) If within six months from the date appointed in this behalf a majority of the Muslim members of the Legislatures of the Provinces of the North-West Frontier, the Punjab, Sind and Bengal pass a resolution that the predominantly Muslim areas be separated from British India, His Majesty shall cause a poll to be taken on that question of the Muslim and the non-Muslim electors of these Provinces and of Baluchistan in accordance with the provisions of this Act.

(2) The question shall be submitted to the electors in these Provinces in the following form :— (i) Are you in favour of separation from British India ? (U) Are you against separation ?

(3) The poll of Muslim and non-Muslim electors shall be taken separately.

II.—(1) If on a result of the poll, a majority of Muslim electors are found to be in favour of separation and a majority of non-Muslim electors against separation, His Majesty shall by proclamation appoint a Boundary Commission for the purpose of preparing a list of such districts and areas in these Provinces in which a majority of inhabitants are Muslims. Such districts and areas shall be called Scheduled Districts.

(2) The Scheduled Districts shall be collectively designated as Pakistan and the rest of British India as Hindustan. The Scheduled Districts lying in the North-west shall be called the State of Western Pakistan and those lying in the North-east shall be called Eastern Pakistan.

///.—(1) After the findings of the Boundary Commission have become final either by agreement or the award of an Arbitrator, His Majesty shall cause another poll to be taken of the electors of the Scheduled Districts.

(2) The following shall be the form of the questions submitted to the electors :— (i) Are you in favour of separation forthwith ? (U) Are you against separation forthwith ?

IV.—(I) If the majority is in favour of separation forthwith it shall be lawful for His Majesty to make arrangements for the framing of two separate constitutions, one for Pakistan and the other for Hindustan.

(2) The New States of Pakistan and Hindustan shall commence to function as separate States on the day appointed by His Majesty by proclamation issued in that behalf.

(3) If the majority are against separation forthwith it shall be lawful for His Majesty to make arrangements for the framing of a single constitution for British India as a whole.

V.— No motion for the separation of Pakistan. If the poll under the last preceding section has been against separation forthwith and no motion for incorporation of Pakistan into Hindustan if the poll under the last preceding section has been in favour of separation forthwith shall be entertained until ten years have elapsed from the date appointed by His Majesty for putting into effect the new constitution for British India or the two separate constitutions for Pakistan and Hindustan.

VI.—(1) In the event of two separate constitutions coming into existence under Section Four it shall be lawful for His Majesty to establish as soon as may be after the appointed day, a Council of India with a view to the eventual establishment of a constitution for the whole of British India, and to bringing about harmonious action between the Legislatures and Governments of Pakistan and Hindustan, and to the promotion of mutual intercourse and uniformity in relation to matters affecting the whole of British India, and to providing for the administration of services which the two parliaments mutually agree should be administered uniformly throughout the whole of British India, or which by virtue of this Act are to be so administered.

(2) Subject as hereinafter provided, the Council of India shall consist of a President nominated in accordance with instructions from His Majesty and forty other persons, of whom twenty shall be members representing Pakistan and twenty shall be members representing Hindustan.

(3) The members of the Council of India shall be elected in each case by the members of the Lower Houses of the Parliament of Pakistan or Hindustan.

(4) The election of members of the Council of India shall be the first business of the Legislatures of Pakistan and Hindustan.

(5) A member of the Council shall, on ceasing to be a member of that House of the Legislature of Pakistan or Hindustan by which he was elected a member of the Council, cease to be a member of the Council : Provided that, on the dissolution of the Legislature of Pakistan or Hindustan, the persons who are members of the Council shall continue to hold office as members of the Council until a new election has taken place and shall then retire unless re-elected.

(6) The President of the Council shall preside at each meeting of the Council at which he is present and shall be entitled to vote in case of an equality of votes, but not otherwise.

(7) The first meeting of the Council shall be held at such time and place as may be appointed by the President.

(8) The Council may act notwithstanding a deficiency in their number, and the quorum of the Council shall be fifteen.

(9) Subject as aforesaid, the Council may regulate their own procedure, including the delegation of powers to committees.

(10) The constitution of the Council of India may from time to time be varied by identical Acts passed by the Legislature of Pakistan and the Legislature of Hindustan, and the Acts may provide for all or any of the members of the Council of India being elected by parliamentary electors, and determine the constituencies by which the several elective members are to be returned and the number of the members to be returned by the several constituencies and the method of election.

VII.—(1) The Legislatures of Pakistan and Hindustan may, by identical Acts, delegate to the Council of India any of the powers of the Legislatures and Government of Pakistan and Hindustan, and such Acts may determine the manner in which the powers so delegated are to be exercisable by the Council.

(2) The powers of making laws with respect to railways and waterways shall, as from the day appointed for the operation of the new constitution, become the powers of the Council of India and not of Pakistan or Hindustan : Provided that nothing in this subsection shall prevent the Legislature of Pakistan or Hindustan making laws authorising the construction, extension, or improvement of railways and waterways where the works to be constructed are situate wholly in Pakistan or Hindustan as the case may be.

(3) The Council may consider any questions which may appear in any way to bear on the welfare of both Pakistan and Hindustan, and may, by resolution, make suggestions in relation thereto as they may think proper, but suggestions so made shall have no legislative effect.

(4) It shall be lawful for the Council of India to make recommendations to the Legislatures of Pakistan and Hindustan as to the advisability of passing identical Acts delegating to the Council of India the administration of any all-India subject, with a view to avoiding the necessity of administering them separately in Pakistan or Hindustan.

(5) It shall be lawful for either Legislature at any time by Act to deprive the delegation to the Council of India of any powers which are in pursuance of such identical Acts as aforesaid for the time being delegated to the Council and thereupon the powers in question shall cease to be exercisable by the Council of India and shall become exercisable in parts of British India within their respective jurisdictions by the Legislatures and Governments of Pakistan and Hindustan and the Council shall take such steps as may be necessary to carry out the transfer, including adjustments of any funds in their hands or at their disposal.

VIII.—(1) If at the end of ten years after coming into operation of a constitution for British India as prescribed by Section IV—(3) a petition is presented to His Majesty by a majority of the Muslim members representing the Scheduled Districts in the Provincial and Central Legislatures demanding a poll to be taken with regard to the separation of Pakistan from Hindustan, His Majesty shall cause a poll to be taken. (2) The following shall be the form of the questions submitted to the electors :—
d) Are you in favour of separation of Pakistan from Hindustan ?

(ii) Are you against the separation of Pakistan from Hindustan ?

IX.— If the result of the poll is in favour of separation it shall be lawful for His Majesty to declare by an Order-in-Council that from a day appointed in that behalf Pakistan shall cease to be a part of British India, and dissolve the Council of India.

X.—(1) Where two constitutions have come into existence under circumstances mentioned in Section IV it shall be lawful for His Majesty to declare by an Order-in-Council that Pakistan shall cease to be a separate State and shall form part of Hindustan. Provided that no such order shall be made until ten years have elapsed from the commencement of the separate constitution for Pakistan. Provided also that no such declaration shall be made unless the Popular Legislatures of Pakistan and Hindustan have passed Constituent Acts as are provided for in Section X—(2).

(2) The popular Legislatures of Pakistan and Hindustan may, by identical Acts agreed to by an absolute majority of members at the third reading (hereinafter referred to as Constituent Acts), establish, in lieu of the Council of India, a Legislature for United India, and may determine the number of members thereof and the manner in which the members are to be appointed or elected and the constituencies for which the several elective members are to be returned, and the number of members to be returned by the several constituencies, and the method of appointment or election, and the relations of the two Houses if provided for to one another.

XI.—(1) On the date of the union of Pakistan and Hindustan the Council of India shall cease to exist and there shall be transferred to the Legislature and Government of India all powers then exercisable by the Council of India.

(2) There shall also be transferred to the Legislature and Government of British India all the powers and duties of the Legislatures and Government of Pakistan and Hindustan, including all powers as to taxation, and those Legislatures and Government shall cease to exist.

XII.—(1) A poll under this Act shall be taken by ballot in the same manner so far as possible as a poll of electors for the election of a member to serve in a Legislature and His Majesty may make rules adopting the election laws for the purpose of the taking of the poll.

(2) An elector shall not vote more than once at the poll, although registered in more than one place.

(3) Elector means every adult male and female residing in the Provinces of North-West Frontier, the Punjab, Sind, and Bengal and in Baluchistan.

XIII.— This Act may be called the Indian Constitution

(Preliminary Provisions) Act, 194 .

I do not think that any detailed explanation is necessary for the reader to follow and grasp the conclusions I have endeavoured to embody in this skeleton Act. Perhaps it might be advantageous if I bring out some of the salient features of the proposals to which the projected statute of Parliament is intended to give effect by comparing them with the Cripps proposals.

In my opinion it is no use for Indians to ask and the British Parliament to agree to proceed forthwith to pass an Act conferring Dominion Status or Independence without first disposing of the issue of Pakistan. The Pakistan issue must be treated as a preliminary issue and must be disposed of one way or the other. This is why I have called the proposed Act " The Government of India (Preliminary Provisions) Act." The issue of Pakistan being one of self-determination must be decided by the wishes of the people. It is for this that I propose to take a poll of the Muslims and non-Muslims in the predominantly Muslim Provinces. If the Majority of the Muslims are in favour of separation and a majority of non-Muslims are against separation, steps must be taken to delimit the areas wherever it is possible by redrawing provincial boundaries on ethnic and cultural lines by separating the Muslim majority districts from the districts in which the majority consists of non-Muslims. A Boundary Commission is necessary for this purpose. So a Boundary Commission is provided for in the Act. It would be better if the Boundary Commission could be international in

its composition.

The scheme of separate referenda of Muslims and non-Muslims is based on two principles which I regard as fundamental. The first is that a minority can demand safeguards for its protection against the tyranny of the majority. It can demand them as a condition precedent. But a minority has no right to put a veto on the right of the majority to decide on questions of ultimate destiny. This is the reason why I have confined the referendum on the establishment of Pakistan to Muslims only. The second is that a communal majority cannot claim a communal minority to submit itself to its dictates. Only a political majority may be permitted to rule a political minority. This principle has been modified in India where a communal minority is placed under a communal majority subject to certain safeguards. But this is as regards the ordinary question of social, economic and political importance. It has never been conceded and can never be conceded that a communal majority has a right to dictate to a communal minority on an issue which is of a constitutional character. That is the reason why I have provided a separate referendum of non-Muslims only, to decide whether they prefer to go in Pakistan or come into Hindustan.

After the Boundary Commission has done its work of delimiting the areas, various possibilities can arise. The Musalmans may stop with the delimitation of the boundaries of Pakistan. They may be satisfied that after all the principle of Pakistan has been accepted—which is what delimitation means. Assuming that the Musalmans are not satisfied with mere delimitation but want to move in the direction of establishing Pakistan there are two courses open to them. They may want to establish Pakistan forthwith or they may agree to live under a common Central Government for a period of say ten years and put the Hindus on their trial. Hindus will have an opportunity to show that the minorities can trust them. The Muslims will learn from experience how far their fears of Hindu Raj are justified. There is another possibility also. The Musalmans of Pakistan having decided to separate forthwith may after a period become so disgusted with Pakistan that they might desire to come back and be incorporated in Hindustan and be one people subject to one single constitution.

These are some of the possibilities I see. These possibilities should in my judgement be kept open for time and circumstances to have their effect. It seems to me to be wrong to say to the Musalmans if you want to remain as part of India then you can never go out or if you want to go then you can never come back. I have in my scheme kept the door open and have provided for both the possibilities in the Act (1) for union after a separation of ten years, (2) for separation for ten years and union there after. I personally prefer the second alternative although I have no strong views either way. It would be much better that the Musalmans should have the experience of Pakistan. A union after an experience of Pakistan is bound to be stable and lasting. In case Pakistan comes into existence forthwith, it seems to me necessary that the separation should not altogether be a severance, sharp and complete. It is necessary to maintain live contact between Pakistan and Hindustan so as to prevent any estrangement growing up and preventing the chances of reunion. A Council of India is accordingly provided for in the Act. It cannot be mistaken for a federation. It is not even a confederation. Its purpose is to do nothing more than to serve as a coupling to link Pakistan to Hindustan until they are united under a single constitution.

Such is my scheme. It is based on a community-wise plebiscite. The scheme is flexible. It takes account of the fact that the Hindu sentiment is against it. It also recognizes the fact that the Muslim demand for Pakistan may only be a passing mood. The scheme is not a divorce. It is only a judicial separation. It gives to the Hindus a term. They can use it to show that they can be trusted with authority to rule justly. It gives the Musalmans a term to try out Pakistan.

It might be desirable to compare my proposals with those of Sir Stafford Cripps. The proposals were given out as a serial story in parts. The draft Declaration issued on 29th March 1943 contained only the following :—

" His Majesty's Government therefore make the following terms:—

(a) Immediately upon cessation of hostilities steps shall be taken to set up in India in manner described hereafter an elected body charged with the task of framing a new constitution for India.

(b) Provision shall be made, as set out below, for participation of Indian States in the constitution-making body.

(c) His Majesty's Government undertake to accept and implement forthwith the constitution so framed subject only to:

(i) The right of any province of British India that is not prepared to accept the new constitution to retain its present constitutional position, provision being made for its subsequent accession if it so decides.

With such non-acceding provinces should they so desire. His Majesty's Government will be prepared to agree upon a new constitution giving them the same full status as the Indian Union and arrived at by a procedure analogous to that here laid down."

Particulars of accession and secession were given in his broadcast. They were in the following terms :—

" That constitution-making body will have as its object the framing of a single constitution for the whole of India—that is, of British India, together with such of the Indian States as may decide to join in.

" But we realize this very simple fact. If you want to persuade a number of people who are inclined to be antagonistic to enter the same room, it is unwise to tell them that once they go in there is no way out, they are to be forever locked in together.

" It is much wiser to tell them they can go in and if they find they can't come to a common decision, then there is nothing to prevent those who wish, from leaving again by another door. They are much more likely all to go in if they have knowledge that they can by their free will go out again if they cannot agree.

" Well, that is what we say to the provinces of India. Come together to frame a common constitution—if you find after all your discussion and all the give and take of a constitution-making assembly that you cannot overcome your differences and that some provinces are still not satisfied with the constitution, then such provinces can go out and remain out if they wish and just the same degree of self-government and freedom will be available for them as for the Union itself, that is to say complete self-government."

To complete the picture further details were added at the Press Conference. Explaining the plan for accession or secession of provinces Sir Stafford Cripps said :—

" If at the end of the Constituent Assembly proceedings, any province or provinces did not wish to accept the new constitution and join the Union, it was free to keep out—provided the Provincial Assembly of that province, by a substantial vote say not less than 60 per cent., decided against accession. If it was less than 60 per cent, the minority could claim a plebiscite of the whole province for ascertaining the will of the people. In the case of the plebiscite, a bare majority would be enough. Sir Stafford explained that for completing accession there would have to be a positive vote from the Provincial Assembly concerned. The non-acceding province could, if they wanted, combine into a separate union through a separate Constituent Assembly, but in order to make such a Union practicable they should be geographically contiguous."

The main difference between my plan and that of Sir Stafford Cripps is quite obvious. For deciding the issue of accession or secession which is only another way of saying, will there be or will there not be Pakistan, Sir Stafford Cripps took the Province as a deciding unit. I have taken community as the deciding unit. I have no doubt that Sir Stafford adopted a wrong basis. The Province can be a

proper unit if the points of dispute were interprovincial. For instance, if the points of dispute related to questions such as distribution of taxation, of water, etc., one could understand the Province as a whole or a particular majority in that Province having the right to decide. But the dispute regarding Pakistan is an inter-communal problem which has involved two communities in the same Province. Further the issue in the dispute is not on what terms the two communities will agree to associate in a common political life. The dispute goes deeper and raises the question whether the communities are prepared at all to associate in a common political life. It is a communal difference in its essence and can only be decided by a community-wise plebiscite.

IV

I do not claim any originality for the solution I have proposed. The ideas which underlie it are drawn from three sources, from the Irish Unity Conference at which Horace Plunket presided, from the Home Rule Amending Bill of Mr. Asquith and from the Government of Ireland Act of 1920. It will be seen that my solution of the Pakistan problem is the result of pooled wisdom. Will it be accepted? There are four ways of resolving the conflict which is raging round the question of Pakistan. First is that the British Government should act as the deciding authority. Second is that the Hindus and the Muslims should agree. Third is to submit the issue to an International Board of Arbitration and the fourth is to fight it out by a Civil War.

Although India today is a political mad-house there are I hope enough sane people in the country who would not allow matters to reach the stage of Civil War. There is no prospect of an agreement between political leaders in the near future. The A.I.C.C. of the Indian National Congress at a meeting in Allahabad held in April 1942 on the motion of Mr. Jagat Narayan Lal resolved ¹⁶ [\[f16\]](#) not to entertain the proposal for Pakistan. Two other ways are left to have the problem solved. One is by the people concerned; the other is by international arbitration. This is the way I have suggested. I prefer the former. For various reasons this seems to me the only right course. The leaders having failed to resolve the dispute it is time it was taken to the people for decision. Indeed, it is inconceivable how an issue like that of partition of territory and transference of peoples' allegiance from one government to another can be decided by political leaders. Such things are no doubt done by conquerors to whom victory in war is sufficient authority to do what they like with the conquered people. But we are not working under such a lawless condition. In normal times when constitutional procedure is not in abeyance the views of political leaders cannot have the effect which the fiats of dictators have. That would be contrary to the rule of democracy. The highest value that can be put upon the views of leaders is to regard them as worthy to be placed on the agenda. They cannot replace or obviate the necessity of having the matter decided by the people. This is the position which was taken by Sir Stafford Cripps. The stand taken by the Muslim League was, let there be Pakistan because the Muslim League has decided to have it. That position has been negated by the Cripps proposals and quite rightly. The Muslim League is recognized by the Cripps proposals only to the extent of having a right to propose that Pakistan as a proposition be considered. It has not been given the right to decide. Again it does not seem to have been realized that the decision of an All-India body like the Congress which does not carry with it the active consent of the majority of the people, immediately affected by the issue of Pakistan, cannot carry the matter to solution. What good can it do if Mr. Gandhi or Mr. Rajagopalachariar agreeing or the All-India Congress Committee resolving to concede Pakistan, if it was opposed by the Hindus of the Punjab, or Bengal. Really speaking it is not the business of the people of Bombay or Madras to say, 'let there be Pakistan' It must be left to be decided by the people who are living in those areas and who will have to bear the consequences of so violent, so revolutionary and so fundamental a change in the political and economic system with which their lives and fortunes have been closely bound up for so many years. A referendum by people in the Pakistan Provinces seems to me the safest and the most constitutional method of solving the problem of Pakistan.

But I fear that solving the question of Pakistan by a referendum of the people howsoever attractive

may not find much favour with those who count. Even the Muslim League may not be very enthusiastic about it. This is not because the proposal is unsound. Quite the contrary. The fact is that there is another solution which has its own attractions. It calls upon the British Government to establish Pakistan by the exercise of its sovereign authority. The reason why this solution may be preferred to that which rests on the consent of the people is that it is simple and involves no such elaborate procedure as that of a referendum to the people and has none of the uncertainties involved in a referendum. But there is another ground why it is preferred, namely, that there is a precedent for it. The precedent is the Irish precedent and the argument is that if the British Government by virtue of its sovereign authority divided Ireland and created Ulster why cannot the British Government divide India and create Pakistan ?

The British Parliament is the most sovereign legislative body in the world. De L'home, a French writer on English Constitution, observed that there is nothing the British Parliament cannot do except make man a woman and woman a man. And although the sovereignty of the British Parliament over the affairs of the Dominions is limited by the Statute of Westminster it is still unlimited so far as India is concerned. There is nothing in law to prevent the British Parliament from proceeding to divide India as it did in the case of Ireland. It can do it, but will it do it? The question is not one of power but of will.

Those who urge the British Government to follow the precedent in Ireland should ask what led the British Government to partition Ireland. Was it the conscience of the British Government which led them to sanction the course they took or was it forced upon them by circumstances to which they had to yield ? A student of the history of Irish Home Rule will have to admit that the partition of Ireland was not sanctioned by conscience but by the force of circumstances. It is not often clearly realized that no party to the Irish dispute wanted partition of Ireland. Not even Carson, the Leader of Ulster. Carson was opposed to Home Rule but he was not in favour of partition. His primary position was to oppose Home Rule and maintain the integrity of Ireland. It was only as a second line of defence against the imposition of Home Rule that he insisted on partition. This will be quite clear from his speeches both inside and outside the House of Commons. Asquith's Government on the other side was equally opposed to partition. This may be seen from the proceedings in the House of Commons over the Irish Home Rule Bill of 1912. Twice amendments were moved for the exclusion of Ulster from the provisions of the Bill, once in the Committee stage by Mr. Agar-Roberts and again on the third reading by Carson himself. Both the times the Government opposed and the amendments were lost.

Permanent partition of Ireland was effected in 1920 by Mr. Lloyd George in his Government of Ireland Act. Many people think that this was the first time that partition of Ireland was thought of and that it was due to the dictation of the Conservative—Unionists in the Coalition Government of which Mr. Lloyd George was the nominal head. It may be true that Mr. Lloyd George succumbed to the influence of the predominant party in his coalition. But it is not true that partition was thought of in 1920 for the first time. Nor is it true that the Liberal Party had not undergone a change and shown its readiness to favour partition as a possible solution. As a matter of fact partition as a solution came in 1914 six years before Mr. Lloyd George's Act when the Asquith Government, a purely Liberal Government, was in office. The real cause which led to the partition of Ireland can be understood only by examining the factors which made the Liberal Government of Mr. Asquith change its mind. I feel certain that the factor which brought about this change in the viewpoint of the Liberal Government was the Military crisis which took place in March 1914 and which is generally referred to as the " Curragh Incident". A few facts will be sufficient to explain what the " Curragh Incident " was and how decisive it was in bringing about a change in the policy of the Asquith Government.

To begin at a convenient point the Irish Home Rule Bill had gone through all its stages by the end of 1913. Mr. Asquith who had been challenged that he was proceeding without a mandate from the electorate had however given an undertaking that the Act would not be given effect to until another general election had been held. In the ordinary course there would have been a general election in 1915 if the War had not supervened. But the Ulstermen were not prepared to take their chance in a

general election and started taking active steps to oppose Home Rule. They were not always very scrupulous in choosing their means and their methods and under the seductive pose that they were fighting against the Government which was preventing them from remaining loyal subjects of the King they resorted to means which nobody would hesitate to call shameless and nefarious. There was one Maginot Line on which the Ulstermen always depended for defeating Home Rule. That was the House of Lords. But by the Parliament Act of 1911 the House of Lords had become a Wailing Wall neither strong nor high. It had ceased to be a line of defence to rely upon. Knowing that the Bill might pass notwithstanding its rejection by the House of Lords, feeling that in the next election Asquith might win, the Ulstermen had become desperate and were searching for another line of defence. They found it in the Army. The plan was twofold. It included the project of getting the House of Lords to hold up the Annual Army Act so as to ensure that there would be no Army in existence to be used against Ulster. The second project was to spread their propaganda—That Home Rule will be Home Rule—in the Army with a view to preparing the Army to disobey the Government in case Government decided to use the Army for forcing Home Rule on Ireland. The first became unnecessary as they succeeded easily in bringing about the second. This became clear in March 1914 when there occurred the Curragh Incident. The Government had reasons to suspect that certain Army depots in Ireland were likely to be raided by the Unionist Volunteers. On March 20th, orders were sent to Sir Arthur Paget, Commander-in-Chief of the Forces in Ireland, to take steps to safeguard these depots. His reply was a telegram to the effect that officers were not prepared to obey and were resigning their commissions and it was feared that men would refuse to move. General Sir Hubert Gough had refused to serve against the Ulster Unionists and his example had been followed by others. The Government realized that the Army had become political,¹⁷[\[f.17\]](#) nay, partisan. It took fright and decided in favour of partition acting on the well-known maxim that wisdom is the better part of valour. What made Asquith change his position was not conscience but the fright of the Army rebelling. The fright was so great that no one thereafter felt bold enough to challenge the Army and enforce Home Rule without partition.

Can His Majesty's Government be depended upon to repeat in India what it did in Ireland? I am unable to answer the question. But two things I will say. The first thing is that His Majesty's Government knows full well what have been the consequences of this partition of Ireland. The Irish Free State has become the most irreconcilable enemy of Great Britain. The enmity knows no limits. The wound caused by partition will never be healed so long as partition remains a settled fact. The Partition of Ireland cannot but be said to be morally indefensible inasmuch as it was the result not of the consent of the people but of superior force. It was as bad as the murder of Duncan by Macbeth. The blood stains left on His Majesty's Government are as deep as those on Lady Macbeth and of which Lady Macbeth said that "All the perfumes of Arabia" had failed to remove the stink. That His Majesty's Government does not like to be responsible for the execution of another deed of partition is quite clear from its policy with the Jew-Arab problem in Palestine. It appointed the Peel Commission to investigate. The Commission recommended partition of Palestine. The Government accepted¹⁸[\[f.18\]](#) it in principle as the most hopeful line of solving the deadlock. Suddenly the Government realized the gravity of forcing such a solution on the Arabs and appointed another Royal Commission called the Woodhead Commission which condemned partition and opened an easy way to a Government which was anxious to extricate itself from a terrible position. The partition of Ireland is not a precedent worthy to be followed. It is an ugly incident which requires to be avoided. It is a warning and not an example. I doubt very much if His Majesty's Government will partition India on its own authority at the behest of the Muslim League.

And why should His Majesty's Government oblige the Muslim League? In the case of Ulster there was the tie of blood which made a powerful section of the British politicians take the side of Ulster. It was this tie of blood which made Lord Curzon say "You are compelling Ulster to divorce her present husband, to whom she is not unfaithful and you are compelling her to marry someone else who she cordially dislikes, with whom she does not want to live." There is no such kinship between His Majesty's Government and the Muslim League and it would be a vain hope for the League to expect His Majesty's Government to take her side.

The other thing I would like to say is that it would not be in the interests of the Muslim League to achieve its object by invoking the authority of His Majesty's Government to bring about the partition of India. In my judgement more important than getting Pakistan is the procedure to be adopted in bringing about Pakistan if the object is that after partition Pakistan and Hindustan should continue as two friendly States with goodwill and no malice towards each other.

What is the procedure which is best suited for the realization of this end ? Everyone will agree that the procedure must be such that it must not involve victory to one community and humiliation to the other. The method must be of peace with honour to both sides. I do not know if there is another solution better calculated to achieve this end than the decision by a referendum of the people. I have made my suggestion as to which is the best course. Others also will come forth with theirs. I cannot say that mine is the best. But whatever the suggestion be unless good sense as well as a sense of responsibility is brought to bear upon the solution of this question it will remain a festering sore.

EPILOGUE

Here I propose to stop. For I feel that I have said all that I can say about the subject. To use legal language I have drawn the pleadings. This I may claim to have done at sufficient length. In doing so, I have adopted that prolix style so dear to the Victorian lawyers, under which the two sides plied one another with plea and replication, rejoinder and rebutter, surrejoinder and surrebutter and so on. I have done this deliberately with the object that a full statement of the case for and against Pakistan may be made. The foregoing pages contain the pleadings. The facts contained therein are true to the best of my knowledge and belief. I have also given my findings. It is now for Hindus and Muslims to give theirs.

To help them in their task it might be well to set out the issues. On the pleadings the following issues seem to be necessary issues:

- (1) Is Hindu-Muslim unity necessary for India's political advancement ? If necessary, is it still possible of realization notwithstanding the new ideology of the Hindus and the Muslims being two different nations?
- (2) If Hindu-Muslim unity is possible, should it be reached by appeasement or by settlement ?
- (3) If it is to be achieved by appeasement, what are the new concessions that can be offered to the Muslims to obtain their willing co-operation, without prejudice to other interests ?
- (4) (4) If it is to be achieved by a settlement, what are the terms of that - settlement ? If there are only two alternatives, (i) Division of India into Pakistan and Hindustan, or (ii) Fifty-fifty share in Legislature, Executive and the Services, which alternative is preferable ?
- (5) Whether India, if she remained one integral whole, can rely upon both Hindus and Musalmans to defend her independence, assuming it is won from the British?
- (6) Having regard to the prevailing antagonism between Hindus and Musalmans and having regard to the new ideology demarcating them as two distinct nations and postulating an opposition in their ultimate destinies, whether a single constitution for these two nations can be built in the hope that they will show an intention to work it and not to stop it ?
- (7) On the assumption that the two-nation theory has come to stay, will not India as one single unit become an incoherent body without organic unity, incapable of developing into a strong united nation bound by a common faith in a common destiny and therefore likely to remain a feebler and

sickly country, easy to be kept in perpetual subjection either of the British or-of any other foreign power ?

(8) If India cannot be one united country, is it not better that Indians should help India in the peaceful dissolution of this incoherent whole into its natural parts, namely, Pakistan and Hindustan ?

(9) Whether it is not better to provide for the growth of two independent and separate nations, a Muslim nation inhabiting Pakistan and a Hindu nation inhabiting Hindustan, than pursue the vain attempt to keep India as one undivided country in the false hope that Hindus and Muslims will some day be one and occupy it as the members of one nation and sons of one motherland ?

Nothing can come in the way of an Indian getting to grips with these issues and reaching his own conclusions with the help of the material contained in the foregoing pages except three things : (1) A false sentiment of historical patriotism, (2) a false conception of the exclusive ownership of territory and (3) absence of willingness to think for oneself. Of these obstacles, the last is the most difficult to get over. Unfortunately thought in India is rare and free thought is rarer still. This is particularly true of Hindus. That is why a large part of the argument of this book has been addressed to them. The reasons for this are obvious. The Hindus are in a majority. Being in a majority, their view point must count! There is not much possibility of peaceful solution if no attempt is made to meet their objections rational or sentimental. But there are special reasons which have led me to address so large a part of the argument to them and which may not be quite so obvious to others. I feel that those Hindus who are guiding the destinies of their fellows have lost what Carlyle calls " the Seeing Eye " and are walking in the glamour of certain vain illusions, the consequences of which must, I fear, be terrible for the Hindus. The Hindus are in the grip of the Congress and the Congress is in the grip of Mr. Gandhi. It cannot be said that Mr. Gandhi has given the Congress the right lead. Mr. Gandhi first sought to avoid facing the issue by taking refuge in two things. He started by saying that to partition India is a moral wrong and a sin to which he will never be a party. This is a strange argument. India is not the only country faced with the issue of partition or shifting of frontiers based on natural and historical factors to those based on the national factors. Poland has been partitioned three times and no one can be sure that there will be no more partition of Poland. There are very few countries in Europe which have not undergone partition during the last 150 years. This shows that the partition of a country is neither moral nor immoral. It is unmoral. It is a social, political or military question. Sin has no place in it.

As a second refuge Mr. Gandhi started by protesting that the Muslim League did not represent the Muslims and that Pakistan was only a fancy of Mr. Jinnah. It is difficult to understand how Mr. Gandhi could be so blind as not to see how Mr. Jinnah's influence over the Muslim masses has been growing day by day and how he has engaged himself in mobilizing all his forces for battle. Never before was Mr. Jinnah a man for the masses. He distrusted them. ¹⁹[\[f.19\]](#) To exclude them from political power he was always for a high franchise. Mr. Jinnah was never known to be a very devout, pious or a professing Muslim. Besides kissing the Holy Koran as and when he was sworn in as an M.L.A., he does not appear to have bothered much about its contents or its special tenets. It is doubtful if he frequented any mosque either out of curiosity or religious fervour. Mr. Jinnah was never found in the midst of Muslim mass congregations, religious or political.

Today one finds a complete change in Mr. Jinnah. He has become a man of the masses. He is no longer above them. He is among them. Now they have raised him above themselves and call him their Qaid-e-Azam. He has not only become a believer in Islam, but is prepared to die for Islam. Today, he knows more of Islam than mere *Kalama*. Today, he goes to the mosque to hear *Khutba*

and takes delight in joining the *Id* congregational prayers. Dongri and Null Bazaar once knew Mr. Jinnah by name. Today they know him by his presence. No Muslim meeting in Bombay begins or ends without Allah-ho-Akbar and Long Live Qaid-e-Azam. In this Mr. Jinnah has merely followed King Henry IV of France—the unhappy father-in-law of the English King Charles I. Henry IV was a Huguenot by faith. But he did not hesitate to attend mass in a Catholic Church in Paris. He believed that to change his Huguenot faith and go to mass was an easy price to pay for the powerful support of Paris. As Paris became worth a mass to Henry IV, so have Dongri and Null Bazaar become worth a mass to Mr. Jinnah and for similar reason. It is strategy ; it is mobilization. But even if it is viewed as the sinking of Mr. Jinnah from reason to superstition, he is sinking with his ideology which by his very sinking is spreading into all the different strata of Muslim society and is becoming part and parcel of its mental make-up. This is as clear as anything could be. The only basis for Mr. Gandhi's extraordinary view is the existence of what are called Nationalist Musalmans. It is difficult to see any real difference between the communal Muslims who form the Muslim League and the Nationalist Muslims. It is extremely doubtful whether the Nationalist Musalmans have any real community of sentiment, aim and policy with the Congress which marks them off from the Muslim League. Indeed many Congressmen are alleged to hold the view that there is no different between the two and that the Nationalist Muslim inside the Congress are only an outpost of the communal Muslims. This view does not seem to be quite devoid of truth when one recalls that the late Dr. Ansari, the leader of the Nationalist Musalmans, refused to oppose the Communal Award although it gave the Muslims separate electorates in teeth of the resolution passed by the Congress and the Nationalist Musalmans. Nay, so great has been the increase in the influence of the League among the Musalmans that many Musalmans who were opposed to the League have been compelled to seek for a place in the League or make peace with it. Anyone who takes account of the turns and twists of the late Sir Sikandar Hyat Khan and Mr. Faziul Huq, the late Premier of Bengal, must admit the truth of this fact. Both Sir Sikandar and Mr. Fazlul Huq were opposed to the formation of branches of the Muslim League in their Provinces when Mr. Jinnah tried to revive it in 1937. Notwithstanding their opposition, when the branches of the League were formed in the Punjab and in Bengal within one year both were compelled to join them. It is a case of those coming to scoff remaining to pray. No more cogent proof seems to be necessary to prove the victory of the League.

Notwithstanding this Mr. Gandhi instead of negotiating with Mr. Jinnah and the Muslim League with a view to a settlement, took a different turn. He got the Congress to pass the famous Quit India Resolution on the 8th August 1942. This Quit India Resolution was primarily a challenge to the British Government. But it was also an attempt to do away with the intervention of the British Government in the discussion of the Minority question and thereby securing for the Congress a free hand to settle it on its own terms and according to its own lights. It was in effect, if not in intention, an attempt to win independence by bypassing the Muslims and the other minorities. The Quit India Campaign turned out to be a complete failure.

It was a mad venture and took the most diabolical form. It was a scorch-earth campaign in which the victims of looting, arson and murder were Indians and the perpetrators were Congressmen. Beaten, he started a fast for twenty-one days in March 1943 while he was in gaol with the object of getting out of it. He failed. Thereafter he fell ill. As he was reported to be sinking the British Government released him for fear that he might die on their hand and bring them ignominy. On coming out of gaol, he found that he and the Congress had not only missed the bus but had also lost the road. To retrieve the position and win for the Congress the respect of the British Government as a premier party in the country which it had lost by reason of the failure of the campaign that followed up the Quit India Resolution, and the violence which accompanied it, he started negotiating with the Viceroy. Thwarted in that attempt, Mr. Gandhi turned to Mr. Jinnah. On the 17th July 1944 Mr. Gandhi wrote to Mr. Jinnah expressing his desire to meet him and discuss with him the communal question. Mr. Jinnah agreed to receive Mr. Gandhi in his house in Bombay. They met on the 9th September 1944. It was good that at long last wisdom dawned on Mr. Gandhi and he agreed to see the light which was staring him in the face and which he had so far refused to see.

The basis of their talks was the offer made by Mr. Rajagopalachariar to Mr. Jinnah in April 1944 which, according to the somewhat incredible ²⁰[\[f.20\]](#) story told by Mr. Rajagopalachariar, was discussed by him with Mr. Gandhi in March 1943 when he (Mr. Gandhi) was fasting in gaol and to which Mr. Gandhi had given his full approval. The following is the text of Mr. Rajagopalachariar's formula popularly spoken of as the C. R. Formula:—

- (1) *Subject to the terms set out below as regards the constitution for Free India, the Muslim League endorses the Indian demand for Independence and will co-operate with the Congress in the formation of a provisional interim government for the transitional period.*
- (2) *After the termination of the war, a commission shall be appointed for demarcating contiguous districts in the north-west and east of India, wherein the Muslim population is in absolute majority. In the areas thus demarcated, a plebiscite of all the inhabitants held on the basis of adult suffrage or other practicable franchise shall ultimately decide the issue of separation from Hindustan. If the majority decide in favour of forming a sovereign State separate from Hindustan, such decision shall be given effect to, without prejudice to the right of districts on the border to choose to join either State.*
- (3) *It will be open to all parties to advocate their points of view before the plebiscite is held.*
- (4) *In the event of separation, mutual agreements shall be entered into for safeguarding defence, and commerce and communications and for other essential purposes.*
- (5) *Any transfer of population shall only be on an absolutely voluntary basis.*
- (6) *These terms shall be binding only in case of transfer by Britain of full power and responsibility for the governance of India.*

The talks which began on the 9th September were carried on over a period of 18 days till 27th September when it was announced that the talks had failed. The failure of the talks produced different reactions in the minds of different people. Some were glad, others were sorry. But as both had been, just previous to the talks, worsted by their opponents in their struggle for supremacy, Gandhi by the British and Jinnah by the Unionist Party in the Punjab, and had lost a good deal of their credit the majority of people expected that they would put forth some constructive effort to bring about a solution. The failure may have been due to the defects of personalities. But it must however be said that failure was inevitable having regard to certain fundamental faults in the C. R. Formula. In the first place, it tied up the communal question with the political question in an indissoluble knot. No political settlement, no communal settlement, is the strategy on which the formula proceeds. The formula did not offer a solution. It invited Mr. Jinnah to enter into a deal. It was a bargain—" If you help us in getting independence, we shall be glad to consider your proposal for Pakistan. " I don't know from where Mr. Rajagopalachariar got the idea that this was the best means of getting independence. It is possible that he borrowed it from the old Hindu kings of India who built up alliance for protecting their independence against foreign enemies by giving their daughters to neighbouring princes. Mr. Rajagopalachariar forgot that such alliances brought neither a good husband nor a permanent ally. To make communal settlement depend upon help rendered in winning freedom is a very unwise way of proceeding in a matter of this kind. It is a way of one party drawing another party into its net by offering communal privileges as a bait. The C. R. Formula made communal settlement an article for sale.

The second fault in the C. R. Formula relates to the machinery for giving effect to any agreement that may be arrived at. The agency suggested in the C. R. Formula is the Provisional Government. In suggesting this Mr. Rajagopalachariar obviously overlooked two difficulties. The first thing he overlooked is that once the Provisional Government was established, the promises of the contracting parties, to use legal phraseology, did not remain concurrent promises. The case became one of the executed promise against an executory promise. By consenting to the establishment of a Provisional Government, the League would have executed its promise to help the Congress to win

independence. But the promise of the Congress to bring about Pakistan would remain executory. Mr. Jinnah who insists, and quite rightly, that the promises should be concurrent could never be expected to agree to place himself in such a position. The second difficulty which Mr. Rajagopalachariar has overlooked is what would happen if the Provisional Government failed to give effect to the Congress part of the agreement. Who is to enforce it ? The Provisional Government is to be a sovereign government, not subject to superior authority. If it was unwilling to give effect to the agreement, the only sanction open to the Muslims would be rebellion. To make the Provisional Government the agency for forging a new Constitution, for bringing about Pakistan, nobody will accept. It is a snare and not a solution.

The only way of bringing about the constitutional changes will be through an Act of Parliament embodying provisions agreed upon by the important elements in the national life of British India. There is no other way.

There is a third fault in the C. R. Formula. It relates to the provision for a treaty between Pakistan and Hindustan to safeguard what are called matters of common interests such as Defence, Foreign Affairs, Customs, etc. Here again Mr. Rajagopalachariar does not seem to be aware of obvious difficulties. How are matters of common interest to be safeguarded? I see only two ways. One is to have a Central Government vested with Executive and Legislative authority in respect of these matters. This means Pakistan and Hindustan will not be sovereign States. Will Mr. Jinnah agree to this ? Obviously he does not. The other way is to make Pakistan and Hindustan sovereign States and to bind them by a treaty relating to matters of common interests. But what is there to ensure that the terms of the treaty will be observed ? As a sovereign State Pakistan can always repudiate it even if it was a Dominion. Mr. Rajagopalachariar obviously drew his inspiration in drafting this clause from the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1922. But he forgot the fact that the treaty lasted so long as Ireland was not a Dominion and that as soon as it became a Dominion it repudiated the treaty and the British Parliament stood silent and grinned, for it knew that it could do nothing.

One does not mind very much that the talks failed. What one feels sorry for is that the talks failed giving us a clear idea of some of the questions about which Mr. Jinnah has been observing discreet silence in his public utterances, though he has been quite outspoken about them in his private talks. These questions are— (1) Is Pakistan to be conceded because of the Resolution of the Muslim League ? (2) Are the Muslims, as distinguished from the Muslim League, to have no say in the matter ? (3) What will be the boundaries of Pakistan ? Whether the boundaries will be the present administrative boundaries of the Punjab and Bengal or whether the boundaries of Pakistan will be ethnological boundaries ? (4) What do the words " subject to such territorial adjustments as may be necessary " which occur in the Lahore Resolution mean ? What were the territorial adjustments the League had in mind ? (5) What does the word " finally " which occurs in the last part of the Lahore Resolution mean ? Did the League contemplate a transition period in which Pakistan will not be an independent and sovereign State ? (6) If Mr. Jinnah's proposal that the boundaries of Eastern and Western Pakistan are to be the present administrative boundaries, will he allow the Scheduled Castes, or, if I may say so, the non-Muslims in the Punjab and Bengal to determine by a plebiscite whether they wish to be included in Mr. Jinnah's Pakistan and whether Mr. Jinnah would be prepared to abide by the results of the plebiscite of the non-Muslim elements in the Punjab and Bengal ?

(7) Does Mr. Jinnah want a corridor running through U. P. and Bihar to connect up Eastern Pakistan to Western Pakistan ? It would have been a great gain if straight questions had been put to Mr. Jinnah and unequivocal answers obtained. But instead of coming to grips with Mr. Jinnah on these questions, Mr. Gandhi spent his whole time proving that the C. R. Formula is substantially the same as the League's Lahore Resolution—which was ingenious if not nonsensical and thereby lost the best opportunity he had of having these questions clarified.

After these talks Mr. Gandhi and Mr. Jinnah have retired to their pavilions as players in a cricket

match do after their game is over, as though there is nothing further to be done. There is no indication whether they will meet again and if so when. What next ? is not a question which seems to worry them. Yet it is difficult to see how India can make any political advance without a solution of the question which one may refuse to discuss. It does not belong to that class of questions about which people can agree to differ. It is a question for which solution will have to be found. How ? It must be by agreement or by arbitration. If it is to be by agreement, it must be the result of negotiations—of give and take and not of surrender by one side to the other. That is not agreement. It is dictation. Good sense may in the end prevail and parties may come to an agreement. But agreement may turn out to be a very dilatory way. It may take long before good sense prevails. How long one cannot say. The political freedom of India is a most urgent necessity. It cannot be postponed and yet without a solution of the communal problem it cannot be hastened. To make it dependent on agreement is to postpone its solution indefinitely. Another expeditious method must be found. It seems to me that arbitration by an International Board is the best way out. The disputed points in the minorities problem including that of Pakistan should be remitted to such a Board. The Board should be constituted of persons drawn from countries outside the British Empire. Each statutory minority in India—Muslims, Scheduled Castes, Sikhs, Indian Christians—should be asked to select its nominee to this Board of Arbitration. These minorities as also the Hindus should appear before the Board in support of their demands and should agree to abide by the decision given by the Board. The British should give the following undertakings :—

- (1) That they will have nothing to do with the communal settlement. It will be left to agreement or to a Board of Arbitration.
- (2) They will implement the decision of the Board of Arbitration on the communal question by embodying it in the Government of India Act.
- (3) That the award of the International Board of Arbitration would be regarded by them as a sufficient discharge of their obligations to the minorities in India and would agree to give India Dominion Status.

The procedure has many advantages. It eliminates the fear of British interference in the communal settlement which has been offered by the Congress as an excuse for its not being able to settle the communal problem. It is alleged that, as there is always the possibility of the minorities getting from the British something more than what the Congress thinks it proper to give, the minorities do not wish to come to terms with the Congress. The proposal has a second advantage. It removes the objection of the Congress that by making the constitution subject to the consent of the minorities, the British Government has placed a veto in the hands, of the minorities over the constitutional progress of India. It is complained that the minorities can unreasonably withhold their consent or they can be prevailed upon by the British Government to withhold their consent as the minorities are suspected by the Congress to be mere tools in the hands of the British Government. International arbitration removes completely every ground of complaint on this account. There should be no objection on the part of the minorities. If their demands are fair and just no minority need have any fear from a Board of International Arbitration. There is nothing unfair in the requirement of a submission to arbitration. It follows the well known rule of law, namely, that no man should be allowed to be a judge in his own case. There is no reason to make any exception in the case of a minority. Like an individual it cannot claim to sit in judgement over its own case. What about the British Government ? I cannot see any reason why the British Government should object to any part of this scheme. The Communal Award has brought great odium on the British. It has been a thankless task and the British should be glad to be relieved of it. On the question of the discharge of their responsibilities for making adequate provision for the safety and security of certain communities in respect of which they have regarded themselves as trustees before they relinquish their sovereignty what more can such communities ask than the implantation in the constitution of safeguards in terms of the award of an International Board of Arbitration ? There is only one contingency which may appear to create some difficulty for the British Government in the matter of enforcing the award of the Board of Arbitration. Such a contingency can arise if any one of the parties to the dispute is not prepared to submit its case to arbitration.

In that case the question will be: will the British Government be justified in enforcing the award against such a party ? I see no difficulty in saying that the British Government can with perfect justice proceed to enforce the award against such a party. After all what is the status of a party which refuses to submit its case to arbitration ? The answer is that such a party is an aggressor. How is an aggressor dealt with ? By subjecting him to sanctions. Implementing the award of the Board of Arbitration in a constitution against a party which refuses to go to arbitration is simply another name for the process of applying sanctions against an aggressor. The British Government need not feel embarrassed in following this process if the contingency should arise. For it is a well recognized process of dealing with such cases and has the imprimatur of the League of Nations which evolved this formula when Mussolini refused to submit to arbitration his dispute with Abyssinia. What I have proposed may not be the answer to the question : What next ? I don't know what else can be. All I know is that there will be no freedom for India without an answer. It must be decisive, it must be prompt and it must be satisfactory to the parties concerned.

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[\[f.1\]](#) *Canada*—Chapter 1.

[\[f2\]](#) *The Political Future of South Africa*, 1927.

[\[f3\]](#) *The South African Commonwealth*, p. 365.

[\[f.4\]](#) On this point, see Report of the Inquiry Committee appointed by the All-India Muslim League to inquire into Muslim grievances in Congress Provinces popularly known as Pirpur Report. Also Report of the Bihar Provincial Muslim League to inquire into some grievances of Muslims in Bihar and the Press Note issued by the Information Officer, Government of Bihar, replying to some of the allegations contained in these reports published in *Amrita Bazar Patrika* of 13-3-39.

[\[f.5\]](#) *Canada Year Book*, 1936.

[\[f6\]](#) *South Africa Year Book*. 1941.

[\[f.7\]](#) *Statesman's Year Book*, 1941.

[\[f.8\]](#) That is for the Province of Quebec.

[\[f.9\]](#) Italics not in the original.

[\[f.10\]](#) Quoted by Sir James O'Connor—*History of Ireland*, Vol. II, p. 257.

[\[f.11\]](#) *History of Ireland*, vol. II

[\[f.12\]](#) Italics are mine.

[\[f.13\]](#) *Eastern Times* (Lahore) of 17th November 1942.

[\[f.14\]](#) *Hansard* (House of Commons), 1920, Vol. 129, p. 1315. Italics are mine.

[\[f.15\]](#) Those who want more information on the question of transfer of population may consult with great advantage *The Exchange of Minorities, Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey* by Stephen P. Ladas (Mac), 1932, where the scheme for the transfer of population between Greece and Bulgaria and Greece and Turkey has been fully set out.

[\[f16\]](#)The text of the resolution is as follows :—

" The A. I. C. C. is of opinion that any proposal to disintegrate India by giving liberty to any component State or territorial unit to secede from the Indian Union or Federation will be highly detrimental to the best interests of the people of the States and Provinces and the country as a whole and the Congress, therefore, cannot agree to any such proposal."

[\[f.17\]](#)On this point see *Life of Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson* by Major General Sir C. E. Callwell, Vol. 1., Chapter IX ; also Parliamentary Debates (House of Lords), 1914, Vol. 15, pp. 998-1017, on Ulster and the Army. This shows that the Army had been won over by the Ulsterites long before the Curragh Incident. It is possible that Mr. Asquith decided in 1913 to bring in an Amending Bill to exclude Ulster from Home Rule for six years because he had become aware that the Army had gone over to Ulster and that it could not be used for enforcing Home Rule.

[\[f.18\]](#)See Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 1938-39, Vol. 341, pp. 1987-2107 ; also (Lords) 1936-37, Vol. 106, pp. 599-674.

[\[f.19\]](#)Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru in his autobiography says that Mr. Jinnah wanted the Congress to restrict its membership to matriculates

[\[f.20\]](#)The formula was discussed with Mr. Gandhi in March 1943 but was not communicated to Mr. Jinnah till April 1944.

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APPENDIX I

POPULATION OF INDIA BY COMMUNITIES

Communities	British India	Indian States and Agencies	Total
1. Hindus	150,890,146	55,227,180	206,117,326
2. Muslims	79,398,503	12,659,593	92,058,096
3. Scheduled Castes ²¹ [f.1]	39,920,807	8,892,373	48,813,180
4. Tribal	16,713,256	8,728,233	25,441,489
5. Sikhs	4,165,097	1,526,350	5,691,447
6. Christians			
(i) Indian Christians	1,655,982	1,413,808	3,069,790
(ii) Anglo-Indians	113,936	26,486	140,422
(iii) Others	75,751	7,708	83,459
7. Jains	578,372	870,914	1,449,286
8. Buddhists	167,413	64,590	232,003
9. Parsees	101,968	12,922	114,890
10. Jews	19,327	3,153	22,480
11. Others	371,403	38,474	409,877
Total	294,171,961	89,471,784	383,643,745

NOTE.—The figures for the Scheduled Castes both for British India and Indian States do not give the correct totals. The figures for Ajmer-Merwara in British India and for Gwalior State are not included in the totals. The Census Reports for 1940 fail to give these figures.

APPENDIX II

COMMUNAL DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION BY MINORITIES IN THE PROVINCES OF BRITISH INDIA

Provinces	Total	Muslims		Scheduled Castes		Indian Christians		Sikhs	
	Population	Population	%	Population	%	Population	%	Population	%
1. Ajmere-Merwara	583,693	89,899	15.4	Nil		3,895	.8	867	.15
2. Andaman Nicobar	33,768	8,005	23.7	Nil		779	2.3	744	2.2
3. Assam	10,204,733	3,442,479	33.7	676,291	6.6	37,750	.4	3,464	.03
4. British Baluchistan	501,631	438,930	87.5	5,102	1.0	2,633	.5	11,918	2.3
5. Bengal	60,306,525	33,005,434	54.7	7,878,970	13.0	110,923	.2	16,281	.03
6. Bihar*	36,340,151	4,716,314	12.9	4,840,379	13.3	24,693	.07	13,213	.04
7. Bombay	20,849,840	1,920,368	9.2	1,855,148	8.9	338,812	1.6	8,011	.04
8. Central Provinces & Berar*	16,813,584	783,697	4.7	3,051,413	18.1	48,260	.3	14,996	.09
9. Coorg	168,726	14,780	8.8	25,740	15.3	3,309	2.0	Nil	
10. Delhi	917,939	304,971	33.2	121,693	13.3	10,494	1.1	16,157	1.8
11. Madras	49,341,810	3,896,452	7.9	8,068,492	16.4	2,001,082	4.06	418	.001
12. N.-W.F.P.	3,038,067	2,788,797	91.8	Nil		5,426	.2	57,989	1.9
13. Orissa	8,728,544	146,301	1.7	1,238,171	14.2	26,584	.3	232	.003
14. Punjab	28,418,819	16,217,242	57	1,248,635	4.4	486,038	1.7	3,757,401	13.2
15. Panth Piploda	5,267	251	4.8	918	17.4	216	4.1	Nil	
16. Sind	4,229,221	3,054,635	72.2	191,634	4.5	13,232	.3	31,011	.7
17. United Provinces @	55,020,617	8,416,308	15.3	11,717,158	21.3	131,327	.2	232,445	.4
Total	295,502,935	79,344,863	26.9	40,919,744	13.9	3,245,453	1.0	4,155,147	1.0
* Bihar	28,823,802	4,168,470	14.4	3,919,619	13.6	12,651	.04	3,204	.01
Chota Nagpur	7,516,349	547,844	7.3	420,760	5.6	12,042	.2	10,009	.1
* C.P.	13,208,718	448,528	3.4	2,359,836	17.9	42,135	.3	12,766	.1
Berar	3,604,866	335,169	9.3	691,577	19.2	6,125	.2	2,230	.05
@ Agra	40,903,147	6,231,062	15.2	8,018,803	19.6	120,549	.3	226,096	.5
Oudh	14,114,470	2,185,246	15.5	3,698,355	26.2	10,778	.08	6,349	.05

APPENDIX III

COMMUNAL DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION BY MINORITIES IN INDIAN STATES

States and Agencies	Total Population	Muslims		Scheduled Castes		Indian Christians		Sikhs	
		Population	%	Population	%	Population	%	Population	%

1. Assam	725,655	31,662	4.4	265	.04	25913	3.6	381	.05
2. Baluchistan	356,204	346,251	97.2	65	.02	40	.01	126	.04
3. Baroda	2,855,010	223,610	7.8	230,794	8.1	9182	.3	566	.02
4. Bengal	2,144,829	372,113	17.3	269,729	12.6	564	.03	28	.001
5. Central India	7,506,427	439,850	5.9	1,027,009	13.7	7,582	.1	2731	.04
6. Chattisgarh	4,050,000	28,773	0.7	483,132	11.9	11,820	.3	507	.01
7. Cochin	1,422,875	109,188	7.7	141,154	9.9	399,394	28.1	9	
8. Deccan (and Kolhapur)	2,785,428	182,036	6.5	306,898	11.0	17,236	.6	22	.001
9. Gujarat	1,458,702	58,000	3.9	55,204	3.8	4,215	.3	182	.01
10. Gwalior	4,006,159	240,903	6.0			1,352	.03	2,342	.06
11. Hyderabad	16,338,534	2,097,475	12.8	2,928,048	17.9	215,989	1.3	5,330	.03
12. Kashmir and Feudatories	4,021,616	3,073,540	76.4	113,464	2.8	3,079	.08	65,903	1.6
13. Madras	498,754	30,263	6.0	83,734	16.8	20,806	4.2	5	
14. Mysore	7,329,140	485,230	6.6	1,405,067	19.2	98,580	1.3	269	.004
15. N.-W.F.P.	46,267	22,068	47.7	Nil		571	1.2	4,472	9.1
16. Orissa	3,023,731	14,355	0.47	352,088	11.6	2,249	.07	151	.005
17. Punjab	5,503,554	2,251,459	40.9	349,962	6.4	6,952	.1	1,342,685	24.4
18. Punjab Hill	1,090,644	46,678	4.3	238,774	21.9	188	.02	17,739	1-6
19. Rajputana	13,670,208	1,297,841	9.5			4,349	.03	81,896	.6
20. Sikkim	121,520	83	0.07	76	.06	34	.03	1	
21. Travancore	6,070,018	434,150	7.2	395,952	6.5	1,958,491	32.3	31	
22. U.P.	928,470	273,625	29.5	152,927	16.5	1,281	.1	731	.08
23. Western India	4,904,156	600,440	12.2	358,038	7.3	3,105	.06	239	.005
Total	91,810,571	15,733,133	16.59	8,892,373	9.7	2,794,959	3.1	1,526,350	1.7

APPENDIX IV

COMMUNAL DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION IN THE PUNJAB BY DISTRICTS

Districts	Total Population	Muslims		Scheduled Castes		Indian Christians		Sikhs		Hindus	
		Population	%	Population	%	Population	%	Population	%	Population	%
1. Hissar	1,006,709	285,208	28.3	128,240	12.7	1,235	.1	60,731	6.0	524,602	52.1
2. Rohtak	956,399	166,569	17.4	135,103	14.1	1,026	.1	1,466	.2	645,371	57.5
3. Gurgaon	851,458	285,992	33.6	119,250	14.0	1,457	.2	637	.07	441,287	51.8
4. Karnal	994,575	304,346	30.6	136,713	13.7	1,223	.1	19,887	2.0	529,588	53.2
5. Ambala	847,745	268,999	31.7	124,006	14.6	4,892	.6	153,543	18.1	288,652	34.0
6. Simla	38,576	7,022	18.2	7,092	18.4	508	1.3	1,032	2.7	22,374	58.0
7. Kangra	899,377	43,249	4.8	121,622	13.5	590	.07	4,809	.5	725,909	80.7
8. Hoshiyarpur	1,170,323	380,759	32.5	170,855	14.6	6,060	.5	198,194	16.9	413,837	35.4
9. Jullundar	1,127,190	509,804	45.2	154,431	13.7	5,971	.5	298,744	26.5	156,579	13.9
10. Ludhiana .	818,615	302,482	36.9	68,469	8.4	1,632	.2	341,175	41.7	106,246	12.9
11. Ferozapore .	1,423,076	641,448	45.1	73,504	5.1	11,031	.8	479,486	33.7	216,229	15.2

12. Lahore	1,695,375	1,027,772	60.6	32,735	1.9	67,686	4.0	310,648	18.3	252,004	14.9
13. Amritsar	1,413,876	657,695	46.5	22,750	1.6	25,330	1.8	510,845	36.1	194,727	13.8
14. Gurdaspur .	1,153,511	589,923	51.1	45,839	4.0	40,262	4.4	221,251	19.2	244,935	21.2
15. Sialkot	1,190,497	739,218	62.1	65,354	5.5	73,846	6.2	139,409	11.7	165,965	13.9
16. Gujranwalla	912,235	642,706	70.5	7,485	.8	60,380	6.6	99,139	10.9	100,630	11.0
17. Shakhupura	852,508	542,344	63.6	22,438	2.6	59,985	7.0	160,706	18.9	66,744	7.8
18. Gujarat	1,104,52	945,609	85.6	4,621	.4	4,391	.4	70,233	6.3	80,022	7.2
19. Shahapur	998,921	835,918	83.7	9,693	1.0	12,690	1.3	48,046	4.8	92,479	9.2
20. Jhealam .	629,658	563,033	89.4	771	.1	730	.1	24,680	3.9	40,117	6.4
21. Rawalpindi	785,231	628,193	80.0	4,233	.5	4,212	.5	64,127	8.2	78,245	10.0
22. Attock	675,875	611,128	90.4	1,015	.1	504	.09	20,102	30	42,194	6.2
23. Mianwali .	506,321	436,260	86.2	1,008	.2	324	.06	6,865	1.3	61,806	12.2
24. Montgomery	1,329,103	918,564	69.1	43,456	3.2	24,101	1.9	175,064	13.2	167,510	12.6
25. Lyallpore	1,396,305	877,518	62.8	68,222	4.9	51,694	3.7	262,737	18.8	135,637	9.7
26. Jhang.	821,631	678,736	82.6	1,943	.2	744	.1	12,238	1.5	127,946	15.6
27. Multan	1,484,333	1,157,911	78.0	24,530	1.7	13,270	.9	61,628	4.1	225,342	15.2
28. Muzaffargarh	712,849	616,074	86.4	2,691	.4	218	.03	5,882	.8	87,952	12.3
29. Dera Gazi Khan	581,350	512,678	88.1	1,059	.2	46	.01	1,072	.2	66,348	11.4
30. Transfrontier Tract	40,246	40,084	99.6	Nil		Nil		2		160	.4
Total .	28,418,820	16,217,242	57.1	1,592,320	5.6	486,038	1.7	3,757,401	13.2	6,301,737	22.2

APPENDIX V

COMMUNAL DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION IN BENGAL BY DISTRICTS

Districts	Total Population	Muslims		Scheduled Castes		Hindus		Indian Christians	
		Population	%	Population	%	Population	%	Population	%
1. Burdwan	1,890,732	336,665	17.8	430,300	22.8	963,520	51.0	3,280	.2
2. Birbhum	1,048,317	287,310	27.4	280,254	26.7	406,182	38.8	344	.03
3. Bankura	1,289,640	55,564	4.3	355,290	27.5	723,269	56.1	1,216	.1
4. Midnapore	3,190,647	246,559	7.7	339,066	10.6	2,342,897	73.4	3,834	.1
5. Hooghly	1,377,729	207,077	15.0	245,810	17.8	853,734	61.9	543	.04
6. Howrah	1,490,304	296,325	19.9	184,318	12.4	1,000,548	67.1	994	.06
7. 24-Parganas	3,536,386	1,148,180	32.5	743,397	21.0	1,566,599	44.3	20,823	.6
8. Calcutta	2,108,891	497,535	23.6	55,228	2.6	1,476,284	70.0	16,431	.8
9. Nadia	1,759,846	1,078,007	61.3	143,682	8.2	514,268	29.2	10,749	.6
10. Murshidabad	1,640,530	927,747	56.6	167,184	10.2	517,803	31.6	394	.02
11. Khulna	1,943,218	959,172	49.4	470,550	24.2	507,143	26.1	3,538	.2
12. Rajshahi	1,571,750	1,173,285	74.6	75,650	4.8	253,580	16.1	1,166	.07

13. Dinajpur	1,926,833	967,246	50.2	399,410	20.7	375,212	19.5	1,448	.07
14. Jalpaiguri	1,089,513	251,460	23.4	325,504	29.9	226,143	20.8	2,589	.2
15. Darjeeling	376,369	9,125	2.4	28,922	7.7	149,574	39.7	2,599	.7
	2,877,847	2,055,186		495,462		307,387	10.7		
16. Rangpur	1,260,463	1,057,902	71.4	61,303	17.2	126,229	10.0	389	.01
			83.9					286	.02
17. Bogra					4.9				
18. Pabna	1705,072	1,313,968	77.1	114,738	6.7	269,017	15.8	285	.02
19. Malda .	1,232,618	699,945	56.7	75,535	6.1	390,143	31.6	466	.04
20. Dacca	4,222,143	2,841,261	67.3	409,905	9.7	950,227	22.5	15,846	.4
21. Myrnensiagh	6,023,758	4,664,548	77.4	340,676	5.7	955,962	15.9	2,322	.04
	2,888,803	1,871,336	64.4	527,496		478,742	16.6		
22. Faridpur	3,549,010	2,567,027	72.3	427,667	18.3	480,962	13.6	9,549	.3
23. Bakargunj	3,860,139	2,975,901	77.1	227,643	12.1	652,318	16.9	9,357	.2
	2,217,402	1,803,937	81.3	81,817	5.9	330,494	14.9		
24. Tippera					3.7			428	.01
25. Naokhali								535	.02
26. Chittagong	2,153,296	1,605,183	74.5	57,024	2.6	401,050	18.6	395	.02
27. Chittagong Hill Tracts .	247,053	7,270	2.9	283	.1	4,598	1.9	60	.02
28. Jessore	1,828,216	1,100,713	60.2	314,856	17.2	406,223	22.2	1057	.06
Total	60,306,525	33,005,434	54.7	7,378,970	12.2	17,630,054	29.3	110,923	.2

APPENDIX VI

COMMUNAL DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION IN ASSAM BY DISTRICTS

Districts	Total Population	Muslims		Scheduled Castes		Indian Christians		Sikhs		Hindus	
		Population	%	Population	%	Population	%	Population	%	Population	%
Surma Valley											
1. Kachahar	641,181	232,950	36.3	51,961	8.1	3,744	.6	---	---	173,855	27.1
2. Sylhet	3,116,602	1,892,117	60.7	364,510	11.7	2,590	.08	---	---	785,004	25.2
3. Khasi and Jantia Hills	118,665	1,555	1.3	63	.05	120	.1	---	---	12,676	10.7
4. Naga Hills	189,641	531	.2	45	.02	9		---	---	4,153	2.2
5. Lushai Hills	152,786	101	.06	22	.01	Nil		---	---	2,425	1.6

Assam Valley								---	---		
6. Goalpara	1,014,285	468,924	46.2	23,434	2.3	269	.03	---	---	282,789	27.9
7. Kamrup	1,264,200	361,522	391	59,092	4.7	1,038	.08	---	---	637,457	50.4
8. Darang	736,791	120,995	16.4	19,475	2.6	6,367	.8	---	---	328,283	44.6
9. Nowgong	710,800	250,113	35.2	59,214	8.3	4,049	.6	---	---	229,137	32.2
10. Sibsagar	1,074,741	51,769	4.8	50,184	4.7	15,268	1.4	---	---	593,007	55.2
11. Lakmipur	894,842	44,579	5.0	43,527	4.9	3,786	.4	---	---	457,509	51.1
12. Garo Hills	233,569	10,398	4.5	789	.3	1		---	---	13,518	5.8
13. Sadiya Frontier Tract	60,118	864	1.4	3,991	6.6	486	.8	---	---	14,605	24.3
14. Balipara Frontier Tract	6,512	61	.9	74	1.1	23	.4	---	---	2,514	38.6
Total	10,204,733	3,442,479	33.7	676,291	6.6	37,750	.4	3,464	.03	3,536,932	34.6

APPENDIX VII

N.-W. F. PROVINCE *PROPORTION OF MUSLIM POPULATION BY DISTRICTS*

Districts	Total Population	Total Muslim Population	P. C. of Muslim Population to Total	Total Non-Muslim Population	P. C. of Non-Muslim to Total
Hazara	796,230	756,004	94.9	40,226	5.1
Mardan	506,539	483,575	965	22,964	4.5
Peshawar .	851,833	769,589	90.4	82,244	9.6
Kohat	289,404	266,224	92.0	23,180	8.0
Bannu	295,930	257,648	871	38,282	12.9
D.I. Khan.	298,131	255,757	85.8	42,374	14.2

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[f.1] This is a statutory designation given to the untouchables by the Government of India Act, 1935.



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Europeanization and the Ancient Culture of India

By THE LATE LALA LAJPAT RAI, M.L.A.

Director, Servants of the People Society, Panjab; author of *Unhappy India*

IT is difficult to define culture. I have so far not come across such a definition as would be at once satisfactory and exhaustive. In the absence of any such comprehensive definition of the term culture one is justified in describing a particular country's culture according to his notions of what a culture should be. My conception of culture includes:

- (a) A fairly high standard of comfort in life.
- (b) A developed taste for literature and fine arts.
- (c) Developed industries indicating refinement and taste.
- (d) A developed and fairly extensive literature.
- (e) A philosophical and well-reasoned conception of religion.
- (f) High social position of women.
- (g) Respect for individual liberty with due regard to the strength and good of the whole society.
- (h) High ethical standards in war.
- (i) The economic welfare of the common man, and
- (j) A high standard of public and private hygiene.

Judged from these standards one may confidently assert that India has fulfilled these conditions almost always during the period known to us.

Hindus believe that the Vedas belong to the most remote period of Indian life. European scholars do not, however, accept that view. It is, however, admitted that India is one of the most ancient countries of the world. European scholars are apt to start the history of culture and democracy from the Greek period of civilization. The Greeks and after them the Romans were the founders of civiliza-

tion in Europe. That the East had developed a high state of civilization and culture long before Greece came into prominence in human life is now acknowledged by scholars. Egypt, China, Babylonia, Assyria, Persia and India had all enjoyed long periods of civilization. It is now freely admitted that Europe (or for that matter, Greece) borrowed its art and civilization from Egypt. Whether the civilization of Egypt was an indigenous one or she had borrowed it from some other source is a moot question. However, no civilization can be wholly borrowed nor can any be entirely indigenous, if we are to assume that at no period of world's history were the different parts of the world so isolated from each other as to bar the possibility of some international communication or exchange.

Today the world is rather a small place, distances and obstacles to free communication having been destroyed by steam and electricity. But even when the world had no such facilities, the different parts of the world did know each other either through markets or through universities. Personally I do not believe that civilization had its birth in any one place or in any one country. The world has always been inter-dependent, always borrowing and giving ideas as well as commodities. I believe all civilizations have developed in that way. India was no exception to this nor was Europe or Egypt.

RELIGION

India is a vast country. It has undergone vast changes, geographi-

cally, historically, as well as culturally. At first sight it seems absurd to give one name to all Indian civilization. But a close examination of facts and data amply proves the unity of Indian civilization, at least for the present geological period. Ever since the beginning of Indian history Indian civilization has been more or less religious. One may retort that this could equally be said of other civilizations too. I do not admit that. Religion has had to do something with all civilizations. That is true. But religion has not been the dominating feature of them all. Take, for instance, the European civilization. Some people call it a Christian civilization, but it has no relation whatsoever with the religion preached by Christ. It may have been so in certain epochs, but not always, nor now. It has not had that continuity of religious stamp on it that the civilization of India can claim. I am not saying this because I claim any credit for that. I am simply stating a fact. Ever since India has had a literature that is literature, the civilization embodied therein, and the life lived by the people who composed that literature have been dominated by religion.

Religion has had its developments in India but fundamentally and in its essence it has remained the same. When I speak of religion in relation to India, I mean the religion followed by the great bulk of its population, that is, Brahmanism; Buddhism and Jainism are daughters of Hinduism. Their philosophy is only an extension or an amplification of the Hindu philosophy. Their doctrine in its essence is a Hindu doctrine. I will quote only two opinions, one about the unity of its civilization and the other about the dominance of religion. Dr. V. A. Smith, the historian of the "Early History of India," says:

Her type of civilization, too, has many features which differentiate it from that of all other religions of the world, while they are common to the whole country or rather sub-continent, in a degree sufficient to justify its treatment as a unit in the history of the social, religious, and intellectual development of mankind.

Professor Lowes Dickinson of Oxford, in his essay on the *Civilization of India, China and Japan*, says:

I conceive the dominant note of India to be religion; of China, humanity; of Japan, chivalry. But religion to Indians means more than praying for children, praying for rain, praying for healing, praying for everything they want. . . . Observers believe that it is, too, and I am inclined to think they are right. That even the Indian peasant does really believe that the true life is a spiritual life; that he respects the saint more than any other man; and that he regards the material world as "unreal," and all its cares as illusion. He can not, of course, and does not, put this conviction into practice, or Indian society would come to an end.

Now let us see the chief distinguishing features of Hinduism. It is a religion which, in its manifold phases, developments and manipulations, insists on seeing one in many and many in one. Within this limit it gives the fullest possible freedom of thought, belief and worship to all its votaries, the fullest possible liberty to the individual in the realm of thought, belief and worship. This distinguishing feature of Hinduism is reflected in its social institutions.

What is the caste system? It is the division of the body of the "Purusha" into four parts (varnas) (see X Rigveda) resulting eventually in the remerging of all into one at the time of *Moksha*. "The poets of the Rigveda," says Professor Rapson in the *Cambridge History of India*, p. 54:

know nothing of caste in the later and stricter sense of the term; but they recog-

nise that there are divers orders of men. Before the end of the period covered by the hymns of the Rigveda a belief in the Divine origin of the four orders of men was fully established; but there is nowhere in the Rigveda any indication of the castes into which these orders were afterwards sub-divided.

At no period of Indian history has the caste system stood in the way of a man of the lowest caste becoming divine. The "untouchables," the Pariahs of Madras, have produced saints whose shrines and images are worshipped by Brahmin and Sudras alike, in the temple of Srirangam at Trichnopoly. The same may be said of *Kabir*, a *Julaha* or weaver of northern India, or of *Sur Das*, and many others.

Speaking politically the caste system of India has been a curse. As a social institution I have said in another place¹ that "Today the Indian caste system is beyond doubt an anachronism." It is fast disintegrating. Other communities and other nations have known of caste or class divisions, too, but in their case the distinguishing feature of these divisions has been either wealth or economic position. Not so in India. In India a wealthy Brahmin may never attain salvation, while the poorest Pariah may. I am not praising the system. I am again only stating a fact.

Coming to Indian literature, there also one finds religion as the dominant note.²

¹ *Unhappy India*, 1st edition, p. 88.

² Says Professor Rapson (*Cambridge History of India*, p. 58): "Literature controlled by Brahmanism or by Jain and Buddhist monks, must naturally represent systems of faith rather than national ties. They must deal with thought rather than with action, with ideas rather than with events. And in fact, as sources for the history of religion and philosophy, and for the development of those sciences which, like grammar, depend on the minute and careful observation of facts, they stand among the literatures of the ancient world unequalled in

Of late some scholars have made good use of the Buddhistic *Jatakas* and the *Puranas* in building up ancient Indian history.

LITERATURE AND ART

There has been no break in the continuity of Hindu literature. Literature of the highest type, covering all the departments of knowledge, science, and art exists in India from before 3000 years B.C. up to date. I wonder if there is any other country in the world which can establish such a claim unless it be China. India stands unique in this respect. Having spoken of religion and literature, we come to the art of India. For long, scholars continued to hint that India borrowed its art from Greece, but the recent discoveries at Mohenjodaro and Harappa have set this matter at rest.

The art of the Indus is distinct from that of any neighbouring country, notwithstanding that there are certain elements in common. The best of the figures on the engraved seals—notably the humped Indian bulls and short-horn cattle—are distinguished by a breadth of treatment and a feeling for line and form unequalled in the contemporary glyptic art of Elam or Mesopotamia or Egypt? The modelling, too, in faience of the miniature rams, monkeys, dogs and squirrels is of a very high order—far in advance of what we should expect in the fourth and third millenniums B.C. Contrasted with these, the few examples we possess of human figures, whether executed in marble, stone, clay or bronze, are strangely uncouth and suggest

their fullness and their continuity. But as records of political progress they are deficient. By their aid alone it would be impossible to sketch the outline of the political history of any of the nations of India before the Muhammadan conquest. Fortunately two other sources of information—foreign accounts of India and the monuments of India (especially the inscriptions and coins)—supply to some extent this deficiency of the literatures, and furnish a chronological framework for the history of certain periods."

that for some reason or other the artists could have had relatively little experience in delineating the human form.

About Industrial art also the following evidence is sufficiently conclusive:

Numerous spindle wheels in the débris of the houses attest the practice of spinning and weaving, and scraps of a fine woven material, which appears to be linen, have also been found.

The ornaments of the rich were of silver and gold or copper plated with gold, of blue faience ivory, carnelian, jadestone, and multi-colored stones of various kinds. For the poor, they were mainly of shell or terracotta. Many examples of both kinds are exhibited in the collection. Especially striking are the girdles of carnelian and gilded copper and some of the smaller objects, that is, earrings and "netting" needles of pure gold, the surface of which is polished to a degree that would do credit to a present day jeweller.

Besides gold and silver, the Indus people were familiar with copper, tin and lead. Copper they used freely for weapons, implements and domestic utensils; daggers, knives, hatchets, sickles, celts, chisels, vessels, figurines and personal ornaments, amulets, wire, etc. Most of these objects are wrought by hammering, but examples of cast copper are not unknown.

Common domestic vessels were of earthenware. Their greater variety of shapes—each evolved for some particular purpose—evidence a long period of antecedent development, though it is curious how few of the vases are provided with handles. Most of the pottery is plain undecorated red ware, but painted ware is by no means uncommon. As a rule, the designs are painted in black on a darkish red slip and consist of geometric and foliate devices with occasional figures of animals. A few specimens of polychrome decoration in red, white and black have also been met with. Certain of the ceramic shapes and ornamental patterns betoken a connection with Baluchistan, as well as with Elam and Mesopotamia.

The presence of inscribed seals, sealings and other objects in almost every building is sufficient indication that the citizens

must have been familiar with the art of writing, and it may be inferred that it was employed for business and other purposes.

I have given these extracts in full because in my judgment they are almost conclusive proof of a high degree of material civilization in the Indus valley region of India some 5000 years ago.³

It will be relevant to quote further here the opinion of Sir John Marshall, Director-General of Archæology, about the level of the general culture of the people of India at that time:

That by the above date city life in Harappa and Mohenjodaro was already remarkably well-organized and that the material culture of the people was relatively highly developed, is evident. Indeed, the roomy and well-built houses and the degree of luxury denoted by the presence in them of walls and bath-rooms, betoken a social condition of the citizens, at least equal to that found in Sumer, and markedly in advance of that prevailing in contemporary Babylonia and Egypt, where the royal monuments of the kings—palaces, tombs and temples—may have been superior to anything of their class to be found in India, but where no private dwelling houses of the citizens have been discovered at all comparable with those unearthed in India.

ECONOMIC CONDITION

About the economic condition of the people of India, in the historical period, we have the evidence of literature, laws and folklore. The historical period in India has been placed about 750 B.C. "The Sutras precede the earliest works on Buddhism. The earliest known Parana precedes the later law books by centuries," (says the *Cambridge History of India*). Taking all this into consideration and looking at the life of the peoples of

³ For subsequent developments of Arts and Industries, I must refer the reader to the writings of Havell and Ananda Coomaraswamy.

North India, as it survives in the records of their folklore, and of the discipline of the brethren who lived in close touch with all classes, Mrs. Rhys Davids, the writer of the chapter on Economic conditions in the *Cambridge History of India*, has come to the following conclusion:

And we have seen agriculture diligently and amicably carried on by practically the whole people as a toilsome but most natural and necessary pursuit. We have seen crafts and commerce flourishing, highly organised corporately and locally, under conditions of individual and corporate competition, the leading men thereof the friends and counsellors of kings. We have found "labour" largely hereditary, yet, therewithal, a mobility and initiative, anything but rigid, revealed in the exercise of it. And we have discovered a thorough familiarity with money and credit ages before the seventh century A.D.

The same learned writer says

that the rural economy of India, at the coming of Buddhism was (*i.e.*, about the fifth century B.C.) based chiefly on a system of village communities of land owners or what in Europe was known as village proportionship.

Speaking of the same period Professor Rhys Davids has said in his *Buddhist India*:

There was security, there was independence, there were landlords and no paupers. The mass of the people held it degradation to which only dire misfortune would drive them, to work for hire.

These three quotations give a good picture of economic conditions in ancient India. Magesthanese and other Greek writers have testified to "the high level of veracity and honesty" in the India of the Mauriyan period (300 B.C.).

About the health of the people of India, in the Mauriyan period of Indian history, which almost begins

with the "raid" of Alexander (323 B.C.), we find the Greeks stating:

There was really very little for a doctor to do in India except to cure snake bites since diseases were so rare in India (*Cambridge History of India* P. 406).

Another Greek writer described the Indians to be singularly free from disease and long-lived. The people of Sind, Onesicritus said, sometimes reached 130 years.⁴

THE STATUS OF THE WOMEN

As for the status of the women in ancient Indian society one may fairly assume the accuracy of the following conclusions:

- (a) The Vedic marriage was usually monogamic though polygamy was not unknown probably among the princely class.
- (b) Polyandry was unknown.
- (c) The poetical idea of the family was decidedly high, and we have no reason to doubt that it was often actually fulfilled (Macdonell and Keith's *Vedic India*, p. 488).
- (d) Rigveda X, 85, discloses a society in which the parties to the marriage were grown up persons competent to woo and be wooed, qualified to give consent and make choice (Ragozin's *Vedic India*, pp. 372 and 373).
- (e) The same hymn gives evidence of the complete supremacy of the wife as mistress of her husband's house (Ragozin's *Vedic India*, pp. 372 and 373).
- (f) No religious ceremony could be considered complete and efficacious unless both husband and wife joined in it.

⁴ The intellectual powers which they displayed in arts and crafts were attributed, like the health and longevity, to the purity of the air and the rarified qualities of water, but their health was also attributed to the simplicity of their diet and their abstinence from wine. (Pp. 407 and 408 *Cambridge History Of India*.)

- (g) The words *Pati* (Master) and *Patni* (Mistress) signify equality of general position.
- (h) There was no seclusion of women.
- (i) No trace of *Sati* is to be found in the Vedic literature.
- (j) Women enjoyed full rights of property (*Stridham*).

This is with regard to the Vedic period. In the Epic period the position of women did not deteriorate. There was the same position of general equality. The Epic period expressly recognises marriages of love contracted otherwise than with the consent of parents. The tendency of the Epic period seems to have been to confer the status of marriage on all permanent unions, however effected,—permanent in the intentions of the parties. In fact even irregular unions were declared valid. Hindu law really makes no mention of illegitimacy of children. There are no caste distinctions. The wife enjoys full rights of property in her estate. Singing and dancing and riding were considered accomplishments, and otherwise also sex relations were of the best kind. Women were freely and highly educated.

It is during the Sutra and the Smirti period that the position of the Indian woman becomes one of dependence, and caste restrictions are enforced. The position of a Hindu mother has always been and is infinitely superior to anything known in any other part of the world. As regards inheritance in a divided Hindu family, the widow, the mother, the daughter and the sister all have rights of inheritance under certain circumstances. The widow has a right of adopting a son to her husband under certain circumstances, a right perhaps known to no other part of the world. It is maintained that if one compares, period by period and epoch by epoch, he will find that at no

period of the world's history before the nineteenth century, was the general position of the Indian woman inferior to her sisters elsewhere, except perhaps as far as it was affected by the custom of child marriage and the prohibition against the remarriage of widows. In the best period of ancient Indian culture, however, both these customs were non-existent. In medieval India they were the product of political conditions.

WAR TIME SANCTIONS

The standard of culture in a community is, I think, best determined by the treatment it sanctions for enemies in war time. In the war of 1914-18, "Kill the enemy and the enemy nation by all means available" was the principle. The Indians, however, had no bombs, and no submarines. They did not evidently know of poisonous gases, nor did they blockade whole countries for the purpose of starving them to subjection. Nevertheless, the Epic period of India shows ideals of war loftier than anything known anywhere else in the world. The Mahabharata and the Sutras lay down high ideals of war morality. The warrior was specially enjoined to avoid doing any harm to women, old men, men bearing no arms, and non-combatants. To kill the enemy by fraud, or to starve or blockade him was considered unworthy of a warrior.

Apastamba and Baudhyana and Gautama prohibited the use of poisoned arrows or an attack on those who supplicate for mercy or are helpless, such as those who have ceased to fight, or surrendered. That these rules were followed in actual practice can be abundantly proved by the pages of Rajput history. Even in medieval India Rajputs showed more humanity and chivalry in war than the Europeans did in 1914-18.

Gautama X, 18, lays down that a

king commits a sin if he injures or slays in battle

those who have lost their horses, chariot-eers, or arms, those who join their hands (in supplication), those who flee with flying hair, those who sit down with averted faces, those who have climbed (in flight) on eminences or trees, messengers, and those who declare themselves to be cows or Brahmans.

Baudhyana on p. 200 says:

Let him not fight with those who are in fear, intoxicated, insane or out of their minds, (nor with those) who have lost their armour, (nor with) women, infants, aged men, and Brahmanas.

The Greek writers have made it a point worthy of mention that the cultivators took no part in war.

"War rolled past them. At the very time when a battle was going on, the neighboring cultivators might be seen quietly pursuing their work of ploughing or digging unmolested" (*Cambridge History of India*, p. 410).

THE ART OF GOVERNMENT

I am sorry that considerations of space forbid me from saying something about the art of Government in ancient India. Government in ancient India was much more civilised and humane and in a way more democratic than it has been in any country in the world before the eighteenth century A.D. In certain respects it would bear good comparison even with modern Governments of Europe and America.

THE EFFECT OF MODERN EUROPEAN CULTURE

So much about the spirit of the culture of Ancient India. Now I shall discuss the effect of modern European culture on it. It is too early yet to speak of the permanent effects of European culture on Hindu civilization. One can only mention certain tendencies. As far as religion is con-

cerned, India has little to learn from Europe.

Neither Christian dogma, nor Christian theology, nor European philosophy have made any appreciable impression on the Indian people. No doubt the number of Christians is increasing every year, but the reason for it is other than the superiority of Christian doctrine. European non-religionism also is not having much vogue. Speaking of the nation as a whole, India is not likely to lose her spiritual mentality. But her spiritual outlook is bound to be transformed by the general European outlook on life. Back to the simple religion of the Vedas with their joyful outlook on life may be the outcome, but it is dangerous to prophesy. In the matter of the rights of women, the change in the mentality of educated India is distinctly progressive and it may be confidently asserted that *Purdah* (seclusion of women), early marriage, the prohibition against widow remarriage, will go. There has never been any *Purdah* in the south. In the north its rigour has been confined to city folk of respectability, mostly *Musalmans*. In the villages throughout India there has hardly been any *Purdah*. The custom of child marriage is fast disappearing. That also was confined to particular classes. Prohibition to widow remarriage was never universal. It was generally confined to the higher caste. Among these, too, widow remarriages are multiplying. The present custom of marriage being arranged by parents will also cease to function and marriage by choice among adult persons will take its place. The immediate cause of it may be the impact of European civilization, but it will not be a new thing. The economic independence of women may come, but only to a limited extent, as Indians on the whole still loath to think of their women

having to earn either for themselves or for others. There is a deep-rooted sentiment against it, with a reason behind it. Birth control is, I think, an entirely new idea for India. It will grow. As regards the improvement of the Hindu women's position for the purposes of inheritance, that too may come, though the break up of the joint family system and the power to dispose of one's property by will make it rather unnecessary.

In education the women are coming into their own. That again will be reproducing ancient conditions. The effect of European art on Indian art was at first horrible. But the Indian art and ideals are fast recovering, and will probably create an entirely new system peculiar to India and her civilisation.

In the matter of Industrial art, Europe's cheap designs have almost completely destroyed Indian ideals. Machine has killed the soul, and the result is only a caricature of its former self. There is a revival in this respect too. As far as clean and hygienic living is concerned, India can not do

better than revert to her ancient ideals. European influence in this respect is partly good and partly bad. The bulk of the people are too poor and too ignorant to observe rules of hygiene, and the Government is too callous to spare money for public health arrangements. Things may improve slowly.

On the whole, I am inclined to think that the influence of European culture on the Indian mind has not been much for the good of the latter. In the long run, as I have already remarked, no culture can remain purely local. India will certainly learn many things from Europe, and Europe also, as she comes to know India better, will grow in her appreciation of ancient Indian culture. European science and European learning is producing a revolution in people's mentality all over the world and India can not and will not remain unaffected. Nor is there any reason why she should. India wants to take her proper place in the up-to-date nations of the world, and has no ambition to be an isolated unit.

UPDATE ON THE ARYAN INVASION DEBATE

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PREFACE

This book on the developing arguments concerning the Aryan Invasion Theory consists of adapted versions of papers I have read: the first at the World Association of Vedic Studies (WAVES) conference on the Indus-Saraswati civilization in Atlanta 1996, the third at the 1996 Annual South Asia conference in Madison, Wisconsin and in a lecture at the Linguistics Department in Madison; the fifth contains material used in my paper read at the second WAVES conference in Los Angeles 1998; the second and fourth were read at lectures for the Belgo-Indian Association, Brussels, and at the Etnografisch Museum, Antwerp. Overlaps have been kept to a minimum. Here and there, sections of my book *Indigenous Indians* (Voice of India 1993, outdated as far as the fast-moving Aryan invasion debate is concerned) have been reused in adapted form.

My thanks are due to the late Dr. Lèon Poliakov and to Dr. Bernard Sergent for our correspondence; to Prof. B.B. Lal, Prof. A.K. Narain, Prof. Andrew Sihler, Prof. Lambert Isebaert, Dr. Herman Seldeslachts, Drs. Erik Seldeslachts, Dr. Edwin Bryant, Dr. Beatrice Reusch, Mr. Jose Calazans, Mr. Bhagwan Singh and Mr. Shrikant Talageri for the enlightening discussions; and to Mrs. Yamini Liu, Mrs. Manju Jhaver, Mr. Krishna Bhatnagar (and friends), Dr. Manohar Shinde and Mr. Shrichand Chawla for their material help. I also thank the publishers for their patience: it so happens that the writing and editing process has been bedeviled by technical and other hurdles.

The greatest hurdle has been my own anxiety in treading unsure ground, where every hypothesis which is now carrying the day may be blown away by a new discovery tomorrow. Even now, it hurts to release a book in mid-debate, knowing that much of it will be dated by the time a new consensus will have evolved. But then, I am confident that this painful awareness of uncertainty has been the right attitude and the best starting-point for uprooting the false certainties of some and for clearing the bewilderment of others. While too many debaters are still at base one, unfamiliar with the newest arguments and insufficiently alert to the strong and weak points of the several types of evidence in the balance, I hope this book helps the debate in moving on and reaching its conclusion.

Koenraad Elst

Brecht
20 May 1999

(Belgium)

1. Political aspects of the Aryan invasion debate

1.1. POLITICIZING A LINGUISTIC THEORY

1.1.1. Aryavarta for the Aryans

Until the mid-19th century, no Indian had ever heard of the notion that his ancestors could be Aryan invaders from Central Asia who had destroyed the native civilization and enslaved the native population. Neither had South-Indians ever dreamt that they were the rightful owners of the whole subcontinent, dispossessed by the Aryan invaders who had chased them from North India, turning it into *Aryavarta*, the land of the Aryans. Nor had the low-caste people heard that they were the original inhabitants of India, subdued by the Aryans and forced into the prisonhouse of caste which the conquerors imposed upon them as an early form of Apartheid. All these ideas had to be imported by European scholars and missionaries, who thought through the implications of the *Aryan Invasion Theory* (AIT, the theory that the Indo-European (IE) language family had spread out from a given homeland, probably in Eastern Europe, and found a place in Western and Southern Europe and in India as cultural luggage of horse-borne invaders who subjugated the natives.

One of the first natives to interiorize these ideas was Jotirao Phule, India's first modern Mahatma, a convent-educated low-caste leader from Maharashtra. In 1873, he set the tone for the political appropriation of the AIT: "Recent researches have shown beyond a shadow of doubt that the Brahmins were not the Aborigines of India (...) Aryans came to India not as simple emigrants with peaceful intentions of colonization, but as conquerors. They appear to have been a race imbued with very high notions of self, extremely cunning, arrogant and bigoted."¹ Ever since, the political reading of the AIT has become all-pervasive in Indian textbooks as well as in all kinds of divisive propaganda pitting high and low castes, North and South Indians, speakers of Indo-Aryan and of Dravidian languages, and tribals and non-tribals, against each other.

Today, out of indignation with the socially destructive implications of the politically appropriated AIT, many Indian scholars get excited about supposed imperialist motives distorting the views of the Western scholars who first introduced the AIT. They point to the Christian missionary commitment of early Sanskritists like Friedrich Max Müller, John Muir and Sir M. Monier-Williams and of Dravidologists like Bishop Robert Caldwell and Reverend G.U. Pope, alleging that the missionaries justify their presence in India by claiming that Aryan Hinduism is as much a foreign import as Christianity. They quote Viceroy Lord Curzon as saying that the AIT is "the furniture of Empire", and explain how the British colonisers justified their conquest by claiming that India had never been anything but booty for foreign invaders, and that the Indians (or at least the upper-caste Hindus who led the Freedom Movement) were as much foreigners as their fellow-Aryans from Britain.²

About the use of the AIT in the service of colonialism, there can be no doubt. Thus, during the 1935 Parliament debates on the Government of India Act, Sir Winston Churchill opposed any policy tending towards decolonization on the following ground: "We have as much right to be in India as anyone there, except perhaps for the Depressed Classes [= *the Scheduled Castes and Tribes*], who are the native stock."³ SO, the British Aryans had as much right to Aryavarta as their Vedic fellow-Aryans. Indian loyalists justified the British presence on the same grounds, e.g. Keshab Chandra Sen, leader of the reformist movement Brahmo Samaj (mid-19th century), welcomed the British advent as a reunion with his Aryan cousins: "In the advent of the English nation in India we see a reunion of parted cousins, the descendants of two different families of the ancient Aryan race"⁴.

However, it doesn't follow that the AIT was conceived with these political uses as its deliberate aim. The scholars concerned were children of their age, conditioned by prevalent perceptions and prejudices, but they sincerely believed that this theory explained the available data best.

1.1.2. Hitler's Aryans

Even the 19th-century race theories which would feature so dramatically in crimes against humanity in 1941-45 were not originally conceived as political ploys. In the prevailing *Zeitgeist*, most of their theorists genuinely thought that the race concept provided the best explanation for the incoming data of nascent sciences like sociology and anthropology. Nonetheless, the disruptive effects of their work have reached beyond Europe as far as India.

In the proliferating race theories of the late 19th and early 20th century, "Aryan", an early synonym of "Indo-European" (IE), became a racial term designating the purest segment of the White race. Of course, the identification of "white" with "Aryan" was an innovation made by armchair theorists in Europe, far from and in stark disregard for the self-described *Aryas* in India. Better-informed India-based Britons like Rudyard Kipling summed up the Indian type as "Aryan brown".

Incorporated in the theme of Aryan whiteness, the AIT became a crown piece in Adolf Hitler's vision of white supremacy: here was the proof of both white superiority and of the need to preserve the race from admixture with inferior darker races. Had not the white Aryan invaders of India subdued the vastly more numerous brown-skinned natives, and had they not lost their superior white quality by mixing with the natives and becoming more brown themselves? In the Nazi view, the Aryan invaders had retained a relative superiority vis-à-vis the pure black natives by means of the caste system, but had been too slow in instituting this early form of Apartheid, so that their type was fatally contaminated with inferior blood.

One of Hitler's admirers, Mrs. Maximiani Portas alias Savitri Devi Mukherji, reports: "In the Third Reich, even schoolchildren knew from their textbooks that this [= the Aryan] race had spread from the north to the south and east, and not the other way around."⁵ Establishment historians in Nazi Germany, such as Hermann Lommel, were quite explicit about their doctrine that "by invading India, the Aryans, powerful conquerors, have violated the culture which had been established there."⁶ The subjugation of the black natives of India by the white Aryan invaders was, in the *Rassenkunde* ("racial science") courses in Nazi schools, the clearest illustration of the superiority of the white and especially the Aryan race.

1.1.3. Hindu and Aryan

The "Aryan" theme failed to kindle any sympathy in Hitler for the brown Aryans of India. He spurned the collaboration offer by freedom fighter and leftist Congress leader Subhash Chandra Bose because he preferred India to be under white British domination. And he ordered the extermination of the Gypsies, Indian immigrants into Europe. Nonetheless, anti-Hindu polemicists cleverly exploit the ambiguity of the term "Aryan" to associate Hindus with Hitler.

Consider this crassly false statement by a leading Marxist historian about the reform movement Arya Samaj, founded in 1875 and well-known for its anti-untouchability campaigns: "The Arya Samaj was described by its followers as 'the society of the Aryan race'. The Aryas were the upper castes and the untouchables were excluded."⁷ The second sentence is precisely the Western indologist reading of the term Arya which the Arya Samaj sought to *counter*. The Samaj restored the original meaning of the term, viz. "civilized", in particular "belonging to or expressive of the Vedic civilization".⁸ While the Samaj was not slow in acknowledging that in its own day, the untouchables were being excluded from learning the Vedic rituals and philosophies, it worked hard to *undo* this exclusions.⁹

As for the first sentence quoted, it is not known to me where a Samaj spokesman called his own organization “the society of the Aryan race”. It is quite impossible that the term was ever used in the sense in which the quoter wants the reader to understand it, viz. in the Hitlerian sense. However, it is not altogether impossible that the expression was used, because in those days the word “race” in English (as opposed to German and post-1945 English) had a more general, non-biological and non-racist meaning, viz. “nation, people”.

Sri Aurobindo, for one, has definitely used the term “Aryan race”, thereby not meaning what Hitler and post-Hitlerian readers will understand by that term, but “Hindu nation”. For all his “Aryan race” talk, Aurobindo was among the most clear-sighted analysts of the problem which Nazism posed. In 1939, Aurobindo advocated India’s total support to the Allied cause as a matter of principle, because he saw in Hitler a force of evil; this at a time when many Indians, both Hindu and Muslim, were very fond of Hitler, and when others advocated participation in the British war effort on purely tactical grounds. On 19 September 1940, he briefly broke his self-imposed seclusion to make a public statement: “We feel that not only is this a battle waged in just self-defence and in defence of the nations threatened with the world domination of Germany and the Nazi system of life, but that it is a defence of civilization (...) To this cause our support and sympathy will be unswerving whatever may happen; we look forward to the victory of Britain and, as the eventual result, an era of peace and union among the nations”.¹⁰

On one occasion, already in 1914, Aurobindo did express his doubts about the term “race” as follows: “I prefer not to use the term race, for *race* is a thing much more difficult to determine than is usually imagined. In dealing with it the trenchant distinctions current in the popular mind are wholly out of place.”¹¹ At any rate, when he and other Hindus used the expression “Aryan race”, they meant something totally unrelated to Nazism, for both terms had a meaning totally distinct from their Nazi interpretation.¹² To quote Hindus as speaking of the “Aryan race” without explaining the semantic itinerary of the expression is tantamount to manipulating the readership into reading something into the phrase which Arya Samaj spokesmen and Aurobindo never intended. To Hindus, *Arya*, or “Aryan” in English texts, simply means “Hindu”, nothing more, nothing less.

1.1.4. Indo-European and the Nouvelle Droite

The positive association of the IE theme with racist or Nazi ideas is quite dead in Europe except in a few extremely marginal groups. It is not really present in the main focus of contemporary ideological interest in the IE past, the French intellectual current known as the *Nouvelle Droite* (“New Right”).¹³ By the 1980s, this movement, ultra-rightist in the 1960s, had shifted from “race” to “culture”, from authoritarianism to participatory democracy, from crude nationalism to the celebration of multicultural difference (e.g. its leading ideologue, Alain de Benoist, was one of the rare French intellectuals to support the right of Muslim girls to wear the *hijab* in school). The *Nouvelle Droite* shows a sincere interest in and respect for traditional cultures, though sometimes forcing them conceptually into the mould of its own pet concerns. In contrast with the -mushrooming xenophobic parties, it believes in European integration and seeks to underpin it with an awareness of pan-European cultural identity, hence its interest in the IE cultural heritage.¹⁴

Unlike the Left with its nostalgia for the victorious 40s, which it tries to recreate by perennially invoking the bogey of “renascent fascism”, the Right has had to learn from its defeat and move on. So, the focus is not on some “Aryan race” anymore, but on “Indo-European culture” as reconstructed by modern philologists.

One of the better known IE motifs is the theory of *trifunctionality* elaborated by Georges Dumézil. The idea is that PIE society had a tripolar worldview, which it applied to cosmology (Sanskrit *triguNa*: the transparent, turbid and dark energies) as well as to society. The three social functions were identified as spiritual-intellectual, martial-political, and productive-economic, the

medieval *oratores, bellatores, laboratores* (worshippers, fighters, workers), or in Indian caste terms: *brAhmaNa, kshatriya, vaishya*. Apart from the questions whether this scheme is typically IE (which is doubtful) and whether it effectively applied to ancient IE societies (where four-fold divisions are more common), it is not clear what its relevance to modern politics could be.

Further, it is strange that European patriots put all their eggs in the IE basket, when ancient European culture had important non-IE tributaries (Megalithic, VinCa, *et al*), of which the Basque language is the only linguistic remnant. And not only is Europe a plural entity, but “IE culture” itself was probably never a homogeneous unity, nor was it necessarily all that distinct from neighbouring cultures (e.g. the Scythians were Iranian-speaking but were feared and loathed by the sedentary Iranians, and resembled the non-IE Turks in religion and lifestyle). Indeed, of IE motifs like trifunctionality, as of IE myths like that of the dragon-slayer (Indra), it could be argued that they are not coterminous with the IE world, and perhaps even that some of them are just universal.

If IE is the basis of European identity, one can understand that a European *Urheimat* for IE would be preferred over an Asian one.¹⁵ Consequently, some of the *Nouvelle Droite* authors are very attached to the idea of the Aryan Invasion as a necessary implication of the presumed European character and origin of the IE family.

1.1.5. The *Nouvelle Droite* on race and the Aryans Invasion

As a corollary to their Eurocentric view of IE history, *Nouvelle Droite* authors tend to accept the AIT and, along with it, the view of the caste system as an apartheid system between IE immigrants and Indian natives, possibly because they have no reason to rethink the specifically Indian chapter of IE history. The net result is that in spite of their declared anti-racism, they end up reconnecting with 19th-century racist assumptions, at least as far as India is concerned.

The chief sources for *Nouvelle Droite* musings about India are the late Jean Varenne, an eminent indologist who was less outspoken on the present debate, and Jean Haudry, sanskritist and IE linguist, who by contrast has involved himself quite strongly in this debate. Haudry, member of the Scientific Committee of the French national-populist party *Front National*, maintains that the Proto-Indo-Europeans were tall, blue-eyed, fair-haired, long-skulled and straight-nosed.¹⁶ Of course, he supports the AIT: “The Vedas and Brahmanas mention the Aryan invasion in India” (actually, they don’t), and: “It is probable that the Aryans left from the site of Jamna on the Volga” and that some of them “came to India where they first arrived towards the beginning of the second millennium BC”.¹⁷

There are frequent allegations, generally exaggerated but sometimes true, of unsavoury connections between the *Nouvelle Droite* and certain veterans of the Nazi and Fascist regimes. The Marxist critic Maurice Olender claims that one of the original patrons of the *Nouvelle Droite* publication *Nouvelle Ecole* was Herbert Jankuhn, once an officer of the SS research department, and that the movement also republishes indo-europeanist studies by Ludwig Ferdinand Clauss and Hans F.K. Günther, editors of the Nazi periodical *Rasse* (“Race”).¹⁸

In a “right of reply” which the Paris Appeals Court forced the periodical to publish (February 1994), *Nouvelle Droite* ideologue Alain de Benoist denied the allegation and listed his own publications in which he had argued against all forms of racism, defended democracy against its critics, deconstructed Western ethnocentrism, and criticized totalitarianism, nationalism, social darwinism and sociobiology.¹⁹ He also pointed out that his periodical *Krisis*, which Olender had described as “extreme-Rightist”, has published many Leftist authors who never felt they were in bad company.²⁰ The antagonism between Left and Right is indeed giving way to new political fault-lines.

On the other hand, if we just stick with the information which Nouvelle Droite publications themselves furnish, it is undeniable that there are some personal connections with the pre-1945 Right. Thus, among the members of the patronage committee of *Nouvelle Ecole*, we find not only scholars above suspicion, like Manfred Mayrhofer, Edgar Polomé, Colin Renfrew, the late Arthur Koestler or the late Marija Gimbutas, but also the famous scholar Mircea Eliade, who had been close to the fascist Iron Guard in his homeland Rumania. That Herbert Jankuhn was a member of the patronage committee is also uncontroversial.

My own impression is that the Nouvelle Droite is by and large a respectable intellectual movement of the Right, but that precisely this respectability makes it attractive as an umbrella for nostalgics of the 1930s, for IE romantics, as well as for plain crackpots. The same phenomenon is in evidence in related movements throughout Europe: their periodicals present a curious mixture of healthy non-conformism and sarcasm vis-à-vis the dominant “political correctness”, often in the form of thoughtful and original critiques, with deplorable flare-ups of obsolete race thinking and starry-eyed “traditionalism”, i.e. a dogmatic kind of nostalgia for pre-modern culture.

The main problem with the Nouvelle Droite in the present context is that it continues to see other cultures, and India in particular, through the ideological lenses developed by European thinkers in the 19th century. The *Nouvelle Droite* people, rather than acquaint themselves with the reality of other cultures, often prefer to stay with their own coloured versions of them, e.g. René Guénon’s explanation of Taoism rather than living Taoism.²¹ This is the way to remain stuck in Eurocentric theories of bygone days, which is more or less the story of the whole pro-AIT argument.

1.1.6. Fondness for caste

The caste system as a religiously sanctioned hierarchical organization of society has exerted a fascination on Western nostalgics who felt lost in the modern world and longed for a kind of restoration of the pre-modern world. Among these nostalgics, one of extraordinary stature was certainly Julius Evola (1898-1974), an Italian aristocrat and an independent Rightist ideologue who, after years in the margin, ingratiated himself with the Fascist regime by developing a “truly Italian” version of the Race Theory, “more spiritual than the purely biological German *Rassenlehre*”. Thus, he rejected biological determinism in favour of will-power, preferring chivalrous values like courage over the modern rigid bio-materialist subjection of man to the verdict of his genes. On the other hand, his occasional conflicts with the ideologues and the authorities of Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, now eagerly highlighted by his remaining followers, hardly suffice to make him acceptable, e.g. there is no excuse for his writing a foreword to the Italian translation of the anti-Semitic forgery, *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion*.

Though a declared racist, his views were at odds with those of most White racists, e.g. he glorified Asian cultures because of their hierarchy and traditionalism, esp. the martial virtues as preserved (or so Western romantics thought) in imperial Japan.²² He professed a premodern aristocratic “horizontal racism”: the European aristocracy was one “race” bound to intermarry, the common people were the other “race”, with national borders and identities being less important. After being hit during a bombardment in Vienna at the end of World War 2, he spent his last thirty years in a wheelchair, writing political-cultural essays and fairly accurate but always “traditionalist” accounts of Oriental religions.

Evola is interesting because he presented a premodern (and anti-modern) viewpoint, a living fossil in the 20th century. Those who have been duped by the dominant Marxist discourse into classifying Fascism as Rightist would do well to study Evola’s Rightist critique of Fascism. He attacked Fascism on the following points: its anti-traditionalism and zest for newness and youth (as exemplified by its term *Duce* “leader”, i.e. one who takes the people to a distant goal, a utopia, as opposed to the premodern “ruler” who merely maintains the existing order); its superficial modernist optimism (best seen in Fascist, Nazi, Stalinist and Maoist visual art); its equalizing “Jacobin” nationalism which minimizes class differences; its totalitarianism, as

opposed to premodern culture's sense of measure and division of powers; its secularism, which creates an opposition between the political and the sacred; its socialism; its personality cult (one ought to revere the institution of kingship, not the person of the king); and its natalist policy based on the vulgar cult of numbers, neglecting quality for the sake of quantity.²³

In the absence of a living traditional society, some moderns like Evola have tried to recreate a sense of tradition, called traditionalism (term launched by his contemporary René Guénon), but this is often distortive. The whole traditionalist movement, including most of its votaries whom I have personally known, is characterized by a rigid attachment to certain typically modern (though anti-modernist) Western concerns, leading to great distortions in its numerous attempts to link up with ancient European or contemporary Asian traditions and surviving traditional societies.

Among the projections of European intellectual fashions onto other societies was of course the racialist understanding of the caste system. Thus, Maximiani Portas (1905-82), a French-Greek lady, converted to Hinduism on the assumption that the Hindu caste system was an institution imposed by the Aryan race on the non-Aryan natives, so that the upper castes had preserved the ancient Aryan race and culture till today (for more about her, see Ch. 1.4.9. below).

A related distortion was Evola's assumption that the spiritual caste is subordinate to the martial caste, an assumption which he maintained even in the analysis of a Vedic ritual in which the king "marries" his priest.²⁴ The traditional and Vedic view is that worldly action is subordinate to contemplation, so that ritually, the king is the bride and the priest is the groom. Evola turned this upside down, affirming the primacy of the royal function: partly, this was an exaggerated exaltation of the martial function typical of the interbellum period (when marching in uniform was an almost universal style for all kinds of movements, due to the militarization of a whole generation in World War 1); partly, it was a projection of a medieval conflict in the Holy Roman Empire between the Emperor and the Pope, a conflict in which Evola's retrospective sympathies lay with the Emperor.

At any rate, it took a top-ranking scholar genuinely rooted in a genuine tradition, the Brahmin art historian and philosopher Ananda Kentish Coomaraswamy, to correct the deviations of the Western enthusiasts of "Tradition". He commented: "As it is, Evola's argument for the superiority of the Regnum, the active principle, to the Sacerdotium, the contemplative principle, is a concession to that very 'mondo moderno' [= modern world] against which his polemic is directed."²⁵ But the problem with the Traditionalist school is that they never listen: why should they listen to an Oriental scholar, when they already have Evola's or Guénon's version of Oriental wisdom?

So, the subordination of genuine Asian tradition to the pet concerns of some Western seekers and weirdos has continued. The late Frithjof Schuon, a Traditionalist who (like Guénon) converted to Islam, finding it the best embodiment of the "perennial wisdom", has written a eulogy of the caste system: "Like all sacred institutions, the caste system is based on the very nature of things (...) to justify the caste system, it is enough to ask this question: do heredity and diversity of qualities exist? If yes, the caste system is possible and legitimate."²⁶ Yet, it must be said in his favour that he takes a nuance view, valuing egalitarianism as well, viz. as a natural implication of the fact that apart from difference in qualities, all human beings also have something in common: their immortal soul. Moreover, he has partly abandoned the racial view of caste: "Even the Hindu castes, originally purely Indo-European, could not be limited to a race: there are Tamil, Balinese, Siamese Brahmins."²⁷

Even more recently, a passionate defence of caste has been published by the late Alain Daniélou, musicologist and India-lover of socialist persuasion and homosexual inclination. Like many orientalists before him, he had a distorted perception of Hindu culture, transparent of his own likes and dislikes, e.g. greatly exaggerating the degree of sexual freedom or permissiveness

in Hindu society. He considered the caste system as a primitive but highly effective form of guild socialism.

Daniélou's book *Histoire de l'Inde* includes an imaginative processing of the AIT in all its implications, describing how the white Aryans subdued the dark natives and forced them into the menial castes, etc. His book *Les Quatre Sens de la Vie* ("The Four Meanings of Life") is a passionate plea for the caste system conceived as a way to preserve the racial and cultural identities of different ethnic groups.²⁸ It remains odd, though, to read a glorification of caste by a Westerner who will never have to live in that system. Should it not be possible to appreciate certain historical merits of the caste system (e.g. its decentralized structure which helped Hindu society to survive centuries of Islamic occupation) without going all the way in glorifying it?

Daniélou was an associate of the late Swami Karpatri, a pure Hindu traditionalist whose pro-caste political party, the *Ram Rajya Parishad*, occupied a few seats in the Indian Parliament in the 1950s and 60s. Note, however, that real Hindu traditionalists with a purely traditional Sanskrit-medium education uphold caste without believing in the invasionist or racial theory of caste. Till today, quite a few of them have not even *heard* of the AIT.

1.1.7. Aryan racism today

An unquestioning faith in the AIT, not in some sophisticated or sanitized modern form but in its unadulterated racist version, is still in evidence in ultra-Rightist fringe groups. Consider the following lament by a Belgian critic of Peter Brooke's theatre version of the Mahabharata: "Incomprehensible and shocking is that some major roles have been played by actors of African origin. It is certainly commendable to include Italians, Englishmen etc., but *Africans*? Nothing in the epic permits such a deviation. Let there be no mistake about it: the Mahabharata is not an epic written for some entity called humanity. It is a narrative by and for the Aryas as an Indo-European caste which had imposed its authority in India".²⁹

The man seems unaware that "Aryan" Mahabharata protagonists like Krishna and Draupadi, as well as some of the Vedic rishis, are explicitly described as dark-skinned while nearly all upper-caste Hindus are at least black-haired, a far cry from the *Blond Beast* (to borrow Friedrich Nietzsche's sarcastic term) which was the white racists' idea of the Aryan Superman.³⁰

The far-Right French monthly *Rivarol* still analyzes Indian politics, including the Lok Sabha elections of February 1998, in racial terms. Its commentator makes fun of the plight of Western Leftists who, supposedly anti-racist and anti-colonial, feel constrained to oppose the allegedly "rightist" BJP with its programme of cultural decolonization, and to support the anti-BJP alliance led by Sonia Gandhi, a beneficiary of an alleged Indian racial prejudice: "In the West, India's election campaign has been reduced to the presence of Sonia Gandhi, Rajiv Gandhi's widow, presented as the bulwark against the expected gains of the BJP, considered as sectarian, fascist and anti-Muslim. However, the anti-racist supporters of the pretty Italian are forgetting a decisive factor in her unusual popularity (...): the whiteness of her skin. Living in the myth of Aryan superiority, the Indians, including those from the south, are obsessed with paleness: the paler your skin colour, the better your chances of finding a job or a marriage partner. So, the fascination for Sonia is largely an Aryan fascination!"³¹

Significantly, no such comments have appeared in the Indian press, much less in the Hindu nationalist press (where Sonia is denounced as an agent of the Vatican and derided as the "white elephant" and "the shroud of Turin") or in Indian anti-AIT publications. To Hindu nationalists, *paleface* does not mean "Aryan"; if anything, it could only connote "neocolonialist". Meanwhile, Sonia Gandhi's first year in office as Congress Party leader (1998) undeniably gave her a fast-increasing popularity in spite of her poverty in ideas and leadership.

The foregoing examples show that the political reading of the AIT in terms of 19th-century colonial conceptions is not entirely dead yet in Europe. But at least, it has been definitively marginalized. Though noteworthy as a tenacious relic of the world-view of a bygone age, it is now without political importance, nor does it have a presence in the academic world (the above-mentioned Prof. Jean Haudry has retired, and his institute for IE studies in Lyon is being closed down). The only consequential political motive for Western academics to uphold the AIT is not a lingering commitment to colonial causes, but solidarity with their Indian counterparts who have their own reasons for defending the AIT against its challengers. By contrast, Indian political readings of the AIT still weigh heavily on the present-day political climate of that country.

Footnotes:

¹J. Phule: *Slavery* (1873), republished by the Government of Maharashtra, Mumbai 1991, as vol.1 of *Collected Works of Mahatma Jotirao Phule*, p.xxix-xxx.

²A survey of British colonial thought about the Aryan theory is given in Thomas R. Trautmann: *Aryans and British India*, University of California Press, Berkeley 1997; see also the review by C.A. Bayly: "What language hath joined", *Times Literary Supplement*, 8-8-1997. See also Christine Bolt: *Victorian Attitudes to Race*, Routledge & Kegan, London 1971.

³Reproduced in C.H. Philips ed.: *Select Documents on the History of India and Pakistan*, part IV, OUP, London 1962, p-315.

⁴Keshub Chunder Sen's *Lectures in India*, p.323, quoted by Romila Thapar: "The theory of Aryan race and India", *Social Scientist*, January-March 1996, p.8.

⁵Savitri Devi Mukherji: *Souvenirs et Refléxions d'une Aryenne*, Delhi 1976, p.273.

⁶Quoted by André van Lysebeth: *Tantra, Le Culte de la Féminité*, Flammarion, Fribourg 1988, p.24, from Hermann Lommel: *Les anciens Aryens*, Gallimard, Paris 1943.

⁷Romila Thapar: "The Theory of Aryan Race and India: History and Politics", *Social Scientist*, Delhi, January-March 1996, p.s.

⁸The term is still used in that sense in the Constitution of the Hindu Kingdom of Nepal, which enjoins the King to "uphold Aryan culture".

⁹For a first acquaintance with the Arya Samaj and the causes it fought for, see J.T.F. Jordens: *Swami Shradhananda, His Life and Causes*, CUP, Delhi 1981.

¹⁰Sri Aurobindo: *India's Rebirth*, institut de Recherches Evolutives, Paris 1993, p.228. For his views on Nazism, see also *op.cit.*, p.206, 209, 210, 221.

¹¹Sri Aurobindo: *India's Rebirth*, p. 104.

¹²Sri Aurobindo was also a critic of the AIT, e.g. in an appendix on IE-Dravidian relations in his book *The Secret of the Veda*. His line of argument has been developed further in a meritorious booklet by Michel Danino and Sujata Nahar: *The Invasion that Never Was*, Mira Aditi Centre, Mysore 1996.

¹³Not to be confused with the Anglo-Saxon Reaganite-Thatcherite *New Right* tendency of the 1980s: the *Nouvelle Droite* is, among other things, anti-American, anti-capitalist, and pro-multiculturalist. By far the best English-language introduction to the *Nouvelle Droite* is the winter 1993-94 issue of the American periodical *Telos*. A political manifesto of the *Nouvelle Droite* was published in its quarterly *Eléments*, February 1999.

¹⁴The very idea that IE heritage could include other cultural items beside language is argued and pleasantly illustrated in Shan M.M. Winn: *Heaven, Heroes and Happiness. The Indo-European Roots of Western Ideology*, University Press of America, Lanham MD 1995.

¹⁵A defence of the European Urheimat hypothesis is given by Jean Haudry and Alain de Benoist in the *Nouvelle Droite* periodical *Nouvelle Ecole*, 1997 (issue title *Les Indo-Européens*), along with an exhaustive survey of the development of the field of IE studies. It was praised sky-high for its completeness by Edgar Polomé. (who is a member of the periodical's patronage committee) in the review section of the *Journal of Indo-European Studies*, spring-summer 1997. The 1995 issue of *Nouvelle Ecole* was devoted to the theme of "Tradition", with articles on the IE heritage in India, academically sound but of course full of the Aryan-Dravidian opposition and the inevitable Aryan invasion.

¹⁶Jean Haudry: *Les Indo-Européens*, PUF, Paris 1985, p. 122-124.

¹⁷J. Haudry: *Les Indo-Européens*, p. 114.

¹⁸"Au panthéon de la Nouvelle Droite", Maurice Olender interviewed in *L'Histoire*, October 1992, p.48-51. Reference is, among others, to the republication of Hans F.K. Günther: *Religiosité Indo-Européenne*, Pardès, Puiseaux 1987 (1934), with a foreword by the Belgian Rightist ideologue Robert Steuckers, who tries to whitewash Günther from his reputation of being "Hitler's official anthropologist". On closer reading, we find that Günther's occasional criticism of Nazi policies hardly exonerates him, e.g. he opposed the equal allotment of social security benefits to all Germans regardless of their degree of racial "fitness" (p.12). Of course, Günther also assumes the Aryan invasion of India.

¹⁹Reference is to A. de Benoist's books *Racismes, Antiracismes* (with Pierre-André Taguieff, Julien Freund et al.), Klincksieck 1984; *Democratie: le Problème*, Labyrinthe 1985; and *Europe, Tiers-Monde, Même Combat*, Laffont 1986.

²⁰It is telling how even a Rightist has to invoke Leftist company to gain respectability. The well-known French Leftist author Régis Debray, former fellow-traveller of Che Guevara, has remarked that "there is no life left in the French intellectual scene" (that much is true) "except in the Nouvelle Droite". This Left-Right collaboration was the target of a Leftist campaign in 1993, appealing to all institutions and media to boycott the Nouvelle Droite. The campaign, led by Roger-Pol Droit, author of a meritorious book on the decline of India's stature in Western thought during the 19th century (*L'Oubli de l'Inde*, Paris 1989), backfired: the targeted authors published a counter-statement condemning the witch-hunt, and many of the signatories of the campaign withdrew their own signature.

²¹René Guénon: *La Grande Triade*, Gallimard, Paris 1980 (1957). Remark how the basic division in three, deemed typical of IE culture, is presented here through Chinese philosophy (heaven, atmosphere, earth, corresponding with the Hindu triad *sattva*/transparent, *rajas*/turbid, *tamas*/dark), an unwitting argument against the exclusively IE character of "trifunctionality". As the chief ideologue of "traditionalism", Guénon also wrote about Hinduism: *L'Homme et son Devenir selon le Vedanta*, and *Etudes sur l'Hindouisme*.

²²Sometimes, Evola did make straight pleas for the white racist case, e.g. in an article against racial integration in the USA: "L'Amérique négriifiée", in J. Evola: *L'Arc et la Messue*, Guy Trédaniel/Pardes, Paris 1983 (1971), p.31-39.

²³J. Evola: *Le Fascisme Vu de Droite*, Totalité, Paris 1981.

²⁴J. Evola: *Rivolta contra il Mondo Moderno*, Milan 1934, p. 105; I have used the French translation: *Révolte contre le Monde Moderne*, Editions de l'Homme, Ottawa/Brussels, p.115ff.

²⁵Ananda K. Coomaraswamy: *Spiritual Authority and Temporal Power in the Indian Theory of Government*, Munshiram Manoharlal, Delhi 1978 (1942), P.2.

²⁶Frithjof Schuon: *Castes et Races*, Arché, Milan 1979, p.7.

²⁷Frithjof Schuon: *Castes et Races*, p.37.

²⁸A. Daniélou: *Histoire de l'Inde*, Fayard, Paris 1983 (1971); *Les Quatre Sens de la Vie: La Structure Sociale de l'Inde Traditionnelle*, Buchet-Chastel, Paris 1984 (1975).

²⁹Ralf van den Haute: "Le MahAbhArata ou la mémoire la plus longue", *L'Anneau* (Brussels), #22-23 (1993)

³⁰When I communicated the present criticism to him in November 1998, Mr. Van den Haute replied that he had already changed his mind after actually reading a Mahabharata translation. He maintained nonetheless that Peter Brooke had only included Africans in his cast because "this would please the commissars of political correctness who control the subsidy purse strings".

³¹P.P.B.: "Elections indiennes: la longue marche des hindouistes", *Rivarol*, early March 1998.

1. Political aspects of the Aryan invasion debate

1.2. THE ARYAN INVASION THEORY IN INDIAN POLITICS

1.2.1. The AIT and the “anti-national forces”

There are quite a few cases worldwide of late-medieval and modern history having repercussions on contemporary politics, witness the role of bad memories in ex-Yugoslavia. By contrast, I do not know of any question of *ancient* history which is as loaded with actual political significance as is the AIT in India. The AIT was turned into a political tool in order to question the Indian identity of the Indians, and thereby weaken the claims of Indians to their own country. This political use of the AIT continues till today, especially at the hands of what Hindu nationalists call “the anti-national forces”. Christian “liberation theologians”, Islamic missionaries, assorted separatists and like-minded anti-Hindu or anti-India activists are still highlighting the AIT in order to:

1) Mobilize lower-caste people, supposedly the “subdued natives” forced into the Apartheid prisonhouse of caste by the invaders, against the upper-caste people, supposedly the progeny of the “invading Aryans”. All this propaganda is carried out in the name of the low-caste leader Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, eventhough Ambedkar himself had strongly rejected the AIT and the notion that caste status has a racial origin: “European students of caste (...), themselves impregnated by colour prejudices, very readily imagined it to be the chief factor in the Caste problem. But nothing can be farther from the truth, and Dr. Ketkar is right when he insists that ‘all the princes whether they belonged to the so-called Aryan race or to the so-called Dravidian race, were Aryas. Whether a tribe or a family was racially Aryan or Dravidian was a question which never troubled the people of India until foreign scholars came in and began to draw the line.’”³²

2) Mobilize Dravidian-speakers against speakers of IE languages, esp. through the Dravidian separatist movement which was started under British patronage in 1916 as the Justice Party, later refounded as the Dravida Kazhagam, and which reached its peak in the 1950s. One of its gimmicks was the glorification of the “black Dravidian” hero Ravana against the “white Aryan” hero Rama, disregarding the Ramayana information that Ravana was actually an Aryan coloniser of Sri Lanka and a performer of Vedic rituals, while Rama was dark-skinned.³³ Its most consequential success was the sabotage (masterminded by the English-speaking elite in Delhi, not in the Dravidians’ but in its own interest) of the implementation of the Constitutional provision that Hindi, a North-Indian IE language, replace English as official language by 1965.

3) Mobilize the tribals, who have been given the new name “aboriginals” (*AdivAs*) as part of this strategy, against the non-tribals, who are to be treated on a par with the European invaders of America and Australia. This in spite of the demonstrable foreign (East-Asian) origin of the Munda and Tibeto-Burmese languages spoken by the most vocal tribes.

4) Mobilize Indian politicians towards delegitimizing Sanskrit, that “foreign language brought by the Aryan invaders”, as India’s culture language and as a school subject, in order to further dehinduize India and weaken her cultural unity: “Sanskrit should be deleted from the Eighth Schedule of the Constitution because it is a foreign language brought to the country by foreign invaders - the Aryans.”³⁴

5) Mobilize world opinion against the “racist Aryans”, meaning the Hindus, since they are the “Aryan invaders who imposed the caste system as a kind of Apartheid to preserve their racial purity and dominance”, never mind the fact that the association of “Aryan” with “race” is a strictly European invention unknown to Hindu tradition. Now that “idolater” and “heathen” have lost their force as swearwords, “racist” is a brilliant new way of demonizing Hinduism.

1.2.2. Crank racism

The explicit use of the AIT for political purposes is in evidence in a string of publications aimed at pitting the lower castes and the tribals against Hinduism, from Swami Dharma Theertha's *The Menace of Hindu Imperialism* (1941) to S.K. Biswas's *Autochthon of India and the Aryan Invasion* (1995).³⁵ It is most obvious in the militant anti-Brahmin movement spearheaded by the Bangalore fortnightly *Dalit Voice*, edited by V.T. Rajshekar, a former *Indian Express* journalist fired because of his links with Khalistani terrorism. This extremist wing of the broader *Dalit movement* (Dalit meaning "oppressed", ex-Untouchable)³⁶ has formulated an Indian variant of Afrocentric history, copied from the Black Muslims in the USA, with whom it co-operates closely.³⁷

Thus, the theory of *continental drift*, first suggested by Abraham Ortelius in the 16th century, and formulated scientifically by Alfred Wegener in 1915, is harnessed to the cart of Dalit Afrocentrism: "The Dalits were the original inhabitants of India and resemble the African in physical features. It is said that India and Africa were one land-mass until separated by the ocean. So both the Africans and the Indian Untouchables had common ancestors."³⁸ Actually, the break-up of the *Urkontinent* Gondwanaland took place millions of years before mankind spread across the face of the earth.

More importantly, physical anthropology does not bear out the African connection of India's lowest castes: though their ancestors may well have migrated from Africa along with those of every other *homo sapiens*, they are racially far closer to the Indian upper castes than to the Africans. It does not even bear out the racial dividing-line between upper and lower castes: lower castes are genetically closer to the upper castes of their own region than to people of the same caste rank in other parts of India.³⁹ A recent survey has yielded this conclusion: "Detailed anthropomorphic surveys carried out among the people of Uttar Pradesh, Gujarat, Maharashtra, Bengal and Tamil Nadu revealed significant regional differences within a caste and a closer resemblance between castes of different varnas within a region than between sub-populations of the caste from different regions."⁴⁰ Yet, cranky as it is, *Dalit Voice* is strongly supported by militant Islamic centres, by Christian Liberation Theology circles and by many Western academics because they share its anti-Brahminism.⁴¹ Their reason probably is that they share *Dalit Voice's* motto: "What Hindus hate, we must love, and what Hindus love, we must hate."⁴²

In fairness to the Dalit cause, it must be emphasized that *Dalit Voice* is not representative (and often diametrically opposed to the goals) of the broader Dalit movement as envisaged by Dr. Bhimrao Ambedkar (1891-1956), a most necessary movement given the slackness of the other castes in implementing social reform. Thus, while Ambedkar became a Buddhist, *Dalit Voice* downplays the liberating message of Buddhism in favour of Christianity and Islam, religions criticized and rejected by Dr. Ambedkar.

1.2.3. Anti-Brahminism and anti-Semitism

Describing the Brahmins as the "Jews of India", V.T. Rajshekar combines anti-Brahminism with anti-Semitism: "Since the Brahminical Social Order is much more ancient it is quite likely that the Zionist founding fathers got their inspiration from the BSO (...) *Dalit Voice* has thus proved right in predicting that the Jews and the 'Jews of India' will join hands to crush Muslims, Blacks and India's Dalits."⁴³ He publishes calls to "get a copy of the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion* from the Iranian embassy in Delhi to understand the Zionist hatred against Blacks and Muslims."⁴⁴

Rajshekar also copies some of the classics of anti-Semitism: "The First World War, the Second World War, the establishment of Communism, the rise of Hitler, were also systematically planned and executed by Zionists."⁴⁵ With his sex scandal, Bill Clinton was the "victim of a Zionist conspiracy", for the Zionists, who "control the entire American politics, economy and the media as well", are "angry that Clinton refused to finish the 'demon' of Islam and render all-out support to

Israel”.⁴⁶ Rajshekar’s constant railing against the *CIA-Zionist-Brahminical world conspiracy* has earned him a mention in a recent authoritative survey of contemporary anti-Semitism.⁴⁷

Even apart from this confabulated conspiracy, an analysis of anti-Brahmin rhetoric shows that it is approximately, and in considerable detail, the Indian equivalent of anti-Semitism. Thus, Brahmins think they are the chosen ones; they (at least the orthodox) distinguish themselves by funny dress and hairstyle; they are cowards but past masters at manipulation and pitting outsiders against one another; they are pale bookworms with a transregional language of their own; they always help their own kind and deceive the others; and they monopolize wealth. For an early example, Jotirao Phule wrote: “The Brahmin’s natural (instinctive) temperament is mischievous and cantankerous, and it is so inveterate that it can never be eradicated.”⁴⁸

Moreover, just as in the Nazi view the antagonism between Soviet “Judeo-Bolshevism” and American “Jewish plutocracy” was but a deceptive front for the omnipresent Jewish hand, the Indian conflict between traditionalist Brahmins and socialist Brahmins (e.g. the founders of the Communist Party of India, mostly Brahmins) is also a mere puppet-show masking the hand-in-glove cooperation between these two types of Brahmins.⁴⁹ Even their occasional shows of goodness and concern for the common good always turn out to be exercises in manipulation. And worst of all, as per the AIT, the Brahmins are *foreigners*, usurping the rightful inheritance of the sons of the soil.

This line of anti-Brahmin rhetoric on the model of anti-Semitism comes full circle with the following allegation, originally made in 1971 by K.K. Gangadharan, a Leftist sociologist from Maharashtra working in Christ College in Kanpur, and since then adopted by the likes of V.T. Rajshekar: the Chitpavan Brahmins, a caste in Maharashtra which immigrated from Afghanistan (hence their taller build and lighter colour) when that region was islamized in the 10th century, and which took a leadership role in the struggle against the Moghuls, the British Raj and Congress secularism, are so “arrogant” and “fanatical” because, unbeknownst to other Indians, they actually have Jewish ancestors!⁵⁰

That Brahmins monopolize wealth has even less basis in fact than the same stereotype of Jews. Brahmins always had an ideal of “simple living and high thinking”, and observed a prohibition of “selling” their Vedic knowledge and ritual status; Brahmins with lucrative posts counted *ipso facto* as lower in rank. Moreover, the traditional sources of wealth for certain Brahmin families have dried up (abolition of maharaja courts, nationalization or expropriation of temples) and today poverty is rampant among most non-westernized Brahmins. But it is easy to sell the notion that the ritually highest caste must also be the richest, esp. to Western audiences brought up on one-dimensional materialism.

However, the wealth aspect of anti-Semitism does find an Indian counterpart in the *Bania* merchant caste, which in the past few centuries and particularly in the most islamized parts of the Subcontinent occupied exactly the same niche in society as the Jews in medieval Europe: often they were the only Hindus who could buy themselves the safety which allowed them to preserve their Hindu identity, and as non-Muslim money-lenders they were allowed to practise “usury”, which is prohibited to Muslims. As a devout and vegetarian class, they are stereotypical Hindus, and at the same time they are a natural object of envy, just like their successful Hindu relatives in Britain and Africa. This makes them another excellent scapegoat for anti-“Aryan” crank racism in India, as exemplified by *Dalit Voice*’s regular tirades against the most famous Bania, Mahatma Gandhi, and against the Bania core constituency of the BJP.

1.2.4. Foreign support for anti-Brahminism

According to the politicized version of the AIT, the following is the grim truth about the situation of the pre-Aryan populations of India: “The Aryan invasion has been a disaster for India, just like for

all the other Alpino-Mediterranean peoples invaded by the steppe nomads. Let us imagine that the Huns had overpowered us, destroyed our civilization, and that we would be their slaves till today, as well as our descendents for thousands of years to come, and we will understand the drama of the defeated Harappan civilization.”⁵¹ These are the words of a locally well-known Belgian yoga teacher, André van Lysebeth, someone who owes a lot to Hindu tradition and who is probably dubbed “that Hindu” by his neighbours. Yet, in attacking the Brahmins he is merciless.

The chief instrument of this racist enslavement was the caste system. In describing the horrors of caste, Mr. Van Lysebeth has the good sense to draw attention to the two separate concepts of *jAti* (the thousands of actual endogamous communities) and *varNa* (the theoretical four layers of society: Brahmins, Kshatriyas, Vaishyas, Shudras), which Europeans have lumped together in the Portuguese term *caste*. But the next thing he does is to re-equate them, this time as being both terms of racial purity: “The Sanskrit term *jati*, which designates what we call the castes, means ‘race’, neither more nor less. It’s simple, it’s clear.”⁵² And: “The prime criterion of discrimination, purely racial, is *varna*, a Sanskrit word meaning colour (evidently of the skin).”⁵³ Actually, *jAti* has all the meanings which the word “race” had in the 18th-19th century: kinship group, nation, race, species. Thus, *mAnava-jAti* means “the human race”, or more accurately, “the human species”. And *varNa*, “colour”, has nothing to do with skin colour, but refers to symbolic colours allotted to the elements, the cardinal directions, and likewise also to the layers of society.

But the notion of caste as a form of racism is well-entrenched: “Compared with the imposed racism of the Aryans in India, the Apartheid in South Africa is a gentle joke, and I am weighing my words.”⁵⁴ The villain of the piece is easily identifiable: “Aryanized India is under the thumb of the racist Brahmins, smug and full of their superiority over all other human beings, even over all of creation.”⁵⁵ They set the tone for all the ills of Hindu society: “Venality, hypocrisy, callous unconcern, are the characteristic traits of the Aryans, starting with the Brahmins.”⁵⁶

But Mr. van Lysebeth, who equates Brahminism with Hitlerism, sees the problem as even larger than India: “From India to Europe, the same drama has repeated itself everywhere. Leaving their icy steppes, from 3000 BC onwards nomadic plunderers invade the pre-Aryan civilizations, making the defeated natives their serfs. These barbarians were neither of pure race, nor superior, except in brute force. Everywhere they have destroyed civilizations.” The only revenge left to the natives was to smuggle their own traditions, supposedly centred around a Mother Goddess cult, into the new orthodoxies as a counter-current against “the foreign patriarchal system, imported from the cold”.⁵⁷ In this age of multiculturalism, we had just learned to scrap the word “barbarian” from our dictionaries, and that we should see the complex cultural motifs and structures even in the most illiterate and primitive cultures. But the Barbarian is back, and his name is Brahmin.

It is perfectly OK to say about Brahmins those things which anti-racist legislation has prohibited in many countries in the case of Blacks and others. Be that as it may, the remarkable point here is the zeal with which a Western yoga adept has thrown himself into the anti-“Aryan” struggle. That is how deep the AIT has moulded public opinion in an anti-Hindu sense: the very people whom you would expect to sympathize with India and with the community which has preserved ancient traditions through the millennia, have been enlisted in the opposite camp, for no other reason than their belief in the AIT and the concomitant racial understanding of caste.

The same thing is true of the Western Indology departments, where many professors share the positions of anti-Brahminism to a greater or lesser extent. In my student days in Leuven University’s Asian Studies department, I saw students of Chinese develop into zealous defenders of the Chinese occupation of Tibet, and students of Islam become apologists of Islam. The Indology students, by contrast, never developed such feelings for Hinduism, and this was in large measure due to the negative light cast on Hinduism by its original sin of the Aryan invasion and

the “racist imposition of caste”. Of course it is legitimate to criticize caste; but it is perverse to do so on the basis of false history.

1.2.5. The Aryan conspiracy

The anomaly that the Aryan invasion is the key event in Indian history but that no Hindu ever heard of it, has led to a new species of paranoia. Wherever an invasionist looks around in India, he will always see reminders of the devastating Aryan invasion. Often, these reminders are of an “occult” type: those who pass them on to future generations are not aware of their true meaning. It sounds like the story, popular among enthusiasts of the divinatory Tarot cards, that Egyptian Masters of Wisdom decided to encode their secret knowledge in the designs of ordinary playing-cards, so that man’s propensity to play games would ensure the transmission of the ancient knowledge to future generations until such time as people would once more be worthy of being initiated into it. In the case of the Aryan invasion, the time has come: after 3000 years of silence and forgetfulness about the Aryan invasion, the secret has been uncovered, and the hidden meaning of all manner of cultural elements is finally being understood.

Thus, Malati Shendge claims that a number of hymns of the Rg-Veda were composed to celebrate the victory of the Aryans over the non-Aryans, while at the same time incorporating some of the traditional lore of the more civilized defeated non-Aryans. In her view, this explains the prohibition for Shudras (low-caste people supposed to be the natives) of listening to Vedic recitation: “The Shudras were especially debarred from the practice of the Vedic religion. This was not so much for preserving the purity or the monopoly as for the fear which constantly haunted the Aryan mind and of which it could never be free, viz. the revolt of the non-Aryans leading to their (Aryan) expulsion from this land. Thus the Shudra was prohibited even from listening to the Vedic literature simply because if he understood the basis of this religion he might rebel, jeopardizing the social peace. Secondly, if he understood the dirty trick that was played on him, i.e. the borrowal of the Asura lore and its transformation into an Aryan religion, he may once again be reminded of his past glory.”⁵⁸

One wonders why these natives, who vastly out-numbered the Aryans and lived their separate lives in their designated corner of the caste system, were unable to preserve the true story about the usurpation of their land and power by these foreign invaders. But then, gullible Westerners listening to the invasionist reinterpretation of Hindu lore by Indian agitators have been made to believe that the true story has effectively been preserved in the popular Tantrik tradition.

Thus, Mr. Van Lysebeth suspects that Hindu ritual and symbolism is all about the struggle between Aryan invaders and Dravidians. Even Shiva’s trident, now a symbol of militant Hinduism as well as a mystical symbol into which all manner of philosophical profundities have been read, is really a symbol of pre-Aryan resistance against the Aryan invaders: “India is a volcano where the pressure mounts under the crust constituted by the millennarian Aryan structure.(...) Shiva’s trident is ‘officially’ the three *gunas* [the three qualities: light, turbid, dark] of *Samkhya* [=cosmological philosophy], or the three *nadis* (subtle energy channels) of yoga. But for those who *know*, it is all different, for the trident was the preferred weapon of the Dravidians, while its Aryan counterpart had four teeth. The Rgveda says: ‘With their four-pointed weapon (*catu rashri*) Mitra and Varuna kill the bearers of the trident.’ The Indian Rajmohan Nath (...) comments on this verse: ‘This gives an indication of the ancient conflict between the two camps which still continues in India.’”⁵⁹

Those who care to look up the Vedic verse (1:152:2) will find that it merely says, in Ralph Griffith’s literal translation, that “the fearful four-edged bolt smites down the three-edged”. The passage as a whole is one of the many difficult points in Vedic translation, and every modern translator has a different version; but though they are mostly well-grounded in the AIT, no serious translator has turned this passage into a reference to aboriginal tridents against invaders’ quadridents. The most logical explanation available is the one given by the classical

commentator Sayana: in glorifying the might of the truth (*satya*) in the sage's power-word (*mantra*), mentioned in the first half of the verse, it is asserted in general (as if it were a well-known proverb at that time) that he who has more or stronger weapons defeats him who has fewer or less effective ones.⁶⁰

As for the meaning of *trirashri*, which was translated as "(Shivaite) trident", its dictionary meaning is simply "three-cornered"⁶¹; it is part of a series which includes *catrashri* and even *shatashri*, "having a hundred angles or edges (said of the thunderbolt)".⁶² There is no hint that the trident is meant.⁶³ More decisively, there is nothing un-Aryan about the trident, considering that it was an attribute of the Greco-Roman god Poseidon/Neptune, both names with IE etymologies. In Germanic and Celtic folk art, three-armed (triskel) and four-armed (tetraskel) variations of a given symbol (fylfot, swastika) coexist. That the three-armed version is anti-Aryan and the four-armed one pro-Aryan, is without foundation.

Likewise, Malati Shendge and others have made much of the Vedic myth of the Dragon-slayer: Indra defeating the dragon Vrtra would be the Aryan invader defeating the native Vrtra. Since this killing is associated with the release of the waters which were withheld by Vrtra, it is also imagined that the Aryans had destroyed the impressive waterworks with which the Dravidian Harappans ensured the fertility of their lands. However, the myth of the Dragon-slayer is a pan-IE myth, even known among non-IE people like the Babylonians (Marduk defeating Tiamat). Have they all invaded Harappa and killed its chief water-engineer?

Mr. Van Lysebeth was invited to attend a Vedic fire ceremony (*agnihotra*) once, but those wily Brahmins were not able to deceive him: "They are careful not to tell us that it is in commemoration of the destruction of the enemies, the *Dasas*, that several ingredients are thrown into the fire, among which the grains symbolize the destruction of the harvest, the cities and the forts, nor [do they tell us] that the pieces of meat represent the enemies burned to death."⁶⁴ Is it not far-fetched to explain the ritual use of fire, which exists in a great many cultures that have flourished on earth, as a commemoration of the burning down of Harappan cities? And the ingredients of the offering as representing the enemies who were burnt alive in those genocidal bonfires? Especially when no traces of this Aryan campaign of burning and destruction have ever been discovered.

Numerous allegorical interpretations can be imposed on any text or symbol; in New Age bookstores, you can find books on the "esoteric meaning of fairy tales". But this is mostly just what the Germans call *Hineininterpretieren*, "interpreting meanings *into* the text". None of the authors imposing an invasionist interpretation on Hindu scriptures, rituals and symbols, has ever shown how their reading is anything more than just that. They are merely, as the saying goes, elated to discover the Easter eggs which they themselves have concealed.

1.2.6. Indian Marxism

Among the most active and determined academic opponents of any serious reopening of the AIT debate, we find Marxists such as Prof. Romila Thapar (whose positions will be discussed below) and Prof. Ram Sharan Sharma.⁶⁵ Let us make it clear from the outset that there is nothing controversial about the label "Marxist": in India, Marxism is still the dominant paradigm in the Humanities, and hundreds of academics are still proud to call themselves Marxists. It is therefore a bit bizarre when Romila Thapar insinuates that the non-AIT school merely uses the label "Marxist" as a cheap way to dismiss the Indian pro-AIT scholars like Sharma and herself without proper refutation: "Those that question their theories are dismissed as Marxists!"⁶⁶ If confirmation from an unsuspect Marxist source is needed, Tom Bottomore's standard dictionary of Marxism mentions and quotes both R.S. Sharma and Romila Thapar as representatives of Indian Marxism.⁶⁷

The Marxist dominance of India's cultural sphere is not a convenient rumour, it can easily be documented and its genesis traced and explained. Nehru was fond of Communism though personally too bourgeois to join it. It was chiefly his daughter Indira Gandhi (guided by her secretary P.N. Haksar) who, when she was critically dependent on Communist support during her intra-Congress power struggle, promoted Communists (often unregenerate Stalinists till today) and created many new institutes for them, including Jawaharlal Nehru University. In 1975, when the Communist bid to take over the Congress Party from within was thwarted by Indira's son Sanjay Gandhi, the Communist power position in the intellectual sector was left untouched: its importance escaped the Gandhi family, who only focused on immediate political power. When in 1998, the new BJP Government nominated people of its own choice to the Indian Council of Historical Research, a roar of indignation went up among Indian Marxists against this "politicization of scholarship", highlighting to the alert observer the extent to which the Marxists themselves had treated the ICHR as their own playground, and how, like spoilt children, they couldn't stand losing it.⁶⁸

Marx's Indian followers have a confused but predominantly negative attitude to the question of India's legitimacy as a united republic. They are willing to accept the unified Indian state as long as it is useful to their own ends (as in 1959-62, after their election victory in Kerala gave them hope of taking over India, a hope crushed by the embarrassing Chinese invasion of 1962), but they are just as ready to discard it, because they do not believe in it and have no loyalty towards it. Around the time of independence, they actively campaigned for the Balkanization of India, hoping to gobble up one fragment after another. They never tire of denouncing anything that bolsters India's unity as a "myth". For them, India is an artificial unit, a prisonhouse of nations, bound to fall apart.⁶⁹

In contrast with other colonized countries, Marxists in India played no important role in the freedom movement, except negatively. According to a Western Marxist observer: "Uncompromising opposition to Gandhi and his cherished Hindu convictions meant that communists were cut off in a considerable measure from the mainstream of the patriotic struggle".⁷⁰ Ever since, they have supported every antinational cause: the crushing of the *Quit India* movement (1942), Partition (1947), the Razakar terror campaign to prevent the merger of Hyderabad with India (1948), the Chinese claims to Indian territory (up to 1962: "China's chairman is also India's chairman"). As late as 1997, Communist leader Sitaram Yechury refused to admit that China had been the aggressor in 1962.⁷¹ In the 1990s, they have threatened secession of the states they control in the event of a Hindu-nationalist election victory.⁷² It is a different matter that by the time this victory took place, in 1998, the Communist movement had become too weak and grey to hazard such action.

To complete the picture, it should be realized that as born upper-caste Hindus alienated by westernization, Indian Marxists are animated by a seething hatred of their ancestral culture. Unlike the British who felt some patronizing sympathy for the heathens whom God had entrusted to their civilizing care, anglicized Hindus feel a need to exorcize the remainders of Hindu heritage from themselves and their surroundings.

1.2.7. Marxism against India

To understand the compulsion on Indian Marxists to hold out against changes in the dominant AIT paradigm as long as possible, we should know a few things about their unique position as compared to that of Marxists elsewhere. Their animosity against the native culture of India and against a theory which would strengthen their own country's prestige is somewhat surprising, for in most Third World countries, Marxists have also been ardent nationalists in the struggle for cultural as well as political and economic decolonization. In Communist countries, national history was rewritten not only to vilify the reactionary forces (e.g. Confucius) but also to highlight and glorify the nation's contribution to material culture and scientific progress. This is or was true of China, the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and of their supporters abroad. Thus, Cambridge

scientist historian Joseph Needham's loyalty was to Mao's version of Stalinism as a system, but he got enamoured with China itself and wrote a very Sinocentric history of *Science and Civilization in China*, highlighting the unexpectedly large contribution which China has made to human progress.

Along the same lines, we must note in India the lone Marxist historian Bhagwan Singh, who has contributed to the critique of the AIT, focusing specifically on the material culture and the economic data available in Vedic literature and the archaeological record of the Harappan cities, to show that the two match.⁷³ Also, Western Marxists of an earlier generation have protested against the imperialist projection of colonial racism onto the colonized native society, as in the AIT-related racial theory of caste: "The early Indo-Aryans could no more have thought in modern terms of race prejudice than they could have invented the airplane."⁷⁴ Finally, Soviet historians have extolled ancient Hindu contributions to science and political culture which were ignored by their political allies in India.⁷⁵

Most Indian Marxists, by contrast, along with their supporters in Western Indology departments (when it comes to controversial issues, most Western India-watchers are incredibly gullible parrots of whatever their privileged Indian contacts tell them), go out of their way to belittle India and to vilify as "chauvinistic" or worse any attempt to revalue India's contribution. The mainstream of contemporary Indian Marxism is true to Karl Marx's own contempt for and worst-possible interpretation of all things Indian. Marx thought that Hinduism "was the ideology of an oppressive and outworn society"; he "shared the distaste of most Europeans for its more lurid features. (...) he was as sceptical as his Hindu followers were to be of any notion of a Hindu 'golden age' of the past."⁷⁶

Marx acknowledged the colonialists' historical mission of eliminating the "Asiatic mode of production", and claimed that colonial rule could only be compared (to its obvious advantage) to the memory of Turkish or the threat of Czarist rule, but not to native rule, for which India was historically unfit because it had never been a nation. In an 1853 letter, Marx wrote that "Indian society has no history at all, at least no known history. What we call its history, is but the history of the successive intruders who founded their empires on the passive basis of that unresisting and unchanging society."⁷⁷

The idea of a continuous and glorious civilization in North India dating back more than 5,000 years does not fit in well with this vision. That of the barbaric Aryans imposing foreign rule on the hapless natives is much more useful, esp. for characterizing Indian society as "oppressive". This way, lingering colonial prejudices of Western scholars and the class interests of India's anglicized elite and anti-Hindu intelligentsia reinforce each other to create the strange spectacle of Indians and indologists virulently opposing any rethinking of India's past which might increase the weight of India's own contribution to her own history.

For instance, Romila Thapar questions the term "Indus-Saraswati civilization", which "evokes the Rigveda" (by bringing the Vedic river Saraswati, where the biggest concentration of Harappan cities has been found, into the picture), for its "ideological and political dimensions", and she imputes to its proponents the following motive: "The equating of the Harappan and Vedic culture is not essentially an attempt at correlating archaeological and literary sources (...) There are other agendas which are being addressed in the attempt."⁷⁸ It is bad form and bad scholarship to bypass someone's arguments to attack his motives, and even worse to replace his stated motives with imputed motives, but this is one phenomenon which outside observers of the debate will have to get used to: Indian Marxism has given wide currency to the approach of "*I don't care what arguments you come up with, I'm going to tell you what your true motives are, you reactionary pig*".

But then, even if reprehensible, this imputation of motives may once in a while hit upon the truth. I believe Prof. Thapar is right when she guesses this reasoning in the minds of Indian AIT critics:

"If it can be argued that the Harappan culture is in fact Vedic or that the Rigveda is earlier even than the Harappan, then the Vedas continue to be foundational to the subcontinental civilisation of South Asia and also attract the encomium of representing an advanced civilization, superior even to the pastoral-agrarian culture actually described in Vedic texts."⁷⁹ However, I think that in saying this, Prof. Thapar has also revealed what exactly goes on in the minds of Indian Marxist critics of AIT criticism. Indeed, Vedic tradition does gain in stature by being identified with the vast and advanced Harappan civilization: that is why Indian nationalists like it, and just as precisely, it is why Indian Marxists abhor it.

1.2.8. The establishment vs. the outsiders

Since the Marxists have occupied the seats of academic and media power for decades, it is no surprise that their attacks on others often take the form of a haughty dismissal. David Frawley's contributions are laughed off with reference to his lack of western academic training (he studied the Vedas in a traditional Indian setting, becoming an acknowledged *vedacarya*). The fact that he published about Ayurveda and Vedic astrology are sufficient to denounce him as a "quack". With reference to Subhash Kak and N.S. Rajaram, indeed complete outsiders to the Indian history establishment, Romila Thapar dismisses the contribution of these "American-trained professional scientists researching on ancient India" as essentially "nineteenth-century tracts [though] peppered with references to using the computer so as to suggest scientific objectivity", typical for amateurs who do history "as a hobby".⁸⁰

Should people be allowed to speak out on subjects not mentioned on their diplomas? Romila Thapar seems to think so when it comes to her own case, e.g. as a non-linguist she invokes the authority of the linguistic evidence several times: "Such an early date for the Rigveda is untenable on the available linguistic evidence nor is there support for the argument of a westward flow of people from northern India, neither from linguistic nor from archaeological sources"⁸¹ And: "These reconstructions disregard the linguistic data, probably because it would puncture their argument. It is conveniently stated that the linguistic models arise out of political and cultural factors and presumably therefore may be ignored."⁸²

The latter sentence is an incorrect rendering of N.S. Rajaram's rejection of the linguistic evidence. Though he does make much of the political context behind the linguistic theory of an East-European *Urheimat*, his point is, rather, that the reconstruction of a proto-language can never reach beyond the stage of mere hypothesis, for it cannot pass the decisive scientific test of empirical verifications.⁸³ This critique is pertinent, though by no means as devastating for the scientific value of historical linguistics as Prof. Rajaram assumes; it is at any rate more than a "convenient" excuse.

I believe AIT critics are wrong to disregard the linguistic evidence, but I also believe that for those who rightly choose to take it into account, evaluating the linguistic evidence requires specific competence. The US-based scientists' exaggerated skepticism vis-à-vis linguistics has at least made them abstain from dabbling in a subject they don't sufficiently understand. By contrast, Romila Thapar discusses not only the linguistic but also the astronomical evidence, if only to dismiss it as unreliable.⁸⁴ Now, here is a subject on which I would rather trust a NASA scientist like Prof. Rajaram than a bookworm from JNU's History department. Likewise, the evidence of Vedic mathematics (Baudhayana's *Shulba Sutra* as logical ancestor of Babylonian and Greek mathematics) is a subject which I would rather leave in the care of professional mathematicians like Rajaram and Subhash Kak. If anything looks "19th-century" in this debate, it is the conspicuous negligence by Prof. Thapar and other invasionists of the input from the exact sciences, an input which has gone far in strengthening the anti-AIT case.

True, there is often something naive about exact scientists when they enter the field of the Humanities. But then, people from the Sciences have a logic and a lucidity and a healthy aversion to compromise with prevalent opinion (natural laws not being bendable to opinion), so

that, once they have learned the ways of the Humanities, they often do much better than the established authorities. This is particularly true in India, where bright students are invariably guided towards the scientific departments, so that the Humanities typically attract the second-rate students, quite a few of whom go on to become professors. Anyone can master the art of providing erudite footnotes, but the Vedic and Harappan evidence, particularly the evidence reachable through the “hard” sciences (astronomy, geology), is a much more serious nut to crack.

Another Marxist historian, Parvathi Menon, has ridiculed Dr. Natwar Jha, who has elaborated a Sanskrit-based decipherment of the Indus script, as “just a schoolmaster”.⁸⁵ Comments N.S. Rajaram: “This is not true, but it doesn’t matter. The great mathematician Ramanujan was a clerk in the Madras port, while Einstein himself was serving as a clerk in the Swiss patent office when he discovered Relativity. (...) The idea of objectivity is beyond such minds; status means everything.”⁸⁶

Mercifully, Romila Thapar and her friends haven’t found occasion to comment on Shrikant Talageri yet. His bright and innovative contributions, quite literally written after working hours “as a hobby”, would not suggest to the readers that he actually makes a living as a bank clerk. There was a time when Marxists denounced academic ivory towers and applauded the contributions of working people, but in India they have been too privileged to be even polite towards people who make an honest living.

1.2.9. Indian Marxists abroad

In their campaign against India and Hinduism, Indian Marxists get plenty of patronage from Western universities. When Non-Resident Indians raise money to fund a chair of Indian Studies in a Western university, what they get for their money is in most cases the appointment of an Indian Marxist academic who comes to confirm the Western audiences in their most negative stereotypes about India, e.g. by reducing every single aspect of Hindu civilization to “caste oppression” (it is Axioma 1 of contemporary Indian Studies that Hinduism is caste, wholly caste and nothing but caste). Thus, the Hinduja Foundation has set up an Indic Studies programme in Columbia University, but its staff includes determinedly anti-Hindu characters who even vilify their own sponsors at conferences elsewhere.

One occasion where I saw US-based Indian Marxists in action was at the 1996 Annual South Asia Conference in Madison, Wisconsin, in a panel purportedly dealing with the AIT debate. I knew that excellent and innovative papers by N.S. Rajaram and Shrikant Talageri had been rejected by the organizers, so I felt entitled to expect presentations of top-notch scholarship dwarfing even that of Rajaram and Talageri. Instead, what the audience got, was a canvassing session for the “Forum of Indian Leftists” without any scholarly papers. The speakers disdained to even mention any of the argumentative contents of the AIT debate, except “David Frawley’s paradox” (the AIT’s puzzling implication pointed out by Frawley, viz. that the Harappan civilization had numerous cities but no literature, while Vedic civilization had a vast literature but no cities)⁸⁷, which they simply laughed off without discussion *ad rem*.

But Frawley’s paradox is entirely pertinent: what are the chances that a literate culture leaves the biggest conglomerate of archaeological sites behind, but only a handful of short inscriptions as the complete corpus of its literature; while the illiterate conquerors produce a vast and sophisticated literature within a few centuries, but leave no sizable architecture behind? What are the chances that the largest civilization of the world loses its language to a conquering band of nomadic tribesmen? The AIT has the weight of probability against it.

The one interesting piece of information in the whole session was presented by Vijay Prashad: about the impact of the Aryan race theory on the position of (Asian) Indians in the USA in the past century. It turns out that for much of the time, they were counted as “white” thanks to their IE

connection, and that they strongly held on to this profitable classification rather than to show solidarity with other non-white minorities. But in the 1970s, when the policy of positive discrimination for ethnic minorities started to have a serious impact, Indians were not slow to parade their skin colour as entitling them to minority privileges. If true, this is yet another interesting instance of the political use of the AIT. However, Prashad revealed his destructive intentions when he called *Dalit Voice* “a wonderful paper” and praised its disruptive positions, esp. its division of Indians in aboriginals and invaders.

Biju Matthew insisted on the Stalinist position that in the social sciences, no theory ever comes without a political agenda. So, he reduced the whole AIT debate to a question of cultural policy of the Indian bourgeoisie, which was badly trying to be European. This was indeed part of the motive for the 19th-century *acceptance* of the AIT by the likes of Keshab Chandra Sen, but not of the present-day *rejection* of the AIT. But Matthew had not cared to notice the diametrical opposition between the former, colonial, and the latter, anti-colonial positions, perhaps because he counted on a knee-jerk reaction of hostility to anyone who merely utters the word

He was all the more serious about deciding the burning question whether Non-Resident Indians should call themselves “Indian” or “South-Asian”; he himself opted for the latter “because it has the advantage of being antinational”. He wanted South-Asians in North America to shake off their religious and national identities and develop an “identity project” on the model of the African-Americans, which would only leave race as the distinctive trait of South-Asians in the US, a self-identification which approximates racism in its original meaning. I am in no position to berate African-Americans for defining their own identity in racial terms, for the reduction of their complex ethno-religio-linguistic identities (Yoruba, Ashanti etc.) to their skin colour was forced on them by Arab (7th-20th century) and later also by European slave-traders (15th-19th century); but to deliberately drop existing non-racial identities for a racial one, that is another matter.

Footnotes:

³²Thus spake Dr. B.R. Ambedkar in his paper “Castes in India”, reproduced in his *Writings and Speeches*, Govt. of Maharashtra, 1986, vol. 1, p.21, with reference to S.V. Ketkar: *History of Caste in India*, Low Price Publ., Delhi 1990 (1909), p.82. Though he condemned the Hindu caste system in the strongest terms and ended up converting to Buddhism, Dr. Ambedkar shared many doctrinal points with the Hindu nationalists, often even being more outspoken than they: he was a merciless critic of Islam, opposed the conversion of low-castes to foreign religions, ridiculed Mahatma Gandhi’s extremist pacifism and religious fantasizing, lambasted Jawaharlal Nehru’s foreign policy, and rejected the AIT.

³³Note the agreement between the Indian Left and the European racists. In his *L’arc de Civa. poèmes antiques*, the 19th-century French poet Charles Leconte de Lisle wrote: “*Rama, toi dont le sang est pur, toi dont le corps est blanc, (...) dompteur étincelant de toutes les races profanes*” (“*Rama, you whose blood is pure, you whose body is white, bright subduer of all the profane races*”). In fact, the Ramayana is about a struggle between two heroes who were both Aryan and both dark-skinned.

³⁴Frank Anthony, a Christian former Member of Parliament, quoted with strong approval by Razia Ashraf, a Muslim protester against the Sanskrit news service on All-India Radio, in a letter to *Indian Express*, 9-2-1991.

³⁵Swami Dharma Theertha’s book has been republished as *History of Hindu Imperialism*, Dalit Educational Literature Centre, Madras 1992.

³⁶The term *Dalit* as a social category was introduced by the Hindu reform movement Arya Samaj in the late 19th century in its campaign for *dalitoddhara*, “upliftment of the oppressed”. Its English counterpart “depressed classes” was used by Dr. B.R. Ambedkar as a more precise alternative to Mahatma Gandhi’s religious term *Harijan*, “people of God”, a term which has recently given way to *Dalit* or to the legal term *scheduled Caste* in ordinary usage.

³⁷E.g., a few years ago, Black Muslims opposed the renaming of a street in Atlanta, Georgia, as *Mahatma Gandhi Square*, in deference to the hatred of the Mahatma’s integrationist views by the polarizationist *Dalit Voice* group. It must be admitted, though, that they had a case in collecting all the statements by Gandhi (during his South-African period 1893-1914) which could be construed as derogatory to Blacks, see e.g. “Gandhi’s anti-African racism”, chapter 2 of Fazlul Huq: *Gandhi Saint or Sinner?*, Dalit Sahitya Akademy, Bangalore 1992.

³⁸V.T. Rajshekar: *Dalit - the Black Untouchables of India*, Clarity Press, Atlanta 1987, p.43.

³⁹This was already argued by Dr. Ambedkar, e.g. in *Writings and Speeches* (1989 ff.), vol.7, p.301, with reference to G.S. Ghurye: *Caste and Race in India*, Popular Prakashan, Mumbai 1969 (1932). It is significant that the vast majority of the numerous publications on caste fail to mention Ghurye’s important work even in their bibliography; as for Ambedkar, his explicit rejection of the AIT-cum-racial explanation of caste goes equally unmentioned in the copious pro-Dalit and Indian Marxist literature.

⁴⁰Kailash C. Malhotra interviewed by N.V. Subramaniam: “The way we are. An ASI project shatters some entrenched myths”, *Sunday*, 10-4-1994.

⁴¹See e.g. the Flemish missionary monthly *Wereldwijd*, March 1986 and February 1991; some of V.T. Rajshekar’s separately published brochures (from Dalit Sahitya Akademi, Bangalore) are transcripts of speeches given at Christian conferences.

⁴²*Dalit Voice*, 16-2-1992.

⁴³*Dalit Voice*, 16-1-1993.

⁴⁴*Dalit Voice*, 1-12-1991.

⁴⁵*Dalit Voice*, 16-1-1993.

⁴⁶“Clinton, victim of Zionist conspiracy?” *Dalit Voice*, 1-9-1998.

⁴⁷Léon Poliakov, ed.: *Histoire de l’antisémitisme 1945-93*, Paris 1994, P.395. The phenomenon of anti-Semitism in a vocal though marginal and unrepresentative section of the Dalit movement is attributed somewhat patronizingly to the “mental confusion among India’s poor Dalits”.

⁴⁸*Collected Works of Mahatma Jotirao Phule*, vol.2, Government of Maharashtra, Mumbai 1992, p.73, quoted with approval in *Dalit Voice*, 16-12-1992.

⁴⁹See e.g. V.T. Rajshekar: *Dialogue of the Bhoodevatas. Sacred Brahmins versus Socialist Brahmins*, Dalit Sahitya Akademy, Bangalore 1993.

⁵⁰K.K. Gangadharan is quoted to this effect in Gérard Heuzé: *Où va l'Inde moderne?*, L'Harmattan, Paris 1993, p.87. As for V.T. Rajshekar to this effect, see Dalit Voice, 1-2-1995 and 1-3-1995; and V.T. Rajshekhar: *Brahminism*, Dalit Sahitya Akademy, Bangalore n.d., p. 28.

⁵¹André Van Lysebeth: *Tantra, le Culte de la Féminité*, Flammarion Fribourg 1988, p.59.

⁵²A. Van Lysebeth: *Tantra*, p.46.

⁵³A. Van Lysebeth: *Tantra*, p.47.

⁵⁴A. Van Lysebeth: *Tantra*, p.26.

⁵⁵A. Van Lysebeth: *Tantra*, p.58.

⁵⁶A. Van Lysebeth: *Tantra*, p.62.

⁵⁷A. Van Lysebeth: *Tantra*, p.30.

⁵⁸Shendge: *The Civilized Demons. The Harappans in the Rg-Veda*, Abhinav Publ. Delhi 1977, p.378. *Asura* originally "god", since late-Vedic times "demon", enemy of the *Devas* or "gods". The shift is the result of a confrontation between Iranians, who mostly addressed their gods as *Asura/Ahura* (esp. *Ahura Mazda*), and Indians who mostly addressed their gods as *Deva*. On both sides, the enemy's term was forthwith demonized: *Asura* for Indians and *Daeva* for Iranians were turned from "god" into "demon".

⁵⁹A. Van Lysebeth: *Tantra*, p.211, with reference to Rajmohon Nath: *Rigveda Summary*, Shillong 1966, p-83.

⁶⁰Ralph A.T. Griffith: *The Hymns of the Rgveda*, Motilal Banarsidass reprint, Delhi p. 102n.

⁶¹M. Monier-Williams: *Sanskrit-English Dictionary*, entry *Trir-ashri*, p.461.

⁶²M. Monier-Williams: *Sanskrit-English Dictionary*, entry *Shatashri*, p.1050.

⁶³There are non-weapon interpretations, e.g. on the model of *shaDyantra* (literally "six-pointed star" but effectively "conspiracy"), *trirashri* may, in opposition to *caturashri* ("square"), have a connotation of "not (fair &) square" in a figurative sense. Swami Dayananda Saraswati (*Rigveda*, vol.3, p.76) translates it as "wicked".

⁶⁴André Van Lysebeth: *Tantra*, p. 196. Similarly on p. 195, with reference to Malati J. Shendge: *The Civilized Demons: the Harappans in Rigveda*.

⁶⁵See e.g. R.S. Sharma: *Looking for the Aryans*, Orient Longman, Delhi 1995, and the interview with him in a programme by the Dutch Hindu broadcasting foundation OHM, 1997.

⁶⁶Romila Thapar: "The theory of Aryan race and India", *Social Scientist*, January-March 1996, p. 17.

⁶⁷Tom Bottomore: *Dictionary of Marxist Thought*, Blackwell, Oxford 1988, entry "Hinduism".

⁶⁸The ICHR controversy is discussed in Arun Shourie: *Eminent Historians, Their Technology, Their Line, Their Fraud*, ASA, Delhi 1998.

⁶⁹This assessment-cum-prediction is made quite cheerfully by Romila Thapar in her 1993 interview in the French daily *Le Monde*.

⁷⁰Tom Bottomore: *Dictionary of Marxist Thought*, p. 205.

⁷¹"China vs. India: who is Yechury batting for?", *Indian Express*, 28.2.1997.

⁷²According to Ashok Mitra, a leader of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) in West Bengal, in an interview in the Rotterdam daily *NRC Handelsblad*, 20-3-1993, "India was never the solution".

⁷³Bhagwan Singh: *The Vedic Harappans*, Aditya Prakashan, Delhi 1995.

⁷⁴Quoted from Marxist theorist Oliver Cromwell Cox: *Caste, Class and Race* (1948), p.91, in Ivan Hannaford: *Race, the History of an Idea in the West*, John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore 1996, p.383. Hannaford summarizes: "The relationship between Brahmans (white), Kshatriyas (red), Vaishyas (yellow) and Shudras (black) was not a color ["varNa"] relationship in the 'racial' sense but a metaphor identified with dharma - 'a way of life virtue complex (p.95) - that was acquired by "the mode of livelihood" or "the inherent qualities of nature". His fundamental argument was that the case for color as a dominant factor in the development of caste was not supported by the evidence of historical literature, and that it was foreign scholars who had made it so."

⁷⁵K. Antonova, G. Bongard-Levin, G. Kotovsky: *A History of India*, 2 vols., Progress Publ., Moscow 1979 (1973), discussed in Arun Shourie: *Eminent Historians, Their Technology, Their Line, their Fraud*, p. 189ff.

⁷⁶Tom Bottomore: *Dictionary of Marxist Thought*, p. 203, paraphrasing K. Marx: *The First Indian War of Independence*, Moscow 1959 (a compilation of Marx' columns on the 1857 Mutiny in the *New York Daily Tribune*), p.156.

⁷⁷Quoted with approval by S.K. Biswas: *Autochthon of India and the Aryan Invasions*, Genuine Publ., Delhi 1995, p.10.

⁷⁸Romila Thapar: "The theory of Aryan race and India", *Social Scientist*, January-March 1996, p.16.

⁷⁹Romila Thapar: "The theory of Aryan race and India", *Social Scientist*, January-March 1996, p. 16. It is one of Bhagwan Singh's main theses (in *The Vedic Harappans*) that the image of the Vedic people as rustic pastoralists is wrong, e.g. it is in conflict With many indications of long-distance and overseas trade. To the extent that the Rg-Veda describes a more primitive cultural setting than what the ruins of Harappa suggest, this is explained by identifying the Rg-Vedic culture with an earlier stage of Harappan culture, before its most impressive urbanization, e.g. by K.D. Sethna: *KarpAsa in Prehistoric India: a Chronological and Cultural Clue*, Impex India, Delhi 1984.

⁸⁰Romila Thapar: "The theory of Aryan race and India", *Social Scientist*, January-March 1996, p.16-17.

⁸¹Romila Thapar: "The theory of Aryan race and India", *Social Scientist*, January-March 1996, p.15.

⁸²Romila Thapar: "The theory of Aryan race and India", *Social Scientist*, January-March 1996, p.17.

⁸³N. S. Rajaram: *Politics of History*, pp. 174-196.

⁸⁴"The use of astronomy in dating an entire text is regarded as unreliable since the references to planetary positions could have been incorporated from an earlier tradition which need not have been Vedic", according to Romila Thapar: "The theory of Aryan race and India", *Social Scientist*, January-March 1996, p.12.

⁸⁵Parvathi Menon in the Communist fortnightly *Frontline*, 21-2-1997; see also JNU professor Shereen Ratnagar's hostile review of N.S. Rajaram's work in *Frontline*, 9-1-1996. The principle of the decipherment is presented in N. Jha: *Vedic Glossary on Indus Seals*, Ganga Kaveri Publ., Varanasi 1996.

⁸⁶N.S. Rajaram: *From Harappa to Ayodhya*, p.12.

⁸⁷D. Frawley (with N.S. Rajaram): *Vedic 'Aryans' and the Origin of Civilization*, WH Press, Québec 1995, p.23. Note that the authors, or their publisher, took care to put "Aryans" in quotation marks; and that the publisher changed his name from "World Heritage Press" to "WH Press" to obscure the word "heritage" (German *Erbe*, as in *Ahnenerbe*, "Ancestral Heritage", the name of the SS research department): so intense is the fear that the vaguest allusion to terms employed by the Nazis would be deemed indicative of Nazi intentions. Also see Georg Feuerstein, Subhash Kak & David Frawley: *In Search of the Cradle of Civilization*, Theosophical Publ., Wheaton IL 1995.

1. Political aspects of the Aryan invasion debate

1.3. POLITICIZATION AS AN OBSTACLE TO RESEARCH

1.3.1. Taboo on Indo-European studies

The association of racist doctrines with the term “Aryan”, introduced in Western languages as a synonym of “Indo-European”, had as one of its side-effects that after the collapse of Nazi Germany, the entire field of IE studies came under a shadow. Specialists of IE culture were ipso facto suspected of Nazi sympathies. Sometimes this was not altogether baseless, e.g. the Dutch scholar Jan de Vries, whose studies on Germanic and Celtic culture are still standard works, was chairman of the *Kulturkamer*, the collaborationist institution which controlled the purse strings for all cultural activities under the German occupation of the Netherlands. Under his supervision, Nazi themes were cunningly interwoven with legitimate Dutch or Germanic folklore. Though arguably not a full-blooded Nazi by conviction, he could hardly be considered innocent.

In other cases, this suspicion is quite misplaced, e.g. in the case of Georges Dumézil, actually a critic of Nazism, cautious in public but quite outspoken in his minor writings and private communications.⁸⁸ It is true that Dumézil sympathized with Italian Fascism, but Fascism *stricto sensu* contrasted with Nazism in very important respects, esp. in not being racist (the Communist-imposed usage of “fascism” as a generic term or as a synonym of National-Socialism, resulting from Stalin’s desire to avoid staining the term “socialism” with Hitlerian associations, obscures the contrast between the two systems). It has been shown that Dumézil’s sympathy for Fascism and contempt for Nazism may have influenced his views of ancient Germanic religion, which he contrasted unfavourably with ancient Roman religion.⁸⁹ In Dumézil’s studies ca. 1940, Germanic religion is criticized as a defective evolute of IE religion, having lost the spiritual and overemphasized the martial function: this was at least partly a projection onto the past of the militarization of Germany in Dumézil’s own day.

As late as 1982, a survey of Swedish national history had its chapters on the settlement of the Indo-Europeans in Scandinavia cut out. Not rewritten but cut out, for the very mention of the Indo-Europeans (not even “Aryans”) was considered irredeemably tainted.⁹⁰ The hysterical nature of this act of censorship comes out more clearly when you realize that the settlement of IE immigrants coming to Scandinavia from the southeast goes *against* the Nazi predilection for a North-European Urheimat of the “Aryans”. Even now, normalcy in this department of historical research has not been entirely restored yet.

This taboo on IE studies emanates from lazy or superstitious minds: rather than identifying exactly what was wrong with Nazism, they simply label everything which was ever associated with the Nazi regime, albeit accidentally or even illegitimately (as with the swastika, borrowed without permission, through the Theosophy-led “occultist” revival, from Hindu-Jain-Buddhist tradition)⁹¹, as being somehow the root cause of the Holocaust. All kinds of things justly or unjustly associated with the Nazi regime are still under a cloud even though they have in any case nothing to do with the crimes of that regime.

Thus, in 1997, the German Minister of Postal Services, Wolfgang Bötsch (belonging to the right-wing *Christlich-Soziale Union*), stopped the printing of poststamps commemorating the 200th anniversary of the liberal German-Jewish poet Heinrich Heine (1797-1856) because they showed the years of his birth and death with the runic signs *Man* (a glyph resembling a tree with upward branches, suggesting life) c.q. *Yr* (“yew”, a tree with branches hanging down, signifying death), still a common usage in North-European graveyards. Someone had protested that runes are

tainted by their association with the Nazi elite corps, the SS, whose sigil carried the letters SS in runic script. In reality, the rune script is thousands of years old and has nothing to do with the Nazi ideology, even less than the Roman script in which the orders for exterminating the Jews were written.

In some cases, this fear of anything that was in any way related to Nazi Germany is simply silly, e.g. the tirades in the leading Belgian daily *La Libre Belgique* in the post-war years against plans for a national motorway network, citing the grim objection that the German motorways had been built by Hitler. It is a modern form of superstition, as if all these items are somehow magically tainted with the Nazi evil. In other cases, the tendency to cast the net of Nazi guilt as widely as possible is a deliberate strategy born from self-interested calculation. Thus, many members of the post-war generation enjoyed putting the entire generation of their parents in the dock, telling them that their values (order, discipline, morality), which Hitler had also extolled, had “led to” Auschwitz. Communists still try to capitalize on their victory against Nazism in their struggle against other opponents, arguing e.g. that liberal democracy is deeply flawed and that this is proven by Hitler’s rise to power through democratic elections: so, down with democracy, for it has “led to” Hitler’s regime.

In the present case, Christians and secularists who try to make the (largely mythical) association of ancient IE Pagan culture with Nazism stick to the old enemy: Pagan religion, including the neo-Paganism now emerging in many European countries.⁹² For all we know about ancient IE culture, or certainly about the ancient Celtic, Baltic, Slavic and Germanic ancestors of the modern Germans, they were very freedom-loving, they had a decentralized polity and a pluralistic religion, and they had of course no notion of anti-Semitism. They would never have felt at home in Hitler’s regimented and racially obsessed Nazi state.

1.3.2. Paradigm inertia

From the usefulness of the AIT for political ends, it does not follow that the AIT was coined simply as a political weapon. Both in Europe and in India, many scholars have believed and still believe that the AIT is simply the most convincing hypothesis to account for a number of actual data in linguistics and other disciplines. The tendency in some Indian circles to denounce linguistics as a “pseudo-science” for having generated the AIT, or to allege that the AIT was “concocted” by political schemers, must be rejected. On the whole, the scholars concerned genuinely believed in their own hypotheses, and were sincerely trying to make sense of newly-discovered facts such as the linguistic kinship between the languages of Europe and northern India.

But if the Western scholars are not guided by political motives, their Hindu critic might ask, why are they so stubborn in refusing to acknowledge facts which may disturb the AIT? Why, for example, have they failed, all through the past decade, to acknowledge the relevance of the twin fact that archaeology locates the Harappan civilization mostly in the Saraswati river basin, and that Vedic literature places Vedic civilization in the same Saraswati basin, in both cases before the river dried up in ca. 2000 BC?

If historians and linguists sometimes display great ingenuity in explaining away (or just ignoring) facts inconvenient to their pet theory, this should be seen as merely a case of the universal tendency to stick to established beliefs until the evidence to the contrary becomes really overwhelming. Scientists - in any field - abhor the disorder created by information which is incompatible with the established theory, and therefore rightfully continue to assume that a second look will smoothen this initial incompatibility and “domesticate” the new information. They have a very functional kind of immunity to facts disturbing the paradigm which underlies their research.

Even a first-rate and patriotic Indian historian like R.C. Majumdar had the same capacity to keep on ignoring facts disobeying the theory to which his mind had become accustomed, viz. the AIT. After describing how many cultural elements of the “pre-Aryan” Indus civilization have survived till today, Majumdar displays that typical academic skill of not taking even registered facts into account once they come in conflict with the paradigm: “How such a great culture and civilization could *vanish without leaving any trace* or even memory behind it, is a problem that cannot be solved at the present state of our knowledge.”⁹³ Such a huge anomaly should call the theory itself into question, esp. when an alternative is ready at hand, and is even suggested by facts mentioned by Majumdar himself, viz. that there is a straight continuity between the Indus civilization and the later stages of “Aryan” culture.

For another example, the allusions to armed conflict in the Rg-Veda have always been taken to refer to the confrontation between the Aryan invaders and the defenders of the indigenous culture. Madhav M. Deshpande remarks about these references: “It is extremely important to recognize that all of these references to *dasyu-hattya*[= killing of the Dasyu enemies] are found in those parts of the RV which are traditionally regarded to be late parts of the text.”⁹⁴ This should imply that the invaders were at first on good terms with the natives (like the *Mayflower* pioneers with the Native Americans) but became hostile later; or that the Vedic people were stable inhabitants of the region which forms the permanent background of the Vedic hymns, and were confronted with these Dasyus at a later stage, viz. when the Dasyus invaded the Vedic-Aryan territory; or that this hostility had nothing to do with a confrontation between invaders and natives.

But Deshpande doesn’t even consider any of these possibilities: “This would most probably mean that even by the time of the late parts of the RV, the attitudes of the Vedic Aryans had not significantly changed, and that they still regarded the dasyus as those who deserve to be killed by Indra.”⁹⁵ After saying in so many words that the earlier layers of the RV do not contain this hostility, he claims that the late parts “still” have it, and that the Aryans’ attitude “had not significantly changed”, when it had actually changed from neutral to hostile, as per his own summary of the Vedic data. When facts challenging the AIT stare him in the face, the scholar tends to prefer the familiar theory to the unwilling facts, and this phenomenon can exist quite separately from any possible political bias.

1.3.3. Political excuse for non-argumentation: the West

One consequence of the political connotations of the rivalling theories is that people feel justified in dismissing the theory they don’t like as “politically motivated” and *therefore* obviously wrong and not worth refuting. This phenomenon is in evidence in both wings of the political pro-AIT coalition, a certain European Right and a certain Indian Left (plus its friends in the West). Thus, the survey of IE studies in the French periodical *Nouvelle Ecole* devotes exactly one footnote to the entire argumentation for an Indian Urheimat, which it dismisses as “in self-evident contradiction with all the data of linguistics and comparative mythology” and as the symptom of “an exacerbated Indian nationalism”.⁹⁶ Consequently, it does not care to mention the Indian Urheimat theory in its discussion of “the five existing (Urheimat) hypotheses”.⁹⁷ This is, of course, a case of the “genetic fallacy”: to assume that a position must be wrong because of the motive in which it allegedly originates. Quite apart from the fact that this motive is merely imputed, and often falsely so, no good or evil motive can make a proposition right or wrong; it is perfectly possible to speak the truth for the wrong reasons.

Bernard Sergent, in an otherwise brilliant book, can equally dispose of the anti-invasionist argument in a single footnote, in which he accuses American archaeologist Jim Shaffer of “manipulations”, which consist in “simply ignoring the linguistic data”.⁹⁸ He misrepresents scientist N.S. Rajaram’s argument against the linguistic evidence for the Aryan invasion as follows: “Linguistics is not a science because it doesn’t reach the same conclusions as I do.” (In reality, Rajaram’s critique concerns the tendency common among linguists to treat hypothetical reconstructions as historical facts, and the impossibility for historical linguistics to satisfy two tests

of real science, viz. reproducing its findings and defining test criteria which can show up its claims as false.)⁹⁹ Sergent also dismisses conferences such as the 1996 conference of the World Association for Vedic Studies in Atlanta on the Indus-Saraswati civilization as propaganda exercises betraying a crusading rather than a dispassionate scholarly spirit. This is rather poor as refutation, but then his whole point is precisely that theories construed as emanating from a political agenda are simply not worth discussing or refuting.

There are cases where the impression of political usefulness of a theory has stimulated research without really obstructing the researchers' objectivity and sincerity. Thus, in the 19th century, French scholars eagerly explored the possibility that the Italic and Celtic branches of the IE language family had, after separating from PIE, continued for long as a single language group: such a scenario would have helped in strengthening the French nation's historical identity, otherwise split between a biological Celtic ancestry and linguistic Latin roots. This research ultimately led to the non-desired conclusion that Celtic and Italic were, after all, not much closer to each other than either is to Germanic or Greek. Ironically, recent research has revived and given new support to the idea that Italic and Celtic did share a common itinerary for some centuries after the break-up of IE unity, and this is not any less true just because it has been a pet theory of French chauvinists.

Another example of the refused to discuss "politically motivated" research is the treatment given to Shrikant Talageri in a prestigious book specifically setting itself the task of countering the rising tide of doubts voiced by archaeologists and philologists about the AIT. One may or may not agree with Talageri's anti-AIT position, but he has undoubtedly built up a painstaking argumentation with ample reference to state-of-the-art scholarship, and he deserves better than this comment by George Erdosy, who locates him in the "lunatic fringe" and judges: "Unfortunately, political motivation (usually associated with Hindu revivalism) renders this opposition devoid of scholarly value".¹⁰⁰ In the same volume, Michael Witzel dismisses his work as "modern Hindu exegetical or apologetic religious writing".¹⁰¹

So far, so good; Erdosy and Witzel are entitled to their opinions, even to calling a fellow scholar a "lunatic" (though I doubt that they could get their articles past the editor of an academic journal if they applied this term to a Western scholar).¹⁰² But the point is: they don't show even the least acquaintance with the actual arguments offered by Talageri. Both Erdosy and Witzel refer to: "S.K. Talageri: Aryan Invasion Theory and Indian Nationalism, Aditya Prakashan 1993". That is how the book's data were given in a (laudatory) review by Girilal Jain in the *Times of India* of 17 June 1993. Unfortunately, the author's real name is *Talageri*, and the book's publisher is not Aditya Prakashan (though there is another edition of the same book under a different title by Aditya Prakashan, hence the reviewer's confusion), but Voice of India.¹⁰³ This indicates that the book which Erdosy and Witzel dismiss in such strong terms has never even been on their desk.

1.3.4. Political excuse for non-argumentation: India

In India too, proponents of the AIT use the alleged political connotations of the rival theory as a handy pretext for avoiding discussion of the actual evidence. Thus, historian Romila Thapar devotes a 27-page lead article in a social science periodical (which admits in an editorial note that the article's publication is a political move to counter "the Hindutva forces", and falsely narrows the non-AIT school down to "the RSS") to "The Theory of Aryan Race and India" practically without mentioning the evidence presented by the non-AIT school.¹⁰⁴ She invokes "the linguistic evidence" twice as proof of a late chronology for the Vedas (1500 BC), without telling us how the linguistic data prove her point. Off-hand, she brings in "the Indo-Iranian links" as proof of the same "since the earliest suggested date now for Zoroaster is circa 1200 BC", ignoring the fact that the dating of Zoroaster's Avesta is itself based on the late chronology of the Vedas (the Avestan language being a slightly younger offshoot of Indo-Iranian than Vedic Sanskrit). This cavalier way of dealing with evidence apparently stems from the feeling that the anti-AIT case need not be taken seriously.

Most importantly, Romila Thapar's entire article could easily have been written several decades ago, for she totally disregards all the evidence from archaeology and archaeo-astronomy presented by her opponents in recent years. She does mention the existence of a non-AIT school, but explains it away as partly an RSS conspiracy, partly a symptom of a psychological identity crisis in Non-Resident Indians, meaning US-based scientists N.S. Rajaram and Subhash Kak and historian Sushil Mittal of the *International Institute for Indian Studies* in Québec.

The same disregard for recent evidence is noticeable in R. S. Sharma's book *Looking for the Aryans*, which went to the press in November 1994 but fails to mention the pre-1994 argumentations against the AIT by K.D. Sethna, S.P. Gupta (the only RSS man in the non-AIT school), David Frawley, Shrikant Talageri and others, even in the bibliography. Thus, Sharma repeats the old identification of Painted Grey Ware with the invading Aryans, in stark disregard of the fact that the scholars whom he is countering (as well as some who never opposed the AIT) have demonstrated that PGW was but one "Aryan" art form among others, and that it is not traceable to Central Asia as a marker of invading Aryans.¹⁰⁵

The derivation of a judgment on the Urheimat question from the alleged motives of the proponents of the contending theories is all-pervading and vitiates the whole debate. Yet, if a theory can be considered wrong simply because it is being used for political ends, it is clear that the AIT itself must be the wrongest theory in the world: one looks in vain for a historical hypothesis which has been more tainted with various political uses including the most lethal ones.

Footnotes:

⁸⁸A list and rebuttal of the allegations against Dumézil is given in Didier Eribon: *Faut-il brûler Dumézil?* ("Should Dumézil be burned at the stake?"), Flammarion, Paris 1992. Of course, malafide authors keep on repeating the refuted allegations.

⁸⁹Bruce Lincoln: "Rewriting the German war god: Georges Dumézil, politics and scholarship in the late 1930s", *History of Religions*, Feb. 1998.

⁹⁰The work affected is R. & G. Haland: *Bra Böckers Världshistoria*, vol. 1, Höganäs 1982, as reported in Christopher Prescott & Eva Walderhaug: "The Last Frontier? Processes of Indo-Europeanization in Northern Europe: the Norwegian Case", *Journal of Indo-European Studies*, autumn/winter 1995, p-257-278.

⁹¹In its final report (1997), the Belgian Parliamentary Enquiry Committee on Cults counted the Mahikari movement of Japanese Shinto origin among the dangerous cults and accused it of "extreme Right" connections, citing no other evidence than that a swastika had been seen on its premises. Buddhist temples in the West have been targets of serious vandalism because of the swastikas on their walls. The swastika is used to prove the essentially evil character of Hinduism in Evangelical propaganda, e.g. the 1980s' movie *Gods of the New Age* by Jeremiah Films, discussed with indignation by a more fair-minded missionary, Richard Young, in *Areopagus* (Hong Kong), Christmas 1990.

⁹²A Christian attempt to associate Paganism with Nazism is Robert A. Pois: *National Socialism and the Religion of Nature*, Croom Helm, Beckenham GB 1986. A secularist attempt to impute a proto-Nazi mind-set to Paganism is found in numerous passages in Bernard-Henry Lévy's books *Le Testament de Dieu*, Grasset, Paris 1979, and *L'Idéologie Française*, ibid. 1981.

⁹³R.C. Majumdar: Ancient India, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi 1991 (1952), p.19; emphasis added.

⁹⁴M.M. Deshpande: "Genesis of Rgvedic Retroflexion", in M.M. Deshpande & P.E. Hook: Aryan and Non-Aryan in India, Ann Arbor 1979, p.300.

⁹⁵M.M. Deshpande: "Genesis of Rgvedic Retroflexion", in M.M. Deshpande & P.E. Hook: Aryan and Non-Aryan in India, p.300.

⁹⁶Alain de Benoist in Nouvelle Ecole 49, Paris 1997, p.44.

⁹⁷Alain de Benoist in Nouvelle Ecole 49, Paris 1997, p.50.

⁹⁸Bernard Sergent: Ganèse de l'Inde, Payot, Paris 1997, p.477. Shaffer is also derided for consulting only English-language publications.

⁹⁹See e.g. N.S. Rajaram: Aryan Invasion of India, the Mob and the Truth, Voice of India, Delhi 1993, p.42, and Politics of History, ibid. 1995, p. 163ff.

¹⁰⁰G. Erdosy, ed.: Indo-Aryans of Ancient South Asia, Walter De Gruyter, Berlin 1995, p.x. This comment also extends to Paramesh Choudhury: The Aryans: a Modern Mob, Eastern Publ., Delhi 1993.

¹⁰¹M. Witzel in G. Erdosy: Indo-Aryans, p.116-117. Referring to a likeminded piece by A.K. Biswas (whom he mistakenly associates with Talageri), he ridicules "the ulterior political motive of this 'scientific' piece"; op.cit., p.111.

¹⁰²In spite of all the "multiculturalism" and "globalization" buzz-words, numerous Westerners still treat Indians as a lesser breed which is not to be taken seriously. Prof. Ulrich Libbrecht, the Flemish pioneer of Comparative Philosophy, told me how at an international conference in Honolulu on that subject, multicultural par excellence, the average American participant treated the lectures by Indians as coffee breaks. I too have noticed many times that proposals for talks or publications by Indians are dismissed without a proper hearing on the assumption that Indians are cranks unless they have an introduction from a Western institution.

¹⁰³Shrikant Talageri: Aryan Invasion Theory, a Reappraisal, Aditya Prakashan, Delhi 1993, with a foreword by Prof. S.R. Rao and minus the three more political introductory chapters of the Voice of India edition: Aryan Invasion Theory and Indian Nationalism, with foreword by Sita Ram Goel.

¹⁰⁴R. Thapar: "The Theory of Aryan Race and India: History and Politics", Social Scientist, Delhi, January-March 1996, p.3-29. RSS: Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, "National Volunteer Association", a Hindu Nationalist organization founded in 1925, now several million strong, and closely linked with the Bharatiya Janata Party which came to power in March 1998.

¹⁰⁵R.S. Sharma: Looking for the Aryans, p. 12.

1. Political aspects of the Aryan invasion debate

1.4. A CASE STUDY IN AIT POLEMIC

1.4.1. A primer in AIT polemic

For a case study in anti-AIT polemic, I have chosen the article “An obscurantist argument” by the Dutch-Canadian scholar Robert J. Zydenbos.¹⁰⁶ His *bona fides* is unquestionable, and he represents the majority of AIT-believing scholars in that he merely accepts the predominant opinion without having a political axe to grind, though this makes him susceptible to being influenced by AIT defenders who do have political motives. He is emphatically not a representative of the anti-Brahminism so prevalent among Western India-watchers, being in fact the author of an informed critique of this ideological distortion of much contemporary scholarship.¹⁰⁷ Some of the rhetoric in this article typifies the way in which certain AIT defenders in positions of authority tend to over-awe the public with references to overrated evidence, and to vilify spokesmen of the dissident non-AIT school.

The piece is an attack on N.S. Rajaram, a scientist from Karnataka (in AIT parlance: a Dravidian, not an Aryan) working in the USA, who has contributed decisive insights to the AIT debate.¹⁰⁸ I disagree on some important points with Prof. Rajaram, most of all with his rejection of the linguistic reconstruction of an IE protolanguage; but that is no reason to dismiss his work as “a textbook example of the quasi-religious-cum-political obscurantism that is so popular among alienated Non-Resident Indians”, which is moreover “out of touch with what serious scholars both in India and abroad hold at present”, as Zydenbos alleges.

“The linguistic evidence for the Indo-European origin of Sanskrit outside India is Overwhelming”, he claims, in almost verbatim agreement with Prof. Romila Thapar, whom he defends against Rajaram’s critique of her article “The Perennial Aryans”.¹⁰⁹ Neither in his nor in Prof. Thapar’s much lengthier article is even one item of this “overwhelming evidence” mentioned. However, Dr. Zydenbos can claim the merit of being one of the first (to my knowledge, the very first) among the defenders of the AIT to actually respond to the rising tide of anti-AIT argumentation.

1.4.2. Ethnically pure Aryans

Zydenbos starts his crescendo of allegations by stating something Rajaram never disputed: “No scholar seriously believes that there are any ‘ethnically pure’ Aryans in India today (and perhaps anywhere else, either). And why should anyone care?” Actually, Rajaram himself is among those who reject the notion of ‘ethnically pure Aryans’, not because of the obvious fact that countless inter-ethnic marriages have taken place, but because he rejects the use of “Aryan” as an ethnic term in the first place. As he and many others have argued time and again, the Sanskrit word *Arya* was not an ethnic term, it is Western scholars who have turned it into one.

And it is the Western participant in this duel, Dr. Zydenbos, who, even after reading Prof. Rajaram, just continues to use “Aryan” as an ethnic and even as a racial term: “Those who called themselves ‘Aryan’ 1000 years ago were already very different from the various Aryan tribes that came over 3500 years ago (...) This too is historical fact. One only needs to learn Sanskrit to find this out.” I fear that there is something very wrong with Sanskrit courses if accomplished indologists can read *Arya* in a racial sense unattested in the whole of Sanskrit literature.

The anti-AIT authors may nonetheless be wrong in denying an ethnic meaning to *Arya* altogether. While *Arya* was definitely never a racial or linguistic concept, it may have had a precise ethnic usage at least in some circles in one specific period. As Shrikant Talageri has shown, in the Rg-Veda, the term *Arya* is exclusively applied to the Puru tribe, including the Bharata clan, the community which generated the Rg-Vedic texts. Thus, when something negative is said about “*Arya*” people, these turn out to be non-Bharata Purus; and when the merits of a non-Puru king or sage are extolled, he may be called any term of praise but never

Arya.¹¹⁰ Likewise, it seems that the Iranian Avesta uses *Airyā* in referring to a specific community, the cultivators in the Oxus river basin, contrasting it with nomadic barbarians who were similar in race and equally Iranian-speaking (generically known as *Shakas/Scythians*), but who were not part of the sedentary Mazdean “*Airyā*” world.¹¹¹

The matter must be studied more closely, after freeing ourselves from the AIT-related misconceptions. For now, I speculate that the term *Arya* spread over the Hindu world, which included many non-Vedic Indo-Aryan-speaking tribes (Aikshvaku, Yadava, Pramshava, etc.), along with the Vedic tradition which was originally the exclusively local tradition of the Paurava tribe and Bharata clan settled on the banks of the Saraswati river. And that it originally had an ethnic connotation, something like “the Puru tradition”, even when used as the name of a religious tradition and civilizational standard, viz. the Vedic culture, somewhat like the ethno-geographical term *Roman* came to mean “Catholic”. At any rate, in classical Sanskrit, *Arya* means “civilized”, specifically “following the norms of Vedic civilization”, and this might imply a reference to the ancient situation when Vedic culture typified the metropolis, the Saraswati region (well-attested as being the centre of both the Rg-Vedic world and Harappan civilization), which the provinces tried to emulate. In the ShAstras and in literary works, the term *Arya* typically takes the place which would nowadays be filled by the term *Hindu*, or of “the Hindu ideal”, *Hindu* in a normative rather than in a descriptive sense.

It is in this (by that time definitely the usual) sense that the Buddha used the term *Arya*, as in the *catvAri-Arya-satyAni*, “the four noble truths”, and the *Arya-ashtANgika-mArga*, “the noble eightfold path”, meaning that his way (more than the petty magic with which many Veda-reciting priests made a living) fulfilled the old ideals of Vedic civilization. It is with a similar intention that the modern Veda revivalists of the *Arya Samaj* chose the name of their organization. While conceptions may differ concerning what the real essence of the Vedic worldview was, there has been a wide pan-Indian agreement for at least 3,000 years that *Arya* means a standard of civilization, regardless of language, race or even ethnicity.

1.4.3. Rajaram vs. Hitler

Next, Zydenbos attacks Rajaram’s reading of Romila Thapar’s article, esp. her insinuation (uttered much more explicitly elsewhere by other Marxist authors in India)¹¹² that the anti-AIT case is motivated by some kind of Hitlerian vision of Aryanism: “Romila Thapar does not ‘obviously refer to Nazi Germany’ when she speaks of the fantasy of an ‘Aryan nation’, but to the new Indian tendency among obscurantists towards creating something parallel.” So, alleging that someone wants to “create something parallel to Nazi Germany” does not imply a reference to Nazi Germany? In that case, we might perhaps focus on the implied allegation that those Indians who question the AIT are entertaining a fantasy of creating an “Aryan nation”.

I challenge Prof. Thapar and Dr. Zydenbos to produce any publication of any Indian scholar presently questioning the AIT which contains even a hint of this “fantasy”. And I reprimand them both for using the term *Arya(n)* uncritically, i.e. without explicitating that it has two distinct meanings, viz. “Hindu” for Hindus, and “of Nordic race” for the Nazis. If that distinction is made, the alleged connection between Rajaram and Hitler (through the “common” term *Aryan*) vanishes, and this seems to go against the AIT defenders’ intentions. In the current opinion climate, accusing someone of Nazi connections is the single gravest allegation possible. I don’t think that in an academic forum, one can simply get away with such extremely serious allegations; one has to offer evidence, - or apologies.

If even scholars of Zydenbos’s rank entertain the confusion between Aryan/Nordic-racist and *Arya/Hindu*, it is no surprise that this confusion vitiates much journalistic reporting on Hinduism and Hindu nationalism. Thus, the French monthly *Le Choc du Mois* once commented that the “sulphurous” BJP takes inspiration from “Bharat, the first Aryan prince in North India”. By all accounts, Bharata, patriarch of the Vedic Bharata clan, came later than many other Aryans in

North India: Manu, Ikshvaku, Mandhata, Yayati, Bharat's own ancestor Puru, et al. Anyway, here is the key to Hindu political thought: "The basis of the 'Hindu nation' will therefore be Aryanity, a warlike and conquering Aryanity which owes its imperial territory only to an unceasing struggle on the side of the gods."¹¹³ This mixes a projection of stereotypes concerning Islamic fundamentalism onto its Hindu "counterpart" with the AIT-based Aryan lore.

But seriously: are Hindu scholars, if only just a few of them, thinking along the lines of "Aryan" racism? Apart from reading the works of the Indian scholars concerned, I have also privately talked with most of them, and I feel certain that no such "fantasy" is at the back of the anti-AIT polemic. In fact, what they reject in Western scholarship is precisely the creation of the conceptual framework which has made the racist misuse of the term "Aryan" possible: "Indian Marxists in particular are singularly touchy about the whole thing and hate to be reminded that their pet dogma of the non-indigenous origin of the Vedic Aryan civilization is an offshoot of the same race theories that gave rise to Nazism."¹¹⁴

1.4.4. The importance of being white

Dr. Zydenbos continues: "This includes the endorsement of blatant racism by certain Indian scholarly personalities. Thus, the archaeologist S.R. Rao, who also figures in Rajaram's article, said at a recent seminar in Mysore in response to a student's question about the Aryans that we should not listen to what 'white people' say." I don't know how Hitler would have felt about this slur on white people, but Zydenbos is quite mistaken when he infers that there is any "racism" behind Prof. Rao's remark. Rao obviously did not mean that whiteness makes one unfit for researching the question of the "Aryans". What he meant was, of course, that at present, Westerners in general are still basing their opinions about this question on theories rendered outdated by the recent findings of Indian scholars like himself, and of some paleface scholars as well, - but the latter have so far not carried Western or "white" opinion in general with them.

Dr. Zydenbos, who is described editorially as a European indological scholar living in Mysore, must have found out for himself that being "white" still connotes authority and reliability for most Indians.¹¹⁵ In heated debates like the one on the Aryan question, reference to Western opinion is still treated as a trump card. Often, this reference is used as a "circular argument of authority": first Western India-watchers borrow their opinions from the *Times of India* or the *Economic and Political Weekly*, then they express these opinions in the *New York Times* or the *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, and finally, these same opinions are quoted in the same Indian media as authoritative endorsements by "independent" Westerners of their own positions. If a student has been over-awed by the apparent Western consensus in favour of the AIT, Prof. Rao was right to break the spell and to put the student with his feet back on the solid ground of self-reliance, esp. in a field where. Western indological opinion happens to be out of touch with the latest research.

Indeed, in his article, Dr. Zydenbos himself unwittingly plays the same game of over-awing the Indians with references to Western indologists, viz. to K.V. Zvelebil, H. Kulke and D. Rothermund, as sheer arguments of authority.¹¹⁶ Zydenbos refers to Zvelebil to support this statement: "That the Indus Valley people were Dravidians is an unproven hypothesis; but the real, as yet undeciphered writings of that civilization give more support to this hypothesis than to any other."

In fact, the scholars working from the Dravidian hypothesis have, after decades of intensive labour, not conclusively deciphered a single line of the Indus writings, and Zvelebil admits as much: "[The Soviet scholars] have not convincingly deciphered even one single short Harappan description, and they have not been able to offer a verifiable reading of any Harappan text."¹¹⁷ Of the other teams working on the decipherment, Zvelebil has no hard results to quote either, though he praises their (and the Soviet scholars') merits in structural analysis, preparing concordances etc. He does not mention a single definite and positive (non-circular) indication that the language on the Harappan seals is Dravidian.

In Kulke and Rothermund's book *A History of India* "can be found in detail the up-to-date view concerning the Aryan migration, and confirming it", according to Zydenbos. In fact, their book does not *confirm* (with independent research findings) but merely *restates* the AIT, without refuting or even taking into account the research findings on which Prof. Rajaram and Prof. Rao base their case.

1.4.5. Nehru's testimony

Dr. Zydenbos sums up "a few interesting questions", starting with: "Why should leading, respected Indian scholars (and even Nehru, who can hardly be accused of being politically naive or a colonial collaborator) accept the idea of the migration, if it is as patently false as our author claims it is?" We forego the occasion of preparing a list of factual reasons why "leading, respected scholars" have been found to defend the wrong position on numerous occasions in history. The interesting term in the question is "colonial collaborator", which Nehru is claimed not to have been. In fact, while politically an anti-colonial campaigner, Jawaharlal Nehru was culturally the archetypal "collaborator" with colonialism and with the colonial view of India.

Free India's first Prime Minister never properly mastered his native Hindustani language and like his father, he demanded from his relatives that they speak only English at the dinner table. He was in most cultural respects a typical colonial Englishman ("India's last Viceroy"), fully equipped with the concomitant disdain for Indian and particularly Hindu culture, of which he was 100% ignorant. About the Sanskrit traditions which provide the information relevant to the Aryan question, he knew strictly nothing (in spite of his hereditary caste title *Pandit*), and he could not possibly have written anything about it except what he had read in the standard English textbooks. This can easily be verified in his book *The Discovery of India*, which reads like the history chapter of a tourist guidebook, but which according to Dr. Zydenbos "in essence still holds good" in its picturesque description of the Aryan invasion.¹¹⁸

Nehru shared with many contemporary establishment academics an ideological reason to welcome the AIT. Just as the British liked to flatter themselves with the idea that they had "created" India as a political unit, so Congress politicians liked to see Nehru as the "maker of India".¹¹⁹ In this view, prior to Queen Victoria and Jawaharlal Nehru, no such cultural entity as "India" ever existed, merely a hunting-ground for ever new waves of invaders, starting with the Aryans. Nehru didn't mind such a past for India, because as a Leftist utopianist, he believed that a great future could be built on any national past, even a very depressing one. It must be said to his credit that from a vision of a fragmented and invasion-ridden India of the past, he did not deduce the impossibility of creating a united and prosperous India in the future, unlike contemporary casteists and separatists.

It must also be admitted that other Indian leaders have accepted the idea of an Aryan invasion without being any the less patriotic for it. Congress leader Bal Gangadhar Tilak (*Arctic Home in the Vedas*, 1903) and Hindu Mahasabha ideologue Vinayak Damodar Savarkar (*Hindutva*, 1923) had also interiorized the AIT, simply because it seemed hard to refute. To most English-educated Indians of their time, the prestige of Western scholarship was so overwhelming that it seemed quixotic to go against it. But it was not hard for them to combine patriotism with a belief in a fragmented and conflictual origin of their nation, 3,500 years ago. After all, most nations in the world are younger than that. The USA was built on broken treaties, slavery and genocide, only a few centuries ago, yet there exists a heartfelt and legitimate American patriotism. The strange thing is not that Tilak, Nehru and Savarkar could be Indian patriots all while believing in the AIT, but that Marxists and missionaries question the legitimacy of Indian nationhood on the basis of a theory pertaining to events thousands of years in the past.

1.4.6. From Harappa to Ayodhya

Dr. Zydenbos summons Prof. Rajaram to own up some responsibility for India's communal conflict: "Does he really not see the parallel between Nazi attacks on synagogues in the 1930s and what happened in Ayodhya on December 6th?" We would not have believed it, but it is there in cold print: an academic tries to score against a fellow academic by arbitrarily linking him with an event which had not yet taken place when the latter's paper was published, and with which he had strictly nothing to do, viz. the demolition of the Babri Masjid in Ayodhya on 6 December 1992.

In a later paper, Prof. Rajaram has accepted the challenge: *From Harappa to Ayodhya*, read at the Indian institute of World Culture in Bangalore (4 September 1997), discusses the parallels between the historians' debates on the Indus-Saraswati civilization and on the temple/mosque in Ayodhya. He argues that "what the history establishment has done through the models it has proposed for both the ancient and the medieval periods is to *exactly reverse the historical picture*".¹²⁰ Most importantly, for the ancient period, Indian Marxist and other anti-Hindu historians posit a massive conflict (between Aryan invaders and natives) in spite of the total absence of either textual or archaeological evidence for such conflict; while for the medieval period, they wax eloquent about an idyllic "composite culture" and deny a massive conflict spanning centuries (viz. between Muslim invaders and Hindu natives), against the copiously available evidence for this conflict, both textual and archaeological.

This observation is entirely correct: both ancient and medieval history have been rewritten in the sense of belittling and blackening Hindu civilization and extolling its enemies. As a Westerner I may add that in both cases, there has been a wholesale, painfully naive endorsement of the Indian Marxist line by Western India-watchers in academe as well as journalism. There are exceptions, mostly in the past, e.g. Fernand Braudel who described Muslim India as a "colonial experiment" which was "extremely violent".¹²¹

Braudel explained: "India survived only by virtue of its patience, its superhuman power and its immense size. The levies it had to pay were so crushing that one catastrophic harvest was enough to unleash famines and epidemics capable of killing a million people at a time. Appalling poverty was the constant counterpart of the conquerors' opulence. (...) The Muslims (...) could not rule the country except by systematic terror. Cruelty was the norm burnings, summary executions, crucifixions or impalements, inventive tortures. Hindu temples were destroyed to make way for mosques. On occasion there were forced conversions. If ever there were an uprising, it was instantly and savagely repressed: houses were burned, the countryside was laid waste, men were slaughtered and women were taken as slaves."¹²² Braudel was not a Hindu chauvinist, just a scholarly observer, but in today's climate, he would be blacklisted.

While there is solid evidence that the Babri Masjid in Ayodhya had been built in forcible replacement of a Hindu temple, rubble of which was used in the Masjid's construction, this fact has been denounced as "Hindu chauvinist propaganda", and an entirely fictional claim was upheld that the Masjid had been built on an uncontroversial site, so that there was of course no trace of evidence for a preceding temple demolition.¹²³ Indian Marxists could reasonably have taken the position that while the temple demolition was a historical fact, this was no reason for a counter-demolition today. However, inebriated by their power position, they went farther and denied the temple destruction altogether, against the evidence, thinking they could get away with it.

As usual, they could count on their Western contacts to cover them: to my knowledge, not a single Western academic has critically examined the Indian Marxist claim that the historical temple demolition at the Babri Masjid site was Hindu chauvinist fiction. All of those who have actually written about the Ayodhya affair, have acted as amplifiers to the Indian Marxist propaganda, explicitly or implicitly defaming those Indian colleagues who stuck to the evidence that a Hindu temple at the controversial site had indeed been destroyed.

One of these was Prof. B.B. Lal, one of the greatest living archaeologists, who has been attacked for his expert testimony about the demolished temple at the Babri Masjid site (e.g. in an editorial in the Marxist-controlled paper *The Hindu*)¹²⁴ as well as for his progressively more determined support to the identity or close kinship of Vedic and Harappan culture.¹²⁵ Indeed, on both sides in the Ayodhya debate and in the AIT debate, both in academic and journalistic platforms, we find the same names. Without conspicuous exception, those who fight for the AIT have also fought for the Ayodhya no-temple thesis (and more generally for the view that the Islamic occupation of India was benign), and those who fought for the demolished-temple thesis are now fighting for the Vedic-Harappan kinship. So, Dr. Zydenbos is right in positing a parallel between the Ayodhya and AIT debates, though perhaps it is not the parallel he intended.

1.4.7. The denial of history

As for an Indian counterpart to the Nazi attacks on synagogues, any Hindu worth his salt will definitely welcome the simile. The demolition of literally hundreds of thousands of Hindu places of worship (often along with their personnel and customers) by Muslims, from the first Arab invasion in AD 636 to the destruction of hundreds of temples in Pakistan and Bangladesh and the vandalization of twenty-odd Hindu temples in Britain in “retaliation” for the demolition of the Babri Masjid, is often described in Hindu pamphlets as a “Holocaust”. I disapprove of the ease with which every crime is nowadays likened with the Holocaust and other Nazi crimes; but in the present debate, it is Dr. Zydenbos who has uninvitedly introduced Nazi references.

While the erratic and violent manner in which the Babri Masjid was disposed of is certainly deplorable, there is something badly disproportionate in the holy indignation of so many India-watchers about the Ayodhya demolition, when you notice how it is combined with a stark indifference to the vastly larger and longer record of Islamic destruction in India (including a million Hindus killed by the Pakistani Army in East Bengal as late as 1971), often even with a negationist denial of that very record of Islam in India. Here again there is a parallel: informed Hindus are pained by the denial of their centuries of suffering at the hands of Islam, and are likewise pained by the denial of their millennia of civilization-building, a denial which goes by the name of Aryan Invasion Theory.

There may yet be another point to Zydenbos’s comparison between Nazi attacks on synagogues and the attacks on places of worship in India. The Islamic swordsmen considered Pagan temples as monuments of *Jahiliyya*, the Age of Ignorance, and they wanted to destroy them in order to stamp out this evil superstition of Paganism and all reminders of its history. In Islamic countries with a great pre-Islamic past, history courses in schools start with Mohammed, and pay minimal (if at all any) attention to the long and fascinating history of the Pharaohs, the Achaemenids or Mohenjo Daro; the intention is to deny an unwanted, “impure” part of history. As recently as 1992, this rejection of history led to raids to the ruins of Buddhist temples in Afghanistan to deface any remaining Buddha statues; and in 1992 and 1997, bomb attacks were committed against the pharaonic temples of Karnak. One could arguably hold it against the demolishers of the Babri mosque that they too have tried to wipe out an unwanted chapter of Indian history embodied in the Islamic architecture of the temple building. Bad enough, but its relevance for our topic is this: for Indians, the AIT likewise implies *the denial of a long stretch of Indian history*.

The AIT denies principally the history of the Solar and Lunar dynasties and other tribes living in Aryavarta (the area from Sindh to Bihar and from the Vindhyas to Kashmir), as covered in the *Flu* for a period from the dawn of proto-history to the 1st millennium BC. The major motifs (epics, artistic standards, schools of philosophy) of Indian civilization are embedded in that history, which is simply denied in its long pre-1500 BC phase, and vilified as merely the cultural superstructure of an ethnic subjugation of pre-Aryans by Aryans in its post-1500 BC phase.

1.4.8. Blood and soil

Dr. Zydenbos continues: “Why should it be so important that the Aryans, or the extremely remote ancestors of anyone in India for that matter, have been in the subcontinent since all eternity? That would come close to the *Blut und Boden* [blood and sod] ideology of Nazism, with its Aryan rhetoric. Why the xenophobia?”

Accusing Prof. Rajaram of something “close to” Nazi ideology looks like an old trick to associate someone with Nazism without taking the responsibility for calling him a Nazi outright and risking a frontal rebuttal if not a court case. I wonder: how would he fare if he accused a Western colleague in the same vein in a Western paper, considering the extreme importance which academics attach to reputation? There, slurs against a colleague’s scholarly integrity are normally made to backfire on the slanderer himself. At any rate, AIT defenders display a tendency to exceed the topic of debate and launch unwarranted attacks *ad hominem*.

Favouring the idea that the “Aryan” ancestors of the contemporary Indians have lived in the subcontinent “since all eternity” is what Zydenbos dubs “xenophobic” and “close to the *Blut und Boden* ideology of Nazism with its Aryan rhetoric”. Actually, the historians in the SS research department were inclined to embrace the theory that the Nordic Aryans originated in Atlantis, whence they had fled to northern Europe after the inundation of their homeland. Hitler’s attachment was not to the German territory but to the German race, which was free to wander and colonize other lands. Then again, most ordinary Nazis who cared, tended to accept some variation of the European Urheimat Theory, locating their own Aryan ancestors in Germany itself or nearby, “just as” Hindus nowadays locate their Urheimat in or near India itself.

However, it is not Rajaram’s school of thought which has given political implications to the question of the geographical provenance of India’s population. As we have seen, it is precisely the AIT which has been used systematically as a xenophobic political argument against those groups considered as the progeny of the “Aryan invaders”. Even most AIT opponents subscribe to the prevalent theory that mankind probably originated in Africa, so that all Indians, like all Europeans, are ultimately immigrants. The ridiculous argument of doubting the legitimacy of a community’s presence in India on the basis of an ancestral immigration of 3500 years ago has been launched in all seriousness by interest groups wielding the AIT as their major intellectual weapon, not by the critics of the AIT.

1.4.9. Nazis in India

As for the Nazi connection, let us at any rate be clear about an easily verifiable fact: in so far as the Nazis cared about Indian history, they favoured the AIT. On the AIT, not Rajaram but Zydenbos is in the same camp with Hitler. The only avowed Nazis in India, the Bengali scholar Dr. Asit Krishna Mukherji (ca.1898-1977) and his French-Greek wife Dr. Maximiani Portas (Lyon 1905-Sible Hedingham, Essex, 1982) alias Savitri Devi Mukherji, had made the AIT itself the alpha and omega of their philosophy.¹²⁶ The one Indian who interpreted the AIT explanation of the Hindu caste system in Hitlerian terms, i.e. as a positive realization of the natural hierarchy between the races achieved by the conquering Nordic Aryans and imposed on the dark-skinned natives, was Asit Krishna Mukherji, “Brahmin conscious of his distant Nordic roots”¹²⁷ who published a pro-Hitler paper, the *New Mercury*, “the only truly Hitlerian paper ever to have appeared in India”¹²⁸, from 1935 until the British closed it down in 1937. He was instrumental in establishing the links between the Axis representatives and the leftist Congress leader Subhas Chandra Bose, who formed an *Indian National Army* (1943-45) under Japanese tutelage.

His wife Savitri Devi cited with approval B.G. Tilak’s version of the AIT, viz. that the Aryan tribes had come from the Arctic where they had composed the Rg-Veda. This erratic theory is inordinately popular among Western racists for providing “independent” Indian confirmation to a

North-European Homeland Theory (in reality, Tilak had tried to bend the Vedic evidence, often ludicrously, to bring it in conformity with fashionable Western theories).¹²⁹ She also repeated the usual AIT annexe that the upper castes are Aryan immigrants, that the lower castes are largely and the tribals purely “aboriginals”, a theory implicitly endorsed (see next para) by Dr. Zydenbos in this very article.¹³⁰ In fact, after reading her autobiography, “Memories and Reflexions of an Aryan Lady”, there is not the slightest doubt left that for her and her husband, their belief in the AIT, along with their distortive reinterpretation of Hindu tradition in terms of the AIT, was the direct cause of their enthusiasm for Hitler. If Zydenbos shuns theories with Hitlerian connotations, he should drop the AIT at once.

Indeed, the AIT happens to have the same historical roots as the race theories centred on white superiority which culminated in Nazi racism. In the 19th-century race theories, Indian civilization had to be the work of white people, who, like the modern Europeans, had colonized India by subjugating the dark natives; later, the mixing of the white Aryans (in spite of a belated attempt to preserve their purity through the caste system) with the dark natives caused the decline and “feminization” of the conquering Aryan culture, which invited a new conquest by Europeans taking up the “white man’s burden” of bringing order and enlightenment to the dark-skinned people living in social, intellectual and spiritual darkness. The AIT was an essential part of this view, and Nazism a slight radicalization.

While we let the topic of Nazism rest, we have to mention another “blood and soil” movement which has emerged in India, and again its basis was not Rajaram’s denial of the AIT, but Zydenbos’s AIT itself. The Dravidian movement, started with colonial and missionary funding and aid in 1916 (founding of the *Justice Party* in Madras, later renamed as *Dravida Kazhagam*) to counter the Freedom Movement, was based precisely on the AIT notion that the North Indians as well as the South Indian Brahmins were “Aryan invaders” who had stolen the land from the Dravidian natives. Militants of this movement roughed up Brahmins and Hindi-speaking people, and its leader Ramaswamy Naicker gained notoriety with statements like: “We will do with the Brahmins what Hitler did with the Jews.” When the Chinese invasion of 1962 made Indians aware of the need for national unity, the demand for a separate Dravidian state was abandoned, and the anti-Brahmin drive lost its edge as Brahmin predominance in public office diminished.

Meanwhile, the AIT-related doctrines of this movement have started a second life in a section of the Dalit (ex-Untouchable) movement, which attacks upper-caste people as “Aryan invaders”, a notion which they could have borrowed directly from Dr. Zydenbos’s article. Here again, slurs of “Nazism” against the supposed “Aryans” mask a vision of Indian society directly rooted in the very views which generated Nazism itself.

1.4.10. Aryans vs. Indians

The closing paragraph of “An obscurantist argument” reiterates the outdated notion that India’s upper castes are the progeny of the “Aryan invaders” and pride themselves on it: “We can briefly sum up the ‘Aryan problem’ and the interest it creates among certain people as follows. Whatever problem is there, will not be solved by constructing a new bit of mythology on the theme of the evil foreign hand and the Indian academic community that is supposed to have no mind of its own. This has no basis in fact. Only certain people in certain castes who identify themselves strongly with the Aryans and pride themselves on being ‘Aryan’ rather than Indian, and thereby stress their difference from (and assume superiority to) other Indians, have a problem. As soon as the author [= N.S. Rajaram], and people of his ilk, make up their minds as to whether they are Indian or not, and whether they want to identify themselves with India and other Indians or not, the problem is solved.”

That the Indian academic community “has no mind of its own” has the following basis in fact: India has only just begun to decolonize at the intellectual level, and the view of Indian history instilled in the pupils of India’s elite schools is still strictly the view inherited from colonial

historiography. In another sense, however, the anglicized academic establishment certainly has a mind of its own: while the colonial British still had a condescending sympathy for native culture, the new elite is waging a war against it as a matter of cultural self-exorcism and of political class interest. It knows its own mind very well and has concluded that the AIT serves its interests better than a version of history which would boost native Indian self-respect. Of course, India is not the Soviet Union of Stalin's and Lysenko's days, so when the international academic opinion shifts away from the AIT, the Indian establishment will have to follow suit; but as long as the matter is in the balance, it throws its entire weight on the side of the AIT.

If certain people in certain castes "pride themselves on being 'Aryan' rather than Indian", it means they have accepted the AIT, which posits the initial non-Indianness of the "Aryans" and identifies them with the upper castes. Of course, this view has no takers among traditionalist upper-caste Hindus, who pride themselves on being the progeny of the Vedic poets and epic heroes revered as the sources of Indian civilization. For them, it is not "Aryan rather than Indian", but "Arya, or Indian par excellence".

Prof. Rajaram "and people of his ilk" have long made up their minds about whether they are Indian or not. That is why they feel strongly about the divisive effect to which the AIT has been used, first by interested outside forces (Zydenbos's sarcastic "evil foreign hand") who have tried to stress the difference- of the "Aryans" from other Indians as a weapon against native self-reassertion, and subsequently by sectional interest groups in India. Their first motive for arguing against the AIT is the sound academic consideration that it seems to be contradicted by the evidence. And this evidence is not nullified at all by their secondary, political motive: the desire to stop the pernicious influence of the AIT on India's unity and integrity.

Footnotes:

¹⁰⁶[Indian Express](#), 12-12-1993, in reply to a piece on a lecture by Prof. N.S. Rajaram, *Indian Express*, 14-11-1993, of which an expanded version constitutes the first chapter of Rajaram's book: *Aryan Invasion of India, the Myth and the Truth*, Voice of India, Delhi 1994.

¹⁰⁷Robert J. Zydenbos: "Virashaivism, caste, revolution, etc.", *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, 1997, p.525-535, a review of the very Christian (and anti-Brahminical) look at the Virashaiva sect by Rev. J.P. Schouten: *Revolution of the Mystics: On the Social Aspects of Virashaivism*, Kok/Pharos, Kampen (Netherlands) 1991.

¹⁰⁸Apart from other works by Rajaram mentioned elsewhere, note also N.S. Rajaram: *From Saraswati River to Indus Script*, Diganta Sahitya, Mangalore 1998, an elaboration on the Sanskrit-based decipherment of the Indus script by N. Jha: *Vedic Glossary on Indus Seals*, Ganga Kaveri Publ., Varanasi 1996.

¹⁰⁹Romila Thapar: "The Perennial Aryans", *Seminar*# 400 (1992).

¹¹⁰Shrikant Talageri: *The Rg-Veda, a Historical Analysis*, Aditya Prakashan, Delhi, forthcoming.

¹¹¹It is as yet unclear whether in this consideration we should include the self-description of the *Kalash Kafirs*, the last semi-Vedic Pagans in the Hindu Kush mountains (unaffected by all the later developments in the Indian plains which now constitute

Hinduism), as *Arya-e-Koh*, “Aryas of the mountains”. Rather than authentic testimony, this could be the result of interiorizing theories learned from Western visitors.

¹¹²E.g. Yoginder Sikand: “Exploding the Aryan myth”, *Observer of Business and Politics*, 30-10-1993, discussed below.

¹¹³Olivier Trandum: “Inde: le réveil identitaire de la droite”, *Le Choc du Mois*, Sep. 1992.

¹¹⁴N.S. Rajaram: *The Politics of History*, p.98.

¹¹⁵It is one of Mahatma Gandhi’s achievements that “he made India safe for the white man”, as the Indian Communists used to say around the time of Independence. Fact is that he must take credit for the friendly character of the decolonization of India, which led to the situation that Westerners who feel a strong hostility in countries like China and Malaysia, feel like honoured guests in India.

¹¹⁶K.V. Zvelebil: *Dravidian Linguistics: An Introduction*, Pondicherry Institute of Linguistics and Culture, 1990; and H. Kulke and D. Rothermund: *A History of India*, Rupa, Delhi 1991.

¹¹⁷K. Zvelebil: *Dravidian Linguistics*, p.90.

¹¹⁸Dr. Zydenbos’s use of Nehru as an argument of authority, along with his use of Indian English, has raised questions. A source inside the *Indian Express* office suspected that he had merely lent his name to an article by an Indian author. Zydenbos denied this when I asked him personally about it.

¹¹⁹See e.g. M.J. Akbar: *Nehru, the Making of India*, Penguin 1992.

¹²⁰N.S. Rajaram: *From Harappa to Ayodhya*, Sahitya Sindhu Prakashana, Bangalore 1997, p.6; emphasis in the original.

¹²¹Fernand Braudel: *A History of Civilizations*, Penguin 1988 (1963), p.236.

¹²²Fernand Braudel: *A History of Civilizations*, p.232.

¹²³See K. Elst: “The Ayodhya debate”, in G. Pollet, ed.: *Indian Epic Values*, Peeters, Leuven 1995, p-21-42; and K. Elst: “The Ayodhya demolition: an evaluation”, in Swapan Dasgupta et al.: *The Ayodhya Reference*, Voice of India, Delhi 1995, p.123-154.

¹²⁴“Tampering with history”, editorial in *The Hindu*, 12-6-1998. B.B. Lal wrote a reply: “Facts of history cannot be altered”, *The Hindu*, 1-7-1998.

¹²⁵B.B. Lal: *New Light on the Indus Civilization*, Aryan Books International, Delhi 1997.

¹²⁶About Savitri Devi and her husband, see Nicholas Goodrick-Clarke: *Hitler’s Priestess. Savitri Devi, the Hindu-Aryan Myth, and Neo-Nazism*, New York University Press, 1998, a book full of details but suffering from the same basic misconceptions as Dr. Zydenbos’ article and most Western writing on the “Hindu-Aryan” connection. Also see K. Elst: *The Saffron Swastika*, Voice of India, Delhi 1999.

¹²⁷Savitri Devi Mukherji: *Souvenirs et Réflexions d’une Arjenne*, Delhi 1976, p.41.

¹²⁸Savitri Devi Mukherji: *Souvenirs et Réflexions*, p.41.

¹²⁹Savitri Devi Mukherji: *Souvenirs et Réflexions*, p.27 and p.272, with reference to B.G. Tilak & Hermann Jacobi: *Arctic Home in the Vedas*, Pune 1903. Tilak and Jacobi had met after separately concluding that astronomical data in the Rg-Veda indicated its time of composition as ca. 4000 BC, see B.G. Tilak: *Orion, or Researches into the Antiquity of the Vedas*, Pune 1893. A detailed and convincing refutation of Tilak's arguments for the polar homeland is given by N.R. Waradpande: "The Home of the Aryans: an Astronomical Approach", in S.B. Deo & Suryanath Kamath: *The Aryan Problem*, Bharatiya Itihasa Sankalana Samiti, Pune 1993, p. 123-134, and in Shrikant Talageri: *The Rg-Veda, a Historical Analysis*, Aditya Prakashan, New Delhi, forthcoming.

¹³⁰Savitri Devi Mukherji: *Souvenirs et Réflexions*, p.157.

1. Political aspects of the Aryan invasion debate

1.5. SOME RED HERRINGS

1.5.1. Aryans and social mobility

Like Dr. Zydenbos in the passage discussed in the preceding section, some Indian scholars impute to the AIT critics motives or presuppositions which themselves imply the AIT, and which exist only in the eye of the beholder, meaning the AIT believer. Thus, Prof. Romila Thapar argues against a rigid view of caste history which she imputes to the Hindu nationalists: "Moralizing on the evils of caste precluded the need to (...) recognize the large area of negotiation which, to some degree, permitted certain castes to shape their status. For example, families of obscure origin and some even said to be of the lower castes, rose to political power and many legitimized their power by successfully claiming upper caste *kshatriya* status. To concede these facts would have contradicted the theory that the upper castes are the lineal descendants of the Aryans".¹³¹

It will be dear that "the theory that the upper castes are the lineal descendants of the Aryans" is part of the standard version of the AIT. While an earlier generation of Hindu nationalists may still have believed this theory in deference to the prestige of Western scholarship, this is not the case at all with the post-Independence Hindu nationalists, and most certainly not with the Hindu nationalist AIT critics whom Prof. Thapar is countering. They have no problem with the insight that "lower castes rose to political power and legitimized their power by successfully claiming upper caste *kshatriya* status".

On the contrary, such historical processes of social mobility corroborate the unity of the Hindu nation: even if there were such a thing as Aryan invasions, such upward (and corresponding downward) social mobility would have ensured that you find both Aryans and non-Aryans in both the upper and lower layers of Hindu society. An ethnic divide which may or may not have existed in Hindu society is neutralized and dissolved by such social processes, and this gives Hindu nationalists reason to applaud them.

1.5.2. Role of the non-Aryans

Another example of how AIT champions impute to the AIT critics motives or presuppositions which themselves imply the AIT, is this remark by Marxist columnist Yoginder Sikand: "It is significant that while asserting the indigenous origins of the Aryans, the existence of the Dravidian and other non-Aryan races native to India is not denied. After all, if it were asserted that all Indians are Aryans, it would not be possible to justify the racist caste system. While acknowledging the presence in India of non-Aryan indigenous races, their cultural contributions are completely ignored in the discourse of Hindutva. (...) the Hindutvawadis now assert that the Indus Valley civilization, which is generally accepted to be of Dravidian and pre-Aryan origin, was built by the Aryans. By asserting the native origins of the Aryans, and by attributing all the finer aspects of Indian culture to their supposed genius, the rich cultural legacy of the non-Aryan Indian races is effectively denied."¹³²

We may forego discussion of Sikand's obvious lack of knowledge of the present state of research, e.g. his mistaken assumption that there exists any evidence for the oft-assumed Dravidian character of the Harappan civilization.

The point is that he imputes to the AIT critics the desire to “justify the caste system”, the consent to the common belief that the caste system has a “racist” basis, the belief in a division between “Aryans” on the one hand and “Dravidian and other non-Aryan races” on the other, and the denial of the “cultural contributions” of these “non-Aryan indigenous races”. Underlying all this, and very conspicuous in Sikand’s discourse, is the assumption that it is a “racial” affair, an assumption emphatically criticized and rejected in practically all anti-AIT publications of the past decade.¹³³

Likewise, the specific theory of a “racial” basis of the caste system has been denied by Hindu and other nationalists from Dr. Ambedkar on down. That the AIT is criticized in a bid to “justify the caste system”, racist or otherwise, is not suggested by a reading of any of the AIT critiques known to me, let alone any cited by Sikand, who doesn’t mention any of the recent and learned critiques. Like a cowardly big boy picking fights with little boys, Sikand prefers to focus on Hindu Nationalist ideologue (and non-historian) M.S. Golwalkar’s 1939 musings about the “Arctic home” of the Aryans having been in India before the earth’s polar axis shifted to its present position.¹³⁴ Much of his attention is also devoted to semi-literate pamphletists who argue that everything worthwhile in the world has been created by Hindus, citing as evidence some silly pseudo-etymologies like *Jerusalem = Yadu Shalyam*, “shrine of Yadu/Krishna”. But he bravely avoids any confrontation with serious historians.

The only historian cited is Balraj Madhok, former president of the Jana Sangh, predecessor (1952-77) of the BJP (01980): “He is of the view that the Aryans were the natives of the *Sapta-Sindhu* region while various non-Aryan tribes inhabited the rest of India”. Though Madhok is by no means a specialist of ancient history and the Arya debate, his view makes good sense; it is one of the several possible interpretations of the evidence supporting the rejection of the AIT. Yet Sikand calls him one of those who “care little for historical truth, academic objectivity and consistency”.

The identification of “Aryan” with the Indo-Aryan speech community of the northern subcontinent and Sri Lanka, hence the conception of “Aryan” as the opposite of “Dravidian”, is also extraneous to the Hindu tradition. Many AIT critics emphasize that a Dravidian could be classified as *Arya* while a speaker of Indo-Aryan languages could be *an-Arya* if he abandoned the practice of Vedic tradition (e.g. by converting to Islam). Some of these critics, from Sri Aurobindo to N. R. Waradpande and Subhash Kak, go as far as to question the linguistic concept of Indo-European and Dravidian as distinct language families.¹³⁵ I believe they are mistaken, but at any rate, their views are strictly incompatible with the political programme of Aryans locking native Dravidians into the racist caste system, which Yoginder Sikand imputes to them.

1.5.3. Hitler again

Hitler’s use of the Sanskrit-derived term “Aryan” was bound to suggest a new line of Hindu-baiting. And effectively, while commenting on the enthusiasm in Hindu Nationalist circles about recent discoveries supporting the Indian origin of the Indo-European or “Aryan” language family, Yoginder Sikand alleges that “the Hindutvawadis, like their Nazi counterparts, fanatically believe in the thoroughly discredited Aryan master-race theory”.¹³⁶ Having read most of the Hindu Nationalist writings on the Aryan question, I am confident that there does not exist a single statement on their part which admits of the interpretation given by Yoginder Sikand.

Historically, Hitler’s Aryan master race theory and Yoginder Sikand’s cherished Aryan invasion theory have the same roots. It is precisely the *refutation* of this Aryan Invasion Theory which is a hot issue in Hindutva circles; and it is the anti-Hindutva polemicists like Yoginder Sikand who uphold the European racists’ AIT and who ridicule the attempts to refute it. Some earlier Hindu leaders, esp. Bal Gangadhar Tilak and Veer Savarkar, had accepted the voguish Aryan Invasion theory, though they (rightfully) refused to attach any practical importance to this issue of geographical provenance. But the dominant opinion in Hindutva circles today is that the native Hindu (Vedic and Puranic) tradition had it right when it consistently assumed Sanskritic culture to

be native to India. Indeed, Yoginder Sikand's own article was written in anticipation of a symposium organized by the RSS-affiliated Deendayal Research Institute to bring together different scholarly contributions to the *refutation* of the Aryan Invasion Theory so dear to the Nazis.

1.5.4. The Muslim factor

Indian Marxists have the power but lack the numbers, so they have cultivated alliances with all actual or potential enemies of Hinduism. Most importantly, they have assiduously sought to ingratiate themselves with India's large Muslim community (about 13% of the population), and in any debate with Hindu nationalists, they will invariably try to drag in some Muslim angle to the topic at hand. Their last trump card against the anti-AIT argument is that it is somehow anti-Muslim: "The Hindutva version of the theory became a mechanism for excluding some sections of Indian society, specifically Indian Muslims and Christians, by insisting that they are alien."¹³⁷ Or: "If Muslims have to be projected as the sole invaders of this land, the Aryans need to be presented as natives... If the Muslims are to be projected as traitors, bereft of any attachment to this land, they need to be presented as the only outsider."¹³⁸

Dr. Edwin Bryant reports: "Although in various other academic fields and area studies, such as race science, postcolonial scholarship has completely deconstructed and exposed the colonial investment in the propagation of certain theories, the field of Indology, at least in present-day Western academic circles, has been very suspicious of these voices being raised against the theory of the Aryan invasions"¹³⁹ He cited distrust of "political subtexts", in particular hidden anti-Muslim motives, as the reason why Indologists are reluctant to take up the rethinking of the Aryan question.

However, the deduction of exclusionary politics from a theory of Aryan origins has for a hundred years been the monopoly of the invasionist school. Its central argument has always been that the Brahmins and other upper-caste Hindus are foreign invaders in illegal occupation of whatever power they have in India. If "political subtexts" render a theory unrespectable, those Indologists should stay away from the AIT, and take a very critical second look at their own anti-Brahmin prejudice.

The non-invasionist school has strictly refrained from this line of rhetoric. Thus, no non-invasionist critic has so far tried to incorporate the fairly popular theory of a Dravidian invasion as an extra polemical point against the Dravidian separatists, much less to deduce from it that Dravidians are mere invaders with no right to stay in India. Most of them reject the hypothesis of a Dravidian invasion along with that of an Aryan invasion.

In certain factions of Hindu nationalism, it is not uncommon to find Muslims described as traitors.¹⁴⁰ After the Partition, which turned millions of Hindus into foreigners in their places of birth overnight, which put at least seven million of them to flight, and which may have killed up to half a million of them, it is not surprising that many Hindus remember how that Partition was imposed on an unwilling Hindu majority by an intransigent Muslim minority. Of course, generalizations about groups of people are dangerous and unwarranted, and the simplistic crudeness of some RSS discourse about Muslims is deplorable. Yet, even the grossest RSS blockhead hasn't stooped to calling them "alien". Though their religion is undeniably of alien origin, and though many of them cultivate imaginary Arab genealogies for themselves, the Indian Muslims are mostly the progeny of Hindu converts to Islam. This fact, far from being denied, is frequently cited in RSS literature as a basis for reclaiming these Muslims for Indian nationalism if not for Hinduism.

At any rate, most AIT critics have never had anything to do with anti-Muslim politics, e.g. K.D. Sethna and B.B. Lal are elderly scholars who try to stay out of politics. A few have made legitimate critiques of specific Islamic policies in India, e.g. Shrikant Talageri has discussed the

glorification of Islamic elements in Indian culture and the corresponding disparaging of purely Hindu elements by schoolbooks and the Mumbai film industry.¹⁴¹ No Muslim has died because of that. For many, the Aryan debate in the mid- 1990s came as a fresh breeze after the intense Hindu-Muslim conflict of ca. 1990. At last, a revolution without enemies!

Conversely, most Islamic polemicists have taken to using the AIT in their anti-Hindu writings. As Syed Shahabuddin once put it in an editorial of his monthly *Muslim India*: if invaders have to quit India, the Aryans as the first invaders will have to quit first.

1.5.5. Pakistani Indus, Bharatiya Saraswati

Another frequently-heard red herring is that the anti-AIT school is emphasizing the Saraswati basin as the centre of Harappan (and Vedic) culture at the expense of the Indus because the Indus now lies in Pakistan. Thus: "The discovery of Harappan sites on the Indian side of the border between India and Pakistan is viewed as compensating for the loss of the cities of Mohenjo-Daro and Harappa which are located in Pakistan."¹⁴²

Here again, we are faced with a projection by an outsider to Hindu nationalism. For Hindu nationalists, the Indus basin has not ceased to be part of India just because a state of Pakistan was created. To the indignation of Indian Marxists, the Hindu nationalists take a long-term view of their motherland: over the centuries, numerous empires have come and gone, native as well as foreign, and they all had their temporary borders, but the basic identity of India was not affected by these. The Marxists don't believe in this timeless India, but the Hindu nationalists are confident that the territory which is now Pakistan will revert to the bosom of Mother India in due course.

The insistence that a political motive explains the renewed emphasis on the Saraswati basin ignores a more obvious reason for paying due scholarly attention to the Saraswati basin: that is where most of the "Harappan" cities have been found. When people conspicuously disregard facts, it may be appropriate to wonder what motive they might have for this strange behaviour. But when they fully take the facts into account, there is no reason to suspect ulterior motives, except in the minds of the suspects.

1.5.6. Aryans as servants of imperialism

The reduction of Brahminism or Hinduism to the residue of the Aryan invasion is deductively taken to the most absurd lengths. Thus, a Christian theologian involved in Dalit politics alleges that the upper castes collaborated with the Muslim conquerors for the following reason: "Perhaps as descendants of the Aryan invaders into this country prior to the Moghuls and the British the advocates of Arya dharma could not outright condemn aggression and exploitation."¹⁴³ Well, most aggressors and exploiters don't feel that much solidarity with those who come to subject them in their turn to aggression and exploitation.

Likewise, Yoginder Sikand alleges: "The British invasion is, of course, not to be talked of at all, in line with the consistent and time-tested pro-imperialist line of the Hindutva brigade."¹⁴⁴ In fact, of the four Hindu leaders he attacks in his article, two were prominent leaders of the freedom movement who spent years in British prisons (Tilak and Savarkar), and the two others (Golwalkar and Madhok) have never lagged behind in anti-imperialist rhetoric, against fading British as well as against threatening Soviet and Chinese imperialism; all four are known for their critical view of Islamic imperialism.

This kind of wild allegation has to do with the Communists' bad conscience about their collaboration with the British against the freedom movement in 1941-45. Any detailed analysis of politicized AIT polemic ends up having to deal with the whole history of Indian Marxism, the Pakistan movement and other anti-Hindu forces.

Footnotes:

¹³¹Romila Thapar: "The theory of Aryan race and India", *Social Scientist*, January-March 1996, p.11.

¹³²Yoginder Sikand: "Exploding the Aryan myth", *Observer of Business and Politics*, 30-10-1993.

¹³³Most prominently in Paramesh Choudhury: *The Aryan Hoax that Dupes the Indians*, Calcutta 1995, which reproduces in appendix the UNESCO statement on racism, *The Race Question in Modern Science*, ca. 1950, and quotes from it on the cover: "The so-called Aryan 'people' or 'race' is a mere myth."

¹³⁴Reference is to M.S. Golwalkar: *We, Our Nationhood Defined*, Nagpur 1939.

¹³⁵See e.g. Subhash Kak: "Is there an Aryan/Dravidian binary?", www.indiastar.com, 1998.

¹³⁶Yoginder Sikand: "Exploding the Aryan myth", *Observer of Business and Politics*, 30-10-1993.

¹³⁷Romila Thapar: "The theory of Aryan race and India", *Social Scientist*, January-March 1996, p.10.

¹³⁸Yoginder Sikand: "Exploding the Aryan myth", *Observer of Business and Politics*, 30-10-1993.

¹³⁹Edwin Bryant: "The Indo-Aryan invasion debate: the politics of a discourse", WAVES conference, Los Angeles. August 1998, abstract.

¹⁴⁰See e.g. M.S. Golwalkar: *Bunch of Thoughts*, Jagarana Prakashan, Bangalore 1984 (1966).

¹⁴¹Shrikant Talageri: *Aryan Invasion Theory and Indian Nationalism*, introduction.

¹⁴²Romila Thapar: "The theory of Aryan race and India", *Social Scientist*, January-March 1996, p.16.

¹⁴³Israel Selvanayagam: "The roots of Hindu fundamentalism - a historical overview", *Asia Journal of Theology*, Bangalore, Oct. 1996, p.445.

¹⁴⁴Yoginder Sikand: "Exploding the Aryan myth", *Observer of Business and Politics*, 30.10.1993.

2. Astronomical data and the Aryan question

2.1. DATING THE RG-VEDA

The determination of the age in which Vedic literature started and flourished has its consequences for the Aryan Invasion question. The oldest text, the Rg-Veda, is full of precise references to places and natural phenomena in what are now Panjab and Haryana, and was unmistakably composed in that part of India. The date at which it was composed is a firm *terminus ante quem* for the entry of the Vedic Aryans into India. They may have come from abroad or they may have been fully native, but by the time of the Rg-Veda, they were certainly Indians without memory of a foreign homeland.

In a rather shoddy way, Friedrich Max Müller launched the hypothesis that the Rg-Veda had to be dated to about 1200 BC, and even though he later retracted it, that arbitrary guess has become the orthodoxy.¹ It is forgotten too often that in his own day, other scholars rejected this extremely late date on a variety of grounds. Maurice Winternitz based his estimate on purely philological considerations: "We cannot explain the development of the whole of this great literature if we assume as late a date as round about 1200 BC or 1500 BC as its starting-point."² Isn't it refreshing to find how logical and unprejudiced the early researchers were? You cannot credibly cram the complicated linguistic, cultural and philosophical developments which are in evidence in Vedic literature, into just a few centuries.

But since this argument of plausibility can always be countered with the argument that unlikely developments are not strictly impossible, we need a firmer basis to decide this chronological question. The most explicit chronology would be provided by astronomical markers of time.

Footnotes:

¹The story of Max Müller's chronology and its impact is told by N.S Rajaram: *The Politics of History*, Voice of India, Delhi 1995, ch.3.

²M. Winternitz: *History of Indian Literature* (1907, reprint by Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi 1987), vol. 1, p.288.

2. Astronomical data and the Aryan question

2.2. ANCIENT HINDU ASTRONOMY

2.2.1. Astronomical tables

One of the earliest estimates of the date of the Vedas was at once among the most scientific. In 1790, the Scottish mathematician John Playfair demonstrated that the starting-date of the astronomical observations recorded in the tables still in use among Hindu astrologers (of which three copies had reached Europe between 1687 and 1787) had to be 4300 BC.³ His proposal was dismissed as absurd by some, but it was not refuted by any scientist.

Playfair's judicious use of astronomy was countered by John Bentley with a Scriptural argument which we now must consider invalid. In 1825, Bentley objected: "By his [= *Playfair's*] attempt to uphold the antiquity of Hindu books against absolute facts, he thereby supports all those horrid abuses and impositions found in them, under the pretended sanction of antiquity. Nay, his aim goes still deeper, for by the same means he endeavours to overturn the Mosaic account, and sap the very foundation of our religion: for if we are to believe in the antiquity of Hindu books, as he would wish us, then the Mosaic account is all a fable, or a fiction."⁴

Bentley did not object to astronomy per se, in so far as it could be helpful in showing up the falsehood of Brahminical scriptures. However, it did precisely the reverse. Falsehood in this context could have meant that the Brahmins falsely claimed high antiquity for their texts by presenting as ancient astronomical observations recorded in Scripture what were in fact back-calculations from a much later age. But Playfair showed that this was impossible.

Back-calculation of planetary positions is a highly complex affair requiring knowledge of a number of physical laws, universal constants and actual measurements of densities, diameters and distances. Though Brahminical astronomy was remarkably sophisticated for its time, it could only back-calculate planetary position of the presumed Vedic age with an inaccuracy margin of at least several degrees of arc. With our modern knowledge, it is easy to determine what the actual positions were, and what the results of back-calculations with the Brahminical formulae would have been, e.g.:

"Aldebaran was therefore 40' before the point of the vernal equinox, according to the Indian astronomy, in the year 3102 before Christ. (...) [Modern astronomy] gives the longitude of that star 13' from the vernal equinox, at the time of the Calyougham, agreeing, within 53', with the determination of the Indian astronomy. This agreement is the more remarkable, that the Brahmins, by their own rules for computing the motion of the fixed stars, could not have assigned this place to Aldebaran for the beginning of Calyougham, had they calculated it from a modern observation. For as they make the motion of the fixed stars too great by more than 3" annually, if they had calculated backward from 1491, they would have placed the fixed stars less advanced by 4⁰ or 5⁰, at their ancient epoch, than they have actually done."⁵

So, it turns out that the data given by the Brahmins corresponded not with the results deduced from their formulae, but with the actual positions, and this, according to Playfair, for nine different astronomical parameters. This is a bit much to explain away as coincidence or sheer luck.

2.2.2. Ancient observation, modern confirmation

That Hindu astronomical lore about ancient times cannot be based on later back-calculation, was also argued by Playfair's contemporary, the French astronomer Jean-Sylvain Bailly: "The motions of the stars calculated by the Hindus before some 4500 years vary not even a single minute from the [modern] tables of Cassini and Meyer. The Indian tables give the same annual variation of the moon as that discovered by Tycho Brahe - a variation unknown to the school of Alexandria and also the Arabs."⁶

Prof. N.S. Rajaram, a mathematician who has worked for NASA, comments: "fabricating astronomical data going back thousands of years calls for knowledge of Newton's Law of Gravitation and the ability to solve differential equations."⁷ Failing this advanced knowledge, the data in the Brahminical tables must be based on actual observation. Ergo, the Sanskrit-speaking Vedic seers were present in person to record astronomical observations and preserve them for a full 6,000 years: "The observations on which the astronomy of India is founded, were made more than three thousand years before the Christian era. (...) Two other elements of this astronomy, the equation of the sun's centre and the obliquity of the ecliptic (...) seem to point to a period still more remote, and to fix the origin of this astronomy 1000 or 1200 years earlier, that is, 4300 years before the Christian era".⁸

All this at least on the assumption that Playfair's, Bailly's and Rajaram's claims about the Hindu astronomical tables are correct. Disputants may start by proving them factually wrong, but should not enter the dispute arena without a refutation of the astronomers' assertions. It is something of a scandal that Playfair's and Bailly's findings have been lying around for two hundred years while linguists and indologists were publishing speculations on Vedic chronology in stark disregard for the contribution of astronomy.

2.2.3. The start of Kali-Yuga

Hindu tradition makes mention of the conjunction of the "seven planets" (Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, Venus, Mercury, sun and moon) and Ketu (southern lunar node, the northern node/ Rahu being by definition in the opposite location) near the fixed star Revati (*Zeta Piscium*) on 18 February 3102 BC. This date, at which Krishna is supposed to have breathed his last, is conventionally the start of the so-called Kali-Yuga, the "age of strife", the low point in a declining sequence of four ages. However, modern scholars have claimed that the Kali-Yuga system of time-reckoning was a much younger invention, not attested before the 6th century AD.

Against this modernist opinion, Bailly and Playfair had already shown that the position of the moon (the fastest-moving "planet", hence the hardest to back-calculate with precision) at the beginning of Kali-Yuga, 18 February 3102, as given by Hindu tradition, was accurate to 37'.⁹ Either the Brahmins had made an incredibly lucky guess, or they had recorded an actual observation on Kali Yuga day itself.

Richard L. Thompson claims that in Indian literature and inscriptions, there are a number of datelines expressed in Kali-Yuga which are older than the Christian era (and a fortiori older than the 6th century AD).¹⁰ More importantly, Thompson argues that the *Jyotisha-shAstras* (treatises on astronomy and, increasingly, astrology, starting in the 14th century BC with the *VedANga Jyotisha* as per its own astronomical data, but mostly from the first millennium AD) are correct in mentioning this remarkable conjunction on that exact day, for there was indeed a conjunction of sun, moon, Mercury, Venus, Mars, Jupiter, Saturn, Ketu and Revati.

True, the conjunction was not spectacularly exact, having an orb of 37' between the two most extreme planetary positions. But that precisely supports the hypothesis of an actual observation as opposed to a back-calculation. Indeed, if the Hindu astronomers were able to calculate this

position after a lapse of many centuries (when the *Jyotisha-Shastra* was written), it is unclear what reason they would have had for picking out that particular conjunction. Surely, such conjunctions are spectacular to those who witness one, and hence worth recording if observed. But they are not that exceptional when considered over millennia: even closer conjunctions of all visible planets do occur (most recently on 5 February 1962).¹¹ If the Hindu astronomers had simply been going over their astronomical tables looking for an exceptional conjunction, they could have found more spectacular ones than the one on 18 February 3102 BC. And why would they have calculated tables for such a remote period, sixteen centuries before the Aryan invasion, nineteen before the composition of the Rg-Vedic hymns, a time of which they had no recollection?

Footnotes:

³Playfair's argumentation, "Remarks on the astronomy of the Brahmins", Edinburg 1790, is reproduced in Dharampal: Indian Science and Technology in the Eighteenth Century, Academy of Gandhian Studies, Hyderabad 1983 (Impex India, Delhi 1971), p.69-124.

⁴John Bentley: Hindu Astronomy, republished by Shri Publ., Delhi 1990, p.xxvii; also discussed by Richard L. Thompson: "World Views: Vedic vs. Western", The India Times, 31-3-1993. On p.111, we find that Bentley has "proven" that Krishna was born on 7 August in AD 600 (the most conservative estimate elsewhere is the 9th century BC), and on p.158ff., that Varaha Mihira (AD 510-587) was a contemporary of the Moghul emperor Akbar (r.1556-1605).

⁵J. Playfair in Dharampal: Indian Science and Technology, p.87.

⁶Quoted in S. Sathe: In Search for the Year of the Bharata War, Navabharati, Hyderabad 1982, p.32.

⁷N.S. Rajaram: The Politics of History, p.47.

⁸J. Playfair in Dharampal: Indian Science and Technology, p-118.

⁹J. Playfair in Dharampal: Indian Science and Technology, p.88-89.

¹⁰R.L. Thompson: Vedic Cosmography and Astronomy, Bhaktivedanta Book Trust, Los Angeles 1989, p. 19-24. Unfortunately, he gives no examples of the early use of Kali-Yuga, contenting himself with references to Indian publications offering such examples, unlikely to convince Western scholars, viz. S.D. Kulkarni: *Adi Sankara*, Bombay 1987, and G.C. Agrawala: *Age of Bharata War*, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi 1979. Kulkarni's book (p.281ff) offers Kali-Yuga dates such as 509 BC, but from marginal Sanskrit sources which most Western scholars would consider unreliable.

¹¹On that day, Hindu astrologers gathered for prayer-sessions on hilltops to avert the impending catastrophe; they were moderately successful.

2. Astronomical data and the Aryan question

2.3. THE PRECESSION OF THE EQUINOX

2.3.1. The slowest hand on the clock

The truly strong evidence for a high chronology of the Vedas is the Vedic information about the position of the equinox. The phenomenon of the “precession of the equinoxes” takes the ecliptical constellations (also known as the sidereal *Zodiac*, i.e. those constellations through which the sun passes)¹² slowly past the vernal equinox point, i.e. the intersection of ecliptic and equator, rising due East on the horizon. The whole tour is made in about 25,791 years, the longest cycle manageable for naked-eye observers. If data about the precession are properly recorded, they provide the best and often the only clue to an absolute chronology for ancient events.

If we can read the Vedic and post-Vedic indications properly, they mention constellations on the equinox points which were there from 4,000 BC for the Rg-Veda (Orion, as already pointed out by B.G. Tilak)¹³ through around 3100 BC for the Atharva-Veda and the core Mahabharata (Aldebaran) down to 2,300 BC for the Sutras and the Shatapatha Brahmana (Pleiades).¹⁴

Other references to the constellational position of the solstices or of solar and lunar positions at the beginning of the monsoon confirm this chronology. Thus, the Kaushitaki Brahmana puts the winter solstice at the new moon of the sidereal month of Magha (i.e. the Mahashivaratri festival), which now falls 70 days later: this points to a date in the first half of the 3rd millennium BC. The same processional movement of the twelve months of the Hindu calendar (which are tied to the constellations) vis-a-vis the meteorological seasons, is what allowed Hermann Jacobi to fix the date of the Rg-Veda to the 5th-4th millennium BC.¹⁵ Indeed, the regular references to the full moon's position in a constellation at the time of the beginning of the monsoon, which nearly coincides with the summer solstice, provide a secure and unambiguous chronology through the millennial Vedic literature.

It is not only the Vedic age which is moved a number of centuries deeper into the past, when comparing the astronomical indications with the conventional chronology. Even the Gupta age (and implicitly the earlier ages of the Buddha, the Mauryas etc.) could be affected. Indeed, the famous playwright and poet Kalidasa, supposed to have worked at the Gupta court in about 400 AD, wrote that the monsoon rains started at the start of the sidereal month of Ashadha; this timing of the monsoon was accurate in the last centuries BC.¹⁶ This implicit astronomy-based chronology of Kalidasa, about 5 centuries higher than the conventional one, tallies well with the traditional “high” chronology of the Buddha, whom Chinese Buddhist tradition dates to ca. 1100 BC, and the implicit Puranic chronology even to ca. 1700 BC.¹⁷

2.3.2. Some difficulties

These indications about the processional phases may be unreliable insofar as their exact meaning is not unambiguous. To say that a constellation “never swerves from the East” (as is said of the Pleiades in the Shatapatha Brahmana 2:1:2:3) seems to mean that it contains the spring equinox, implying that it is on the equator, which intersects the horizon due East. But this might seem insufficiently explicit for the modern reader who is used to a precise and separate technical terminology for such matters. But then, the modern reader will have to accept that technical terminology in Vedic days mostly consisted in fixed metaphorical uses of common terms. This is not all that primitive, for the same thing will be found when the etymology of

modern technical terms is analyzed, e.g. a *telescope* is a Greek “far-seer”, *oxygen* is “acid-producer”, a *cylinder* is a “roller”. The only difference is that we can use the vocabulary of foreign classical languages to borrow from, while Sanskrit was its own classical reservoir of specialized terminology.

Another factor of uncertainty is that the equinox moves very slowly (1° in nearly 71 years), so that any inexactness in the Vedic indications and any ambiguity in the constellations’ boundaries makes a difference of centuries. This occasional inexactness might possibly be enough to neutralize the above shift in Kalidasa’s date - but not to account for a shift of millennia (each millennium corresponding to about 14 degrees of arc) needed to move the Vedic age from the pre-Harappan to the post-Harappan period, from 4000 BC as calculated by the astronomers to 1200 BC as surmised by Friedrich Max Müller.

On the other hand, it is encouraging to note that the astronomical evidence is entirely free of contradictions. There would be a real problem if the astronomical indications had put the Upanishads earlier than the Rg-Veda, or Kalidasa earlier than the Brahmanas, but that is not the case: the astronomical evidence is consistent. Inconsistency would prove the predictable objection of AIT defenders that these astronomical references are but poetical tabulation without any scientific contents. However, the facts are just the opposite. To the extent that there *are* astronomical indications in the Vedas, these form a consistent set of data detailing an absolute chronology for Vedic literature in full agreement with the known relative chronology of the different texts of this literature. This way, they completely contradict the hypothesis that the Vedas were composed after an invasion in about 1500 BC. Not one of the dozens of astronomical data in Vedic literature confirms the AIT chronology.

2.3.3. Regulus at summer solstice

In the Shulba Sutra appended to Baudhayana’s Shrauta Sutra, mathematical instructions are given for the construction of Vedic altars. One of its remarkable contributions is the theorem usually ascribed to Pythagoras, first for the special case of a square (the form in which it was discovered), then for the general case of the rectangle: “The diagonal of the rectangle produces the combined surface which the length and the breadth produce separately.” This and other instances of advanced mathematics presented by Baudhayana have been shown by the American mathematician A. Seidenberg to be the origin of similar mathematical techniques and ‘discoveries’ in Greece and Babylonia, some of which have been securely dated to 1700 BC. So, 1700 BC was a *terminus post quem* for Baudhayana’s mathematics, which would reasonably be dated to the later part of the Harappan period which ended in ca. 1900 BC.

However, Seidenberg was told by the indologists that these Sutras, or any Vedic text for that matter, were definitely written later than 1700 BC. But mathematical data cannot be manipulated just like that, and Seidenberg remained convinced of his case: “Whatever the difficulty there may be [concerning chronology], it is small in comparison with the difficulty of deriving the Vedic ritual application of the theorem from Babylonia. (The reverse derivation is easy)... the application involves geometric algebra, and there is no evidence of geometric algebra from Babylonia. And the geometry of Babylonia is already secondary whereas in India it is primary.”¹⁸ To satisfy the indologists, he said that the Shulba Sutra had conserved an older tradition, and that it is from this one that the Babylonians had learned their mathematics: “Hence we do not hesitate to place the Vedic (...) rituals, or more exactly, rituals exactly like them, far back of 1700 BC. (...) elements of geometry found in Egypt and Babylonia stem from a ritual system of the kind described in the Sulvasutras.”¹⁹

This is then one of those “entities multiplied beyond necessity”: a ritual, annex altar, annex mathematical theory, which is exactly like the Vedic ritual, annex altar, annex mathematical theory, only it is not the Vedic ritual but a thousand or so years older. Let us simplify matters and assume that it was Baudhayana himself who devised his mathematical theories “far back of 1700

BC". Is there a way to find independent confirmation of this suspicion? Yes, there is: the precession of the equinoxes.

In their *Vedic Index of Names and Subjects*, A.A. MacDonell and A.B. Keith cite the opinion of several philologists about a reference to a solstice in *Magha* in the Baudhayana Shrauta Sutra (as well as in the Kaushitaki Brahmana 19:3), to which the Shulba Sutra is an appendix. *Magha* is the asterism around the star Regulus, but the name is used for an entire month (names of months are typically the name of the most prominent one of the two or three asterisms/*nakshatras* which make up that one-twelfth of the ecliptic), spatially equivalent to a zone of about 30° around that star, so any deduction here must take a fair degree of imprecision into account. The 18th- and 19th-century philologists cited disagree about whether a *Magha* solstice was in 1181 BC or in 1391 BC. The authors themselves consider it "only fair to allow a thousand years for possible errors", and settle for a date between 800 BC and 600 BC, "quite in harmony with the probable date of the Brahmana literature".²⁰

However, it is very easy to calculate that Regulus, currently at almost exactly 60° from the solstitial axis, was on that axis about 60×71 years ago, i.e. in the 23rd century BC. Though we must indeed allow for an inexactitude of up to 15° , equivalent to about 1100 years, the *Magha* solstice described is much more likely to have been in 2200 BC than in 1100 BC, and Keith and MacDonell's 600 BC is quite beyond the pale. It may have taken place even before the 23rd century BC: maybe only the asterism around Regulus had reached the solstitial axis but not yet the star itself. Most likely, then, this reference to a *Magha* solstice confirms that the Bra and Sutra literature including the Baudhayana Shrauta Sutra (annex Shulba) dates to the late 3rd millennium BC, at the height of the Harappan civilization. In that case, Seidenberg's reconstruction of the development and transmission of mathematical knowledge and the astronomical references in the literature confirm each other in placing Baudhayana's (post-Vedic!) work in the later part of the Harappan period.

2.3.4. One Veda can hide another

At this point, the only defence for the AIT can consist in a wholesale rejection of the astronomical evidence. This can be done in a crude way, e.g. by simply ignoring the astronomical evidence, as is done in most explicitations of the AIT. A slightly subtler approach is to explain it away, as is done by Romila Thapar, who affirms her belief in "the generally accepted chronology that the Rig-Vedic hymns were composed over a period extending from about 1500 to 1000 BC". When "references to what have been interpreted as configurations of stars have been used to suggest dates of about 4000 BC for these hymns", she raises the objection that "planetary positions could have been observed in earlier times and such observations been handed down as part of an oral tradition", so that they "do not constitute proof of the chronology of the Vedic hymns".²¹

This would imply that accurate astronomical data were indeed made from the 5th millennium onwards, and that they were preserved for more than two thousand years, an unparalleled feat in oral traditions. If such a feat is not an indication of literacy and of written records, at the least it supposes a mnemotechnical device capable of preserving information orally, and the one that was available then was verse. So, some poems with the memory-aiding devices of verse, rhythm and tone must have been composed when the information was available first-hand, i.e. close to the time of the actual observation, and those hymns would of course be the Vedic hymns themselves. Otherwise, one has to postulate that the Vedic hymns were composed by borrowing the contents of an earlier tradition of verse, composed at the time when the equinox was observed to be in Orion.

In other words, the Rg-Veda contains literal (though unacknowledged) quotations from another hymns collection composed 2,500 years earlier. This is as good as asserting that Shakespeare's works were not written by Shakespeare, but by someone else whose name was also Shakespeare. However, the point to remember is that even Romila Thapar does not deny that

somebody's actual observation of these celestial phenomena was the source of their description in the Vedas.

It is not good enough for those who don't like this evidence, to object that they are not convinced by these astronomical indications of high antiquity, on the plea that their meaning might be somewhat unclear to us. It is clear enough and undeniable that the Vedic seers took care to mention certain astronomical positions and phenomena. A convincing refutation would therefore require an alternative but consistent (philologically as well as astronomically sound) interpretation of the existing astronomical indications which brings Vedic literature down to a much later age. But so far, such a reading of those text passages doesn't seem to exist. In no case is there astronomical information which puts the Vedas at as late a date as "generally accepted" by Prof. Thapar and others.

Footnotes:

¹²The sidereal Zodiac, used in astrology by most Hindu and some Western astrologers, consists of the actually visible constellations on the ecliptic. It is contrasted with the tropical Zodiac, an abstract division of the ecliptic in twelve equal sectors of which the first one starts by definition at the equinox axis. This tropical Zodiac, used by most Western and some Hindu astrologers, is unrelated to the background of constellations (it could be constructed even if the universe consisted only of the sun and the earth); but it does not figure anywhere in the present discussion. As far as we know, the process of abstraction from visible constellations to geometrical sectors took place only in the Hellenistic period, ca. 100 BC, and was unknown to the Vedic seers, though they did know the solstice axis and equinox axis.

¹³We are aware that the equinox axis never points exactly towards the constellation Orion, which lies south of the ecliptic; but it is understood that the relatively starless area between the constellations of Gemini and Taurus was named after the conspicuous constellation Orion which lies nearby on the same longitude.

¹⁴Remark that the second half of the 3rd millennium BC, the high tide of the Harappan cities, is also identified by K.D. Sethna (KarpAsa in Prehistoric India: a Chronological and Cultural Clue, Impex India, Delhi 1981) as the period of the Sutras, the Vedas being assigned to the pre-Harappan period, all on the basis of the evidence of material culture (with special focus on cotton/karpAsa) as attested in the literary and archaeological records. According to Asko Parpola, Indus~Saraswati seal 430 (reasonably datable to the 24th century BC) depicting the Seven Sisters seems to refer to the observation of the Pleiades.

¹⁵Hermann G. Jacobi: "On the Date of the Rgveda" (1894), reproduced in K.C. Verma et al., eds.: *Rtambhara Studies in Indology*, Society for Indic Studies, Ghaziabad 1986, p-91-99.

¹⁶"We can, therefore, say that about 2000 years have elapsed since the period of Kalidasa", according to P.V. Holay: "Vedic astronomy, its origin and evolution", in Haribhai Pandit et al.: *Issues in Vedic Astronomy and Astrology*, Rashtriya Veda Vidya Pratishthan & Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, P.109.

¹⁷The argument for a higher chronology (by about 6 centuries) for the Guptas as well as for the Buddha has been elaborated by K.D. Sethna in *Ancient India in New Light*, Aditya Prakashan, Delhi 1989. The established chronology starts from the uncertain

assumption that the Sandrokottos/ Chandragupta whom Megasthenes met was the Maurya rather than the Gupta king of that name. This hypothetical synchronism is known as the “sheet-anchor of Indian chronology”. In August 1995, a gathering of 43 historians and archaeologists from South-Indian universities (at the initiative of Prof. K.M. Rao, Dr. N. Mahalingam and Dr. S.D. Kulkarni) passed a resolution fixing “the date of the Bharata war at 3139-38 BC” and declaring this date “to be the true sheet anchor of Indian chronology”.

¹⁸A. Seidenberg: “The ritual origin of geometry”, *Archive for History of Exact Sciences*, 1962, p. 488-527, specifically p-515, quoted by N.S. Rajaram and D. Frawley: *Vedic ‘Aryans’ and the Origins of Civilization*, WH Press, Québec 1995, p-85.

¹⁹A. Seidenberg: “The ritual origin of geometry”, *Archive for History of Exact Sciences*, 1962, p.515, quoted by N.S. Rajaram and D. Frawley: *Vedic ‘Aryans’ and the Origins of Civilization*, p.85.

²⁰A.A. MacDonell & A.B. Keith: *Vedic Index of Names and Subjects*, vol. 1 (1912, reprint by Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi 1982), p.423-424, entry Nakshatra.

²¹Romila Thapar: “The Perennial Aryans”, *Seminar*, December 1992.

2. Astronomical data and the Aryan question

2.4. ADDITIONAL ASTRONOMICAL INDICATIONS

Apart from the hard evidence, there are a few elements in Hindu astronomical tradition which would not count as evidence all by themselves, but which may gain a new significance when studied in the company of the more solid elements already considered. We will mention four of them: the Saptarshi cycle, the Vedic description of a particular eclipse, cosmic number games in Vedic texts and ritual, and the surprising presence of the Zodiac.

2.4.1. The Saptarshi cycle

A lesser-known Hindu system of time-reckoning is the Saptarshi cycle of 3600 years (possibly based on the 60-year cycle, see ch. 2.4.5. below). At any rate, by the Christian age we find writers who take this concept of a 3600-year cycle literally, and it is hard to either prove or refute that this may have been a much older tradition.

The medieval Kashmiri historian Kalhana claimed that the previous cycle had started in 3076 BC, and the present one in AD 525. J.E. Mitchiner has suggested that the beginning of the Saptarshi reckoning was one more cycle earlier, in 6676 BC: "We may conclude that the older and original version of the Era of the Seven Rsis commenced with the Seven Rsis in Krttika in 6676 BC, used a total of 28 Naksatras, and placed the start of the Kali Yuga in 3102 BC. This version was in use in northern India from at least the 4th century BC, as witnessed by the statements of Greek and Roman writers; it was also the version used by Vrddha Garga, at around the start of the Christian era."²² This would roughly coincide with the start of the Puranic dynastic list reported by Greco-Roman authors as starting in 6776 BC.

Indeed, the Puranic king-list as known to Greek visitors of Chandragupta's court in the 4th century BC or to later Greco-Roman India-watchers, started in 6776 BC. Pliny wrote that the Indians date their first king, "Liber Pater" (Roman equivalent of Dionysus), to "6,451 years and 3 months" before Alexander the Great (d. 323 BC), while Arrian puts "Dionysus" as head of the dynastic list at $6,042 + 300 + 120 = 6,462$ years before Sandrokottos (Chandragupta), to whom a Greek embassy was sent in 314 BC.²³ Both indications add up to a date, give or take a year, of 6776 BC. This would, according to the implicit chronology of Puranic tradition, be the time of Manu's enthronement, Manu being the Aryan patriarch who established his kingdom in North India after having survived the Flood. One of Manu's heirs was Ila, ancestress of Yayati, whose five sons became the patriarchs of the "five peoples" who form the ethnic horizon of the Vedas, one of them being Puru; in Puru's tribe, then, one Bharata started the Bharata clan to which most of the Vedic seers belonged.

It so happens that in the 7th millennium BC, the oceans were still in the process of recovering the ground they lost during the ice Age, when the sea level was for thousands of years nearly a hundred metres below the present level. The importance of the Glaciation, which peaked ca. 16,000 years ago, in the reconstruction of Eurasian migration histories can hardly be overestimated. The Channel between Britain and France, with sea bottom at ca. 40 metres, was a walkway until it was inundated again in ca. 6500 BC, when the sea was already more than halfway back to its normal (or at least its present) level. This means that for centuries before and for some more centuries after that time, the sea level was progressively rising. Since large populations had settled in the coastal areas vacated by the receding sea at the beginning of the Ice Age, the progressive melting of the ice-caps led to the progressive flooding of ever higher-situated population centres, for several millennia until perhaps 5,000 BC.

One can imagine what would happen if today the sea level would rise a mere 10 metres: densely populated countries like the Netherlands and Bangladesh would get largely submerged, along with major cities like New York and Mumbai, and at least a quarter of the world population would have to move. But that was, for several millennia, the human condition: one after another, low-lying villages had to be abandoned to the rising sea. It must have seemed like a law of nature to them that the sea was forever rising, forcing men to seek higher habitats. And this process was probably continuous only when looked at from a distance, the reality being more like periods of stable sea levels followed by sudden jumps, catastrophes when considered on the scale of a human lifetime. Most probably, that is the origin of the Flood story.²⁴ The Puranas describe Manu as the leader of mankind after the Flood, and if we apply a realistic average length to the rulerships of the kings mentioned in the Puranic dynastic lists, Manu may have lived in the 7th millennium BC, the time of the rising waters, warranting the suspicion that the Flood story is related to historical events at the end of the ice Age.

The myth of Atlantis and other submerged continents probably has a similar origin. The Tamils have a tradition of a submerged land to India's south, of which the Maldives and Sri Lanka are remaining hilltops: *KumArIkhaNDam* or, in the parlance of the Madras-based Theosophical Society, *Lemuria*. The city in which their poets' academy or *Sangam* (recorded in the early Christian era, but claimed to be ten thousand years old) was established, was said to have been moved thrice because of the rising waters. Though it is hard to see how poets working at the turn of the Christian era could have a memory of events five millennia older, one cannot dismiss as pure fable a story which tallies neatly with the known geological facts of the rising sea level at the end of the Ice Age.

And if such memory was possible, the existence of a system of time-reckoning going back that far is not impossible either. But we must admit that for the time being, this is merely "not impossible". However, even if we let the Saptarshi cycle start only in 3076 BC, unrelated to Manu and the Flood, this is still hard to reconcile with the theory of an Aryan invasion in the 2nd millennium BC.

2.4.2. A remarkable eclipse

For another chronological marker, Rg-Veda 5:40:5-9 describes a solar eclipse. From the description, one can deduce a number of conditions determining the times at which it could have taken place: it was at that site a central, non-total eclipse, which took place in the afternoon on the Kurukshetra meridian, on a given day after the summer solstice, at least in the reading of P.C. Sengupta. Only one date satisfies all conditions, which he calculated as 26 July 3928 BC.²⁵ We have to add, however, that this calculation stands or falls with the accuracy of the unusual translation of the word *brahma* as "solstice". This reading is supported by later scriptural references to the same event, Shankhayana Aranyaka 1:2,18 and Jaiminiya Brahmana 2:404-410. N.S. Rajaram has identified an even more explicit use of *brahma* in the sense of "solstice": in Rg-Veda 10:85:35, where *brahma* is associated with the division of the solar cycle in two halves.²⁶

Moreover, the astronomical interpretation (e.g. by B.G. Tilak) of Rg-Veda 10:61:5-8, where *brahma* is the equinox and the fruit of the union between a divine father and daughter, i.e. the two adjoining constellations MRgashira/Orion and Rohini/Aldebaran, if not more abstractly the intersection of two related celestial circles, may be cited in support: *equinox* is not the same as *solstice*, but it is at least one of the cardinal directions, a purely astronomical rather than a religious concept; the common meaning of *brahma* would then be "cardinal direction". The division of the ecliptic in 4 parts of 90° by the solstice axis and the equinox axis is already obliquely referred to in RV 1:155:6, so the concept of "cardinal direction" was certainly understood. Still, this construction remains sufficiently strange to be a reasonable ground for skepticism. On the other hand, it is up to the skeptics to come up with a convincing alternative translation which fits the context.

2.4.3. Cosmic data in Vedic ritual

A different type of astronomical evidence, not to fix a precise date but to give an idea of the scientific spirit of the Vedic Aryans, is the interpretation of numerical facts about the Vedas as implicit references to astronomical data. If this seems far-fetched, it should be borne in mind that ancient mythology and religion were primarily concerned with the visible heaven-dwellers, i.e. the heavenly bodies. Many myths are nothing but anthropomorphic narrations of celestial phenomena such as eclipses, solstices and equinoxes, the angular relations between the orbiting planets (e.g. the regular overtaking of the planets by the fast-moving moon, therefore imagined by the Greeks as a huntress, Artemis), the analogy between the twelve-month solar cycle and the twelve-year Jupiter cycle, and even the precession.²⁷

Apart from this figurative representation, there is also a numerical representation of astronomical data in ancient traditions. Thus the Bible, written by a satellite culture of the astronomically astute Babylonians, used the device of enciphering astronomical data in all kinds of contingent numerical aspects of the narrative, e.g. the ages of the antediluvian patriarchs in *Genesis* turn out to be equal to the sums of the planets' synodic cycles (period from one conjunction with the sun till the next): Lamech dies at age 777 = 399 (number of days in Jupiter's synodic cycle) + 378 (Saturn's); Mahalalel at 895 = 116 + 779 (Mercury: Mars); Yared at 962 = 584 + 378 (Venus + Saturn). Similarly, the symbolism of 12 and 13, referring to the lunar months in a year, is omnipresent in the Bible: 12 sons of Jacob plus 1 daughter; 12 tribes of Israel with a territory plus the 1 priestly tribe of Levi; 12 regular apostles of Jesus plus the one substitute for the traitor Judas, Matthias; the "thirteen-petalled rose" as Talmudic symbol of the Torah.

In the past decades, scientists and orthodox religionists have often made fun of attempts to connect religion with science, as in Frithjof Capra's *Tao of Physics* and numerous other books. Yet, in ancient religious texts we already see this attempt of religious thinkers to keep up with the latest in science, as outlined above for astronomy. In his Gospel, John takes the trouble of counting the fish caught by the apostle-fishermen in their nets: 153. Number theory was fairly advanced among the Pythagoreans, and some of its remarkable findings were well-known among the educated in the Hellenistic world. They were aware of the unique property of 153: it is equal to the sum of the third powers of its own constituent figures: $1 + 125 + 27$. Somehow, John assumed that the religious depth of his text would gain from including some allusions to mathematics. In ancient Pagan civilizations, this fusion of religion and proto-science was the done thing; it was usually the priests who used their leisure to develop scientific knowledge, for they were not troubled by the conflict between faith and religion which would characterize the Christian and Islamic Middle Ages.

So in the Vedas as well, we find astronomical data enciphered in all kinds of ways. Thus, the Hindus' most sacred number 108 is, with an inaccuracy of only 1%, the distance earth-sun expressed in solar diameters (i.e. the radius of the earth's orbit divided by the sun's diameter), as well as the distance earth-moon expressed in lunar diameters. Subhash Kak has checked if such numerical combinations as just cited from *Genesis* also appear in the Vedas.²⁸ They do, though they are often quite complicated and only obvious to someone well-versed in the idiosyncrasies of the multiple Vedic calendar systems. An easy example is: the number of hymns in books 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the Rg-Veda adds up to 354, the number of days in the Lunar year consisting of 12 moon cycles. Similarly, the total number of hymns in books 4, 5, 6 and 7 is 324, the number of days in the so-called Nakshatra year, being the duration of the sun's stay in 24 of the 27 lunar mansions. Coincidence?

According to Kak: "By adding the hymn counts of the ten books of the Rig-Veda in different combinations, we obtain numbers that are factors of the sidereal periods and the five synodic periods (...) The probability of this happening is about one in a million. Hence whoever arranged the Rig-Veda encoded into it not only obvious numbers like the lunar year but also hidden numbers of great astronomical significance."²⁹

This choice of numbers in a cosmically meaningful way is also present in the construction of the Vedic altar, such as the numbers of bricks in each layer being equal to the number of days in given planetary cycles.³⁰ It involves fairly complicated arithmetic, and shows the kind of concern which the Vedic seers had for the harmony between their own religious practices and the astronomical cycles. That mentality led logically to painstakingly accurate observations and calculations, and thereby supports the suspicion of reliability of the internal Vedic astro-chronology.

2.4.4. The Zodiac

To conclude this brief acquaintance with Vedic astronomy, we want to draw attention to the possible presence in the Rg-Veda of a momentous cultural artifact, the origin of which is usually situated in Babylonia in about 600 BC: the twelve-sign Zodiac. In RV 1:164:11, the sun wheel in heaven is said to have 12 spokes, and to be subdivided into 360 pairs of “sons”: the days (consisting of day and night), rounded off to an arithmetically manageable number, also the basis of the “Babylonian” division of the circle in 360° . The division in 12 already suggests the Zodiac, and we also find, in the footsteps of N.R. Waradpande, that a number of the Zodiacal constellations/*rAshis* (classically conceived as combinations of 2 or 3 successive Lunar mansions or *nakshatras* of $13^{\circ}20'$ each) are mentioned: SiMha/Leo (5:83:3 and 9:89:3), *Kanya*/Virgo (6:49:7), Mithunal/Gemini (3:39.3), and *VRshabha*/Taurus (6:47:5 and 8:93:1).³¹

Here again, the precession has located them where we would expect them in about 4000 BC. The *VRshabha rAshi* is said to have stabilised the heavens with a mighty prop, apparently a reference to the Taurus equinox in the 4th millennium BC; the same verse links the Taurus month with its opposite, *Shukra/JyeshTha* (coinciding with Scorpio, which contained the autumnal equinox), confirming it least that *VRshabha*, “bull”, is used here in an astronomical-calendrical sense. That the seasons are linked with the constellation which is “heliacally rising” (i.e. rising just before dawn) is perhaps indicated by RV 8:93:1: “Surya, thou mountest up to meet the *vRshabha*”, the sun rises as if to meet the constellation which is just above the horizon.

We are aware that, like the Chinese, the Hindus link the season to the lunar constellation/*nakshatra* in opposition, i.e. the one which rises at sunset and may contain the full moon. This approach, if applied to modern astrology, would mean that those who think they are Taurus (sun in Taurus) would become its opposite, Scorpio (sun opposite Scorpio, full moon in Scorpio). By contrast, the Babylonians linked the seasons to the solar constellation/*rAshi* in heliacal rising. If that method were used in modern astrology, those who consider themselves Taurus (sun in Taurus) would find themselves to be Aries (last constellation to rise before the sun-in-Taurus rises).³² However, Waradpande’s discovery seems to imply that the Hindus too used the constellation (at least the *rAshi*, not the *nakshatra*) in heliacal rising, like the Babylonians did.

If in Rg-Vedic astronomy the twelve constellations are not linked to the time of the year when they are heliacally rising, but to the time when they are “inhabited” by the sun (as is the practice in modern Hindu astrology), then the whole story would move up at least a thousand and possibly two thousand years, putting the Rg-Veda in about 2000 BC. This is because the sun is in mid-Taurus a month before Taurus’s heliacal rising, or about 3° of the cycle, a distance covered by the precession of the equinox in about two thousand years. But it is unlikely that they considered the constellation containing the sun rather than the constellation heliacally rising, as astronomy was based on actual observation more than on calculation, and consequently required that the constellation be visible.³³ The constellation temporarily inhabited by the sun is invisible, and that is why the ancients made do with the constellation rising before the one in which the sun is located (heliacal rising), or the one rising when the sun sets, in practice the one inhabited by the full moon (opposition).

The difference between the sun, which obscures the constellation it inhabits, and the moon, which is seen against the background of the constellation it inhabits, explains why a moon-based system uses moon-in-constellation or, via full-moon-in-constellation, sun-in-opposition (the full moon being by definition opposite to the sun); while a sun-based system had to make do with a derivative relation between sun and constellation, typically the constellation's heliacal rising. The implication is that India originally had both systems: a Lunar 27-part Zodiac (*nakshatras*) using the opposition, exactly like in China (and its derived system of 12 months, based on combinations of 2 or 3 *nakshatras* and still in use); and a Solar 12-part Zodiac (*rAshis*) using the heliacal rising, exactly like in Babylonia.

The *Mithuna rAshi*/Gemini is said to destroy darkness and to be basis (*budhna*) of heat (*tapes*) (RV 3:39:3). During Gemini's heliacal rising in 4000 BC, the sun was in Cancer, then coinciding with our month of May, in northern India the first month of summer (May-June), a season of drought and extreme heat. During Leo's heliacal rising, around summer solstice in 4000 BC, the rainy season began. Therefore, verse 5:83:3 says: "Like the charioteer driving the horse by the whip, he releases the messengers of shower. From afar the roars of the *siMha* declare that the rain-god is making the sky showering." It could not be clearer.

Leo is followed by Virgo, indicating the second half of the rainy season, when the water level in the rivers rises dramatically: in verse 6:49:7, she is called "the purifier *KanyA* with *ChitrA* as her life", and equated with the river Saraswati, the "waterstream-full". At this point I must disagree with Waradpande, who takes *Saraswati*, "waterstream-full," in its literal meaning, when obviously it is used as the name of the Vedic river. But at least the reference - the reference to *ChitrA*, the asterism Spica, the most conspicuous part of the constellation Virgo, dispels any lingering doubt that in this context, *KanyA*/Virgo does indeed mean the sixth constellation of the Zodiac.

If this is correct, it means that the Zodiac is as old as the oldest Veda, and that the Zodiac itself helps to date the Vedas to the age when Leo and Virgo were connected with the rainy season. Even if we consider sun-in-Virgo rather than Virgo's heliacal rising, this would still indicate the centuries around 2000 BC, well before the 1500 BC taught in our universities as the earliest possible date of the Rg-Veda. Either way, it also upsets the current assumption that the Zodiac was invented in Babylon in the last millennium BC.

2.4.5. India as the metropolis

Off-hand, while trying to give a solid astronomical basis to Vedic chronology, we discover a case of cultural transmission in which India is no longer a rather late receiver but, on the contrary, the extremely ancient source. Indeed, both the solar and the lunar Zodiac may well originate in India. If the Rg-Veda does refer to a 12-part Zodiac, it precedes the Babylonian Zodiac by centuries even in the lowest AIT-based chronology for the Vedas. As for China: in his famous *Science and Civilization in China*, Joseph Needham notes, again by using the precession as a time marker, that the Chinese 27-part Zodiac dates back to the 24th century BC.³⁴ He recognizes a common origin with the Hindu *nakshatra* Zodiac, and then surmises that the Hindus had it from China, on the assumption that the Vedic references to the *nakshatras* are from 1500 BC at the earliest. But that assumption, a by-product of the AIT, is seriously undermined by all the data we have been considering here.

Another indication for Indian influence on Chinese astronomy is the 60-year century, known in Vedic literature (the Brhaspati cycle) and still commonly used in the Chinese calendar. The 6th-century astronomer Aryabhatta reports that he was 23 when the 60th cycle ended, implying that the system was set rolling in 3102 BC. In China, the system was adopted a few centuries later: according to Chinese tradition, it started with the enthronement of the legendary Yellow Emperor in 2697 BC.

A stellar myth which was apparently transmitted from India to China is the notion that after death, the souls go to the Scorpio-Sagittarius region of the sky (specifically Phi Sagittarii), where the autumnal equinox was located in the 4th millennium BC. There, they were to be judged by Yama or a similar god of the dead.

The influence of Indian astronomy on both China and Babylonia confirms the Vedic-Harappan civilization's status as the world metropolis in the 4th-3rd millennium BC. In the official cults in imperial China and in Babylon, stellar science, stellar symbolism and stellar worship were central. But the same central place had already been accorded to astronomy in the Vedas, as we have seen here (if only fragmentarily, for numerous Vedic motifs not discussed here are also related to astronomy, e.g. the *twelve* Adityas or divine children of the sun, Prajapati as personification of the year cycle, etc.); and also in the culture and religion of the Indus-Saraswati civilization, as Asko Parpola and others have shown.³⁵

Remark that Parpola often tries to make sense of Harappan data by referring to Vedic data, on the AIT-based assumption that the Aryan invaders integrated Harappan astronomy and religion.³⁶ This is again a case of multiplying entities without necessity: instead of saying that there are two cultures which happen to share some astro-religious lore, we might assume that these two cultures are one, until proof of the contrary. Parpola's arguments for a Harappan origin of Vedic and Hindu cultural items, e.g. of astronomy-based nomenclature (names like *KRttika*, "of the Pleiades"), are just as much arguments for an identity of Vedic and Harappan.³⁷ The point to remember is that even Parpola, often cited as an argument of authority by Indian defenders of the AIT, fully acknowledges the continuity between Vedic and Harappan culture. The common emphasis on astronomy in both Vedic and Harappan sources is certainly an indication of their close kinship if not their identity.

Footnotes:

²²J.E. Mitchiner: Traditions of the Seven Rishis, Motilal B Delhi 1982, p. 163. I thank Prof. Subhash Kak for this reference.

²³Pliny:Naturalis Historia 6:59; Arrian: Indica 9:9. I thank Dr. Herman Seldeslachts for checking these references.

²⁴The worst case was probably the Black Sea, which was a lake during the Ice Age, until some time in the 7th millennium BC. When rising waters in the Mediterranean inundated the dry Bosphorus straits and plunged into the Black Sea, the latter rose dramatically, forcing coast-dwellers to flee as much as a mile a day for months on end. Many of them didn't survive, and entire states (or whatever political units were in existence) were drowned. The fact that the Biblical Flood story has Noah land on Mount Ararat, not far from the Black Sea, may be due (apart from the presence of a boat-like rock formation there) to the memory of the Black Sea flood drama. In most parts of the world, the flooding of coastal villages must have been more gradual.

²⁵P.C. Sengupta: "The solar eclipse in the Rgveda and the Date of Atri", Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal Letters, 1941/7, p.92-113, also included in his Ancient Indian Chronology, Calcutta 1947; discussed in K.V. Sarma: "A Solar Eclipse Recorded in the Rgveda", in Haribhai Pandya et al., eds.: Issues in Vedic Astronomy and Astrology, Motilal Banarsidass. Delhi 1992, p.217-224.

²⁶N.S. Rajaram (with D. Frawley): Vedic 'Aryans' and the Origins of Civilization, WH Press, Québec 1995, p.106.

²⁷This position is argued powerfully in the classic study by Giorgio de Santillana & Hertha von Dechend: *Hamlet's Mill*, David R. Godine, Boston 1992 (1969); in Norman Davidson: *Astronomy and the Imagination*, Routledge & Kegan, London 1986 (1985); and in Thomas D. Worthen: *The Myth of Replacement. Stars, Gods and Order in the Universe*, University of Arizona Press, Tucson 1991.

²⁸S. Kak: *Astronomical Code of the Rig-Veda*, Ch.5-6.

²⁹Georg Feuerstein, Subhash Kak and David Frawley: *In Search of the Cradle of Civilization*, Quest Books, Wheaton IL 1995, p. 208.

³⁰Kak: *Astronomical Code*, Ch.4.

³¹Argued in N.R. Waradpande: *New Light on the Date of the Rgveda*, Sanskrit Bhasha Pracharini Sabha, Nagpur 1994, p.13-24.

³²This remains true whether one uses the Tropical (abstract, solstice/ equinox-based) or the Sidereal (visible, constellation-based) Zodiac, a question which is not really relevant here. The Vedic Zodiac was sidereal, more based on observation than on calculation; the tropical Zodiac apparently dates from the time when sidereal and tropical signs coincided (around the turn of the Christian era), i.e. when the constellation of Aries filled the 300 sector following the spring equinox in the sun-earth cycle, a tropical sector known since then as Aries regardless of the position of the constellation Aries.

³³Other possible Vedic indications that the seers used the concept of heliacal rising, are the descriptions of the last stars fading before the almost-rising sun: RV 1:50:2, and metaphorically RV 7:36:1, 7:81:2, 9:69:4.

³⁴Joseph Needham: *Science and Civilization in China*, part 1, ch-20: "Astronomy", p.253-254.

2. Astronomical data and the Aryan question

2.5. CONCLUSION

The astronomical lore in Vedic literature provides elements of an absolute chronology in a consistent way. For what it is worth, this corpus of astronomical indications suggests that the Rg-Veda was completed in the 4th millennium AD, that the core text of the Mahabharata was composed at the end of that millennium, and that the Brahmanas and Sutras are products of the high Harappan period towards the end of the 3rd millennium BC. This corpus of evidence is hard to reconcile with the AIT, and has been standing as a growing challenge to the AIT defenders for two centuries.

3. of the Linguistic Indo-European Urheimat aspects question

3.1. INTRODUCTION

3.1.1. Evidence sweeping everything before it

When evidence from archaeology and Sanskrit text studies seems to contradict the theory of the entry of the Indo-Aryan branch of the Indo-European (IE) language family in India through the so-called "Aryan Invasion" (Aryan Invasion Theory, AIT), we are usually reassured that "there is of course the linguistic evidence" for this invasion, or at least for the non-Indian origin of the IE family.

Thus, F.E. Pargiter had shown how the Puranas locate Aryan origins in the Ganga basin and found "the earliest connexion of the Vedas to be with the eastern region and not with the Panjab"¹, but then he allowed the unnamed linguistic evidence to overrule his own findings: "We know from the evidence of language that the Aryans entered India very early."² (His solution is to relocate the point of entry of the Aryans from the western Khyber pass to the eastern Himalaya: Kathmandu or thereabouts.)

At the same time, the linguists themselves are often quite aware that the AIT is just a successful theory, not a proven fact. Those who try to take the scientific pretences of their discipline seriously, are not all that over-confident about the AIT. Many are willing to be modest and concede that so far it has merely been the most successful hypothesis. In fact, when quizzing linguists about the AIT, I came away with the impression that they too are not very sure of their case. By now, most of them have been trained entirely within the AIT framework, which was taken for granted and consequently not sought to be proven anymore. One of them told me that he had never bothered about a linguistic justification for the AIT framework, because there was, after all, "the well-known archaeological evidence"!

But for the rest, "the linguistic evidence" is still the magic mantra to silence all doubts about the AIT. It is time that we take a look for ourselves at this fabled linguistic evidence.

3.1.2. Down with the Linguistic evidence

A common reaction among Indians against this state of affairs is to dismiss linguistics altogether, calling it a "pseudo-science". Thus, Prof. N.S. Rajaram describes 19th-century comparative and historical linguistics, which generated the Aryan Invasion Theory (AIT), as "a scholarly discipline that had none of the checks and balances of a real science"³, in which "a conjecture is turned into a hypothesis to be later treated as a fact in support of a new theory".⁴

Likewise, N.R. Waradpande questions the very existence of an Indo-European language family and rejects the genetic kinship model, arguing very briefly that similarities between Greek and Sanskrit must be due to very early borrowing.⁵ He argues that "the linguists have not been able to establish that the similarities in the Aryan or Indo-European languages are genetic, i.e. due to their having a common ancestry". He alleges that "the view that the South-Indian languages have an origin different from that of the North-Indian languages is based on irresponsible, ignorant and motivated utterances of a missionary".⁶ The "missionary" in question is the 19th century pioneer of Dravidology, Bishop Robert Caldwell.

This rejection of linguistics by critics of the AIT creates the impression that their own pet theory, which makes the Aryans into natives of India rather than invaders, is not resistant to the test of

linguistics. However, the fact that people fail to challenge the linguistic evidence, preferring simply to excommunicate it from the debate, does not by itself validate this body of evidence. Prof. Rajaram's remark that hypotheses are treated by scholars as facts, as arguments capable of overruling other hypotheses, is definitely valid for much of the humanities, including linguistics. To be sure, it doesn't follow that linguistics is a pseudo-science, merely that linguists in their reasoning have often fallen short of the scientific standard.

Footnotes:

¹F.E. Pargiter: *Ancient Indian Historical Tradition*, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi 1962, p.302.

²F.E. Pargiter: *Ancient Indian Historical Tradition*, p. 1.

³N.S. Rajaram: *The Politics of History*, Voice of India, Delhi 1995, p. 144.

⁴N.S. Rajaram: *The Politics of History*, p.217.

⁵N.R. Waradpande: *The Aryan Invasion, a Myth*, Babasaheb Apte Smarak Samiti, Nagpur 1989, p. 19-21.

⁶N.R. Waradpande: "Fact and fiction about the Aryans", in S.B. Deo & Suryanath Kamath: *The Aryan Problem*, Bharatiya Itihasa Sankalana Samiti, Pune 1993, p.14-15.

3. Linguistic aspects of the Indo-European Urheimat question

3.2. ORIGIN OF THE LINGUISTIC ARGUMENT

3.2.1. Linguistic and geographical distance from the origins

In the 18th century, when comparative IE linguistics started, the majority opinion was that the original homeland (or *Urheimat*) of the IE language family had to be India. This had an ideological reason, viz. that Enlightenment philosophers such as Voltaire were eager to replace Biblical tradition with a more distant Oriental source of inspiration for European culture.⁷ China was a popular candidate, but India had the advantage of being linguistically and even racially more akin to Europe; making it the homeland of the European languages or even of the European peoples, would be helpful in the dethronement of Biblical authority, but by no means far-fetched.

The ancient Indian language, Sanskrit, was apparently the closest to the hypothetical Proto-Indo-European (PIE) language from which all existing members of the language family descended. It had all the grammatical categories of Latin and Greek in the most complete form, plus a few more., e.g. three numbers including a dualis in declension and conjugation, and all eight declension cases. Apparently, Sanskrit was very close to if not identical with PIE, and this was taken to support the case for India as the *Urheimat*.

In reality, there is no necessary relation between the linguistic antiquity of a language and its proximity to the *Urheimat*. Thus, among the North-Germanic languages, the one closest to Proto-North-Germanic is Icelandic, yet Iceland was most definitely not its *Urheimat*. The relative antiquity of Sanskrit vis-à-vis PIE does not determine its proximity to the *Urheimat*. Conversely, the subsequent dethronement of Sanskrit and the progressive desanskritization of reconstructed PIE do not imply a geographical remoteness of India from the *Urheimat*. Yet, this mistaken inference has been quite common, though more often silent and implicit than explicit.

3.2.2. Kentum/Satem

The first major element creating a distance between PIE and Sanskrit was the *kentum/satem* divide. It was assumed, in my view correctly (but denied by Indian scholars like Satya Swarup Misra)⁸, that palatalization is a one-way process transforming velars (k,g) into palatals (c,j) but never the reverse; so that the velar or “kentum” (Latin for “hundred”, from PIE **kmtom*) forms had to be the original and the palatal or “satem” (Avestan for “hundred”) forms the evolved variants.

However, it would be erroneous to infer from this that the kentum area, i.e. Western and Southern Europe, was the homeland. On the contrary, it is altogether more likely that the *Urheimat* was in satem territory. The alternative from the angle of an Indian *Urheimat* theory (IUT) would be that India had originally had the kentum form, that the dialects which first emigrated (Hittite, Italo-Celtic, Germanic, Tokharic) retained the kentum form and took it to the geographical borderlands of the IE expanse (Europe, Anatolia, China), while the dialects which emigrated later (Baltic, Thracian, Phrygian) were at a halfway stage and the last-emigrated dialects (Slavic, Armenian, Iranian) plus the staybehind Indo-Aryan languages had adopted the satem form. This would satisfy the claim of the so-called Lateral Theory that the most conservative forms are to be found at the outskirts rather than in the metropolis.

Moreover, Indian scholars have pointed out that the discovery of a small and extinct kentum language inside India (Proto-Bangani, with *koto* as its word for “hundred”), surviving as a sizable

substratum in the Himalayan language Bangani, tends to support the hypothesis that the older *kentum* form was originally present in India as well.⁹ This discovery had been made by the German linguist Claus Peter Zoller, who does not explain it through an Indian *Urheimat* Theory but as a left-over of a pre-Vedic Indo-European immigration into India.¹⁰ He claims that the local people have a tradition of their immigration from Afghanistan.

However, in a recent survey among Bangani speakers, George van Driem (Netherlands) and Suhnu Ram Sharma have found the hypothesis of a *kentum* Proto-Bangani to be erroneous: the supposed *kentum* words turned out to be misreadings of quite ordinary modern Bangani words or phrases.¹¹ Then again, an even more recent survey on the spot by Anvita Abbi (Jawaharlal Nehru University) and her students has almost entirely confirmed Zoller's list of *kentum* substratum words in Bangani.¹² As the trite phrase goes: this calls for more research.

3.2.3. Sanskrit and PIE vowels

The second element in the progressive separation of Sanskrit from PIE was the impression that the [a/e/o] differentiation in Latin and Greek was original, and that their reduction to [a] in Sanskrit was a subsequent development (as in Greek *genos* corresponding to Sanskrit *jana*). Satya Swarup Misra argues that it may just as well have been the other way around, and unlike the palatalization process, this vowel shift is indeed possible in either direction.¹³ Mishra cites examples from the Gypsy language, but we need look no farther than English, where [a], still preserved in "bar", has practically become [e] in "back" and "bake", and [o] in "ball".

There are, however, excellent reasons to stick to the conventional view that the [a/e/o] distinctness is original and their coalescence into [a] a later development. Firstly, the reduction to [a] is typical of just one branch, viz. Indo-Iranian, whereas a differentiation starting from [a] would have been a change uniformly affecting all the branches except one, which is less probable. Secondly, the different treatment of the velar consonants in reduplicated Sanskrit verb forms like *jagAma* or *cakAra* suggests a difference in subsequent vowel, with only the first vowel having a palatalizing impact on the preceding velar: *jegAma* < *gegAma*, *cekAra* < *kekAra*.

So, there is no reason to reject the conventional view that Greek vowels are closer to the PIE original than the Sanskrit vowels are. But here again, we also see no reason to make geographical deductions from this. India may as well have been the homeland of Proto-Greek, which left before the shift from [a/e/o] to [a] took place.

3.2.4. Indo-Hittite

A third element which increased the distance between reconstructed PIE and Sanskrit dramatically was the discovery of Hittite. Though Hittite displayed a very large intake of lexical and other elements from non-IE languages, some of its features were deemed to be older than their Sanskrit counterparts, e.g. the Hittite *genus commune* as opposed to Sanskrit's contrast between masculine and feminine genders, or the much-discussed laryngeal consonants, absent in Sanskrit as in all other IE languages.

It is by no means universally accepted that these features of Hittite are indeed PIE. Thus, the erosion of grammatical gender is a common phenomenon in IE languages, especially those suddenly exposed to an overdose of foreign influence, notably Persian and English. So, it is arguable that Hittite underwent the same development when it had to absorb large doses of Hittite or other pre-IE influence. In the past, the laryngeals have been explained by competent scholars (the last one probably being Heinz Kronasser, d. 1967) as being due to South-Caucasian or Semitic influence.

In any case, those who reject the laryngeal theory have definitely been marginalized. But for our purposes there is no need to align ourselves with these dissident opinions. Even if we go with the dominant opinion and accept these elements as PIE, that is still no reason why the Urheimat should be in the historical location of Hittite or at least outside India. As the first emigrant dialect, Hittite could have taken from India some linguistic features (genus commune, laryngeals) which were about to disappear in the dialects emigrating only later or staying behind.

Footnotes:

⁷The classic reference for the ideological factors in the development of the Indo-European theory is Léon Poliakov: *The Aryan Myth*, London 1974.

⁸Satya Swarup Misra: *The Aryan Problem* (Delhi 1992), p.47. This palatalization is known in numerous languages, e.g. Chinese (Yangzi-kiang > Yangzi-jiang), the Bantu language Chiluba (cfr. Ki-konko, Ki-swahili, but Chi-luba), Arabic (Gabriel > Jibril), English (kirk > church), the Romance languages, Swedish etc.

⁹E.g. Shrikant Talageri: *The Aryan Invasion Theory, a Reappraisal*, Aditya Prakashan, Delhi 1993, p.70.

¹⁰The discovery of Kentum elements in Proto-Bangani was announced to the world by Claus Peter Zoller at the 7th World Sanskrit Conference, Leiden 1987, in his paper: "On the vestiges of an old Kentum language in Garhwal (Indian Himalayas)", and elaborated further in his articles: "Bericht über besondere Archaismen im Bangani, einer Western Pahari-Sprache", *Münchener Studien zur Sprachwissenschaft*, 1988, p. 173-200, and: "Bericht über grammatische Archaismen im Bangani", *ibid.*, 1989, p-159-218.

¹¹George van Driem and Suhnu Ram Sharma: "In search of Kentum Indo-Europeans in the Himalayas", *Indogermanische Forschungen*, 1996, p. 107-146. In terms of serenity and academic factuality, the language they use to qualify Zoller's work leaves much to be desired, a fact which is sure to be used by the Indocentric school to prove its point that the AIT school is just biased. Likewise, the refusal by the *Indogermanische Forschungen* editor to publish Zoller's reply is a telling instance of the mentality among defenders of the Aryan invasion status quo.

¹²Anvita Abbi: "Debate on archaism of some select Bangani words", <http://www-personal.umich.edu/~pehook/bangani.abbi2.html>, 1998.

¹³Satya Swarup Misra: *The Aryan Problem.*, p. 80-87, p. 89.

3. Linguistic aspects of the Indo-European Urheimat question

aspects

3.3. DIRECT GEOGRAPHICAL CLUES

3.3.1. Geographical asymmetry in expansion

In the 19th century, as India went out of favour, a number of European countries started competing for the honour of being the Urheimat. Ukraine and Russia gained the upper hand with the archaeological discovery of the so-called Kurgan culture, dated to the 5th to 3rd millennium, and apparently the source of migrations into central and western Europe. This area also fell neatly in the middle of the expansion area of IE, a fact which some took as an element in support of the Kurgan culture's Urheimat claim. However, unless IE differs in this respect from other languages and language families, this central location argues more against than in favour of the Kurgan culture's Urheimat claim. Indeed, we find very few examples of languages expanding symmetrically: Chinese spread from the Yellow River basin southward, Russian from Ukraine eastward, Arabic from Arabia northwestward. There is consequently nothing against an IE migration starting from India and continuing almost exclusively in a westward direction.

The reason for this observed tendency to asymmetry is that the two opposite directions from a given region are only symmetrical in a geometrical sense: climatologically, economically and demographically, the two are usually very different, e.g. the region north of the Yellow River is much less fertile and hospitable than the regions to its south. From the viewpoint of Kurgan culture emigrants, there was hardly a symmetry between the European West and the Indian Southeast: India was densely inhabited, technologically advanced and politically organized, Europe much less so. Europe could be overrun and culturally revolutionized by immigrants, while in India even large groups of immigrants were bound to be assimilated by the established civilization.

India satisfied the conditions for making the spectacular expansion of IE possible: like Europe in the colonial period, it had a demographic surplus and a technological edge over its neighbours. Food crises and political conflicts must have led to emigrations which were small by Indian standards but sizable for the less populated countries to India's northwest. Since these emigrants, increasingly mingled with the populations they encountered along the way, retained their technological edge vis-à-vis every next population to its west (esp. in the use of horse and chariot), the expansion in western direction continued until the Atlantic Ocean stopped it. Processes of elite dominance led to the linguistic assimilation of ever more westerly populations.

It is easy to see how and why the tendency to asymmetric expansion in the case of other languages also applies to India as the Urheimat of IE. On the road to the northwest, every next region was useful for the Indo-Europeans in terms of their established lifestyle and ways of food production. The mountainous regions to the north and west of India were much less interesting, as were the mountainous areas in the Indian interior. In India, Aryan expansion was long confined to the riverine plains with economic conditions similar to those in the middle basin of the Indus, Saraswati and Ganga rivers; the Vindhya and Himalaya mountains formed a natural frontier (the Vindhya mountains were first bypassed by sea, with landings on the Malabar coast). To the northwest, by contrast, after crossing the mountains of Afghanistan, emigrants could move from one riverine plain into the next: Oxus and Jaxartes, Wolga, Dniepr, Dniestr, Don, Danube, and into the European plain stretching from Poland to Holland. Only in the south and southwest of Europe, a more complex geography and a denser and more advanced native population slowed IE expansion down, and a number of pre-IE languages survived there into the Roman period, Basque even till today.

3.3.2. Geographical distribution

Another aspect of geographical distribution is the allocation of larger and smaller stretches of territory to the different branches of the IE family. We find the Iranian (covering the whole of Central Asia before 1000 AD) and Indo-Aryan branches each covering a territory as large as all the European branches (at least in the pre-colonial era) combined. We also find the Indo-Aryan branch by itself having, from antiquity till today, more speakers on the Eurasian continent (now nearing 900 million) than all other branches combined. This state of affairs could help us to see the Indo-Aryan branch as the centre and the other branches as wayward satellites; but so far, philologists have made exactly the opposite inference. It is said that this is the typical contrast between a homeland and its colony: a fragmented homeland where languages have small territories, and a large but linguistically more homogeneous colony (cfr. English, which shares its little home island with some Celtic languages, but has much larger stretches of land in North America and Australia all to itself, and with less dialect variation than in Britain; or cfr. Spanish, likewise).

It is also argued that Indo-Aryan must be a late-comer to India, for otherwise it would have been divided by now in several subfamilies as distinct from each other as, say, Celtic from Slavic. To this, we must remark first of all that the linguistic unity of Indo-Aryan should not be exaggerated. Native speakers of Indo-Aryan languages tell me that the difference between Bengali and Sindhī is bigger than that between, say, any two of the Romance languages. Further, to the extent that Indo-Aryan has preserved its unity, this may be attributed to the following factors, which have played to a larger extent and for longer periods in India than in Europe: a geographical unity from Sindh to Bengal (a continuous riverine plain) facilitating interaction between the regions, unlike the much more fragmented geography of Europe; long-time inclusion in common political units (e.g. Maurya, Gupta and Moghul empires); and continuous inclusion in a common cultural space with the common stabilizing influence of Sanskrit.

From the viewpoint of an Indian Urheimat hypothesis, the most important factor explaining the high fragmentation of IE in Europe as compared to its relative homogeneity in North India is the way in which an emigration from India to Europe must be imagined. Tribes left India and mixed with the non-IE-speaking tribes of their respective corners of Central Asia and Europe. This happens to be the fastest way of making two dialects of a single language grow apart and develop distinctive new characteristics: make them mingle with different foreign languages.

Thus, in the Romance family, we find little difference between Catalan, Occitan and Italian, three languages which have organically grown without much outside influence except for a short period of Germanic influence which was common to them; by contrast, Spanish and Rumanian have grown far apart (lexically, phonetically and grammatically), and this is largely due to the fact that the former has been influenced by Germanic and Arabic, while the latter was influenced by Greek and Slavic. Similarly, under the impact of languages they encountered (now mostly extinct and beyond the reach of our searchlight), and whose speakers they took over, the dialects of the IE emigrants from India differentiated much faster from each other than the dialects of Indo-Aryan.

3.3.3. Linguistic paleontology's failure

One of the main reasons for 19th-century philologists to exclude India as a candidate for Urheimat status was the findings of a fledgling new method called *linguistic paleontology*. The idea was that from the reconstructed vocabulary, one could deduce which flora, fauna and artefacts were familiar to the speakers of the proto-language, hence also their geographical area of habitation. The presence in the common vocabulary of words denoting northern animals like the bear, wolf, elk, otter and beaver seemed to indicate a northern Urheimat; likewise, the absence of terms for the lion or elephant seemed to exclude tropical countries like India.

It should be realized that virtually all IE-speaking areas are familiar with the cold climate and its concomitant flora and fauna. Even in hot countries, the mountainous areas provide islands of cold climate, e.g. the foothills of the Himalaya have pine trees rather than palm trees, apples (though these were imported) rather than mangoes. Indians are therefore quite familiar with a range of flora and fauna usually associated with the north, including bears (Sanskrit *Rksha*, cfr. Greek *arktos*), otters (*udra*, Hindi *Ud/UdbilAv*) and wolves (*vRka*). Elks and beavers do not live in India, yet the words exist, albeit with a different but related meaning: *Rsha* means a male antelope, *babhru* a mongoose. The shift of meaning may have taken place in either direction: it is perfectly possible that emigrants from India transferred their term for “mongoose” to the first beavers which they encountered in Russia or other mongoose-free territory.

While the commonly-assumed northern location of PIE is at least disputable even on linguistic-paleontological grounds, as just shown, the derivation of its western location on the basis of the famous “beech” argument is undisputably flawed. The tree name *beech/fagus/bhegos* exists only in the Italic, Celtic and Germanic languages with that meaning, while in Greek (spoken in a beechless country) its meaning has shifted to “a type of oak”. More easterly languages do not have this word, and their speakers are not naturally familiar with this tree, which only exists in western and central Europe. Somehow, our 19th-century predecessors deduced from this that PIE was spoken in the beech-growing part of Europe.

But in that case, one might have expected that at least some of the easterly languages had taken the word with them on their eastward exodus, applying it to other but somewhat similar trees. The distribution of the “beech” term is much better explained by assuming that it was an Old-European term adopted by the IE newcomers, and never known to those IE-speakers who stayed to the east of Central Europe. Few people now take the once-decisive “beech” argument seriously anymore.

3.3.4. Positive evidence from linguistic paleontology

It is one thing to show that the fauna terms provide no proof for a northern Urheimat. In the last section it has been shown that this can be done, so that the positive evidence from linguistic paleontology for a northern Urheimat is effectively refuted. Thomas Gamkrelidze and Vyaceslav Ivanov, in their bid to prove their Anatolian Urheimat theory, have gone a step further and tried to find terms for hot-climate fauna in the common IE vocabulary.¹⁴

Thus, they relate Sanskrit *pRdaku* with Greek *pardos* and Hittite *parsana*, all meaning “leopard”, an IE term lost in some northern regions devoid of leopards. The word “lion” is found as a native word, in regular phonetic correspondence, in Greek, Italic, Germanic and Hittite, and with a vaguer meaning “beast”, in Slavic and Tokharic. Moreover, it is not unreasonable to give it deeper roots in IE by linking it with a verb, Sanskrit *rav-*, “howl, roar”, considering that the alternation *r/l* is common in Sanskrit (e.g. the double form *plavaga/pravaga*, “monkey”, or the noun *plava*, “frog” related to the verb *pravate*, “jump”).

A word for “monkey” is common to Greek (*kepos*) and Sanskrit (*kapi*), and Gamkrelidze and Ivanov argue for its connection with the Germanic and Celtic word “ape”, which does not have the initial [k], for such *k/mute* alternation (which they derive from a preexisting laryngeal) is also found in other IE words, e.g. Greek *kapros* next to Latin *aper*, Dutch *ever*, “boar”. For “elephant”, they even found two distinct IE words: Sanskrit *ibha*, “male elephant”, corresponding to Latin *ebur*, “ivory, elephant”; and Greek *elephant-* corresponding to Gothic *ulbandus*, Tokharic **alpi*, “camel”. In the second case, the “camel” meaning may be the original one, if we assume a migration through camel-rich Central Asia to Greece, where trade contacts with Egypt made the elephant known; the word may be a derivative from a word meaning “deer”, e.g. Greek *elaphos*. In the case of *ibha/ebur*, however, we have a linguistic-paleontological argument for an Urheimat with elephants (Gamkrelidze and Ivanov also suggest a connection with Hebrew *shen-habbim*, “tusk-of-elephant”, “ivory”).

An important point to note is that, contrary to common belief, the Sanskrit names of purely Indian animals all have IE etymologies: *mayUra*, “peacock”; *vyAghra*, “tiger”; *mahiSa*, “buffalo”; *pRshatl*, “spotted deer”; and the terms already mentioned for “monkey” and “elephant”, plus some alternative names for the latter: *hastin*, *vAraNa*, *gaja*. The standard pro-AIT reply is that these (actually some of these) are somewhat artificial words, viz. indirect descriptions: *mayUra* is “the bleater”, *gaja* (from *garj-*) is “the trumpeter”, *pRshatl* is “the spotted one”, *hastin* is “the one with the hand” (meaning that dextrous elephant’s trunk). However, this is equally true for many other IE animal names: *ekwos*, “horse”, is “the fast one” (cfr. Greek *okus*, “fast”); *babhru*, “beaver” or “mongoose”, is “the brown one” (idem for Germanic *bear*); Slavic *medv-ed* and Sanskrit *madhv-ad*, “bear”, means “honey-eater”; Latin *homo*, “human being”, is “the earth-dweller” (cfr. Hebrew: *adam* = “man”, *adamah* = “earth”).

Often it is only in Sanskrit that this deeper etymology is still visible, e.g. *wolf* is “the tearer”, cfr. Sanskrit *vRka* related to *vRk-*, “to tear”; *mare* is “the swift one”, cfr. Sanskrit *marka*, “swift”. The closeness of the animal name to its etymon in Sanskrit is also seen in the fact that one term can still denote two different animals which have the same eponymous trait: *prdAku* can mean both “snake” and “panther”, (from their common trait “spotted”), whereas the Latin and Hittite equivalents have only retained the latter meaning. Finally, to clinch this argument, it may be pointed out that Sanskrit *matsya*, “fish”, means “the wet one”, an apt but seemingly superfluous circumlocution, from which no one will conclude that the Indo-Aryans had never seen fish before invading India.

With this, we have briefly entered the game of linguistic paleontology, but not without retaining a measure of skepticism before the whole idea of reconstructing an-environment of a proto-language from the vocabulary of its much younger daughter-languages. As Stefan Zimmer has written: “The long dispute about the reliability of this ‘linguistic paleontology’ is not yet finished, but approaching its inevitable end - with a negative result, of course.”¹⁵ This cornerstone of the European Urheimat theory is now largely discredited. At any rate, we believe we have shown that even if valid, the findings of linguistic paleontology would be neatly compatible with an Indian Urheimat.

Footnotes:

¹⁴T. Gamkrelidze and V. Ivanov: Indo-European and the Indo-Europeans, Walter De Gruyter, Berlin 1995.

3. Linguistic aspects of the Indo-European Urheimat question

3.4. EXCHANGES WITH OTHER LANGUAGE FAMILIES

3.4.1. Souvenirs of language contacts

One of the best keys to the geographical itinerary of a language is the exchange of lexical and other elements with other languages. Two types of language contact should be distinguished. The first type of language contact is the exchange of vocabulary and other linguistic traits, whether by long-distance trade contact, by contiguity or by substratum influence, between languages which are not necessarily otherwise related. A well-known example is the transmission of terms in the sphere of cattle-breeding from IE (mostly Tokharic) to Chinese: terms for dog, horse, cow, milk, honey. This doesn't add new information on the Urheimat question but neatly confirms the long-suspected presence of Tokharic in Western China since at least the 2nd millennium BC. It also tells us a lot about the relations between the tea-drinking Chinese farmers (till today, milk is a rarity in the Chinese diet) and the milk-drinking cattle-rearing 'barbarians' on the northwestern borders.

A more surprising example is the apparent influence of Hamitic on Irish (as in the unusual word order in Irish sentences): it would seem that after the Ice Age, the European west coast was repopulated from the southwest, by Basque and even Hamitic-speaking peoples, who were assimilated into the IE and esp. the Celtic speech community, but smuggled some of their language traits into their newly adopted language. The example is interesting but does not provide information on the Urheimat, except to confirm that it was not in Celtic Western Europe.

Often, substratum elements are not identifiable with any known language. Thus, while IE has a neat decimal counting system, the Albanian and French languages show traces of a pre-IE, Old European counting system with base twenty, e.g. in French, 76 is *soixante-seize*, "60 + 16" (but in Belgian French, *septante-six*, "70 + 6", the normal Romance form), or 80 is *quatre-vingts*, "4 X 20". To be more precise: the analysis of 76 into 70 + 6 (as opposed to 60 + 16) is IE, but the word order may be a later innovation. The Indo-Aryan languages put the unit first: Hindi *paintls*, 35, is 5 + 30; *paintAls*, 45, is 5 + 40, etc. Likewise in Germanic (except English, which has adopted the French form): Dutch *zesenzeventig*, 76, is "six-and-seventy". This difference in sequence may also be due to substratum influence.

The most likely explanation is that the system with base 20 was the prevalent system in parts of Europe in the pre-IE period, and that the people retained this system at least in part even after adopting an IE dialect as their language. This way, we find glimpses of pre-IE heritage in odd corners of the IE linguistic landscape.

3.4.2. Sumerian

A few terms exchanged with Sumerian, esp. *karpAsa/kapazum*, "cotton", and possibly *ager/agar*, "field", and *go/gu*, "cow" (to cite some suggestions from Gamkrelidze and Ivanov's *magnum opus*), would confirm the presence of IE (though not necessarily of its PIE ancestor if Sumerian was the borrowing language) in an area conducting trade with Sumeria in the 3rd millennium or earlier. The main candidates would be Anatolia (Gamkrelidze and Ivanov's Urheimat choice) and the Indus basin.

But being the main-language of civilization in ca. 3000 BC, one could not exclude contact through long-distance trade with the Kurgan area. Note however that the trade links between Sumeria and the Harappan civilization (“Meluhha” in Mesopotamian texts) are well-attested, e.g. the names *Arisena* and *Somasena* in a tablet from Akkad dating to ca.2200 BC.¹⁶ There are depictions of the Indian humped bull in Mesopotamia and even in Palestine.

Some seals with Harappan inscriptions have been found in Mesopotamia. No such attestation exists for similar contacts with the Kurgan people.

3.4.3. Uralic

A case of contact on a rather large scale which is taken as providing crucial information on the Urheimat question is between early IE and Uralic. It was a one-way traffic, imparting some Tokharic, dozens of Iranian and also a few seemingly Indo-Aryan terms to either Proto-Uralic or Proto-Finno-Ugric (i.e. mainstream Uralic after Samoyedic split off). Among the loans from Indo-Iranian or Indo-Aryan, we note *sapta*, “seven, week”, *asura*, “lord”, *sasar*, “sister”, *shata*, “hundred”.¹⁷ At first sight, this would seem to confirm the European Urheimat theory: on their way from Europe, the Indo-Iranian and Tokharic tribes encountered the Uralic people in the Ural region and imparted some vocabulary to them. This would even remain possible if, as leading scholars of Uralic suggest, the Uralic languages themselves came from farther east, from the Irtysh river and Balkhash lake area.

The question of the Uralic homeland obviously has consequences. Karoly Rédei reports on the work of a fellow Hungarian scholar, Peter Hajdu (1950s and 60s): “According to Hajdu, the Uralic Urheimat may have been in western Siberia. The defect of this theory is that it gives no explanation for the chronological and geographical conditions of its contacts between Uralians (Finno-Ugrians) and Indo-Europeans (Proto-Aryans).”¹⁸ Not at all: Hajdu’s theory explains nicely how these contacts may have taken place in Central Asia rather than in eastern Europe, and with Indo-Iranian rather than with the Western branches of IE. After the westward trek of the first IE-speaking tribes, it was the turn of the Iranians and the Uralic speakers to undertake parallel migrations to South Russia and North (European) Russia, respectively.

V.V. Napolskikh has supported the Siberian Urheimat theory of Uralic with different types of evidence from that given by Hajdu.¹⁹ The Siberian or at least Asian Urheimat of Uralic is also indicated by its well-known links with the Altaic languages, based in Mongolia, and by its less well-known links with Dravidian.²⁰ This much at least is well-known, that both Uralic and Dravidian have an agglutinative structure. In a first acquaintance with Hungarian and Tamil, it is striking how both have long words with the stress on the first syllable and very few of the consonant clusters so typical of IE. The case against this Siberian Urheimat for Uralic rests precisely on a European Urheimat theory of IE, as Rédei’s objection to Hajdu’s position illustrates. So, if we drop the European Urheimat assumption for IE, we need not maintain it for Uralic either.

In that case, two alternative explanations are equally sustainable. Imagine the first waves of emigrants from India, taking most of the ancestor-dialects of the various branches of the IE family with them, through the Oxus valley to the Wolga plain and beyond. With the exception of Tokharic which remained in the area, they did not come in contact with Uralic, or when they did, they linguistically swallowed this marginal Uralic-speaking population without allowing it much substratal influence. Only the Slavic branch of IE shows some substratal influence from Uralic (and even this is disputed), a fact which is neatly compatible with an India-to-Europe migration: an Uralic-speaking tribe in the peri-Caspian region got assimilated in the westwardly expanding IE-speaking population.

It was the Iranians who came in contact with Uralic on a large scale, partly because they filled up the whole of Central Asia and (in the Scythian expansion) even Eastern Europe as far as Western

Ukraine and Belarus, where an older Slavic population subsisted and adopted a lot of Iranian vocabulary, just as the Uralic population to its northeast did; and partly because the Uralic-speaking people were moving westward through the Urals region in a movement parallel to the Iranian westward expansion. At any rate, the Iranian influence is uncontroversial and easily compatible with *any* IE Urheimat scenario.

But how do the seemingly Indo-Aryan words fit in? One possibility is that these words were imparted to Uralic by non-Iranian, Indo-Aryan-speaking emigrants from India at the time of the great catastrophe in about 2000 BC, when the Saraswati river dried up and many of the Harappan cities were abandoned. This catastrophe triggered migrations in all directions: to the Malabar coast, to India's interior and east, to West Asia by sea (the Kassite dynasty in Babylon in ca. 1600 BC venerated some of the Vedic gods)²¹, and to Central Asia. The Sanskrit terms in the Mitannic language attested in Kurdistan in the 15th century BC seem to be a leftover of an Indo-Aryan presence in West Asia, which presupposes an earlier Indo-Aryan migration through (an already predominantly Iranian-speaking) Central Asia. A similar emigrant group may have ended up in an Uralic-speaking environment, imparting some of its own terminology but getting assimilated over time, just like their Mitannic cousins. The Uralic term *orya*, "slave", from either Iranian *airya* or Sanskrit *Arya*, may indicate that their position was not as dignified as that of the Mitannic horse trainers.

An alternative possibility is that the linguistic exchange between Proto-Uralic and Iranian took place at a much earlier stage, before Iranian had grown distinct from Indo-Aryan. It is by no means a new suggestion that these seemingly Indo-Aryan words are in fact Indo-Iranian, i.e. dating back to before the separation of Iranian from Indo-Aryan, or in effect, before the development of typical Iranianisms such as the softening of [s] to [h]. This would mean that the vanguard of the Iranian emigration from India had not yet changed *asura* and *sapta* into *ahura* and *hafta*, and that Iranian developed its typical features (some of which it shares with Armenian and Greek, most notably the said [s]>[h] shift) outside India. This tallies with the fact (admittedly only an argument *e silentio*) that the Vedic reports on struggles with Iranian tribes such as the Dasas and the Panis (attested in Greco-Roman sources as the East-Iranian tribes *Dahae* and *Parnoi*), the Pakthas (Pathans?), Parshus (Persians?), Prthus (Parthians?) and Bhalanas (Baluchis?) never mention any term or phrase or name with typically features.²²

Even the stage before Indo-Iranian unity, viz. when Indo-Iranian had not yet replaced the PIE *kentum* forms with its own *satem* forms, may already have witnessed some lexical exchanges with Uralic: as, Asko Parpola has pointed out, among the IE loans in Uralic, we find a few terms in *kentum* form which are exclusively attested in the Indo-Iranian branch of IE, e.g. Finnish *kehrä*, "spindle", from PIE **kettra*, attested in Sanskrit as *cattra*.²³ It is of course also possible that words like **kettra* once did exist in branches other than Indo-Iranian but disappeared in the intervening period along with so many other original PIE words which were replaced by non-IE loans or new IE formations. If *kettra* was indeed transmitted to Uralic by early Indo-Iranian, it may have been as a result of trade instead of migration, for the Indus basin was an advanced manufacturing centre which exported goods deep into Central Asia.

This leads us to a third possibility, viz. that the seemingly Indo-Aryan words in Uralic were transmitted by long-distance traders, regardless of migrations, possibly even at a fairly late date. They may have been pure Indo-Aryan, as distinct from Iranian, normally spoken only in India itself, but brought to the Uralic people by means of long-distance trade, regardless of which languages were spoken in the territory in between, somewhat like the entry of Arabic and Persian words in European languages during the Middle Ages (e.g. *tariff*, *cheque*, *bazar*, *douane*, *chess*). If we see India in the 3rd millennium BC as the mighty metropolis whose influence radiated deep into Central Asia (as archaeology suggests)²⁴, this cannot be ruled out. At any rate, I believe I have shown enough possible ways to reasonably reconcile the lexical exchange between the eastern IE languages and Uralic with an Indian Urheimat scenario.

3.4.4. “Nostratic”

Isoglosses (i.e. common traits, whether of lexical, grammatical or phonetic nature) between different languages may be due to historical contact between the languages, but also to deep kinship: just as Portuguese and Italian have both developed out of Latin (partly by absorbing each its own dose of foreign elements), and just as both Latin and Tokharic have evolved out of a common ancestor-language provisionally called PIE, so PIE must have evolved from an even earlier language, which may at the same time have been the ancestor of other language families as well.

The most important theory in this line of research is the Nostratic superfamily theory, postulating a common origin for Eskimo-Aleut, Altaic, Uralic, IE, Afro-Asiatic, Dravidian and possibly South-Caucasian. Some people make fun of this theory, and refer it jokingly to the “nostratosphere”, yet its basic postulate makes perfect sense: differentiation of ancestor-languages, as attested in detail in the case of Latin and the Romance language family, must have happened at earlier stages of history as well. Whether the present superfamily theory and the methods actually used for reconstructing the supposed Nostratic vocabulary are at all acceptable, is a different matter.

The state of the art is that we just don’t know very much yet about the ancestry of PIE, especially when even the location of PIE in its heyday is still the object of debate. But just to be on the safe side in case of a breakthrough of the Nostratic theory, it should be noted that the distribution of the alleged Nostratic language families at their earliest date of appearance, with most of them within travelling distance from the Indus-Saraswati basin (Uralic in the Ob-Irtysh basin, Altaic in Mongolia, Semitic in Mesopotamia, Elamite in Iran, Dravidian on the Indian coast), is certainly compatible with a Northwest-Indian Urheimat of IE, more than with a European Urheimat. For the rest, it is best to leave these proto-proto-languages alone and concentrate on real language families.

3.4.5. Semitic

Semitic (and by implication also the Chadic, Kushitic and Hamitic branches of the Afro-Asiatic family, assumed to be the result of a pre-4th-millennium migration of early agriculturists from West Asia into North Africa) is suspected to spring from a common ancestor with IE, even by scholars skeptical of Nostratic adventures. The commonality of some elementary lexical items is striking, and includes the numerals 6 and 7 (Hebrew *shisha*, *shiva*, Arabic *sitta*, *sab’a*, conceivably borrowed at the time when counting was extended beyond the fingers of a single hand for the first time), arguably even all the first seven numerals.

Contact with Akkadian (the Semitic language of Mesopotamia in the third millennium BC) and even Proto-Semitic is attested by a good handful of words, esp. some terms for utensils and animals. This includes two terms for “axe”: PIE **peleku*, Greek *pelekus*, Ossetic *faeraet*, Sanskrit *parashu*, “axe”, related (one way or the other) to Akkadian *pilaqu*, “axe”, cfr. Arabic *falaqa*, “to split apart”; and PIE **sekwr*, Latin *securis*, “axe”, *secula*, “hatchet”, Old Slavic *sekyra*, “hatchet”, related to a Semitic root yielding Akkadian *shukurru*, “javelin”, Hebrew *segor*, “axe”. Some terms are in common only with the Western IE languages, e.g. Semitic *gedi*, still recognizable in English *goat*. This testimony is too slender, though, for concluding that the Western Indo-Europeans had come from the East and encountered the Semites on their way to the West.

Even more remarkable are the common fundamental grammatical traits, which indicate a common genetic origin rather than an influence from the one language family on the other. Semitic, like IE, has grammatically functional vowel changes, grammatical gender, declension, conjugational categories including participles and medial and passive modes, and a range of phonemes which in Proto-Semitic was almost entirely in common with PIE, even more so if we assume PIE laryngeals to match Semitic *aleph*, *he* and *’ayn*. Many of these grammatical

elements are shared only by Semitic (or Afro-Asiatic) and IE, setting them off as a pair against all other language families. If any language family has a chance of being the sister of the IE family, it is Semitic.

One way to imagine how Semitic and IE went their separate ways has been offered by Bernard Sergent, who is strongly convinced of the two families' common origin. He combines the linguistic evidence with archaeological and anthropological indications that the (supposedly PIE-speaking) Kurgan people in the North-Caspian area of ca. 4000 BC came from the southeast, a finding which might just as well be cited in support of their Indian origin. Thus, the Kurgan people's typical grain was millet, not the rye and wheat cultivated by the Old Europeans, and in ca. 5000 BC, millet had been cultivated in what is now Turkmenistan (it apparently originates in China), particularly in the Mesolithic culture of Jebel. From there on, the archaeological traces become really tenuous, but Sergent claims to discern a link with the Zarzian culture of Kurdistan 10,000 to 8500 BC. Short, he suggests that the Kurgan people had come along the eastern coast of the Caspian Sea, not from the southeast (India) but the southwest, in or near Mesopotamia, where PIE may have had a common homeland with Semitic.²⁵

However, those who interpret the archaeological data concerning the genesis of agriculture in the Indus site of Mehrgarh as being the effect of a diffusion from West Asia, may well interpret an eventual kinship of IE with Semitic as proving their own point: along with its material culture, Mehrgarh's language may have been an offshoot of a metropolitan model, viz. a Proto-Semitic-speaking culture in West Asia. This would mean that the Indus area was indeed the homeland of the original PIE, but that in the preceding millennia, PIE had been created by the interaction of Proto-Semitic-speaking colonists from West Asia with locals. On the other hand, now that the case for an independent genesis of the Neolithic revolution (i.e. the development of agriculture) in Mehrgarh is getting stronger, we may have to reconsider the direction of such a process.

At any rate, the actual proof for the Mesopotamian origin of the pre-Kurganite culture to the east of the Caspian Sea has not yet been established. Archaeologists favouring an Indian Urheimat ought to take up the challenge and materially trace this culture to pre-Harappan India. At the same time, linguists should develop a more precise model of the ancient relationship between IE and Semitic,

3.4.6. Dravidian substratum elements

Apart from contact between different languages which have continued to exist, there can also be influence from a disappearing language on a surviving language, often in the form of a substratum: people take to speaking a new (mostly the elite's) language, and drop their old language all while preserving some lexical items, some phonetic propensities, some grammatical ways of organizing information. The alleged presence of a large dose of "pre-Aryan" substratum features in Sanskrit and the other Indo-Aryan languages, notably from now-extinct Dravidian languages once spoken in northern India, was historically one of the important reasons for deciding against India as the Urheimat.

In the 19th century, it was not yet realized how the European branches of IE are all full of substratum elements, mostly from extinct Old European languages. For Latin, this includes such elementary terms as *lapis* and *urbs*, borrowed from a substratum language tentatively described as "Urbian". For Germanic, it includes some 30% of the acknowledged "Germanic" vocabulary, including such core lexical items as *sheep* and *drink*. For Greek, it amounts to some 40% of the vocabulary, both from extinct branches of the Anatolian (Hittite-related) family and from non-IE languages. The branch least affected by foreign elements is Slavic, but this need not be taken as proof of a South-Russian homeland: in an Indian Urheimat scenario, the way for Slavic would have been cleared by forerunners on the great IE trek to the West, chiefly Celtic and Germanic, and though these languages would absorb many Old-European elements as substratum features,

they also eliminated the Old-European languages as such and prevented them from further influencing Slavic.

Even if we accept as non-IE all the elements in Sanskrit described as such by various scholars, the non-IE contribution is still not greater than in some of the European branches of IE.²⁶ And, as Shrikant Talageri has shown, a large part of this so-called Dravidian contribution is highly questionable: many words routinely described as Dravidian-originated can be analyzed as pure IE.²⁷ Numerous supposed loanwords have no counterpart in Dravidian and Munda, or when they do, there is often no reason to assume that the direction of borrowing was into rather than out of Indo-Aryan, especially when you consider that Dravidian is attested in writing at least 1500 years after (and at a distance of 2000 km from) the Sanskrit sources, and Munda has not been committed to writing until the 19th century.

The observation had been made earlier by Western scholars: the convergence of Indo-Aryan and Dravidian (as well as Munda and to an extent Burushaski) in lexical and grammatical features need not be due to a Dravidian substratum, for which there are in fact no compelling indications.²⁸ At any rate, there has been so much interaction of Indo-Aryan with Dravidian, including exchange of people and goods, that a Dravidian contribution (as a neighbourly or *adstratum* influence) is perfectly normal even without any substratum effect. This contribution remains in any case much smaller than the well-known Indo-Aryan influence on the Dravidian languages, which no one tries to explain as a substratum effect.

In this respect, the testimony of the place-names may be useful. In the Hindi belt and most of Panjab, there is absolutely no evidence of a Dravidian substratum in the toponyms. By contrast, in Sindh and Gujarat, Dravidian toponyms are fairly common, e.g. names ending in *valli/palli*, “village”. In Sindhi, and more so in Gujarati and Marathi, Dravidian influence is discernible, e.g. in the existence of two pronouns for *we*, an inclusive one (including the speaker as well as the person addressed) and an exclusive one (including only the speaker and his group, like in the French expression *nous autres*). By contrast, Hindi has much fewer Dravidian elements, even “losing” (or just never having had) a number of loanwords which had been adopted in Sanskrit. There is no reason to assume a Dravidian presence in North India, but it seems to have been there in the coastal area.

This would fit in with David McAlpin’s Elamo-Dravidian theory, which puts Proto-Elamo-Dravidian on the coast of Iran, spreading westwards to Mesopotamia (Elam) and eastwards to Sindh and along the Indian coast southwards.²⁹ This theory is supported by the similarities between the undeciphered early Elamite script and the Harappan script, and by the survival of the Brahui Dravidian speech pocket in Baluchistan. It would make the Harappan culture area bi- and possibly multi-lingual: a perfectly normal situation, comparable with multi-lingual Mesopotamia or with Latin-Greek bilingualism in the Roman Empire.

But in that case, Indo-Aryan influence on Dravidian may be much older than usually assumed, and date back well into the heyday of Harappan culture. However, the Dravidians influenced by Indo-Aryan in Gujarat and Maharashtra may have been a dead-end in the history of Dravidian, losing their language altogether. There is no trace of Harappans migrating south, whether to save their Dravidian language from Indo-Aryan contamination or for other, more likely reasons.

Either way, Indo-Aryan influence on Dravidian is certainly more profound than generally thought. Apart from the *tatsama* (literally adopted) Sanskrit words which make up more than half of Telugu or Kannada vocabulary, and which are attributed to the influence of Brahmin families settling in South India since the turn of the Christian era, many apparent members of the Dravidian core vocabulary as attested in Sangam Tamil are actually very ancient *tadbhava* (evolved and sometimes unrecognizably changed) loans from Sanskrit or Prakrit, e.g. *AkAyam*, “sky” (< *AkAsha*); *Ayutham*, “weapon” (< *Ayudha*); *tavem*, “penance” (< *tapas*); *tlvu*, “island” (< *dvIpa*); *chetti*, “foreman, merchant” (< *shreshthI*), *tiru*, term of respectful address (< *shrI*).³⁰ It is not

impossible that there ever was a pure Dravidian language in South India, but in the oldest texts already, we find a Dravidian written in a Brahmi-derived script and influenced by Sanskrit.

Many scholars now assume that there was a third language in northwestern India, which acted as a buffer between Dravidian and Indo-Aryan before being eliminated by the latter. Words looking like Dravidian loans in Indo-Aryan could then in fact have been borrowed from this third language into both Indo-Aryan and Dravidian. To Indian critics of linguistics as a “pseudoscience”, such a ghost language is a perfect proof of the purely speculative nature of our science. Yet, it is an entirely reasonable proposition: even Sumerian, one of the great vehicles of civilization, died out, and we have reason to assume that the Bhil tribals originally spoke a different language, possibly related to the isolated tribal Nahali language still spoken in a few villages in Madhya Pradesh.

Such a buffer language would at any rate explain, in an Indian *Urheimat* theory, why there is no Dravidian influence on IE as a whole, merely on Indo-Aryan and to a very small extent on Iranian (though it is remarkable that some of the words transmitted from Indo-Iranian to Uralic are usually credited with a Dravidian origin, e.g. *shishu*, “child”, and *kota*, “house”: another modest argument for an Indian *Urheimat*?). By the time the buffer language had been swallowed and Dravidian-IE interaction began, most of the IE proto-languages had already left India.

As for the alleged Dravidian substratum influence on Indo-Aryan phonetics, viz. the retroflex or cerebral consonants in Indo-Aryan (as well as in Dravidian), there has always been a school which rejects the hypothesis of a Dravidian origin. According to Eric Hamp, the phonetic conditions favouring the differentiation dental/retroflex “can be traced in the Indo-European patrimony of Sanskrit”.³¹ Though Hamp is not yet prepared to discard a Dravidian influence in cerebralization altogether, he does note certain facts which plead against a Dravidian origin, e.g. the absence of retroflexes in initial position. The debate is still open, but the case for an indigenous IE origin is getting stronger. Also, a Dravidian origin of the retroflexes would not prove the Aryan invasion, merely that the interaction of Dravidian and Indo-Aryan happened later than the latter’s separation from its IE sister branches.

3.4.7. Sino-Tibetan

To prove an Asian homeland for IE, it is not good enough to diminish the connections between IE and more westerly language families. To anchor IE in Asia, the strongest argument would be genetic kinship with an East-Asian language family.

There have been very early contacts between IE and Chinese, fossilized in IE loan-words in Chinese, e.g. *ma* (< **mra*, cfr. *mare*, Sanskrit *marka*, “swift”), “horse”; *quan*, “hound”; *sun*, “grandson” (cfr. *son*); *mi*, “honey” (cfr. *mead*, Sanskrit *madhu*); *gu*, “bull”, and *niu*, “cow” (through **ngiu*, from IE **gwou-*); and, more recently, *shi*, “lion” (Iranian *sher*). Chang Tsung-tung has pleaded that there were linguistic and cultural contacts between Indo-Europeans from Inner Asia and late-neolithic Chinese peasants, who learned cattle-breeding from them.³² These loans generally came through Tokharic, which we know was the northwestern neighbour of Chinese for many centuries, at least since the turn of the 1st millennium BC when the Tokhars are mentioned in records of the Western Zhou dynasty, and until the mid-1st millennium AD.

The contact between Tokharic and Chinese adds little to our knowledge of the *Urheimat* but merely confirms that the Tokharic people lived that far east. The adoption of almost the whole range of domesticated cattle-names from Tokharic into Chinese also emphasizes a fact insufficiently realized, viz. how innovative the cattle-breeding culture of the early IE tribes really was. They ranked as powerful and capable, and their prestige helped them to assimilate large populations culturally and linguistically. But for *Urheimat*-related trails, we must look elsewhere.

Vedic Sanskrit and ancient Greek, and therefore perhaps also PIE, had a pitch accent, a typical feature of Proto-Sino-Tibetan, preserved in Chinese and in a smaller way in Tibetan. True, the behaviour of this pitch accent is completely different in Vedic from what it is in Sino-Tibetan. But that is only what you would expect after millennia of separate development; after all, the behaviour of the pitch accent is completely different between some of the Sino-Tibetan languages as well. Picking up this hint from a similarity in accentuation, scholars have looked around for other “deep”, structural similarities, e.g. the presumed fact that all PIE roots, like the Sino-Tibetan roots, were monosyllabic, while the original Sino-Tibetan roots (very unlike the modern Chinese words) resembled the IE roots in being rich in consonant clusters.³³

Edwin Pulleyblank claims to have reconstructed a number of rather abstract similarities in the phonetics and morphology of PIE and Sino-Tibetan. Though he fails to back this structural similarity up with any (even a single) lexical similarity, he confidently dismisses as a “prejudice” the phenomenon that “for a variety of reasons, the possibility, of a genetic relationship between these two language families strikes most people as inherently most improbable.” He believes that “there is no compelling reason from the point of view of either linguistics or archaeology to rule out the possibility of a genetic connection between Sino-Tibetan and Indo-European. Such a connection is certainly inconsistent with a European or Anatolian homeland for the Indo-Europeans but it is much less so with the Kurgan theory”, esp. considering that the Kurgan culture “was not the result of local evolution in that region but had its source in an intrusion from an earlier culture farther east”.³⁴ This is of course very interesting, (and it deserves being repeated that the Kurgan culture came from farther east), but: “It will be necessary to demonstrate the existence of a considerable number of cognates linked by regular sound correspondences. To do so in a way that will convince the doubters on both sides of the equation will be a formidable task.”³⁵

Apart from Pulleyblank’s vision of a deep, Nostratic-type connection between Sino-Tibetan and PIE, we should also consider the question of influence, especially the interaction with neighbouring Tibetan. There is of course a mass of Buddhistic loan-words which crept into Tibetan during the Middle Ages, but they tell us nothing about origins.

As Prof. Ulrich Libbrecht writes, the Tibetans were not native to their present habitat, and immigrated there in the historical period: “The general ethnic movement of the Sinitic-speaking peoples was southward. The immigration of Tai- and Tibeto-Burman-speaking languages in Indochina has entirely taken place within the historical period. The same is true of the Chinese-speaking peoples from the middle part of the Yellow River basin towards the southern and eastern coast. Indications from Greek geographers and in Tibetan traditions teach us that the early centre of these peoples lay more to the north than present-day Tibet, viz. in the upper Yangzi basin. It is suspected that the centre of dispersion of the Sinitic languages was near the Koko-nor lake, at the borders of China proper, Tibet and Mongolia. From there, one branch spread eastward and formed the Chinese language; another went southward to form the Tibeto-Burman subgroup. The cause of this dispersal may well be found in the periodic droughts affecting Inner Asia in prehistoric and historical periods.”³⁶

Likewise, George van Driem confirms: “The Tibeto-Burman proto-homeland or Urheimat probably lay at the language family’s current centre of gravity, which is basically western Sichuan, northern Yunnan and eastern Tibet.”³⁷

So, unless PIE came from China, there may have been thousands of years without any substantial contact between IE and Sino-Tibetan, the first contact being the Tokharian settlement on the Chinese border. No evidence of contact has been identified for the PIE period, but the case for a distant genetic kinship remains in the balance.

3.4.8. Austronesian

A language family with unexpected similarities to IE, similarities which may provide a strong geographical clue, is Austronesian. This family of languages is the one with the second greatest geographical spread after IE: from Madagascar through Malaysia and Indonesia, Taiwan and the Philippines, to Melanesia and Polynesia, as far south as New Zealand, as far east as Hawaii and Easter Island. So, what is the relation of Austronesian to Indo-Aryan and to PIE?

According to Franklin Southworth: "The presence of other ethnic groups, speaking other languages [*than IE, Dravidian or Munda*], must be assumed (...) numerous examples can be found to suggest early contact with language groups now unrepresented in the subcontinent. A single example will be noted here. The word for 'mother' in several of the Dardic languages, as well as in Nepali, Assamese, Bengali, Oriya, Gujarati, and Marathi (...) is *AI* (or a similar form). The source of this is clearly the same as that of classical Tamil *Ay*, 'mother'. These words are apparently connected with a widespread group of words found in Malayo-Polynesian (cf. Proto-Austronesian **bayi* ...) and elsewhere. The distribution of this word in Indo-Aryan suggests that it must have entered Old Indo-Aryan very early (presumably as a nursery word, and thus not likely to appear in religious texts), before the movement of Indo-Aryan speakers out of the Panjab. In Dravidian, this word is well-represented in all branches (though *amma* is perhaps an older word) and thus, if it is a borrowing, it must be a very early one."³⁸

Next to *Ay*, "mother", Marathi has the form *bAI*, "lady", as in *TArAbAI*, *LakshmlbAI* etc.; the same two forms are attested in Austronesian. So, we have a nearly pan-Indian word, attested from Nepal and Kashmir to Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu, and seemingly related to Austronesian. For another example: "Malayo-Polynesian shares cognate forms of a few [words which are attested in both Indo-Aryan and Dravidian], notably Old Indo-Aryan *phala-* ['fruit'], Dravidian *paLam* ['ripe fruit'], etc. (cf. Proto-Austronesian **paLam*, 'to ripen a fruit artificially'...), and the words for rice."³⁹

Austronesian seems to have very early and very profound links with IE. In the personal pronouns (e.g. Proto-Austronesian **aku*, cfr. *ego*), the first four numerals (e.g. Malay *dua* for "two") and other elementary vocabulary (e.g. the words for "water" and "land"), the similarity is too striking to be missed. Remarkable lexical similarities had been reported since at least the 1930s, and they have been presented by Isidore Dyen in 1966.⁴⁰ Dyen's comparisons are sometimes not too obvious but satisfy the linguistic requirement of regularity. At the same time, this lexical influence or exchange is not backed up by grammatical similarities: in contrast with the elaborate categories of IE grammar, Austronesian grammar looks very unsystematic and primitive, the textbook example being the Malay plural by reduplication, as in *orang*, "man", *orang-orang*, "men".⁴¹

Most scholars of IE including myself know too little of Austronesian to verify Dyen's suggestion, and all of us tend to remind ourselves of the existence of pure coincidence when confronted with these data. At any rate, the relation would be one between the entire Austronesian and the entire Indo-European family, indicating that it pre-dates their split into daughter languages. Moreover, it concerns the very core of the vocabulary. Further, it so happens that some Austronesian languages have the typically Indian cerebral or retroflex consonants; it is possible that this was an original feature of Proto-Austronesian, which its other daughter languages have lost.

As for the language structure, the similarity between PIE and Proto-Austronesian is not established as being much above statistical coincidence. It is, in that case, much less than that between PIE and Proto-Semitic, which latter is still not enough to convince all linguists of a genetic relationship rather than an influence through contact. At first sight, the similarities between IE and Austronesian vocabularies may therefore better be explained through contact than through a genetic relationship. In this case, we may also be dealing with a case of heavy pidginization: a mixed population adopting lexical items from PIE but making up a grammar from scratch. Then again, genetically related languages may become completely different in language structure (e.g. English vs. Sanskrit, Chinese vs. Tibetan). Dyen therefore saw no objection to postulating a common genetic origin rather than an early large-scale borrowing.

Dyen cannot be accused of an Indian Urheimat bias either for IE or for Austronesian. For the latter, “Dyen’s lexicostatistical classification of Austronesian suggested a Melanesian homeland, a conclusion at variance with all other sources of information (...) heavy borrowing and numerous shifts in and around New Guinea have obviously distorted the picture”, according to Peter Bellwood.⁴² It is *in spite* of his opinions about the Austronesian and IE homelands that he felt forced to face facts concerning IE-Austronesian similarities. Meanwhile, the dominant opinion as reported by Bellwood is that Southeast China and Taiwan are the Urheimat from where Austronesian expanded in all seaborne directions (hence its proposed substratum presence in Japanese, a rather hard nut to crack for an Indian Urheimat theory of Austronesian).

Yet, just as the Kurgan culture may be a secondary centre of IE dispersal, formed by immigrants from India, the supposed Southeast-Chinese Urheimat of Austronesian may itself be a secondary homeland. If there is to be a point of contact between PIE and Proto-Austronesian, it is hard to imagine it in another location than India.

Bernard Sergent suggests northern China, arguing that the yellow race as a whole comes from there, and that the Chinese-Siberian border was the place of contact between white Indo-Europeans and the yellow race, including speakers of Sino-Tibetan, Austro-Asiatic (Munda, Khmer) and Austronesian.⁴³ But that is a *petitio principii*; just as it need not be assumed that the Proto-Indo-Europeans were blonde Nordics (as Sergent himself has forcefully argued)⁴⁴, there is no ground for racial assumptions about the Austronesians. If they originated in India, they rely have been brown-skinned (as most of them still are) rather than yellow. Moreover, even if it is assumed that Austronesian came from southern China, there is no need to trace it further back to northern China; and if its very thin connection to northern China is sufficient for an impressive amount of IE-Austronesian isoglosses, how come there aren’t even more IE-Chinese isoglosses, as Chinese or Sino-Tibetan has a much longer certified presence in northern China on the border with the barbarians?

For another alternative: suppose the Indo-Europeans and the Austronesians shared a homeland somewhere in southern China or Southeast Asia. An entry of the Indo-Europeans into India from the east, arriving by boat from Southeast Asia, is an interesting thought experiment, if only to free ourselves from entrenched stereotypes. Why not counter the Western AIT with an Eastern AIT? Just imagine, a wayward Austronesian tribe sailed up the Ganga led by one Manu who, as related in the Puranas, started Aryan history in the mid-Ganga basin (Ayodhya, Prayag, Kashi), and whose progeny subsequently conquered the Indus basin and expanded further westward. In that case, the elaborate structure of PIE would be an innovation due to a peculiar intellectual culture (let’s call it proto-brahminism) and to the influence of local languages, including perhaps a lost branch of Semitic spoken by colonists who had brought agriculture from West Asia to Indus settlements like Mehrgarh. This is of course a speculation, a highly provisional thought experiment made in order to accomodate the ‘theory’ of IE-Semitic kinship in the present ‘theory’ of IE-Austronesian kinship.

I will welcome any new evidence which forces us to take the southeastern scenario seriously. Until then, if there has to be a common homeland of IE and Austronesian, I consider India more likely. India, in this case, may have to be understood as including the submerged lands to its south which were inhabited perhaps as late as 5000 BC. The scenario that unfolds is of India as a major demographic growth centre, from which IE spread to the north and west and Austronesian to the southeast as far as Polynesia. Though disappearing from India, Austronesian expanded in the same period and just as spectacularly as IE. These two most impressive linguistic migrations would then have been part of one India-centred expansion movement spanning the Old World from Iceland to New Zealand.

Footnotes:

¹⁶Cited in R.S. Sharma: *Looking for the Aryans*, p.36, with reference to J. Harmatta: "The emergence of the Indo-Iranians: the Indo-Iranian languages", in A.H. Dani and V.M. Masson, ed.: *History of Civilizations*, vol. 1, UNESCO Publ., Paris 1992, p.374.

¹⁷A rather complete list and discussion of common IE-Uralic vocabulary is Karoly Rédei: "Die ältesten indogermanischen Lehnwörter der Uralischen Sprachen", in Denis Sinor, ed.: *The Uralic Languages: Description, History and Foreign Influences*, Brill, Leiden 1988, p.638-664.

¹⁸Karoly Rédei: "Die ältesten indogermanischen Lehnwörter der Uralischen Sprachen", in Denis Sinor, ed.: *The Uralic Languages: Description, History and Foreign Influences*, p.641.

¹⁹V.V. Napolskikh: "Uralic fish names and original home", *Ural-Altäische Jahrbücher*, Neue Folge Band 12, Göttingen 1993, p.35-57.

²⁰The geographically divergent connections of Dravidian have been detailed by Bernard Sergent. *Genèse l'Inde*, Payot, Paris 1997.

²¹Even according to AIT defender Prof. R.S. Sharma (*Looking for the Aryans*, p.36), Mesopotamian inscriptions from the 16th century BC "show that the Kassites spoke the Indo-European language", and mention the Vedic gods "Suryash" and "Marutash".

²²That the Dasas, Dasyus (Iranian *dahyu*, "tribe") and Panis were Iranians and not "dark-skinned pre-Aryan aboriginals" is argued by a number of Indian anti-invasionist authors but also by Asko Parpola: "The problem of the Aryans and the Soma: textual-linguistic and archaeological evidence", in G. Erdosy: *The Indo-Aryans of Ancient South Asia* (W. De Gruyter, Berlin 1995), p-367ff. The identification of Pakthas, Parshus and other tribes encountered by the Vedic king Sudas in the "battle of the ten kings" (related in Rg-Veda VII:18, 19, 33, 83) is elaborated by Shrikant Talageri: *The Aryan Invasion Theory, a Reappraisal*, p.319ff.

²³A. Parpola in G. Erdosy: *The Indo-Aryans of Ancient South Asia*, p.355.

²⁴In the margin of the 1996 South Asia Conference in Madison, Wisconsin, Prof. J.M. Kenoyer did a slide show on beads and jewels found in Central Asia: many of them, it turned out, were imported from the Harappan civilization.

²⁵Bernard Sergent: *Les Indo-Européens*, Payot, Paris 1995, p.398 and p.432.

²⁶Among the highest estimates is the 5% to 9% of Dravidian loans in Vedic Sanskrit proposed by F.B.J. Kuiper: *Aryans in the Rigveda*, Rodopi, Amsterdam 1991. On p.90 ff., he gives a list of 383 "foreign words in the Rigvedic language", including such obviously IE words as *aksha*, "axle", *prdAku*, "leopard"; *bala*, "strength" (cf. Greek *beltiOn*, "better"). Madhav Deshpande rejects Kuiper's presupposition that there was considerable Indo-Aryan-Dravidian bilingualism: "There is not the slightest evidence in the Rg-Veda of any large-scale bilingualism or social or religious convergence of Vedic Aryans with non-Aryans." (Deshpande and Hook, *Aryan and Non-Aryan in India*, p.253).

²⁷Shrikant Talageri: *Aryan Invasion Theory, a Reappraisal*, p. 156-175. To this effect, Thomas Burrow (in Thomas A. Seebok: *Current Trends in Linguistics*, Mouton, The Hague/Paris, vol.5, p.18, quoted by Talageri, op.cit., p.162) already wrote that “there has been a certain amount of controversy concerning the question of non-Aryan loan-words in Sanskrit, and some scholars (P. Thieme, H.W. Bailey) have adopted a sceptical position in this respect. Alternate Indo-European etymologies have been offered for words for which a Dravidian or Munda etymology had previously been proposed, in some cases successfully (...)but more dubious in other cases.”

²⁸Summarized by Edwin Bryant: “Linguistic Substrata and the Indo-Aryan Migration Debate”, read at the 1996 Atlanta conference on the Indus-Saraswati civilization; he mentions Jules Bloch and Hans Hock, among others, to this effect.

²⁹See e.g. D. McAlpin: “Linguistic Prehistory: the Dravidian Situation”, in M.M. Deshpande and P.E. Hook, eds.: *Aryan and Non-Aryan in India*, Ann Arbor 1979.

³⁰R. Swaminatha Aiyar: *Dravidian Theories*, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi 1987 (but written in 1923).

³¹Eric P. Hamp: “On the Indo-European Origins of the Retroflexes in Sanskrit”, *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, 1996, p.720.

³²Quoted in Stefan Zimmer: *Ursprache, Urvolk und Indogermanisierung*, Innsbruck 1990, p.25.

³³As remarked in 1952 by Oswald Szemerényi, quoted to this effect by Edwin G. Pulleyblank: “The Typology of Indo-European”, *Journal of Indo-European Studies*, spring 1993, p.63-118, spec. p.63 -64.

³⁴Edwin Pulleyblank: “The Typology of Indo-European”, *Journal of Indo-European Studies*, spring 1993, p. 106-107. The article is followed by two sharply critical pieces of comment, but the focus of their criticism is not the connection between Sino-Tibetan and PIE, though the authors do not conceal their skepticism of that point too. Remark that the claim of typological similarity with PIE, here made by Pulleyblank for Sino-Tibetan, is also made by others for North-Caucasian, and that the triangle is closed by yet other argumentations for a typological (and even lexical) relation between North-Caucasian and Sino-Tibetan, e.g. S.A. Starostin: “Word-final Resonants in Sino-Caucasian”, *Journal of Chinese Linguistics*, June 1996, p.281-311.

³⁵Edwin Pulleyblank: “The Typology of Indo-European”, *Journal of Indo-European Studies*, spring 1993, p. 109.

³⁶U. Libbrecht: *Historische Grammatika van het Chinees*, part III, Leuven 1978, p.3-4. In my opinion, the fertile and moderate-climate Yellow River basin itself is a more likely centre of dispersal. Either way, it is a long distance from northwestern India, not to mention the other regions proposed as Urheimat for IE.

³⁷George van Driem: “Language change, conjugational morphology and the Sino-Tibetan Urheimat”, 1993, abstract on <http://iias.leidenuniv.nl/host/himalaya/abstracts/lcc.html>.

³⁸Franklin Southworth: “Indo-Aryan and Dravidian”, in M. Deshpande & P.E. Hook: *Aryan & Non-Aryan in India*, Arm Arbor 1979, p.205. Ay, “mother” is also attested in Nahali, *vide* F.B.J. Kuiper: *Nahali, a Comparative Study*, Amsterdam 1962, p.60.

³⁹Franklin Southworth: “Indo-Aryan and Dravidian”, in M. Deshpande & P.E. Hook: *Aryan & Non-Aryan in India*, p.206.

⁴⁰I. Dyen in G. Cardona: *Indo-European and Indo-Europeans*, Philadelphia 1970, proceedings of the Third Indo-European Conference, 1966, p.431-440.

⁴¹It goes without saying that “primitiveness” in grammar says nothing about the civilizational level of a language community; Chinese is spoken by a highly civilized people, but its grammar strikes native speakers of German or Russian as very childlike.

⁴²Peter Bellwood: “An archaeologist’s view of language macrofamily relationships”, *Oceanic Linguistics*, December 1994, p.391-406.

⁴³Bernard Sergent: *Les Indo-Européens*, p-398.

⁴⁴B. Sergent: *Les Indo-Européens*, p.435.

3. Linguistic aspects of the Indo-European Urheimat question

3.5. CONCLUSION

We have just studied the pro and contra of some *prima facie* indications for language contacts which would imply an ancient IE and even PIE presence in Harappan and pre-Harappan India. In my opinion, none of these can presently be considered decisive evidence for an Indian Urheimat theory, though some of them are indeed suggestive in that direction.

However, to put the strengths and weaknesses of our findings in the proper perspective, we should not forget to also evaluate the evidence from language contacts for the rivalling European Urheimat theory, which should be put to the same tests as the Indian Urheimat theory. The fact is that such evidence is very scarce, if not non-existent. The Old-European Basque language has no ancient links with IE. For the rest, all Old-European languages have disappeared and most have not even survived as dead inscriptional languages providing us with material for linguistic comparison. Evidence of the type tentatively provided by isoglosses between IE and Semitic, Austronesian or Uralic, all Asian language families, is simply not available for the westerly branches of IE or for a hypothetical Europe-based PIE. On balance, the evidence from contact with once-neighbouring languages does not provide compelling evidence for an Indian Urheimat (unless the Austronesian connection is valid), but even less evidence for a European Urheimat.

It is too early to say that linguistics has proven an Indian origin for the IE family. But we can assert with confidence that the oft-invoked linguistic evidence for a European Urheimat and for an Aryan invasion of India is completely wanting. One after another, the classical proofs of the European Urheimat theory have been discredited, usually by scholars who had no knowledge of or interest in an alternative Indian Urheimat theory. In the absence of a final judgment by linguistics, other approaches deserve to be taken seriously, unhindered and uninhibited by fear of that large-looming but in fact elusive “linguistic evidence”.

4. Miscellaneous aspects of the Aryan invasion debate

4.1. DEMOGRAPHICAL COMMON SENSE

4.1.1. A beehive

The expansion of the IE languages must have started with a certain amount of emigration from the Urheimat, though at later stages the numerical importance of natives joining the new speech community of immigrants and expanding it further in their turn became preponderant: "The transfer of languages like a baton in a relay race refers precisely to the gradual spread of the speakers from the initial area (but not necessarily from inside of it!). Such an expansion can have only one reason: population growth in ecological conditions unusually favourable (for ancient times)."¹

With its extensive and fertile river systems of the Indus, Saraswati and Ganga, India was the best place on earth for food production, for demographic growth, for cultural life and for scientific progress. That is not a chauvinistic myth, but a materialist dogma: economic quantity generates quality in the superstructure. It is quite certain that, after mankind had been wandering over the earth for several hundreds of centuries, trying out the best places for survival, a generous country like India must have had a large population. Next, it is perfectly plausible that large groups of Indians went to other countries as traders and colonists, precisely like the Europeans did when it was their turn to have a demographical as well as a technological edge over their neighbours. And just like a dominant Spanish minority managed to make its own language the mother-tongue of much larger populations which are genetically predominantly Native American, so also the slightly darker emigrants from India may have passed on their language to the white people of Russia and Europe. The view of some chauvinist Hindu writers that "the ancient Hindus colonized the world", may have a grain of truth in it.²

Saying that India had a large population may not sound -very revolutionary, yet in the context of the AIT, it is. The theory of the Aryan Invasions, complemented by the secondary theory of an earlier Dravidian invasion, assumes, as it were, that India was nearly empty. On the other hand, the steppes of Eastern Europe and Central Asia must have been a beehive of people. Today, the huge ex-Soviet Republic of Kazakhstan has hardly more people than the city of Mumbai, but in those days, the steppes had so many people, most of them "Aryans", that they could flood both India and Europe with them; at least according to the AIT. So, against that common though unspoken presupposition, it has somehow become quite a statement to say that lands with a hospitable climate like India had a bigger population than the outlying steppes, and were a more likely source of emigrants.

In the early days of the Aryan theory, it was often assumed that civilization had to come from the North. One argument given was that people in the Tropics didn't need either effort or ingenuity to survive, since they just had to pick bananas from trees or wait for coconuts to rain down; while by contrast, people in the North were forced to be inventive, creative and hard-working. Yet, there were advanced civilisations in the Tropics: Zimbabwe, Ghana, the Mayas, the Incas. Within Europe, it is the North which received civilizing influences from the South. This is not to belittle the ingenuity and effort of North-Europeans in their struggle for survival in tough circumstances - but that is precisely the point: they had to use their skills in the struggle for life, while people in a more comfortable climate (Mediterranean, Mesopotamia, India) had more leisure to focus on the long-term development of complex civilizational achievements. Therefore, it is quite normal that the greatest advances were made in places like India, that the demographic growth was the

greatest there, and that consequently, IE expansion went from India to Russia and Germany rather than the reverse.

4.1.2. Civilization and demography

Population growth at that stage was mainly the effect of the recently invented practice of agriculture. The IE Urheimat was consequently a centre of agriculture, and the Proto-Indo-Europeans were a sedentary population, and not nomads as is often claimed: "Why does a migration happen? We have to distinguish two things in this context: the migrations of nomads (and of other tribes uprooted by waves of nomadic migration) and other migrations. The Proto-Indo-Europeans were no nomads: their well-developed agricultural and social terminology testifies against this; and so does history: nomadism is mobile cattle-breeding with regular change of pasture on vast territories, either absolutely without agriculture (agricultural products were to be stolen or bought) or with underdeveloped subsidiary agriculture. Nomadism supposes riding with cattle: either horse-riding or camel-riding. Chariots are not suitable for tending cattle: they are no good on broken terrain and require very specialized service. The Middle East did not know true nomadism until the last centuries of the second millennium BC (...) Nomadism did not exist in Middle Asia (...) until the second millennium BC either."³

The charioteers of the Vedic culture were not fresh arrivals from the steppe, but members of a mature sedentary civilization. Such a civilization is the source more than the goal of migrations. In many versions of the Aryan migration theory, it is assumed that the Aryans originally lived in inhospitable territory and subsequently descended upon lands with a more pleasant climate and material culture. This scenario is familiar throughout history, e.g. the steppe nomads overrunning parts or all of China, time and again. However, the outcome of such episodes is systematically the opposite of the general outcome of IE expansion: the invaders were usually assimilated into the sedentary civilization which they had overpowered in battle, if they were not driven back out. The Mongols became Chinese in China, Muslim in Iran, and of the enormous territory they conquered, there is (with the exception of Kalmukia) not one square mile where a native language was permanently replaced with Mongolian.

Only when the conquest was focused on a smaller and manageable area did it produce a lasting imposition of the conquerors' language, e.g. the Uralic settlement in Pannonia, now Hungary. The Germanic conquests at the end of the Roman period resulted in a lasting germanization of the thinly populated areas where it was supported by a strong demographic influx (Austria, Bavaria, much of Switzerland and Belgium, England), partly made possible by the advances of the Slavs who pushed Germanic tribes westward and thus made them available for colonizing the newly-won lands. But the Germanic element disappeared quickly in a far larger part of the conquered territories: France, Italy, Spain, North Africa and Ukraine.

It seems that the model of the barbarians overrunning vast tracts of the more civilized world generally does not apply to the IE expansion. A far better model in this case is European colonization. Europe was going through a period of fast demographic growth, and had gained a technological (including a military) lead; so, it became the source of massive emigration, and it managed to europeanize whole continents with permanent effect (in spite of nativist revivals, it is improbable that English and Spanish will leave Oceania and the Americas anytime soon). Similarly, the indo-europeanization of such a vast area could only succeed because the Urheimat had produced a technological lead and a demographic surplus.

To be sure, there are the inevitable differences: in much of the New World, there was a racial discontinuity, a physical replacement of the Native with the European race; in the case of IE expansion, there seems to have been more racial continuity and assimilation. But then again, judging by present trends, a few centuries will suffice to restore the Native American racial element to some prominence; the USA will not be a white country eventhough its citizens will still use the language which the white man brought. In that case, the end result will be quite similar to

that of IE expansion: the spread of a language and culture to areas and populations with different racial complexions.

At any rate, a good demographic starting-point was needed to make the transcontinental and transracial expansion of IE possible. With an agricultural and urban population larger than that of all contemporaneous civilizations combined, the pre- or early Harappan culture of northwestern India was an excellent candidate.

Footnotes:

¹I.M. Diakonov: "On the Original Home of the Speakers of Indo-European", *Journal of Indo-European Studies*, 1-2/1985, p.92-174, spec. p-153-154.

²E.g. Harbilas Sarda: *Hindu Superiority*, 1906; Krishan Lal Jain: *Hindu Raj in the World*, 1989; and K.L. Jain Vasasisya: *The Indian Asuras Colonised Europe*.

³Diakonov: "on the Original Home", *JIES* 1-2/1985, p. 148-149.

4. Miscellaneous of the Aryan invasion debate

aspects

4.2. TEXTUAL EVIDENCE

4.2.1. Ayu and Amavasu

In this section, we will consider the sparse attempts to discover references to the Aryan invasion in Vedic literature, and argue that these have not yielded any such finding.

A first category consists of old but still commonly repeated cases of circular reasoning, e.g. the assumption that the enemies encountered by the tribe with which the Vedic poet identifies, are “aboriginals”.⁴ In fact, there is not one passage where the Vedic authors describe such encounters in terms of “us invaders” vs. “them natives”, even implicitly.

Among more recent attempts, motivated explicitly by the desire to counter the increasing skepticism regarding the Aryan invasion theory, the most precise endeavour to show up an explicit mention of the invasion turns out to be based on mistranslation. Michael Witzel tries to read a line from the “admittedly much later” Baudhayana Shrauta Sutra as attesting the Aryan invasion: “*PrAn ayuh pravavrAja, tasyaite kurupañcAla kAshI-videhA ity, etad Ayavam, pratyam amAvasus tasyaite gAndhArayas parshavo'rattA ity, etad AmAvasyam*” (BSS 18.44:397.9).⁵ This is rendered by Witzel as: “Ayu went eastwards. His (people) are the Kuru-Panchala and the Kashi-Videha. This is the Ayava (migration). (His other people) stayed at home in the West. His people are the Gandhari, Parshu and Aratta. This is the Amavasava (group).”

This passage consists of two halves in parallel, and it is unlikely that in such a construction, the subject of the second half would remain unexpressed, and that terms containing contrastive information (like “migration” as opposed to the alleged non-migration of the other group) would remain unexpressed, all left for future scholars to fill in. It is more likely that a non-contrastive term representing an action indicated in both statements, is left unexpressed in the second: that exactly is the case with the verb *pravavrAja* “he went”, meaning “Ayu went” and “Amavasus went”. Amavasus is the subject of the second statement, but Witzel spirits the subject away, leaving the statement subjectless, and turns it into a verb, “*amA vasu*”, “stayed at home”. To my knowledge *vasu* is not even a verb form.

In fact, the meaning of the sentence is really quite straightforward, and doesn't require supposing a lot of unexpressed subjects: “Ayu went east, his is the Yamuna-Ganga region”, while “Amavasus went west, his is Afghanistan, *Parshu* and West Panjab”. Though the then location of “*Parshu*” (Persia?) is hard to decide, it is definitely a western country, along with the two others named, western from the viewpoint of a people settled near the Saraswati river in what is now Haryana. Far from attesting an eastward movement into India, this text actually speaks of a westward movement towards Central Asia, coupled with a symmetrical eastward movement from India's demographic centre around the Saraswati basin into the Ganga basin. The fact that a world-class specialist has to content himself with a late text like the Baudhayana Shrauta Sutra, and that he has to twist its meaning this much in order to get an invasionist story out of it, suggests that harvesting invasionist information in the oldest literature is very difficult indeed.

4.2.2. Iranians in the Rg-Veda

Aren't the references to Iranian tribes in the Rg-Veda proof of Central-Asian memories? Prof. Witzel claims that: “Taking a look at the data relating to the immigration of Indo-Aryans into South

Asia, one is struck by a number of vague reminiscences of foreign localities and tribes in the Rgveda, in spite [of] repeated assertions to the contrary in the secondary literature.”⁶ But after this promising start, he fails to quote even a single one of those “vague reminiscences”.

On the next page, however, Witzel does mention the ethnonyms of the enemies of the Vedic Aryans, the Dasas (Iranian *Daha*, known to Greco-Roman authors as *Daai*, *Dahae*), Dasyus (Iranian *dahyu*, “tribe”, esp. hostile nomadic tribe) and Panis (Greek *Parnoi*), as unmistakably the names of Iranian tribes. The identification of these tribes as Iranian has been elaborated in the same volume by Asko Parpola, the Finnish author of a Dravidian reading of the Indus script.⁷ The Iranian identity of Dasas and Dasyus is now well-established, a development which should at least put an end to the talk of the Dasas being “the dark-skinned aboriginals enslaved by the Aryan invaders”.

Unfortunately, Witzel and Parpola project their invasionist notions onto their discovery: they assume that the mentioning of Iranian tribes constitutes a “reminiscence” of the Indo-Aryan sojourn in Central Asia. This is in disregard of the explicit evidence of the geographical data given in the same Vedic texts, which locate the interaction with the Dasas and Dasyus in Panjab. From the identification of the Dasas and Dasyus as Iranians, it could be deduced that these Iranian tribes have lived in India for a while. Of course, this inference might be explained away with the plea that a narrative transfer of geographical setting may have taken place, but that would be a purely external conjecture not supported by the Vedic text itself.

Witzel makes much of the transfer of geographical names: *SarasvatI*, *GomatI*, *SarayU*, *RasA* are the names of rivers in India as well as in Afghanistan.⁸ This is well-known, but what does it prove? The Vedic references to these rivers definitely concern the Indian rivers, not the Afghan ones, e.g. the Vedic description of the Saraswati as ‘sea-going’ does not apply to the Afghan *HarahvaitI* (the Iranian equivalent of Sanskrit *SarasvatI*), which, quite remarkably for a river, does not send its waters to the sea but to a small lake on the Iranian plateau. It is perfectly possible that the names were taken from the Indian metropolis to the Afghan country of emigrant settlement, rather than the other way around.

4.2.3. The south was on their right-hand side

Another philological argument which keeps on being repeated is the migration-related interpretation of the polysemy of ordinary terms of direction, e.g. *dakshiNa*: “south” and “right-hand side”; *pUrva*: “east” and “frontside”, *pashcima*: “west” and “backside”. Since the equivalence of “south” with “right-hand side” presupposes an eastward orientation, it is assumed that this linguistic fact (along with its ritual application of carrying the fire eastward during the Vedic *agnicayana* ceremony) “is connected with the eastward expansion of the Vedic Indians through the plains north of the Ganges”.⁹

Frits Staal elaborates: “In an early period, the Vedic Aryans made their way, fighting, into the Indian subcontinent, from the West to the East, and carried the fire with them. In the *agni-praNayana* rite, the fire is still carried from West to East.” Mercifully, he adds that Vedic ritual does not function as a commemoration of this invasion. With reference to a warlike hymn to Indra, still chanted in the course of the *agni-praNayana* ritual, and off-hand interpreted as celebrating the Aryan invasion, he writes: “But the priests are not commemorating the conquests of their ancestors, of which they actually knew nothing. The function of the hymn has not changed, but has become ritual, i.e. it has lost its [meaning].”¹⁰ If we understand this correctly, he means that the rite originally did celebrate the successful Aryan invasion, but that contemporary Brahmins, having forgotten the invasion history, keep on conducting the rite without realizing its origin.

This inference assumes that the Vedic Aryans had impressed on such elementary items in their language as the term for the cardinal directions an association with an eastward movement which must have taken only a small part of their daily routine (even migrants are sedentary much of the time, producing or finding food and other necessities) and a relatively short span in their national history. Yet, though they impressed this invasion memory so deeply upon their language, they managed to forget it altogether, so that today, even the Vedic ritual specialists have to learn the “true” meaning of their ritual from a big white professor from Berkeley.

Moreover, this explanation is contradicted by a study of similar polysemic terms in other languages. It is in fact very common to identify the “positive”, solar directions (east, south) with the front side, the “negative” directions (west, north) with the back side. Sometimes, the emphasis is on the north-south axis, e.g. in Chinese, where the character *bei*, “north”, is derived from the character for “backside”. Likewise, in Sanskrit, *uttara*, “north”, also means “last, final”, while in Avestan, *paurva*, “frontside”, also means “south”.

Otherwise, the emphasis is on the east-west axis, as in Sanskrit *pUrva*, “east” and “frontside”. Thus, the old Hebrew word *yamIn* means both “right-hand side” and “south” (hence the country name *Yemen*, the “south” of the Arabian peninsula), this eventhough Abraham had made a *westward* journey from Ur of the Chaldees in Mesopotamia to the Promised Land.¹¹ The same polysemy exists in some of the Celtic languages, which had also migrated *westward* from the central part to the western coasts of Europe. A standard history book of Mesopotamia reports about a Sumerian text: “Enheduana’s Temple Hymn addressing the temple of Enlil at Nippur, says: ‘On your right and left are Sumer and Akkad’. This reflects a long-lasting tradition that north is ‘left’ and south ‘right’”.¹² The very word *orientation*, from Latin, testifies to the natural tendency of taking the orient as the direction of reference.

The term *pUrva/paurva* is discussed further by I.M. Diakonov, who argues that Avestan *paurva* means “forward, south”, while Sanskrit *pUrva* means “forward, east”, because the Proto-Iranians migrated to the south while the Proto-Indians migrated to the east.¹³ One cannot deny that it sounds good, but it would only be convincing if he could also find a word meaning “forward, west” in a westbound IE protolanguage (say, Celtic). The point is that in practically all prescientific cosmologies, both south and east are “positive” (in Chinese: *yang*) or solar directions, associated with clarity and the front side, while both west and north are “negative” (in Chinese: *yin*) or lunar directions, associated with obscurity and the hidden side.

The word *pUrva* itself, spatially the opposite of *pashcima*, “west”, is in its metaphorical temporal use, “earlier” (as in *PUrva-MimAMsA*, “earlier Veda hermeneutics”, ritualism), the opposite of *uttara* (as in *Uttara-MimAMsA*, “later Veda hermeneutics”, monistic Vedanta metaphysics), which in its literal spatial sense means “north”. The distribution of the two positive directions over the words *pUrva/paurva* in Iranian and Indo-Aryan is therefore only superficially an opposition. The alternance south/east in the case of *paurva/pUrva* stems from their common “positive” character. This has parallels elsewhere, e.g. Germanic *east* corresponds to Latin *Auster*, “south wind”, both being related to Skt. *UshA*, Gk. *Eos*, Lat. *Aurora*, Gmc. *Ostarra* (whence Eng. *Easter*), “dawn goddess”, the common meaning being “light”, “the direction of the light”.

As for the *orient*-ation of the Vedic *agnicayana* ritual, if this proves an eastward movement of the Vedic ancestors, what shall we say about the rule that Christian churches are oriented towards the east, eventhough Christianity is not particularly associated with any eastward migration? The explanation of the ritual of carrying the fire to the east may be much simpler and of universal application: it symbolizes the underground night journey of the sun from the sunset west to the sunrise east. Here again, Staal’s explanation of the West-East direction is an unnecessary superimposition of a specific (and unsubstantiated) historical connotation on a widespread practice of orientation.

Traditional Christian churches are directed to the East so that ideally, the light of the rising sun at Easter (i.e. spring equinox) falls on the consecrated wafer which the priest holds up; and so that at any rate the sunlight confers an aura upon the frontal part of the church interior. Of course, this was a christianized adaptation of a Pagan practice, preserved by Roman, Germanic and other "Aryans"; these nations have either not invaded their habitat from anywhere, or alternatively, according to the dominant theory, they (as well as the Christian religion) have invaded Europe in a westward movement from the east. Here again we find that the south sometimes alternates with the east: while most church buildings were directed east, the churches of the Knights Templar were directed south. And that, too, had nothing to do with any migration history apart from the sun's daily migration in the sky.

4.2.4. Geographical implications of Vedic chronology

Sometimes, invasionist scholars miss the non-invasionist information which is staring them in the face. It is easy to establish on the basis of internal evidence (the genealogy of the composers and of the kings they mention) that the 8th *maNDala* of the Rg-Veda is one of the younger parts of the book. It is there (RV 8:5, 8:46, 8:56) that we find clear reference to the material culture and fauna of Afghanistan, including camels. Michael Witzel duly notes all this, but fails to realize that the invasionist scenario requires that such references appear in the *oldest* part of the Rg-Veda.¹⁴ What we now have is an indication that the movement went from inside India to the northwest, where Indian explorers and emigrants got acquainted with new scenery, new fauna and new ethnic groups.

Witzel makes a beginning with a long-overdue project: establishing the internal chronology of the Rg-Veda on the basis of internal cross-references between kings and poets of different generations.¹⁵ Unfortunately, his first results are rather confused because he does not confine himself to the information actually given in the Rg-Veda, frequently bringing in the "information" (actually conjecture) provided by modern theorists with their invasionist model. This is in fact a general tendency among academics trying to come to grips with the challenge to their trusted AIT-based models: even while evaluating non-AIT scenarios, they often relapse into AIT-derived assumptions.

By contrast, Shrikant Talageri's survey of the relative chronology of all Rg-Vedic kings and poets has been based exclusively on the internal textual evidence, and yields a completely consistent chronology.¹⁶ Its main finding is that the geographical gradient of Vedic Aryan culture in its Rg-Vedic stage is from east to west, with the eastern river Ganga appearing a few times in the older passages (written by the oldest poets mentioning the oldest kings), and the western river Indus appearing in later parts of the book (written by descendants of the oldest poets mentioning descendants of the oldest kings).

The *status quaestionis* is still, more than ever, that the Vedic corpus provides no reference to an immigration of the so-called Vedic Aryans from Central Asia. This need not be taken as sufficient proof that such an invasion never took place, that Indo-Aryan was native to India, and that India is the homeland of the Indo-European language family. Perhaps such an invasion from a non-Indian homeland into India took place at a much earlier date, so that it was forgotten by the time of the composition of the Rg-Veda. But at least, such an "Aryan invasion" cannot be proven from the information provided by the Vedic narrative itself.

Footnotes:

⁴E.g. in Ralph Griffith's translation *The Hymns of the Rgveda*, 1889 (Motilal Banarsidass reprint, Delhi 1991), still commonly used.

⁵Michael Witzel: "Rgvedic History", in G. Erdosy, ed.: *The Indo-Aryans of Ancient South Asia*, Berlin 1995, p.321.

⁶Michael Witzel: "Rgvedic History", in G. Erdosy, ed.: *The Indo-Aryans of Ancient South Asia*, p.320.

⁷Asko Parpola: "The problem of the Aryans and the Soma", in G. Erdosy: *The Indo-Aryans of Ancient South Asia*, p-367.

⁸Michael Witzel: "Rgvedic History", in G. Erdosy, ed.: *The Indo-Aryans of Ancient South Asia*, p.321.

⁹Frits Staal: *Ritual and Mantras: Rules without Meaning*, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi 1996 (1990), p.154, and to the same effect, Frits Staal: *Zin en Onzin in Filosofie, Religie en Wetenschap*, Amsterdam 1986, p.310.

¹⁰F. Staal: *Zin en Onzin*, P.310.

¹¹According to *Langenscheidt's Pocket Hebrew-English Dictionary*, the word *yamin* is translated as: "right side, right hand, the south; prosperity". As for the latter meaning, cfr. the meaning of the derived Sanskrit word *dakshina*, viz. "(esp. teacher's) fee".

¹²J. N. Postgate: *Early Mesopotamia. Society and Economy at the Dawn of History*, Routledge, London 1992, p.38.

¹³I.M. Diakonov: "On the Original Home of the Speakers of Indo-European", *Journal of Indo-European Studies*, spring 1985, p-92-174, specifically p.159.

¹⁴Michael Witzel: "Rgvedic History", in G. Erdosy, ed.: *The Indo-Aryans of ancient South Asia*, p.322.

¹⁵Michael Witzel: "Rgvedic History", in G. Erdosy, ed.: *The Indo-Aryans of ancient South Asia*, P.324ff.

¹⁶Shrikant Talageri: *The Rg-Veda, a Historical Analysis*, Aditya Prakashan, New Delhi, forthcoming.

4. Miscellaneous aspects of the Aryan invasion debate

4.3. WHERE DID THE KURGAN PEOPLE COME FROM?

4.3.1 Kurgan immigrants

From the east, a foreign IE-speaking population intruded into Europe, soon to be diluted by genetically mixing with the natives, and totally assimilated before they, or rather their language and culture, reached Europe's western shores. However, it stands to reason that they were still genetically distinct when their entry began. That is why the start of the Kurgan culture was accompanied by a change in the racial composition of the population of South Russia in about 4500 BC: "The Dniepr-Donets people are known to be massive Cro-Magnons, continuous from the Upper Palaeolithic; the Strednij Stog-2 men are described as more gracile, tall-statured, dolichocephalic with narrow faces."¹⁷ And again, Maria Gimbutas writes: "The skeletal remains are dolichomesocranial, taller-statured and of a more gracile type than those of their predecessors in the substratum."¹⁸

It is this new racial element which the Kurgan Urheimat school identifies as IE. In that case, the cultural change was effected by an incoming new ethnic group. It is fair to observe that the racial type described here as typical of the first Kurgan-making community, is similar to the tall, robust and long-headed type which you find in the Pashtu, Panjabi and Kashmiri populations of contemporary India and Pakistan, as also in the Harappan and pre-Harappan settlements.

But the two racial types coexisted for long, though still culturally distinct: "Kurgan II, ca. 4000-3500 BC. Materials from this period demonstrate continuous coexistence with the Dniepr-Donets culture: two different physical types (both of 'Cro-Magnon C' type, but with the Kurgan people being more gracile) and burial customs (collective burials in trenchlike pits characteristic of the Dniepr-Donets culture, and single burials of Kurgan type) were proved to be present even in the same villages."¹⁹ This is precisely the type of coexistence which renders cultural assimilation and transmission of the IE language to pre-IE populations possible.

4.3.2. Eastern origins

While V. Gordon Childe, one of the first to identify South Russia as the Urheimat, thought that the Urheimat population and/or culture had come from more westerly regions, "Gimbutas, following most recent Russian work, has departed from Childe, to the extent of deriving the Kurgan cultures from the steppes on the Lower Volga and farther east (...) While linguistic opinion has been moving in the direction of putting the Indo-European homeland in the region of the Vistula, Oder or Elbe, archaeological opinion is now putting it in the Lower Volga steppe and regions east of the Caspian Sea."²⁰ This was written in 1966, when considerations of the geographical and linguistic location of "birch" and "beech", now quite outdated, were still tempting people to locate the Urheimat in Germany or Poland "on linguistic grounds".

Population geneticists like L.Cavalli-Sforza have also discerned an east-to-west migration through eastern Europe in ca. 4000 BC, and identified this westbound population with the bringers of the Indo-European languages.²¹

The archaeological evidence also indicates an abrupt change, suggesting an immigration, and more particularly an immigration from the east: "Local evolution cannot account for such abrupt changes (...) The pottery is relatable to the earliest Neolithic in the Middle Urals and Soviet

Central Asia.²² We already saw how the Kurgan people brought the cultivation of millet from Central Asia.²³ All in all, there is now a very strong case for an Asian origin, dated to before 4500 BC, of the Kurgan culture. Tracing these pre-Kurganites to India is a job yet to be done, but at present it should certainly be considered one of the reasonable hypotheses.

Remark that in this section, I have only quoted findings which predate the ongoing AIT debate by years or by decades. All of them were published by established academic indo-europeanists. On respected platforms, all the necessary information had been made available to deduce an Asian origin of IE. Yet, so strong is the paradigm inertia that few if any established academics have intervened to draw that conclusion openly. Let us therefore add the more recent and more outspoken opinion of Bernard Sergent: "The present stage of research effectively permits tracing an Asian origin for the Indo-Europeans well before their dispersion."²⁴ Sergent affirms in so many words that "the Kurgan people had to originate in Central Asia"²⁵, and even that may have been a waystation en route from yet another country of origin.

Footnotes:

¹⁷Editorial note in *Journal of Indo-European Studies*, 1977/4, p-345.

¹⁸Marija Gimbutas: "Primary and Secondary Homeland of the Indo-Europeans", *Journal of Indo-European Studies*, 1985/1-2, p. 191.

¹⁹M. Gimbutas: "Proto-Indo-European Culture: The Kurgan Culture during the Fifth, Fourth and Third Millennia BC", in Cardona et al., eds.: *Indo-European and Indo-Europeans*, p. 178.

²⁰Ward H. Goodenough: "The Evolution of Pastoralism and Indo-European Origins", in G. Cardona et al., eds.: *Indo-European and Indo-Europeans*, p.253-265, specially p.255, with reference to V. Gordon Childe: *The Aryans. A Study of Indo-European Origins*, London 1926.

²¹A.J. Ammerman and L.L. Cavalli-Sforza: *The Neolithic Transition and the Genetics of Populations in Europe*, Princeton 1984, p.59, and L.L. Cavalli-Sforza. *The History and Geography of Human Genes*, Princeton 1994, p.108. Donald Haarmann: "Aspects of early Indo-European contacts with neighbouring cultures", *Indogermanische Forschungen* 1996, p. 12, tries to refute the theory of the geneticists by pointing out early linguistic contacts between IE and North-Caucasian as well as Uralic. In fact, North-Caucasian may easily have borrowed everything it has in common with IE rather than having imparted anything, while Uralic itself migrated from north-central Asia to eastern Europe.

²²M. Gimbutas: "Primary and Secondary Homeland", *JIES* 1985, p.191, emphasis added.

²³B. Sergent: *Les Indo-Européens*, p.398, p.432.

²⁴B. Sergent, *Les Indo-Européens*, p.62.

²⁵B. Sergent: *Les Indo-Européens*, p.440, with reference to Roland Menk: *Anthropologie du Néolithique Européen*, dissertation, Geneva, 1981,

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4.4. THE HORSE EVIDENCE

4.4.1. The horse and IE expansion

Horses are prominent in the traditions of every known branch of the ancient Indo-Europeans. In 731 AD the Pope had to prohibit the consumption of horse meat in order to help the conversion effort among the horse-revering Germanic heathens, who used to ritually eat horse meat as consecrated food (*prasAda*) after the horse sacrifice. Horse domestication is commonly taken to have triggered the unprecedented Indo-European expansion, with a revolution in the lifestyle of the IE tribes (paralleled by the military, political and economic revolution which the horse caused among Native Americans in the 17th-18th century) as the first stage.

In Mesopotamia, horse trade made its appearance in about 2000 BC along with IE communities. The Sumerian sign for "horse" was apparently borrowed from Elamite, which was spoken on the northern (now Iranian) coast of the Persian Gulf, half-way between Sumer and the Indus Valley. Linguists have argued that the Sumerian word *si-si*, "known in Sumerian since the fourth millennium BC", and the derived Semitic words (Hebrew *sUs*), were borrowed from Indo-Iranian *aSva*, even though "the chronology has to be stretched to make this comparison acceptable".²⁶

If we accept an Indian *Urheimat*, the chronological problem disappears: since Vedic and related dialects of Old Indo-Aryan were spoken in the Indus basin in the 4th millennium BC, their term for "horse" may have been imparted to Sumerian in that very period.

But: according to the first archaeological surveys, there had been no horses in the Harappan cities. By contrast, plenty of horse remains have been found in Ukraine and South Russia, including bridle-scarred horse teeth dated to 4300 BC.²⁷ Is that not proof enough that horses are a foreign import into India, and that the momentous step of horse domestication was taken far outside India?

Even if there had not existed any horses in Harappan India, it would still be conceivable that Indians had domesticated the horse outside India. The idea of domestication may have been brought to the horse-rich steppes from a more advanced area where donkeys and oxen were already being used as beasts of burden or even to pull carts. It is often claimed that horses were first used for the same purpose before becoming mounts; other scholars reject this hypothesis, considering that bare-back riding is not much more difficult and dangerous than the whole process of harnessing a horse to a cart. But this makes little difference for our argument, among other reasons because both the horse and the wheeled cart are part of the common PIE heritage, as shown by their presence in the common PIE vocabulary.

For an explanation of the Aryans' remarkable expansion, it is not necessary that they were the first to domesticate the horse; it is sufficient that they were the first to use the advantages of domesticated horses to the fullest. Compare: gunpowder was invented by the Chinese, but used to the best effect by the European colonizers, even in their confrontations with the Chinese. Nor is it necessary that they domesticated the horse before their expansion began.

No case should be built on eager but unconfirmed hypotheses that the horse was domesticated in India, but the more popular hypothesis that it was first domesticated in Central Asia or Eastern Europe will do just fine even for an Indian *Urheimat* hypothesis. The first wave of IE emigrants, in

pre- or early Vedic times, may have reached the Caspian Sea coasts and domesticated the horse there, or learnt from natives how to master the horse. They communicated the new knowledge along with a few specimens of the animal to their homeland (supposing it was indeed unknown or nearly unavailable in India itself), and along with the appropriate new terminology, so that it became part of the cultural scene depicted in Vedic literature. Meanwhile, the IE pioneers on the Caspian Sea coast made good use of the horse to speed up their expansion into Europe.

4.4.2. The absence of horse remains

The possibility of horse domestication inside India should not be dismissed too quickly: we insist that, in the presence of other types of evidence (the familiarity with domesticated horses literarily attested since the earliest Vedic hymns), the seeming absence of archaeological evidence should not be treated as positive counter-evidence. For a striking example of the discrepancy between abundant reality and meagre archaeological testimony, let us not forget that the Harappan seal inscriptions have yielded only a few thousands of lines of text, though they are obviously the tip of an iceberg of a vast literary tradition.

Even stranger: there are practically no Leftovers of writing from the centuries between the abandonment of the Harappan cities and the Maurya empire, more than a thousand years during which numerous important works in Sanskrit and Prakrit were, shall we say, *composed*. Does this prove that writing was absent from India during those centuries (as has been claimed in all seriousness by accomplished scholars), and that the grammarians including Panini had to do their path-breaking research without the aid of a literary corpus or written notes? Of course not: the inability of archaeologists to find Leftovers from what we *know* to be a highly literate stage of Indian civilization, simply proves that the archaeological record in India falls short of the historical reality to a vastly greater extent than in Egypt or West Asia. In the case of artefacts, this may be due to a greater availability of organic, perishable materials to build with or to write on. In the case of bodies, it is mostly cultural: unlike the Egyptians who embalmed their pharaohs as well as their Apis (bull-god) temple's sacred bulls, Indians had no inclination to preserve mortal entities for a day longer than their allotted life-span. For the rest, the most important factor is climatological, with India's damp heat leading to a faster decay of the available relics.

That the presence of horses in Harappa may well be out of proportion to the meagre archeological testimony of horse bones, has unwittingly been confirmed by Marxist historian Romila Thapar. All while affirming that "the horse is an insignificant animal in the Indus cities", apparently referring to the paucity (but not absence) of horse bones in Harappan ruins, she neutralizes this oft-used argument for the non-Aryan character of Harappa by also telling us: "Excavated animal bones from Hastinapur in the first millennium BC when the use of horses was more frequent, indicate that horse bones make up only a very small percentage of the bones."²⁸ In today's India, cows are vastly more numerous than horses, as future archaeologists are bound to discover in their turn, yet on ceremonial occasions like army parades you get to see whole regiments of horses with riders but not a single cow. This, as archaeology has confirmed, was also the situation in Hastinapur: horses were rare in absolute figures, though very prominent on ritual occasions of the kind recorded in the vedas.

And likewise in Vedic culture: "From the Vedic texts onwards the horse is symbolic of nobility and is associated with people of status."²⁹ So, the Vedic attention paid to horses was quite out of proportion with their percentage in the domesticated animal population. Compared with Russia, India was relatively poor in horses, and on top of that, it was by far not as good in preserving what much of horse bones it had, for reasons outlined above. Therefore, the paucity of horse remains is only to be expected; it is not as strong an argument against "Vedic Harappa" as it once seemed to be.

4.4.3. The presence of horse remains

Meanwhile, in several Harappan sites remains of horses have been found. Even supporters of the AIT have admitted that the horse was known in Mohenjo Daro, near the coast of the Arabian Sea (let alone in more northerly areas), in 2500 BC at the latest.³⁰ But the presence of horses and even domesticated horses has already been traced further back: horse teeth at Amri, on the Indus near Mohenjo Daro, and at Rana Ghundai on the Panjab-Baluchistan border have been dated to about 3,600 BC. The latter has been interpreted as indicating “horse-riding invaders”³¹, but that is merely an application of invasionist preconceptions. More bones of the true and domesticated horse have been found in Harappa, Surkotada (all layers including the earliest), Kalibangan, Malvan and Ropar.³² Recently, bones which were first taken to belong to onager specimens, have been identified as belonging to the, domesticated horse (Kuntasi, near the Gujarat coast, dated to 2300 BC). Superintending archaeologist Dr. A.M. Chitalwala comments: “We may have to ask whether the Aryans (...) could have been Harappans themselves. (...) We don’t have to believe in the imports theory anymore.”³³

Admittedly, the presence of horses in the Harappan excavation sites is not as overwhelming in quantity as in the neolithic cultures of Eastern Europe. However, the relative paucity of horse remains is matched by the fact that the millions-strong population of the Harappan civilization, much larger than that of Egypt and Mesopotamia combined, has left us only several hundreds of skeletons, even when men sometimes had the benefit of burial which horses did not have.

The implication for the question of the horses is that any finds of horses are good enough to make the point that horses were known in India, and that they were available to a substantially greater extent than a simple count of the excavated bones would suggest. The cave paintings in Bhimbetka near Bhopal, perhaps 30,000 years old (but the datings of cave paintings are highly controversial), showing a horse being caught by humans, confirm that horses existed in India in spite of the paucity of skeletal remains.³⁴ There is, however, room for debate on whether the animals depicted are really horses and not onagers. Other cave paintings, so far undated, show a number of warriors wielding sticks in their right hands and actually riding horses without saddles or bridles.³⁵

The fact that both the Austro-Asiatic and the Dravidian language families have their own words for “horse” (e.g. Old Tamil *ivuLi*, “wild horse”, and *kutirai*, “domesticated horse”) not borrowed from the language of the Aryans who are supposed to have brought the horse into India, should also carry some weight. Partly because of the uncongenial climate, horses must have been comparatively rare in India (as they would remain in later centuries, when Rajput forces were attacked by Turkish invaders with an invariably superior cavalry), but they were available.

The evidence concerning horses remains nonetheless the weakest point in the case for an Indian Urheimat. While the evidence is arguably not such that it proves the Harappan culture’s unfamiliarity with horses, it cannot be claimed to prove the identity of Vedic and Harappan culture either, the way the abundance of horse remains in Ukraine is used to prove the IE character of the settlements there. At this point, the centre-piece of the anti-AIT plea is an *explainable* paucity of the evidence material, so that everything remains possible.

This is true both at the level of physical evidence and on that of artistic testimony: the apparent absence of horse motifs on the Harappan seals (except one)³⁶ can certainly be explained, viz. by pointing at the equally remarkable absence of the female cow among the numerous animal depictions on the seals, eventhough the cow must have been very familiar to the Harappans considering the frequent depiction of the bull. A taboo on depictions of the two most sacred animals may well explain the absence of both the cow and the horse. However, it is obvious that a positive attestation of the horse on the Harappan seals would have served the non-invasionist

cause

much

better.

Footnotes:

²⁶The linguists arguing in favour of this IE-Sumerian connection are T.V. Gamkrelidze and V.V. Ivanov; in reply to two Russian articles of theirs, I.M. Diakonov wrote: "On the Original Home of the Indo-Europeans", *Journal of Indo-European Studies*, spring 1985, p.92-174. The quotations are Diakonov's, p. 134.

²⁷The story of horse domestication and its social effects is told by David Anthony, Dimitri Y. Telegin and Dorcas Brown: "The Origin of Horseback Riding", *Scientific American* 12/1991.

²⁸Romila Thapar: "The theory of Aryan race and India", *Social Scientist*, January-March 1996, p.21.

²⁹Romila Thapar: "The theory of Aryan race and India", *Social Scientist*, January-March 1996, p.21.

³⁰E.J.H. Mackay and A.D. Pusalker, quoted in Talageri: *Aryan Invasion Theory, a Reappraisal*, p.118; see also K.D. Sethna: *KarpAsa*, p. 13-15.

³¹Cited in Harry H. Hicks & Robert N. Anderson: "Analysis of an Indo-European Vedic Aryan Head, 4th Millennium BC", *Journal of Indo-European Studies*, fall 1990, p.425-446, specifically p.437.

³²S.P. Gupta: *The Lost Sarasvati and the Indus Civilization*, p. 193-196, with full references.

³³Interviewed in: "Aryan civilization may become 'bone' of contention", *Indian Express*, 10/12/1995.

³⁴These paintings have been reproduced in, among others, Klaus Klostermaier: *Survey of Hinduism*, p.35.

³⁵Dated to la nuit des temps, "the night of time", in *Science Illustrée*, May 1995.

³⁶Reproduced in N.S. Rajaram: *From Harappa to Ayodhya*, inside the front page.

4. Miscellaneous aspects of the Aryan invasion debate

4.5. VEDIC ARYANS IN WEST ASIA

4.5.1. The Kassite and Mitannic peoples

An important anomaly in the AIT is the presence of the Mitanni kings in northern Mesopotamia, with their Vedic cultural heritage and language, as early as the 15th century BC, with absolutely no indication that they were “the Aryans on the way to India”. In fact, the Vedic memories appearing in the Mitanni texts were already remote, with only four Vedic gods mentioned amid a long list of non-Vedic gods. This does not in itself prove that the Mitanni dynasty was post-Vedic, but it certainly confers the burden of proof on those who want to declare it pre-Vedic.

Their language was mature Indo-Aryan, not proto-Indo-Iranian. Satya Swarup Misra argues that the Mitannic languages already showed early Middle-Indo-Aryan traits, e.g. the assimilation of dissimilar plosives (*sapta* > *satta*), and the break-up of consonant clusters by interpolation of vowels (anaptyxis, *Indra* > *Indara*).³⁷ This would imply that Middle-Indo-Aryan had developed a full millennium earlier than hitherto assumed, which in turn has implications for the chronology of the extant literature written in Middle-Indo-Aryan.

In the centuries before the Mitanni texts, there was a Kassite dynasty in Mesopotamia, from the 18th to the 16th century BC. Linguistically assimilated, they preserved some purely Vedic names: *Shuriash*, *Maruttash*, *Inda-Bugash*, i.e. Surya, Marut, Indra-Bhaga (*Bhaga* meaning effectively “god”, cfr. *Bhag-wAn*, Slavic *Bog*).

The Kassite and Mitanni peoples were definitely considered as foreign invaders. They are latecomers in the history of the IE dispersal, appearing at a time when, leaving India out of the argument, at least the area from Iran to France was already IE. They have little bearing on the *Urheimat* question, but they have all the more relevance for mapping the history of the Indo-Iranian group.

Probably the Kassite and Mitannic tribes were part of the same migration, with the latter settling in a peripheral area and thereby retaining their identity a few centuries longer than the Kassites in the metropolitan area of Babylon. According to Babylonian sources, the Kassites came from the swampy area in what is now southern Iraq: unlike the Iranians, who migrated from India through Afghanistan, the Kassites must have come by sea from Sindh to southern Mesopotamia. While the Iranians migrated slowly, taking generations to take control gradually of the fertile areas to the south of the Aral Lake and of the Caspian Sea, the Kassites seem to have been a warrior group moving directly from India to Mesopotamia to carry out a planned invasion which immediately gave them control of the delta area, a bridgehead for further conquests of the Babylonian heartland. They were a conquering aristocracy, and having to marry native women, they lost their language within a few generations, just like the Vikings after their conquest of Normandy.

If the earlier Kassite and the later Mitanni people were indeed part of the same migration, their sudden appearance falls neatly into place if we connect them with the migration wave caused by the dessiccation of the Saraswati area in ca. 2000 BC.

Indian-Mesopotamian connections relevant to the *Urheimat* question have to be sought in a much earlier period. Whether the country *Aratta* of the Sumerian sources is really to be identified with a part of the Harappan area, is uncertain; the Sumerian legend *Enmerkar and the Lord of Aratta*

(late 3rd millennium BC) mentions that Aratta was the source of silver, gold and lapis lazuli, in exchange for grain which was transported not by ship but over land by donkeys; this would rather point to the mining centres in mountainous Afghanistan, arguably Harappan colonies but not the Harappan area itself. However, if this Aratta is the same as the Indian *AraTTa* (in West Panjab) after all, it has far-reaching implications. *AraTTa* is Prakrit for *A-rASTra*, “without kingdom”. The point here is not its meaning, but its almost Middle-Indo-Aryan shape. Like *sapta* becoming *satta* in the Mitannic text, it suggests that this stage of Indo-Aryan is much older than hitherto assumed, viz. earlier than 2000 BC.

4.5.2. The Sumerian connection

At the material high tide of the Harappan culture, Mesopotamia had trade contacts with *Magan*, the Makran coast west of the Indus delta, with *Bad Imin*, “the seven cities”, and with *Meluhha*, the Indus valley. The name *Meluhha* is probably of Dravidian origin: Asko Parpola derives *Meluhha*, “to be read in the early documents with the alternative value as *Me-lah-ha*”, from Dravidian *Met-akam*, “high abode/country” (with *mel/melu*, “high”, being the etymon of Sanskrit *Meru*, the cosmic mountain).³⁸ *Meluhha* is the origin of Sanskrit *Mleccha*, Pali *Milakkhu*, “barbarian”³⁹: because of the unrefined sounds of their Prakrit and because of their cultural impurity (whether by borrowing foreign elements or simply by an indigenous decay of existing cultural standards), the people of Sindh/Meluhha were considered barbarian by the elites of *Madhyadesh* (the Ganga-Yamuna doab) during the Sutra period, which non-invasionists date to the late 3rd millennium BC, precisely the period when Mesopotamia had a flourishing trade with *Meluhha*.

The search is on for common cultural motifs between the Harappan culture and Sumer. One element in literature which strikes the observer as meaningful, is this: according to the account given by the Babylonian priest Berossus, the Sumerians believed their civilization (writing and astronomy) had been brought to the Mesopotamian coast by sages, the first of whom was one Uana-Adapa, better known through his Greek name *Oannes*. He was a messenger of Enki, god of the Abyss, who was worshipped at the oldest Mesopotamian city of Eridu. Like the Vedic “seven sages”, meaning both the seven clans of Vedic seers as well as the seven major stars of Ursa Major, these seven sages are associated with the starry sky; like the *Matsya* incarnation of Vishnu, *Oannes*’s body is that of a fish. The myth of the Flood, wherein divine guidance helps the leader of mankind (Sumerian *Ziusudra*, Sanskrit *Manu*, Akkadian *Utnapishtim*, Hebrew *Noah*) to survive, is another well-known common cultural motif.

The antediluvian kings in Sumer are said by Berossus to have ruled for 120 periods of 3,600 years, or 432,000 years; epochs of 3600 years were in use among Indian astronomers, and the mega-era of 432,000 is equally familiar in India as the scripturally estimated (inexact) number of syllables in the Rg Veda, and as the “high” interpretation of the length of the Kali-Yuga.⁴⁰ Rather than being a late borrowing, this number 432,000 may well be part of the common IE heritage. At least implicitly, it was present in Germanic mythology, which developed separately from Hindu mythology for several millennia before Berossus (ca. 300 BC): 800 men at each of the 540 gates of Wodan’s palace makes for a total of 432,000. This does not prove any far-fetched claim that “the gods were cosmonauts” or so, but it does show that early Indo-European had a world view involving advanced arithmetic (Sanskrit being the first and for many centuries the only language with terms for “astronomical” numbers), and that they shared some of it with neighbouring cultures.

We may be confident that a deeper search, more alert to specifically Indian contributions than is now common among sumerologists, will reveal more connections. Through the Hittites, Philistines (i.e. the “Sea Peoples” originating on the Aegean coasts and settling on the Egyptian and Gaza coasts in ca. 1200 BC), Mitanni and Kassites, elements of IE culture were known throughout West Asia. Even ancient Israelite culture was culturally much more Indo-European than certain race theorists would like to believe.

Footnotes:

³⁷S.S. Misra: *The Aryan Problem*, p.10. Of course, the data are to be handled with care, for the foreign script in which the Indo-Aryan words were rendered, may not have been phonologically accurate.

³⁸Asko Parpola: "Interpreting the Indus Script", in A.H. Dani: *Indus Civilisation: New Perspectives*, p.117-132, specifically p.121.

³⁹V.S. Pathak ("Semantics of *Arya*", in S.B. Deo & S. Kamath: *The Aryan Problem*, p.93) derives the modern ethnic term *Baluch* from *Bloch* (< *Blukh* < *Mlukh*) < *Meluhha*. This is very unlikely, if only because the Baluchis have immigrated into this area from Western Iran during the early Muslim period. Before that, in most of the areas where Pashtu and Baluchi are now spoken, the language was Indo-Aryan Prakrit.

⁴⁰Discussed in Ivan Verheyden: "Het begon met Oannes", *Bres* (Antwerp), May 1976. Strictly, Kali-Yuga is to last for 1,200 years, but since "a year among men is but a day among the gods", scribes have magnified the number to $360 \times 1,200 = 432,000$.

4. of the Miscellaneous Aryan invasion aspects debate

4.6. MEMORY OF THE URHEIMAT

4.6.1. Poetry vs. history

The Vedas do not preserve any veneration, not even any mention, of an *Urheimat*. Compare this with the *Thora* (the first five books of the Bible): edited in about the 6th century BC, it gives a central place to Moses' exodus from Egypt in about 1200 BC, and of Abraham from "Ur of the Chaldees" in about 1600 BC. Similarly, in the 16th century, the Aztecs in Mexico still preserved the memory of Aztlan (probably Utah), the country from which they migrated in the 12th century. Postulating that the Vedic people kept silent about a homeland which they still vividly remembered, as the invasionists imply, is not coherent with all we know about ancient peoples, who preserved such memories for many centuries.

Admittedly, the Vedas are a defective source of history. As religious books, they only deal with historical data in passing. But that has never kept the invasionist school from treating the Vedas as the only source of ancient Indian history, to the neglect of the legitimate history books, the *ItihAsa-PuraNa* literature, i.e. the Epics and the Puranas. It is like ignoring the historical Bible books (*Exodus, Joshua, Chronicles, Kings*) to draw ancient Israelite history exclusively from the *Psalms*, or like ignoring the historians Livius, Tacitus and Suetonius to do Roman history on the basis of the poet Virgil. What would be dismissed as "utterly ridiculous" in Western history is standard practice in Indian history.

Essentially the same remark was already made by Puranic scholar F.E. Pargiter.⁴¹ It was dismissed by some, with the remark that the Puranas are even more religious and unhistorical than the Vedas.⁴² However, that does injustice to the strictly historical parts of the Puranas, mixed though they are with religious lore. No serious historian would ignore the Exodus narrative simply because it *also* contains unhistorical episodes like the Parting of the Sea and the voice from the Burning Bush.

Experience should also make us skeptical towards the knee-jerk skepticism displayed by historians when confronted with ancient historiography. Thus, the king-list of the Chinese Shang dynasty (16th-12th century BC) was dismissed as "obviously mythical", but when in the 1920s the Shang oracle bones were discovered, all the kings were found to be mentioned there: the "mythical" dynastic list proved to be correct to the detail. Likewise, the first Bible historians were skeptical of Biblical history, e.g. of the "obviously wildly exaggerated" description of the huge city of Niniveh; but then archaeologists discovered the ruins of Niniveh, and found that the Bible editors had been fairly accurate in their description.

The Bible provides another important parallel with the Epics and Puranas: most historians now accept the basic historicity of the Biblical account of Israelite political history from at least king David until the Exile, yet it is almost completely unattested in non-Biblical documents, just as ancient Indian history as narrated in the Epics and Puranas (and glimpsed in the Vedas) is practically unattested in non-Indic literature. The non-attestation of Israel's history in the writings of its highly literate neighbours is more anomalous than the non-attestation of early Indian history in the writings of other literate cultures, which were more distant from India geographically and linguistically than Babylon was from Jerusalem. So, if Biblical history can be accepted as more than fantasy, the same credit should be given to the historiographical parts of the Epics and Puranas.

4.6.2. Value of the Puranas

In spite of the low esteem in which they are held, the Puranas are essentially good history. More than 30 years ago, P. L. Bhargava has already demonstrated that the dynastic lists which form the backbone of Puranic history cannot be dismissed as legend or propaganda.⁴³ His first argument is that the oldest names of kings, though mostly Indo-Aryan, are often of a different type (e.g. absence or paucity of theophoric names, like in ancient Greek or Germanic) than those common at the time of the Puranic editors, who show their unfamiliarity with the obsolete names by sometimes misspelling or misinterpreting them. This would not be the case if they had made them up.

Secondly, against those who think that court historians may have concocted genealogies and ancient claims to the land for their royal patrons, Bhargava points out that the Puranas do not locate any dynasties in those areas which are reasonably assumed to have been non-Aryan originally but which were dominated by Indo-Aryan dynasties (or Dravidian-speaking dynasties claiming an "Aryan" ancestry) at the time of the Purana editors, e.g. parts of Bihar, the east coast (Utkala, Kalinga, Cola), and the south (Pandya, Kerala): "This clearly means that the lists are all genuine and the later Puranic editors, in spite of their failings, never went to the extent of interspersing imaginary genealogies with genuine ones."⁴⁴

The argument is similar to one of Irving Zeitlin's arguments for the authenticity of the Biblical account of the conquest of Palestine by the Israelites.⁴⁵ Zeitlin shows that the land conquered by Joshua according to the Biblical narrative did not coincide with the Promised Land as promised by Jahweh to Joshua (it falls short of the promised area while also comprising some non-promised territory); a purely propagandistic narrative intent on legitimizing the later extent of the Israelite kingdom or on glorifying Jahweh's reliability, would have made Joshua acquire the exact territory promised by the Lord.

Thirdly, many names from the Puranic lists also show up in other sources, including the Epics, the Jain Agamas, the Sutras, and earliest of all, the Vedas. Of course, persons are sometimes shown in a rather different light in different sources, and there are differences on details between the different Puranas as well as between the Puranas and the other sources; but that is exactly what happens when authentic events (such as a traffic accident) are related by different witnesses.

4.6.3. Dynastic history in the Puranas

Shrikant Talageri takes up the argument where Bhargava had left it, and proceeds to demonstrate that the fragmentary Vedic data and the systematic Puranic account tally rather splendidly.⁴⁶ The Puranas relate a westward movement of a branch of the Aila/Saudyumna clan or Lunar dynasty from Prayag (Allahabad, at the junction of Ganga and Yamuna) to Sapta Saindhavah, the land of the seven rivers. There, the tribe splits into five, after the five sons of the conqueror Yayati: Yadu, Druhyu, Anu, Puru, Turvashu. All the rulers mentioned in the Vedas either belong to the Paurava (Puru-descended) tribe settled on the banks of the Saraswati, or have come in contact with them according to the Puranic account, whether by alliance and matrimony or by war. Later, the Pauravas (and minor dynasties springing from them) extend their power eastward, into and across their ancestral territory, and the Vedic traditions spread along with the economic and political influence of the metropolitan Saraswati-based Paurava people.

This way, the eastward expansion of the Vedic horizon, which has often been read as proof of a western origin of the Aryans, is integrated into a larger history. The Vedic people are shown as merely one branch of an existing Aryan culture, originally spanning northern India (at least) from eastern Uttar Pradesh to Panjab. The approximate and relative chronology provided by the

dynastic lists allow us to estimate the time of those events as much earlier than the heyday and end of the Harappan cities.

Puranic history reaches back beyond the starting date of the composition of the Vedas. In the king-lists, a number of kings are enumerated before the first kings appear who are also mentioned in the Rg-Veda. In what remains of the Puranas, no absolute chronology is added to the list, but from Greek visitors to ancient India, we get the entirely plausible information such a chronology did exist. To be precise, the Puranic king-list as known to Greek visitors of Candragupta's court in the 4th century BC or to later Greco-Roman India-watchers, started in 6776 BC.⁴⁷ Even for that early pre-Vedic period, there is no hint of any immigration.

4.6.4. Emigrations in the Puranas

What is more: the Puranas mention several *emigrations*. The oldest one explicitly described is by groups belonging to the Afghanistan-based Druhyu branch of the Aila/Saudyumna people, i.e. the Pauravas' cousins, in the pre-Vedic or early Vedic period. They are said to have moved to distant lands and set up kingdoms there. Estimating our way through the dynastic (relative) chronology given in the Puranas, we could situate this emigration in the 5th millennium BC. It is not asserted that that was the earliest such emigration: the genealogy starts with Manu's ten successors, of whom six disappear from the Puranic horizon at once, while two others also recede in the background after a few generations; and many acts of peripheral tribes and dynasties, including their emigration, may have gone unnoticed. But even if it were the earliest emigration, it is not far removed from a realistic chronology for the dispersion of the different branches of the IE family. It also tallies well with the start of the Kurgan culture by Asian immigrants in ca. 4500 BC.

Later the Anavas are said to have invaded Panjab from their habitat in Kashmir, and to have been defeated and expelled by the Pauravas in the so-called Battle of the Ten Kings, described in Rg Veda 7:18,19,33,83. The ten tribes allied against king Sudas (who belonged to the Trtsu branch of the Paurava tribe) have been enumerated in the Vedic references to the actual battle, and a number of them are unmistakably Iranian: *Paktha* (Pashtu), *BhalAna* (Bolan/Baluch), *Parshu* (Persian), *PRthu* (Parthian), the others being less recognizable: *VishANin*, *Allna*, *Shiva*, *Shimyu*, *BhRgu*, *Druhyu*. At the same time, they are (except for the Druhyus) collectively called "Anu's sons", in striking agreement with the Puranic account of an Anava struggle against the Paurava natives of Panjab. Not mentioned in the Vedic account, but mentioned in the Puranic account as the Anava tribe settled farthest west in Panjab (most removed from the war theatre), is the *Madra* (Mede?) tribe.

Talageri tentatively identifies the other tribes as well: the *Druhyu* as the *Druids* or Celts (untenable)⁴⁸; the Bhrgus as the *Phrygians* (etymologically reasonable); the *Allnas* as the *Hellenes* or Greeks (shaky); the *Shimiyus* with the *Sirmios/Srems* or ancient Albanians (possible), etc. It is hard to prove or disprove this; all we can say is that along with the Iranian tribes, there may have been several non-Iranian tribes who emigrated from northwestern India after the Battle of the Ten Kings.

More migrations are attested, of individuals, families as well as whole tribes. The Vedic character Sarama calls on the Panis to go far away and to the north; assuming that the Panis are not some kind of heavenly creatures, this presupposes that the northward exit was a well-known route, and perhaps a common trail for exiles, outlaws and refugees (just as in the colonial period, an Englishman who had lost all perspectives in his homeland could always move to Australia).⁴⁹ Vishvamitra's sons, fifty in number, dissented from their father and left the country, after which they are called *udantyah*, "those of the northern border".⁵⁰ A group of Asuras are said to have fled across the northern border, chased by Agni and the Devas, who mounted guard there.⁵¹

4.6.5. Migration history of other IE tribes

Other branches of IE have a clear migration history, even if no literary record has been preserved. It is commonly accepted that the Celtic and Italic peoples were invaders into their classical habitats. The Celts' itinerary can be archaeologically traced back to Slovakia and Hungary, and Germany still preserves some Celtic place-names.⁵² In France, Spain, and the British Isles, a large pre-IE population existed, comprising at least two distinct language families. Of the Iberian languages, only a few written fragments have been preserved. Etruscan is extinct but well-attested and fully deciphered, though we don't know what to make of the persistent claims that it was a wayward branch of the IE Anatolian family. The Basque language survives till today, but attempts to link it to distant languages remain unsuccessful. At any rate, this area witnessed a classic case of IE expansion, resulting in the near-complete celtization or latinization of western and southern Europe.

Germanic, Baltic and Slavic cover those areas of Europe which have been claimed as the *Urheimat*: Germany, Poland, Lithuania, Ukraine, South Russia. In the case of the Germanic peoples, there is no literary record (but plenty of archaeological indications) of an immigration, nor of the replacement or assimilation of an earlier population. The Baltic language group, represented today by Latvian and Lithuanian, once covered a slightly larger area than today, but there is no literary memory of a migration from another area. However, many Balts today will tell you that they originally came from India. Before this is declared to be an argument for an Indian *Urheimat*, it should be verified that this belief really pre-dates the 19th century, when it was the prevalent theory among scholars throughout Europe. The folklore avidly recorded by nationalist philologists in the 19th century could well contain not only age-old oral traditions of the common people but also some beliefs fashionable among those who recorded them. The Slavic peoples have expanded to the southwest across the Danube, and in recent centuries also (back?) to the east, across the Ural mountains. The farthest in time that human memory can reach, Ukraine and southern Poland seem to have been the Slavs' homeland.

When scholars from the Germanic, Baltic and Slavic countries started claiming their own country as the IE *Urheimat*, this certainly was not in contradiction with facts known at the time. But these *Urheimat* claims were only based on a weak *argumentum e silentio*: the first written records of these peoples are comparatively recent, several millennia younger than the break-up of PIE, and the true story of their migratory origins has simply been lost. This is not to deny that they may have preserved traditions of their own migrations for as long as the Israelites, but apart from the erosion wrought by time, it is christianization which has generally put a stop to the continuation of the traditional tribal knowledge. And where Christian monks stepped in to collect and preserve remnants of the national heritage (as in Ireland), it was too late: stories had gotten mixed up, the people who remembered the traditional knowledge were dying out, the thread had become too thin not to be broken,

That the Greeks took their classical habitat from an Old European population is not in doubt, but there is no definite memory of their immigration. Perhaps the myth of the Argonauts and the Golden Fleece, located in Georgia, should be read as a vague indication of a Greek migration from there, overseas to Thracia, whence the Greek tribes entered Greece proper in succession. But an actual immigration narrative is missing.

4.6.6. Iranian *Urheimat* memory

The one branch of IE which has preserved a relatively unambiguous record of its migration, is Iranian. The Iranians once controlled a much larger territory than today, after the Slavic and Turkic expansions. The Cimmerians and Scythians spread out over the steppes between Ukraine and the Pamir mountains; of this branch of the Iranians, only the Ossets in the northern Caucasus remain. The Sogdians in the Jaxartes or Syr Darya valley and even as far east as Khotan (Xinjiang) made important contributions to culture and especially to Buddhist tradition. An

unsuspected wayward branch of the Iranian family is the Croat people: till the early Christian era, when they were spotted in what is now Eastern Europe, they spoke an Iranian language, which was gradually replaced by Slavic “Serbo-Croat”. They call themselves *Hrvat*, apparently from *Harahvaiti*, the name of a river in Western Afghanistan, which is merely the Iranian form of *Saraswati*. In an Achaemenid inscription, the *Harahvaita* tribe is mentioned as one of the tribute-paying components of the Iranian empire. The migration of the Croats from Afghanistan to the western Balkan (and likewise, that of the *Alans*, a name evolved from *Arya*, as far west as France) could be the perfect illustration of the general east-to-west movement which the Indian Urheimat hypothesis implies.

The Iranians are fairly clear about their history of immigration from *Hapta-Hendu and Airyanam Vaejo*, two of sixteen Iranian lands mentioned in the Zoroastrian scripture *Vendidad*. To the extent that they are recognizable, all sixteen are in Bactria, Afghanistan or northwestern India. Iran proper is not in the picture, nor is the Volga region whence the Iranians are assumed to have migrated in the AIT. Their religious reformer Zarathushtra, whom modern scholarship dates to the mid-2nd millennium BC, lived in present-day Balkh in Afghanistan, then a more domesticated land than today.⁵³ Afghanistan was a half-way station in a slow migration from India. The Iranians may have brought the name of the lost *Saraswati* river along with them and given it, in the phonetically evolved form *Harahvaiti*, to a river in their new country; similarly with the name *Saryu*, the river flowing through Ayodhya, becoming *Harayu*, the old name of another river in western Afghanistan.

The Iranian homelands *Airyanam Vaejo*, described as too cold in its 10-months-long winter, and *Hapta-Hendu*, described as rendered too hot for men (i.e. the Iranians) by the wicked Angra-Mainyu, are Kashmir and Sapta-Saindhavah (Panjab-Haryana) respectively.⁵⁴ They are considered as the first two of sixteen countries successively allotted to the Iranians, the rest being the areas where the Iranians have effectively been living in proto-historical times. This scenario tallies quite exactly with the Vedic and Puranic data about the history of the *Anavas*, one of the five branches of the *Aila/Saudyumna* people: from Kashmir, they invaded Sapta-Saindhavah, but were defeated by the *Paurava* branch (which composed the Rg-Veda) and driven northwestward.

Those who deny this scenario have had to invent a second “land of seven rivers” as the common Indo-Iranian homeland, from which the Iranians’ Vedic cousins took the name but not the memory into India; or to interpret the Avestan river-name *Ranha* (correlate of Sanskrit *RasA*, the Puranic name of the Amu Darya or Oxus) as meaning the Volga.⁵⁵ It is a safe rule of scientific method that “entities are not to be multiplied without necessity” (Occam’s razor), and therefore, until proof of the contrary, we should accept that the term *Sapta Saindhavah* and its Iranian evolute *Hapta Hendu* refer to the same region historically known by that name. Both Indian and Iranian sources situate the break-up between Indians and Iranians, Deva- and Asura-worshippers, in Sapta-Saindhavah. Before such a concordant testimony of all parties concerned, it is quite pretentious to claim that one knows it all better, and that they separated in Iran or Central Asia instead.

The balance-sheet is that some branches of the IE family have no memory of any migration, some have vague memories of their own immigration into their historical habitat, the Iranian branch has a distinct memory of migration from India to Iran, and only the Indian branch has a record of emigration of others from its own habitat.

4.6.7. Rama in the Avesta?

In India, it is sometimes claimed that the Avesta contains the names of the Hindu hero Rama and of his guru Vasishtha. This was suggested by among others, Prof. Sukumar Sen and *Illustrated Weekly* journalist O. K. Ghosh, who tried to use this hypothesis as “proof” that Rama could not have been born in Ayodhya, locus of a Hindu-Muslim controversy involving Rama’s birthplaces.⁵⁶ The word *rAma* appears in Avestan, e.g. thrice in Zarathushtra’s *GATHA*-s (29:10, 47:3, 53:8), but apparently only in its proper sense (“joyful, pleasant, peaceful”, whence the derivative *A-rAm*, till

today the Persian and Urdu word for “rest”). This means that it is not referring to the name of an individual called *RAMa*, whether Ramachandra son of Dasharatha or another. The same is true in the even older *YaSna GAthA*-s and in the much younger Pehlevi writings (Denkart, Vendidad), where derivatives of the root *rAm* appear in their proper sense.

There does exist a royal name *RAMateja*, carried by at least two kings of Media in the 8th-7th centuries BC (unless this form is Indic rather than Iranian, which could be explained as a late remainder of the Indic Mitanni presence in the same area which later became Media, or today's Kurdistan). In the regular Zarathushtrian prayer, *RAM* is seemingly used as a personal name: every day of the month is dedicated to one of the *ferishta*-s, sort of angels (the *Amesha Spenta*-s or aspects of Ahura Mazda, and their *hamkar*-s or co-workers) who are personifications (*yazad*-s) of values, e.g. Bahram (<< *VRtraghna*) is the *yazad* of victory, Ashtad of rectitude etc., and *RAM* is the *yazad* of joy, invoked in prayer on the 21st day of the month. Though used as a personal name, this instance too may have nothing to do with the Rama from Ayodhya.

In the oldest Avestan texts, the word *vahishta* also appears, the equivalent of *VasishTha*, but this again probably not as a personal name, but rather in its proper sense of “the best” (whence *behesht*, “he best [state]”, paradise). That at least is the view of accomplished iranologists.⁵⁷ Admittedly, translating the ancientmost Iranian texts is even trickier than the already difficult Vedas, but I have as yet no reasons to insist on a different translation than the established one.

Prof. Sukumar Sen and his translator (for the *Illustrated Weekly*). O.K. Ghosh, found it useful to interpret Avestan *rAma* and *vahishta* as personal names because they thought it would confirm the Aryan invasion theory, by putting all the Ramayana characters and places in Iran-Afghanistan. Others think that it would rather confirm the Indian origin of the Iranians, giving them a memory of the indisputably Indian characters Rama and Vasishtha. I think that either explanation is possible once the reading of Rama and Vasishtha as personal names is accepted. Therefore, nothing is lost if we return to the non-personal reading.

Footnotes:

⁴¹F.E. Pargiter: *Ancient Indian Historical Tradition*, London 1922, p.v.

⁴²A.K. Majumdar: *Concise History of Ancient India*, Delhi 1977, p.89, and D.K. Ganguly who quotes him approvingly: *History and Historians in Ancient India*, p.30.

⁴³Bhargava: *India in the Vedic Age*, p-139-140. Not that I recommend Bhargava's book as an introduction to the Puranic history, for it imposes grossly arbitrary “corrections” on the geographical data so as to fit them into a kind of Invasionist framework. He is a mild example of the school which claims that Puranic history actually took place alright, but in Central Asia or thereabouts rather than in India; and that Puranic historians simply transferred it to an Indian setting. As if an American were to write national history by transferring the Battle of Hastings and the War of the Roses from a British to an American setting.

⁴⁴Bhargava, *Vedic Age*, p.139.

⁴⁵Irving M. Zeitlin: *Ancient Judaism*, Polity Press, Cambridge 1991 (1984), ch.4, particularly p.125ff. Zeitlin's thesis is that the Biblical account of the conquest is quite factual. The thesis is controversial not because actual discoveries plead against it, but because it is ideologically uncomfortable. After the Holocaust, it is painful to accept the

Biblical account because what it describes is a genocide in the full sense of the term, eliminating all the men, women and children of the conquered parts of Canaan. Liberal theologians of Judaism and Christianity would greatly prefer a more peaceful version.

⁴⁶Talageri: *Aryan Invasion Theory, a Reappraisal*, p.304ff.

⁴⁷Pliny: *Naturalis Historia* 6:59; Arrian: *Indica* 9:9.

⁴⁸The etymology of Druid is as follows: *do-ro-vid*, i.e. Celtic *do*, “very”, plus *ro* (from **pro*, as in Latin, cfr. Sanskrit *pra*), “very”, plus IE *vid*, “know”, hence “very very knowing”. For a full discussion, see Françoise Le Roux & Christian-J. Guyonvarch: *Les Druides*, Editions Ouest-France, Rennes 1986, appendix 1.

⁴⁹Rg Veda 10:108:11.

⁵⁰Aitareya Brahmana 33:6:1. My attention was drawn to this passage by L.N. Renu: *Indian Ancestors of Vedic Aryans*, p.28.

⁵¹Shatapatha Brahmana 1:2:4:10. Thanks again to L.N. Renu: *Indian Ancestors*, p.31-32. Renu also draws attention to a type of evidence which we cannot elaborate on: the continuity between the four-syllable folk-metre which is mentioned in the Shatapatha Brahmana 4:3:2:7 as “prevalent earlier” (before being reduplicated to the standard eight-syllable metric unit of Vedic verse) and which according to Renu (p.24) “belongs to the pre-Samhita days” but is “still popular amongst the tribal folk in India”. Continuity between tribal and Vedic culture is one of the most important *demonstranda* for non-AIT theorists.

⁵²It is claimed that the Druids had a tradition tracing their own origins “to Asia in 3903 BC”, quoted for what it is worth in Harry H. Hicks & Robert N. Anderson: “Analysis of an Indo-European Vedic Aryan head - 4th millennium BC”, *Journal of Indo-European Studies*, fall 1990, p.426, from W. Morgan: *St. Paul in Britain*, published in 1860.

⁵³The *Cambridge History of Inner Asia* (p.15) puts him in the period 1450-1200 BC, others go as far back as 1800 BC. It is to be kept in mind, however, that this dating is partly based on the AIT, including the assumption that Zarathushtra must be roughly contemporaneous with the vedas. It is also disputed that the Gathas were written by Zarathushtra: just as the Thora was attributed to Moses but written much after his death, the Gathas may have been written long after Zarathushtra.

⁵⁴In the Zoroastrian evil spirit’s name *Angra-Mainyu*, later *Ahriman*, we can recognize the names *Angiras*, one of the principal clans of Vedic seers, and *Manyu*, “intention”, one of the names of Indra, and addressed in Rg-Veda 10:83-84. Coincidence?

⁵⁵E.g. Jean Haudry: *Les Indo-Européens*, p.118. Remark that in other contexts, *Rasa* can also mean the Narmada river, and also the mythical river which surrounds the world. Oxus and Narmada were apparently the borderline rivers of the Indus-Saraswati civilization.

⁵⁶O.K. Ghosh: “Was Rama an Iranian?”, *Illustrated Weekly of India*, 27-2-1993, with reference to Sukumar Sen: *RAM ItihAser Prak-kathan* (Bengali: “Introduction to the History of Ram”).

⁵⁷My thanks to Prof. Wociecz Skalmowski, who teaches Persian and Iranian at Catholic University, Leuven.

4. Miscellaneous aspects of the Aryan invasion debate

4.7. INDRA AND SHIVA

4.7.1. Indra stands accused

A central Vedic myth is the killing of the dragon or snake, Vrtra, by the Vedic thunder god Indra. Here is a beautiful occasion to demonize Vedic religion to its core, considering that “the duel between Indra and Vrtra, officially the symbol of the eternal fight between good and evil, is the central element of the Vedic sacrificial rite.”⁵⁸ For Dravidianist agitators and other anti-Brahmin writers, the central Vedic myth of the dragon-slayer is but an allegorical report of the Aryan invasion and defeat of the pre-Aryan natives, a commemoration of an ancient crime against humanity.⁵⁹

In reality, the slaying of the dragon is a pan-IE myth, attested even in the remote Germanic tradition, where it was later christianized into Saint George's and Archangel Michael's dragon-slayings. In Iranian this dragon-slayer is actually called *Verethraghna*, a form eroded in Armenian to *Veragn* (remark that while the rejection of Indra was a central concern of Zarathushtra, Indra's epithet *Verethraghna* remained as a separate deity in the Avesta). Obviously, the Iranians and Armenians did not have a history of conquering North-India from the Harappans, as per the AIT itself, so we may safely assume that the Vrtra myth has nothing to do with an Aryan-Harappan war.

Nor is there any evidence that there ever was any war between Aryans and Harappans in the first place. No large-scale destruction of Harappan cities has been noticed. Contrast this with the IE expansion in the Balkans. From linguistic evidence, we understand that the Hellenes (Greeks) along with the Illyrians and Thracians supplanted or absorbed a highly civilized non-IE native population, whose culture is known as the *VinCa culture* (after its richest excavation site near Belgrade). These natives had used an as yet undeciphered writing system reportedly going back to 5300 BC, and disappearing along with the Old European culture in about 3500 BC. So there it really was an advanced civilization being overrun by barbarian invaders who largely destroyed it.

That model is being projected onto the Vedic-Harappan history: a literate urban and agricultural civilization being overrun by semi-nomadic horsemen. But the crucial difference is that in the Balkans, this violent scenario is attested by archaeological findings: “The existence of archaeologically attested burnt layers at many settlements is evidence for military confrontations between the native farmers of Southeast Europe and the cattle-breeding nomads from South Russia.”⁶⁰ The same thing happened when, according to most specialists, the Greeks entered mainland Greece in 1,900 BC, driving the last remains of Old European culture to their last refuge on Crete: “numerous destructions”, “widespread destruction on the mainland, but no destruction on Crete or the islands”.⁶¹ This testimony of many settlements having been burnt down is absent at the Harappan sites.

All the same, a whole superstructure of invasionist readings of Indian symbols and mythology has been erected on the invasionist suspicion that, in Sir Mortimer Wheeler's famous words, “Indra stands accused” of destroying the Harappan civilization.

4.7.2. Continuity between Indra and Shiva

Once Indra had been identified by the AIT as a deified tribal leader of the invaders, an antagonism was elaborated between the “Aryan” sky-god Indra and the “pre-Aryan” fertility god Shiva; Indra being the winner of the initial military confrontation, but Shiva having the last laugh by gradually winning over the conquerors to the cult of the subdued natives. As I heard a Catholic priest from Kerala claim, “Shiva is not a Hindu god, because he is the god of the pre-Aryans.”

That Shiva was the god of the Harappans, is based on a single Harappan finding, the so-called *Pashupati* seal. It depicts a man with a strange headwear sitting in lotus posture and surrounded by animals. Though not well visible, he seems to have three faces, which may mean that he is a three-faced god (like the famous three-faced Shiva sculpture in the Elephanta cave), or that he is a four-faced god with the back face undepictable on a two-dimensional surface. The common speculation is that this is Shiva in his *Pashupati* (“lord of beasts”) aspect. Ever since the discovery of the Gundestrup cauldron in Central Europe, which depicts the Celtic horned god Cernunnos similarly seated between animals, this *Pashupati* seal is actually an argument in favour of the IE character of Harappan culture.

Let us, nevertheless, go with the common opinion: Shiva for the Harappans, Indra for the Aryans. Those who see it this way have never explained why the dominant Aryans have, over the centuries, abandoned their victorious god (Indra is practically not worshipped in any of the temples manned by Brahminical priests) in favour of the god of their defeated enemies. At any rate, when we study these two divine characters, we find that they are not all that antagonistic.

Shiva is usually identified with the Vedic god Rudra. It so happens that Indra’s and Rudra’s domains are more or less the same: both are thundering sky gods. In mythology, Indra is, like Shiva, a bit of an outsider, who is in conflict with the other gods, shunned by them (and even by his mother), left alone by them to fight the Dragon, doing things that disrupt the world order. Christians who picture Jesus as the friend of the outcasts, may like to know that the despised “Aryan racist god” Indra is in fact on the side of the outcasts: “Indra, you lifted up the outcast who was oppressed, you glorified the blind and the lame.” (Rg-Veda 2:13:12) As David Frawley has shown, Indra has many epithets and attributes which were later associated with Shiva: the dispeller of fear, the lord of *mAyA* (enchantment), the bull, the dancer, the destroyer of cities (Indra *purandara*, Shiva *tripurahara*).⁶² Both are associated with mountains, rivers, male fertility, fierceness, fearlessness, warfare, transgression of established mores, the *Aum* sound, the Supreme Self.

Shiva and Indra are both associated with intoxication. Indra is praised as having a tremendous appetite for the psychedelic *soma* juice. Shiva has *Soma-Shiva* as one of his aspects, a name containing one of those Brahminical etymology games: Soma is the Vedic intoxicant, and also the moon (as in *SomwAr*, “Monday”), which is part of Shiva’s iconography (hence his, epithet *SomanAtha*).

The now-popular theory that Shiva is a non-Vedic and anti-Vedic god, is partly based on the Puranic story of the destruction of Daksha’s sacrifice. Daksha is the father of Shiva’s beloved Sati: he rebukes Shiva, Sati commits suicide, and Shiva vents his anger by disturbing the sacrifice which Daksha is conducting. Daksha refuses to worship Shiva because Shiva is *vedabAhya*, “outside the Vedas”; as in a fit of anger, mortals also call their relatives all kinds of inaccurate names.

As David Frawley shows, the Daksha story is quite parallel to the Vedic story of Indra stealing the *soma* from Twashtr and even killing the latter, and to the Vedic story of Rudra killing Prajapati. In each case, a god who disrupts or “destroys” the world order, is seen to defeat a god representing

the process of creation, which is equated with the process of the Vedic sacrifice (the Creator creates the world by sacrificing). The destroyer-god, himself a cornerstone of the created world, disrupts the creative sacrifice. David Frawley restores these stories to their traditional metaphysical interpretation: "Both Indra's and Shiva's role of destroying Prajapati or his son relate to their role as eternity (absolute time) destroying time or the year (relative time) represented by Prajapati and the sacrifice."⁶³ Personally, I prefer the more physical explanation given by Bal Gangadhar Tilak and in consonance with modern insights into mythology, viz. that the victory of the one god over the other may simply refer to the replacement of one constellation by the next as the stellar location of the equinox.

The outsider role of Shiva in the Puranic pantheon is the continuation of Indra's role in the Vedic pantheon, which in turn is only the Indian version of a role which exists in the other IE pantheons as well, e.g. the Germanic fire god Loki or the Greco-Roman warrior-god Ares/Mars. Shiva also continues Indra's role of warrior-god. Till today, many Shiva sadhus are proficient in the martial arts. The Shaiva war-cry *Hara Hara Mahadev* is still used by some regiments of the Indian army as well as by Hindu demonstrators during communal confrontations.⁶⁴

Finally, shiva, "the auspicious one", is an epithet of not only Rudra but of Vedic gods in general. Indra himself is called *shiva* several times (Rg-Veda 2:20:3, 6:45:17, 8:93:3). Shiva is by no means a non-Vedic god, and Indra never really disappeared from popular Hinduism but lives on under another name.

Footnotes:

⁵⁸André. Van Lysebeth: *Tantra*, p.25.

⁵⁹A very elaborate interpretation of the whole Rg-Veda as a report on the destruction of the Harappan "Asura Empire" by the Aryan invaders is Malati Shendge: *The Civilized Demons. The Harappans in Rg-Veda*.

⁶⁰Harald Haarmann: *Universalgeschichte der Schrift*, p.80.

⁶¹William F. Wyatt, jr.: "The Indo-Europeanization of Greece", in Cardona et al., eds.: *Indo-European and Indo-Europeans*, p.89-111, specifically p-93.

⁶²D. Frawley: *Gods, Sages and Kings*, p.224-225, and in more detail: *Arise Arjuna*, p. 170-181.

⁶³D. Frawley: *Arise Arjuna*, p. 177. The symbolism of eternity and time is very clear in the iconography of Shiva's consort *Kali*. Representing all-devouring time, she dances on Shiva's unconscious body: the world of change and destruction exists and affects us as long as the timeless self-consciousness of the Self has not awoken.

⁶⁴In the *Chanakya* TV-serial, broadcast in truncated version on Doordarshan in 1992, the *Hara Hara Mahadev* sequences were censored out for fear that they might arouse communal passions.

4. Miscellaneous of the Aryan invasion debate

aspects

4.8. INVASIONIST TERMS IN THE VEDAS

4.8.1. Dasa

Though not a pandit or philologist, Dalit leader Dr. Ambedkar took the trouble of verifying the meaning and context, in every single instance, of the Vedic terms which Western scholars often mentioned as proof of a conflict between white Aryan invaders and dark non-Aryan aboriginals.⁶⁵ His line of argument has been elaborated further by V.S. Pathak and Shrikant Talageri.⁶⁶

Among the Vedic terms figuring prominently in the AIT reading of the Vedas, the most important one is probably *dAsa*. *DAsa*, known to mean “slave, servant” in classical Sanskrit, but in the Rg-Veda the name of an enemy tribe, along with the apparently related word *dasyu*, is interpreted in AIT parlance as “aboriginal”. More probably these words designate the Vedic people’s white-skinned n cousins, who at one point became their enemies, for both terms exist in Iranian, *dahae* being one of the Iranian tribes, and *dahyu* meaning “tribe, nation”. The original meaning of *dAsa*, long preserved in the Khotanese dialect of Iranian, is “man”; it is used in this sense in the Vedic names *DivodAs*, “divine man” and *SudAs*, “good man”.⁶⁷ In Iranian, it always preserved its neutral or positive meaning, it is only in late-Vedic that it acquired a hostile and ultimately a degrading connotation. Strangely a similar evolution has taken place in Greek, where *doulos*, “slave”, is an evolutive of **dowelos*, from **dos-*, the IE root of *dAsa*.

The post-Vedic evolution in meaning from an ethnic name to “servant” does not necessarily point to enslavement of enemies; no military event of such nature and relating to the word, *dAsa* is mentioned in the Vedic literature. Instead of seeing the Vedic people as warriors, we may see them as a prosperous merchant population which at some stage, in a perfectly normal economic development, attracted the inflow of neighbouring populations as guestworkers willing to do the menial work, the way the Biblical twelve sons of Jacob went to Egypt of their own free will, where their children became a class of menial workers. But it is admittedly just as likely that the evolution was from “enemy” through “captive” to “slave”. Whatever the scenario of their social degradation may have been, nothing in the Vedic text shows that the Dasas were dark, nor that they were aboriginals as opposed to invaders.

4.8.2. Asura

Asura is the original Indo-Iranian and Vedic term for “Lord”, a form of address both for the gods and for people of rank. The late- and post-Vedic concept of *DevAsurasaMgrAma*, usually translated as “war between Devas/gods and Asuras/demons”, has led to the notion that this represents a war between two categories of gods, comparable to the Germanic *Aesir* and *Wanir*, or to the warring Gods and Titans of Greek mythology. However, there never existed a separate category of celestial beings called Asuras; the Devas themselves were originally addressed as Asura.

At this point, we have to give credit to the invasionists for identifying the *DevAsurasaMgrAma* as essentially a political struggle between two nations using their respective religious terminology as a banner. However, the Asura-worshippers, or Asuras for short, are not the non-Aryan aboriginals of whom we merely assume that they must have worshipped Asura; they are the nation known to worship Asura, or in their own dialect *Ahura* (epithet *Mazda*, so “wise Lord”), the usual Iranian term for the Vedic god Varuna, god of the cosmic order and the truth (*Rta/arta*).

The religious difference between Iranians and Vedic “fire-worshippers” was a minor difference in emphasis, and had nothing to do with the causes of their conflict. It was only after a war over the control of prize territory in the Panjab erupted, that the term Asura got identified with the aggression of the Kashmir-based *Anava*/Iranian people against the *Paurava*/Vedic heartland in Sapta-Saindhavah, and acquired a negative, anti-Vedic or anti-Deva meaning. Conversely, it must have been on that same occasion that the Iranians turned *Deva/Daeva* into a term for “demon”.

4.8.3. Speech defects

MRdhraVak, “of harsh speech”, could refer to hecklers mocking the Vedic rituals, more or less “blasphemers”. Usually it is interpreted as “speaking a foreign language”, though that is not its literal meaning; and even if correct, this could still refer to another IE language or dialect. Scornful references to other people’s languages are more often about closely related ones, cfr. the many English expressions pejoratively using the word “Dutch”, the language of England’s enemies in the 17th century, but nonetheless also the language which is (except for Frisian) the most closely akin to English.

AnAsa is interpreted as *a-nAsa*, “noseless”, stretched to mean “snub-nosed”; but classical commentators analysed it, just as credibly, as *an-Asa*, “speechless” (*Asa* being the regular cognate of Latin *os*, “mouth”). This type of anthropomorphic imagery. is often used in the Vedas for characterizing natural elements, e.g. fire as “footless”. If referring to people, it is to be remarked that few Indians even among the tribals are snub-nosed. If taken to mean “speechless”, hence perhaps “unintelligible”, the same remark is valid as in the case of *mRdhraVak*: unintelligibility is most striking when hearing someone speaking a dialect of your own language, i.e. when he was expected to be intelligible in the first place.

Nevertheless, it stands to reason that the Vedic people have encountered enemies on some occasions, that some of these enemies did speak a completely different language, that Vedic hymns were composed in preparation or commemoration of the battle, and that the enemies were mentioned in the hymns along with their strange language as their most distinctive trait. So, let us assume that the above terms do refer to people speaking a non-IE language. That would not at all be proof of an Aryan invasion, because both parties may be native, or the non-IE-speaking party may be the invading one. When the Germans invaded France in 1870, 1914 and 1940, the French duly noted that the German language was full of “harsh” sounds; even so, it was the *mRdhraVak* Germans who were the invaders.

4.8.4. Black

KRsNayoni (“from a black womb”), *kRshNatvac* (“black-skinned”), *tvacamasiknlm* (id.), *asiknivishah* (“black tribe”) and other composites involving “black”, read in their contexts, usually refer to darkness, to nightly stratagems in war, or metaphorically to evil. Most languages have expressions like “black deeds”, “dark portends”, “the dark age”, associating darkness with evil, ignorance or danger. Vedic Sanskrit is extremely rich in metaphors, in techno-scientific contexts (for lack of a separate technical jargon) as well as in cultural and religious contexts, e.g. the word go, “cow” can refer to Mother Earth, the sunshine, material wealth, language, the *Aum* sound, etc. It is not far-fetched to perceive a metaphorical intention behind the use of words like “black”, similar to that in other languages.

It also has to be inspected case by case whether the reference is at all to human beings (whether skin-colour or figurative characterization), because many Vedic expressions are about gods and heavenly phenomena. When it is said that Agni, the fire, “puts the dark demons to flight”, one should keep in mind that the darkness was thought to be filled with ghosts or ghouls, so that making light frees the atmosphere of their presence. And when Usha, the dawn, is said to chase

the “dark skin” or “the black monster” away, it obviously refers to the cover of nightly darkness over the surface of the earth.⁶⁸

The term *varNa* is understood in classical Sanskrit as “colour”. This is then explained as referring to the symbolic colours attributed to the three cosmological “qualities” (*guNa*): white corresponds to *sattva* (clarity), red to *rajas* (energy) and black to *tamas* (darkness), following the pattern of daylight, twilight and nightly darkness. Likewise, the different functions in the social spectrum are allotted a member of the colour spectrum: the menial (*tAmasika*) Shudras are symbolically “black”, the heroic (*rAjasika*) Kshatriyas are “red”, and the truth-loving (*sAttvika*) Brahmins are “white”; in addition, the entrepreneurial Vaishyas are considered to have a mixture of qualities, and are allotted the colour yellow. This sense of “colour” has nothing to do with skin colour, as should also be evident from the ancient use of the same colour code among the all-white Germanic peoples.

Moreover, “Colour” might even not be the original, Vedic meaning of *varNa*. Reformist Hindus eager to disentangle the institution of *varNa* from any doctrines of genetic determinism, derive it from the root var-, “choose” (as in *svayamvara*, “[a girl’s] own choice [of a husband]”), with the implication that one’s *varNa* is not a matter of birth but of personal choice. This seems to tally with Stanley Insler’s rendering, in his classic translation of *The Gathas of Zarathustra*, of the corresponding Avestan term *varanA* as “preference” (which other translators sometimes stretch to mean “conviction”, “religious affiliation”). But we believe that the root meaning is even simpler.

In the Rg-Veda, the word *varNa* usually (17 out of 22 times) refers to the “lustre” (i.e. “one’s own typical light”, a meaning obviously related to “colour”) of specified gods: Usha, Agni, Soma, etc.⁶⁹ As for the remaining cases, in 3:34:5 and 9:71:2 it indicates the lustrous colour of the sky at dawn. In 1:104:2 and 2:12:4, reference is only to quelling the *varNa* of the *DAsas*, - meaning “the *DAsas*’ luster” (in the first case, Ralph Griffith translates it as “the fury of the *DAsa*”). Finally, in the erotic Rg-Vedic hymn 4:179, verse 6, where Agastya, in doing the needful with his wife Lopamudra to obtain progeny, is said to satisfy “both *varNas*”, this is understood by some as referring quite plainly to the two families of husband and wife, who rejoice in the arrival of a grandchild. Since the hymn mentions the conflict between sexuality and asceticism, others interpret it as meaning “both paths (of worldliness and world-renunciation)”. At any rate, there is simply no question of reading a racist meaning into it.

Nevertheless, for the sake of argument, let us assume that some of the above references to “colour” or “blackness” are really about dark-skinned neighbouring tribes. That would still not prove that the lighter-skinned people were invaders. At the same latitude and in essentially the same climate, the people of Mesopotamia are predominantly white; the presence of whitish people in northwestern India can be explained by the same factors as their presence in Mesopotamia, and does not require an invasion. Nor would it prove that the Vedic Aryans were racists: there is not the slightest hint anywhere in the vast Vedic literature that “dark-skinned” tribes were treated as enemies *because of* their skin colour, that there existed a doctrine of inequality by skin colour. It is only said that these “demons” disrupted the worship of the gods, so that the Aryans had to defend their culture against them.

When read in their specific Vedic contexts, the terms which we have just discussed do not fit the “white Aryans attack black *DAsas*” scenario at all. Most conflicts hinted at in the Vedas and described in the Puranas are between different Aryan tribes and kings. A closer reading of the ancientmost Indian writings reveals a total absence of any immigration stories. In fact, even if there had been mention of a struggle between “whites” and “blacks”, this would still not be proof of an immigration. From Pashtunistan and Kashmir southeastwards, skin colour changes fast from nearly white to nearly black; to a race-conscious observer, a war between two tribes could therefore easily look like a war between “whites” and “blacks”, even when neither tribe had invaded the Indian subcontinent from outside.

Footnotes:

⁶⁵Dr. B.R. Ambedkar: *Writings and Speeches*, vol.1, p.16-22 (from his *Caste in India*), p.49 (from his *Annihilation of Caste*); p.74-85 (from his *Who Were the Shudras?*), p.301-303 (from his *The Untouchables*). I have discussed these passages in K. Elst: *Dr. Ambedkar, a True Aryan*, Voice of India, Delhi 1994, p.15-23.

⁶⁶V.S. Pathak: "Semantics of Arya: Its Historical Implications", in S.B. Deo and Suryanath Kamath: *The Aryan Problem*, p.86-99; S. Talageri: *Aryan Invasion Theory*, p.226-254.

⁶⁷See V.S. Pathak: "Semantics of Arya", in Deo & Kamath, *The Aryan Problem*, p.91-95.

⁶⁸This is admitted in so many words by Sir Monier-Williams in his *A Sanskrit-English Dictionary*, entry *tvac*. Reference is to Rg Veda 1:92:5 and 4:51:9.

⁶⁹As pointed out by Dr. Ambedkar: *Writings and Speeches*, vol.7, p.82. It should be kept in mind that gods were primarily identified with stars and their "lustre".

4. Miscellaneous aspects of the Aryan invasion debate

4.9. THE EVIDENCE FROM PHYSICAL ANTHROPOLOGY

4.9.1. Continuity between castes

Half a century ago, Dr. Ambedkar surveyed the existing data on the physical anthropology of the different castes in his book *The Untouchables*. He found that the received wisdom of a racial basis of caste was not supported by the data, e.g.: “The table for Bengal shows that the Chandal who stands sixth in the scheme of social precedence and whose touch pollutes, is not much differentiated from the Brahmin (...) In Bombay the Deshastha Brahmin bears a closer affinity to the Son-Koli, a fisherman caste, than to his own compeer, the Chitpavan Brahmin. The Mahar, the Untouchable of the Maratha region, comes next together with the Kunbi, the peasant. They follow in order the Shenvi Brahmin, the Nagar Brahmin and the high-caste Maratha. These results (...) mean that there is no correspondence between social gradation and physical differentiation in Bombay.”⁷⁰

A remarkable case of differentiation in skull and nose indexes, noted by Dr. Ambedkar, was found to exist between the Brahmin and the (untouchable) Chamar of Uttar Pradesh.⁷¹ But this does not prove that Brahmins are foreigners, because the data for the U.P. Brahmin were found to be very close to those for the Khattri and the untouchable Chuhra of Panjab. If the U.P. Brahmin is indeed “foreign” to U.P., he is by no means foreign to India, at least not more than the Panjab untouchables. This confirms the scenario which we can derive from the Vedic and *ItihAsa-PurANa* literature: the Vedic tradition was brought east from the Vedic heartland by Brahmins who were physically indistinguishable from the lower castes there, when the heartland in Panjab-Haryana at its apogee exported its culture to the whole Aryavarta (comparable to the planned importation of Brahmins into Bengal and the South around the turn of the Christian era). These were just two of the numerous intra-Indian migrations of caste groups.

Recent research has not refuted Ambedkar’s views. A press report on a recent anthropological survey led by Kumar Suresh Singh explains: “English anthropologists contended that the upper castes of India belonged to the Caucasian race and the rest drew their origin from Australoid types. The survey has revealed this to be a myth. ‘Biologically and linguistically, we are very mixed’, says Suresh Singh (...) The report says that the people of India have more genes in common, and also share a large number of morphological traits. ‘There is much greater homogenization in terms of morphological and genetic traits at the regional level’, says the report. For example, the Brahmins of Tamil Nadu (esp. Iyengars) share more traits with non-Brahmins in the state than with fellow Brahmins in western or northern India. (...) The sons-of-the-soil theory also stands demolished. The Anthropological Survey of India has found no community in India that can’t remember having migrated from some other part of the country.”⁷² Internal migration accounts for much of India’s complex ethnic landscape, while there is no evidence of a separate or foreign origin for the upper castes.

Among other scientists who reject the identification of caste (*varNa*) with race on physical-anthropological grounds, we may cite Kailash C. Malhotra:

“Detailed anthropometric surveys carried out among the people of Uttar Pradesh, Gujarat, Maharashtra, Bengal and Tamil Nadu revealed significant regional differences within a caste and a closer resemblance between castes of different varnas within a region than between sub-populations of the caste from different regions. On the basis of analysis of stature, cephalic and

nasal index, H.K. Rakshit (1966) concludes that 'the Brahmins of India are heterogeneous and suggest incorporation of more than one physical type involving more than one migration of people'.

"A more detailed study among eight Brahmin castes in Maharashtra on whom 18 metric, 16 scopic and 8 genetic markers were studied, revealed not only a great heterogeneity in both morphological and genetic characteristics but also showed that 3 Brahmin castes were closer to non-Brahmin castes than [to the] other Brahmin castes. P.P. Majumdar and K.C. Malhotra (1974) observed a great deal of heterogeneity with respect to OAB blood group system among 50 Brahmin samples spread over 11 Indian states. The evidence thus suggests that varna is a sociological and not a homogeneous biological entity."⁷³

4.9.2 Family traits

This general rejection of the racial basis of caste does not exclude that specific castes stand out in their environment by their phenotypical or genotypical characteristics. Firstly, any group that goes on breeding endogamously for generations will have "family traits" recognizable to the regular and sharp observer, at least to a statistically significant extent. This does not mean that these family traits (rarely distinctive enough to be called "racial" traits) are in any way the *reason why* one caste refuses to intermarry with another caste, as you would have in the case of racial discrimination.

Secondly, intra-Indian migrations have taken place so that certain caste groups stand out by retaining the physical characteristics of their source region's population for quite a few generations. Thus, the Muslim invasions chased some Rajput castes from western India to the Nepalese borderland, and some Saraswat Brahmins from Kashmir to the Konkan region; geneticists ought to be able to find traces of that history.

It is well-known that the Brahmin communities of Bengal and South India originated in the physical importation of Brahmin families by kings who sought accession to the prestigious Vedic civilization and wanted to give extra religious legitimacy to their thrones. These Brahmin families were brought in from northwestern India where, for obvious geographical reason, people are whiter and closer to the European physical type than in Bengal or the South. (Even so, due to intermarriage and the incorporation of local priesthoods, numerous Brahmins in South India are simply black.) Apart from Brahmins, numerous other caste groups throughout India have histories of immigration, putting them in environments where they differed in genetic profile from their neighbours, e.g. the Dravidian-speaking Oraon tribals of Chotanagpur recall having migrated from Maharashtra along the Narmada river.

The Chitpavan Brahmins of Maharashtra are often mentioned as a caste that stands out by its physical type. Their slightly more "Nordic" build and the occurrence of blue eyes among them look like the perfect evidence for the theory that the Brahmins are the descendents of the Nordic Aryans who invaded India in 1500 BC. In fact, it is only during the initial Islamic onslaught that the Chitpavans migrated from the Afghan borderland to their present habitat.

Nevertheless, the Chitpavan case shows that sometimes, such distinctive family traits do coincide with the difference between the higher or lower incidence of the distinctive traits of the white race, esp. the low pigmentation of the skin or, in this case, the eyes. The difference between castes can in some cases be expressed in terms of the respective distances between their average characteristics and those of the European type. And this is only to be expected given the basic fact that India is a large country with great variation in physical type and lying in the border zone between the major races. The rich biological variety in the Indian chapter of the human species is due to many factors, but so far the Aryan invasion has not been shown to be one of them.

4.9.3. Mixing of castes

The genetic differential between castes has recently been confirmed in a survey in the southern state of Andhra Pradesh.⁷⁴ The main finding of the survey, conducted by human-geneticists Lynn B. Jorde (University of Utah) and Bhaskara B. Rao and J.M. Naidu (both with Andhra University), concerned the role of inter-caste marriages: men stay in their castes, while women sometimes go and live with a man from another, mostly higher caste. In spite of the definition of caste as an “endogamous group”, the fact is that there has always been a marginal mixing of castes as well. Likewise, even outside the marital framework, upper-class employers (in *any* society) have made passes at their maid-servants, while prostitutes got impregnated by their higher-class clients, all producing mixed offspring.

Factoring all these marginal mixed-caste births in, the cumulative effect over centuries is that the castes have mixed much more than the theory of caste would lead you to expect. Over many generations, this mixing had to lead to a thorough genetic kinship even between castes of very divergent origins. Given these known sociological facts, the scientists naturally found that genetic traits in the male line (Y chromosome) are stable, those in the female line (mitochondrial DNA) considerably less so. Because inter-caste marriages are mostly between “neighbouring” castes in the hierarchy, the genetic distance between highest and lowest is about one and a half times greater than that between high and middle or between middle and low.

However, none of this requires a policy of racial discrimination nor an Aryan invasion into India: the known history of internal migrations and the general facts about relations between higher and lower classes in all societies can easily account for it.⁷⁵ Moreover, the observed differences between Indian communities are much smaller than those between Indians collectively and Europeans (or Africans etc.) collectively. A provisional table of the genetic distance between populations shows that North-Indians and South-Indians are indeed very close, much closer than “Aryan” North-Indians and “Aryan” Iranians are to each other.⁷⁶

Both sides in the debate should realize that this evidence can cut both ways. If an Aryan or other invasion is assumed, this evidence shows that all castes are biologically the progeny of both invaders and natives, though perhaps in different proportions. Conversely, if the genetic distance between two castes is small, this still leaves open the possibility that the castes or their communal identities can nonetheless have divergent origins, even foreign versus native, although these are obscured to the geneticist by centuries of caste mixing.

4.9.4. Tribals and “Caucasians”

The one important general difference between two parts of the population is that between a number of tribes on the one hand, and some other tribes plus the non-tribals on the other. V. Bhalla’s mapping of genetic traits shows that the latter category roughly belongs to the Mediterranean subgroup of the *Caucasian* race (though by the superficial criterion of skin colour, it can differ widely from the type found in Italy or Greece). incidentally, the term Caucasian as meaning the white race was coined in 1795 by the German scientist Johann Friedrich Blumenbach, who believed that the Caucasus region, particularly Georgia, “produces the most beautiful human race”, and that it was the most likely habitat of “the autochthonous, most original forms of mankind”.⁷⁷ Thus, the typically Caucasian Rhesus-negative factor is “conspicuous by its absence” in the Mongoloid populations of India’s northeast, but the non-tribal populations “show a moderately high frequency of 15% to 20% but not as high as in Europe” of this genetic trait.⁷⁸

Bhalla lists a number of specific genes which are characteristically strong or weak in given racial types, and finds that they do define certain ethnic sub-groups of India, esp. the Mongoloid tribals of the northeast, the Negritos of the Andaman Islands, and the Australoids in the remaining tribal pockets of the south. Everywhere else, including in many tribal areas, the Mediterranean type is

predominant, but the present battery of genetic markers was not able to distinguish between subtypes within this population, much less to indicate different waves of entry.

In fact, no “entry” of these Mediterranean Caucasians can be derived from the data, certainly not for the post-Harappan period. According to an older study, they were present even in South India in 2,000 BC at the latest: “The evidence of two racial types, the Mediterranean and the Autochthonous proto-Australoid, recognized in the study of the skeletal remains from the neolithic levels at Brahmagiri, Piklihal, Tekkalakota, Nevasa etc., seems to suggest that there was a thick population consisting mainly of these two races in South India around 2000 BC.”⁷⁹

The Caucasian race was present in India (like in Europe and the Kurgan area) since hoary antiquity. Kailash Malhotra reports, starting with their geographical spread today: “The Caucasoids are found practically all over the country, though the preferred habitats have been river valleys and plains.”⁸⁰

In the past, the Caucasian presence was also in evidence: “Although a large number of prehistoric sites have been excavated in India, only a few of them have yielded human osseous remains (...) None of the pre-Mesolithic sites have yielded skeletal material; the earliest remains are around 8,000 years old. An examination of the morphological features of skeletons from sites of the Mesolithic, Neolithic, Chalcolithic and iron age periods reveals the presence of Australoids and Caucasoids in all the periods, the absence of Mongoloids, and the existence of at least two types of Caucasoids, the dolichocephals and the brachycephals (...) The skeletal evidence thus clearly establishes the presence of Australoids and Caucasoids in India for at least 8,000 years.”⁸¹

All that can be said, is that the population of India’s northeast is akin to that of areas to India’s north and east, that of the southeast to that of countries further southeast, and the bulk of the Indian population to that of areas to India’s west. Probably a large demographic expansion from India’s northwest to the east and south took place during and at the end of the Harappan period (2,000 BC). It is logical to infer that the populations of the Mediterranean type were more concentrated in the northwest prior to that time; but it does not follow that they came from the outside. India’s northwest simply happened to be the easternmost area of Caucasian habitation, just like India’s northeast happens to be the frontier of the Mongoloid type’s habitat.

For politically correct support in denying the racial divide between tribals and non-tribals, we may cite the Marxist scholar S.K. Chatterjee, who dismissed the notion of distinct races in India, be they Aryan, Dravidian, Mongoloid or Austro-Asiatic. He called the Indian people a “mixed people, in blood, in speech and in culture”.⁸²

Though the Christian missionaries have been the champions of tribal distinctness, Christian author P.A. Augustine writes about the Bhil tribals: “The Bhils have long ceased to be a homogeneous people. In the course of millennia, various elements have fused to shape the community. During their long and tortuous history, other aboriginal groups which came under their sway have probably merged with them, losing their identity. One can see a wide range of physical types and complexion. The variation in complexion is very striking indeed, ranging between fair to quite dark-skinned (...) There is no consensus among scholars on the exact ethnic character of the Bhils, They have been alternatively described as proto-Australoid, Dravidian or Veddoid.”⁸³ The same racial “impurity” counts for most Indians, tribal as well as non-tribal. While not by itself disproving the Aryan invasion, it should prove even to invasionists that all Indians are descendents of both indigenous and so-called invader populations.

4.9.5. Language and genetics

While it is wrong to identify a speech community with a physical type, it is also wrong to discard physical anthropology completely as a source of information on human migrations in pre-literate times. Lately, findings have been published which suggest that, for all the racial mingling that has taken place, there is still a broad statistical correlation between certain physical characteristics and nations, even language groups.

Thus, the percentage of individuals with the Rhesus-negative factor is the highest (over 25%) among the Basques, a nation in the French-Spanish borderland which has preserved a pre-IE language. Other pockets of high incidence of Rh-neg. (which is nearly non-existent among the Bantus, Austroloids and Mongoloids) are in the same part of the world: western Morocco, Scotland and, strangely, the Baltic area, or apparently those backwater regions least affected by immigrations of the first Neolithic farmers (from the Balkans and Anatolia), the Indo-Europeans, and in Morocco also the Arabs.

Another European nation which stands out, at least to the discerning eye of the population geneticist, is the Sami (Lapp) population of northern Scandinavia: when contrasted genetically with the surrounding populations, the Sami genetic make-up "points to kinship with the peoples of North Siberia" even though they now resemble the Europeans more than the native Siberians.⁸⁴ This confirms the suspicion of an Asian origin for the Uralic-speaking peoples of which the Sami people is one.

Where a small group of people have spread out over a vast area and lived in isolation ever since, as has happened in large parts of America in the past 20,000 years, genetic differentiation and linguistic differentiation have gone hand in hand, and the borderline between genetic types usually coincides with a linguistic borderline: "Joseph Greenberg distinguishes three language families among the Native Americans: Amerind, Na-Dene and Eskimo-Aleut. (...) According to Christy Turner of Arizona University, Native American dental morphology indicates three groups, which coincide with Greenberg's. Luigi Cavalli-Sforza from Stanford investigated a variegated set of human genes. His results equally point in the direction of Greenberg's classification."⁸⁵

Linguistic difference between populations may coincide with genetic differences; and likewise, linguistic mixing may coincide with genetic mixing. A perfect illustration is provided by Nelson Mandela, leader of the anti-Apartheid struggle and belonging to the Xhosa nation. His facial features are more *Khoi* (Hottentot) than Bantu, and his language, Xhosa, happens to be a Bantu language strongly influenced by the Khoi-San (Hottentot-Bushman) languages, most strikingly by adopting the click sounds. In this case, genetic mixing and linguistic mixing have gone hand in hand.

However, in and around the area of IE expansion, a notorious crossroads of migrating peoples, the remaining statistical correlation between genetic traits and language groups is less important than the evidence for the opposite phenomenon: languages spreading across genetic frontiers. In India, the only neat racial division which coincides with a linguistic borderline is between the mainland and the Andamans: though so-called Negrito features are dimly visible in the population of Orissa and surrounding areas, the pure Negrito type is confined to the Andamans, along with the Andamanese language group. For the rest, in India, like in Central Asia or Europe, i.e. in areas with lots of migration and interaction between diverse peoples, genetic and linguistic divisions only coincide by exception.

Thus, the Altaic languages are spoken by the Mongolians, eponymous members of the Mongoloid race, and by the Turks, who have mixed so thoroughly with their Persian, Armenian, Greek and Slavic neighbours that they now belong to the Caucasian race. The Hungarians are genetically closer to their Slavic and German neighbours than to their linguistic cousins in the

Urals. India being the meeting-place (or rather, mixing-place) of Mongoloid, Caucasian and Austroloid racial strands, it is naturally impossible to identify the speakers of the different Indian language-groups with different races.

Asked whether there are “concordances between genetic data and languages”, L.L. Cavalli-Sforza, the world’s leading population geneticist, explains: “Yes, very much so. Our genealogical tree [of genetic traits] corresponds remarkably well with the table of linguistic families. There are a few exceptions e.g. the Lapps, genetically rather European, have preserved the language they spoke in their Siberian-Uralic homeland. The Hungarians, similarly, speak an Uralic language while being predominantly European. In the late 9th century AD, the Magyar invaders in Hungary, then called Pannonia, imposed their language on the natives. (...) What counts from a genetic viewpoint, is the number of invaders relative to the natives. As the Hungarians were not very numerous, they left only a feeble genetic imprint on the population.”⁸⁶ So, the replacement of native languages by those of less civilized but stronger invaders is a real possibility (it is also what the Greeks did to the Old Europeans), though it becomes less probable in proportion to the size and the cultural superiority of the native population.

The reason why the replacement of native languages by the languages of genetically distinguishable invaders remains relatively exceptional, is this: “In a traditional culture, language is transmitted vertically from parents to children, just like the genes. But in some conquests or in civilizations with schools, there is also horizontal transmission and substitution of languages. The Romans organized schools in their part of Europe and thereby managed to replace the native languages by their own. But this type of phenomenon is relatively recent. In 90% of its history, mankind consisted of hunter-gatherers speaking tribal languages. That is why the genetic tree has preserved a strong concordance with the linguistic tree.”⁸⁷

A typical example are the Basques: “The Basque language is the direct descendent of a language which must have arrived along with modern mankind, say 30,000 years ago. It is [in Europe] the only pre-Indo-European language which has been preserved. Why? Probably because the Basque people had a very strong social cohesion. Genetically too, the Basques are different. They have mixed very little. All the other *Europeans have lost their original language and adopted an Indo-European language.*”⁸⁸

So, the Basques are both biologically and linguistically the straight descendants of Old Europeans. Most other Europeans are biologically the progeny of the non-IE-speaking Old Europeans, with some admixture of the Asian tribes who originally brought the IE languages into Europe. These immigrants may have differed somewhat from the average European type, into which their smaller number got genetically drowned over the centuries. Linguistically, most non-Basque (and non-Uralic) Europeans are the progeny, through adoption, of the IE-speaking invaders.

4.9.6. The original “Aryan race”

Is there anything we can say about the ethnic identity of the nomads or migrants who spread the early IE languages, if only to help physical-anthropologists to recognize them when found at archaeological sites? Competent authorities have warned against the “semi-conscious prejudices on original genetic characteristics of the Indo-Europeans: they are supposed to be blond and blue-eyed”.⁸⁹ This prejudice has even been reinforced recently by the discovery of blond-haired mummies of presumably IE-speaking people in the Xinjiang province of China.⁹⁰

The fact that the IE speech community includes people of diverse race, from the dark-skinned Sinhalese to the white-skinned Scandinavians, definitely implies that the spread of the language cannot be equated with the spread of a racial type. Languages can and do migrate across racial

boundaries. That the IE languages crossed racial frontiers during their expansion accords well with established perspectives on the spread of IE, e.g. by I.M. Diakonov:

“These expanding tribes met local, poor and hungry sparser populations, often consisting of hunters and cattle-breeders. The migrants started to merge with the local population, giving them their language and cultural achievements. But in some cases, the local population may have been larger in numbers than the migrants. In some historical situations the language of the minority, if it was widely used and understandable on a vast territory, could be accepted as *lingua franca*, and later as the common language, particularly if it was a language of cattle-breeders (cf. the examples of the Semites and the Turks). The area of the newly created population became itself a centre of population spread, and so on. Bloody conquests could take place in some instances; in others it was not the case, but the important thing to realize is that what migrated were languages, not peoples, although there had to be at least a handful of users of the languages, though not necessarily native speakers.”⁹¹

On the other hand, the fact that the PIE-speaking community must have been a fairly small ethnic group, living together and marrying mostly within the community, implies that they must have belonged collectively to a fairly precisely circumscribed physical type. Even if you throw together people from all races, after a few generations of interbreeding they will develop a common and distinctive physical type, with atavistic births of people resembling the pure type of one of the ancestral races becoming rarer and rarer. Therefore, in the days before intercontinental travel and migrations, a speech community was normally also a kinship group (or, in strict caste societies, a conglomerate of kinship groups) presenting a fairly homogeneous physical type.

During the heyday of the racial theories, a handful of words in Greek sources were taken to mean that the ancient Indo-Europeans were fair-haired and had a tall Nordic-looking build. In Homer's description, the Greek heroes besieging Troy were fair-haired. The Egyptians described the “Sea Peoples” from the Aegean region (and even their Libyan co-invaders, presumably Berber-speaking) as fair-haired. The Chinese described the Western (Tokharic) barbarians likewise.

However, the incidence of Nordic looks was not necessarily overwhelming. In classical Greek writings, the Thracians and Macedonians (most notably Alexander the Great), whose language belonged to an extinct Balkanic branch of the IE family, are mentioned as being fair-haired; apparently most Greeks were by then dark enough to notice this fair colour as a trait typical of their “barbaric” northern neighbours. The Armenians have a legend of their own king *Ara the Blond* and his eventful personal relationship with the Assyrian queen Sammuamat/Semiramis (about 810 BC), who is known to have fought *Urtu* (the pre-IE name of Armenia, preserved in the Biblical mountain name *Ararat*). The use of “the blond” as a distinctive epithet confirms the existence of fair-haired people in Armenia, but also their conspicuousness and relative rarity.

All this testimony, along with the Xinjiang mummies and the presence of Nordic looks in the IE-speaking (Dardic/Kafiri) tribes in the Subcontinent's northwestern valleys, does suggest a long-standing association between some branches of the IE family and the genes which program their carriers to have fair hair and blue eyes. These traits give a comparative advantage for survival in cold latitudes: just as melanine protects against the excessive intake of ultraviolet rays in sunny latitudes, lack of melanine favours the intake of ultraviolet. This segment of the sunrays is needed in the production of vitamin D, which in turn is needed in shaping the bones; its deficiency causes rachitis and makes it difficult for women to birth - a decisive handicap in the struggle for life. The link between northern latitudes and the light colour of skin, hair and eyes in many IE-speaking communities only proves what we already knew: IE is spoken in fairly northern latitudes including Europe and Central Asia. Yet, none of this proves the fair-haired and blue-eyed point about the speakers of the original proto-language PIE.

Suppose, with the non-invasion theorists, that the original speakers of IE had been Indians with dark eyes and dark hair; then, according to I.M. Diakonov: “if this population had migrated

together with the languages, blue-eyed Balts could not have originated from it. Blue eyes, as a recessive characteristic, are met everywhere from Europe to the Hindu Kush. But nobody can be blue-eyed if neither of his/her parents had blue-eyed ancestors, and a predominantly blue-eyed population cannot originate from ancestors with predominantly black eyes.”⁹²

This allows for two possible scenarios. Either the PIE speakers were indeed blue-eyed and fair-haired: that is the old explanation, preferred by the Nazis.⁹³ Or the blue-eyed people of Europe have not inherited their IE languages from their biological ancestors, but changed language at some point along the genealogical line, abandoning the pre-IE Old European language of their fair ancestors in favour of Proto-Germanic, Proto-Baltic, Proto-Slavic etc., based on the language of the invaders from Asia. The latter scenario would agree with I.M. Diakonov’s observation: “The biological situation among the speakers of modern Indo-European languages can only be explained through a transfer of languages like a baton, as it were, in a relay race, but not by several thousand miles’ migration of the tribes themselves.”⁹⁴

That this is far from impossible is demonstrated by the Turks who, after centuries of mixing with subdued natives of West Asia and the Balkans, have effectively crossed the racial borderline from yellow to white. But against using this Turkish scenario as a simile for the story of IE dispersal, one could point out that some eastern Turkic people, such as the Kirghiz and the Yakut, are still very much Mongoloids. However, far from forming a contrast with the IE state of affairs, this makes the simile more splendid: if IE spread from a non-white to a white population, it also remained the language of numerous non-whites (though technically “Caucasians”), viz. the Indians. On the Eurasian continent, South-Asians still constitute more than half of the wider IE speech community; the Indian Republic alone has more IE speakers than the whole of Europe.

It is perfectly possible that the PIE language and culture were developed after a non-white group of colonists from elsewhere settled among and got racially immersed in a larger whitish population. As we saw in our speculations about IE-Austronesian kinship and about Puranic history, it is at least conceivable that Aryan culture in India started after “Manu” and his dark-skinned cohorts fled the rising sea level by moving up the Ganga and settling high and dry in the upper Ganga basin, whence their progeny conquered areas to the northwest with ever whiter-skinned and lighter-haired populations: the Saraswati basin, the upper Indus basin, the Oxus riverside, the peri-Caspian region. By the time these Indian colonists settled in eastern Europe with their Kurgans, their blackness had been washed off by generations of intermarriage with white people of the type attested by the Xinjiang mummies. (Likewise, their material culture had been thoroughly adapted to their new habitat, hence de-indianized.)

So, it is perfectly possible that the Aryan heartland lay farther to the southeast, and that, like eastern Europe in the later 5th millennium BC, the Panjab area a few centuries earlier was already a first area of colonization, bringing people of a new and whiter physical type into the expanding Aryan speech community which was originally darker. While the Panjabi is physically very similar to the European, the Bihari, Oriya or Nepali is markedly less so, and yet it is possible that he represents more closely the ultimate Proto-Indo-European.

4.9.7. The race of the Vedic Aryans

As for the Vedas, the only ones whom they describe as “golden-haired” are the resplendent lightning gods Indra and Rudra and the sun-god Savitar; not the Aryans or Brahmins. At the same time, several passages explicitly mention black hair when referring to Brahmins.⁹⁵ These texts are considerably earlier than the enigmatic passage in Patanjali describing Brahmins as golden- or tawny-haired (*piNgala* and *kapisha*).⁹⁶ Already one of Patanjali’s early commentators dismissed this line as absurd. To the passage from the grammarian Panini which describes Brahmins as “brown-haired”, A.A. Macdonnell notes (apparently against contemporary claims to the contrary): “All we can say is that the above-mentioned expressions do not give evidence of blonde characteristics of the ancient Brahmins.”⁹⁷ Considering that Patanjali was elaborating

upon the work of Panini, could it have anything to do with Panini's location in the far northwest, where lighter hair must have been fairly common?

On the other hand, demons or *Rakshasas*, so often equated with the "dark-skinned aboriginals", have on occasion been described as red- or tawny-haired (also *piNgala* or *kapisha*, the same as Patanjali's Brahmins).⁹⁸ Deviating from the usual Indian line that all these demon creatures are but supernatural entities, let us for once assume that they do represent hostile tribals racially distinct from the Vedic Aryans. In that case, reference can only be to certain northwestern tribals, among whom fair and red hair are found till today, indicating that they at least partly descended from a fair-haired population. If the Vedic Aryans were dark-haired and migrated from inside India to the northwest, these odd coloured hairs may have struck them as distinctive.

In modern Anglo-Hindu publications, such as the *Amar Chitra Katha* religious comics, *Rakshasas* are always depicted as dark-skinned, a faithful application of the AIT. Yet, there are instances in Vedic literature where "blackness" is imputed to people whom we know to have had the same (if not a lighter) skin colour than the Vedic Aryans: the *Dasas* and *Dasyus*, as Asko Parpola has shown, were the Iranian cousins and neighbours of the Vedic Aryans. Physical (as opposed to metaphorical) blackness or more generally skin colour was never a criterion by which the Vedic Aryans classified their neighbours and enemies; that precisely is why we have no direct testimony on the Vedic Aryans' own skin or hair colour except through a few ambiguous, indirect and passing references.

4.9.8. Evidence of immigration?

A very recent study, not on crude skull types but on the far more precise genetic traits, confirms the absence of an immigration from Central Asia in the second millennium BC. Brian E. Hemphill and Alexander F. Christensen report on their study of the migration of genetic traits (with reference to AIT advocate Asko Parpola): "Parpola's suggestion of movement of Proto-Rg-Vedic Aryan speakers into the Indus Valley by 1800 BC is not supported by our data. Gene flow from Bactria occurs much later, and does not impact Indus Valley gene pools until the dawn of the Christian era."⁹⁹ The inflow which they do find, around the turn of the Christian era, is apparently that of the well-known Shaka and Kushana invasions.

Kenneth A.R. Kennedy reaches similar conclusions from his physical-anthropological data: "Evidence of demographic discontinuities is present in our study, but the first occurs between 6000 and 4500 BC (a separation of the Neolithic and Chalcolithic populations of Mehrgarh) and the second is after 800 BC, the discontinuity being between the peoples of Harappa, Chalcolithic Mehrgarh and post-Harappan Timargarha on the one hand and the late Bronze Age and early Iron Age inhabitants of Sarai Khola on the other. In short, there is no evidence of demographic disruptions in the northwestern sector of the subcontinent during and immediately after the decline of the Harappan culture. If Vedic Aryans were a biological entity represented by the skeletons from Timargarha, then their biological features of cranial and dental anatomy were not distinct to a marked degree from what we encountered in the ancient Harappans."¹⁰⁰

Kennedy also notes the anthropological continuity between the Harappan population and that of the contemporaneous Gandhara (eastern Afghanistan)¹⁰¹ culture, which in an Aryan invasion scenario should be the Indo-Aryan settlement just prior to the Aryan invasion of India: "Our multivariate approach does not define the biological identity of an ancient Aryan population, but it does indicate that the Indus Valley and Gandhara peoples shared a number of craniometric, odontometric and discrete traits that point to a high degree of biological affinity."¹⁰²

And so, Sir Mortimer Wheeler, one of the great pioneers of the AIT, may be right after all. Indeed, even he had remarked that "the anthropologists who have recently described the skeletons from Harappa remark that there, as at Lothal, the population would appear, on the available evidence,

to have remained more or less stable to the present day.”¹⁰³ If anything Aryan really invaded, it was at any rate not an Aryan race.

There are no indications that the racial composition and distribution of the Indian population has substantially changed since the start of the IE dispersal, which cannot reasonably be placed much earlier than 6,000 BC. This means that even if the IE *language* is imported, as claimed by the AIT, the IE-speaking people in India are nevertheless biologically native to India. Or in practice: the use of the terms “aboriginal” and “indigenous” (*AdivAsI*) as designating India’s tribals, with the implication that the non-tribals are the non-indigenous progeny of invaders, has to be rejected and terminated, *even* if the Urheimat of the IE languages is found to lie outside India.

One of the ironies of Indian identity politics is that those most vocal in claiming an “aboriginal” identity may well be the only ones whose foreign origin has been securely established. The Adivasi movement is strongest in the areas where Christian missionaries were numerous present since the mid-19th century to nourish it, viz. in Chotanagpur and the North-East. Most tribals there speak languages belonging to the Austro-Asiatic and Sino-Tibetan families. Their geographical origin, unlike that of IE which is still being debated, is definitely outside India, viz. in Southeast Asia c.q. in northern China.

The Tibeto-Burmese tribals of Nagaland and other northeastern statelets are among India’s most recent immigrants. Many of those tribes have entered during the last millennium, which is very late by Indian standards. As for the Munda tribes in Chotanagpur, it is not even certain that the ancestors of the present tribes are the authors of the attested Neolithic cultures in their present habitat. In H.D. Sankalia’s words: “It is an *unanswered* but interesting question whether any of the Aboriginal tribes of these regions were the authors of the Neolithic culture.”¹⁰⁴ Those who want to give the Austro-Asiatic peoples of India a proud heritage, will find more of it in China and Indochina than in India, e.g. in the Bronze age culture of 2300 BC in Thailand.

On the other hand, biologically the Indian Austro-Asiatics (unlike the Nagas) are much closer to the other Indians than to their linguistic cousins in the east. Exactly like the Indo-Aryans in the Aryan invasion hypothesis, they are predominantly Indian people speaking a foreign-originated language: “Whereas the now Dravidian-speaking tribals of Central and South India can be considered to be descendents of the original inhabitants of India, who gave up their original languages in favour of Dravidian, Tibeto-Chinese speaking tribals (Northeast India) and Austro-Asiatic speaking ones (East India) immigrated into India since ancient historical times. Most likely they came in several waves from Southern China (Tibeto-Chinese speakers) and from Southeast Asia (Austro-Asiatic speakers) respectively. Without doubt these immigrating groups met with ancient Indian populations, which were living already on their migration routes, and thus one cannot exclude some cultural and also genetic contacts between immigrants and original inhabitants of India, at least at some places.”¹⁰⁵

In the case of Indo-Aryan, by contrast, its speakers have obviously also mixed with other communities, but its foreign origin has not been firmly established.

4.9.9. Conclusion

We may conclude with a recent *status quaestionis* by archaeologist Jonathan Mark Kenoyer of Wisconsin University at Madison: “Although the overall socioeconomic organization changed, continuities in technology, subsistence practices, settlement organization, and some regional symbols show that the indigenous population was not displaced by invading hordes of Indo-Aryan speaking people. For many years, the ‘invasions’ or ‘migrations’ of these Indo-Aryan-speaking Vedic/Aryan tribes explained the decline of the Indus civilization and the sudden rise of urbanization in the Ganga-Yamuna valley. This was based on simplistic models of culture change and an uncritical reading of Vedic texts. Current evidence does not support a pre- or

proto-historic Indo-Aryan invasion of southern Asia. Instead, there was an overlap between Late Harappan and post-Harappan communities, with no biological evidence for major new populations.”¹⁰⁶

We repeat that physical anthropology is going through rapid developments due to the availability of new techniques, and we don't want to jump to conclusions in this moving field. But we notice that whatever new technique is applied and from whichever new angle the question is approached, it has so far consistently failed to yield evidence of the fabled Aryan Invasion..

Footnotes:

⁷⁰Dr. Ambedkar: *Writings and Speeches*, vol.7, p.301.

⁷¹Dr. Ambedkar: *Writings and Speeches*, vol.7, p.301, with reference to G.S. Ghurye: *Caste and Race on India*, London 1932.

⁷²N.V. Subramaniam: “The way we are. An ASI project shatters some entrenched myths”, *Sunday*, 10-4-1994.

⁷³K.C. Malhotra: “Biological Dimensions to Ethnicity and caste in India”, in K.S. Singh: *Ethnicity, Caste and People*, Manohar, Delhi 1992, p.65. Reference is to H.K. Rakshit: “An Anthropometric Study of the Brahmins of India”, in *Man in India* #46; and P.P. Majumdar & K.C. Malhotra: *OAB Dynamics in India: A Statistical Study*, Calcutta 1974.

⁷⁴Pallava Bagla: “Study shows caste system has changed genetic makeup of Hindus. Studying 200 men in AP, Indo-US team finds that lower castes have over the years become ‘genetically different’ from upper castes”, *Indian Express*, 18-10-1998. See also the subsequent critical editorial: “Questionable enterprises. DNA and caste can make a deadly combination”, *Indian Express*, 22-10-1998, which points out that the study merely confirm what observers of caste relations had known all along.

⁷⁵Thus, Kancha Ilaiah (*Why I Am Not a Hindu*, Samya/Bhatkal & Sen, Calcutta 1996) offers a description of the differences in life style between upper castes and Shudras, with the declared intention of getting the reader indignant at the injustice and absurdity of the typically Hindu caste system. Yet, his testimony unwittingly shows just how similar Hindu caste inequality is to the social inequality in other societies, e.g. Ilaiah’s repeated observation that women are more controlled in upper castes and more assertive and free in lower castes is or was just as true for Confucian China or the feudal and bourgeois societies of Europe.

⁷⁶Luigi Luca Cavalli-Sforza: “Genes, Peoples and Languages”, *Scientific American*, November 1991.

⁷⁷Quoted in Simon Rozendaal: “Ras - wat is dat eigenlijk?”, *Elsevier*, 14-10-1995.

⁷⁸V. Bhalla: “Aspects of Gene Geography and Ethnic Diversity of the People of India”, in K.S. Singh: *Ethnicity, Caste and People*, P.51-60; specifically p.58.

⁷⁹B. Narasimhaiah: *Neolithic and Megalithic Cultures in Tamil Nadu*, Sundeep Prakashan, Delhi 1980, p.195:

⁸⁰Kailash C. Malhotra: "Biological Dimensions to Ethnicity and Caste in India", in K.S. Singh: *Ethnicity, Caste and People*, p.63.

⁸¹Kailash C. Malhotra: "Biological Dimensions to Ethnicity and Caste in India", in K.S. Singh: *Ethnicity, Caste and People*, p.63.

⁸²S.K. Chatterjee: *Indianism and Indian Synthesis*, Calcutta 1962, p.125.

⁸³P.A. Augustine: *The Bhils of Rajasthan*, Indian Social Institute. Delhi 1986, p. 2-3.

⁸⁴Hilde Van den Eynde: "Genetische kaart van Europa tekent oorlogen en volksverhuizingen", *De Standaard* (Brussels), 20-7-1993.

⁸⁵Hilde Van den Eynde: "Biologen en archaeologen moeten Amerikaanse taalknoop doorhakken", *De Standard* (Brussels), 3-8-1990; see also Joseph H. Greenberg & Merritt Ruhlen: "Linguistic Origins of Native Americans". *Scientific American*, November 1992.

⁸⁶Interview in *Le Nouvel Observateur*, 23-1-1992.

⁸⁷Interview in *Le Nouvel Observateur*, 23-1-1992.

⁸⁸Interview in *Le Nouvel Observateur*, 23-1-1992, emphasis added.

⁸⁹T.V. Gamkrelidze and V.V. Ivanov, in *Journal of Indo-European Studies*, 1985/1-2, p. 182.

⁹⁰See e.g. the fall/winter 1995 issue of *Journal of Indo-European Studies*, almost entirely devoted to the Xinjiang mummies.

⁹¹I.M. Diakonov: "On the Original Home of the Speakers of Indo-European", *Journal of Indo-European Studies*, 1-2/1985, p.92-174, specifically p. 152-153.

⁹²I.M. Diakonov: "On the Original Home of the Speakers of Indo-European", *Journal of Indo-European Studies*, 1-2/1985, p. 153-154.

⁹³Related with details and undisguised favour by Alian de Benoist: *Les Indo-Européens* (*Nouvelle Ecole* no. 49, Paris 1997), p.47.

⁹⁴I.M. Diakonov: "On the Original Home of the Speakers of Indo-European", *Journal of Indo-European Studies*, 1-2/1985, p.153-154.

⁹⁵*Atharva-Veda* 6:137.2-3 is a charm, for making "strong black hairlocks" grow, apparently on the heads of bald or albino or greyed people. Paramesh Choudhury (*The Aryan Hoax*, p. 13) also mentions Baudhayana's Dharma-Sutra 1:2, "Let him kindle the sacrificial fire while his hair is still black", also cited in Shabara's Bhasya on Jaimini 1:33, as instances where Brahmins' hair is off-hand assumed to be black.

⁹⁶Patanjali: Mahabhashya (comment on Panini) 2:2:6.

⁹⁷Quoted from his *A Practical Sanskrit Dictionary* by Paramesh Choudhury: *The Aryan Hoax*, p. 13.

⁹⁸E.g. Mahabharata: Adiparva 223, describes a Rakshasa as red-haired, as pointed out by Paramesh Choudhury: *The Aryan Hoax*, p. 13. He also mentions that Ravana's sister Surpanakha is described by Valmiki as having *pingala* eyes, but remember that Ravana's family is described as a Brahmin family immigrated in Lanka from northern India.

⁹⁹Hemphill & Christensen: "The Oxus Civilization as a Link between East and West: A Non-Metric Analysis of Bronze Age Bactrain Biological Affinities", paper read at the South Asia Conference, 3-5 November 1994, Madison, Wisconsin; p. 13.

¹⁰⁰K.A.R. Kennedy: "Have Aryans been identified in the prehistoric skeletal record from South Asia?", in George Erdosy, ed.: *The Indo-Aryans of Ancient South Asia*, p.49. On p.42, Kennedy quotes the suggestion that "not only the end of the [Harappan] cities but even their initial impetus may have been due to Indo-European speaking peoples", by B. and F.R. Allchin: *The Birth of Indian Civilization*, Penguin 1968, p. 144.

¹⁰¹Note that many scholars assume an (albeit somewhat irregular) etymological kinship between *GandhAra* and the Greek word *Kentauros*, meaning a horse-man. The rough terrain of Afghanistan was unfit for chariot-riding and required horseback-riding. To people from countries unfamiliar with horses (as India must have been in some pre-Vedic age, and as Mesopotamia was until the 2nd millennium BC), horseborne men must have looked like strange creatures with a human head and torso and a equine body; indeed, that is what the Aztecs thought when they first saw Spanish cavalrists. Could the concept of a *kentaur* date back to the early days of horse domestication when the first riders made such an impression on people from a region bordering on Afganistan and whence the Greeks originated?

¹⁰²K.A.R. Kennedy: "Have Aryans been identified in the prehistoric skeletal record from South Asia?", in George Erdosy, ed.: *The Indo-Aryans of Ancient South Asia*, p.49.

¹⁰³M. Wheeler: *The Indus Civilization*, Cambridge University Press 1968, p.72, quoted in K.D. Sethna: *The Problem of Aryan Origins*, Aditya Prakashan, New Delhi 1992 (1980), p.20.

¹⁰⁴H.D. Sankalia: *Indian Archaeology Today*, Delhi 1979, p.22.

¹⁰⁵H. Walter et al.: "Investigations on the variability of blood group polymorphisms among sixteen tribal; populations from Orissa, Madhya Prades and Maharashtra, India", in *Zeitschrift für Morphologie und Anthropologie*, Band 79 Heft 1 (1992).

¹⁰⁶J.M. Kenoyer: "The Indus Valley Tradition of Pakistan and Western India", *Journal of World Prehistory*, 1991/4. Interestingly and fortunately, Kenoyer was until recently misinformed about the political connotations of the Aryan question, as I noticed during a conversation with him on 20 October 1995 in Madison, Wisconsin. Labouring under the assumption that the *Bharatiya Janata Party* is a "fascist" party, proud of Nordic Aryan origins and disdaining the dark-skinned Indian natives, he thought he was taking a bold stand against the BJP by refuting the AIT. If he had known that the BJP shares the dislike of most Indian patriots for the AIT, he might have been more subdued in his advocacy of a non-AIT scenario, esp. considering the extreme politicization (in an anti-BJP sense) of Indology in the USA.

5. Some new arguments

5.1. A REMARKABLE BOOK

In spite of the mutual deafness of the pro- and anti-invasionist schools, the increasing awareness of a challenge has led prominent scholars groomed in the invasionist view to collect, for the first time in their careers, actual arguments in favour of the Aryan Invasion Theory. As yet this is never in the form of a pointwise rebuttal of an existing anti-invasionist argumentation, a head-on approach so far exclusively adopted by one or two non-invasionists.¹ Nonetheless, some recent contributions to the archaeological and physical-anthropological aspects of the controversy pose a fresh challenge to the (by now often over-confident) anti-invasionist school.

An extremely important new synthesis of various types of data is provided by Dr. Bernard Sergent in his book *Genesis of India*, as yet only available in French.² The book comes as a sequel to his equally important book, *Les Indo-Européens* (1995). Sergent is a Ph.D. in Archaeology with additional degrees in Physical Anthropology and in History, a researcher at the French National Centre for Scientific Research, and chairman of the French Society for Mythology.

One of Sergent's objectives is to counter the rising tide of skepticism against the AIT with archaeological and other proofs. In particular, he proposes a precise identification of a particular Harappan-age but non-Harappan culture with the Indo-Aryans poised to invade India: the Bactrian Bronze Age culture of ca. 2000 BC. At the same time, he is quite scornful of AIT critics and neglects to take their arguments apart, which means that he effectively leaves them standing.

Sergent is very skeptical of the Aryan non-invasion theory, and dismisses it in one sentence plus footnote as simply unbelievable and as the effect of nationalistic blindness for the shattering evidence provided by linguistics.³ Nonetheless, it is important to note that, unlike Indian Marxists, he does not show any contempt for Hinduism or for the idea of India. Most people who analyze Indian culture into different contributions by peoples with divergent origins do so with the implicit or explicit message that "there is no such thing as Indian or Hindu culture, there is only a composite of divergent cultures, each of which should break free and destroy the dominant Brahminical system which propagates the false notion of a single all-Indian culture". Sergent, by contrast, admits that the ethnically different contributions have merged into an admirable synthesis, e.g.: "One of the paradoxes of India is its astonishing linguistic diversity (they speak about five hundred languages there) compared with its cultural unity."⁴ Rather than denying the idea of India, he strongly sympathizes with it: though a construct of history, India is a cultural reality. This French invasionist is more an Indian patriot than most Indian invasionists.

To do full justice to Sergent's work, I must refer to the original, and I hope it will soon be translated in English or Hindi. Here, we will only discuss some of the most original or controversial points.

Footnotes:

¹S. Talageri: *Aryan Invasion Theory, a Reappraisal*, passim; and K.D. Sethna: *The Problem of Aryan Origins*, Aditya Prakashan, Delhi 1992 (1980), which includes a lengthy appendix dissecting Asko Parpola's archaeological evidence.

²Bernard Sergent: *Genèse de l'Inde*, Payot, Paris 1997.

³Bernard Sergent: *Genèse de l'Inde*, p.370 and p.477 n-485.

⁴Bernard Sergent: *Genèse de l'Inde*, p.9.

5. Some new arguments

5.2. EVIDENCE PROVIDED BY PHYSICAL ANTHROPOLOGY

5.2.1. A touchy subject

Bernard Sergent treads sensitive ground in discussing the evidence furnished by physical anthropology. Though not identifying language with race (as some 19th-century scholars did), he maintains that in many cases, a certain correlation between language and genes may nonetheless be discernible. As we have seen, this thesis has been put forward by Luigi Cavalli-Sforza and other leading population geneticists. The underlying logic is simple: people who speak a common language do so by living together as a community, and as such, they will also intermarry and pass on their genes along with their language and culture to their children. To say that there was an original IE community whose language got diversified into the existing IE languages, and whose “heirs” we IE-speakers are, is already enough to attract suspicions of Nazi fantasies, even in the case of so authoritative and objective a scholar as Bernard Sergent.

Indeed, oblique aspersions are cast on Sergent by Jean-Paul Demoule, who uses the familiar and simple technique of juxtaposition, i.c. with the term “mother race”, used off-hand by Emmanuel Leroy-Ladurie in a review of Sergent’s book *Les Indo-Européens*.⁵ Demoule’s explicit thesis is that “not one scientific fact allows support for the hypothesis of an original [PIE-speaking] people”. In fact, there are no known languages which are not spoken by a living community or a “people”, either in the past (e.g. Latin) or in the present. The only exception would be Esperanto, an artificial language; but would Prof. Demoule maintain that IE came about as a constructed (“*sanskRta*”) language, propagated by word of mouth from the Bay of Bengal to the Atlantic coast? Plain common sense requires that the PIE dialects were also spoken by some such “people”. If postmodernists like Demoule want to deny to the hypothetical PIE language the *necessary* hypothesis that it was used by a community of speakers, it is up to them to provide an alternative hypothesis plus the “scientific facts” supporting it.

A related political inhibition obstructing the progress of research in IE studies is the post-1945 mistrust of migratory models as explanations of the spread of technologies, cultures or indeed languages. Sergent goes against the dominant tendency by insisting that the IE language family has spread by means of migrations.⁶ Prior to the telegraph and the modern electronic media, a language could indeed only be spread by being physically taken from one place to the next. In the case of India, while we need not concede Sergent’s specific assumption of an Aryan immigration, it is obvious that migrations have been a key factor in the present distribution of languages.⁷

As he points out, the historical period in India has witnessed well-recorded invasions by the Greeks, Huns, Scythians, Kushanas, Arabs, Turks, Afghans and Europeans, producing such linguistic phenomena as Greek loans in Sanskrit, the Persian-Hindi hybrid language Urdu, the Portuguese family names of many Indian Christians, the de facto status of English as India’s link language, and numerous English loans in Tamil and other modern Indian languages, plus a handful of Indian loans in European languages generally (*ginger, rice*) and a whole lot in English specifically (*thug, goonda, bungalow, jungle* etc.). And that is mild stuff compared with the Americas, where European immigration has marginalized or extinguished numerous native languages and replaced them wholesale with a few European ones. So, there is no need to be shy about surmising the existence and the linguistic impact of migrations, including violent ones, in the proto-historical period. It so happens that migrations may leave traces in the physical-anthropological “record” of a population, thus adding modern genetics to the sciences which can be employed in reconstructing ancient history.

5.2.2. A challenge to monogenism?

The presence of human and para-human races in India is extremely ancient, including attested traces of archanthropian specimens of *Homo Erectus*. Among the extraordinary findings, surprisingly late traces of pre-human hominids have been found in the Narmada Valley, dated to ca. 23,000 BC. This, to Sergent, confirms the hypothesis that *Homo Sapiens Sapiens* has mixed with *Homo Erectus* in Asia, just as modern man has mixed to an extent with *Homo Sapiens Neanderthalensis* in Europe.⁸ Sergent reminds us that the dental characteristics of the xanthodermic (yellow-skinned) race are those of *Homo Erectus* rather than of *Homo Sapiens*.

This could be read as an implicit questioning of the monogenist thesis, i.e. the assumption that the human species has crossed the threshold from animal to human as a single collectivity. After 1945, this assumption has been insisted upon as if it were a religious dogma, because it was feared that polygenism would undermine the unity of the human species.⁹ This fear seems unfounded: the simple fact that the different human races can interbreed and have *fertile* offspring (unlike horse and donkey, or lion and tiger) firmly establishes the unity of the human species.¹⁰ The relative unimportance of mono- or polygenism is shown by the Biblical example of the extremely unequal valuation and treatment of the “Hamitic” race (interpreted as either the natives of Canaan, crushed by the Israelites under Joshua, or as the Black Africans, reduced to slavery by Christian Europeans) for the sin of their ancestor Ham, even though the latter had a common origin with his brothers Sem, deemed ancestor of the Israelites, and Japhet, deemed ancestor of the Europeans. The monogenist belief that Noah was the common ancestor of the Hamite, Semite and Japhetite “races” could not prevent the extreme inequality between them.

By contrast, the polygenist discovery of a dental trait of the “infra-human” *Homo Erectus* in the yellow race has not led to a classification of the yellow race as subhuman or otherwise inferior. On the contrary, even white believers in racial inequality (like Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray in their controversial book *The Bell Curve*, 1994) have affirmed the *superior* intelligence, on average, of yellow as compared with white and black people. Being a partial descendant of the Neanderthal troglodytes myself, I propose we celebrate the fusion of different strands of *hominines* in our own genes. Indeed, what the mixing of *Sapiens Sapiens* with *Neanderthalensis* and *Erectus* proves, is that they were not really different species, but merely different races within the developing human species; and this restores monogenism.

5.2.3. The Veddoid aboriginals

Sergent claims that the oldest *Homo Sapiens Sapiens* racial type of India, now largely submerged by interbreeding with immigrant Dravidian, Austro-Asiatic and IE populations, is the one preserved in the Vedda and Rodiya tribes of Sri Lanka. Earlier physical-anthropologists had isolated them as “primitive”, by which they meant un-European: little facial and body hair, broad nose, receding forehead, heavy eyebrows. They also recognized them as very similar to the Australian aboriginals, though the latter are in fact less dissimilar from the European type, e.g. being just as hairy and often having light-brown or blond hair. Though living in the southernmost, near-equatorial part of the subcontinent, the Veddas are not black but brown.

While the purely black skin is associated (by Sergent) with the population which “brought” the Dravidian languages, the Veddoid traits are found to an extent among tribal populations in south India and as far north as the Bhils and the Gonds. Perhaps Nahali is the last remnant of the lost language of this ancient layer of the Indian population, for all the said tribes including the Veddas now speak the languages of their non-tribal neighbours.¹¹

The Veddoid type has also been found in the Harappan area, in the chronologically post-Harappan and culturally non-Harappan site known as Cemetery H. It has even been found in Iran and Mesopotamia. In Sergent’s view, this indicates the trail of the Veddoid-Australoid vanguard

of Homo Sapiens Sapiens on its way from Africa to East Asia, Indonesia and Australia, very roughly in 40,000 BC. In countries along the way, this type may have coexisted with Homo Erectus for thousands of years before assimilating or displacing the latter, and before being assimilated or displaced by other, more European-like racial types.

5.2.4. Waves of immigrants

Bernard Sergent questions the neat division of the South-Asian population into “Mediterranean”, “Melano-Indian” (black-skinned, associated with the Dravidian languages) and “Veddoid” or “Australoid”, introduced by British colonial anthropologists: “the Vedda, the Melano-Indians and the Indus people and the actual inhabitants of the northern half of India, which classical anthropology used to class as Mediterraneans, all belong to one same human ‘current’ of which they manifest the successive ‘waves’. Everything indicates, physical traits as well as geographical distribution, that the Vedda have arrived first, followed by the Melano-Indians, and then the Indus people.”¹² Note that he does not mention “Aryans” as a distinct type separate from and arriving after the “Indus people”.

Sergent rejects the classical view that populations having traits halfway between the typical Veddoid and Mediterranean traits must be considered “mixed”. Instead, rather than assuming discrete racial types subsequently subject to miscegenation, he posits a racial continuum, corresponding with the continuum of migrations from northeastern Africa via West Asia to South Asia. Indeed, he takes a few Veddoid-looking skeletons found in Mesopotamia as proof that the Veddoids too were immigrants into India, “far from representing emigrations from India (how and when could these have come about, all movements going in the opposite sense, as we shall see?)”.¹³

The circular argument that the distribution of Veddoid skulls over South- as well as West Asia must be due to a southeastward migration as all migrations in this region have been southeastward, loses much of its force when we consider that in the historical period, northwestward migrations are equally attested, esp. that of the Gypsies hardly a thousand years ago. Nonetheless, with the present state of knowledge suggesting an African origin for modern humanity, it is of course plausible that India’s first human inhabitants were immigrants from West Asia and ultimately from Africa.

The Dravidian-speakers largely coincide with a racial type called “Melano-Indian”, which is very dark-skinned (darker than the Veddoids), but in all other respects similar not to the Melano-Africans but to the Mediterranean variety of the white race, e.g. wavy hair, a near-vertical forehead, thinner nose. Sergent thinks they arrived in Mehrgarh well before the beginning of the Neolithic, in ca. 8,000 BC, and that they were subsequently replaced or absorbed by the real Harappans, who belonged to the “Indo-Afghan” type.¹⁴

At this point, it is customary to point to the Dravidian Brahui speakers of Baluchistan (living in the vicinity of Mehrgarh) as a remnant of the Dravidian Harappans. However, they are physically indistinguishable from the Iranian Baluchis, and Sergent proposes that the Brahui speakers, far from being a native remnant of a pre-Harappan population of Baluchistan, only immigrated into Baluchistan from inner India in the early Muslim period. Given that Baluchi, a West-Iranian language, only established itself in Baluchistan in the 13th century (“for 2000 years, India has been retreating before Iran”)¹⁵, and that the only Indo-Iranian loans in Brahui are from Baluchi and not from Indo-Aryan, Sergent deduces that Brahui was imported in its present habitat only that late.¹⁶ We’ll have to leave that as just a proposal for now: it is hard to understand how a Central-Indian population could migrate there, dissolve itself physically into the Baluchi population yet remain linguistically distinct.

The Harappan civilization “prolongs the ancient Neolithic of Baluchistan [viz. Mehrgarh], whose physical type is West-Asian, notably the type called (because of its contemporary location) Indo-Afghan”.¹⁷ This suggests that the “Indo-Afghan” type was located elsewhere before the beginning of the Neolithic in Mehrgarh, viz. in West Asia. If so, this means that the last great wave of immigrants (as opposed to smaller waves like the Scythian or the Turco-Afghan or the English which did not deeply alter the average genetic type of the Indian population) took place thousands of years before the supposed Aryan invasion. And the latter, bringing Aryans of the Indo-Afghan type into an India already populated with Harappans of the Indo-Afghan type, happens to be untraceable in the physical-anthropological data.

No new blood type or skull type or skin colour marks the period when the Aryans are supposed to have invaded India. So, one potentially decisive proof of the Aryan invasion is conspicuously missing. Indeed, the physical-anthropological record is now confidently used by opponents of the AIT as proof of the continuity between the Harappan and the post-Harappan societies in northwestern India.

Footnotes:

⁵Jean-Paul Demoule: “Les Indo-Européens, un mythe sur mesure”, *La Recherche*, April 1998, p.41.

⁶Bernard Sergent: *Genèse de l'Inde*, 153-156, criticizing non-migrationist theses by Jean-Francois Jarrige and Jim Shaffer.

⁷One scholar who still agrees with Dr. Sergent's common-sense position is Dr. Robert Zydenbos (“An obscurantist argument”, *Indian Express*, 12-12-1993): “And it should be clear that languages do not migrate by themselves: people migrate, and bring languages with them.”

⁸Bernard Sergent: *Genèse de l'Inde*, p.35-37. Fresh confirmation of the Sapiens-Neanderthal mixing was unearthed in Lapedo Valley near Leiria, Portugal, in December 1998: a 4-year-old boy who lived 24,500 years ago and whose skeleton shows mixed characteristics of both *Homo* types, according to palaeo-anthropologist Dr. Erik Trinkaus (*De Standaard*, 26-4-1999).

⁹About the ideological extrapolations from polygenist and monogenist anthropologies, see Léon Poliakov: *Le Mythe Aryen* (Paris 1971), ch. 2.2.

¹⁰It is a different matter that some polygenists did indeed hold crudely racist views, e.g. the proto-Nazi Ariosophists, led by Guido von List (1848-1919) and Joerg Lanz von Liebenfels (1874-1954) ascribed divergent origins to the different non-white and Jewish “races”, with the Black Africans being a hybrid progeny fathered by white Aryans upon apes, cfr. Nicholas Goodrick-Clarke: *The Occult Roots of Nazism*, Tauris, London 1992 (1985)

¹¹Bernard Sergent: *Genèse de l'Inde*, p.38.

¹²Bernard Sergent: *Genèse de l'Inde*, p.43.

¹³Bernard Sergent: *Genèse de l'Inde*, p.44.

¹⁴Bernard Sergent: *Genèse de l'Inde*, p.50.

¹⁵Bernard Sergent: *Genèse de l'Inde*, p.29. Indeed, both Baluchistan (including the Brahminical place of pilgrimage Hinglaj) and the Northwest Frontier Province (hometown of Panini) were partly Indo-Aryan-speaking before Baluchi and Pashtu moved in.

¹⁶Bernard Sergent: *Genèse de l'Inde*, p.130.

¹⁷Bernard Sergent: *Genèse* *de* *l'Inde*, p.50.

5. Some new arguments

5.3. THE ARCHAEOLOGICAL EVIDENCE

5.3.1. Tracing the Aryan migrants

Though the question of Aryan origins was much disputed in the 19th century, the Aryan invasion theory has been so solidly dominant in the past century that attempts to prove it have been extremely rare in recent decades (why prove the obvious?), until the debate flared up again in India after 1990. In his attempt to prove the Aryan invasion, Bernard Sergent uses the archaeological record, which, paradoxically, is invoked with equal confidence by the non-invasionist school.¹⁸

The crux of the matter is: can archaeologists trace a population migrating through Central Asia and settling down in India? There seems to be new hope to pin down this elusive band of migrants: "Today, thanks to the extremely rich findings in Central Asia in the past twenty years, the discovery of the 'pre-Indian Indians' has become possible."¹⁹

Before discussing his evidence, let us consider the apparent lack of evidence for the opposite itinerary: India to Central Asia. So far, Indian scholars have been on the defensive, busy refuting the AIT but not elaborating an India-centred alternative scenario of IE expansion. Indeed, some of them just deny the existence of an IE language family, so that no expansion needs to be reconstructed. In the absence of an archaeological Saraswati-to-Volga trail, I suppose that established archaeologists would readily point to important differences between pre-Harappan culture of ca. 5,000 BC and the contemporaneous Central-Asian cultures, e.g. the higher degree of sophistication and incipient urbanization in northwestern India, or the much more intense use which was made of the horse in Central Asia and in the Pontic region by 4,000 BC.

My layman's reply would be as follows. The fact that there are differences between Central-Asian cultures and (pre-)Harappan culture hardly disproves the possibility of migrations from India to Central Asia. To an extent, it is perfectly normal that the itinerary cannot be traced by archaeology alone: when people move from an urban environment in a hot climate to a steppe region with bitterly cold winters, their material culture changes. Iranian having developed into a distinct branch of Indo-Iranian by Zarathushtra's time, we may surmise that Iranian emigrants from India must have been settled in Bactria for quite some time by the end of the Harappan city culture, long enough to have differentiated a lot from their pre-Harappan Indian mother culture.

For the sake of comparison, the Dutch Afrikaners in Transvaal gradually lost touch with the European world and its technological progress; for their metalwork, a routine affair in Holland, they had to go to Zulu blacksmiths, having lost the skill themselves. The European trappers in North America returned to an almost prehistorical lifestyle during their stays in the forests. In antiquity, with communications being so much more limited, this effect must have been much stronger: Harappan immigrants in Central Asia soon adopted the material culture of their new environment, forgetting the most advanced and complex elements of Indian culture.

Nonetheless, it remains possible for archaeologists to ascertain the Dutch presence in 19th-century Transvaal or that of French fur-hunters in 18th-century Canada, e.g. by discovering remains of non-indigenous rifles. So, Indian archaeologists should come out of their defensive position and see for themselves what evidence there may be for the presence of Indian colonists in Central Asia and for an India-to-Europe migration. It is quite possible that such evidence is already on the table but that no one has interpreted it correctly due to the widespread AIT bias.

5.3.2. The Bactrian culture

Bactria, the basin of the Amu Darya or Oxus river, now northern Afghanistan plus southeastern Uzbekistan, is historically the cradle of Iranian culture. In an Indian Urheimat scenario, the Iranians left India either after or, apparently more in line with scriptural evidence, before the heyday of the Harappan cities. The next waystation, where they developed their own distinct culture, was Bactria. In that framework, it is entirely logical that a separate though Harappa-related culture has been discovered in Bactria and dated to the late 3rd millennium BC. However, Bernard Sergent identifies this Bronze Age culture of Bactria, “one of the most brilliant civilizations of Asia”²⁰, as that of the Indo-Aryans poised to invade India.

Though not figuring much in the development of his own theory, evidence for similarities in material culture between Harappa and Bactria is acknowledged by Bernard Sergent, e.g. ceramics resembling those found in Chanhudaro. This Harappan influence on the Bactrian culture proper is distinct from the existence of six fully Harappan colonies in Afghanistan, most importantly Shortugai in Bactria, “a settlement completely Harappan in character on a tributary of the Amu Darya (...) on the foot of the ore-rich Badkshan range (...) with lapis lazuli, gold, silver, copper and lead ores. Not one of the standard characteristics of the Harappan cultural complex is missing from it.”²¹ Logically, the close coexistence of Harappan colonies and Bactrian settlements was a conduit for mutual influence but also a source of friction and conflict. Indian-Iranian conflict has been a constant from the Bronze Age (with the replacement of Harappan with Bactrian culture in Shortugai ca. 1800 BC)²² through Pehlevi, Shaka and Afghan invasions until Nadir Shah’s sack of Delhi in the 18th century.

Sergent notes a peculiarity of the Bronze Age Bactrian culture: “in contrast with all the neighbouring cultures, the settlements of this culture are characterized by a very feeble accumulation: they were constructed in haste, apparently on the basis of a pre-established plan, and have not been occupied for very long”.²³ That such makeshift settlements have produced such “brilliant” culture, indicates to me that they already had a brilliant cultural heritage to start with. And isn’t precisely the Harappan culture known for its proficiency in urban planning?

Sergent cites Akhmadali A. Askarov’s conclusion that the Harappan-Bactrian similarities are due to “influence of northwestern India on Bactria by means of a migration of Indus people to Central Asia after the end of their civilization”.²⁴ The acknowledgment of a Harappa-to-Bactria movement is well taken, but this poses a chronological problem (unless we assume that the Iranians themselves were Harappans, refugees from the debris of a crumbling civilization). Sergent himself solves the chronological problem by pointing out that Askarov and other Soviet scholars who first dug up the sites in Margiana (eastern Turkmenistan) and Bactria, used an obsolete form of C-14 Carbon dating, and that newer methods have pushed the chronology of these sites back by centuries.²⁵ For Sergent, this chronological correction is essential: if the Bactrian culture was that of the Indo-Aryans who brought down the Indus civilization, it is necessary that they lived there before the end of the latter.

Sergent then mentions a number of similarities in material culture between the Bactrian culture and some cultures in Central Asia and in Iran proper, e.g. ceramics like those of Namazga-V (southern Turkmenistan). Some of these were loans from Elam which were being transmitted from one Iranian (in his reconstruction, Indo-Iranian) settlement to the next, e.g. the so-called “Luristan bronzes”, Luristan being a Southwest-Iranian region where Elamite culture was located. Some were loans from the “neighbouring and older”²⁶ culture of Margiana: does this not indicate an east-to-west gradient for the Indo-Iranians?

Well, one effect of Sergent’s chronological correction is that what seem to be influences from elsewhere on Bactrian culture, may have to be reversed: “From that point onwards, the direction of exchanges and influences gets partly reversed: a number of similarities can just as well be explained by an influence of Bactria on another region as one of another on Bactria.”²⁷ So, even

for the relation between the Bactrian culture and its neighbours, the proper direction required by the AIT has not been demonstrated, let alone a movement all the way from the northern Caspian region to India. And if there was transmission from other cultures to Bactria (as of course there was), this does not prove that the Bactrians were colonists originating in these other cultures; they may simply have practised commerce.

At any rate, all the sites related in material culture to the Dashli settlement (except for the Harappan sites) are in present-day Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Afghanistan or Iran proper, and are without exception places which were Iranian at the time they made their appearance in written history in the last millennium BC (or earlier if that source was the Avesta). While migrations are obviously possible, it seems to me that this says something about the burden of proof. It is entirely reasonable to accept as a starting hypothesis that the Dashli settlement, like its sister settlements, was Iranian. Those who insist it was something else, should accept the burden of proving that Dashli was different, that migrations took place in which the Indo-Aryans there made way for Iranians whose presence there was certified a few centuries later, and if possible also to explain why those things happened.

5.3.3. Bactria vs. Harappa

A new insight based on archaeology and detrimental to the stereotypical Harappan/Aryan opposition, is that the Harappans were not matriarchal pacifists after all, that they did have weapons and fortifications, "just like" the Aryans.²⁸ This has even been argued by Prof. Shereen Ratnagar, a virulent critic of all Indocentric revisions of the Aryan question.²⁹ Incidentally, the Dravidians, often identified with the Harappans, were not all that peace-loving either: in the context of research into the identity of the megalith-builders in South India in the 2nd millennium BC. Asko Parpola sees a connection between the glorification of war in Old Tamil poetry and the findings of weaponry in Megalithic graves.³⁰ In the jungle of the human world, purely pacifistic civilizations would not be viable except as a pipe-dream.

Yet, at this point, Sergent insists on the old picture: relatively unarmed mercantile Harappans versus heavily armed Aryans preparing their invasion in Bactria. It is not a contrast between martial and pacifist, but at least one between more martial and less martial. The Bactrian settlements abound in metal weaponry, and this does present a contrast with the relative paucity of weapons in Harappa. The latter was a well-ordered mercantile society, while Bactria seems to have been a frontier society.

However, this need not indicate an ethnic or linguistic difference: at the time of writing, English law prohibits nearly every form of private possession of firearms, while American law allows every citizen to carry firearms and most American families do indeed possess some. A different situation and history can account for a different attitude to weaponry, even within the same speech community. On the other hand, to pursue the comparison, British and American English have grown somewhat apart; in the absence of modern communication, they might have been close to differentiating as much from each other as Iranian did from Indo-Aryan. Would the latter difference not neatly fit the relation between Harappan and Bactrian societies: related but sufficiently distinct?

The emphatically martial culture of Bactria as compared with the relatively peaceful culture of the Indus-Saraswati civilization reminds us of a contrast between Iranian and Indian in the historical period. In pre-Alexandrine Iranian royal inscriptions, we come across truly shameless expressions of pride in bloody victories, even defiantly detailing the cruel treatment meted out to the defeated kings. By contrast, in Ashoka's inscriptions, we find apologies for the bloody Kalinga war and a call for establishing peace and order. Far from being a purely Buddhist reaction against prevalent Hindu martial customs, Ashoka's relative pacifism presents a personal variation within a broader and more ancient tradition of *AhiMsA*, non-violence, best expressed in some sections of the Mahabharata. Though this epic (and most explicitly its section known as the

Bhagavad Gita) rejects the extremist non-violence propagated by Mahatma Gandhi and also by the wavering Arjuna before the decisive battle, Krishna's exhortation to fight comes only after every peaceful means of appeasing or reconciling the enemy has been tried.

True, the Vedas seem to be inspired by the same martial spirit of the Iranian inscriptions, but in the Indocentric chronology, they predate the high tide of Harappan civilization, belonging to a pre-Harappan period of conquest, viz. the conquest of the northwest by the Yamuna/Saraswati-based Puru tribe. Their westward conquest was part of a larger westward movement including the Iranian conquest of Central Asia. By way of hypothesis, I propose that *AhiMsA* was a largely post-Vedic development (though it has been argued that Vedic ritual rules to minimize the suffering of the sacrificed animals already prove the existence of the *AhiMsA* spirit, a concern equally present in Zarathushtra's hymns)³¹, and that the Iranians missed its more radical phase, sticking instead to the more uncivilized glorification of victory by means of force. This would concur with the finding of a more military orientation of Bactrian culture as compared with the post-Vedic Harappan culture.

5.3.4. The Bactrian tripura

In the principal Bactrian site of Dashli, a circular building with three concentric walls has been found. The building was divided into a number of rooms and inside, three fireplaces on platforms were discovered along with the charred remains of sacrificed animals. In this building, its Soviet excavator Viktor Sarianidi recognized an Iranian temple, but Sergent explains why he disagrees with him.³² He argues that the Vedic Aryans were as much fire-worshippers as the Iranians, and like the early Iranians (prior to the establishment of Zarathushtra's reforms), they sacrificed animals, so that the excavated fire altars could be either Indo-Aryan or Iranian.

Of course, India and Iran have a large common heritage, and many religious practices, mythical motifs and other cultural items were the same or closely similar in both. But that truism will not do to satisfy Sergent's purpose, which is to show that the Bactrian culture was not generally Indo-Iranian, and definitely not Iranian, but specifically Indo-Aryan. There is nothing decisively un-Iranian about the Dashli fire altars.

On the contrary, there may well be something un-Indic and specifically Iranian about it. First of all, roundness in buildings is highly unusual in Hindu culture, which has a strong preference for square plans (even vertically, as in windows, where rectangular shapes are preferred over arches), in evidence already in the Harappan cities. Moreover, Sergent notes the similarity with a fire temple found in Togolok, Margiana. The Togolok fire altar has gained fame by yielding traces of a plant used in the *Soma* (Iranian: *Haoma*) sacrifice: laboratory analysis in Moscow showed this to be *Ephedra*, a stimulant still used in ephedrine and derivative products.³³ Asko Parpola tries to turn the Togolok temple into an Indo-Iranian and possibly proto-Vedic one citing the *Soma* sacrifice there as evidence: the Rg-Vedic people reproached their *Dasa* (Iranian) enemies for not performing rituals including the *Soma* ritual, so Parpola identifies the former with the "*Haumavarga Shakas*" or *Soma*-using Scythians mentioned in Zoroastrian texts.³⁴ However, every testimony we have of the Scythians, including the *Haumavarga* ones in whose sites traces of the *Soma* ceremony have been found, is as an Iranian-speaking people. It is possible that the sedentary Iranians included all nomads in their term *Shaka*, even the hypothetical Vedic-Aryan nomads on their way to India, but it is not more than just possible. The use of *Soma* was a bone of contention *within Mazdeism*, with Zarathushtra apparently opposing it against its adepts who were equally Iranian.³⁵

And even if Thomas Burrow were right with his thesis that the Mazdean religion originated in a sustained reaction against the Indo-Aryans present in Bactria and throughout the Iranian speech area (making the non-Zoroastrian faction in Greater Iran an Indo-Aryan foreign resident group)³⁶, it remains to be proven that these dissident Indo-Aryans made way for Zoroastrian hegemony in Iran by moving out, and more specifically by moving to India, somewhat like Moses taking the

Israelites out of Egypt. There is neither scriptural nor archaeological evidence for such a scenario: the normal course of events would be assimilation by the dominant group, and the only emigration from Iranian territory (if it had already been Iranianized) by Indo-Aryans that we know of, is the movement of the Mitannic and Kassite Indo-Aryans from the southern Caspian area into Mesopotamia and even as far as Palestine.

In the Dashli building, Asko Parpola recognized a *tripura* such as have been described in the Vedic literature as the strongholds with three circular concentric walls of the Dasas or Asuras (*Asura/Ahura* worshippers), which Parpola himself has identified elsewhere as Iranians.³⁷ So, chances are that the Soma-holding fire-altars, like the *tripura* structures around them, in both Togolok and Dashli, were Iranian. Parpola makes this conclusion even more compelling when he informs us that a similar building in Kutlug-Tepe “demonstrates that the tradition of building forts with three concentric walls survived in Bactria until Achaemenid times”³⁸ - when the region was undoubtedly Iranian.

Moreover, Parpola points out details in the Vedic descriptions of the *tripura*-holding Dasas and Asuras which neatly fit the Bactrian culture, the Rg-Veda “places the Dasa strongholds (...) in the mountainous area”³⁹, which is what Afghanistan looks like to people from the Ganga-Saraswati-Indus plains; it speaks of “a hundred forts” of the Dasa, while the Vedic Aryans themselves “are never said to have anything but fire or rivers as their ‘forts’. The later Vedic texts confirm this by stating that when the Asuras and Devas were fighting, the Asuras always won in the beginning, because they alone had forts. (...) The Rg-Vedic Aryans described their enemy as rich and powerful, defending their cattle, gold and wonderful treasures with sharp weapons, horses and chariots. This description fits the Bactria-Margiana Archaeological Complex in Bactria, with its finely decorated golden cups, weapons with ornamental animal figurines including the horse, and trumpets indicative of chariot warfare.”⁴⁰

This may pose a chronological problem to those who consider the Rg-Veda as pre-Bronze Age, or perhaps not, e.g. Parpola notes that the term *tripura* was “unknown to the Rg-Veda” and only appears later, “in the Brahmana texts”⁴¹ which non-invasionists date to the high Harappan period, contemporaneous with the Bactrian Bronze Age culture. At any rate, it affirms in so many words that the Bactrian Bronze Age culture was Dasa or Asura, terms which Parpola had identified with “the carriers of the Bronze Age culture of Greater Iran”.⁴² It also constitutes a challenge to those who make India the Urheimat of IE or at least of Indo-Iranian: if the presumed *tripuras* are a distinctly Dasa/Iranian element, identified as such in Vedic literature, and if the Vedic Aryans fought the Dasas in India, should we not be able to find some *tripuras* in India too? Or did the Iranians only develop them after leaving India but while still waging occasional wars on the Indian border?

5.3.5. Were the Bactrians Indo-Aryans?

Other artefacts in Dashli have the same Iranian/Indo-Aryan ambiguity with a preference for the Iranian alternative. A vase in Dashli shows a scene with men wearing a kind of shirt leaving one shoulder uncovered. In this, Sergent recognizes the *upanayana* ceremony, in which a youngster is invested with the sacred shirt or thread.⁴³ But this is both a Vedic and a Zoroastrian ritual, with the latter resembling the depicted scene more closely: in India, only a thread is given, but among Zoroastrians, it is an actual shirt.

Some vases display horned snakes or dragons carrying one or more suns inside of them: according to Sergent, this refers to an Indo-Iranian dragon myth, attested in slightly greater detail in the Rg-Veda than in the Avesta (but what else would you expect, with Vedic literature being much larger, older and better preserved than the Avestan corpus?), about Indra liberating the sun by slaying the dragon Vrtra, or in the Avesta, Keresaspa killing the snake Azhi Svara, “the homed one”.⁴⁴ The sources which drew his attention to this picture, both Soviet and French, are agreed that it is specifically Iranian.⁴⁵ What Sergent adds is only that, like with the fire cult, it

could just as well be Indo-Aryan; but that does not amount to proof of its Indo-Aryan rather than Iranian identity.

Several depictions (statuettes, seals) of a fertility goddess associated with watery themes have been found. Sergent points out that they are unrelated to Mesopotamian mythology but closely related to the “Indo-Iranian” goddess known in India as Saraswati, in Iran as Anahita. Which shall it be in this particular case, Iranian or Indian, Avestan or Vedic? Sergent himself adds that the closest written description corresponding to the visual iconography in question is found in Yasht 5 of the Avesta.⁴⁶

Of course we must remain open to new interpretations and new findings. In this field, confident assertions can be overruled the same day by new discoveries. But if Sergent himself, all while advocating an Indo-Aryan interpretation of the known Bactrian findings, is giving us so many hints that their identity is uncertain at best, and otherwise more likely Iranian than Indo-Aryan, we should have no reason to disbelieve him. On the strength of the data he offers, the safest bet is that the Bactrian Bronze Age culture was the centre of Iranian culture.

This happens to agree with the evidence of Zoroastrian scripture, which has dialectal features pointing to the northeast of the historical Iranian linguistic space (i.e. including Iran proper, which was in fact a late addition to the Iranian speech area), meaning Bactria, and which specifically locates Zarathushtra in Bahlika/Balkh, a town in northern Afghanistan or Bactria. It tallies with the list of regions in the opening chapter of the Vendidad, corresponding to Bactria, Sogdia, Margiana, southern Afghanistan and northwestern India, which happens to put Balkh practically in the geographical centre. Iran proper was Iranianized only well after Zarathushtra’s preaching. As Sergent notes, in ca. 1900 BC, the Namazga culture in Turkmenistan changes considerably taking in the influence of the then fast-expanding Bactria-Margiana culture:⁴⁷ the Iranians were moving from their historical heartland westward into the south-Caspian area. From there, but again only after a few more centuries, they were to colonize Kurdistan/Media and Fars/Persia, where their kingdoms were to flourish into far-flung empires in the 1st millennium BC.

It is only logical that the dominant religious tradition in a civilization is the one developed in its demographic and cultural metropolis: the Veda in the Saraswati basin, the Avesta in the Oxus basin, i.e. Bactria. That Bactria did have the status of a metropolis is suggested by Sergent’s own description of its Bronze Age culture as “one of the most brilliant in Asia”. Though provincial compared with Harappa, it was a worthy metropolis to the somewhat less polished Iranian civilization.

5.3.6. Clarions of the Aryan invaders

Another distinctively Aryan innovation attested in Dashli was the trumpet: “Bactria has yielded a number of trumpets; some others had been found earlier in Tepe Hissar and Astrabad (northeastern Iran); Roman Ghirshman proposed to connect these instruments with the use of the horse, with the Iranian cavalry manoeuvring to the sound of the clarion. (...) In ancient India, the trumpet is not mentioned in the written sources”.⁴⁸ Would it not be logical if the same type of cavalry manoeuvres had yielded the Aryans both Iran and India? In that case, we should have encountered some references to clarions in the Vedas. But no, as per Sergent’s own reading, the Rg-Veda, supposedly the record of Aryan settlement in India, knows nothing of trumpets; though post-Harappan depictions of riders with trumpets are known.

All this falls into place if we follow the chronology given by K.D. Sethna and other Indian dissidents: the Rg-Veda was not younger but older than the Bronze Age and the heyday of Harappa. So, the trumpet was invented in the intervening period, say 3,000 BC, and then used in the subsequent Iranian conquest of Bactria, Margiana and Iran.

The comparatively recent migration into Iran of the Iranians, who supposedly covered the short distance from the Volga mouth to Iran in the 3rd or 2nd millennium BC (losing the wayward Indo-Aryans along the way), has not been mapped archaeologically, in contrast with the successive Kurgan expansion waves into Europe. Jean Haudry reports optimistically: "Since the late 3rd millennium BC, an undecorated black pottery appears in Tepe Hissar (Turkmenistan), together with violin-shaped female idols and esp. with bronze weapons, the horse and the war chariots, and - a detail of which R. Ghirshman has demonstrated the importance - the clarion, indispensable instrument for collective chariot maneuvers. We can follow them from a distance on their way to the south."⁴⁹ But as we shall see, this is not necessarily the entry of "the" Iranians into Iran, and even if it is, it does not prove the Kurgan area to be the starting-point of their journey.

In the account of Roman Ghirshman and Jean Haudry, the proto-Iranians with their clarions travelled "to the south". Rather than Indo-Iranians on their way from South Russia to Iran and partly to India, these may just as well be the Iranians on their way from India, via the Aral Lake area, to Iran and Mesopotamia, where they show up in subsequent centuries. Indeed, viewed from Iran, entrants from Russia and from India would come through the same route, viz. from the Aral Lake southward. A look at the map suffices to show the improbability of any other route from India to Iran: rather than to go in a straight line across the mountains, substantial groups of migrants would follow the far more hospitable route through the fertile Oxus valley to the Aral Lake area, and then proceed south from there.

On the other hand, migrations from Iran northward are also attested. Against the theory of a southward migration of the Iranians from the Aral-Caspian area into Iran, P. Bosch-Gimpera proposes that the Iranians came from South Russia via the Caucasus into Iran and thence to what is now Turkestan: "The acknowledged penetration of the Iranians into Turkestan, where they arrived as far as Khorezm (...) must have taken place, on the contrary, from Iran itself, around 1000 BC."⁵⁰ While he is wrong in describing the group migrating northward from Iran as "the" Iranians, the migration to which he draws attention confirms that Central Asia was a vast space which nomadic groups, mostly Iranian-speaking, crisscrossed in all directions.⁵¹

Thus, in the 3rd century BC, there was a Parthian migration which resulted in the enthronement of the Parthian Arsacid dynasty in Iran, where they became formidable enemies to the Roman armies.⁵² From Chinese as well as Roman sources, it has been deduced that the Parthians had been living in the Syr Darya and Amu Darya regions. In present-day Turkmenistan, the Parthian town of Nisa has been excavated, which bears testimony to their impressive culture. If only for the sake of colourfulness, I would like to draw attention to the theory of Philip Lozinski, who considers the *Nisa* area but a stage in a much longer migration: "All this leads me to suggest that the seat of the Parthians, first recorded in written sources, the *Parthau-nisa*, was in the region of the upper Irtysh river in Siberia. The whole region must have been well populated, flourishing and highly civilized. The archaeological remains recorded in modern times give ample evidence to this effect. Furthermore the very close parallel between the actual finds and the description of the Western, barbarians by the Chinese makes it highly likely that this was the region the Chinese had in mind. They were remarkably accurate: their descriptions of gold mines, irrigation systems, iron bridges, glass in the windows of palaces, the jewelled personal decorations of the aristocracy, and other regalia which caught their attention, correspond to actual remains in Siberia."⁵³

Such a migration from Siberia to western Iran, all within the Iranian speech area, certainly gives an idea of what migrations could take place within the vast expanse of Central Asia. This type of migration has occurred many times in the preceding millennia (as well as in the subsequent centuries with the Turkic and Mongol conquests); it would be very easy for archaeologists to mistake such an intra-Iranian migration for the momentous entry of the Aryans. There is as yet no firm archaeological proof for the original migration of the first Iranians and Indians in any direction through Central Asia, at least it has not been identified in the relative wealth of separate

archaeological findings attesting numerous different migrations. Even in Bernard Sergent's erudite book, I have not found any data which compel us to accept that a particular culture can be identified with the very first Indo-Iranian wave of migrants; nor any data which are incompatible with the scenario of an original Iranian migration from India via the Oxus basin to the Caspian area and Iran proper.

5.3.7. Bactrian invasion into India

Thus far, the archaeological argument advanced by some scholars in favour of an Aryan invasion into India has not been very convincing.

Consider e.g. this circular reasoning by Prof. Romila Thapar: "In Haryana and the western Ganga plain, there was an earlier Ochre Colour Pottery going back to about 1500 BC or some elements of the Chalcolithic cultures using Black-and-Red Ware. Later in about 800 BC there evolved the Painted Grey Ware culture. The geographical focus of this culture seems to be the Doab, although the pottery is widely distributed across northern Rajasthan, Panjab, Haryana and western U.P. None of these post-Harappan cultures, identifiable by their pottery, are found beyond the Indus. Yet this would be expected if 'the Aryans' were a people indigenous to India with some diffusion to Iran, and if the attempt was to find archaeological correlates for the affinities between Old Indo-Aryan and Old Avestan."⁵⁴

Firstly, if no common pottery type is found in Iran and India in 1500-800 BC, and if this counts as proof that no migration from India to Iran took place, then it also proves that no migration from Iran to India took place. In particular, the Painted Grey Ware, long identified with the Indo-Aryans, cannot be traced to Central Asia; if it belonged to Aryans, then not to Aryan invaders. So, if substantiated, Prof. Thapar's statement is actually an argument against an Aryan invasion in ca. 1500 BC.

Secondly, if the absence of migration in either direction in the period from 1500 BC onwards is really proven, then this only disproves the Aryan migration if one stays with the assumption that the Aryan migration (whether into or out of India) took place around 1500 BC. But that assumption is precisely part of (the textbook version of) the AIT which Prof. Thapar has set out to prove. The archaeological data which she mentions, assuming they can prove the absence of migrations in 1500 BC and later, are not at all in conflict with the theory that Indo-Europeans emigrated from India anytime between 6000 and 2000 BC.

In spite of the impression created in popular literature, archaeology has by no means demonstrated that there was an Aryan immigration into India. Even the new levels in accuracy do not affect the following *status quaestionis* of the Aryan Invasion theory: "The question of Indo-European migrations into the subcontinent of India can, at best, be described as enigmatic."⁵⁵ Thus, among those who assume the Aryan Invasion, there is no consensus on when it took place, and some AIT archaeologists alter the chronology so much that the theory comes to mean the opposite of what it is usually believed to mean, viz. an affirmation of Aryan dominance in Harappa rather than an Aryan destruction of Harappa: "[This] episode of elite dominance which brought the Indo-Aryan branch of the Indo-European family to India (...) may have been as early as the flourish of the Indus civilization (...)"⁵⁶

Enter Bernard Sergent. He builds on a corpus of findings (some of them already used by Asko Parpola) pertaining to the apparent entry of elements from the Bactrian Bronze Age culture into late- and post-Harappan northwestern India. He also offers a theory of how these Bactrians may have caused the downfall of the Harappan civilization, parallel with the contemporaneous crisis in civilizations in Central and West Asia.

5.3.8. Why Harappa suffered decline

Civilization and urbanization are closely related to commerce, exchange, colonization of mining areas, and other socioeconomic processes which presuppose communications and transport. When communication and transport cease, we see cultures suffer terrible decline, e.g. the Tasmanian aboriginals (exterminated by the British settlers), living in splendid isolation for thousands of years, had lost many of the skills which mankind had developed in the Stone Age, including the art of making fire. One of the reasons why the Eurasian continent won out against Africa and the Americas in the march of progress, was the fairly easy and well-developed contact between the different civilizations of Europe, Egypt, Mesopotamia, India and China. So, one can force decline on a culture by cutting off its trade routes, a tactic routinely used for short periods (hence only with limited long-term effect) in wartime, but which seems to have troubled the ancient civilizations in ca. 2000 BC with devastating effect for several centuries. It was in reaction to this destabilization of international trade links that the civilizational centres started budding empires by the mid-2nd millennium, e.g. the Kassite empire in Mesopotamia where there had been city-states (Ur, Uruk, Isin, Larsa, etc.) prior to the great crisis.

Or so Sergent says. Dismissing the thesis of a climatological crisis (proposed in the case of the Harappan decline but also in the case of West-Asian cultures), he argues that only an economic crisis can explain the simultaneous decline of cities in widely different locations, some near rivers and some on hills, some in densely populated agglomerations and some overlooking thinly populated steppes or mountain areas, some in hot and some in colder areas. The ones to blame are - who else? - the *Aryans*. They, and “specifically Indo-Aryans”⁵⁷, played a role in the Hurrian and Kassite invasions disrupting Mesopotamia (while the IE or non-IE identity of the Gutti and Lullubi invaders remains unknown, though attempts are made to link the Gutti with the Tokharians); and from Bactria, they by themselves disrupted the economy of the Indus-Saraswati civilization.

They didn’t physically destroy the Harappan cities, as Mortimer Wheeler and others of his generation thought: “No trace of destruction has been observed in these cities.”⁵⁸ But by creating insecurity for the travelling traders, they bled and suffocated the economy which made city life possible; and thus forced the Harappans to abandon their cities and return to a pre-urban lifestyle. The declining and fragmented Harappan country and society then fell an easy prey to the Indo-Aryan invaders from Bactria.

This scenario has been attested in writing in the case of Mesopotamia. Sergent quotes other experts to the effect that “from ca. 2230 BC, (...) the Gutti had cut off the roads, ruined the countryside, set the cities on fire”⁵⁹ etc., that the Assyrian trade system was disrupted by the Mitannic people, etc. But is there similar evidence for the Indus-Saraswati civilization?

Sergent cites findings that in the final stage of Mohenjo Daro, we see the large mansions of the rich subdivided into small apartments for the poor, the water supply system neglected, the roads and houses no longer following the plan.⁶⁰ This certainly marks a decline, the rich losing their power and the powerful losing their control and resources. Same story in Harappa, Chanhu Daro, Kalibangan, Lothal: a great loss of quality in architecture and organization in the last phase. Moreover, all traces of long-distance trade disappear (just as in Mesopotamia, all signs of commerce with “Meluhha”/Sindh disappear by 2000 BC), and trade is the basis of city life. So, “these cities didn’t need to be destroyed: they had lost their reason for existing, and were vacated”.⁶¹ But that doesn’t bring the Bactrians or Indo-Aryans into the picture.

5.3.9. Aryan settlements in India

To Bernard Sergent, the “strategic” key to the Aryan invasion puzzle has been provided by the discovery, by a French team in 1968, of the post-Harappan town of Pirak, near the Bolan pass

and near Mehrgarh in Baluchistan. Pirak was a new settlement dating back only to the 18th century BC. Culturally it was closely related to the societies to its north and west, especially Bactria. Sergent sums up a long list of precise material items which Pirak had in common with those non-Indian regions, and specifies in some cases that the artefacts are attested earlier in other sites than in Pirak.⁶² So, this was a settlement of foreign newcomers bringing some foreign culture with them.

Sergent will certainly convince many readers by asserting that in Pirak, “the horse makes its appearance in India, both through bones and in figurines”, and this “connotes without any possible doubt the arrival in India of the first Indo-European-speaking populations”.⁶³ That depends entirely on how much we make of the limited but real evidence of horses in the Harappan civilization. Note moreover that while the horse was important to the Indo-Aryans, the Bactrian two-humped camel was not; but in Pirak, both camel and horse are conspicuous, both in skeletal remains and in depictions.

If the Bactrian culture and those to its west were Iranian-speaking, which is likely, then Pirak is simply an Iranian settlement in an Indian border region, a southward extension of the Bactrian culture. Indo-Iranian borders have been fluctuating somewhat for millennia, while different groups of Iranians down to Nadir Shah have again and again tried to invade India, so the Iranian intrusion in Pirak (which may have ended up assimilated into its Indo-Aryan environment) need not be the momentous historical breakthrough which it is to Sergent. It would only be that if it can be shown that the Pirak innovations are repeated in many North-Indian sites in the subsequent centuries, where we know that the dominant culture was Indo-Aryan.

A related culture is the Cemetery H culture on the outskirts of Harappa itself. Sergent offers a detail which is distinctly non-Vedic and Mazdean (Zoroastrian): “The dead, represented by unconnected skulls and bones, were placed, *after exposure*, in big jars”.⁶⁴ Exposure to birds and insects is still the first stage in the Zoroastrian disposal of the dead. Sergent also reports that the influence of the native Harappan civilization is much greater here than in Pirak. So, as the Iranian invaders moved deeper inland, they soon lost their distinctiveness. Considering that Afghan dynasties have ruled parts of India as far east as Bengal, using Persian and building in a West-Asian style, this post-Harappan Iranian intrusion as far as the Indus riverside is not that impressive.

Indeed, from the Indus eastwards, we lose track of this Bactrian invasion. Sergent himself admits as much: “For the sequel, archaeology offers little help. The diggings in India for the 2nd millennium BC reveal a large number of regional cultures, generally rather poor, and to decree what within them represents the Indo-Aryan or the indigenous contribution would be arbitrary. If Pirak (...) represents the start of Indian culture, there is in the present state of Indian archaeology no ‘post-Pirak’ except at Pirak itself, which lasted till the 7th century BC: the site remained, along with a few very nearby ones, isolated.”⁶⁵ So, the Bactrian invaders who arrived through the Bolan pass and established themselves in and around the border town of Pirak, never crossed the Indus.

This confirms the statement by the much-maligned (by Sergent, that is)⁶⁶ American archaeologist Jim Shaffer that “no material culture is found to move from west to east across the Indus”⁶⁷, or more academically, that the demographic eastward shift of the Harappan population during the decline of their cities, i.e. an intra-Indian movement from Indus to Ganga, “is the only archaeologically documented west-to-east movement of human populations in South Asia before the first half of the first millennium BC”, while the archaeological record shows “no significant discontinuities” for the period when the Aryan invasion should have made its mark.⁶⁸ The Aryan invasion of India has somehow gone missing from the archaeological record.

5.3.10. Scriptural evidence

To fortify his reconstruction of the Aryan invasion, Bernard Sergent repeats some well-known scriptural references. Indian authors are right in pointing out that this is systematically the weakest part in AIT argumentations, as the knowledge of Vedic literature among Western scholars is either too limited or too distorted by AIT presuppositions. Sergent's arguments at this point repeat well-known claims about the contents of the Vedas. Thus, the Rg-Veda was written by foreigners because it doesn't know the tiger nor rice nor "the domesticated elephant which existed in the Harappan Indus culture".⁶⁹

As for the tiger, it is often said that India was divided in a lion zone in the west and a tiger zone in the rest. This image persists in the symbolism of the civil war in Sri Lanka: the Sinhalese, originating in Gujarat (the last place in India where lions exist even today), have the lion as their symbol, while the separatists among the Tamils, originating in southeastern India, call themselves the Tigers. However, to judge from the Harappan seal imagery, tigers did originally exist in the Saraswati and Indus basins as well, overlapping with the lion zone. As Sir Monier Monier-Williams notes, in the Atharva-Veda, "vyAghra/tiger is often mentioned together with the lion".⁷⁰ It is simply impossible that the Rg-Vedic seers, even if they were unaware of the Ganga basin (*quod non*), had never heard of tigers.

As for the domesticated elephant, if it was known in Harappa, does anyone seriously suggest that it was not known in the same area in subsequent centuries? While regression in knowledge and technology does sometimes happen, there is no reason whatsoever why people who could domesticate elephants would have lost this useful skill, which is not dependent on foreign trade or urbanization, when the Harappan cities declined. If the Vedic Aryans had settled in India, it is impossible that they didn't know domesticated elephants; they need not have mentioned everything they knew in their Vedic hymns. At any rate, the actual reading of Vedic information has so far been the weakest arrow in the invasionists' quiver, and I wouldn't take their word for it that the domesticated elephant is indeed absent from the Rg-Veda. Isn't the specification "wild elephant"⁷¹ an indication that they also knew non-wild elephants? Isn't the mention of how "the people deck him like a docile king of elephants"⁷² a reference to the Hindu custom of taking adorned domesticated elephants in pageants?

Rice, according to Sergent himself, made its appearance in the Indus basin in the late Harappan period, and was known to the Bactrian invaders in Pirak.⁷³ He identifies those Bactrian invaders as the Vedic Aryans, so why haven't they mentioned rice in their Rg-Veda? One simple answer would be that the Rg-Veda is pre-Harappan, composed at a time and in a place where rice was not yet cultivated. This chronological correction solves a lot of similar arguments from silence. Thus, there was cotton in Harappa and after, but no cotton in the Rg-Veda. Bronze swords were used aplenty in the Bactrian culture and in Pirak, but are not mentioned in the Rg-Veda (a short knife can be made from soft metals like gold or copper, but a sword requires advanced bronze or iron metallurgy).⁷⁴ Camels were part of the Bactrian culture and its Pirak offshoot, but are not mentioned in the Rg-Veda except for its rather late 8th book, which mentions Bactria, possibly in the period when the early Harappans were setting up mining colonies there such as Shortugai. It all falls into place when the Rg-Veda is considered as pre-Harappan.

For a very different type of scriptural evidence, Sergent sees a synchronism between the archaeologically attested settlement of Pirak and the beginning of the Puranic chronology, which in his view goes back to the 17th century BC, in "remarkable coincidence" with the florescence of Pirak.⁷⁵ Reference is in fact to Kalhana's Rajatarangini, which starts a dynastic lists of kings of Kashmir in 1882, i.e. the early 19th century BC.⁷⁶ But if Kalhana can be a valid reference, what about Kalhana's dating the Mahabharata war to the 25th century BC? If Puranic history is any criterion, Sergent should realize that its lists of Aryan kings for other parts of India than Kashmir go way beyond 2,000 BC.

Another classic scriptural reference concerns everything relating to the enemies of the Vedic Aryans, such as the “aboriginal” Dasas. Very aptly, Sergent identifies the Dasas and the Panis as Iranians, and the Pakthas (one of the tribes confronting the Vedic king Sudas in the Battle of the Ten Kings) as the Iranian Pathans.⁷⁷ Yet he doesn’t identify these tribes with the Bronze Age Bactrians, arguing that in Alexander’s time, Greek authors locate the Parnoi and Dahai just south of the Aral Lake. But that was almost two thousand years after the heyday of the Bactrian Bronze Age culture and arguably even longer after the Rg-Veda. The only mystery is that these ethnonyms managed to survive that long, not that during those long centuries, they could migrate a few hundred miles to the northwest - centuries during which we know for fact that the Iranians expanded westward from their Bactrian heartland across rivers and mountains to settle as far west as Mesopotamia.

Moreover, the Vedas locate the confrontations in the prolonged hostility between Indo-Aryans and Iranians not on the Saraswati (which could in theory be identified as the homonymous Harahvaiti/Helmand in Afghanistan)⁷⁸, but on the riverside of the Parushni/Ravi and other Panjab rivers, unambiguously in India. This is only logical if the Vedic Aryans were based in the Saraswati basin and their Iranian enemies were based in an area to their west (western Panjab, Khyber pass): they confronted halfway in eastern Panjab. So not only did these Iranian tribes move from Bactria to the Aral Lake area in 2000-300 BC, but they had started moving northwestward centuries earlier, in the Rg-Vedic period, in Panjab.

With every invasionist attempting to strengthen his case by appealing to the testimony of Hindu scripture, the collective failure becomes more glaring.

5.3.11. Comparison with archaeological reconstruction in Europe

The westward expansion of the Kurgan culture has been mapped with some degree of accuracy: “If an archaeologist is set the problem of examining the archaeological record for a cultural horizon that is both suitably early and of reasonable uniformity to postulate as the common prehistoric ancestor of the later Celtic, Germanic, Baltic, Slavic, and possibly some of the Indo-European languages of Italy, then the history of research indicates that the candidate will normally be the Corded Ware culture. At about 3200-2300 BC this Corded Ware horizon is sufficiently early to predate the emergence of any of the specific proto-languages. In addition, it is universally accepted as the common component if not the very basis of the later Bronze Age cultures that are specifically identified with the different proto-languages. Furthermore, its geographical distribution from Holland and Switzerland on the west across northern and central Europe to the upper Volga and middle Dniepr encompasses all those areas which [have been] assigned as the “homelands” of these European proto-languages.”⁷⁹

This is a very important insight for understanding the large common (partly pre-IE substratal) element in the European IE languages, distinguishing them collectively from Anatolian, Tokharic and Indo-Iranian: “The study of the lexicon of the Northern European languages, especially Germanic and Baltic, reveals that a large number of terms relevant to the ecology of the habitat of the early populations of the area and to their socioeconomic activities have no plausible Indo-European etymology. (...) it is possible to ascribe to the pre-Indo-European substrate in the Baltic area a number of names of plants, animals, objects and activities characteristic of the Neolithic cultures.”⁸⁰ Many of these terms also extend to Celtic, Slavic and sometimes Italic and Greek.

Examples include the words *barley*, Russian *bor* (“millet”), Latin *far* (“spelt”); Irish *tuath*, Gothic *thiuda*, “people”, whence the ethnic names *Dutch/Deutsch*; German *wahr*, Latin *verus*, Old Irish *fir*, “true”; Latin *granum*, Dutch *koren*, English *grain* and *corn*; Lithuanian *puodas*, Germanic *fata*, whence Dutch *vat*, “vessel”; Dutch *delven*, “dig”, Old Prussian (Baltic) *dalptan*, “piercing-tool”; Old Irish *land*, Old Prussian *lindan*, Germanic *land*; Latin *alnus* (<alisnos), Dutch *els*, Lithuanian *elksnis*, “alder”, also related to Greek *aliza*, “white poplar”; Dutch *smaak*, “taste”, Gothic *smakka*, “fig, tasty fruit”, Lithuanian *smaguricu*, “sweet, treat”; from an ancient form **londhwos*, Dutch

lenden, Latin *lumbus*, “waist”. Likewise, the Germanic words *fish*, *apple*, *oak*, *beech*, *whale*, *goat*, *elm*, (*n*)*adder* have counterparts in other European languages, e.g. Latin *piscis*, Old Irish *aball*, Greek *aig-ilops* or *krat-aigos* (possibly related to Berber *iksir*, Basque *eskur*)⁸¹, Latin *fagus*, *squalus*, *haedus*, *ulmus*, *natrix*, but they have no attested counterparts in the Asian IE languages.⁸²

Archaeology and linguistics reinforce each other in indicating the existence of a second centre of IE dispersal in the heart of Europe, the Corded Ware culture of ca. 3000 BC, whence most European branches of IE parted for their historical habitats.

Even earlier demographic and cultural movements have been mapped with convincing accuracy. The sudden apparition of full-fledged Neolithic culture in the Low Countries in about 5,100 BC can clearly be traced to a gradual expansion of the agricultural civilization through Hungary (5700 BC) and southern Germany (5350 BC), from the Balkans and ultimately from Anatolia.⁸³ It is this gradual spread of agriculture and its concomitant changes in life-style (houses, tools, ceramics, domesticated animals) which the leading archaeologist Colin Renfrew has rashly identified as the indo-europeanization of Europe, but which Marija Gimbutas and many others would consider as the spread of the pre-IE “Old European” culture.

It remains possible that in some outlying regions, the early Indo-Europeans arrived on the scene in time to capture this movement of expanding agriculture, but it did not originate with them, because Anatolia and the Balkans were demonstrably not the IE Urheimat. On the contrary, in the northeastern Mediterranean, the presence of pre-IE elements in the historically attested IE cultures and languages (Greek, Hittite) is very strong, indicating that the Indo-Europeans had to subdue a numerous and self-confident, culturally advanced population. It is this Old European people, known through towns like Catal HLyLk and Vinca, which gradually spread to the northwest and civilized most of Europe before its indo-europeanization.

An even earlier case of demographic-cum-cultural expansion has been identified: “One is astonished by the cultural coherence which manifests during the Middle- and *Late-Magdalénien* (12,000 to 10,000 BC) in a large area reaching from Spain (the Valencia region) to central Czechoslovakia. Everything indicates that this culture has spread fast starting from southwestern France, either by migrations or by cultural exchange between autochthonous tribes. Should one - since at that socio-economic stage there can be no question of political unity - not consider the possibility that this was one large ethnic group? In the entire *Magdalénien* territory, there is (...), apart from similarities in tools and way of life, a conspicuous unity in artistic styles and symbolism.”⁸⁴

This culture made way for a new cultural wave: “Around 10,000 BC or shortly after, the *Magdalénien* culture comes to an end without any demonstrable reason. This is the end of a civilization. This is clearly visible in the French-Cantabrian region where the places of worship which had been installed in deep caves 8,000 years earlier, were abandoned. In [its northern reaches], the *Magdalénien* culture makes way for cultural currents from the Anglo-Polish plains”⁸⁵, a nomadic culture of pioneers living on the rim of the (by then receding) ice-cap. They were the last hunter-gatherer culture in Europe, and their expansion in non-Mediterranean Europe set the stage for the inexorable expansion of the Neolithic Revolution of agriculture from the southeast.

So, that’s archaeology in action. Without the benefit of a single written document, several cultural and partly demographic waves have been identified in European prehistory: a Mesolithic wave expanding from the Ur-European population centres in the southwest (probably proto-Basque) before 10,000 BC; a counter-wave from the northeast after 10,000 BC (linguistically unidentified); the wave of agriculture spreading to the farthest corners from the southeast in the 7th-4th millennium BC (linguistically unidentified); and finally the wave of the horse-riding late-Kurganites bringing their IE languages.

There is as yet no parallel map of a Kurgan-to-India migration. Thus, the material relation between the Andronovo culture in Kazakhstan (often considered as the Indo-Iranians freshly emigrated from the Kurgan area) and the Bactria-Margiana culture (presumed to be the Indo-Aryans and the Iranians on their way to India and Iran) has been established only vaguely, certainly not enough to claim that the latter was an offshoot of the former (which the AIT would require). As we saw, even tracing a migration from Bactria across the Indus has not succeeded so far.

But then, neither has a reverse migration been mapped archaeologically. If the Bactrian Bronze Age culture was Iranian and the Iranians had earlier been defeated in India, where is the archaeological trail of the Iranians from India to Bactria? And earlier, where is the evidence of the Proto-Indo-Europeans on their way from India to the Kurgan area? Those who consider India as the Urheimat of IE should suspend their current triumphalism and take up the challenge.

Footnotes:

¹⁸E.g.B.B.Lal: *New Light on the Indus Civilization*, Aryan Books, Delhi 1997.

¹⁹Bernard Sergent: *Genèse de l'Inde*, p-33.

²⁰Bernard Sergent: *Genèse de l'Inde*, p. 157.

²¹Maurizio Tosi: "De indusbeschaving voorbij de grenzen van het Indisch subcontinent", in UNESCO exhibition book *Oude Culturen in Pakistan*, Koninklijke Musea voor Kunst en Geschiedenis, Brussels 1989, p.133.

²²Bernard Sergent: *Genèse de l'Inde*, p.180.

²³Bernard Sergent: *Genèse de l'Inde*, p.160.

²⁴Bernard Sergent: *Genèse de l'Inde*, p.224, with reference to A.A. Askarov: "Traditions et innovations dans la culture du nord de la Bactriane à l'age du bronze", *Colloque Archéologie*, CNRS, Paris 1985, p.119-124.

²⁵Bernard Sergent: *Genèse de l'Inde*, p.160.

²⁶Bernard Sergent: *Genèse de l'Inde*, p.158.

²⁷Bernard Sergent: *Genèse de l'Inde*, p.160.

²⁸This is one of the points elaborated by Shereen Ratnagar: *Enquiries into the Political Organization of Harappan Society*, Ravish Publ., Pune 1991.

²⁹Vide Shereen Ratnagar: "Revisionist at work: a chauvinistic inversion of the Aryan invasion theory", *Frontline*, 9-2-1996, an attack on Prof. N.S. Rajaram.

³⁰Asko Parpola: *Deciphering the Indus Script*, Cambridge University Press 1994, p. 171.

³¹Discussed in Hans-Peter Schmidt: "The origin of Ahimsa", *Mélanges d'Indianisme à la Mémoire de Louis Renou*, Paris 1968, and Herman W. Tull: "The killing that is not killing:

men, cattle and the origins of non-violence (ahimsa) in the Vedic sacrifice”, *Indo-Iranian Journal* 1996, p.223-244.

³²Bernard Sergent: *Genèse de l'Inde*, p. 161.

³³The name *Soma/Haoma* does not etymologically refer to a specific plant, but to the process of pressing it to obtain its juices: *sav/hav*, “to press/crush”. Gernot Windfuhr: “Haoma/Soma: the Plant”, *Acta Iranica* 25, 2nd series, vol.XI (Brill, Leiden 1985), p.699-726, proposes that the original Soma plant was a man-shaped root, like the European *mandrake*, probably the *ginseng* root. Windfuhr shows that its symbolic connection with the celestial man (the constellation Orion) has an exact parallel in the Chinese lore about this strongly medicinal plant. on the other hand, ginseng is at best very rare in the foothills of the Himalayas, while ephedra is quite common there and in the Afghan and Iranian highlands, and it also has mild mind-altering properties. So, the discovery of ephedra in Togolok seems to be a decisive breakthrough to near-certainty about the identity of Soma. Further arguments for the ephedra hypothesis are given by Harri Nyberg: “The problem of the Aryans and the Soma: the botanical evidence”, in G. Erdosy: *The Indo-Aryans in Ancient South Asia*, p.382-406.

³⁴K.D. Sethna: *The Problem of Aryan Origins*, supplement 5, with reference to (and extensive quotation from) Asko Parpola: “The coming of the Aryans to Iran and India and the cultural and ethnic identity of the Dasas”, in *Studia Orientalia*, vol.64 (Helsinki 1988), p. 195-265; see also the review of Parpola’s essay by Harry Falk, in *Indo-Iranian Journal* 34, 1991, p.57-60.

³⁵Our knowledge of the Mazdean use of Haoma is chiefly based on the so-called Hom Yasht, included in the Avesta as Yasna 9, 10 and 11:1-12. The common belief that Zarathushtra opposed the use of Haoma is based on Yasna 48:10 (“When will men shun the *mUthra*/urine of this intoxication?”) and on Yasna 32:14, where a positive reference to an intoxicant is put in the mouth of evil people. But in neither case is the term *Haoma* effectively used, and so, Zarathushtra’s rejection of *Haoma* is disputed.

³⁶Thomas Burrow: “The Proto-Indoaryans”, *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 1973, cited with approval by Bernard Sergent: *Genèse de l'Inde*, p.232.

³⁷Asko Parpola: “The coming of the Aryans to Iran and India and the cultural and ethnic identity of the Dasas”, in *Studia Orientalia*, vol.64 (Helsinki 1988), p.212-215, with reference to Shatapatha Brahmana 6:3:3:24-25; and: “The problem of the Aryans and the Soma: textual-linguistic and archaeological evidence”, in G. Erdosy: *The Indo-Aryans of Ancient South Asia*, p.368ff.

³⁸Asko Parpola: “The problem of the Aryans and the Soma”, in G. Erdosy: *The Indo-Aryans of Ancient South Asia*, p.368.

³⁹Asko Parpola: “The problem of the Aryans and the Soma”, in G. Erdosy: *The Indo-Aryans of Ancient South Asia*, p.368.

⁴⁰Asko Parpola: “The problem of the Aryans and the Soma”, in G. Erdosy: *The Indo-Aryans of Ancient South Asia*, p.368.

⁴¹Asko Parpola: “The problem of the Aryans and the Soma”, in G. Erdosy: *The Indo-Aryans of Ancient South Asia*, p - 369.

⁴²Asko Parpola: "The coming of the Aryans to Iran and India and the cultural and ethnic identity of the Dasas", *Studia Orientalia*, vol.64, p.224.

⁴³Bernard Sergent: *Genèse de l'Inde*, p.163.

⁴⁴Rg-Veda 1:51:4, 1:54:6, discussed in B. Sergent: *Genèse de l'Inde*, p.163-164. Incidentally, the iconography is not unlike the classical Chinese dragons, so this may be yet another IE contribution to Chinese culture. Moreover, the symbolism of the dragon swallowing the sun and getting forced to release it again also returns in Babylonian astrological symbolism: till today, the lunar nodes (intersection points of the lunar orbit and the ecliptic), where solar and lunar eclipses take place, are called Dragon's Head and Dragon's Tail.

⁴⁵Reference is to Russian articles from the 1970s by Viktor Sarianidi and by I.S. Masimof, and to Marie-Hélène Pottier: *Matériel Funéraire de la Bactriane Méridionale à l'Age du Bronze*, Paris 1984, p.82ff.

⁴⁶Bernard Sergent: *Genèse de l'Inde*, p.163.

⁴⁷Bernard Sergent: *Genèse de l'Inde*, p.179.

⁴⁸Bernard Sergent: *Genèse de l'Inde*, p. 162.

⁴⁹J. Haudry: *Les Indo-Européens*, p. 1 18, with reference to R. Ghirshman: *L'Iran et les Migrations des Indo-Aryans et des Iraniens* (1977).

⁵⁰P. Bosch-Gimpera: "The Migration Route of the Indo-Aryans", *Journal of Indo-European Studies*, 1974, p.515.

⁵¹"From Hungary to China", the Iranian-speaking nomads generically known as Scythians filled up the entire space of the steppe lands, vide Natalia Polosmak & Francis van Noten: "Les Scythes de l'Altaï", *La Recherche*, May 1995, p.524-530.

⁵²According to Hermann Kinder and Werner Hilgemann: *The Penguin Atlas of World History*, 1979, p.69, the Parthians were equated in Greco-Roman accounts with a Scythian tribe called the *Parni*, i.e. Greek Parnoi equated by Asko Parpola with the hostile Panis mentioned in the Rg-Veda, in G. Erdosy, ed.: *The Indo-Aryans of Ancient South Asia*, p.367.

⁵³B. Philip Lozinski: *The Original Homeland of the Parthians*, Mouton & Co, The Hague 1959; p.54. The Roman writer Ammianus Marcellinus (XXIII, 6, 43) is quoted as mentioning that "to the north of Persia are Parthians dwelling in lands abounding in snow and frost".

⁵⁴R. Thapar: "The Perennial Aryans", *Seminar*, December 1992.

⁵⁵David G. Zanotti: "Another Aspect of the Indo-European Question: a Response to P. Bosch Gimpera", *Journal of Indo-European Studies*, 1975/3, p.255-270, spec. p.260.

⁵⁶C. Renfrew: "Before Babel: Speculations on the Origins of Linguistic Diversity", *Cambridge Archaeological Journal*, 1 (1), p.3-23, spec. p.14.

⁵⁷Bernard Sergent: *Genèse de l'Inde*, p. 198-199. On p.206 ff., Sergent adds some new data about the large IE and specifically Indo-Aryan presence in West Asia. Indo-Aryan names are quite common in Syria and Palestine in the 15th-13th century BC, e.g. the Palestian town of Sichem was ruled by one *Birishena*, i.e. *Vira-sena*, “the one who has an army of heroes”, and Qiltu near Jerusalem was ruled by one *Suar-data*, i.e. “gift of Heaven”. To Sergent, this also proves that the Indo-Aryans maintained a separate existence after and outside the Mitannic kingdom until at least the 13th century BC.

⁵⁸Bernard Sergent: *Genèse de l'Inde*, p. 201.

⁵⁹Bernard Sergent: *Genèse de l'Inde*, p.199, quoting Paul Garelli: *Le Proche-Orient Asiatique*, PUF. Paris 1969. p.89-93.

⁶⁰Bernard Sergent: *Genèse de l'Inde*, p.200.

⁶¹Bernard Sergent: *Genèse de l'Inde*, p.201.

⁶²Bernard Sergent: *Genèse de l'Inde*, p.219ff.

⁶³Bernard Sergent: *Genèse de l'Inde*, p.221.

⁶⁴Bernard Sergent: *Genèse de l'Inde*, p.224; emphasis added.

⁶⁵Bernard Sergent: *Genèse de l'Inde*, p.246-247.

⁶⁶Bernard Sergent: *Genèse de l'Inde*, p.155 (“the worst is achieved by Jim Shaffer” with his “bad faith”), 477 (“manipulations in which Jim Shaffer indulges, consisting in starkly ignoring the linguistic evidence”).

⁶⁷Personal communication during the 1996 Indus-Saraswati conference in Atlanta GA.

⁶⁸Jim G. Shaffer and Diane A. Lichtenstein: “The concepts of ‘cultural tradition’ and ‘palaeoethnicity’ in South-Asian archaeology”, in G. Erdosy, ed.: *The Indo-Aryans of Ancient South Asia*, p. 139-140.

⁶⁹Bernard Sergent: *Genèse de l'Inde*, p. 241.

⁷⁰M. Monier-Williams: *A Sanskrit-English Dictionary*, p.1036, entry *vyAghra*.

⁷¹Rg-Veda 1:64:7 and 8:33:8.

⁷²Rg-Veda 9:57:3, thus translated by Ralph Griffith: *The Hymns of the Rg-Veda*, p.488.

⁷³Bernard Sergent: *Genèse de l'Inde*, p.230.

⁷⁴Ralph Griffith uses “sword” twice in his translation *The Hymns of the Rg-Veda*, p.25 (1:37:2) and p.544 (10:20:6), both already in the younger part of the Rg-Veda, but in the index on p.702 he corrects himself, specifying that “knife” or “dagger” would be more appropriate. Likewise, the core stories of ,the Ramayana and Mahabharata, the ones most likely to stay close to the original versions even in their material details (unlike the many sideshows woven into these epics, often narrating much more recent events), feature only primitive weapons: Rama’s bow and arrow, Hanuman’s club.

⁷⁵Bernard Sergent: *Genèse de l'Inde*, p.223.

⁷⁶Bernard Sergent: *Genèse de l'Inde*, p.541 n.100, with secondary reference to R. Morton Smith: "The Indian Sennachy", *Journal of Indo-European Studies* 1978, p.77-91.

⁷⁷Bernard Sergent: *Genèse de l'Inde*, p.241-244. He specifically rejects the common belief that the Dasas were black-skinned, in spite of their occasional description as "black-covered" or "from a black womb", pointing out that even the fair-haired and white-skinned Vikings were called the "black foreigners" by the Irish, with "black" purely used as a metaphor for "evil".

⁷⁸Thus Bernard Sergent: *Genèse de l'Inde*, p.242.

⁷⁹J.P. Mallory: *In Search of the Indo-Europeans*, Hudson & Hudson, London 1989, p.108.

⁸⁰Edgar C. Polomié: "The Indo-Europeanization of Northern Europe: the Linguistic Evidence", *Journal of Indo-European Studies*, fall 1990, p.331-337.

⁸¹Suggested by Xavier Delamarre: *Le Vocabulaire Indo-Eurpéen*, Maisonneuve, Paris 1984, p.167.

⁸²Remark that they are all terms of flora and fauna, the typical substratum vocabulary in an immigrant language. Common developments within the pan-IE vocabulary also set the European languages apart, e.g. from *sus*, "pig", the derivative *su-in-o*, "swine", is attested in Latin, Greek, Baltic, Slavic and Germanic; from **ker-*, "horn", the derivative **kerew-*, "deer", strictly "the homed one" (still attested in its literal meaning in Avestan, *srvara*, as epithet of a horned dragon, but in the European languages a paraphrase like Sanskrit *hastī*, "the handed one", for "elephant"), is attested in Germanic (Dutch *hert*), Greek. Latin (*cervus*), Celtic and Baltic.

⁸³Pierre Bonenfant & Paul-Louis van Berg: "De eerste bewoners van het toekomstige 'België': een etnische overrompeling", in Anne Morelli ed.: *Geschiedenis van het eigen volk*, Kritak, Leuven 1993 (1992), p.21-36, specifically p.28.

⁸⁴P. Bonenfant & P.-L. van Berg: "De eerste bewoners van het toekomstige 'België'", in A. Morelli, ed.: *Geschiedenis van het eigen volk*, p.24.

⁸⁵P. Bonenfant & P.-L. van Berg: "De eerste bewoners van het toekomstige 'België'", in A. Morelli, ed.: *Geschiedenis van het eigen volk*, p.24.

5. Some new arguments

5.4. LINGUISTIC ARGUMENTS

5.4.1. East-Asian influences

Bernard Sergent traces practically all Indian language families to foreign origins. He confirms the East-Asian origins of both the Tibeto-Burmese languages (Lepcha, Naga, Mizo etc.) and the Austro-Asiatic languages (Santal, Munda, Khasi etc.). Though many tribals in central and southern India are the biological progeny of India's oldest human inhabitants, their adopted languages are all of foreign origin. To Sergent, this is true of not only Austro-Asiatic and Indo-Aryan, but also of Dravidian.

The Himalayan branch of the Sino-Tibetan language family, distinct from Tibetan, already has a very long but inconspicuous presence in northern India. Originating in China, this group of now very small languages once embraced parts of the northern plains. Of greater historical importance is the Austro-Asiatic family, which Sergent describes as once the predominant one in a continuous area from Central India to Vietnam, but now reduced to a series of pockets in between the riverine population centres dominated by the immigrant Thai and Tibeto-Burmese languages (originating in western and ultimately in northern China) and in India by the Indo-Aryan languages.

He follows those scholars who consider the Central-Indian language isolate Nahali (assumed by its few students to be the original language of the western-Indian Bhils) as also belonging to the Austro-Asiatic family.⁸⁶ This view is emphatically not shared by F.B.J. Kuiper, who lists 123 items of core vocabulary not reducible to Austro-Asiatic, Dravidian or IE roots, and calculates that "about 24 per cent of the Nahali vocabulary has no correspondence whatever in India".⁸⁷ If Kuiper is wrong, it would mean that as per the prevalent theories, not a single living language in the subcontinent (except for the peripheral languages Burushaski and Andamanese, at least for now) is indigenous.

Sergent is merely following in others' footsteps when he assumes that *mayUra*, "peacock", *gaja*, "elephant", *karpAsa*, "cotton", and other Sanskrit fauna or flora terms are loans from Austro-Asiatic.⁸⁸ In most such cases, the only ground for this assumption is that similar-sounding words exist in the Munda languages of Chotanagpur, languages which have not been committed to writing before the 19th century. Chances are that in the intervening millennia, when these words were attested in Sanskrit but not necessarily in Munda, they were borrowed from Indo-Aryan into Munda, or from an extinct language into both. At any rate, the hypothesis of an Austro-Asiatic origin should only be accepted in case the term is also attested in non-Indian branches such as Khmer.

The alleged loans only start appearing in the 10th and youngest book of the Rg-Veda and really break through in the Brahmanas. Sergent follows the classical interpretation, viz. that this shows how the Vedic Aryans gradually moved east, encountering the Austro-Asiatic speakers in the Ganga basin. While I am not convinced of the existence of more than a few Munda terms in Sanskrit (more in the adjoining Indo-Aryan Prakrits: Hindi, Bengali, Oriya), I would agree that there are other Munda influences, notably in mythology, as we shall discuss separately. Non-invasionists will have to account for this Munda contribution.

Here too, I suggest that chronology is all-important. It is quite possible that Munda had not arrived in India at the time of the Rg-Veda. When the Harappans migrated eastward (as

demographically expansive populations do), or when the post-Harappans fled eastward from the disaster area which the Indus-Saraswati basin had become, the Munda-speaking people they encountered in eastern Uttar Pradesh and Bihar may have been re-cent immigrants. All the same, it remains possible that for local flora and fauna, the Indo-Aryans did adopt some Munda terminology.

Broadly, the Austro-Asiatic expansion from the agricultural civilization of Thailand can be compared with the gradual spread of the Old European Neolithic from Anatolia and the Balkans to the far corners of Europe, and with the spread of India's Northwestern Neolithic to the rest of the subcontinent. In that case, the Munda-speaking farmers in the eastern Ganga basin must have assimilated into the Indo-Aryan population, with only the peripheral populations in the hills retaining their imported languages. This Munda contribution is by no means incompatible with a native status of IE, and even Hindu nationalists should welcome it as a factor of national integration across linguistic frontiers.

5.4.2. Is Dravidian native to India?

In one of his most innovative chapters, Sergent reviews all the evidence of Dravido-African and Dravido-Uralic kinship. In African languages spoken in the entire Sahel belt, from Sudan to Senegal, numerous semantic and grammatical elements are found which also exist in Dravidian. The similarity with the Uralic languages (Finnish, Hungarian, Samoyedic) is equally pronounced. Sergent offers the hypothesis that at the dawn of the Neolithic Revolution (start of agriculture, some 10,000 years ago), the Dravidians left the Sudan, one band splitting off in Iran to head north to the Urals, the others entering India and moving south.

Within this scenario of a Dravidian immigration, it is tempting to speculate that upon entering India, the Dravidians first of all founded the Indus civilization. Surprisingly, Sergent rejects this otherwise popular hypothesis, on the impeccably rational ground that there is no evidence for it. Thus, except in coastal Sindh and Gujarat, geographical terms in the Indus-Saraswati area are never of Dravidian origin. There is also no continuity in material culture between Harappan culture and the oldest known Dravidian settlements.

True to scholarly norms, Sergent pleads for a provisional acceptance of our ignorance about the identity of the Harappans. However, as a concession to impatient readers who insist on having some theory at least, he gives one or two very slender indications that the Burushos (who preserve their Burushaski language till today in Hunza, Pak-Occupied Kashmir) may have played a role in it.⁸⁹ However, he finds no Burushaski lexical influence on Indo-Aryan except possibly the word *sinda*, "river", connected in one direction or the other with Sanskrit *Sindhu*, "river, Indus", not otherwise attested in IE.⁹⁰ He is also skeptical of David MacAlpin's thesis of an "Elamo-Dravidian" language family: what isoglosses there are between Elamite and Dravidian can be explained sufficiently through contact rather than common origin.

Like many others, Sergent suggests that the early Dravidians can be equated with the "southern Neolithic" of 2500-1600 BC. Their round huts with wooden framework are the direct precursors of contemporary rural Dravidian housing. Two types of Hindu vessel have been discovered in southern Neolithic sites, including a beaked copper recipient still used in Vedic fire ceremonies.⁹¹

Though the prehistory of the southern Neolithic is difficult to trace, it can be stated with confidence that the best candidate is the Northwestern Neolithic, which started in Mehrgarh in the 8th millennium BC. It is, by contrast, very unlikely that it originated as an outpost of the Southeast-Asian Neolithic, which expanded into India at a rather late date, bringing the Austro-Asiatic languages. According to Sergent, a link with the mature Harappan civilization is equally unlikely: neither in material culture nor in physical type is such a link indicated by the evidence. The Dravidians were certainly already in the Deccan when the mature Harappan

civilization started. Sergent suggests that the Dravidians formed a pre-Harappan population in Sindh and Gujarat, and that they were overwhelmed and assimilated, not by the invading Aryans, but by the mature-Harappan population.⁹²

The picture which emerges is that of a multi-lingual Indus-Saraswati civilization with Dravidian as the minor partner (possibly preserved or at least leaving its mark in the southern metropolis of Mohenjo Daro) who ended up getting assimilated by the major partner, a non-Dravidian population whom we may venture to identify as Indo-Iranian and ultimately Indo-Aryan.

5.4.3. Afro-Dravidian kinship

One of the most remarkable findings related in some detail by Bernard Sergent, on the basis of three independent studies (by Lilius Homburger, by Tidiane Ndiaye, and by U.P. Upadhyaya and Mrs. S.P. Upadhyaya) reaching similar conclusions, is the multifarious kinship of the Dravidian language family with African languages of the Sahel belt, from Somalia to Senegal (Peul, Wolof, Mandè, Dyola). As Sergent notes, all Melano-African languages have been credibly argued to be related, with the exception of the Khoi-San and Korama languages of southern Africa and the Afro-Asiatic family of northern Africa; so the kinship of Dravidian would be with that entire Melano-African superfamily, though it would be more conspicuous with some of its members.

Thus, between Dravidian and Bantu, we find the same verbal endings for the infinitive, the subjunctive, the perfect, the active participle or *nomen agentis*, related postpositions or nominal case endings, and many others. In over-all structure, Dravidian and the Melano-African languages (as distinct from North-African and Khoi-San languages) form a pair when compared with other language families: "The tendency to agglutination, the absence of grammatical gender, the absence of internal vowel change, the use of pre-or postpositions instead of flexion are some of the main traits which set the Negro-African and Dravidian languages jointly apart from the Indo-European and Hamito-Semitic groups."⁹³ Here I would say that this doesn't prove much: the first trait is shared with some more, and the other ones are shared with *most* language families on earth; it is IE and Semito-Hamitic which stand out jointly by *not* having these traits.⁹⁴

But there are more specific similarities: "A simple system of five basic vowels with an opposition short/long, vocalic harmony, absence of consonant clusters in initial position, abundance of geminated consonants, distinction between inclusive and exclusive pronoun in the first person plural, absence of the comparative degree in adjectives, absence of adjectives and adverbs acting as distinct morphological categories, alternation of consonants or augmentation of nouns noted among the nouns of different classes, distinction between accomplished and unaccomplished action in the verbal paradigms as opposed to the distinction of time-specific tenses, separate sets of paradigms for the affirmative and negative forms of verbs, the use of reduplicated forms for the emphatic mode, etc."⁹⁵

Sergent himself adds more isoglosses: "Preference for open syllables (i.e. those ending in vowels), the rejection of clusters of non-identical consonants, the generally initial position of the word accent in Dravidian and in the languages of Senegal".⁹⁶ The similarity in the demonstrative affixes is among the most striking: proximity is indicated by [i], initial in Dravidian but terminal in Wolof; distance by [a], intermediate distance by [u].

Knowing little of Dravidian and nothing at all of African languages, I don't feel qualified to discuss this evidence. However, I do note that we have several separate studies by unrelated researchers, using different samples of languages in their observations, and that each of them lists large numbers of similarities, not just in vocabulary, but also in linguistic structure, even in its most intimate features. Thus, "the proposed demonstratives of Dravidian allow us to comprehend the genesis of the nominal classes, the fundamental trait of the Negro-African languages".⁹⁷

To quite an extent, this evidence suggests that Dravidian and some of the African languages (the case has been made in most detail for the Senegalo-Guinean languages such as Wolof) have a common origin. At the distance involved, it is unlikely that the isoglosses noted are the effects of borrowing. Either way, Proto-Dravidian must have been geographically close to the ancestor-language of the Negro-African languages. Did it come from Africa, as Sergent concludes? Should we think of a lost Saharan culture which disappeared before the conquests of the desert? Note that earlier outspoken fans of Dravidian culture didn't mind describing the Dravidians as immigrants: unlike the Aryans, they were bringers rather than destroyers of civilization, but they were immigrants nonetheless.⁹⁸ Or should we follow Tamil chauvinists in assuming that the Dravidians came from Tamil Nadu and the now-submerged lands to its South, and took their language and civilization to Africa?

5.4.4. Additional indications for Afro-Dravidian

Bernard Sergent argues against the Indian origin of Dravidian. One element to consider is that the members of the Dravidian family have not diverged very much from one another. The relative closeness of its members suggests that they started growing apart only fairly recently: a thousand years for Tamil and Malayalam (well-attested), perhaps three thousand for the divergence of North- from South-Dravidian. This would indicate that Dravidian was still a single language covering a small area in the early Harappan period, after having entered the country from the West.

That the "genealogical tree" of the Dravidian family seems to have its trunk in the coastal West of India, i.e. to the northwest of the main Dravidian area, has long been recognized by scholars of Dravidian.⁹⁹ It also fits in with the old Brahminical nomenclature, which includes Gujarat and Maharashtra in the *Pañcha-DraviDa*, the "five Dravida areas of Brahminical settlement" (as contrasted with *Pañcha-GauDa*, the five North-Indian ones). The northwestern coast was the first part of India to be dravidianized, the wellspring of Dravidian migration to the south, but also an area where Dravidian was gradually displaced by Indo-Aryan though not without influencing it.

Another indication for the Dravidian presence in Gujarat is the attestation in Gujarati Jain texts of inter-cousin marriage, typically South-Indian and quite non-Indo-European.¹⁰⁰ The IE norm was very strict in prohibiting even distant forms of incest, a norm adopted by both Hinduism and Christianity.¹⁰¹ Linguists had already pointed out, and Sergent confirms, that Dravidian has left its mark on the Sindhi, Gujarati and Marathi languages (as with the distinction between inclusive and exclusive first person plural) and toponymy. So, it is fairly well-established that Dravidian culture had a presence in Gujarat while spreading to South India.

It is possible that Gujarat was a waystation in a longer Dravidian migration from further west. Whether the itinerary of Dravidian can ultimately be traced to Sudan or thereabouts, remains to be confirmed, but Sergent already has some interesting data to offer in support. Africans and Dravidians had common types of round hut, common music instruments, common forms of snake worship and tree worship. Thus, a South-Indian board game *pallankuli* closely resembles the African game *mancala*; varieties of the game are attested in Pharaonic Egypt and in a pre-Christian monastery in Sri Lanka.¹⁰²

A point which I do not find entirely convincing is the distinction, based on Mircea Eliade's research, between two types of Shamanism, one best known from Siberia and in evidence among all people originating in North and East Asia including the Native Americans and the Indian Munda-speaking tribes, another best known from Africa but also attested among some South-Indian tribes.¹⁰³ This is a distinction between Shamanism properly speaking, in which the Shaman makes spirit journeys, despatches one of his multiple souls to the spirit world to help the soul of a sick person, etc.; and the religion of ghost-possession, in which the sorcerer allows the ghost to take him over but at the same time makes him obey. The latter is perhaps best known to

outsiders through the Afro-Caribbean *Voodoo* religion, but is also in evidence among South-Indian tribals such as the Saora and the Pramalai Kallar.

If anthropologists have observed these two distinct types, I will not disbelieve them. It does not follow that there must be a link between Africa and South India: Sergent himself notes that the same religion of ghost-possession is attested among the Australian aboriginals, who are related with the Veddoid substratum in India's population.¹⁰⁴ On the other hand, this theme of ghost-possession is but one of Sergent's numerous linguistic and anthropological data which all point in the same direction of Afro-Dravidian kinship.

5.4.5. Uralic-Dravidian kinship

If Dravidian migrated from Africa to India through the Middle East, it could have left traces in Egypt and countries under Egyptian influence as well, explaining the data which led earlier researchers to the thesis of a Dravidian "Indo-Mediterranean" culture.¹⁰⁵ Sergent links Indian forms of phallus worship with Sahel-African, Ethiopian, Egyptian and Mediterranean varieties of the same. The Egyptian *uraeus* ("cobra"), the snake symbol on the pharaonic regalia, has been linked in detail with Dravidian forms of snake worship, including a priest's possession by the snake's spirit. Dravidian cremation rituals for dead snakes recall the ceremonial burial of snakes in parts of Africa.¹⁰⁶ Others have added the similarity between the Dravidian *naga-kal* (Tamil: "snake-stone", a rectangular stone featuring two snakes facing one another, their bodies intertwined) and the intertwined snakes in the *caduceus*, the Greek symbol of science and medicine.

It has consequently been suggested that some Dravidian words may also have penetrated into the European languages. Thus, Dravidian *kal*, "stone", resembles Latin *calculus*, "pebble", and Dravidian *malai*, "mountain", resembles an Albanian and Rumanian word *mal*, "rock, rocky riverside".¹⁰⁷ But this hypothesis is a long shot and we need not pursue it here.

Far more substantial is the Dravidian impact on another language family far removed from the recent Dravidian speech area, viz. Uralic. The influence pertains to a very sizable vocabulary, including core terms for hand, fire, house (Finnish *kota*, Tamil *kudil*), talk, cold, bathe, die, water, pure, see, knock, be mistaken, exit, fear, bright, behind, turn, sick, dirty, ant, strong, little, seed, cut, wait, tongue, laugh, moist, break, chest, tree; some pronouns, several numerals and dozens of terms for body parts.¹⁰⁸ But it goes deeper than that. Thus, both language families exclude voiced and aspirated consonants and all consonant clusters at the beginning of words. They have in common several suffixes, expressions and the phonological principle of *vocalic harmony*.

As the Dravidian influence, like that of IE, is more pronounced in the Finno-Ugric than in the Samoyedic branch, we may surmise that the contact took place after the separation of the Samoyedic branch. But the main question here is how Dravidian could have influenced Uralic given their actual distance. Sergent suggests that a lost branch of Dravidians on the way from Africa strayed into Central Asia and got assimilated but not without influencing their new language.

He also rejects the theory that Dravidian forms one family along with Uralic, Turkic, Mongolian and Tunguz. The latter three are often grouped as "Altaic", a partly genetic and partly areal group which may also include Korean and Japanese, and all the said languages have at one time or another been claimed as relatives of Dravidian, with which they do present some isoglosses. However, the isoglosses are fragmentary and mostly different ones for every language group concerned. Moreover, some Dravidian influences are also discernible in Tokharic, or *Arshi-Kuchi* (Tokharic A c.q. Tokharic B) as Sergent appropriately calls it, which is obviously a matter of influence through contact. So Sergent concludes that this is a matter of areal influence rather

than genetic kinship: Dravidian was a foreign language entering Central Asia at some point in time to briefly exert an influence on the local languages before disappearing.¹⁰⁹

I am not sure this will convince everyone: if Dravidian is not genetically linked with all the said language groups, it might still be so with one of them, viz. Uralic, at least on the strength of the data Sergent offers. Tamil chauvinists may well be tempted to complete the picture by claiming that before the Indo-Europeans from India colonized Central Asia and Europe, it was the turn of the Dravidians to colonize Central Asia and, after mixing genetically and linguistically with the natives, to develop the Uralic languages. At a time when subtropical Neolithic cultures had a tremendous technological and demographical edge over the hunter-gatherers in the inhospitable northern countries, it would not even be so far-fetched to imagine that a small wayward group of Dravidians could enter the vast expanse of Central Asia and completely change the linguistic landscape there.

At any rate, Sergent's observations represent a clean break with earlier theories which had the Dravidians originate in the Uralic speech area and preceding the Indo-Aryans in an invasion of India from Central Asia.

5.4.5. Geographical distribution of IE languages

Since Bernard Sergent doesn't take the Indocentric case for IE seriously, he doesn't bring out all the linguistic data which to him support the Kurgan scenario. One classical argument from linguistics is nonetheless developed at some length: "In Europe one finds the most numerous and geographically most concentrated IE language groups. Such a situation is not unique, and invariably denotes the direction of history: the Indo-Iranian languages represent a branch extended to the east and south, starting from Europe and not the other way around. It is obviously not the IE languages of Europe which have come from India".¹¹⁰

Thus early in his book (p.30 of 584 pp.), he is already so sure that "obviously" the central question of the Urheimat has been decided to the disadvantage of India. That is a great pity, for it is the reason why he has not applied himself to really developing the argument against the Indian Urheimat. If anyone is capable of proving the AIT, it must be Sergent. Yet, because he assumes no proof is necessary, he gives the question much less attention than e.g. the much less contentious (though more original) question 'of the geographical origins of Dravidian.

To be sure, the pattern of language distribution invoked by Sergent as "not unique", is indeed well-attested, e.g. in sub-Saharan West Africa, there are about 15 language families, while in the much larger region of sub-equatorial Africa, a very large majority of the people speaks languages belonging to only one family, Bantu. Though it is only a branch of a subfamily of the Niger-Kordofanian language family, Bantu easily outnumbers all the other branches of this family combined: "Africanists conclude that Bantu originated in a small area, on the border between Nigeria and Cameroon."¹¹¹

But in fact, India is in this respect more akin to West Africa, and Europe more to sub-equatorial Africa. India has more language families: Nahali, Andamanese, Burushaski, Dravidian, Austro-Asiatic (Munda and Mon-Khmer), Sino-Tibetan (Himalayan, Tibetic and Burmese) and IE (Iranian, Kafir, Dardic, Indo-Aryan, and possibly proto-Bangani). Europe is almost entirely IE-speaking, with Basque serving as the European counterpart to the Khoi-San languages in subequatorial Africa, a left-over of the original linguistic landscape largely replaced with the conquering newcomer, IE c.q. Bantu; and Uralic (Finnish, Estonian, Hungarian) a fellow if perhaps slightly later intruder in the European landscape, vaguely comparable to the intrusion of an Austronesian language in a part (viz. Madagascar) of southern Africa.

Therefore, I reject the argument from the geographical distribution. I have already pointed out another objection against it: if the spread of the IE languages to Europe was often a matter of assimilating divergent native populations, this process promoted the speedy diverging of the IE dialects into distinct language groups. Though this is not a conclusive argument against the possibility of IE settlement in India being younger than in Europe, it at least terminates the impression that there was a compelling case in favour of that possibility. So, even under Bernard Sergent's hands, the fabled "linguistic evidence" has failed to decide the IE Urheimat question once and for all.

Footnotes:

⁸⁶Bernard Sergent: *Genèse de l'Inde*, p.31. The precarious situation of Nahali is described as follows by K.S. Nagaraja, reviewing Robert Parkin. *A Guide to Austro-Asiatic Speakers and Their Languages*, University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu 1991, in *Bulletin of the Deccan College* 1996-97, p.342: "On the basis of my observation after visiting Tembi (Teli) village in November 1996, I can say that the Nahals there no longer speak Nahali language at all. (...) in the districts of Buldana in Maharashtra, in the village called Jamud, there is a big concentration of Nahals who actually speak this language (...) there are many settlements in the nearby villages where the language is still spoken. The total number of speakers seems to be over three to four thousand."

⁸⁷F.B.J. Kuiper: *Nahali, a Comparative Study*, Amsterdam 1962, p.49.

⁸⁸Bernard Sergent: *Genèse de l'Inde*, p.370.

⁸⁹Bernard Sergent: *Genèse de l'Inde*, p. 138.

⁹⁰Remark that the Iranian name *Hindu* for "Indus", hence also for "India", indicates that the Iranians have lived near the Indus. If they had not, then *Sindhu* would have been a foreign term which they would have left intact, just as they kept the Elamite city name *Susa* intact (rather than evolving it to *Huha* or something like that). But because *Sindhu* was part of their own vocabulary, it followed the evolution of Iranian phonetics to become *Hindu*.

⁹¹Bernard Sergent: *Genèse de l'Inde*, p.48, with reference to Bridget and Raymond Allchin and to Dharma Pal Agrawal.

⁹²Bernard Sergent: *Genèse de l'Inde*, p.52.

⁹³Bernard Sergent: *Genèse de l'Inde*, p.55, quoting from U.P. and S.P. Upadhyaya: "Dravidian and Negro-African", *International Journal of Dravidian Linguistics*, 1976/5.1, p.32-64; my quotation is retranslated from the French translation (as quoted by Sergent), "Affinités ethno-linguistiques entre les Dravidiens et les Nègro-Africains", *Bulletin de l'Institut FranAais d'Afrique Noire* 38.1, p. 127-157.

⁹⁴That Hamito-Semitic (Afro-Asiatic) and IE stand jointly apart and may have a common origin in Mesopotamia, has been argued by B. Sergent: *Les Indo-Européens*, p.431-434. Critics (such as the reviewer in *Antaios* 10, Brussels 1996) have suggested that with this position, he is playing a political game. This much is true, that by design or by accident, he is pulling the leg of far-rightist adepts of IE studies who consider the reduction of IE to

sisterhood with Semitic as sacrilege. All the same, Sergent's position is quite sound linguistically.

⁹⁵Bernard Sergent: *Genèse de l'Inde*, p.55, quoting from U.P. and S.P. Upadhyaya: "Dravidian and Negro-African", *International Journal of Dravidian Linguistics*, 1976/5.1, p.32-64, retranslated from the French translation, "Affinités ethno-linguistiques entre les Dravidiens et les Négro-Africains", *Bulletin de l'Institut FranAais d'Afrique Noire* 38.1, p.127-157.

⁹⁶Bernard Sergent: *Genèse de l'Inde*, p.56.

⁹⁷Bernard Sergent: *Genèse de l'Inde*, p.53.

⁹⁸E.g. Father H. Heras: *Studies in Proto-Indo-Meditarranean Culture* (1953), and Alain Daniélou: *Histoire de l'Inde* (1983).

⁹⁹A map showing this "tree" is given in G. John Samuel, ed.: *Encyclopedia of Tamil Literature*, Institute of Asian Studies, Madras 1990, p-45, with reference to Kamil Zvelebil, who locates the Proto-Dravidians in Iran as late as 3500 BC.

¹⁰⁰Bernard Sergent: *Genèse de l'Inde*, p.51.

¹⁰¹This in contrast with Biblical Judaism and especially with Islam: Hindu converts to Islam were often required to prove their conversion by eating beef and, if possible, marrying a cousin or niece; half of the marriages in rural Pakistan are between cousins. Note, however, that the Zoroastrians deviated from the IE standard by also practising marriage within the family.

¹⁰²Bernard Sergent: *Genèse de l'Inde*, p.59.

¹⁰³Bernard Sergent: *Genèse de l'Inde*, p.62.

¹⁰⁴Bernard Sergent: *Genèse de l'Inde*, p.62.

¹⁰⁵E.g. Father H. Heras: *Studies in Proto-Indo-Mediterranean Culture*, Indian Historical Research Institute, Bombay 1953.

¹⁰⁶For all Sergent's details about Dravidian snake-worship, which fits in well with the classical picture of snake-worship as an "aboriginal" or at least non-Aryan element in Hinduism, it is interesting to note that he (*Genèse de l'Inde*, p.482, n.607) deviates from the mainstream in his etymology of *nAga*, "snake". With reference to Manfred Mayrhofer, he links it quite regularly to Germanic *s-nake*; the prosthetic *s-* is quasi-onomatopoeic. Personally, I suggest an even more regular link with Germanic *naked* (from PIE **nogwos/nogwodhos*), which reveals the basic meaning: the snake is unhairly, sheds its skin, and exposes itself more deeply to its environment by not having limbs with which to keep objects or the ground at a distance, all forms of exposure or nakedness. *NAgA SAdhUs* are those Hindu godmen who walk naked.

¹⁰⁷Mentioned in a long enumeration of pre-IE loans, but without reference to the Dravidian counterparts, in Sorin Paliga: "Proto-Indo-European, Pre-Indo-European, Old European Archaeological Evidence and Linguistic Investigation", *Journal of Indo-European Studies*, Fall 1989, p.309-334.

¹⁰⁸Bernard Sergent: *Genèse de l'Inde*, p.66-67.

¹⁰⁹Bernard Sergent: *Genèse de l'Inde*, p.71-76.

¹¹⁰Bernard Sergent: *Genèse de l'Inde*, p.29-30.

¹¹¹Bernard Sergent: *Genèse de l'Inde*, p.30.

5. Some new arguments

5.5. THE EVIDENCE FROM COMPARATIVE RELIGION

5.5.1. Aryan contributions to indigenous culture

Unlike most invasionists, who minimize the IE contribution by seeing “pre-Aryan” origins behind every (post-Harappan) Hindu cultural item, Sergent admits the IE origin of numerous elements of Hinduism usually classified as remnants of earlier populations. Though I will offer only very little comment on it, this is one of the most elaborate and original sections in his book.

In invasionist sources, and more so in politicized writings against the “Aryan invader religion” Hinduism, it is claimed that the two most popular gods, Vishnu and Shiva, are (the former partly, the latter wholly) sanskritized pre-Aryan indigenous gods. Sergent argues that they are in fact neat counterparts of IE gods attested in distant parts of the IE language domain, Vishnu corresponding to the Germanic god Vidar, Shiva to the Greek and Thracian and Phrygian god Dionysos and to an extent also to the Celtic god Dagda.¹¹² He notices the puzzling fact that the classical Shiva is unattested in the Vedas (though Shiva’s persona includes some elements from Indra, Rudra and Agni who are not counterparts of Dionysos); so he suggests that the Shiva tradition, definitely part of the common IE heritage, was passed on through a *VrAtya* or non-Vedic Indo-Aryan circle.¹¹³ This is an important acknowledgment of the fact that the Vedic tradition is only one tradition in the Indo-Aryan religious landscape, a key element in Shrikant Talageri’s reconstruction of ancient Indian history: just as Sanskrit is not the mother of all Indo-Aryan languages, the Vedas are not the wellspring of the whole of Hindu tradition.¹¹⁴

Sergent goes into great detail in showing how the IE trifunctionality model does apply throughout the Vedic and Puranic worldview, in fact far more splendidly than in any other IE culture.¹¹⁵ Thus, the first function is juridical-religious and corresponds with *sattva*, the transparent and truthful quality in the Hindu *triguNa* or three-qualities model; the second function is martial-political and corresponds with *rajas*, the passionate and energetic quality; the third function is production and consumption, corresponding with *tamas*, the quality of materiality and ignorance. This threesome also corresponds with the *trivarga* (“three categories”) model, where dharma or religious duty is *sAttvika*, *artha* or striving for worldly success is *rAjasika*, *kAma* or sensuous enjoyment is *tAmasika*, though there is a fourth (*nirguNa*, “quality-less”) dimension, viz. *moksha*, liberation. Likewise for the three states of consciousness: dreaming, waking, sleeping, surpassed by “fourth state”, *turly*, the yogic state. This scheme can then be applied to the Hindu pantheon, e.g. Brahma the creator is *rAjasika*, Vishnu the maintainer is *sAttvika*, Shiva the dissolver is *tAmasika*, or the white mountain goddess Parvati is *sAttvika*, the tiger goddess Durga *rAjasika*, the black devouring goddess Kali *tAmasika*.

Many more IE elements in Hinduism could be cited to the same effect, such as the numerous correspondences in epic motifs between Hindu and European sagas, which Sergent discusses at length. But the interesting ones for our purpose are those which already existed in the Harappan civilization.

5.5.2. The *liNga*

Dr. Sergent goes quite far in indo-europeanizing the alleged aboriginal contribution to Hinduism. He even asserts that “the *linga* (or Shiva’s phallus) cult is of IE origin”.¹¹⁶ An important detail is that Aryan *linga* worshippers venerated the *liNga* by itself, not in the *liNga-yoni* combination common in Hindu shrines, for “the *yoni* cult is without IE parallel”.¹¹⁷ Sergent makes a distinction

between the sculpted stone phallus and the unsculpted variety. The first type is attested in the Harappan area and period, as well as in Africa and the Mediterranean, while the second type is common -in historical and contemporary Hinduism.

On linga worship in the Harappan cities, we find conflicting presentations of the facts, with Sergent assuming that the same Mediterranean-type phallus worship flourished, while no less a scholar than Asko Parpola claims the exact opposite. Parpola contrasts the “earliest historical (1st-2nd century BC) *liNgas*”, which are “realistic”, with the “abstract form of the Harappan conical stones”.¹¹⁸ If Parpola is right, the Harappan linga cult was more akin to the classical Hindu form than to Mediterranean phallus worship. However, the crucial point of comparison in this case is not Harappa but the Indian tribals.

Votaries of the Indo-Mediterranean school claim that the cult of phallus-shaped stones is unknown among the indigenous (though in many cases historically dravidianized) tribal populations of India, implying that the Dravidian immigrants brought it from abroad, first to the Indus Valley, next to the whole of India. The same claim, that the untainted tribals are unattracted to the urban Hindu depravity of phallus-worship, has often been made by Christian missionaries as an argument in support of their doctrine that “tribals are not Hindus”. But is this true?

First of all, many Indian tribals do practise linga worship. Pupul Jayakar (whose work is admittedly coloured by AIT assumptions) situates both Shiva and the *liNga* within the culture of a number of tribes, e.g. the Gonds: “There are, in the archaic Gond legend of Lingo Pen, intimations of an age when Mahadeva or Shiva, the wild and wondrous god of the autochthons, had no human form but was a rounded stone, a *lingam*, washed by the waters of the river Narmada. Even to this day there are areas of the Narmada river basin where every stone in the waters is said to be a Shiva *lingam*: ‘(...) What was Mahadev doing? He was swimming like a rolling stone, he had no hands, no feet. He remained like the trunk (of a tree).’ [Then, Bhagwan makes him come out of the water and grants him a human shape.]”¹¹⁹ Till today, Shiva or a corresponding tribal god is often venerated in the shape of such natural-born, unsculpted, longish but otherwise shapeless stones.¹²⁰

At the same time, female *yoni* symbols are common enough among Indian tribals, esp. inverted triangles, the origin of the Hindu plural-triangle symbols called *yantra*, venerated in such seats of orthodoxy as the Shankaracharya Math in Kanchipuram, where celibacy is the rule and thoughts of fertility unwelcome. In a palaeolithic site in the Siddhi district of Madhya Pradesh (10th or 9th millennium BC), a Mother Goddess shrine has been found containing well-known Hindu symbols: squares, circles, swastikas and most of all, triangles.¹²¹ A participant in an excavation in Bastar told me of how a painted triangular stone was dug up, and the guide, a Gond tribal, at once started doing *pUjA* before this ancient idol.¹²² Such is the continuity of indigenous Indian religion across eleven thousand years.

However, these two-dimensional triangles constitute a different symbolism from the three-dimensional ring-shaped or oval-shaped sculpted *yoni* symbols used in the *liNga-yoni* combination. Sergent sees these sculpted *yoni* symbols as part of the Dravidian tradition with African links, while the triangles, like the unsculpted linga stones, might be older in India than even the Dravidian invasion as imagined by Sergent.

Quite separate from these abstract triangles and unsculpted stones, explicit sexual imagery is also common among the “untainted” tribals: “When the Bhils, primitive people of western India, paint their sacred *pithoras*, they include in an obscure corner a copulating man and woman. When asked to explain, they say, ‘without this, where would the world be?’”¹²³ When they want to express the fertility process, they do so quite explicitly, and they don’t have to make do with a shapeless stone. Conversely, when they do choose to use a shapeless stone, it must be for a

different purpose. Therefore, it is logical that the tribal *liNga* cannot be equated with the sexually explicit sculptures of the ancient Mediterranean cultures.

Like the tribals, Vedic Hindus worship unsculpted *liNgas* without explicit sexual connotation. Most Hindus will reject the Western interpretation of their idol as a phallic symbol, and the quoted details of tribal *liNga* worship tend to prove their point, as would the abstract uses of the term *liNga* (“sign”, “proof”, one of the terms in a syllogism).¹²⁴ The pebbles picked up from the Narmada river are hardly phallus-shaped, in contrast to the phallic pillars in the Mediterranean. When Hindus object to the purely sexual reading of their symbols by Western authors, the latter, irritated with the “refusal of prudish Indian hypocrites to face facts”, retort that “after all, anyone can see that this is explicit sexual imagery.”¹²⁵ Sometime in the 1980s, the two interpretations confronted when some people in the Philippines considered renaming their country as *Maharlika*, reportedly a local variation on *MahAliNga* used by traders at the time of the hinduization of Southeast Asia, on the plea that Sanskrit, unlike English and Spanish, was not “an imperialist language”. Western-educated people objected that they could hardly be citizens of a country called “big penis”, a problem of which the *Maharlika* proponents had not even thought. The renaming was cancelled.

Clearly, both conflicting interpretations have their validity, and linga worship in India is probably a syncretic phenomenon. If “phallus worship” was scorned in the Rg-Veda (in the much-discussed verses where the enemies are abused as *shishna-devAh*, “those who have the phallus for god”)¹²⁶, we do not perforce have to deny, as most anti-AIT authors do, that this concerned non-Aryan people who worshipped phallic stones. There were non-Aryans in many parts of India, though these phallus worshippers may equally have been Indo-Aryan-speaking cultists. We have at any rate a testimony for an ancient religious dispute. A clue has perhaps been given in Sergent’s information that the lone *liNga* (“objects which are interpreted as phalli”)¹²⁷ has been found in the northern half of the Indus-Saraswati civilization, the *yoni-liNga* couple with ring-shaped yoni stones in its arguably Dravidian south.

Anyway, the point for now is that the alleged tribal and Vedic Aryan forms of linga worship are very similar. If this linga worship was IE, as Sergent claims, and if it is an age-old Indian tribal tradition at the same time, may I suggest that the Indo-Europeans discovered or developed it in India itself. Could this be an instance of what should be the Holy Grail of non-invasionist scholars, viz. a case of decided continuity between native tribal and IE cultures, distinguishing both together from imported cultures such as that of the Dravidians?

5.5.3 Harappan and Vedic fire cult

Most invasionist accounts of Hindu history acknowledge that classical Hinduism has included elements from the “Indus civilization”. Thus, the unique water-supply system in the Indus-Saraswati system and the public baths so visibly similar to the bathing *kuNDs* still existing in numerous Indian cities have been interpreted as early witnesses to the Hindu “obsession” with purity. Though open to correction on details, this approach is not controversial. However, it runs into difficulties when items are discovered which are not typical for the Indian IE-speaking culture alone, but for the whole or larger parts of the IE-speaking family of cultures: how could these have been present in Harappa when the IE contribution was only brought in during or after Harappa’s downfall by the Aryan invaders?

The bathing culture which the Harappans shared with the later Hindus is often cited as a pre-IE remnant which crept into Hinduism. However, this is also attested (with local differences, of course) among such IE tribes as the Romans and the Germanic people, and may therefore be part of the common IE heritage. Of course, a general concern about cleanliness is not a very specific and compelling type of evidence. More decisive would be a case like the famous Harappan seal depicting the so-called *Pashupati* (Shiva as Lord of Beasts), long considered proof that the Shiva cult is indigenous and non-Aryan. It is found to have a neat counterpart, to the

detail, in the horned god Cernunnos surrounded by animals (largely similar ones and in the same order as on the Pashupati seal) on the Celtic Gundestrup cauldron made in central Europe sometime in the last centuries BC. So, this Harappan motif may well be part of the common IE heritage.

For another very general trait, the absence of distinct temple buildings in the Harappan cities constitutes a defect in the AIT postulate of a Vedic-Harappan cultural opposition. The fact that no temples are attested is a common trait of Harappa, of some ancient IE cultures (Vedic, Celtic, Germanic), and of that other acclaimed centre of Aryanism, the South Russian Kurgan culture, where “no real sanctuaries have ever been found; they probably had open sanctuaries”.¹²⁸ It contrasts with Mesopotamian and Egyptian cultures and with the *bhakti* cult in later Hinduism, which venerates the deity as if it were a human person and consequently gives the deity a house to live in: a temple. Harappans, Vedic Aryans and contemporary Indian tribals have this in common: they worship without temple buildings.

For a more specific example: fire plays a central role in most historically attested IE religions, most emphatically in the Indo-Iranian branches. A fire-cult was present in the Indus-Saraswati civilization, and it resembled the practices of the Vedic people who are supposed to have entered India only centuries later, and to have brought this particular tradition with them from their IE homeland. The presence of Vedic fire-altars in several Harappan cities (Lothal, Kalibangan, Rakhigarhi) has been noticed by a number of authors, but is somehow always explained away or ignored. Parpola admits as “quite plausible” the suggestion (made to him by Raymond and Bridget Allchin) that they form an Indo-Aryan element within Harappan civilization, but he explains them as imported by “carriers of the Bronze Age culture of Greater Iran, who had become quickly absorbed into the Indus Civilization, culturally and linguistically”.¹²⁹

Likewise, Sergent admits that “the Indian Vedic fire altar seemed to have borrowed its construction principles from the Indus civilization”, all while “the very idea of the fire cult was Indo-Iranian”.¹³⁰ This falls neatly into place if we equate proto-Harappan with Indo-Iranian: the idea of a fire cult was taken along by the emigrating Iranians, while the Indo-Aryans stayed on in the Indus-Saraswati region to develop their altars’ distinct Indian style of construction.

At any rate, how deeply had these Aryan fire-worshippers not penetrated the Harappan civilization, that they had installed their altars in patrician mansions of three of the largest Harappan cities, all three moreover very far from the northwestern border? Indeed, in the Harappan cities on the Indus itself, to my knowledge at least, no such fire-altars have yet been found; if they were imported from outside, it seems they came from the east, which would bring us back to Shrikant Talageri’s thesis that IE originated in the Ganga basin and entered the Harappan area from there. Leaving aside this question of ultimate origins, the very fact of the Vedic fire-altars in the Indus-Saraswati culture is a serious problem for the AIT.

5.5.4. More on Harappan vs. Vedic

As we have already seen, the stellar cult is common to the Harappan and Vedic religions. This is explained by Asko Parpola as the effect of borrowing: the barbarian invaders adopting the religion of the empire they just conquered, somewhat like the Heathen Germanic tribes did when they conquered the Christian Roman empire. In fact, the whole of Vedic and core-Puranic literature has been explained as essentially translations of non-Aryan Harappan traditions. A similar explanation is given for the “soma filter”, often depicted on Harappan seals, and of which an ivory specimen has been discovered by J.M. Kenoyer’s team.

Iravathan Mahadevan proposes that “the mysterious cult object that you find before the unicorn on the unicorn seals is a filter. (...) Since we know that the unicorn seals were the most popular ones, and every unicorn has this cult object before it, whatever it represents must be part of the

central religious ritual of the Harappan religion. We know of one religion whose central religious cult [object] was a filter, that is the soma [cult] of the Indo-Aryans.”¹³¹ If this is not an argument for the identity of Vedic and Harappan, I don’t know what is. Yet, Mahadevan dismisses this conclusion citing the well-known arguments that the Vedas know of no cities while Harappa had no horses, so “the only other possibility is that a soma-like cult (...) must have existed in Harappa and that it was taken over by the Indo-Iranians and incoming Indo-Aryans.”

Speaking of the unicorn: Prof. R.S. Sharma defends the AIT pointing out that the unicorn/*ekashRNga* is popular on Indus seals and in late- or post-Vedic literature but is not mentioned at all in the Rg-Veda.¹³² Within the AIT, this would seem to be an anomaly: first the Harappans had unicorn symbolism, then the Vedic-Aryan invaders didn’t have it, and finally the later Aryans again had it. The implied and slightly contrived explanation is that native unicorn symbolism went underground after the Aryan invasion, but reasserted itself later. But this pro-AIT argument is circular in the sense that it is dependent on the AIT-based chronology, viz. of the Rg-Veda as post-Harappan. Its force is dissolved (along with the anomaly) if the possibility is considered that the Rg-Veda was pre-Harappan, with the unicorn an early Harappan innovation attested in both the archaeological and the late-Vedic literary record.

Asko Parpola has developed the theory that there is at least one clearly identifiable Hindu deity whose trail of importation from abroad we can follow. In the Bactrian Bronze Age culture, deemed Indo- n if not specifically Indo-Aryan, ample testimony is available of the cult of a lion goddess, known in Hinduism as *Durga*, “the fortress”, and who is “worshipped in eastern India as *Tripura*, a name which connects her with the strongholds of the Dasas”.¹³³ Politicized Indian invasionists usually claim goddess worship as a redeeming native, non-Aryan, “matriarchal” and “humanist” contribution to the “patriarchal” and “oppressive” Hindu religion, but now it turns out to have been brought along by the Bactrian invaders: how one invasionist can upset another invasionist’s appellation.

However, Parpola himself reports elsewhere that the same lion or tiger goddess was worshipped in the Indus-Saraswati civilization as well. Discussing “carriers of the Bronze Age culture of Greater Iran” as having been “quickly absorbed into the Indus civilization”, he finds support in “the famous Kalibangan seal showing a Durga-like goddess of war, who is associated with the tiger”.¹³⁴ whether this shows an early Bactrian penetration of India as far as the Saraswati riverside remains to be seen; other scenarios are possible. For now we retain Parpola’s confirmation of a common religious motif in a Harappan city and an Aryan culture.

Just like those few colleagues who have paid attention to the elements of continuity between Harappa and Aryan India, Sergent fads to discuss the most plausible conclusion that could be drawn from all this material: that Harappan and post-Harappan or Aryan are phases of a single civilization.

5.5.5. The impact of East-Asian mythology

Indo-European mythology, or some of its branches, has certain motifs and stories in common with mythologies of non-IE cultures. Some of these are a common heritage dating back to long before a separate IE linguistic and cultural identity existed.

Conversely, some myths can be shown to have been transmitted in a fairly recent time, e.g. the Excalibur myth known to most readers through the King Arthur saga has an exact parallel in a North-Iranian myth, with the sword being drawn from the stone (a poetic reference to the mystery of metallurgy, transforming shapeless ore into metal implements), making its bearer invincible, and finally getting thrown into a lake. This is not because of a common IE heritage of the Celtic and Iranian communities, but because in the 2nd century AD, Sarmatian mercenaries in the Roman army were garrisoned in Britain and, well, told their story.¹³⁵ Through Mongolia and

Korea, elements of this myth have even reached Japan when the supremacy of the sword was established there. So, myths are not necessarily witnesses from the night of time. Their invention and transmission can sometimes be dated.

In the case of the transmission of East-Asian myths into Hindu tradition, by medium of the Munda-speaking culture of the eastern Ganga basin, the apparent date might pose a problem. Some contributions are fairly late: “The *puja*, that extremely common and important practice of covering the gods’ idols with flowers and perfumes, is rather late in India, and succeeds wholly different practices: could that also be an East-Asian substratum?”¹³⁶ On the other hand, Sergent mentions several apparently East-Asian contributions to Vedic and Puranic lore which point to the ultimate beginning of those traditions themselves.

The name of *Ikshvaku*, founder of the Solar Dynasty of Ayodhya, whom the Puranic genealogies place several dozen generations before the Rg-Vedic seers, literally means “bitter gourd”. Likewise, Sumati, wife of the Ayodhya king Sagara, produces offspring with the aid of a bitter gourd. Sergent, following Jean Przyluski, attributes this to the Southeast-Asian mythic motif of the birth of humanity from a bitter gourd: “The Austro-Asiatic myth has visibly been transposed in the legends of Sumati and Ikshvaku”.¹³⁷

The birth of Vyasa’s mother Satyawati from a fish equally refers to a Southeast-Asian myth, unknown in the IE world. The Brahmanas have a story of Brahma or Prajapati, the Creator, taking the form of a boar and diving to the bottom of the ocean to extract the earth and bring it to the surface.¹³⁸ This myth of the “cosmogonic plunge” is widespread in Siberia, among the native Americans, and among some Southeast-Asian peoples, but is foreign to the IE mythologies and to the Vedic Samhitas. The same is true of another innovative mythic motif appearing in the Brahmanas: *BrahmANDa*, the cosmic egg which, when broken, releases all creatures.

Sergent explains that the Rg-Veda could not yet know these myths, just as it had not yet adopted items of Munda vocabulary, because its horizon was still confined to the northwest. But once the Vedic Aryans settled in the Ganga basin, they started assimilating the mythic lore of the Munda people, also immigrants, but who had settled there earlier. So, this seems to confirm the classic picture of the Aryans moving through North India from east to west.

To be sure, even the non-invasionist school accepts that the Vedic tradition spread eastwards during and after the Harappan period, just as it spread to South India in subsequent centuries; but it maintains that the Ganga down to Kashi or so, already had an Indo-Aryan (but non-Vedic) population. This population was obviously exposed to influences from its eastern neighbours, immigrants from Southeast Asia. And their non-Vedic, partly borrowed traditions were incorporated in later Vedic and especially in Puranic literature. By contrast, the IE-speaking people living to the west of the Vedic Puru tribe, those who migrated to the west and formed the other branches of IE, were not exposed to this Austro-Asiatic lore, which is why their mythologies have not adopted elements from Southeast-Asian myths, just as their languages have not borrowed from Munda (or if they have, those words or those mythic motifs would be pan-IE and not recognizable as borrowed).

If Ikshvaku, one of flood survivor Manu Vaivasvata’s immediate successors, was indeed a historical figure, and if his name really refers to an Austro-Asiatic myth, then that would prove either that Manu and his crew had come from the southeast (but then why hasn’t the bitter gourd myth become an IE myth?), or that the Mundas were already in the Ganga basin at the beginning of IE history as narrated in the Puranic genealogies (6776 BC?).¹³⁹ In that case, shouldn’t non-invasionists be able to find more points of contact between IE and Munda, linguistically too? How exactly should we imagine the beginning of IE history in India, in what cultural and linguistic environment?

For example, one could imagine that the Aryans overran the Indus basin, then Afghanistan and beyond, because they had been pushed to the west by invading Mundas from the east: if the idea of the fierce Aryans being put to flight by the fun-loving Mundas seems strange, remember that the invasion of the Roman Empire by the fierce Germanic tribes was partly caused by their being pushed westward by the Slavs. For another question: does this evidence of Munda contributions support the mainstream indological position that the entire Puranic history of the Vedic and pre-Vedic age in Ayodhya, Kashi or Prayag is but “reverse euhemerism”, i.e. the transformation of myth into tabulated history, so that Ikshvaku and his clan never existed except as projections by aryanized Mundas of their gourd-god onto the ancestry of their conquerors? This is worth a discussion in its own right, but an important point certainly is that Ikshvaku is mentioned in the Rg-Veda (10:60:4), possibly referring to the dynasty rather than its founder.

5.5.6. Some caveats to comparatists

Mythology is a large subject, and numerous myths are not well-known even to aficionados of the subject. This way, it sometimes happens that a Hindu myth gets classified as non-IE because it is not reported in any other IE mythology, only to show up in some far corner of the IE world upon closer scrutiny. Sergent provides one example. Everyone knows the Hindu myth of the “churning of the ocean” with which the gods and demons jointly produce the *amRta* the immortality drink. Sergent assures us that this myth “has no parallel in the IE world”¹⁴⁰, that it “is ignored by Vedic India and the IE world outside India”¹⁴¹ but present in Mongolian mythology and in the *Kojiki*, a kind of Japanese Purana. Yet, he also informs us of a lesser-known Germanic myth in which the god Aegir chums the ocean to make the beer of the gods.¹⁴² But that one finding, even if it is in only one (but certainly distant) corner of the IE world, completely nullifies the earlier statement that the myth “has no parallel in the IE world”. It is in fact possible that the Mongolian version (which is closer to the Germanic one, with a single deity doing the churning) and the Japanese version have been adapted from an IE original, just like the Excalibur myth.

Secondly, eastern contributions to Hindu tradition are not exclusively from the Mundas. The *RAjasUya* ceremony described in the Shatapatha Brahmana has an exact counterpart, not in Rome or Greece, nor in Chotanagpur or Japan, but in Fiji. The latter coronation ceremony has been analyzed into 19 distinct elements, and practically all of them are found in the *RAjasUya*.¹⁴³ This island culture is part of the vast expanse of the Austronesian language family. As we have seen, a number of scholars have pointed out remarkable lexical similarities between IE and Austronesian. Unlike in the case of the Mundas, contacts of the Indo-Europeans with the Austronesians are hard to locate even in theory, unless we assume that the Austronesians at one time had a presence in India (and even then, India is a big place).

Finally, if a myth or religious custom is attested in India but not in the other IE cultures, this need not mean that the Indians have borrowed it from “pre-Aryan natives” or so. It can also mean that the other Indo-Europeans have lost what was originally a pan-IE heirloom. All of them have started by going through the same bottleneck, passing through Afghanistan, immediately plunging themselves into a very different climate from India’s permanent summer, so that they had to adopt a very different lifestyle. And as they moved on, the difference only got bigger. Of practically all IE myths attested in some IE cultures, we know that they have been lost in other (generally in most) IE cultures; it is statistically to be expected that some myths have survived only in the Hindu tradition. And because of the full survival of Pagan religion in India plus the long centuries of literacy, it is in fact to be expected that a much higher percentage than the statistical average has only survived in India. So, probably, some myths attested only in Hinduism are purely IE, and if they are also attested in a non-IE neighbouring culture, the possibility remains that the latter has borrowed it from the Indo-Europeans.

5.5.7. Harappa, teacher of China?

Quite separate from the importation of Southeast-Asian myths through the Austro-Asiatic population of the Ganga basin, Sergent also notes similarities between Harappan and Chinese civilizations unrelated to Munda lore. An important myth is that of the cosmogonic tortoise, the Chinese symbol of the universe; also the vehicle of Varuna, god of world order, and the form which, in the Shatapatha Brahmana, Prajapati takes to create the world. A tortoise-shaped construction forms part of the Yajur-Vedic fire altar, and the tortoise has also been depicted in a giant sculpture found in Harappa, indicating a similar myth.¹⁴⁴ The tortoise as a cosmogonic symbol may well be one such mythic motif which is purely IE yet not attested in the non-Indian branches of IE. There is no indication for a foreign origin, and the tortoise's association with the Yamuna river (like the crocodile with the Ganga, the swan with the Saraswati) adds to its indigenous Northwest-Indian character.

Sergent also mentions the common origin of the Chinese and Hindu systems of 27 lunar mansions (*Xiu, Nakshatra*), which we have already considered. He admits that it could only have originated in an advanced culture, and that this was not Mesopotamia. He also notes that the *Nakshatra* system starts with the Pleiades/*kRttikA*, which occupied the vernal equinox position in the centuries around 2,400 BC, exactly during the florescence of the Indus cities.¹⁴⁵ So, Harappa is the best bet as originator of this system, which spread to China and later also to West Asia. Sergent wonders aloud whether the similarities should be attributed to Harappa being “the teacher of China, whose civilization's beginning is contemporaneous”.¹⁴⁶

He informs us that the Nakshatra division of the heavens is unknown in other IE cultures, and in this case I would not speculate that they had known it but lost it along the way: the system was invented long after they had left India. This simple fact that there already was IE history before the genesis of the Nakshatra system also explains another fact he mentions: “The Rg-Veda doesn't allude to it, except in its 10th mandala, the youngest one according to most indologists.”¹⁴⁷ And even the youngest book only mentions “constellations” (RV 10:85:2), a concept known to all cultures, without specifying them as lunar mansions. At any rate, it is only at the end of (if not completely after) the Rg-Vedic period, well after the European branches of IE had left India, that the Nakshatra system was devised. This indicates once more that the Rg-Veda was pre-Harappan.

This chronology is confirmed once more by, another fact related by Sergent: “Another aspect of the continuity between Indus and historical India is marked in the personal names: the oldest in Vedic India are in perfect conformity with Indo-European customs and highlight mostly the attributes with which an individual (or his family) adorns himself. In a later period astral names appear in India, which is foreign to the customs observed elsewhere among the Indo-Europeans”.¹⁴⁸ Exactly: the Rg-Vedic people lived before the heyday of astronomy in Harappa and before the starry sky acquired a central place in the late-Vedic “and” in the Harappan religion.

5.5.8. The Harappan contribution

It is remarkable that Sergent has identified the Oriental origin of so many Hindu myths, that he has identified the Dravidian and even African origin of so many Hindu customs (including even the purity concept underlying post-Vedic caste relations)¹⁴⁹, yet he has said relatively little about specifically Harappan contributions, even though these should logically have made a much larger impact. After all, the Harappans were more numerous, more advanced and more literate than the Mundas, and it is in their territory that the invading Aryans settled before scouting around in the then peripheral and relatively backward Munda-speaking region.

To be sure, Sergent devotes a chapter to the Harappan heritage in Hindu civilization. Thus, the weights and measures found in Lothal are the same ones which Kautilya has defined in his

Arthashastra.¹⁵⁰ Personally, I would add that apart from being an important fact in itself, this continuity may also be symptomatic for a profounder continuity pertaining to fundamental cultural traits. Thus, the same search for standardization visible in the decimal measurements and in the orderly geometrical lay-out of the Harappan cities is evident in the rigorous structure of the Vedic hymns; in the attempt in the later Vedic literature to categorize all types of phenomena in neat little systems (from verbal conjugation classes listed by the grammarians through the Manu Smṛti's artificial genealogy of the occupational castes in society to the Kama Sutra's varieties of sexual intercourse)¹⁵¹; and in the laborious ritual and architectonic details laid down in Brahminical texts for the proper construction of Vedic altars.

Sergent correctly notes that statuettes of mother goddesses have been found in large numbers in the Harappan cities, that mother goddesses are equally common in popular Hinduism, and that these are very uncommon in the historic IE religions. He also adds that in Europe, mother goddesses originated in the neolithic Old European culture, and remained popular all through the IE Pagan period to be picked up for christianization as Our Lady, suggesting a parallel: in India like in Europe, the popular pre-IE mother goddess survived and even asserted itself against the male-dominated IE official religion.

But clearly, IE religion was not hostile to the goddess cult: when the Church sought to win over the devout by accepting their goddess worship in a christianized form, most of Europe had been IE-speaking for several thousand years. All memory of a pre-IE period had vanished, yet these Celts and Romans and Germans venerated goddesses. In their mythologies, goddesses played only a supporting act, but this is the same situation as in Puranic Hinduism, in which goddess worship is widespread even though most myths have the male gods in the starring roles. It is like in real life: men need to dramatize their importance with all kinds of heroism, women simply are important without making such fuss over it. The Virgin Mary is by far the most popular Catholic saint, still present on every rural street corner around my village, much more popular than Jesus and His Father, yet the parts about her in the New Testament and the stories confabulated about her are very few. Therefore, our view of IE religion may be distorted by the fact that we rely on textual sources and myths, which belong to the public and official part of the religion; while by contrast, of Harappan religion we only have cult objects, showing us religion as it was lived by the people.

Sergent mentions the association of gods with animals as their respective "vehicle" (*vAhana*: Vishnu's eagle, Shiva's bull, Saraswati's swan etc.) as an element of Hinduism which is commonly attributed to the pre-Aryan Harappans. But he minimizes this contribution, pointing out that such associated animals are common throughout the IE pantheon, e.g. Athena with her owl, Wodan with his raven, Jupiter who can appear as an eagle, Poseidon as a horse, Demeter as a cow.¹⁵² In one case, the correspondence is even more exact: like Hindu goddess Saranyu (mother of the Ashwins), Celtic goddess Epona is imagined as either mare or rider.

Several more astronomy-based amendments to IE customs are mentioned as effects of Harappan influence, e.g. the fixation of the goddess festival (which existed in other parts of the IE world as well - see that the Indo-Europeans had goddess cults of their own?) at the autumnal equinox. Very significant is the "stellar vestment": the shirt worn by the famous Harappan "priest-king" shows little three-petaled designs (also in evidence on other Harappan depictions), which Sergent, following Parpola, interprets as depictions of stars, exactly like in the scriptural description of the *tArpya* coat which the king must wear at some point in the *RAjasUya* ceremony. In post-Harappan centuries, Mesopotamian kings are known to have worn such stellar vestments, and the China court ritual was likewise full of celestial symbolism.¹⁵³

What we see happening in the Harappan period is that a particular IE culture transforms itself under the impact of the florescence of what I would call a first scientific revolution; there is no indication of a foreign impact. Sergent has the facts under his own eyes without realizing their significance: "Shiva, Varuna, Yama, Durga-Parvati, we already said it, are deities of IE origin, the

rituals concerning fire, *soma* and the person of the king are equally of IE if not Indo-Iranian origin. But it is now obvious that the Indo-Aryans, upon arriving in India, have amply harvested the Harappan heritage and included its ritual customs (construction of hearth-altars, rites inside buildings, use of the stellar vestment, ritual baths, fixation of feasts on the stellar equinoxes...) in their own religion."¹⁵⁴ Well, building facilities had been vastly improved, astronomical knowledge had been developed, so these innovations are not a matter of syncretism, merely of material and intellectual progress.

What more continuity was there? Apart from numerous material items, we note Harappan depictions of men wearing a tuft of hair on their backheads like Brahmins do, and of women wearing anklets. Some pictures suggest the notion of the "third eye". Most importantly, the Harappan people have remained in place: "the Italian anthropologist has emphasized not only that the skulls of Mohenjo Daro resemble those of today's Sindh and those of Harappa resemble those of today's Panjab, but even that the individual variability is identical today to what it was four thousand years ago."¹⁵⁵ Though Sergent considers it exaggerated to say that "the Indus civilization is still alive today", I would comment that it is not very exaggerated.¹⁵⁶

But the point for now is that we really have seen very little evidence of the incorporation in Vedic tradition of elements which are foreign to it and which are traceable to the Harappan civilization. Compared with the limited but very definite list of items borrowed by Hindu tradition from Eastern cultures, the harvest in the case of the Harappan contribution is of a different type, larger but murkier. In spite of the ample archaeological material (quite in contrast with the zero objects identified as Vedic-age Austra-Asiatic), we don't get to see a sequence of "now it's in Harappa, and now it enters Vedic tradition". We don't get to see that clear contrast between Harappan and Vedic which most scholars have taken for granted. What we see is on the one hand plenty of elements which are simply in common between the Vedic and Harappan cultures, and on the other certain late-Vedic innovations which constitute a departure from the common IE heritage but which are perfectly explainable through internal developments, particularly in proto-scientific knowledge and material control of the environment.

Footnotes:

¹¹²Bernard Sergent: *Genèse de l'Inde*, p.402.

¹¹³Bernard Sergent: *Genèse de l'Inde*, p.323-324, with reference to Jarl Charpentier: "Ueber Rudra-Siva", *Wiener Zeitschrift zur Kunde des Morgenlandes*, 23 (1909), p. 151-179.

¹¹⁴Shrikant Talageri: *The Aryan Invasion Theory, a Reappraisal*, Ch. 14.

¹¹⁵Bernard Sergent: *Genèse de l'Inde*, p.252-278.

¹¹⁶Bernard Sergent: *Genèse de l'Inde*, p.139.

¹¹⁷Bernard Sergent: *Genèse de l'Inde*, p.139.

¹¹⁸Parpola: *Deciphering the Indus Script*, p.221.

¹¹⁹Pupul Jayakar: *The Earth Mother*, Penguin 1989 (1980), p.30. Remark that the Gonds are Dravidian-speaking tribals, which complicates the picture: are their customs to be

treated as the heritage of native tribals who adopted the immigrant Dravidian language, or as Dravidian heritage?

¹²⁰The shapeless stones associated with Shiva are comparable to the Black Stone in the Kaaba in Mecca, the central idol of the ancient Pagans of Arabia, which was dedicated to Hubal, a male moon-god resembling Shiva. For this reason, Indian authors have suggested some kind of kinship between the pre-Islamic cult in Mecca and the Shiva cult. This theory is critically discussed in Sita Ram Goel: *Hindu Temples, What Happened to Them*, vol.2, 2nd enlarged edition (Voice of India, Delhi 1993, appendix 2.

¹²¹Pupul Jayakar: *The Earth Mother*, p. 20-22.

¹²²Jan Van Alphen, of the *Etnografisch Museum*, Antwerp; personal communication, 1992.

¹²³Pupul Jayakar: *The Earth Mother*, p.36.

¹²⁴For a serious discussion of the profound meanings of linga worship, see Swami Karpatri & Alain Daniélou: *Le mystère du culte du linga*, Ed. du Relié, Robion 1993.

¹²⁵Or for a more academic variation: "The Brahmans succeeded in concealing the alcoholic and sexual-orgiastic character of the adoration of the phallus (lingam or linga) and transformed it into a pure ritualistic temple cult", according to Max Weber: *The Religion of India*, Munshiram Manoharlal, Delhi 1992 (ca. 1910), p.298. These Westerners' attitude is like that of the man in the joke, who visited a psychiatrist and was made to do the Rorschach test (i.e. revealing your psychic depths by saying what you "see" in shapeless ink blots). He described all kinds of sexual scenes, but when the psychiatrist diagnosed him as "sexually obsessed", he protested: "Sexually obsessed, me? But it's you who is showing me these dirty pictures!"

¹²⁶Rg-Veda 7:21:5 and 10:99:3.

¹²⁷Bernard Sergent: *Genèse de l'Inde*, p. 139; emphasis added.

¹²⁸M. Gimbutas: "Proto-Indo-European Culture: The Kurgan Culture during the Fifth, Fourth and Third Millennia BC", in George Cardona et al., eds.: *Indo-European and Indo-Europeans*, p. 191.

¹²⁹Asko Parpola: "The coming of the Aryans to Iran and India and the cultural and ethnic identity of the Dasas", *Studia Orientalia*, Helsinki 1988, p.238, quoted in K.D. Sethna: *The Problem of Aryan Origins*, p.222-223.

¹³⁰Bernard Sergent: *Genèse de l'Inde*, p. 161.

¹³¹Iravatham Mahadevan interviewed by Omar Khan, Chennai, 17-11998, on <http://www.harappa.com/script/mahadevantext.html>

¹³²"The Indus and the Saraswati", interview with R.S. Sharma published on <http://www2.cybercities.com/akhbar/godown/history/RSSIndus.htm> from 2-12-1998 onwards.

¹³³Asko Parpola: “The problem of the Aryans and the Soma: textual-linguistic and archaeological evidence”, in G. Erdosy: *The Indo-Aryans of Ancient South Asia*, p.370.

¹³⁴Asko Parpola: “The coming of the Aryans to Iran and India and the cultural and ethnic identity of the Dasas”, *Studia Orientalia*, Helsinki 1988, p. 238, quoted in K.D. Sethna: *The Problem of Aryan Origins*, p. 222-223.

¹³⁵Shan M.M. Winn: *Heaven, Heroes and Happiness. The Indo-European Roots of Western Ideology*, p. 34-35.

¹³⁶Bernard Sergent: *Genèse de l'Inde*, p.483, n.639, with reference to Louis de la Vallée Poussin: “Totémisme et végétalisme”, *Extrait des Bulletins de la Classe des Lettres et des Sciences Morales et Politiques*, 1929, 3me série, XV, p.4-9, who emphasizes the similarity with devotional practices among the Kol tribe and among the Semang, a tribe in Malaysia. The more common explanation is that *pUjA* came from the south.

¹³⁷Bernard Sergent: *Genèse de l'Inde*, p.386, quoting Jean Przyluski: “Un ancien peuple du Pendjab: les Udumbara”, *Journal Asiatique* 208, 1926, p-30.

¹³⁸Bernard Sergent: *Genèse de l'Inde*, p-372, citing Taittiriya Brahmana 7:1:5:1-2 and Shatapatha Brahmana 14:1:2:11.

¹³⁹A parallel argument could be made from the commonly assumed etymology of *GaNga*, a name already appearing in the oldest part of the Rg-Veda (6:45:31), viz. as an Austro-Asiatic loan cognate to Chinese *kiang/jiang*, “river”. This would mean that the Munda presence in the (western!) Ganga basin well precedes the beginning of the Vedic period, and that they were either the first or the dominant group, so that they could impose their nomenclature. However, Zhang Hongming: “Chinese etyma for river”, *Journal of Chinese Linguistics*, January 1998, p. 1-43, has refuted the derivation of Chinese *kiang* from Austro-Asiatic, arguing among other things that the reconstructed Austro-Asiatic form is **krong*, still preserved in the Mon-Khmer languages (even the river name *Mekong* appears unrelated; I once heard Prof. Satyavrat Shastri explain it as a Cambodian sanskritism from *MA GangA*). This makes the Munda origin of *GaNga* less likely. A third language family may be involved, or an obscure IE etymon. How about Middle Dutch *konk-el*, “twist, turn, whirlpool”?

¹⁴⁰Bernard Sergent: *Genèse de l'Inde*, p. 116.

¹⁴¹Bernard Sergent: *Genèse de l'Inde*, p.378-379.

¹⁴²Bernard Sergent: *Genèse de l'Inde*, p.378-79, with reference to Georges Dumézil: *Le Problème des Centaures*, Paris 1929, p. 51-60.

¹⁴³Bernard Sergent: *Genèse de l'Inde*, p.381, with reference to Shatapatha Brahmana 5:3-5, and Arthur M. Hocart: *Kingship*, OUP 1927, p.76-83.

¹⁴⁴Bernard Sergent: *Genèse de l'Inde*, p.116, with reference to John Marshall: *Mohenjo Daro and the Indus civilization*, London 1931.

¹⁴⁵This date, approximately, has been accepted by Jean Filliozat: “Notes d’astronomie ancienne de l’Iran et de l’Inde”, *Journal Asiatique* 250, 1962, p.325-350; Albert Pike: “Lectures on the Arya”, Kentucky 1873; and A.L. Basham: *The Wonder That Was India*, London 1954, according to Bernard Sergent: *Genèse de l'Inde*, p.422, n.65. We’ll stick to

this date for the present discussion, but not without mentioning that Asko Parpola (*Decipherment of the Indus Script*, p.206, p.263-265) himself gives reasons for thinking that Aldebaran had been the starting-point earlier, which would push back the birthdate of the Nakshatra system to ca. 3054 BC, the time of the pre-Harappan Kot Diji culture.

¹⁴⁶Bernard Sergent: *Genèse de l'Inde*, p.380.

¹⁴⁷Bernard Sergent: *Genèse de l'Inde*, p.118.

¹⁴⁸Bernard Sergent: *Genèse de l'Inde*, p.121.

¹⁴⁹Bernard Sergent: *Genèse de l'Inde*, p.483, n.639: "As the same importance of purity is found in other societies, e.g. Semitic societies including even Islam and sub-Saharan Africa, it is not impossible that we have here another substratum: that of the ex-Dravidians of North India [*Sindh-Gujarat*], for instance?"

¹⁵⁰Bernard Sergent: *Genèse de l'Inde*, p. 1 13.

¹⁵¹As Cyrus Spitama, central character in Gore Vidal's historical novel *Creation* puts it: east of the Indus, everything is counted. Witness the 64 skills, the 24 categories plus the 1 spectator of Samkhya ("numbering") cosmology, the 4 noble truths and the noble 8-fold path of the Buddha, the 8-limbed yoga of Patanjali, the 4 stages of life, Jawaharlal Nehru's "5 principles of peaceful coexistence" etc.

¹⁵²Bernard Sergent: *Genèse de l'Inde*, p. 1 15.

¹⁵³Bernard Sergent: *Genèse de l'Inde*, p.121, with reference to Asko Parpola: *Deciphering the Indus Script*, p.201-218.

¹⁵⁴Bernard Sergent: *Genèse de l'Inde*, p.124.

¹⁵⁵Bernard Sergent: *Genèse de l'Inde*, p. 128, quoting Mario Cappieri: "Ist die Indus-Kultur und ihre Bevölkerung wirklich verschwunden?", *Anthropos* 60:22,1965, p.22.

¹⁵⁶Bernard Sergent: *Genèse de l'Inde*, p.128. The quoted phrase, which Sergent dismisses in footnote (p.425, n.146) as "a Hindu nationalist myth", is from Dharma Pal Agrawal: *L'Archéologie de l'Inde*, CNRS, Paris 1986, p.2.

5. Some new arguments

5.6. CONCLUSION

Bernard Sergent has written a book of incomparable erudition to narrate the genesis of the “composite culture” of Hinduism from what to him are the separate sources of Harappan, Dravidian, Indo-European and Austra-Asiatic elements. As part of this effort, he has tried to pinpoint the arrival of the Indo-Aryans in India, and this attempt has become the heroic failure of his book. Even in his two fields of expertise, he has not succeeded in finding decisive evidence for the Aryan invasion: in archaeology, he has not shown where a Bactrian or otherwise foreign culture crossed the Indus into India (indeed, the one entry he identifies as the Indo-Aryan invasion doesn't get farther than Pirak in Baluchistan); and in physical anthropology, he has not been able to identify an immigration wave coinciding with the supposed aryanization of northwestern India.

In comparative religion and mythology, he has thrown a few interesting challenges to non-invasionists, giving them some homework to do in fact-finding as well as in interpreting the data. But here too, he has not presented any insurmountable difficulties for a non-invasionist reading of the Harappan and Vedic information. On the contrary, many bits of information which he has either discovered or synthesized from secondary sources actually add substance to the emerging outlines of a non-invasionist version of ancient Indian and Indo-European history. For once the trite reviewer's phrase fully applies: one need not agree with Sergent's position, but his work is highly thought-provoking and bound to stimulate further research.

6.1. SOME FALSE PROBLEMS

6.1.1. Glottochronology

The idea that the direction of the migration from the IE language family from its *Urheimat* should be reversed, may still be hard to digest. Could several generations of scholars have been collectively wrong? One of the objections which I expect both laymen and academics to raise, is the magnitude of the chronological revision needed to account for a scenario which makes the Rg-Veda pre- instead of post-Harappan. The non-invasionist school shifts the date of the Rg-Veda back a full two thousand years. Could the scholars have been so wrong about such matters as the rate of change of languages, that the length of the history of Sanskrit has to be increased this much?

One of the methods used in estimating the age of the fragmentation of PIE into the IE language groups is, or rather was, *glottochronology*, an extrapolation of the observed rate of change in languages onto the preliterate past. When comparing dictionaries or literary corpora of successive centuries, one can count the number of words disappearing from or newly appearing in a language; and likewise the phonological and grammatical changes. Yet, it is very doubtful that the results obtained can reasonably be extrapolated, except the unavoidable finding that the rate of change is very uneven. Languages develop slower or faster depending on the cultural changes in the speech community, on the rate of contact with other languages, and on purely random factors. Thus, Greeks and Albanians both lived for several centuries under Turkish rule, and this had, little effect on the Greek language but made a tremendous impact on Albanian, which replaced a large part of its vocabulary with Turkish words. Therefore, 19th-century calculations of the age of IE on this basis are no longer relied upon: "glottochronology is a methodological deadlock".¹

Nonetheless, it is easy to show that languages evolve more slowly than the standard version of the AIT implies. Linear-B Greek is a thousand years older than classical Greek, yet it is unmistakably Greek, not some half-way stage between Greek and the other branches of IE. The Romance (and likewise the Slavic) languages have gone their separate ways nearly two thousand years ago, and yet they still have a whole lot in common. It takes many centuries to arrive at the degree of difference as exists between Indo-Iranian and the other branches of IE, and even centuries to arrive at the known difference between Iranian and Sanskrit.

In a discussion on the Aryan question, a friend of mine who is an AIT-believing philologist remarked off-hand that the Indo-Aryan languages showed more internal change (from Old through Middle to New Indo-Aryan) than the other IE language groups. This may be true, if only because Old Indo-Aryan was much more archaic and closer to reconstructed PIE than the oldest known Latin or Slavic or Armenian (another reason being that modern Hindi or Bengali are nieces rather than daughters of Sanskrit). It is especially remarkable when you consider that the Indo-Aryan languages have lived in a comparatively very stable linguistic environment, with little foreign impact; even Persian, the court language in the 13th to 19th century in North India, has only imparted some vocabulary but failed to influence Hindi grammar.

Let us assume, then, that this impression of a relatively high rate of change in Indo-Aryan is correct. The rate of change in Indo-Aryan would not be abnormally high if its history is made two thousand years longer, as the Indian critics of the AIT maintain. This would become perfectly normal if the time span from Vedic Sanskrit to modern Hindi is found to be twice as long as that from Homeric Greek to modern Greek, i.e. if the Vedas are dated to before rather than after the golden age of the Harappan cities.

6.1.2. Zarathushtra's chronology

In this context, the objection will also be raised of the incompatibility of the non-invasionist chronology with the date of Zarathushtra, now commonly assigned to ca. 1200 BC. However, this date of Zarathushtra is itself based on the AIT, on the assumption that Zarathushtra was only slightly younger than the Vedic seers. Move the date of the Veda, and Iranologists will move the date of Zarathushtra accordingly. Moreover, the time distance between the Avesta and the Rg-Veda is definitely longer than usually assumed. Zarathushtra writes in a language that is younger than Vedic.

In the introduction to his authoritative translation of Zarathushtra's *Gathas*, Prof. S. Insler writes: "The prophet's hymns are laden with ambiguities resulting both from *the merger of many grammatical endings* and from the intentionally compact and often elliptical style..."² Compared with Vedic, Zarathushtra's language was already eroded morphologically and phonologically. Admittedly, such glottochronological argument is in general not strong (modern Lithuanian has preserved Indo-Europeanisms which Greek had lost 3000 years ago), but here we have two very closely related languages, both in the same solemn and conservative style of religious hymns. Moreover, Zarathushtra also expresses a stage of religious development that is quite post-Vedic (e.g. his reaction against animal sacrifice, paralleled by the same development in post-Rg-Vedic India), being in some respects a reaction against Vedic notions and practices. I suggest Zarathushtra belonged to the Bactrian Bronze Age culture, while the Rg-Veda belonged to the pre-Harappan stage (incipient urbanization, no metal weapons yet) of the Indus-Saraswati culture.

Does this agree with the Iranian traditions concerning the age of Zarathushtra? Yes and no. Iranian literature has highly divergent accounts of the age of Zarathushtra, ranging from 5,000 to 600 BC. One of the dates is bound to be close to the actual date which will have to be decided on the basis of external evidence, not least Zarathushtra's relation with Vedic history.

6.1.3. The West-Asian term "Asura"

Another serious objection concerns the term *Asura*: in the Rg-Veda a word for "god" (cfr. Germanic *Ase*, *Aesir*), in later Vedic literature a word for "demon", obviously parallel and causally related with the Iranian preference for *Asura/Ahura* as against the demonized *Deva/Daeva*, the remaining Hindu term for "god".³ In the Indo-Aryan diaspora in West Asia of the 2nd millennium BC, we find quite a few personal names with *Asura*, e.g. the Mitannic general *Kart-ashura*, the name *Biry-ashura* attested in Nuzi and Ugarit, in Nuzi also the names *Kalm-ashura* and *Sim-ashura*, the Cilician king *Shun-ashura*, while in Alalakh (Syria), two people were called *Ashura* and *Ashur-atti*.⁴ Bernard Sergent explicitly deduces a synchronism between early Vedic and Mitannic-Kassite, which tallies splendidly with the AIT chronology.

At present, this can only be refuted at the level of hypothesis. it is perfectly possible, even if not yet attested archaeologically or literarily, that along with the Iranians, a purely Indo-Aryan-speaking group emigrated from India in the Rg-Vedic period to seek its fortune in the Far West (it may be from them that Uralic speakers in Central Asia borrowed the term *Asura* along with *Sapta*, *Sasar*, etc.). It is these Indo-Aryan bands of warriors who engineered the conquests of their Mitannic and Kassite host populations. Considering that Vedic names are still given to Hindu children today, thousands of years after Vedic Sanskrit went out of daily use, and often in communities which speak a non-Indo-Aryan language, it is quite conceivable that the Indo-Aryans in West Asia managed to preserve their Vedic tradition from the time of their emigration until the mid-2nd millennium BC. And if so, they had to preserve it in the form it had at the time of their emigration, i.e. complete with the veneration for *Asura*, the Lord.

6.1.4. Greater India

Sometimes, Indian scholars unnecessarily overstate their claims, usually to the effect of magnifying the Hindu presence and role in the genesis of civilization in general or specified cultural achievements in particular. Thus, most of them used to be (and many still are) enthusiastic believers in the initial assumption of the fledgling Indo-European philology that Sanskrit was the mother of all other IE languages, rather than their sister. Western scholars can at best smile condescendingly when they read the fairly frequent claim that Hindus created the Mayan culture in Central America, not to speak of Paramesh Choudhury's claim that Chinese culture came from India.⁵

In the same spirit, the impression that the Kassites along with the Mitannians were to an extent Indo-Aryan, has been incorporated in an Indocentric account of IE expansion. Non-invasionists have made much of the presence of Sanskrit names in the Kassite dynasty in Babylon. Yet, the reality revealed by this evidence may be more complicated than is usually assumed. We have information from Semitic Mesopotamians about the Kassite language, and it was not Indo-Aryan. A number of known Kassite words are apparently unrelated to any known language, e.g. *mashu*, ("god"; *yanzi*, "king"; *saribu*, "foot". They also seem to have a formation of the plural unknown in IE, viz. with an infix, e.g. *sirpi*, *sirpami*, "brown one(s)", or *minzir*, *minzamar*, "dotted one(s)",⁶ Assuming that the language described as "Kassite" and located by the Babylonian sources in the hills east of Mesopotamia is indeed the language of the Kassite dynasty (for language names sometimes change referent)⁷, does this not refute the Indian connection of the Kassites?

No: to the relief of the much-maligned Hindu chauvinists, this state of affairs suggests a third scenario, viz. that a non-IE population in Iran used Sanskrit names referring to Vedic gods. Let the Kassites have spoken a non-IE language.⁸ This would be the same situation as in the Dravidian provinces: a non-IE-speaking population maintains its own language but adopts Sanskritic lore and nomenclature. This would mean that Vedic culture had spread as much to the west as we know it has spread to the east and south, and that a part of western Iran (well before its iranianization) was as much part of Greater India as Kerala or Bali became in later centuries.

6.1.5. Simple and avoidable mistakes

In the search for Aryan origins, scholars have sometimes been misled by ignorance of very down-to-earth facts. Let me give an example from my own experience. The approach known as linguistic paleontology has tried to connect the IE vocabulary with the flora and fauna of a particular region or climate zone, but mistakes have been made concerning the Indian fauna. It has been said that the otter (Sanskrit *udra*, Hindi *Ud-bilAw*) does not exist in India, while the word otter is part of the original PIE vocabulary, thus confirming that India cannot be the Urheimat. While I was pondering this problem, the answer came from my little daughter: "Daddy, when are we going to the zoo?" That's where I learned of the simple fact that otters do live in the rivers of the Himalayan foothills.

Likewise, the salmon has been used to decide the Urheimat question, with the claim that it only lives in the Caspian area (serving the interests of both the Kurgan and the Anatolian Urheimat schools).⁹ The IE word **laksos* has retained its original meaning in German, Lithuanian, Russian, Ossetic. It has also developed the general meaning "fish" in Kuchi (Tokharic B); "reddish", "white-spotted red" (i.e. salmon-coloured) in some Iranian and Indo-Aryan languages; and in Indo-Aryan also "100,000".¹⁰ The core meaning is undeniably the salmon, so if there is any validity in linguistic paleontology, there ought to be salmon in the Urheimat. Well, it so turns out that you do find salmon in some rivers of northwestern India.

It gets worse when we come to inside knowledge of Hindu civilization, or to the more technical aspects of this debate. Many advances made by scholars in one discipline, or in one country, are not known to scholars working elsewhere or in another discipline. I am sure that in this book, I must have overlooked pertinent information which is publicly available but somehow not within my horizon; and I see it happen to others as well. This is where doubt and anxiousness come in handy: if you're worried that you may be wrong, you get motivated to scan all the sources of information.

This is where the prevalent self-assuredness in both camps is so counterproductive. And of course, everyone should realize by now that we need an interdisciplinary approach: the fact that Sir Mortimer Wheeler dug up Harappan cities did not by itself give him the competence to interpret his findings in terms of Vedic or non-Vedic culture. Linguists and archaeologists and other experts in their respective fields ought to give a hearing to specialists in neglected aspects of the evidence, starting with Vedic studies.

But the funny part of the problem is the numerous cases where scholars don't see the import of data even when these are presented to them. Thus, during question time after his lecture, I heard a prominent invasionist scholar explain to someone who brought up the evidence of the Saraswati having dried up and thereby providing a *terminus ante quem* for the Saraswati-centred Rg-Veda, that "the Saraswati didn't disappear completely, for it is still mentioned in Sutra texts ca. 600 BC". He did not realize that the whole chronology of Vedic literature is at stake here, and that the conventional date of the Sutra literature should not be taken for granted. Indeed, non-invasionists claim precisely that the Sutra literature was largely produced during the Harappan period, before 2,000 BC, when the Saraswati was still a mighty river. The thing to do here is not to address stray remarks but to first acquaint oneself with the complete version of history as conceived by the opposing side.

Footnotes:

¹Harald Haarmann: "Basic' vocabulary and language contacts: the disillusion of glottochronology", *Indogermanische Forschungen*, 1990, p.35.

²S. Insler: *The Gathas of Zarathustra*, in the series *Acta Iranica*, 3rd series vol.1, Brill, Leiden 1975, p.1 (emphasis mine).

³Bernard Sergent: *Genèse de l'Inde*, p.211 and p.280, makes the very popular mistake of seeing "the Asuras" as a separate class of gods next to "the Devas". In fact, the distinction and opposition between them is a late-Vedic development connected with the Irano-Indian (or Mazdeic-Vedic) conflict. In the Rg-Veda, *Deva* and *Asura* are as synonymous as "God" and "Lord" are in Christian parlance.

⁴Bernard Sergent: *Genèse de l'Inde*, p.210. In this context, though assyriologists might reject it as just too obvious, something can be said in favour of a link between *Asura* and the city name *Assur*, whence the ethnonym *Assyrian*. Some Indian authors are at any rate eager to read a Sanskrit origin in Sanskrit-sounding names like *Assur-bani-pal*.

⁵Thus, Bernard Sergent: *Genèse de l'Inde*, p.477, scornfully mentions Paramesh Choudhury: *Indian Origin of the Chinese Nation, and The India We Have Lost: Did India Colonize and Civilize Sumeria, Egypt, Greece and Europe?* Strange theses indeed, but Choudhury's more recent book *The Aryan Hoax* shows a rare familiarity with contemporary scholarly thinking on the Aryan question, which Sergent fails to acknowledge.

⁶Wilfred van Soldt: “Het Kassitisch”, *Phoenix* (Leiden) 1998, p.90-93.

⁷E.g. the name “Frankish/French” originally refers to a Germanic language, roughly Old Dutch, yet now refers to the Romance language spoken in a state founded by the Frankish and Germanic-speaking king Clovis. Likewise, the name “Hittite” of an IE language is in fact the same word as “Hattic”, name of the pre-IE Anatolian language displaced by Hittite.

⁸One of my history teachers in secondary school, Father Koenraad, used to speculate that the names Hatti and Kassi- are the same: fricative [h] or [x] corresponding to occlusive [k], as between Greek *kard-* and Germanic *heart*, and intervocalic [tt] softened to [ss], as in the Greek allophonic variation *thalatta/thalassa* (“sea”) or in the softening of intervocalic [t] from Greek *demokratia* to [s] in English *democracy*. This hypothesis, while unprovable, is as good as any other: it is by no means impossible that a tribe in the Kurdish mountains retained a language cognate to that of the original Anatolians, even when the latter lost theirs in favour of the incoming IE language now known as Hittite.

⁹E.g. T. Gamkrelidze and V. Ivanov: *Indo-European and the Indo-Europeans*, p.454.

¹⁰Hindi *lakh*, Sanskrit *laksha* means “100,000”. The derivation may be analogous to that of the Chinese character *wan*, “10,000”, which depicts an ant, hence “bristling anthill”, “uncountably many”.

6. Departing thoughts

6.2. THINGS TO DO

6.2.1. The archaeological job

Not being an archaeologist, I do not want to evaluate the *status quaestionis* of the archaeological search for IE origins. All I can do is note that the archaeologists themselves don't seem to have mapped out the trail of the early Indo-Europeans in South and Central Asia with a convincing amount of detail. Asko Parpola and Bernard Sergent have made a valiant attempt, and invasionists are hopeful that if pursued further, these efforts should lead to the definitive proof of the AIT. However, we have seen that the interpretation which Parpola and Sergent give to the crucial Bactrian Bronze Age culture as Indo-Aryan is uncertain, and that their own data could better support the identification of that culture as Iranian. More importantly, we have seen that they have not succeeded in getting the Bactrians into India, i.e. in proving an actual migration of people and of a culture *into* India.

The Bactrian Bronze Age culture is a rather late affair in IE history, which started at least 3,000 years earlier. The focus should be on the origins of the Kurgan culture in ca. 5000 BC. There is sufficient evidence to conclude provisionally that it originated in Asia, to the east of the Caspian Sea, e.g. Russian scholar N. Merpert traces the Kurgan culture to the "Volga-Ural region, developing there under the influence of Neolithic cultures of the south-east Caspian zone".¹¹ And where do we go back to from there? If India is the homeland of the IE family, there should be traces of a cultural expansion or migration from India to the Caspian region around 5,000 BC, the pre-Vedic age.

Another thing to do is to dig up the ancient settlements in the Ganga basin. Unlike the mighty Indus-Saraswati cities, these won't be readily visible, nor are they easily accessible as abandoned ruins: many of them lie underneath bustling cities. But there, as much as in the Harappan area, a very important part of India's (and possibly the Indo-European language family's) history lies waiting for discovery.

6.2.2. Literary testimony to Harappan decline

If it is true that Harappan civilization was prominently Indo-Aryan and that much of Sanskrit literature was written in the Harappan period, then a certain chronological stage in this literary tradition should correspond to the decline and ruination of the Harappan cities. So far, the only literary reference to this process that I've heard of, is a Mahabharata line mentioning the sinking and drying up of the Saraswati river, and attributing it to the goddess's disgust with the decline in moral and cultural standards among the population. That hardly suffices as literary testimony to such a vast civilizational crisis as the abandonment of the Harappan cities. So, this will become an object of mockery for the skeptics, unless the non-invasionists meet the challenge and present the literary evidence.

6.2.3. Let us keep on doubting

One thing which keeps on astonishing me in the present debate is the complete lack of doubt in both camps. Personally, I don't think that either theory, of Aryan invasion and of Aryan indigenesness, can claim to have been "proven" by prevalent standards of proof; eventhough one of the contenders is getting closer. Indeed, while I have enjoyed pointing out the flaws in the

AIT statements of the politicized Indian academic establishment and its American amplifiers, I cannot rule out the possibility that the theory which they are defending may still have its merits.

On both sides, I have seen so much self-satisfaction, the conceit of the academic establishment disdaining the contributions of “amateurs”, the bad faith among the Indian Marxists dismissing every word uttered by “Hindu chauvinists”, the triumphalism among the non-invasionists about having exposed “the myth of the Aryan invasion”. Many seem to think that all the questions have been answered, that only mad or evil people can still adhere to the rivalling school of thought, so that there is also no need to listen to their objections; but what I see is that at least many parts of the question are still waiting for an answer.

For example, the non-invasionists should recognize the merits in the invasionist skepticism of the horse evidence found in the Harappan cities. It is one thing for Prof. B.B. Lal (one of those healthy doubters who only came to dismiss the “myth of the Aryan invasion” gradually) to cite recent finds of horse bones as proving that “the horse was duly known to the Harappans” and to quote archaeozoologist Prof. Sandor Bokonyi as confirming that the horses found in Surkotada were indeed horses (which some had refused to believe due to their AIT bias), and that “the domestic nature of the Surkotada horses is undoubtful”.¹² It is another to deduce that the horse was simply part of Harappan life rather than an exotic curiosity; AIT defenders have a point when they maintain that the horse was not part of the Harappan lifestyle the way it was in the Kurgan culture. More work is to be done, both in digging and incorrectly interpreting the data.

Likewise, invasionists reproach non-invasionists for disregarding the fact of kinship between IE languages, and for behaving as if the presence of IE languages in both India and Europe needs no explanation. They really have a point: most Indian publications focus exclusively on Indian history, and show absolutely no interest in explaining how, if IE was native to India, it made its way to distant countries. True, research is also guided by the actual facts which are being discovered, i.c. findings in India which undermine the AIT, so it is normal to focus on India. But a scholar must not be satisfied with giving *some* answers; he must aim for a theory which answers *all* relevant questions.

Footnotes:

¹¹Paraphrase by J.P. Mallory: “The chronology of the early Kurgan tradition”, Journal of Indo-European Studies, 1977/4, p.339, with reference to a Russian article by N. Merpert, Moscow 1974.

¹²Sandor Bokonyi: letter to the Director General of the Archaeological Survey of India, 13-12-1993, quoted in B.B. Lal: The Myth of Aryan Invasion: Some Reflections on the Authorship of the Harappan Civilization, inaugural address delivered at the Second International Conference of the World Association for Vedic Studies, Los Angeles, 7-8-1998.

6. Departing thoughts

6.3. THE NON-INVASIONIST MODEL

The emerging alternative to the Aryan Invasion Theory may be summarized as follows. In the 6th millennium BC, the Proto-Indo-Europeans were living in what is now Panjab, Haryana and western Uttar Pradesh, speaking a variety of mutually comprehensible dialects, and tending cattle as well as practising agriculture. Due to demographic growth, internal conflicts and the occasional economic crisis, some of them moved out through the Khyber pass to Margiana and Bactria, which was to remain a frontier zone of Indian culture for millennia. From there, some of them moved on to the Caspian coast, while others moved east to become the Tokharians. During this stay in Central Asia, they adapted to the local way of life, growing millet and domesticating the horse, a skill which was soon communicated back to the motherland. The group which separated earliest from the rest was the one which took the oldest form of the IE language along: we encounter them by 2,000 BC in Anatolia.

The next move of the IE settlers in Central Asia, by 4,500 BC, brought them across the Urals and the Volga into Europe. By internal development and because of interaction with ever new native populations, their dialects changed and differentiated. Expanding ever more westward and southward, they broke into the Old European civilization of the Balkans and overran Anatolia. Another group developed its own distinctive culture in northern Central Europe, and was poised to overrun Western Europe and the British Isles.

Meanwhile in India, civilization made great strides, writing was invented ca. 3,500 BC (unfortunately too late for the emigrants to take along), astronomy perfected, cities built of ever greater urbanistic quality. The language, still spoken only in a limited area, had developed the characteristic traits of Indo-Iranian, except in some outlying regions where older forms of IE were preserved, among them Proto-Bangani. Priests composed hymns to the gods and learned the hymns composed by their teachers and colleagues by heart, accumulating a tradition known as *Veda*.

In the northern Indus basin, the Indo-Iranians started fighting amongst each other, and one result was that several factions followed the beaten track to Afghanistan and beyond. We meet them in history as the Iranians, who had built strongholds in Bactria whence their adventurers trekked north and then east as well as west, turning the whole of Central Asia into an Iranian *Lebensraum*; much later, they also conquered the countries to the west and southwest as far as Mesopotamia. They often clashed with the Indians, who had just reached the apogee of civilization with their large and numerous well-planned cities, and who tried to gain control over the Afghan mining centres. Later, perhaps already as a result of the crisis which sounded the death-knell of the magnificent Harappan cities, more people migrated from India to become the West-Asian Indo-Aryans. Having moved through Margiana to the south side of the Caspian Sea, they mixed with Hurrites, Kassites and others, and pushed as far west as Palestine, making their mark for a few centuries (18th-12th century BC) in different parts of West Asia before disappearing through assimilation,

In the southern Indus-Saraswati basin, the Indo-Aryans met the Dravidians whom they assimilated. However, Dravidian language and culture were preserved thanks to Dravidian colonists who had started settling in the south, in their turn assimilating the Veddoid and other native tribals. In a parallel movement, Indo-Aryans were colonizing India's interior, assimilating

the tribals they encountered, except in the less accessible corners where they left them to their traditional way of life. This movement from the northwest to the rest of India accelerated with the decline of the Harappan cities, yielding essentially the very distribution of languages over the Indian territory which exists till today.

This model will certainly need amendments and corrections, but it is better able to explain the data than the dominant Kurgan-to-India invasionist model.



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SEPTEMBER 2016



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Summary

India's economy has grown rapidly in recent years, but the country's bureaucratic quality is widely perceived to be either stagnant or in decline. While small, India's elite civil service cadre, the Indian Administrative Service (IAS), occupies the nerve center of the Indian state. Unfortunately, the IAS is hamstrung by political interference, outdated personnel procedures, and a mixed record on policy implementation, and it is in need of urgent reform. The Indian government should reshape recruitment and promotion processes, improve performance-based assessment of individual officers, and adopt safeguards that promote accountability while protecting bureaucrats from political meddling.

Key Insights Into the IAS

- For officers early in their careers, exam scores and education are highly predictive of future success.
- Older officers who enter the service as part of larger cadres face limited career prospects and are less effective at improving economic outcomes.
- While initial characteristics heavily shape career trajectories, in the long term, there are clear rewards for officers who systematically invest in training or acquire specialized skills.
- Individual bureaucrats can have strong, direct, and measurable impacts on tangible health, education, and poverty outcomes.
- Surprisingly, officers with strong local ties—thought to be vulnerable to corruption—are often linked to improved public service delivery.
- Political interference generates substantial inefficiency: the best officers do not always occupy important positions, while political loyalty offers bureaucrats an alternative path to career success.
- Counterintuitively, greater political competition does not necessarily lead to better bureaucratic performance.

A Reform Agenda for the Civil Service

- The central and state governments should pass and implement pending legislation that protects bureaucrats against politically motivated transfers and postings. Despite judicial prodding, most states have stalled on such moves.

- The IAS should use data on civil servants' abilities, education, and training when placing officers early in their careers. As officers gain experience, performance metrics can inform key decisions about promotion and allocation.
- The government should consider the proposal that officers deemed unfit for further service at certain career benchmarks be compulsorily retired through a transparent and uniform system of performance review. While the present government has moved in this direction, this procedure should be institutionalized.
- State and central governments should discuss whether state cadres should be given greater latitude to experiment with increasing the proportion of local IAS officers and track their relative performance.
- Further research is needed to better understand the impact of local officers on development outcomes, to develop data on bureaucratic efficiency among officers in senior posts, and to systematically examine the workings of state-level bureaucracies.

Introduction

In the annals of global democracy, India holds an unusual status. Almost seventy years ago, at the time of winning its independence from the British Empire, the country instituted a system of universal franchise at an extremely low level of per capita income and when the vast majority of its population lacked even basic literacy. Over these seven decades, India has surprised many pessimists by sustaining democratic governance despite remaining a very poor country.

The considerable economic progress India has achieved is undeniable, particularly in the last few decades. Between 1990 and 2014, India averaged an annual rate of per capita economic growth of nearly 6.5 percent, reducing the share of its population living in extreme poverty from 50.3 percent as of 1987 to 21.3 percent by 2011 in the process.¹

In today's global economy, marked by slumping growth rates and extreme volatility, India stands out as a relative bright spot. In the coming years, according to forecasts by the International Monetary Fund, India is expected to remain the fastest-growing major economy in the world, having finally displaced China as the occupant of this coveted designation.²

Yet while India's short-term prognosis is quite favorable, there is nothing preordained about its future economic trajectory. Globally, there is a robust, positive relationship between the quality of government and economic progress. But India has experienced rapid growth in spite of below-par governance.

Indeed, the quality of India's public-sector institutions in particular has struggled to keep pace with the country's rapid economic advancement. As the adage goes, "India grows at night while the government sleeps."³ Unless India is able to reform its administrative apparatus, sustained economic gains will prove elusive.

Those who have come into contact with the country's bureaucracy have long criticized it for being cumbersome, slow, inefficient, and often venal. Indeed, its infirmities are so widely known that the Indian bureaucracy is the subject of unstinting pop culture mockery. From *Ji Mantriji*, an adaptation of the BBC series *Yes Minister* that made light of political will meeting administrative intransigence, to *Office Office*, a long-running sitcom about a hapless common man stymied by a corrupt, labyrinthine state, the Indian administrative apparatus has not fared well in terms of popular perception.

Today, in 2016, there is a lingering view that corruption and politicization of the civil services have become more, not less, entrenched. According to a measure of government effectiveness developed by the World Bank that captures the quality of a country's civil service, its independence from political

pressure, and the quality of policy formulation and implementation, India's performance is middling. Data from 2014 place India in the forty-fifth percentile globally, nearly a 10 percentage point decline from the country's position in 1996, when these data were first collected.⁴

The Indian Administrative Service (IAS) is situated at the nerve center of this bureaucratic state. It has played a crucial and storied role in managing natural disasters, preserving law and order during episodes of political instability, and conducting free and fair elections.⁵ Unfortunately, the IAS faces a number of serious challenges—from diminishing human capital to political interference—that, if left unaddressed, will lead to further institutional decline. While a competent, functional IAS may not be a sufficient condition for improving key development and governance outcomes, it is likely a necessary one. Fortunately, a host of new, data-driven research sheds light on the conditions under which the IAS can become more efficient and effective in (a modified version of) its present structure.

Cleaning Rust From the Frame

While small in number, the influence of the IAS is outsize. It constitutes but a tiny fraction of all government bureaucrats, collectively (and, typically, pejoratively) referred to as *babus* in Indian parlance—there were 3.3 million individuals employed by the government of India (at all levels) in January 2014, but roughly only 4,800 serving IAS officers as of January 2015.⁶ Yet, perhaps no single bureaucratic entity has received more attention, from actors ranging from government commissions to op-ed columnists, than the IAS.⁷

This group represents the *crème de la crème* of the Indian civil service. Dating back to the times of the British Raj, when it was known as the Indian Civil Service (ICS), the IAS has occupied the most pivotal administrative posts across India at every level, from administrative districts (analogous to U.S. counties) to states, all the way up to the central government in New Delhi.⁸

Over time, however, even sympathetic voices admit that this “steel frame,” as then British prime minister David Lloyd George termed the ICS in 1922, has deteriorated.⁹ An increasingly intransigent political executive has repeatedly abused its authority to transfer, suspend, and promote officers at will, damaging the morale of the service and brazenly politicizing its very essence. The quality of new hires is said to be falling as the best and brightest college graduates are unimpressed by uncompetitive public-sector wages, while those who do enter government service are often not allowed to develop domain expertise that can inform policymaking in an increasingly complex, interconnected world. “The overwhelming perception,” one commentator quipped, “is that corrupt bureaucrats are despised but thrive; the honest are respected but do not rise; and idealists end up in the boondocks.”¹⁰

These concerns about the role and relevance of the IAS are not restricted to think tank forums and newspaper columns. When then Indian prime minister Manmohan Singh delivered his inaugural address to the nation in 2004, he called the reform of administrative and public institutions—including refurbishing the IAS—an “immediate priority” for his government.¹¹ Although very little administrative reform was implemented during his government’s two terms in office, more than a decade later Singh’s successor, Prime Minister Narendra Modi, is echoing many of the same sentiments. Indeed, one week after Modi was sworn in as India’s fourteenth prime minister in May 2014, he summoned all 77 secretaries of central departments and ministries—most of whom are senior members of the IAS—to his official residence for a closed-door meeting. The session, the first in a decade, was a pep rally of sorts for senior IAS officers, an attempt to rejuvenate the upper echelons of a bureaucracy that had grown increasingly demoralized.¹²

Although there is no shortage of opinions on what ails the IAS or what fixes should be implemented, there has been a surprising paucity of hard data on its ranks and their performance. Bureaucratic activities in India are conducted concurrently at the district, state, and central levels with striking variation in the degree of efficiency at each level—not to mention wide variation across geographies. Any proposals for serious, sustainable administrative reform must pry open the black box of the bureaucracy. In particular, three questions stand out: What determines the career success of officers in the IAS? To what degree can individual officers influence tangible development outcomes in areas such as poverty, health, and education? And what impact does politics have on bureaucratic functioning?

A spate of recent research, combining unprecedented access to data on the career profiles of IAS officers with granular measurement of local development outcomes as well as electoral and political dynamics, sheds new light on these questions. This paper reviews the findings of these studies and discusses their implications for institutional reform. These studies are not well-suited to address existential questions regarding the potential role the IAS should play in a twenty-first-century India, but they do help provide answers to the three questions above.

The literature finds that bureaucrats’ initial endowment of human capital is highly predictive of future success in moving up in the ranks. While initial conditions heavily shape career trajectories, there are clear payoffs to officers who show improvement and acquire specialized skills during their careers.

Moving up the IAS ranks is a narrowly construed definition of success, however. The quality of individual bureaucrats can also have strong, direct, and measurable impacts on tangible development outcomes. One characteristic in particular that seems to matter is local embeddedness. Officers with local ties are associated with improved public goods outcomes—but only when propitious conditions exist that reduce the risk of corruption.

Bureaucrats do not function in a vacuum; political interference poses a constant threat to bureaucratic functioning. Research has shown that political loyalty—rather than professional qualifications—represents a viable path to professional mobility. However, the impact of politics is not uniformly negative. For instance, in areas where elections are less competitive (and, hence, incumbent politicians are more likely to be reelected) bureaucrats are better motivated to do their job. This is at odds with the prevailing wisdom that greater electoral competition incentivizes better bureaucratic performance.

The quality of individual bureaucrats can also have strong, direct, and measurable impacts on tangible development outcomes.

Taken together, this new empirical literature suggests several obvious recommendations for civil service reform. For starters, it is imperative that the central and various state governments institute key safeguards to protect against arbitrary, politically motivated transfers and postings of civil servants. Furthermore, the IAS should use data on civil servants' abilities, education, and training to inform posting decisions early in their careers. On this, the research is unambiguous: there is valuable information that can predict the future effectiveness of civil servants, yet these data are rarely used by those in charge of making personnel decisions. The advent of big data also provides a natural opportunity to use metrics on officers' performance in the field to inform promotion and retention decisions. Finally, although India's founders chafed at the prospect that IAS officers should be too closely linked with their home states for fear of elite capture, this issue should be revisited for further consideration.

While these suggested alterations are relatively minor in nature, they are perhaps more consistent with what the political traffic in India can realistically bear. When it comes to the bureaucracy, even enacting minor reforms—much less sweeping change—can come with a hefty political price tag, given the power of public-sector unions.¹³

There are three caveats about the papers reviewed here and what they do and do not focus on. First, the sole preoccupation of this study—and that of the literature analyzed—is with the IAS, even though it is but one segment of the sprawling Indian civil service. This narrow focus is arguably a consequence of the IAS's disproportionate influence over policy formulation and implementation. Unfortunately, this narrow focus precludes an examination of the various state-level civil service bureaucracies. The variation in bureaucratic performance across Indian states is crying out for further exploration; to date, there have been few studies on India that have concerned themselves with administrative dynamics at the subnational level. While this paper does not remedy this shortcoming, it does add a novel dimension to prior studies of the bureaucracy by surveying new literature that uses previously hard-to-access professional histories of individual IAS officers coupled with highly disaggregated political and economic data.

Second, there are many dimensions of IAS officers' job descriptions that are worth scrutinizing. They maintain responsibility for multiple tasks—from regulation to law and order, and from election management to the administration of development schemes. This analysis is focused on this final domain—development and social service delivery. This approach is justifiable, not least because it is easier to identify and measure qualitatively meaningful outcomes in the development domain, relative to regulation or justice. Furthermore, hard data on development outcomes and the control IAS officers have over state-led interventions allow researchers to draw a connecting line from one to the other. Development and service delivery arguably represent the biggest growth areas for elite bureaucrats, given the rise of the welfare state in India and the concomitant proliferation of government-sponsored social-sector programs. And the IAS's developmental mandate is the service's most conspicuous area of underperformance.

Third, some of the research reviewed in this paper comprises unpublished work, and so the findings from these various studies are necessarily tentative. Nevertheless, given the complementarities in the initial conclusions of this growing literature, their results merit substantive consideration.

Neither Indian, Nor Civil, Nor a Service?

The present-day dynamics of the IAS have colonial roots. The decision of independent India's founding leaders to retain the basic structure of the ICS, the predecessor of the IAS, has meant that the elite civil services exhibit a significant degree of path dependency when it comes to their operational dynamics. However, the ICS was built to serve a very different political master at a very different time in history.

The ICS first came into existence through the Government of India Act of 1858.¹⁴ The ICS was created as an all-India service, with positions reserved at every level of government: in administrative districts, for collectors (about 50 percent of all officers); in provincial headquarters (roughly 25 percent); and in the central government (another 10 percent).¹⁵

In its design, the ICS—not surprisingly—imitated Britain's bureaucratic setup, known informally as the Whitehall or Westminster model, in which senior civil servants advise cabinet-rank ministers on policy formulation.¹⁶ The so-called steel frame of the British Raj was a small organization administering a massive country; the ICS numbered 1,032 officials at its peak in 1931 out of an overall bureaucracy of about 1 million officials ruling over an undivided India totaling approximately 350 million people.¹⁷ ICS officers in the prewar period were among the best-paid bureaucrats in the world; in 1935, an ICS secretary to the government of India earned 6,666 rupees, while the U.S. secretary of the treasury earned just half as much.¹⁸

Upon achieving independence in 1947, India's founding leadership retained the ICS with little alteration—aside from a change in name—a decision met with some controversy. A segment of public opinion viewed ICS officers as unsympathetic facilitators of imperial rule. Indeed, Indians were allowed to sit for the service's entrance exam beginning only in 1922; prior to that date, no native Indians were represented in the service's ranks.¹⁹ Those who did successfully join the service once the rules were changed were often treated with suspicion and called "brown sahibs" by their fellow countrymen. Furthermore, in a federal India, many state chief ministers feared that a central administrative structure, as embodied by the ICS, would interfere with decentralized forms of authority.

Notwithstanding these concerns, the founding Congress Party leadership decided to retain the ICS structure because party leaders had little experience with alternative models and were cognizant of the potentially large disruption scrapping the service would entail. While certain alterations might have been necessary, they reasoned it would be wiser to proceed gradually. Furthermore, despite the scorn Indians may have heaped on the ICS prior to independence, many prominent elites associated with the independence movement were impressed by the way the civil service had largely maintained order in the tumultuous decade prior to 1947. As one scholar put it, "even Indian nationalists and their newspapers considered [the ICS] impartial, high-minded, conscientious, and incorruptible."²⁰

The ICS was far from politically neutral during the Raj era, in the sense that it was deeply invested in the continuation of the status quo and was opposed to the nationalist Congress Party. But it was arguably neutral in the sense of subordination. That is, members of the ICS had a highly professionalized, technocratic self-image, carrying out the wishes of their superiors while subordinating their personal views on policy.²¹ Many nationalist leaders believed that the service would continue to be loyal in the wake of independence, but this time grounded in a democratic context and beholden to India's indigenous popular leadership.²²

To proponents of continuity, the value of maintaining an all-India civil service was premised on three additional underlying beliefs: that such officers would have a national, rather than parochial, outlook; that an elite bureaucratic corps would attract the best nationwide talent; and that such a group would possess an ingrained sense of independence and impartiality.²³

One of the most persuasive voices in this camp was that of Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, India's first home minister, who campaigned vigorously for administrative continuity. Speaking at a provincial premiers' conference in 1946 to decide the future of the All India Services, Patel stated that ICS officers were "useful instruments" that would "also serve as a liaison between the Provinces and the Government of India and introduce [a] certain amount of brashness and vigor in the administration both of the Centre and the Provinces."²⁴ The ICS and IAS would play a critical role, therefore, in holding together India's highly divided federal polity.

Rules of the Road

A deeper understanding of the internal processes driving the IAS's policymaking function is crucial for identifying opportunities for organizational reform. The IAS possesses many of the classic features of a professional bureaucracy. This mandarin-style service has several important characteristics: meritocratic recruitment via a competitive examination; a distinct (albeit rigid) set of allocation and assignment procedures, especially in the early stages of an employee's career; and predictable, long-term career incentives that reward seniority.

Organization and Recruitment

The term civil service in India is an umbrella category for several discrete organs. The IAS, along with the Indian Forest Service and the Indian Police Service (IPS), comprise the All India Services.²⁵ These organs serve both the state and the central governments and, hence, are said to be under the dual control of both tiers. This premise of dual control was underpinned by the belief held by India's founders that the All India Services would need to act as a bridge between the center and the states, without being overly beholden to either.²⁶ While the central government largely controls recruitment and advancement, IAS officers belong to state cadres. Within these cadres, officers are one of two types: approximately half spend most of their careers in the service of their respective state governments, while the other half receive postings with the central government in New Delhi.²⁷

Entry into the IAS is highly competitive. The Union Public Service Commission (UPSC), an independent constitutional body, recruits officers to the All India Services and the Central Civil Service through a multistep examination process.²⁸ Anywhere between 200,000 and 400,000 individuals annually sit for the Civil Services (Preliminary) Examination, a number pared down to approximately 10,000 for the Civil Services (Main) Examination and interview. Fewer than 1,000 candidates make the final cut; these successful few are known as direct recruits. Of these, only the top 100 or so qualify for the IAS, depending on vacancies; the remaining candidates are eligible for entry into the other All India and Central Civil Services.²⁹

Once admitted, IAS officers receive initial training at the Lal Bahadur Shastri National Academy of Administration in the state of Uttarakhand. This training comprises a year of classroom instruction on the machinery of government, followed by another year of district-level training to expose trainees to field realities. Based on their record of performance, state civil servants can also be promoted into the IAS on the recommendations of the Staff Selection Commission attached to the Department of Personnel and Training.³⁰

The IAS possesses many of the classic features of a professional bureaucracy.

Allocation to State Cadres

After graduation, IAS officers are assigned to a state cadre through a quasi-random allocation process. The cadre allocation rule takes into consideration officers' rankings as determined by the entrance exam, vacancies in each state, and a rotating roster of states organized alphabetically. For instance, individuals who perform better on the entrance exam are more likely to be assigned to their state of origin. At any given time, however, only one-third of any given cadre may comprise officers serving in their home state. Because officers spend the majority of their careers in their respective state cadres, allocation rules are explicitly geared toward ensuring that all states receive a uniform quality of talent.

Predictable Career Ladder

IAS officers move up in the bureaucratic hierarchy through clearly defined promotion waves (see table 1). Promotions for junior positions are based on years of service, while appointments to higher-level posts are contingent on screening by a committee of senior civil servants (and, thus, ostensibly involve an element of merit-based selection). Performance evaluation is conducted through a performance appraisal report written by an officer's superiors.³¹

A critical juncture in every officer's career is the process of empanelment. Exceptionally competent officers are placed on a panel by a special committee of secretaries entrusted with evaluating their service records; from this panel they are available for promotion as vacancies arise. Successfully empaneled officers are eligible to serve in the most senior and prestigious positions in government.

Two factors remain constant throughout the careers of IAS officers: first, from their earliest days on the job, they are entrusted with substantial responsibilities and authority over a large population; and second, career progression is driven by seniority, not performance. After completing their initial two-year training period, officers begin their careers as subdivisional magistrates, assisting superior officers in district government. After four to five years in their cadre (where they may be promoted to the post of an additional chief magistrate or chief development officer), officers are usually assigned to the post of district magistrate, a district's chief executive. District magistrates oversee revenue collection, law enforcement, and crisis administration, making them among the most powerful bureaucrats in the country. They also are responsible for supervising all infrastructure development projects and working with district-level agencies to implement centrally sponsored schemes like the Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana, an all-India rural roads program, or the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme, a federal workfare program and the largest social-sector scheme in the world. On account of their wide-ranging powers, district magistrates can be described as the "king-pin" in a district's affairs, as one analyst put it.³²

Table 1. Career Progression of IAS Officers

Years of Service	Designation	Illustrative Post	Level	Screening Process	Starting Annual Pay (Rupees)
0	Assistant secretary to the government of India	District subdivisional magistrate	Junior time scale	None; entry level	56,100
4	Under secretary in the government of India	Additional district magistrate	Senior time scale	Evaluation by a committee consisting of the chief secretary and two state-government officers at the supertime scale or above, subject to vacancies	67,700
9	Deputy secretary in the government of India	District magistrate, collector, or deputy commissioner Additional secretary in a state government	Junior administrative grade	Nonfunctional promotion; available to all officers without any screening except in cases where disciplinary or criminal proceedings are pending	78,800
13	Director in the government of India	District magistrate, collector, or deputy commissioner Special secretary in a state government	Selection grade	Evaluation by a committee of the chief secretary and two state-government officers at the supertime scale or above, subject to vacancies	118,500
16	Joint secretary to the government of India Secretary in a state government	Joint secretary Secretary in a state government	Supertime scale	Evaluation by a committee of the chief secretary and two principal secretaries (if unavailable, the most senior supertime scale officer), subject to vacancies	144,200
25	Additional secretary in the government of India Principal secretary in a state government	Additional secretary Principal secretary in a state government	Above supertime scale	Evaluation by a committee of the chief secretary and one senior officer, each working at the levels of the chief secretary and principal secretary, subject to vacancies	182,200
30	Secretary of the government of India Chief secretary of a state government	Secretary Chief secretary in a state government	Apex scale	Evaluation by a committee of the chief secretary, one officer at this grade in the state cadre, and one officer at this grade serving at the center	205,400
30+	Cabinet secretary to the government of India	Cabinet secretary	Cabinet secretary grade	Selected on the recommendation of the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet, comprised of the prime minister and the minister of home affairs	250,000

Sources: Marianne Bertrand, Robin Burgess, Arunish Chawla, and Guo Xu, "Determinants and Consequences of Bureaucrat Effectiveness: Evidence From the Indian Administrative Service," Government of India, Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions, "IAS Promotion Guidelines: No. 20011/4/92-AIS-II"; Government of India, *Report of the Seventh Central Pay Commission*, vol. 1 (New Delhi: Government of India, 2015); and Government of India, Press Information Bureau, "Reconstitution of the Cabinet Committees," June 19, 2014.

Typically after nine years of service, officers become eligible for positions with the state government or the central government as part of a ministry's junior staff.³³ At the sixteen-year mark, officers are eligible for the rank of joint secretary to the government of India. At the state-government level, officers become eligible for the highly prestigious post of secretary, which allows them to manage various state-level departments. Finally, retirement is fixed for all IAS officers at sixty years of age.

Flailing State

Nearly seven decades following independence, India's steel frame is exhibiting considerable signs of strain. Even insiders agree that the apex civil service is not functioning anywhere close to its highest capacity. Commenting on a new report by a political consultancy that rated the Indian bureaucracy as the most inefficient in Asia, leading political scientist Pratap Bhanu Mehta wrote, "the bureaucracy confuses ends with means, rules with outcomes, control with efficiency."³⁴ The IAS of today is hampered by several concomitant issues: a decline in the quality of recruits, political interference, perverse incentives for career advancement, a lack of specialized expertise, and a perception of widespread corruption. These infirmities have compromised the ability of the IAS to fulfill its mandate.

Declining Human Capital

One reason for the IAS's waning reputation is the supposedly diminishing quality of its recruits. Despite an incredibly competitive entrance examination—in 2016, 180 candidates were selected from a pool of 465,882 applicants (a success rate of 0.038 percent)—the government is finding it hard to lure young talent away from increasingly attractive private-sector opportunities (see table 2 for data on all UPSC-conducted exams).³⁵

According to a recent study, successful candidates are getting older, are increasingly less likely to hold a postgraduate degree, and take an average of four attempts to pass the entrance exam. The combination of rising average age and lack of advanced academic qualifications implies that many candidates spend a majority of their twenties preparing for and taking entrance examinations for the elite civil services.³⁶

Beyond the declining quality of new entrants, poor remuneration and severe pay compression—a reduction in the ratio of the highest government salary to the lowest—have had adverse effects on the morale and social prestige associated with a civil service career (see table 3).³⁷ One former IAS officer who joined the service in the mid-1980s notes that secretaries to the government of India earned as much money as their predecessors did fifty years earlier, in the mid-1930s. Once among the best-paid civil servants in the world, IAS officers slid toward the opposite end of the spectrum over subsequent decades.³⁸

Table 2. Success Rate for All UPSC-Conducted Examinations, 1950-2015

Year	Number of Applicants	Number of Candidates Interviewed	Number of Candidates Recommended	Percentage of All Applicants Recommended
1950	24,680	3,383	2,780	11.26
1960	34,349	4,862	3,298	9.6
1970	81,539	3,473	4,187	5.13
1980	243,374	9,256	4,093	1.68
1990	615,850	13,838	4,609	0.75
2000	762,501	3,351	4,177	0.55
2010	1,893,030	5,342	4,896	0.26
2015	3,267,794	9,792	5,969	0.18

Source: Government of India, Union Public Service Commission, *Annual Report 2014-15* (New Delhi: Government of India, 2016).

Table 3. IAS Pay Compression Ratio, 1948-2015 (in Indian Rupees)

Year	Maximum Salary (pre-tax)	Minimum Salary (falls below taxable limit and is thus tax free)	Pre-Tax Compression Pay Ratio
1948	3,000	55	54.5
1949	3,000	65	46.2
1960	3,000	65	37.5
1965	3,500	103	34.0
1970	3,500	141	24.8
1973	3,500	196	17.9
1986	8,000	750	10.7
1996	16,580	2,060	8.0
2006	80,000	7,000	11.5
2015	225,000	18,000	12.5

Source: Government of India, *Report of the Fifth Central Pay Commission*, vol. 1, (New Delhi: Government of India, 1997), as quoted in S.K. Das, *The Civil Services in India* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2013); Government of India, *Report of the Sixth Central Pay Commission*, vol. 1 (New Delhi: Government of India, 2006); and Government of India, *Report of the Seventh Central Pay Commission*, 5.

Diminished Independence

A deeply pervasive culture of political interference has confounded efforts to combat the perceived diminishing quality of human capital in the bureaucracy. According to a 2010 survey of civil servants, only 24 percent believed that postings to sought-after stations were merit based. More broadly, nearly one in two respondents thought undue outside pressure was a significant problem.³⁹

Short average tenure in posts—as low as six months in India’s most populous state, Uttar Pradesh—and a growing number of posts of varying importance, duties, and pay effectively enable elected officials to use lateral transfers to punish officers.⁴⁰ The career of Ashok Khemka, an IAS officer who joined the Haryana cadre in 1991, is one famous case in point: for exposing endemic corruption across various state-government departments, he has been transferred 47 times in twenty-four years.⁴¹ For example, Khemka was transferred from Haryana’s transportation department to the ostensibly less important archaeology and museums department after making policy decisions that were in opposition to the interests of the politically important so-called transport lobby.⁴² Due to the looming prospect of being transferred, bureaucrats are susceptible to political pressure in the execution of their daily responsibilities.⁴³

Poor Incentives for Advancement

Many observers—including many current and former officers—have questioned whether the rules governing advancement in the IAS are allowing the best and the brightest to move up in the ranks. For starters, the bias toward seniority in filling key posts reduces the ability of high-performing officers to swiftly obtain promotions, while protecting poorly performing officers who have more years of service under their belts. The empanelment process, through which officers are selected for service in the central government, is highly opaque and can be influenced by the judgments of politicians, who might wish to derail officers who cross them.⁴⁴

Lack of Specialization

In addition, some experts have questioned whether the IAS can continue to exist as a generalist service in a world that is increasingly complex and where domain knowledge has become more valuable. The frequent rotation that officers experience in the service means that they are constantly developing new skills and new expertise but very rarely stay in one field or sector long enough to become genuine experts.⁴⁵

Malfeasance

Taken together, several of the factors listed above are major drivers of malfeasance in the service. Endemic political interference can lead to rent-seeking behavior even for honest officers, who might feel forced to comply with

questionable demands from superiors for fear of being punished. Furthermore, uncompetitive public-sector salaries (not to mention years of foregone wages as candidates devote an increasing amount of time to passing the civil services exam) encourage officers to make extra money while in office.

In the 2010 survey mentioned previously, 78 percent of IAS respondents believed some or most officers used influence to secure coveted positions, while 62 percent thought some or most officers indulged in nepotism.⁴⁶ A former director of the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), commenting on a recent spate of investigations and arrests of senior IAS officers, bemoaned “the escalation of corruption from the bottom of the bureaucratic hierarchy to its higher echelons.”⁴⁷ According to a statement released by the Modi government, between January 2012 and April 2015 the CBI opened as many as 74 cases against IAS, IPS, and Indian Revenue Service officers for allegedly violating the Prevention of Corruption Act.⁴⁸

Opening the Black Box

A reform agenda for the IAS must seek to resolve the perverse incentive structures that riddle the top functionaries of the Indian state. For the first time, thanks in part to advances in the collection and analysis of big data, scholars have unprecedented access to detailed information on the career profiles of IAS officers. This information, when combined with fine-grained data on development indicators and electoral and political dynamics, provides significant new insights on bureaucratic performance.

The growing empirical literature on the effectiveness of the IAS comprises three broad lines of questioning. First, what determines the upward mobility of IAS officers in the service, thereby shaping career outcomes? Second, what impact can individual bureaucrats have on actual development outcomes? Third, how do politicians and bureaucrats interact while in power, and how does this impact development on the ground? (See table 4 for a summary of the studies and their important attributes.)⁴⁹

A reform agenda for the IAS must seek to resolve the perverse incentive structures that riddle the top functionaries of the Indian state.

Determinants of Upward Mobility

The first line of inquiry examines the determinants of career success in the IAS. The term success here refers strictly to the career advancement of individual officers, as opposed to their impact on tangible development outcomes.

A key predictor of future professional success is an IAS candidate’s entrance exam performance and post-entry training scores. Combining cross-sectional data on subjective assessments of IAS officers from a wide range of societal stakeholders with detailed information about postings and pay scales of more

Table 4. Summary of Research Analyzed

Study	Bureaucratic Data	Effectiveness or Outcomes Data	Statistical Analysis Method	Key Results
Bertrand, Burgess, Chawla, and Guo (2015)	<p>Descriptive rolls of 5,365 IAS officers who joined between 1975 and 2005</p> <p>Seniority data on 4,107 IAS officers who joined between 1972 and 2009</p> <p>Executive record sheets of 10,817 IAS officers who joined between 1949 and 2014</p>	<p>360-degree assessment of IAS officers based on survey of 830 stakeholders</p> <p>State-level GDP growth, revenue, and industrial output</p>	Panel data; fixed effects; instrumental variables	<p>Exam score and training performance predict perceived effectiveness</p> <p>Age interacting with cohort size negatively predicts perceived effectiveness, positively predicts suspension</p> <p>Higher perceived effectiveness associated with faster growth, higher nontax revenue, more development expenditures</p>
Bhavnani and Lee (2015)	Executive record sheets of 4,793 IAS officers serving as of March 7, 2007	Proportion of villages in districts that have high schools and health facilities	Panel data; fixed effects; instrumental variables	Locally embedded officers increase public goods provision, but only in districts with high literacy and newspaper circulation
Ferguson and Hasan (2013)	Executive record sheets of 4,259 IAS officers who joined between 1974 and 2008	Posting to the central government (early career), empanelment (late career)	Fixed effects	Specialization predicts career advancement through two distinct mechanisms: signaling (early career) and skills (late career)
Hjort, Rao, and Santorella (2015)	Executive record sheets of 2,790 district collectors serving between 1996 and 2013	Capital expenditure project starts and completion, satellite nighttime luminosity data	Fixed effects using value-added estimation framework	<p>Bureaucrat value-added explains significant share of variation in project outcomes and luminosity</p> <p>Education, local language proficiency, direct recruitment predict high value-added officer</p> <p>High value-added is negatively related to future empanelment</p>
Iyer and Mani (2012)	Executive record sheets of 2,802 IAS officers who joined the service between 1980 and 2004	<p>Transfer incidence, disaggregated by importance of post</p> <p>Extent of training officers pursue</p> <p>District development outcomes (poverty, road construction, immunization)</p>	Fixed effects	<p>New state chief minister leads to a significant increase in transfer probability</p> <p>High-skilled bureaucrats are transferred less and face lower posting variability</p> <p>Skill and loyalty represent two distinct paths to career success</p> <p>High-ability officers spend more time acquiring training</p> <p>Political transfers weaken poverty reduction; no effect on roads or immunization</p>
Nath (2015)	Executive record sheets of district collectors serving between 1999 and 2009	Project-level data on the Members of Parliament Local Area Development Scheme across 392 constituencies in twelve major states	Difference-in-differences	Bureaucrats approve projects faster when an incumbent politician's winning probability is higher, when an incumbent is up for promotion, or when a politician is likely to be in office at time of promotion

Sources: Marianne Bertrand, Robin Burgess, Arunish Chawla, and Guo Xu, "Determinants and Consequences of Bureaucrat Effectiveness: Evidence From the Indian Administrative Service"; Rikhil R. Bhavnani and Alexander Lee, "Local Embeddedness and Bureaucratic Performance: Evidence from India"; John-Paul Ferguson and Sharique Hasan, "Specialization and Career Dynamics: Evidence From the Indian Administrative Service"; Jonas Hjort, Gautam Rao, and Elizabeth Santorella, "Bureaucrat Value-Added and Local Economic Outcomes"; Lakshmi Iyer and Anandi Mani, "Traveling Agents: Political Change and Bureaucratic Turnover in India"; and Anusha Nath, "Bureaucrats and Politicians: Electoral Competition and Dynamic Incentives."

than 5,600 IAS officers throughout their careers, Marianne Bertrand and her fellow researchers examined how predetermined characteristics of officers at the recruitment stage—age, caste, and exam scores (including both the entrance- and post-entry training exams), among others—correlate with officers’ perceived effectiveness. To establish an objective measure of performance, the researchers asked a diverse group of stakeholders—from state civil servants to politicians and journalists—to rate officers on five dimensions: effectiveness, probity, ability to withstand political pressure, responsiveness to the interests of poor citizens, and an overall summary rating.⁵⁰

There is a highly robust, positive correlation between officers’ scores on the IAS entrance exam and both their future investments in professional training and subjective performance ratings. Interestingly, stakeholders more positively assessed those officers who demonstrated the most improvement in their training compared with their baseline performance on the IAS exam.

It was also the case that officers who were older and entered the IAS as part of a large cohort exhibited lower effectiveness, according to the study’s subjective measures. Age serves as an impediment because older officers will be too old by the time jobs at the highest pay scale open up, at which point the competition for coveted jobs will be even more intense than usual. Larger cohort sizes also make upward mobility more difficult because they imply greater competition for promotions. The interaction between the two characteristics appears especially problematic: older officers in larger cohorts are significantly more likely to face delays in promotions and to be the subjects of official suspensions.⁵¹

Some of these findings are similar to those in a 2013 study by John-Paul Ferguson and Sharique Hasan, who used the records of more than 3,000 IAS officers to examine the impact of specialization on achieving early- and late-career milestones like postings to the central government and empanelment. Specialization was defined as the number of months spent working in a specific domain such as defense, finance, or transportation. Controlling for a host of individual-level characteristics (such as age, education, gender, and tenure) as well as political factors (like changes in party control in each state), junior-level officers with an above-average specialization score (defined as one standard deviation above the mean) were 36 percent more likely to receive a coveted posting with the central government in New Delhi. At earlier stages of their careers, officers are rewarded for their specializations because they signal ability and future potential.

However, there is no systemic match between accumulated experience and postings officers receive; in other words, specializing in a field does not raise the likelihood of working in that field at the center (finance is one notable exception).⁵² An officer’s prior educational performance—whether he or she graduated in the first division of an undergraduate class and possesses multiple academic degrees—remains a robust predictor of earning a posting with the central government in New Delhi.

With regard to empanelment, a late-career milestone, there was a positive and statistically significant relationship between accumulated experience and post-empanelment job offers. Officers with an above-average level of specialization were 43 percent more likely to become joint secretaries—a senior position with direct oversight of a specific governmental department. At this later stage of officers' careers, however, specialization matters not for signaling reasons but because of domain-specific skill accumulation. As the authors wrote, “late in a career, more specialization is rewarded because it reflects specific skills.”⁵³ When it comes to being empaneled, as with winning early-career postings to the central government, educational performance was also linked with higher success rates.⁵⁴

These two distinct mechanisms—signaling and accumulating skills—are plausibly connected. If an officer is rewarded early on in his or her career for specialization, even if it has little to do with any specific domain knowledge, that officer has incentives to double down on specialization—which *is* rewarded for its intrinsic value at a later stage.

These findings suggest that the oft-heard notion that early-career officers have no incentive to acquire knowledge or improve skills in a given domain or area of expertise is not entirely accurate; those who do acquire and cultivate specific domain knowledge are rewarded for doing so.⁵⁵ On this point, an officer's performance on the civil service entrance exam (a proxy for quality) is highly predictive of his or her future career potential. Officers of higher initial ability, as determined by their performance on the entrance exam, are more likely to invest in training and professional development (especially foreign training) over the course of their careers and, in turn, are more likely to be recommended for empanelment down the road.⁵⁶

Bureaucratic Influence on Development Outcomes

The second line of inquiry relates to the tangible impact individual IAS officers can have on development outcomes in their areas of operation.

An efficient bureaucracy matters for economic performance. For every IAS officer in their sample, Bertrand and her colleagues calculated a “predicted effectiveness” score using a combination of individual and organizational-level characteristics.⁵⁷ This comprehensive measure of predicted effectiveness of senior IAS officers was positively associated with per capita state-level gross domestic product (GDP) and industrial growth. Predicted effectiveness was also positively associated with higher total annual public revenue. Interestingly, higher revenue was not driven by improved taxation; rather, it was the result of increases in nontax revenue sources (such as dividends and profits from public-sector enterprises) and grants comprising major funding schemes from the central government—all activities supervised by senior IAS officers.

The service's arcane bureaucratic rules also can have material impacts. A one standard deviation increase in the average age at entry was associated with a

10.6 percent lower state-level GDP per capita; the impact increased by another 4 percent if the cohort size increased by one standard deviation.⁵⁸

One of the biggest debates in the comparative thinking on bureaucracy is the virtue of embeddedness, or the strength of local ties.⁵⁹ Proponents argue that bureaucrats must be locally embedded (typically, native to a given area) if they are to be truly effective. After all, local officers are more likely than those from other parts of the country to be close to the population they serve and able to use their knowledge of language and culture to work well with local stakeholders. On the flip side, detractors argue that officials who are too closely intertwined with the local community only fulfill the policy priorities of elites or exclude the broader community from key public goods and services.

Data suggests bureaucrats with strong local ties to their communities often outperform outsiders when it comes to delivering public goods. In a 2015 paper, Rikhil Bhavnani and Alexander Lee used data on nearly 4,800 serving IAS officers (as of March 2007) to examine whether locally embedded bureaucrats—those IAS officers serving in their home state (known as their state of domicile)—enhanced service delivery between 1991 and 2001, as measured by the proportion of villages in a district with high schools.⁶⁰ A one standard deviation increase in the proportion of local IAS officers was linked to a 4.6 percent increase in the proportion of villages with public high schools. IAS officers' early career postings in their cadre states are largely apolitical, which means that the analysis did not have to account for unobserved forces driving personnel assignment.⁶¹ The researchers studied access to public high schools, rather than elementary schools, due to concerns of ceiling effects: most villages had access to elementary schools in 1991, and there was little incentive for the government to keep building more of them. Interestingly, embeddedness has no discernible impact on the provision of roads and phones, responsibility over which lies not with the district administration but with parastatal organizations, which are publicly owned but privately managed entities in charge of providing public goods and services.

However, the story does not end there; the authors also tested for variation in the impact of embeddedness. It is still possible that there are areas where typical mechanisms of local accountability are ineffective and, hence, bureaucrats are more likely to be susceptible to elite capture. The data suggests that embeddedness was associated with more high school construction—but only in districts with high literacy and large vernacular newspaper circulation (and, hence, greater accountability). The presence of these two factors allows the local populace to better monitor government actions. In districts with low newspaper circulation and literacy, the converse is true: embeddedness had no impact on high school construction. It stands to reason that in the latter environment, where the local populace cannot effectively hold officers accountable,

Bureaucrats with strong local ties to their communities often outperform outsiders when it comes to delivering public goods.

the threat of corruption looms much larger. Interestingly, the positive impacts of embeddedness go beyond facility with the local language or local political connections, suggesting deeper—possibly cultural—advantages.⁶²

Finally, individual IAS officers have a moderately large positive impact on district-level economic outcomes. In a 2015 study, Jonas Hjort, Gautam Rao, and Elizabeth Santorella adopted methodologies developed in education literature (for instance, to quantify the value added of teachers on individual student learning outcomes) and in the field of labor economics (intended to measure worker impact) and applied them to the study of district collectors in India. Based on this value-added methodology, an individual IAS officer could explain up to 2 percent of variation in the outcomes of investment projects in his or her district and roughly 0.4 percent of variation in nighttime luminosity (which is often used as a proxy for local economic activity).⁶³ These are very sizable effects.

Because the scholars also had details on the individual characteristics of district collectors, they could unpack the correlates of better bureaucratic performance. District collectors with better past educational performance (that is, first-class honors in their highest completed degree) were more likely to deliver better outcomes. Similarly, IAS officers who could speak a state's official language also exhibited better performance, on average.

Politician-Bureaucrat Dynamics

The third and final pillar of new research on the IAS disaggregates the impact of elected officials on the bureaucracy.

The most visible and lamentable aspect of political interference in the civil service has been the phenomenon of punitive transfers. In a 2012 article, Lakshmi Iyer and Anandi Mani used the career histories of 2,800 IAS officers—combined with data on political changes, proxy measures of bureaucrat ability,

and a measure of the perceived importance of different IAS posts—to show how politicians use frequent reassignments to pressure bureaucrats. There appear to be two major sources of bureaucratic inefficiency. First, because politicians seek to exercise a degree of control over civil servants, important bureaucratic positions are not necessarily filled by the most qualified officers available (as judged by their

initial ability). Second, junior IAS officers systematically underinvest in skill acquisition because loyalty to powerful politicians, as opposed to merit-based advancement, offers an alternative path to career success.

The extent of what is often referred to as the Transfer-Posting Raj is extraordinary. The probability that an IAS officer would be transferred in a given year was 53 percent, and this is increased by 10 percent when a state elects a new chief minister. The average tenure of an IAS officer in any given post was a mere sixteen months, which stands in contrast to recommendations of various expert committees that have argued for fixed tenures as long as five

The most visible and lamentable aspect of political interference in the civil service has been the phenomenon of punitive transfers.

years. Bureaucrats ranking among the top twenty in their cohort were 2.2 percentage points less likely to be transferred after the election of a new chief minister (and significantly more likely to be empaneled later in their career). Being of the same caste as the core constituency of the chief minister's political party increased an officer's probability of obtaining an important post by 6.6 percentage points.⁶⁴

Taken together, this evidence outlines two divergent paths to moving up in the bureaucratic hierarchy: an officer can either invest in expertise or leverage his or her caste affinity to secure important positions. Does one path lead to more success overall? There is no evidence to suggest this is the case: the average importance of posts held by officers through their career varies little with initial ranking, irrespective of which track they choose.⁶⁵

With regard to the impact on economic development, in places where the probability of an officer being transferred increased by 10 percentage points, poverty rates exhibited a much slower pace of decline than in other districts—suggesting lasting damage to policy outcomes. These results, the authors emphasized, should be treated as suggestive because there could have been some unobserved factor(s) influencing both transfers and development outcomes.⁶⁶

Yet another study, authored by Anusha Nath in 2015, focused exclusively on the impact of political competition on a bureaucrat's ability to implement development activities. The author argues that electoral competition has a counterintuitive impact on bureaucratic outcomes. Whereas a good deal of theory predicts that electoral uncertainty leads to better governance outcomes because politicians are worried about losing reelection bids if they do not perform, Nath posits the opposite: bureaucrats are more incentivized to do their job when it is almost certain that the political incumbent will be brought back to power.⁶⁷

Nath's analysis compiled professional histories of all IAS officers serving as district collectors between 1999 and 2009, data on the implementation of projects executed using constituency development funds allocated to members of parliament (MPs), and official election returns.⁶⁸ Nath's primary measure of bureaucratic performance was the time it took district collectors to sanction projects MPs propose to be built with money from their discretionary funds. Although MPs can propose small public works projects and use earmarked funds to finance their construction, it is the district administration—led by the district collector—that has to undertake the work. This gives collectors an important degree of power; they can speed up (or slow down) the pace of development projects—at least to a certain extent—based on their preferences.

In constituencies where incumbents were prohibited from standing for reelection (because their seats had been reserved for ethnic minorities by an independent redistricting, or delimitation, agency), the average time it took for a district collector to sanction an MP's proposed project increased by 13 percent. The agency's decision to change the reservation status of a given parliamentary

constituency in the following election occurred midway through MPs' terms, which makes it a reasonable exogenous shock.⁶⁹

Conversely, in constituencies that are party strongholds (that is, where reelection for a politician belonging to the incumbent party is virtually guaranteed based on its track record over the past four election cycles), the district administration approved projects 11 percent faster than average. Additionally, district collectors were more effective in implementing projects when they were eligible for promotion *and* when the incumbent politician was likely to remain in power.⁷⁰ In short, where there is greater political certainty, the bureaucracy performs better.

This finding closely tracks Iyer and Mani's insight that bureaucratic transfers exhibit a spike in the aftermath of political turnover. As electoral pressure diminishes, a virtuous cycle is initiated whereby politicians incentivize bureaucrats with future postings and civil servants exert more effort into approving development projects. This is not merely a result of politicians selecting better-performing bureaucrats to begin with; because electoral and administrative boundaries do not perfectly overlap, Nath was able to measure how district officers responded differentially to multiple politicians overlapping with his or her given district.

This work begs the question: when do politicians want to put effort into incentivizing bureaucrats? This puzzle awaits further research, but a forthcoming paper by Saad Gulzar and Benjamin Pasquale offers one plausible narrative. The authors used an original data set of nearly 500,000 villages where the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS) operates to compare officers supervised by a single politician with those supervised by several politicians. Specifically, the authors compared NREGS outcomes (the number of villagers who worked in NREGS and the average number of days worked) in villages whose block administration is split across two politicians with other villages whose block administration is not split.

The study found that split blocks employed fewer individuals in NREGS, who in turn received fewer workdays than their counterparts in unsplit blocks. Further, these results were driven by a specific free-rider problem: if a politician faces a higher marginal cost of effort, as happens when split blocks in his or her constituency are shared with politicians from the same party, development outcomes worsen. The same is true when the marginal benefit of a politician's effort increases, for instance when the political importance of an area grows.

Politicians are therefore incentivized to motivate bureaucrats only when the benefits are internalized. As the authors suggested: "Politicians realize that large development programs offer them an important opportunity to earn favor with voters. Development program designs that help politicians claim credit will strengthen democratic accountability and improve service delivery."⁷¹

Marginal Revolution

Given the concerns dogging the IAS, calls for reform are all too commonplace, especially in New Delhi. And there is no shortage of ideas about how best to proceed. Reform ideas literally run the gamut.

Some analysts have called for doing away with the IAS entirely. For instance, journalist Mihir Sharma has argued for abolishing the IAS on the grounds that an unaccountable and misinformed bureaucracy based on the Whitehall model simply cannot administer a twenty-first-century state.⁷²

While there might be merit to scrapping the system and beginning with a clean slate, as opposed to pursuing a strategy of gradual updating and renewal, public institutions are notoriously sticky and path dependent. Furthermore, replacing local institutions with idealized versions of Western best practices is extremely risky, especially when such reform fails to address underlying social inequalities.⁷³ As one former IAS officer put it, tearing down and replacing a structure that connects villages to districts, districts to states, and—finally—states to the capital of India is no easy task.⁷⁴

This resistance to change is perhaps why many experts have suggested keeping the service intact but introducing a series of updates to its recruitment and overall operations. Many of these alterations can be found, in some form or fashion, in the various reports of the Second Administrative Reforms Commission, a major government-led initiative launched in 2005 to prepare a blueprint for overhauling the Indian bureaucracy. The commission was the latest in a long string of expert panels, dating back to the 1947 Secretariat Reorganization Committee, established by the government to propose civil service reforms.⁷⁵ Recognizing that “inefficiency, corruption and delays have become, in public perception, the hallmarks of public administration in India,” the commission released fifteen reports on various facets of governance, including undue political interference, inadequate accountability mechanisms, and capacity building.⁷⁶

Regarding recruitment, the commission recommended significantly lowering the permissible age of entry into the civil services and establishing national institutes of public administration that would cultivate a new pool of aspiring civil service applicants. In an attempt to engineer a shift away from seniority-based career progression, the commission also suggested that all promotions be based on successful completion of mandatory training.

Finally, to strengthen accountability mechanisms, the commission recommended a system of two intensive reviews at the fourteen- and twenty-year marks to determine continuance in public service, as well as a new civil service reform bill that would fix a minimum tenure for senior posts and establish safeguards against arbitrary dismissal.⁷⁷

The obstacles to even modest reform of this type, such as opening up senior management positions in the IAS to individuals from the private sector, are

immense.⁷⁸ For instance, proposals to allow for lateral entry into the IAS have drawn withering criticism from current and retired civil servants, who have argued that infusing external talent into high-profile posts is likely to both affect incumbent morale and distort the incentives of new entrants.⁷⁹ After initially raising hopes that it would resist opposition to infusing public service with more lateral entrants, the Modi administration has apparently relented. In December 2015, Minister of State for Personnel, Public Grievances, and Pensions Jitendra Singh clarified that the present government has no plans to pursue lateral entry into the IAS.⁸⁰ If the past is any guide, future governments will also move incrementally, if at all, on civil service reform given stiff resistance from incumbent IAS officers.⁸¹

In that spirit, the government would be wise to consider three broad areas in which to undertake incremental policy shifts: enacting legislation to prevent arbitrary transfers of personnel, making data-driven decisions on allocation and retention, and reexamining the potential benefits of increasing the number of local officers in state cadres.

Thwarting Political Interference

Political interference remains one of the biggest obstacles to bureaucratic effectiveness. Perhaps for the first time, researchers have drawn clear, quantifiable links between the pervasive abuse of the transfers and postings of civil servants and development outcomes.

One step the present government could take to rectify this situation is to prioritize action on a series of draft bills that place constraints on politicians' ability to arbitrarily transfer bureaucrats. This pending legislation includes the Public Services Bill (2007), the Civil Services Bill (2009), and the Civil Services Standards, Performance, and Accountability Bill (2010), all of which have been languishing. In recent years, the only notable act of civil service reform has come not from parliament but from the judiciary; in 2013, the Supreme Court of India directed both the central and the state governments to establish civil service boards to manage the tenure, transfer, and posting of all officers in the All India Services.⁸² Unfortunately, the order has been widely perceived as toothless, because very few states have heeded the call to fix a minimum tenure of two years for civil servants.⁸³

Another idea, which has been mooted and deserves consideration, is to develop a stability index for key posts for which the average length of tenures must remain above a certain predetermined average (say, two years). This approach should allow for flexibility; while there might be good reasons for an individual officer to be transferred, on average such moves should be the exception rather than the rule.⁸⁴

Since coming to power in May 2014, the Modi government has taken steps to curb politicized transfers, although its moves have received mixed reviews. Some commentators have praised the new process instituted by the Prime

Minister's Office (PMO), whereby senior bureaucrats run background checks on all officers seeking postings to the central government with two criteria in mind: honesty and efficiency.⁸⁵ Critics, however, argue that centralizing power in the PMO does not bode well for an effective administrative machinery and point to frequent reshuffles at the joint-secretary level and falling numbers of officers willing to work at the center as evidence of this weakness.⁸⁶

Increasing Career Incentives

A second potential area for reform is the manner in which existing processes of recruitment and seniority-based career progression can introduce inefficiencies into the bureaucracy. The empirical finding that an individual officer's initial score on the Civil Services (Main) Examination is highly predictive of future success appears to be fairly robust. Beyond initial exam scores, postrecruitment training (including improvement in training performance relative to an officer's starting point) is also positively correlated with perceived effectiveness.⁸⁷ What this means is that there is useful information available about each civil servant's general ability even before he or she enters the service after the probation period. Yet, these valuable data points are not systematically used in future decisions regarding retention or assignment to sector-specific positions.⁸⁸

Organizational features of the service that dictate career progression, such as those having to do with the rigid age windows around entry and exit and seniority-based promotions, can also have a measurable (often negative) impact on bureaucratic effectiveness. The older an officer is when entering the IAS and the larger his or her cohort, the less effective that officer is likely to be in the future. Furthermore, the assignment of senior officers at the joint-secretary level ought to ensure a strong match between the posting and specific skills that have been accumulated over time.

The recommendations of the Second Administrative Reforms Commission on selection to key leadership positions in the civil services are especially germane. Recognizing that the current system of empanelment suffers from a lack of transparency, the commission argued for a system of performance appraisal that privileged domain competence over subjective annual performance appraisal reports and made domain expertise a criterion for senior management positions of a technical nature. Additionally, the commission made the case for greater competition for positions at the joint-secretary level and above (in both state governments and the government of India) by opening them up to candidates from all senior administrative services, such as the Indian Economic Service, the Indian Revenue Service, and the Indian Information Service.

The body also favored opening up additional secretary (one rank above joint secretary) positions to qualified individuals from the private sector.⁸⁹ The Modi government has taken a welcome step in this direction by restructuring the empanelment process. Previously, an expert committee would aggregate an officer's annual personal appraisal reports (where outstanding grades

were typical) for the preceding sixteen years—a system predicated on negative disqualification, or searching for reasons to drop candidates, rather than on considered selection based on affirmative criteria.⁹⁰ By introducing a comprehensive evaluation that ranks officers on their functional skills, domain expertise, behavioral competence, and integrity, the center seeks to eliminate ambiguity from the empanelment process and explicitly tie high job performance to moving up the career ladder.

Given that older officers entering the bureaucracy are perceived as less effective by internal and external stakeholders like civil society members, businesspeople, politicians, and other civil servants, reducing the maximum age of entry into the IAS is a relatively easy reform the government could introduce.⁹¹ Although the Second Administrative Reforms Commission recommended limiting the permissible age, the Department of Personnel and Training moved in the opposite direction, increasing the age limit for aspiring candidates in 2014.⁹² The agency made the switch despite the fact that two-thirds of all civil servants the government surveyed agreed that the maximum age of entry should be decreased.⁹³ Of late, however, both the government and the bureaucracy seem to have reached a consensus on the importance of lowering the upper-age limit. According to media reports, the Modi administration is likely to accept the recommendation of an August 2016 UPSC panel report to implement a phased reduction in the age limit for general, able-bodied candidates from thirty-two to twenty-seven years.⁹⁴ This small step not only improves the IAS's human capital pipeline but also paves the way for organizational reform in the future.

There is also a case for reducing the overall number of IAS positions. Over time, the number of authorized positions has ballooned, often creating redundancies or multiple layers of bureaucracy, which further encumber decision-making (see table 5). Reducing the size of the individual cadres would also decrease the number of promotions, a step that is needed to ensure only the best officers reach the upper levels of the IAS ranks.⁹⁵ As one commentator has noted, the pyramid structure of promotions looks more like a cylinder because “75 percent of officers become joint secretaries and 40 percent reach the level of additional secretary.”⁹⁶

This begs the question of how to improve the process around promotion decisions. Just as data can help inform the initial assignment of officers in the service, they can also be of use in latter stages of officers' careers. However, the likely benefits of shrinking the size of cadres must be balanced against the costs of creating disincentives for talented young people to join the service. After all, instituting an up-or-out system could adversely affect job security and stability.

Stepping back, it is outcomes that should drive government policymaking. The advent of big data, especially on concrete outcomes that can be traced to a specific officer's time in a given post, opens up wide-ranging possibilities for performance-based evaluation and promotion. Seniority is a blunt instrument for deciding who gets promoted and who does not, especially when

Table 5. Authorized and Actual Strength of the IAS

Year	Total Authorized Strength	Total Actual Strength	Shortage	Actual IAS Officers per 100,000 People
1951	1,232	957 (including 336 officers of the Indian Civil Service)	275	0.265
1961	1,862	1,722 (including 215 officers of the Indian Civil Service)	140	0.392
1971	3,203	2,754 (including 88 officers of the Indian Civil Service)	449	0.502
1981	4,599	3,883	716	0.568
1991	5,334	4,881	453	0.576
2001	5,159	5,118	41	0.497
2011	6,077	4,456	1,621	0.368
2016	6,396	4,926	1,470	0.375

Sources: Government of India, Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances, and Pensions, *Annual Report 2015-16* (New Delhi: Government of India, 2016); World Bank, "World Development Indicators" (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, July 2016), <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL>; Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, Office of the Registrar General & Census Commissioner, "Size, Growth Rate and Distribution of Population" in *Provisional Population Totals - India* (New Delhi: Government of India, 2011).

fine-grained data are now readily available. The choice of the word outcomes here must be emphasized; governments all over the world, including India's, typically track expenditure (such as education funds spent) and defined outputs (number of teachers trained or school buildings constructed), but few have made the jump to outcomes (reading skills of a third grader) that more closely get at issues of quality.⁹⁷

Data-driven performance metrics could not only be used for promotions, but they also could help guide salary and remuneration decisions. There is a growing literature about performance-based pay for public-sector workers, and while the jury is still out about the effectiveness of such schemes, limited experimentation is certainly worth pursuing.⁹⁸ To be clear: data need not be the only criterion on which officers are judged. However, data could be one critical component.

There is the final pesky issue of what to do with perennially underperforming officers. While the government can adopt smarter methods for ensuring that the best officers are selected, promoted, and placed in the right jobs, it must also find creative ways of dealing with poor performers. The Second Administrative Reforms Commission recommended that within the framework of a new civil services law, the government institute a new policy whereby all officers who are deemed unfit for service at the time of their twenty-year review be forcibly retired.

Neither the Singh government nor the Modi administration embraced this suggestion, but the latter has taken new steps to crack down on poor performers. According to media reports, the Department of Personnel and Training has begun systematically reviewing the performance of central officers who have either completed thirty years of service or reached fifty years of age. Those officers who receive negative reviews, the reports suggest, are to receive a notice that their services will be terminated within three months.⁹⁹ At the end of 2015, the Modi government disclosed that it had dismissed or compulsorily retired thirteen bureaucrats for unsatisfactory performance.¹⁰⁰ This process of dismissing officers who are negatively rated at predictable career benchmarks should be institutionalized so that it does not rest on the preferences of any one government but becomes a transparently enforced and embedded rule.

Allocating Officers to Home States

A third reform is somewhat counterintuitive: there might be unexpected benefits from allocating a higher percentage of junior officers to their states of domicile, or home states.¹⁰¹ This proposal flies in the face of some of the original arguments to the contrary made by India's founders. In a speech to the Constituent Assembly in 1949, then home minister Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel highlighted the IAS's role in encouraging center-state harmony, claiming that "you will not have a united India, if you have [not] a good all-India service which has independence to speak out its mind."¹⁰² In subsequent decades, political scientists have echoed these claims, contending that the current structure of the IAS plays "a key role in generating all-India loyalties."¹⁰³ The notion of altering the insider-outsider ratio goes against conventional wisdom among senior bureaucrats, many of whom contend that local officers are susceptible to capture by their personal network, while outsider officers with no such stakes tend to perform better.

The architects of the IAS may have been right to distrust bureaucrats with strong local ties. Yet it is possible that the widespread prevalence of accountability mechanisms in contemporary India—in the form of growing social, television, and print media circulation and rising literacy levels—may minimize the threat of capture by vested interests. While a change to the national cadre allocation policy is unwarranted at this stage, reform-minded state cadres could experiment with increasing the number of local IAS officers and closely tracking their impact on development outcomes relative to other bureaucrats.

Avenues for Future Research

While the primary research findings, taken in aggregate, suggest potential reforms to policies on recruitment, training, career advancement, and transfers, important gaps remain. First, additional research is needed to further test the hypothesis that local officers generate better development outcomes than outsiders. The evidence to date suggests that embedded IAS officers have a tangible, positive impact in areas where strong accountability mechanisms are present. However, a concern many bureaucrats share about increasing the proportion of domiciled officers is that they lack the broad national outlook possessed by officers assigned to states other than those to which they belong. Scholars should explore whether the positive relationship between insider status and development outcomes holds as officers are promoted to posts in state governments or to postings in New Delhi.

Second, woefully little is known about bureaucratic efficiency at the most senior levels of management. This is arguably when productivity matters the most, because senior civil servants are in charge of state- or central-government departments toward the end of their careers. A slew of news reports have documented the phenomenon of retired IAS officers being appointed to official bodies and administrative tribunals.¹⁰⁴ This trend has led some scholars to voice concern about a “sinecure state,” in which senior IAS officers modulate their performance in their final years of service in the hopes of winning a plum postretirement assignment.¹⁰⁵

This conjecture opens up several opportunities for future research. For example, is there a systematic increase in senior bureaucrats assuming post-retirement postings? What impact, if any, does this behavior have on bureaucratic efficiency during officers’ final months and years in office? The answers to these questions are of significant importance in determining whether new rules regarding postretirement government employment should be contemplated.

Third, little is understood about the workings of the state-level bureaucracies, the variation among them, and their impact on development and governance. There has been little systematic research into these issues, despite the fact that states are today the prime venues for political competition, economic policymaking, and governance writ large. Researchers do have hunches worth exploring. The conventional wisdom is that the quality of bureaucrats from the state services is lower than in the IAS. In the words of political scientist Devesh Kapur, “if there are questions about the competencies, integrity and political pressures on the IAS, these are likely to be considerably greater in the case of the PCSes.”¹⁰⁶ But there is likely to be considerable variation across states. Scholar Atul Kohli has remarked that the quality of state-level bureaucracy in southern India has generally been superior to that delivered in the north. Kohli qualifies this statement, writing, “I hesitate in asserting this ‘fact’ because, to the best of my knowledge, it has not been documented by scholarly research;

comparison of state level bureaucracies across India is crying out for further research.¹⁰⁷ Comparative analyses of state-level bureaucracies—not to mention an examination of the interaction between the IAS and the state civil services—are ripe for deeper exploration.

Conclusion

The challenges facing the Indian state in the twenty-first century are immense. The country's fundamentals—a young and growing workforce, a virtually unprecedented urban transition, and a domestic marketplace with seemingly infinite potential—should positively influence its quest to fulfill this promise and sustain high rates of growth. However, India does possess one significant Achilles' heel: the quality of its public-sector institutions.

Any serious reform program for civil administration must address the infirmities of the core bureaucracy. Although the IAS represents a small share of the overall administrative apparatus, given its control over executive positions at all levels—local, state, and national—it is a critical component. For the first time, thanks to a new body of literature that leverages big data with cutting-edge statistical methodologies, there is rigorous evidence to help inform reform discussions. While the solutions implied by the data are not revolutionary, they have the virtue of being based on solid evidence.

As the obstacles facing India's transition to a middle-income economy grow in size and complexity, the country's policymakers cannot let institutional lethargy get in the way of efficient policy implementation. A modern Indian state requires an administrative apparatus that encourages and recognizes productive high performers, ensures political buy-in within the policymaking process, and values genuine innovations in service delivery over an unquestioning adherence to hierarchy and procedure.

Notes

- 1 Growth figures, measured in constant prices, are sourced from the Reserve Bank of India. Poverty data, using a poverty cutoff of \$1.90 per day, comes from the World Bank. For an explanation of the latter, see Rukmini S., “Poverty Is Falling Fast in India, but We Still Measure It Terribly,” *Hindu*, October 28, 2015, <http://www.thehindu.com/data/poverty-is-falling-fast-in-india-but-we-still-measure-it-terribly/article7810119.ece>.
- 2 International Monetary Fund, *World Economic Outlook: Too Slow for Too Long* (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 2016).
- 3 Gurcharan Das, *India Grows at Night* (London: Penguin UK, 2013). Even a shock like the landmark economic reforms of 1991 did little to fundamentally alter the nature of India’s slothful state. As economist Lant Pritchett has argued, market liberalization efforts of the early 1990s were “administrative capability saving” reforms in which the state simply stopped trying to perform extraneous functions. See Lant Pritchett, “Is India a Flailing State? Detours on the Four Lane Highway to Modernization,” Harvard Kennedy School Working Paper RWP09-013, May 13, 2009.
- 4 The government effectiveness indicator combines the views of a large number of survey respondents—enterprises, citizens, and experts—across countries over the period 1996–2014. It is based on over 30 individual data sources produced by a variety of survey institutes, think tanks, nongovernmental organizations, international organizations, and private-sector firms. As a benchmark, in 2014 high-income countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development ranked in the eighty-eighth percentile on the government effectiveness indicator, on average. For more detail, see World Bank, “Worldwide Governance Indicators,” <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home>.
- 5 The outstanding service of officers like C.D. Deshmukh, an ICS officer and the first Indian governor of the Reserve Bank of India, and S.R. Shankaran, a 1958-batch IAS officer in the Andhra Pradesh cadre who fought against bonded labor and atrocities against Dalits, have become the stuff of legend. Several reports by international development organizations on successful innovations in service delivery have recognized the pivotal role IAS officers have played in implementing the Indian government’s key development and economic priorities over the past seven decades. See World Bank, *Reforming Public Services in India: Drawing Lessons From Success* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2006); also see NITI Aayog and the United Nations Development Program, *Social Sector Service Delivery: Good Practices Resource Book* (New Delhi: Government of India, 2015).
- 6 The data on the total number of public-sector officials in India are current as of January 1, 2014. See Government of India, *Report of the Seventh Central Pay Commission* (New Delhi: Government of India, 2015), 23. The data on IAS officers are current of January 1, 2015. See Government of India, National Informatics Center, “Cadre Strength of Indian Administrative Service,” <http://civillist.ias.nic.in/YrCurr/PDF/AppendixA.pdf>.

- 7 The widespread use of the term *babu* is a perennial grievance among IAS officers. As of mid-2016, several tweets by the IAS (Central) Association admonished national newspapers and television channels for their use of the term. A number of Facebook posts by serving officers with large social media followings also expressed disappointment.
- 8 Throughout this paper, we use the term *central* rather than *union* government to refer to the government in New Delhi—even though the latter is the officially recognized term. However, central government is the commonly accepted designation outside of India.
- 9 The origins of the oft-quoted “steel frame” reference can be found in a speech then British prime minister David Lloyd George delivered to the British Parliament in 1922 on the subject of the Indian Civil Service: “If you take that steel frame out, the fabric will collapse. . . . There is one institution we will not cripple, there is one institution we will not deprive of its functions or of its privileges, and that is that institution which built up the British Raj—the British Civil Service in India.” See *House of Commons Debates*, vol. 157, columns 1495–1525, August 2, 1922, <http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1922/aug/02/civil-service-india>.
- 10 Uttam Sengupta, “Shaking Up the Frame,” *Outlook*, June 16, 2014, <http://www.outlookindia.com/magazine/story/shaking-up-the-frame/290983>.
- 11 Manmohan Singh, “Prime Minister’s Address to the Nation,” June 24, 2004, <http://archivepmo.nic.in/drmanmohansingh/speech-details.php?nodeid=1>.
- 12 Sandeep Unnithan and Kumar Anshuman, “Yes, Prime Minister,” *India Today*, July 3, 2014, <http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/narendra-modi-yes-prime-minister/1/369923.html>. In his previous role as chief minister of the state of Gujarat, Modi had cultivated a reputation for relying heavily on the state’s elite civil servants, rather than ministerial colleagues, to implement his flagship programs. The gathering held in the first week of his tenure as prime minister suggested that Modi planned to steal a page from his Gujarat playbook to guide his governing approach in New Delhi.
- 13 The IAS has a staff association that regularly advocates on behalf of officers’ interests. For example, in advance of the report of the Seventh Central Pay Commission, which sets central government salaries, the association vociferously argued against the notion of establishing pay parity between the IAS and other government services. See Remya Nair, Mayank Aggarwal, and Yogendra Kalavalapalli, “IAS Officers Get Pay Commission Jitters,” *Mint*, October 30, 2015, <http://www.livemint.com/Politics/70YQ66cahp5KID17OyOZW1/IAS-officers-get-pay-commission-jitters.html>.
- 14 Jawaharlal Nehru, a central figure in India’s freedom struggle, wrote a series of letters to his daughter Indira while imprisoned by British authorities from 1930 to 1933. In one of the 196 letters, India’s future first prime minister wrote: “Someone—I think it was Voltaire—defined this ‘Holy Roman Empire’ as something which was neither holy, nor Roman, nor an empire. Just as someone else once defined the Indian Civil Service, with which we are unfortunately still afflicted in this country, as neither Indian, nor civil, nor a service.” Jawaharlal Nehru, *Glimpses of World History* (New Delhi: Penguin, 2004).
- 15 The remaining 15 percent were judicial officers, working permanently as judges in districts or as high court justices. David C. Potter, *India’s Political Administrators: 1919-1983* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 21.
- 16 In comparison, political appointees fill the deputy-secretary, undersecretary, assistant-secretary, and (approximately half of all) deputy-assistant-secretary positions in the U.S. bureaucracy. See Edward Page, “Has the Whitehall Model Survived?” *International Review of Administrative Sciences* 76, no. 3 (September 2010): 407–423.
- 17 Population data are taken from the 1931 census. For more details, see Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, “Census Reports 1931,” http://www.censusindia.gov.in/Census_And_You/old_report/Census_1931n.aspx.

- 18 Anirudh Krishna, "Continuity and Change: The Indian Administrative Service 30 Years Ago and Today," *Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, no. 4 (November 2010): 434.
- 19 Prior to 1922, any Indian seeking to enter the ICS would have to travel to London to sit the annual competitive examination. See Potter, *India's Political Administrators*, 83.
- 20 David Gilmour, "The Ruling Caste," *Asian Affairs* 37, no. 3 (2006): 312–319.
- 21 Arudra Burra, "The Indian Civil Service and the Nationalist Movement: Neutrality, Politics and Continuity," *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics* 48, no. 4 (November 2010): 404–432.
- 22 As Arudra Burra argues, "for [Sardar] Patel, the fact that the ICS was a loyal civil service to the Raj was *precisely* [italics in original] what made Indian ICS officers useful to the new state. Their loyalty was proof that their allegiance was to the state irrespective of its political colour." See Burra, "The Indian Civil Service and the Nationalist Movement," 427. This is not to say that India's postindependence leaders did not harbor skepticism about the true nature of the ICS. Prior to independence, Jawaharlal Nehru accused the ICS of having "built up a caste which is rigid and exclusive. Even the Indian members of the service do not really belong to that caste." See Bidyut Chakrabarty, "Jawaharlal Nehru and Administrative Reconstruction of India: A Mere Limitation of the Past or a Creative Initiative?" *South Asia: Journal of South Asia Studies*, no. 1 (April 2006): 83.
- 23 Beryl A. Radin, "The Indian Administrative Service (IAS) in the 21st Century: Living in an Intergovernmental Environment," *International Journal of Public Administration*, no. 12–14 (December 2007): 1,527.
- 24 Quoted in S.R. Maheshwari, *Indian Administration* (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1984), 211.
- 25 Additionally, there are the Central Civil Services and the State Civil Services. The former belong exclusively to the central government and consist mainly of technical organizations like the Indian Postal Service and the Indian Foreign Service. The latter account for the bulk of the bureaucracy at the subnational level. State civil servants typically work under the IAS in the states, whose officers occupy the most consequential positions in government.
- 26 K.P. Krishnan and T.V. Somanathan, "Civil Service: An Institutional Perspective," in *Public Institutions in India: Performance and Design*, eds. by Devesh Kapur and Pratap Bhanu Mehta (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2005).
- 27 After gaining acceptance to the IAS, officers are assigned to a cadre for their entire career and in accordance with a complicated set of allocation rules that is intended to ensure the even distribution of talent across states. Each Indian state corresponds to a cadre, although there are three joint cadres for groups of smaller states: Assam and Meghalaya; Manipur and Tripura; and Arunachal Pradesh, Goa, Mizoram, and the Union Territories. For details, see Government of India; Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances, and Pensions; Department of Personnel and Training, *Cadre Allocation Policy for the All India Services*, Office Memorandum No. 13011/22/2005-AIS (I) (New Delhi: Government of India, April 10, 2008).
- 28 The Central Civil Services are classified further into Group A, B, C, and D services. The UPSC conducts the recruitment process for the All India Services and Group A and B services. The Staff Selection Commission recruits entry-level officers to Group C and D services, while individual State Public Service Commissions conduct the hiring process for state civil servants.
- 29 The IAS has instituted several reservation-based affirmative action policies for members of the Scheduled Castes (SCs), the Scheduled Tribes (STs), and the Other Backward Classes (OBCs) communities. According to the 2011 census, SCs and STs comprised 16.6 and 8.6 percent of India's population, respectively. While estimates for OBCs vary (the last publicly available caste census dates back to 1931),

- recent data from the sixty-sixth round of the National Sample Survey (2009–2010) indicates that OBCs comprise approximately 41 percent of the population. The UPSC has mandated quotas of 15 percent, 7.5 percent, and 27 percent respectively for members of these three groups. See Government of India, Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances, and Pensions, Department of Personnel and Training, “Brochure on Reservation for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Classes in Services,” Office Memorandum No.A36011/1/2013-Estt(Res) (New Delhi: Government of India, January 23, 2014); and R. Ravikanth Reddy, “UPSC Notifies Civil Services Exam,” *Hindu*, May 24, 2015, <http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/upsc-notifies-civil-services-exam/article7239777.ece>. The policy of reservation has made the IAS a more representative body and more in sync with the Indian populace at large; yet, there is currently no systematic evidence of its impact (positive or negative) on performance. One recent study looked at the impact of reservations on productivity among Indian railway employees. While the study did not explicitly look at the IAS, the results were suggestive. The authors found no evidence that reservations reduced productive efficiency. See Ashwini Deshpande and Thomas E. Weisskopf, “Does Affirmative Action Reduce Productivity? A Case Study of the Indian Railways,” *World Development* 64 (December 2014): 169–180.
- 30 These officers, called promotees, undergo an eight-week training program at the Lal Bahadur Shastri National Academy of Administration and various administrative training institutes across India.
 - 31 The performance appraisal report (PAR) system replaced the controversial annual confidential report (ACR) system after the Second Administrative Reforms Commission criticized the latter as representing a supervisor’s subjective opinion. The PAR takes into account a variety of indicators, such as personal attributes, functional competence, and work output to arrive at an overall grade between 1 and 10 for every officer. Government of India, Prime Minister’s Office, Press Information Bureau, “Evaluating IAS Officers: PAR to Replace ACR,” May 7, 2005, <http://pib.nic.in/newsite/erelcontent.aspx?relid=9096>.
 - 32 Akhileshwar Prasad Singh, “The Changing Role of Collector and District Magistrate,” *Indian Journal of Political Science* 55, no. 2 (April–June 1994): 167. In Upamanyu Chatterjee’s fictionalized account of the IAS, one character describes the power of district collectors as the ability to “play God over 17,000 square kilometers.” Upamanyu Chatterjee, *English, August* (New Delhi: Penguin, 1988): 38–39.
 - 33 Roughly two-thirds of all IAS officers typically receive postings to the central government. See John-Paul Ferguson and Sharique Hasan, “Specialization and Career Dynamics Evidence From the Indian Administrative Service,” *Administrative Science Quarterly* 58, no. 2 (June 2013): 6.
 - 34 Pratap Bhanu Mehta, “Our Bureaucracy, Our Selves,” *Indian Express*, June 5, 2009. The Hong Kong–based Political and Economic Risk Consultancy surveyed about 1,200 investors across Asia and labeled India’s bureaucracy the least efficient, calling civil servants “a power centre in their own right at both the national and state levels, and . . . extremely resistant to reform that affects them or the way they go about their duties.” See “Singapore Bureaucracy Best in Asia, India Worst – Survey,” *Reuters*, June 3, 2009, <http://in.reuters.com/article/idINIndia-40062020090603>.
 - 35 Government of India, Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances, and Pensions, Press Information Bureau, “Civil Services Examination, 2015 – Result Declared,” May 10, 2016, <http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=145168>. In comparison, the acceptance rate for elite Indian institutions of higher learning like the Indian Institutes of Technology and Indian Institutes of Management was 16.5 percent and 17.1 percent, respectively. Roshan Kishore, “What It Takes to Crack the Civil Services Entrance,” *Mint*, July 24, 2015, <http://www.livemint.com/Opinion/Z1xMAkTfdWjBq9UBWVQs0L/What-it-takes-to-crack-the-civil-services-entrance.html>.

- 36 K.P. Krishnan and T.V. Somanathan, "The Civil Service," in *Rethinking Public Institutions in India*, eds. by Devesh Kapur, Pratap Bhanu Mehta, and Milan Vaishnav (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, forthcoming).
- 37 This ratio was 36.4:1 in 1947 but only 11.4:1 in 2008. See Government of India, *Seventh Central Pay Commission*, 67; also see K.P. Krishnan and T.V. Somanathan, "The Civil Service." The Seventh Central Pay Commission also documents that a general helper, the lowest-ranked employee in the government, now makes 22,579 rupees, more than double his counterpart in the private sector. For top management positions, however, the pay ratio in the public sector continues to lag considerably: an analysis of 50 major firms listed on the National Stock Exchange of India found that top management were paid 170 times the salary of the average staffer. See N. Sundaresha Subramanian, "Nifty Firm Directors Earn 170 Times Their Staff," *Business Standard*, November 26, 2015, http://www.business-standard.com/article/companies/nifty-firm-directors-earn-170-times-their-staff-11511260039_1.html.
- 38 Krishna, "Continuity and Change," 434. The decline in monetary compensation over time is a point that is heavily contested. While poorly paid in salary terms, IAS officers are still eligible for perquisites like household help, vehicles, housing, and land—although the latter two function akin to stock options and can take a long time to vest.
- 39 The survey covered 18,432 officers belonging to the ten select services, including all three All India Services. Government of India, Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances, and Pensions, Department of Administrative Reforms and Public Grievances, *Civil Services Survey: A Report* (New Delhi: Government of India, 2010).
- 40 Virendra Nath Bhatt, "A Hellhole for Civil Servants," *Tehelka*, September 23, 2013, <http://www.tehelka.com/2013/09/a-hellhole-for-civil-servants/>.
- 41 "Haryana Transfers Ashok Khemka Again," *Economic Times*, April 7, 2016, <http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/haryana-transfers-ashok-khemka-again/articleshow/51733822.cms>.
- 42 Sukhbir Siwach, "Ashok Khemka, Whistleblower IAS Officer, Transferred Again," *Times of India*, April 2, 2015, <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Ashok-Khemka-whistleblower-IAS-officer-transferred-again/articleshow/46777082.cms>.
- 43 In its landmark judgment on the need to free bureaucrats from political interference, the Supreme Court of India stated that "civil servants are not having stability of tenure, particularly in the State Governments where transfers and postings are made frequently, at the whims and fancies of the executive head for political and other considerations and not in public interest." *T.S.R. Subramanian vs. Union of India*, Supreme Court of India, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 82, October 31, 2013.
- 44 Shantanu Nandan Sharma, "Not Happy With Your Performance Appraisal? Join the Government," *Economic Times*, April 13, 2013, <http://economictimes.india-times.com/jobs/not-happy-with-your-performance-appraisal-join-the-government/articleshow/msid-19520037,curpg-2.cms?from=mdr>; also see "Bureaucrats Fleeing From Modi's Delhi: A 'Control Freak' PM Is Not the Only Reason," *Firstpost*, July 10, 2015, <http://www.firstpost.com/politics/bureacrats-fleeing-from-modis-delhi-a-control-freak-pm-is-not-the-only-reason-2336420.html>.
- 45 Thus, while many IAS officers lament arbitrary transfers and brief tenures in a given post, many perceive benefits from regular rotations across domains because this offers a diversity of experience. One cynical interpretation is that this also makes accountability much more diffuse. See Prabhu Ghate, "Reforming the Civil Service: Meeting Crucial Need for Expertise," *Economic and Political Weekly* 33, no.7 (February 14–20, 1998): 359–365.
- 46 Department of Administrative Reforms and Public Grievances, *Civil Services Survey*, 89–90.

- 47 R.K. Raghavan, “The Stained Steel Frame,” *Hindu*, January 28, 2016, <http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/corruption-in-civil-services-the-stained-steel-frame/article8159067.ece>.
- 48 The response of the minister of state in the Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances, and Pensions, Jitendra Singh, to an unstarred question in the Rajya Sabha, April 23, 2015.
- 49 See Marianne Bertrand, Robin Burgess, Arunish Chawla, and Guo Xu, “Determinants and Consequences of Bureaucrat Effectiveness: Evidence From the Indian Administrative Service,” International Growth Center Working Paper, September 24, 2015, http://www.theigc.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/ias_draft_v12.pdf (accessed October 26, 2015); Rikhil R. Bhavnani and Alexander Lee, “Local Embeddedness and Bureaucratic Performance: Evidence From India,” Working Paper, Department of Political Science, University of Wisconsin-Madison, August 26, 2015, <https://faculty.polisci.wisc.edu/bhavnani/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/BhavnaniLeeEmbeddedness.pdf> (accessed October 23, 2015); John-Paul Ferguson and Sharique Hasan, “Specialization and Career Dynamics: Evidence From the Indian Administrative Service,” *Administrative Science Quarterly* 58, no. 2 (June 2013): 233–256; Jonas Hjort, Gautam Rao, and Elizabeth Santorella, “Bureaucrat Value-Added and Local Economic Outcomes,” Working Paper, Department of Economics, Harvard University, November 24, 2015 (on file with authors); Lakshmi Iyer and Anandi Mani, “Traveling Agents: Political Change and Bureaucratic Turnover in India,” *Review of Economics and Statistics* 94, no. 3 (August 2012): 723–739; Anusha Nath, “Bureaucrats and Politicians: Electoral Competition and Dynamic Incentives,” IED Working Paper 269, Boston University, October 6, 2015, https://www.dropbox.com/s/a5n7jldtqw6gza9/AnushaNath_BureacratsAndPoliticians.pdf?dl=0 (accessed October 26, 2015). Some of the findings the authors attribute to Iyer and Mani are contained in a previous version of their 2012 article. See Lakshmi Iyer and Anandi Mani, “Traveling Agents: Political Change and Bureaucratic Turnover in India,” Working Paper, Harvard Business School, November 2009, http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/09-006_161d8937-9cd3-4709-b3ba-53cdc9588cfc.pdf (accessed October 13, 2015). It is important to note that of the six papers under consideration, as of mid-2016 only two—Ferguson and Hasan (2013) and Iyer and Mani (2012)—have been published in peer-reviewed publications. Hence, one should treat the research findings of this new literature with caution. Nonetheless, the fact that key results converge across papers allows one to formulate some initial conclusions.
- 50 As a composite indicator of bureaucratic efficiency that takes the views of fellow officers and stakeholders into account, this index measure arguably provides more precise information about a given IAS officer’s abilities than the current system of performance appraisal. For example, according to a media report, an official review of the executive records of 1,089 serving IAS officers carried out by fourteen state cadres found only two officers unfit for continuation in service. This is despite the fact that according to the government’s admission, formal complaints against IAS officers have risen in recent years, from 246 in 2013–2014 to 333 in 2014–2015 and to 342 in 2015–2016. See Subhomoy Bhattacharjee, “Only 2 of 1,089 IAS Officers Inept: DoPT,” *Business Standard*, April 22, 2016, http://www.business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/only-2-of-1-089-ias-officers-inept-dopt-116042200066_1.html; also see Press Trust of India, “Rise in Complaints Against IAS, IPS Officers: Government,” *Business Standard*, May 4, 2016, http://www.business-standard.com/article/pti-stories/rise-in-complaints-against-ias-ips-officers-govt-116050400617_1.html;
- 51 Bertrand, Burgess, Chawla, and Guo, “Determinants and Consequences of Bureaucrat Effectiveness.”

- 52 While Ferguson and Hasan can rule out any systematic relationship between specialization in any one particular field and the rate of promotion, they cannot fully disentangle the precise mechanism that connects specialization and career success. They list at least two possibilities: that specialization reduces the uncertainty about an officer's ability or that it allows officers to forge better working relations with superiors, which results in more positive evaluations.
- 53 Ferguson and Hasan, "Specialization and Career Dynamics," 19.
- 54 For instance, the authors found that officers who graduated from college in the first division are 66 percent more likely to be empaneled than others. Officers who possess a larger number of academic degrees also receive a positive bump, although smaller in magnitude.
- 55 One example of the traditional contention on specialization can be found in Naresh C. Saxena, "Improving Programme Delivery," *Seminar* 541 (September 2004).
- 56 Iyer and Mani, "Traveling Agents."
- 57 The authors consider four sets of background attributes: individual characteristics (gender, caste, urban or rural background, and age), education (science, technology, engineering, and math degrees and academic distinction), work experience (prior jobs in the public, private, and research sectors), and scores on the entrance and training exams. The organizational determinants under consideration include age at entry, cohort size, and their interaction.
- 58 It is not uncommon for aspiring candidates to take multiple attempts to clear the preliminary and main entrance exams. While the correlation depicted by Bertrand and her fellow researchers do not consider the potentially confounding effect of the number of exam attempts, it is possible that a candidate's average age at entry could obscure several years of preparation and failed attempts preceding entry and, in turn, a candidate's innate unsuitability to work in the IAS.
- 59 Peter B. Evans, *Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995).
- 60 Bhavnani and Lee use access to public healthcare centers as an additional outcome measure and obtain similar results.
- 61 While the cadre allocation policy fixes the total number of insider officers in a state, this study measured the impact of local officers as compared with outsiders.
- 62 It is possible that embeddedness generates positive effects if local officers wish to improve their districts or if they possess knowledge of local customs and connections that improves their performance. However, the positive results in this paper were driven by the presence of accountability mechanisms, not local knowledge as such.
- 63 The data Hjort and his fellow researchers employed measures nighttime light intensity based on high-resolution images captured by satellites at night. This type of luminosity measure has become a common metric of economic activity. See J. Vernon Henderson, Adam Storeygard, and David N Weil, "Measuring Economic Growth From Outer Space," *American Economic Review* 102, no. 2 (April 2012): 994–1028.
- 64 This latter finding on caste loyalty relied on a subset of data from just two northern Indian states, Uttar Pradesh and Uttarakhand. Given that senior civil service positions are typically filled on the basis of seniority, it is possible that the top-ranking officers in a cohort know that they have a higher probability of reaching top positions and, perhaps, have a better incentive to behave well with politicians.
- 65 Here, the researchers looked at the average importance of an officer's posts across the entirety of their career. See Iyer and Mani, "Traveling Agents."
- 66 *Ibid.* Furthermore, the researchers were unable to uncover any statistically significant impact of transfers on either immunization coverage or completion of road projects—two alternative indicators of district-level performance.
- 67 For a theoretical account of why political competition is good for governance, see Pranab Bardhan and Tsung-Tao Yang, "Political Competition in Economic Perspective," BREAD Working Paper No. 78 (2004). For a leading empirical

- account of this relationship, see Timothy Besley, Torsten Persson, and Daniel M. Strum, “Political Competition, Policy and Growth: Theory and Evidence from the US,” *Review of Economic Studies* 77, no.4 (2010): 1329–1352.
- 68 Each MP is given a fixed amount of funding each year to implement public works projects in their constituency. In 2015, the amount was approximately \$735,000. While the MP recommends projects, the district administration is responsible for implementation. The scheme is known as the Members of Parliament Local Area Development Scheme.
- 69 The exogeneity of such a shock might be disputed on the following grounds: shortly after new census data are released, officials begin speculating which constituencies will gain or lose reservation after a new delimitation. Therefore, it is plausible that bureaucrats might know in advance, if not with absolute certainty, the changes in store for the politicians in whose constituencies they work.
- 70 Nath found no systematic bias in the types of projects that district officials sanction faster. This addresses the possible concern that district officials are motivated by rent-seeking incentives associated with certain lucrative types of projects. Furthermore, because bureaucratic promotions occur at different times, both before and after elections, Nath could examine the differences in the timing of promotions. Bureaucrats who were up for promotion following elections changed their behavior in party strongholds or in places where the incumbent politician could punish the bureaucrat if he or she does not perform.
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CIVIL SERVICES AND CURRENT CHALLENGES

BY

GAUTAM PINGLE¹

“The authority of Parliament or the State Legislature must be and is supreme, but it would be frustrating the aim of democracy to let the influence of political or social groups functioning in the legislature or outside to affect recruitment or promotion in the services. In emancipated India, it was the hope that politicians who were born in revolution and civil disobedience should soon learn to become administrators. But this process has been slow. Instead, at the other end, administrators are perhaps tending to become politicians, which is bad.... What is essential at the top is the capacity to judge upon relevant advice and to decide promptly and rightly in executive matters.... To decide in matters executive, quickly and correctly, is a gift of the gods. And this is it that makes a good administrator.”

Sri C. Rajagopalchari, “The Good Administrator”, First Sardar Patel Memorial Lecture. 1957

Introduction

The All India and Central Civil Services form, along with the State Civil Services, the basic framework of administration and governance in the country. They are entrusted with exercise of sovereign functions – performance of which define the State, legitimize the government and preserve the very existence of the country. Apart from this, the civil services are expected to provide essential economic and social services. They are expected to guide and implement programs for the benefit of the masses and the development of the country. A heavy burden is, therefore, placed on the civil services and, moreover, the country expects efficient, honest and speedy execution of tasks so mandated.

Yet the civil services do not perform in a vacuum but are subject to political, economic and social structures and forces beyond their control. Moreover, they are expected to perform tasks, which the services may not have been originally designed to perform. The readiness of the civil services, in itself, does not only rest only in their capacity and willingness to perform but in changing the environment in which they can perform to the best of their ability. Without such changes setting of unsustainable tasks will result in obvious under-performance. Thus a radical change in the manner in which governance is

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carried out is needed to ensure performance by the civil services as well as a well-considered setting of new tasks and provision of resources to carry them out.

Readiness

Professionalisation

The selection and training of civil servants are the basic foundation on which subsequent performance management rests. We select the best and brightest for the services and also make allowance for those whose communities have been historically disadvantaged. When they join the service we expect them all to perform at expected high levels and make no distinction based on their class, caste, specialization, or on any other social or economic factors. By the time they join –in their twenties - they are already socialized and such socialization may come in the way of inculcating the values of a civil servant – neutrality, objectivity and efficiency. This is the real challenge that we face. We need to ensure that this challenge is met and expectations fulfilled. To this end, we need to reexamine the process of selection, training and evaluation as well as to ensure non-interference in the execution of mandated functions. In this task, the civil services and the political executive as well as the legislatures must act in concordance. The stability of the state and development of the country and the livelihood of the people is too important for one or other part of the state alone to carry the burden of this onerous task.

While civil servants are selected on the basis of a common examination covering many subjects, they (as a matter of practice), come to the service with pre-existing specialist qualifications, some which can include Ph.D's, medical and engineering degrees etc. This degree of professionalism, which comes at no cost to the service, is promptly lost to it by the way the cadre is managed.

Those that do not have pre-existing professional qualifications have no encouragement to deepen their personal interest in any particular subject, as their professional duties do not apparently need such expertise. Yet not only does the state loose out on the lack of expertise and professional knowledge, but the civil servant at retirement is left bereft of any skills other than as a “bureaucrat-with-connections”. This has to change and the civil servant should be encouraged and permitted to develop domain expertise and he/she should be kept in posts, which need such skills in order to ensure performance. This in itself will put an end to the transfers of civil servants from one domain to another and reduce the competition among them for what are considered ‘plum’ or “good” posts.

The civil service needs a high degree of skilled, continuous and long-term cadre management, which is currently absent. The heads of the cadres, close to retirement, seem to have other interests than that of the service they are about to leave. The cadre managers need to pay close attention to individual members of their service by encouraging professionalization, while comforting, congratulating, warning and chastising members where necessary without at the same time intimidating them. Civil servants should be made to feel that they have easy access and support from their cadre managers and help and advice to sort out the many problems that they encounter in the

performance of their duties. This is especially so where the interface with the political establishment becomes difficult for an individual civil servant. The demoralization of the civil services is to a great extent due to the feeling that they have no one to rely on except themselves and thus they tend to “manage” as well as possible with lateral links with politicians and businessmen.

The issue of “generalists versus specialists”– especially in the Administrative Service is another issue which has occupied many mind and started many debates without firm conclusion. The idea behind the generalist argument is that IAS officers serving in the districts need a very broad education and training as they are basically chief administrators for a whole range of departments that make for district administration. In the earlier days, they were also district magistrates and supervised law and order through their control of the police service. The magisterial and law and order functions have largely been relegated and are not matters for direct intervention by the Administrative Service. While the tenure as district collectors is one cherished by all IAS officers as one of their memorable experiences, this hardly recurs more than once. Thus the argument for a generalist civil service which is based entirely on district administration is not an argument that can be generalized to the rest of the administrative service which supervises specialist departments at the state and central levels.

The degree of specialization and professionalization required to manage specialist departments and ministries and their functions requires not only adequate education and training in the domain concerned. It also needs continuity of tenure in that particular department or ministry so as to enable continuous acquisition of skills of the officer as well as ensure continuity of policy and institutional memory. This being so there is a case for segmenting the administrative service into not only state cadres, as is done now, but into specialist cadres including a generalist cadre to take care of district administration. A management segment may also be needed if the administrative cadres is to manage government owned enterprises. In this model a civil servant will serve his entire career either as a generalist or as a specified specialist and reach the top positions in his/her segment – generalist to chief secretary and specialists to principle secretary or chairman and managing director of a public sector enterprise. No cross posting can be envisaged.

Remuneration

The salaries earlier available in the private sector were so much more superior to those of the civil service. So much so that even children of civil servants were not motivated to follow the parent’s careers. The parent’s salary was many cases less than the starting salaries of their children working in the more advanced private sector. The outflow of competent civil servants to the private sector was apparent and promised to continue as long as the pay and perquisites and, more importantly, the conditions in which civil servant has to work do not improve.

With the Sixth and, recently, the Seventh Pay Commissions have corrected the inadequacy of remuneration to a large extent – at the risk of fiscal imbalance- the expected better performance from the civil services has not been apparent. As a result, civil servants can look forward not only to satisfactory salaries but on retirement to pensions of a comfortable nature. By the time of retirement, a civil servant would have by the nature of things, built a home assisted by plots allotted by government at subsidized rates and soft loans; children would have been educated to levels ensuring independence and their nuptials performed. Thus the civil servants today do not have the same pressing need for extensions in their service, post-retirement jobs in government or previously favored private sector entities. Writing their memoirs would be the main task for retired civil servants!

Political Neutrality

It is not possible to hold the civil servant responsible for his/her action if the scope for independent action as per law and rules is reduced by the exigencies of party politics. The independence of the civil service is a critical aspect in the performance of its constitutional duties and guaranteed by the Constitution in Article 311. It is for that reason that the conditions of service, remuneration and fixed tenure of service are regulated by law and not by contract. However, civil servants must be allowed fixed tenure in their posts in order for them to complete the tasks set. Frequent transfers, sometimes used as punishments, are not conducive to service delivery or for upholding the morale and integrity of the service. While establishing favorable and conducive conditions of work are established; failure to render efficient, effective, honest and speedy services should be dealt with swiftly and firmly.

Current Challenges

“Turning and turning in the widening gyre
The falcon cannot hear the falconer;
Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold;
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world,
The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere
The ceremony of innocence is drowned;
The best lack all conviction, while the worst
Are full of passionate intensity”

William Butler Yeats, ‘The Second Coming’

Confusion in the Role of the Civil Service

Yet with all these facilities, we still have issues of accountability and transparency to be adhered to by the services. The responsibilities of the services are two fold. One is to the policy making political executive and, through it, to the legislature. The second is to the

people whose expectations have been raised and whose need is great. The civil service, therefore, represents the interface between the people and the political system. While politicians are answerable to the people at the elections, the civil service is accountable to the political and legislative system. This poses some clear issues, which have to be resolved and made transparent and predictable. The accountability of civil servants, the tenure in the post, their motivation and reward systems affect the tasks to be performed.

However, the most important aspect is the delivery of critical government services to the poor. Here no market forces will provide for them, as the paying capacity of the poor to access such private services is limited. The civil services have, therefore, two major core functions – sovereign functions, which no private sector can be allowed to perform, and the delivery of essential services to the poor, which no market is willing to perform. The task before the civil service is to ensure performance of these functions to the best standards required. This is necessary to ensure that the poor are included in the gain from growth and ultimately for the preservation of democracy itself.

Cadre Management

The civil service needs a degree of skilled and long-term cadre management, which is currently absent. The heads of the cadres, close to retirement, seem to have other interests than that of the service they are about to leave. The cadre managers need to pay close attention not only to individual members of their service by encouraging professionalism. The cadre managers also need to comfort, congratulate, warn and chastise members where necessary without at the same time intimidating them. Civil servants should be made to feel that they have easy access and support from their cadre managers and also help and advice to sort out the many problems that they encounter in the performance of their duties. This is especially so where the interface with the political establishment becomes difficult for an individual civil servant. The great demoralization of the civil services is to a great extent due to the feeling that they have no one to rely on except themselves and thus they tend to “manage” as well as possible with lateral links with politicians and businessmen. Cadre managers have a lot of responsibility for the state of their cadre.

Law and Order.

The state of law and order in much of the country is a disgrace. It imposes an intolerable strain on common citizens and opens opportunities for unscrupulous and criminal elements to enrich themselves unjustly and for other elements to intimidate the citizenry. The police service – which is an integral part of the civil administration – has not been able to stem the increasing criminalisation of society. In many cases, they are complicit in this process. The citizens do not consider the forces of law and order to be on their side in defending their legal and constitutional rights – yet it is obvious that the police force is the only bulwark between society and chaos.

The police force faces political interference to a much greater extent than the civil administration – culminating in complicity, demoralization, arbitrariness, corruption, inefficiency and indiscipline.

The numerous laws on the statute book complicate the process of enforcement. A considerable number of these laws are antiquated and obsolete. Quite a number have been legislated largely to pander to specific vested interests and were not intended for serious enforcement. Yet the most important legislations and constitutional provision- that are intended to protect the lives, liberties and properties of the citizens – do not receive the care and consideration of the law and order authorities. There is a need for a wholesale reform of the laws of the land and a radical change in their enforcement process.

Civil and Criminal Justice system

Combined with the poor performance of the forces of law and order is the poor state of the civil and criminal justice system. With three crore cases pending the subordinate courts and 60,000 pending in the Supreme Court itself, the judicial system has reached a breaking point. Unless the judicial system performs its mandated tasks with speed, honesty, efficiency and fairness, it will be difficult to enforce laws and dispense justice. The entire judicial administration – process simplification, greater productivity and integrity of judicial officers, increased number of judges, a more dedicated Bar – needs radical and urgent improvement. Yet the civil and criminal justice system cannot function in an isolated fashion – it is integrated into the law and order systems and the legislative process. Reform of the whole range of the institutions concerned is needed if the country is continue to be governed by the Rule of Law.

Revenue services

The services entrusted with the collection of state and central taxes and duties play an essential role in supporting the entire structure of the state. Yet despite the rapid growth in the economy – and maybe because of it - the revenue services lag behind their international counterparts in terms of efficiency, fairness, honesty and productivity. The degree of discretionary power devolved on them due to the complex and ambiguous nature of the tax and duty codes allows for the interplay of private interest and official action (or inaction). The degree of corruption that exists and is known to exist among these services is a shame.

The key element in their reform process is the simplification of the codes. A reduction of income tax, excise duty, customs duties to a single rate with the concomitant removal of all exemptions and categories would, at a stroke, eliminate most of the corruption and leakages of revenue. Simplification would not only reform the services and improve efficiency but also encourage compliance and honesty among taxpayers.

Corruption

The degree of corruption in the country, assessed both by domestic and international agencies, is a disgrace and a reflection on our system of governance. While we have eliminated, by and large premia and rents in the provision of private sector goods and services through liberalization and increased competition, the state service sector lags behind this trend. The existence of corruption in the delivery of free and subsidized services by the state sector is a major challenge. We must set an agenda, which eliminates this corrosive tendency before it destabilizes and de-legitimizes the very system of governance in the country. The civil services are key to this effort to good governance. We expect the civil service, as a whole, to rise to this challenge. The political system, on the other hand, should stand ready and willing to assist in achieving this objective and to punish where necessary.

Societal Support

Good governance does not come easily or cheap. The process of achieving good governance is long and arduous and needs continuous reiteration by all organs of the state and by positive pressure from civil society. Unless a society demands good governance it will not get it. Indian society today demands it and will not compromise with ineffective, inefficient, dishonest and tardy performance by the civil services. At the same time it must be prepared to pay the price to obtain critical services – especially sovereign services. The competition faced by some government services from the private sector - such as education and health - will put pressure on the state services to either perform better or to abandon that activity altogether.

The task for the civil services is not only to manage the economy but also to ensure that the poorest third of the population are not neglected by the state. The fulfillment of their basic needs of the population is the most crucial task for government, as these will not be met by market forces and elements. Given the dominance of capitalist enterprise, regulating market forces is another important function of government. The freedom, integrity, openness, fairness and efficiency of markets can only be ensured by high level and good quality regulatory capacity. For all these we need “Good Administrators” as well as a good, efficient, effective and fair system of governance – the two are closely interlinked and one will affect the other directly.

Ye are the salt of the earth: but if the salt has lost his savour, wherewith shall it be salted? It is thenceforth good for nothing, but to be cast out, and to be trodden under the foot of men. Matthew, 5:13

**ESRC UK Centre for Evidence Based Policy and Practice:
Working Paper 1**

**Evidence Based Policy:
Whence it Came and Where it's
Going**

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Abstract

This short paper looks at reasons why the UK, in particular, has seen an upsurge of interest in evidence-based policy and practice. It notes the utilitarian turn in research funding policy towards economic and social priorities and the provision of research results that are both useful and useable. This encompasses an increased interest in the fuller exploitation of existing data and research findings. Practitioners are also showing a greater interest in demonstrating the efficacy of particular practices, perhaps as a result of the loss of public confidence in many professions in recent years. And, at the policy level, the evidence-based approach has been given a significant boost by the advent of a Labour government with a pragmatic, anti-ideological stance. ‘What works?’ is now the watchword, but there are many different kinds of evidence that might answer the question. Research findings are only one. Moreover, there is a close relationship between evidence (or knowledge) and power in which evidence may be used both to strengthen power and influence, and to challenge them. Although the evidence-based approach to policy and practice offers the research community major new opportunities, it would be wise to remain modest in its claims to improve the conduct of public affairs.

Key words: Evidence-based; Policy; Practice

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Evidence Based Policy: Whence it Came and Where it's Going

The ascendancy of evidence

There was a time when 'evidence' was what detectives looked for in making up their minds. As Sherlock Holmes said, 'It is a capital mistake to theorise before you have all the evidence. It biases the judgement¹.' But nowadays, seemingly, 'evidence' is as necessary to political conviction as it is to criminal conviction.

This concept of 'evidence-based policy' has been gaining currency over the last decade. The 1999 White Paper on *Modernising government* clearly adopted it as part of its philosophy:

This Government expects more of policy makers. More new ideas, more willingness to question inherited ways of doing things, better use of evidence and research in policy making and better focus on policies that will deliver long term goals.²

And now that the agenda has moved on to a concern with policy delivery³ as much as with policy development, there is an equal concern for practice to be informed by evidence. In Whitehall (and in Edinburgh, Cardiff and Belfast), in local authorities, quangos, the National Health Service, in voluntary agencies and professional associations there is a new thirst for knowledge. Research budgets are expanding, new analytical staff are being recruited, it is boom time for contract research and consultancy, good practice guidance fills websites, publications and workshop programmes.

Why has all this happened now? And most especially in Britain? Some will argue that there is nothing new here. We are re-engaging in long-standing debates about knowledge and power, rationality and politics, democracy and technocracy. Even so, the questions why now? why here? still arise. Is there something in the UK worlds of research, of practice or of policy that has impelled the ascendancy of a concern with the role of evidence in public policy and practice?

The utilitarian turn in research

From the research perspective, more particularly that of social science, there has been a (re)turn in the last decade to doing useful research, research that helps us not just to understand society but offers some guidance on how to make it better. To a large extent this has been driven by the funders of social science. Government departments have come to be the dominant funders; the research charities – like the Joseph Rowntree Foundation and the Nuffield Foundation – have increasingly adopted an instrumental view of research, gearing it to their social priorities; and the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) has been subjected to the demands of government science policy that views academic research as a means to economic and social development much more than as a cultural end in itself. Researchers have perforce responded to these changed funding priorities, but there has also been a shift

in their mood – a wish not just to observe but to engage with society, a more pragmatic stance on matters of theory or method, a greater self-confidence in their role.

In addition, there has been a commitment to make research not just useful but useable. Competition from the commercial research and consultancy sector has brought home to academic researchers the importance of conducting and communicating research in ways that ‘users’ (often actually clients who are footing the bill) find helpful. How to structure a report, write in plain English, make a five minute presentation; these are skills which are now seen to be as important as how to design a questionnaire, conduct an interview or analyse data.

There is, too, a movement in the research community to exploit more fully existing data or existing research findings. This is the rationale for the ESRC’s recent initiative on evidence-based policy and practice⁴. Most research effort is expended on new primary research and yet, on virtually any topic you can name, there is a vast body of past research that may have some continuing value but mostly remains ignored. Social science is very bad at the cumulation and the re-use of past research results. There are sometimes good reasons why these are no longer valid; today’s context, perspective, agenda may be radically different. But too often the disregard of past research is more a matter of ignorance or fashion.

Secondary analysis of existing data – which economists, in particular, have made a speciality – is one established method. Systematic reviews are something newer; methodologically rigorous exercises in assessing the findings of previous cognate research in order to synthesise the results⁵. The Cochrane Collaboration has pioneered this work in the medical field and it is now being extended into social policy by the Campbell Collaboration⁶. Both secondary analysis and systematic reviews depend on an awareness of previous research so skills in searching for existing data or findings are also important.

Professional practice: retreat from priesthood

Some practitioners, too, are showing a new interest in evidence. The focus of their concern has been very much on the efficacy of particular practices. In the UK health field a new infrastructure has been built dedicated to developing and evaluating new treatments; the National Institute for Clinical Excellence, the NHS Centre for Reviews and Dissemination, the National Co-ordinating Centre for Health Technology Assessment, the Health Development Agency and the Cochrane Collaboration are all part of this, as are the numerous practice reviews being commissioned externally. These developments are building on a tradition of evidence-based medicine⁷.

This is now spilling over into new fields of professional practice like education, social work, criminal justice, regeneration and others. The book *What works? Evidence-based policy and practice*⁸, published in 2000, provides a good survey of these fields. For example, in education, the former Department for Education and Employment invested in the creation of a Centre for Evidence-informed Education Policy and Practice (EPPI Centre) in the University of London⁹. The charity, Barnardos, has been in the forefront of initiatives to bring a more evidential approach to practice in childcare¹⁰. The Association of Directors of Social Services has established a

‘research in practice’ (RIP) initiative¹¹. Urban regeneration is another field of burgeoning interest in good practice¹².

It may be that this new interest among professionals in bringing impartial evidence to bear on their practice is related to the loss of public confidence that most have suffered in recent years. Traditionally, professionals operated like a priesthood, reliant on the unquestioning faith of their followers. But patients, parents, students, clients, customers of all kinds are less and less inclined to take professional views on trust. Their ‘informed consent’ is needed to any intervention which means that professionals must be ready to explain not just what they advise and why it is appropriate, but also what they know of its likely efficacy.

To have such information at their finger tips, accessible and constantly updated, practitioners need what have come to be known as knowledge management systems. Knowledge management (KM for short) is the latest organisational enthusiasm, based on the key concept that knowledge is a resource – alongside finance, technology and people – which organisations must deploy to achieve their objectives. Among the knowledge they need is not just ‘know how’ (practical experience of what works) but also ‘know what’ (the state of the world), ‘know why’ (causes and explanations) and ‘know who’ (contacts and networks). Some of this organisational knowledge is explicit and documented but much is tacit, carried in people’s heads. Hence the need for knowledge management. Sophisticated information systems are part of this but equally important is the organisational culture – the willingness to share information, to be open to external influence and to be ready to learn from experience.

Policy: pragmatism replaces ideology

Public policy has caught up with these trends in the worlds of research and practice, endorsed and amplified them. The already noted enthusiasm of the 1999 White Paper for evidence-based policy contrasts with the near silence of its 1994 and 1995 predecessors on the Civil Service¹³ which had a lot to say about structures and systems, but little on strategy or style. What happened between these dates was, of course, the coming into office of New Labour. Its stance was anti-ideological and pragmatic. It had a new agenda and so new knowledge requirements. It was suspicious of many established influences on policy, particularly within the civil service, and anxious to open up policy thinking to outsiders.

Hence the appointment of specialist advisers. Hence, too, the creation of new outfits like the Performance and Innovation Unit (PIU) under Geoff Mulgan (ex of the Demos think tank), the Centre for Management and Policy Studies (CMPS) under Ron Amann (formerly of the ESRC), and the Social Exclusion Unit under Moira Wallace. And hence the penchant for cross-cutting policy reviews such as that on childcare which led to the establishment of the government’s Sure Start initiative. In all these cases ‘evidence’ became a key resource in arguing their corner.

A peculiarly British affair

At present, evidence-based policy seems to be principally a British commitment. The underlying generic issue of how research and policy can better relate is debated in

other countries¹⁴ but the concept of evidence-based policy and practice has not entered into political discourse in other European or North American states. However, the recent European Commission White Paper on governance recognises that:

...scientific and other experts play an increasingly significant role in preparing and monitoring decisions. From human and animal health to social legislation, the institutions rely on specialist expertise to anticipate and identify the nature of the problems and uncertainties that the Union faces, to take decisions and to ensure that risks can be explained clearly and simply to the public.¹⁵

It further declares that, in 2002, it will publish guidelines on the collection and use of expert advice so that it is clear what advice is given, where it is coming from, how it is used and what alternative views are available. It also suggests that, over time, these guidelines could form the basis for a common approach for all institutions *and member states* (my italics).

There is, then, something about public policy and practice in Britain at present that has prompted a renewed concern with evidence. Most working in the field probably welcome this, but let us not be too simple minded in our enthusiasm. In one version of John Maynard Keynes' view, '...there is nothing a government hates more than to be well-informed; for it makes the process of arriving at decisions much more complicated and difficult.'¹⁶

We must not forget that there is more to policy and practice than the disinterested pursuit of truth and wisdom.

Is what works all that matters?

'What matters is what works' emerged as a New Labour mantra somewhere on the journey from Opposition to Government. Once in office, getting to know what works became the rationale for vastly expanded research staffs and budgets in government departments and agencies, in the NHS and in local authorities. Much of this effort is spent on *ex post* evaluation; indeed the US custom of building evaluation routinely into programme designs and budgets has been widely adopted. The current evaluations of major programmes like Sure Start, the New Deals and Neighbourhood Renewal are massive enterprises undertaken by large research consortia, often drawn from both the commercial and the academic sectors.

But *ex post* evaluations of new programmes are not the only way of discovering what works. There are other approaches to garnering such evidence that can be as informative, and may be less costly or more timely. Most programmes use one or more generic policy instruments; partnerships, public disclosure (aka naming and shaming) and zero tolerance are all current favourites. Experience in different applications may reveal the context in which they do and don't work¹⁷. Pilot studies or social experiments, testing out a policy for a limited time or on a limited population, may be a suitably cautious approach to learning about policy impacts where outcomes are uncertain. Experience overseas may yield lessons. Having more regard to theories of human behaviour is also advisable. In short, even the question of what works can be addressed by a wider repertoire of evidence-gathering research

strategies than are commonly employed. And we need to be much better at cumulating the results of individual studies.

But what works is not all that matters. To interpret the call for evidence-based policy and practice in these terms alone is to disregard a whole set of other important questions in policy development, like what is going on? what's the problem? is it better or worse than...? what causes it? what might be done about it? at what cost? by whose agency? Indeed these are mostly prior questions to the question of what works, for the what works question is too bald. What works for whom in what circumstances is what policy makers and practitioners really need to know. And to answer that there needs to be not just research that is evaluative, but also research that is descriptive, analytical, diagnostic, theoretical and prescriptive. That is, an evidence base to policy in all stages of the policy cycle – in shaping agendas, in defining issues, in identifying options, in making choices of action, in delivering them and in monitoring their impact and outcomes.

What counts as evidence?

It is easy, especially for researchers, to elide the concepts of evidence and research, and for academic researchers to believe that only academic research counts. Or, if not that, that somehow academic research is the basis of all knowledge as the Frascati concept of a continuum of basic research-strategic research-applied research-development-application implies. In practice, evidence is more plural than research. The OED offers as a definition of evidence, 'the available body of facts or information indicating whether a belief or proposition is true or valid'¹⁸. So availability and validity are the key issues.

Ask any professional how they get to know what they need to know in their work and you get very diverse answers about the sources of their knowledge. Experience features large, both direct personal experience and that of colleagues. Most professions also have shared norms, values, ideas in good currency, sometimes articulated and made explicit, often tacit. Then there are the results of relevant research which may reach them in diverse ways. Improving how individuals, teams and organisations gather, evaluate, store and use this knowledge is what knowledge management is all about, but the chances are that – even with the most sophisticated hardware and software – the availability of all relevant knowledge is a hit and miss affair.

Not all this knowledge has equal validity. The singular personal experience may leave a powerful impression, but it is still only a sample of one. Even a larger body of personal experience may be strongly context-specific but, with experience, at least the empirical basis is evident. With ideas in good currency, provenance may be quite unknown. Their power lies, dangerously, in their conventionality; 'everybody knows that...'. In comparison, research has some potential advantages, provided that it has been conducted objectively and rigorously.

With all sources of evidence, even with research, some scepticism about validity is desirable. In bringing evidence of any kind to bear on policy or practice, the key questions to be asked are threefold: how *relevant* is this to what we are seeking to understand or decide? how *representative* is this of the population that concerns us?

how *reliable*, how well-founded – theoretically, empirically – is it? These are tough but necessary tests for evidence-based policy and practice.

Knowledge as power?

Public policy is developed and delivered through the use of power, ultimately the coercive power of the state in the hands of democratically accountable politicians. For politicians, with their advisers and their agents, securing and retaining power is a necessary condition for the achievement of their policy objectives. There sometimes, then, seems to be a tension between power and knowledge in the shaping of policy. A similar tension exists between authority and expertise in the world of practice. Emphasising the role of power and authority at the expense of knowledge and expertise in public affairs seems cynical; emphasising the latter at the expense of the former seems naïve.

Maybe the two are more complementary than conflicting¹⁹. In two cases mentioned above – the introduction by New Labour of outsiders into Whitehall, and the aspirations of the European Commission for the better governance of the EU – one can observe the use of knowledge as a means to strengthening power and influence. Equally, many of the performance management regimes developed recently in British public services have asserted the primacy of certain new measures of performance, and the evidence underpinning them, over others which may have prevailed hitherto. New evidence – new data, new theories, new perspectives – is deployed to challenge the positions of established power-holders.

This interdependence of power and knowledge is perhaps more apparent if public policy and practice is conceived as a continuous discourse. For, ‘As politicians know only too well, but social scientists too often forget, public policy is made of language. Whether in written or oral form, argumentation is central in all stages of the policy process.’²⁰

In this context, evidence is an important part of the weaponry of those engaged in the discourse. Lest this seems too crude a metaphor, bear in mind that – to be effective – weapons must be handled with care, their use confined to skilled personnel aware of their limits and capabilities. They must not be deployed casually or wastefully, and must always be used with as full regard to the risks for those who use them as to those against whom they are used. Knowledge is open to misuse quite as much as other sources of power.

Policy, evidence and research

What should we make of all this? There is certainly a sense in which these are re-runs of old debates but, equally, there is something new in the air which gives both a fresh urgency and a new twist to the issues around evidence-based policy. To my mind the key factor is the shift in the nature of politics; the retreat from ideology, the dissolution of class-based party politics, the empowerment of consumers. The new commitment to evidence-based policy cannot be interpreted as the long-awaited triumph of social science, at last given the recognition it deserves. It is more demand than supply-driven. Yet it does provide an astonishing new opportunity for

researchers in material, intellectual and political terms. Let us hope we are up to it. But let us remain modest in our claims to improve the conduct of public affairs.

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A Memorandum to the Government of India 1955

MILTON FRIEDMAN

[EDITORIAL NOTE: This memorandum is dated 5 November 1955, and was written at the invitation of the Government of India, where the author was working for some months as a consultant to the Ministry of Finance. It has not been published before. The editors believe it remains relevant to Indian discussions today. The history of the advice given by other Western economists in the early years of the Indian Republic has been recently surveyed by George Rosen in *Western Economists and Eastern Societies: Agents of Social Change in South Asia 1950-1970* Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1985).]

Note from Milton Friedman

The Goal

A 5 percent per annum rate of increase in real national income, seems entirely feasible, on the basis of both the experience of other countries and of India's own recent past. The great untapped resource of technical and scientific knowledge available to India for the taking is the economic equivalent of the untapped continent available to the United States 150 years ago. The basic question is one of method, of the social and economic arrangements that will best promote the conversion of these potentialities into realities while at the same time maintaining freedom and democracy and giving ever-widening opportunities to the mass of the Indian people. The belief that underlies these notes is that the basic requisites are a steady and moderately expansionary monetary framework, greatly widened opportunities for education and training, improved facilities for transportation and communication to promote the mobility not only of goods but even more important of people, and an environment that gives maximum scope to the initiative and energy of farmers, businessmen, and traders. The conquest of the technical frontier like the conquest of the geographical frontier requires a varied initiative by millions of individuals, flexibility of outlook and organization, and willingness to venture. The Government of India is doing much, and much that is highly effective, to bring these requisites into being. There is much more to do that at least in Indian conditions can be done only by the Government. But the Government also is following some policies and proposing others that are likely to hinder rather than promote economic development. The following comments, which are mainly restricted to such policies, deal with investment policy; policy toward the private sector; monetary policy; resources available to the public sector; and foreign exchange policy.

INVESTMENT POLICY

Over-Emphasis on the Capital-Output Ratio

There is a tendency not only in India but in most of the literature on economic development to regard the ratio of investment national income as almost the only key to the rate of development to take it for granted that there is a rigid and mechanical ratio between the amount of investment and additions to output. In the opinion of this writer, this seems a serious mistake. At the one extreme, output can increase even without investment; at the other, too high a ratio of investment may actually produce a lower rate of increase in income.

There are two reasons why the amount of investment and the increase in output can be, and empirically are, only loosely connected. First, the form and distribution of investment are at least as important as its sheer magnitude. Second, what is called capital investment is only part of the total expenditure on increasing the productivity of an economy. The first reason needs little additional comment. The second is perhaps less clear. In any economy, the major source of productive power is not machinery, equipment, buildings and other physical capital; it is the productive capacity of the human beings who compose the society. Yet what we call investment refers only to expenditures on physical capital; expenditures that improve the productive capacity of human beings are generally left entirely out of account. In the United States, for example, only about one-fifth of the total income is return to physical capital, four-fifths to human capital. By this writer's estimate similarly, only about one fifth of the annual rate of growth in the United States can be attributed to the direct effects of investment in the usual sense; four-fifths must be attributed to the growth in the productivity of human beings. Annual expenditures on improving the quality and quantity of human resources are at least as large as and perhaps much larger than investment as usually defined. Destroy the physical plant of the United States and leave the skills of the people and it would take but a few years to restore the initial position. Destroy the skills and leave the plant and the level of output would sink irretrievably. The cathedrals of medieval Europe, the pyramids of Egypt, the monuments of the Moghul empire in India are all testimony to the possibility of a high rate of investment in physical capital without a growth in the standard of living of the masses of the people. These considerations are especially important for India, precisely because its frontier is the frontier of technical knowledge and skill.

This is not to deny in any way the desirability of investment in physical capital. It is certainly highly important and is to some measure an indispensable concomitant of the development of human capital. But it is not the whole or even the most important part of the story. The danger is that concentration on it may lead to policies that increase physical investment at the expense investment in human capital; and even within the area of physical investment, may lead to increases in the kind of physical investment that we can measure at the expense of kinds that we can measure. We must be aware lest we become the victims of our statistical creations.

Emphasis on Two Extremes Against the Middle

The form of investment is no less important than its kind. The chief problem in the Indian program that impresses one here, the tendency to concentrate investment in heavy industry at one extreme and handicrafts at the other, at the expense of small and moderate size industry. This policy threatens an inefficient use of capital at the one extreme by combining it with too little labor and an inefficient use of labor at the other extreme by combining it with too little capital. The presumption for an economy India's is that the best use of capital is in general somewhere in between, that heavy industry can best develop and be built upon a widely diversified and much expanded light industry. We may hasten to add that this is only a general presumption which may well admit of special exceptions. Perhaps, for example, the steel industry is one exception in India.

Attempt to Do Too Much in the Public Sector

Indian thought may not have taken full account of the post-war experience of European countries in expanding the public sector. Country after country moved in this direction immediately after the war; to the best of the present writer's knowledge, the results were, in every case, disappointing. This experience has produced drastic change in the attitudes of the labor and left-wing toward nationalization and detailed state control over economic activity. The elements in the parties that have not changed the approach are now being dubbed 'reactionary' by some of their fellows!

This point may be especially important for India. The areas for which only Government can take responsibility are here so large, so vital, and require such large investments that they alone would be a heavy burden on the limited administrative personnel of high calibre. It seems the better part of wisdom therefore to avoid any activities that can be left to others. The problem involves both the kind of activities taken into the public sector and the magnitude of investment. Some further comments are made on the latter below in discussing the resources available to the public sector.

Attempt to Control Private Investment in Too Rigid and Detailed a Fashion

(i) Cutting off particular investment projects may not make resources available for other uses but may simply eliminate savings that would otherwise have been available. Much saving is made to finance specific investment projects. If it cannot be used for that purpose, it may well be directed to consumption or to the accumulation of bullion or its equivalent. (ii) It is impossible to predict in advance the lines of investment that will turn out to be the most productive-as the failure of so many private enterprises amply demonstrates. There is therefore great need for a system that is flexible and can change easily. (iii) Detailed direction wastes scarce energies and abilities of public servants in producing and enforcing regulations and of private individuals in trying to evade or avoid or change them. (iv) Given that the public sector gets the resources it demands, is not the market criterion appropriate for the allocation of the rest of investment? To

frustrate it means to deny consumers freedom of choice and so to reduce the value to them of the goods produced. (v) Government does have a responsibility for seeing to it that the total of public and private investment is kept within the total resources of the community without inflation. But this can best be accomplished by monetary and fiscal policy, rather than by detailed regulation, leaving the allocation of investment among private industries to be accomplished by the interest rate. Insofar as this mechanism works imperfectly, measures to improve its operation seem preferable to supplanting it.

POLICY TOWARD THE PRIVATE SECTOR

Protection of Inefficient Methods of Production

In addition to the Government controls already considered which are designed to direct investment, there are others whose purpose is mainly protective: the excise tax on factory-made shoes and factory-made textiles; reservation of markets, and the like. In the opinion of this writer, such policies seem misdirected. India's basic problem is the inefficient use of manpower; it is no solution to protect inefficiency, and the attempt to do so leads to a waste not only of human resources but also of physical capital. The extra money consumers have to pay for the products, let alone direct subsidies to producers, could be channeled at least in part into investment. And there may even be actual disinvestment—we were told that some shoe machinery was lying idle and depreciating because of the tax.

There is a tendency to underrate the importance of nominally low taxes in promoting inefficiency. For example, there is a 10 percent tax on factory-made shoes. But half to two-thirds of the cost of shoes is the raw material. The tax therefore amounts to 20 percent or 30 percent of the value added by the factory, and it will not pay to produce shoes unless factory production is at least this much more efficient than hand production. The justification for these devices is to increase employment. The objective is fundamental, and would be worth achieving even at some cost in total output, but it seems to the present writer dubious that these means accomplish their objective even in the very short run, and certain that they work against it in the moderate or long run. What they do is to increase the number of people employed inefficiently; but they also decrease the number of workers in factories producing the same product, and in other industries stimulated by the higher income of the factory workers; the decrease is likely to exceed the increase but because it is more diffuse and less obvious, it tends to be neglected.

Coddling of Private Industry In Certain Directions Combined with Severely Restrictive Controls In Others

Just as it is inappropriate to discriminate in favor of the cottage industries, so it is equally inappropriate to discriminate in favor of factory industry or large concerns. Granting them special favor the form of especially advantageous loans, guaranteed markets, refusal of licenses to competitors, enforcing or even permitting private price-fixing and market-sharing agreements—simply encourages inefficiency and wastes scarce resources. If private industry is granted special favors by the Government, it is certainly inevitable that

its use of these favors will be controlled; but this does not offset the harm done by the favors; it merely introduces new sources of rigidity and inefficiency. Business ingenuity is devoted to carving out protected sectors instead of to opening up new markets and lowering costs. There is no justification for private industry unless it is competitive, unless the right to receive profits is accompanied by acceptance of the risk of loss. Private industry should be made to stand on its own feet without either favor or harassment.

MONETARY POLICY

Erratic Policy

A stable monetary climate is a basic prerequisite for healthy economic growth. Yet over the past five years, monetary policy has been highly erratic. It first permitted and facilitated substantial price rises, then reacted too far in the opposite direction. More recently, monetary policy has again reversed direction and again threatens to go too far, this time in an inflationary direction. This erratic policy is recorded directly in the behavior of the stock of money and of wholesale and retail prices, and indirectly, in a less rapid rate of economic advance than would have been feasible.

The present writer believes that monetary policy in India would be more stable and consistent if the monetary authorities paid more attention to the size of the money stock and less to other indicators, and if they took as their proximate goal, a steady expansion in the money stock (allowing for seasonal influences) at a rate of something like 4 to 6 percent per year. It may be noted that detailed examination of the record of American monetary authorities persuades one that this general proposition is equally true for the United States, with a desirable rate of expansion of the money stock of 4 percent per year.

The importance of a stable monetary policy hardly can be overemphasized. There is probably no other single area in which mistakes can be more disastrous or appropriate policy more beneficial. The fact that it operates on a general level and makes its effects felt impersonally and indirectly is at one and the same time the reason for its crucial importance and for the widespread failure to recognize its importance.

Deficit Financing

Deficit financing is currently proceeding at the rate of something like Rs. 150 to 200 crores a year. Given the generally deflationary trend of the recent past, such a rate doubtless can be absorbed for a time without a serious price rise. It is exceedingly doubtful, however, that it can be for more than a year or so. According to some rough yet fairly detailed estimates made by this writer, something less than Rs. 500 crores is the maximum amount that can be absorbed over the next five years without a substantial rise in prices. By this estimate, continued deficit financing at a rate of Rs. 200 crores per year over that period would produce a price rise of at least 30 percent, and perhaps much more.

RESOURCES AVAILABLE TO THE PUBLIC SECTOR

There seems to be a general agreement that planned expenditures in the public sector substantially exceed expected receipts, even after allowing for a shortfall of actual expenditures, for deficit financing to the extent of Rs. 1,000 to 1,200 crores, and for a substantial amount of foreign aid. If we are right about the safe amount of deficit financing, the actual gap is substantially larger than the amounts generally cited. This financial gap corresponds to a real resource gap. It can be filled without curtailing the Plan only by either getting additional resources from abroad; or making domestic resources more productive over and above the 5 percent per year increase already allowed for in the estimates; or transferring resources from other uses. The transfer of resources can be brought about by additional taxation, forced savings, additional voluntary savings, or a reduction in private investment. Additional voluntary savings and a reduction in private investment can in turn be brought about to some extent by a monetary policy that allows interest rates to rise. Inflation is of course a possible danger, but it is not really a separate method of filling the gap; it is a form of taxation and, in the view of this writer, a particularly inefficient and inequitable form.

This only states the problem. We have not been able to study in detail either the tax structure of India or the financial structure for mobilizing and encouraging savings, so no independent judgment can be given on the possibility of filling the resource gap by the various means. Casual impression suggests that there is some possibility of increasing tax revenues without doing much harm, but that any substantial expansion in tax revenues or heavy reliance on any of the other methods except for foreign aid is currently subject to extremely serious limitations. If this is so, filling the gap by their use, if successful, might make public investment larger only at the expense of reducing the rate of growth of aggregate real income by killing incentives outside the public sector, eliminating potentially productive private investment, and producing either inflation or a deadening network of direct controls. This is a special case of the point made earlier about the loose connection between the rate of investment and the rate of growth of income. It may well be that under the circumstances, cutting the size of the program may be preferable to trying to fill the gap on the revenue side.

On the tax side, three comments may be made: (i) The small scope of direct income taxes seems an obvious defect in the tax structure. A more broadly based tax with lower exemptions and more effective administration might both raise considerable revenue and produce a more equitable distribution of the tax burden. (One recognizes that for a country like India there are special problems of administration and enforcement that this writer is incompetent to assess.) (ii) The use of excise taxes for the production of one method of production or one product as opposed to another not only promotes inefficiency but is also wasteful of revenue. A 10 percent tax on shoes would yield more revenue, do less harm to productive efficiency and cost the consumer little if any more than a 10 percent tax on factory-made shoes. As a side observation, is it clear that if the

extra proceeds were used to facilitate the retraining and placement of hand workers it would be of less value even from the point of view of the employment problem? (iii) A minor possible source of additional revenue that would have favorable effects on efficiency is the auctioning off of licenses to use foreign exchange suggested as a possibility below.

THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE PROBLEM

The Foreign Exchange Gap

It is generally accepted that present programs are likely to involve a substantial excess in the demand for foreign exchange over the available supply, even if allowance is made for foreign aid at roughly the present level. These estimates take for granted not only the investment program but also retention of the existing exchange rate and the existing structure of import and export controls. Even under these assumptions, the foreign exchange gap in part and perhaps in whole is a particular aspect of the total resource gap: any reduction in the total resource gap will automatically reduce the foreign exchange gap. Given the special foreign exchange resources that are likely to be available, we may guess that solution of the total resource gap would largely solve the foreign exchange gap as well.

Exchange Controls

The existing structure of exchange-controls and their associated system of import and export licenses and of discrimination between sources of purchases, seem to this writer a major obstacle to the growth and progress of the Indian economy. They involve waste and inefficiency in the use of foreign exchange. They introduce delay, uncertainty, and arbitrariness into domestic business activities. They impose on officials in charge of exchange control a task that is bound to be discharged most imperfectly, however able and devoted the officials may be. The criteria the officials use-and must use-tend to perpetuate the status quo ante, and therefore constitute an obstacle to dynamic change and adaptation in an area that traditionally has been one of the most dynamic sectors in the economy and the source of much of the impetus to change. Exchange controls necessarily involve the indiscriminate distribution of implicit subsidies to those granted import licenses, and they lend themselves to abuse as a means of granting administrative protection from foreign competition to inefficient or monopolistic domestic producers.

The elimination of the exchange-controls and import and export restrictions is thus a most desirable objective of policy. It must be recognized, however, that it would probably increase the demand for foreign exchange, but the likelihood of an increase means that elimination of controls would have to be accompanied by the introduction of some other means of rationing exchange. It should be emphasized that this increase in the demand for foreign exchange is not a fresh problem that would be created by the elimination of exchange-controls. The problem is there now. That is why controls are deemed necessary. The question is whether there are not less harmful ways of solving it.

Alternatives to Exchange Controls

One alternative, which retains central control over the amount of foreign exchange to be released, is to auction off whatever amount of foreign exchange it is decided to release, permitting the purchasers to use it for anything they wish and in any currency area they wish. This would be a far more efficient system of rationing and would hinder internal economic development far less than the present system and at the same time yield some revenue. We have not been able to construct even a rough estimate of the amount of revenue, but it is unlikely to be of major magnitude.

It would be preferable to avoid this auctioning system as well. While it eliminates any distortion in the pattern of imports, it does not produce the appropriate adjustment of exports to imports. Only two other basic alternative modes of adjustment to changes in the conditions of external trades are available: first., to inflate or deflate internally in response to a putative surplus or deficit in the balance of payments; second, to permit the exchange rate fluctuate. At least in the present worldwide monetary conditions the first is not desirable economically, since it puts internal conditions of trade at the mercy of changes in external conditions these are about as likely to result from vagaries in the internal policies of other countries as from changes in the 'real' conditions of trade. The preferable method is to let the exchange rate be determined in a free market-the method of a floating exchange rate that has been adopted by Canada with such conspicuous success.

It may be worth saying a few words about how a floating exchange rate eliminates any foreign exchange gap and means that, there are not two problems, at total resource gap and a foreign exchange gap, but only one, a total resource gap. Suppose the total program is in balance but, at the existing exchange rate, there is an excess of demand for foreign exchange over the supply. The result is to lower the rate. This makes India's products more attractive to the outside world, foreign products more expensive to Indians. The result is to lead to an increase in exports, thus making more foreign exchange available, to shift the pattern of investment within India away from kinds with a larger import component and toward kinds with a larger domestic resource component, away from production for the domestic market to production for the foreign market, and to shift consumption from foreign goods toward domestic goods. A putative foreign exchange surplus clearly has the opposite effects. In addition to these effects on trade, there are also, of course, effects on capital movements, which depend on whether the change in rate is regarded as temporary or permanent.

India's membership in the Sterling Area raises obvious difficulties in the way of India's acting alone, and may make it impossible for India to free her exchange rate except in concert with a similar move by Britain. However, if these difficulties could be surmounted, an independent movement by India might have very great advantages precisely because India is entering into a period of rapid economic change and is not a major financial center. This writer believes there is more of an analogy between India's and Canada's positions than might at first appear. In a world of inconvertible currencies, a

country that offers convertibility, albeit at a fluctuating rate, has a special attraction for investors and traders.

The problem of trade is frequently considered separately from that of the import of foreign capital. This is a mistake. Imports of goods may bring with them no capital directly but they bring businessmen and contact, and discovery of investment opportunities by people who are anxious to exploit them and who have contacts at home interested in such opportunities. Such continuous and intimate contact is likely to produce both a larger and, equally important, more productive flow of foreign investment than any number of missions coming out for brief periods with the objective of exploring investment opportunities.

Foreign Assistance

Any foreign assistance will of course help to fill both the total resources gap and the foreign exchange gap. Its direct impact, However, is much greater on the foreign exchange gap. In consequence, foreign assistance is especially likely to permit an elimination of import and export controls without threatening the existing exchange rate. But it would be a mistake to suppose that foreign assistance, however extensive, would permit elimination of controls, a fixed exchange rate, and an independent domestic Monetary policy for any length of time. Even though the exchange rate is in some sense in long-run equilibrium, accidental fluctuations will from time to time produce large drains on reserves and if there is no mechanism for adjusting to them, these drains may well make the short-run position untenable.

CONCLUSION

If these comments have concentrated largely on the financial machinery of economic organization, it is not because that is the only or even the most important problem facing India but rather because, on the one hand, it is more within this writer's special competence, and on the other, it seems to be the area in which current policy can be improved most. The present writer is convinced that the fundamental problem for India is the improvement of the physical and technical quality of her people, the awakening off sense of hope, the weakening of rigid social and economic arrangements, the introduction of flexibility of institutions and mobility people, the opening tip of the social and economic ladder people of all kinds and classes. And what gives a n outsider like t writer a feeling of optimism and hope about the future of India makes one feel that India is on the move and will continue move, is that so much is being done and such a good beginning has been made on this fundamental problem of creating the human and social basis for a dynamic and progressive economy.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL AND THE POWER OF MYTH

March 8, 2013

<http://billmoyers.com/content/ep-1-joseph-campbell-and-the-power-of-myth-the-hero%E2%80%99s-adventure-audio/>

Bill Moyers and mythologist Joseph Campbell begin their groundbreaking and timeless conversation with an exploration of the classic hero cycle, including consistent and enduring hero patterns in literature, real life and even the Star Wars films. Campbell also encourages the audience to view parts of their own lives as heroic journeys. In a clip from the first episode, Campbell encourages the audience to discover what excites them, and make that the basis for their personal journeys.

Watch a Clip

Released in 1988, [The Power of Myth](#) was one of the most popular TV series in the history of public television, and continues to inspire new audiences.

The Hero's Adventure'

TRANSCRIPT

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: We have not even to risk the adventure alone, for the heroes of all time have gone before us. The labyrinth is thoroughly known; we have only to follow the thread of the hero path. And where we had thought to find an abomination, we shall find a god. And where we had thought to slay another, we shall slay ourselves. And where we had thought to travel outward, we shall come to the center of our own existence. And where we had thought to be alone, we shall be with all the world.

BILL MOYERS: Joseph Campbell believed that everything begins with a story, so we begin this series with Joseph Campbell with one of his favorites. He was in Japan for a conference on religion, and he overheard another American delegate, a social philosopher from New York, say to a Shinto priest, "We've been now to a good many ceremonies and have seen quite a few of your shrines. But I don't get your ideology, I don't get your theology." The Japanese paused as though in deep thought, and then slowly shook his head. "I think we don't have ideology," he said, "we don't have theology. We dance."

Campbell could have said it of his own life. When he died in 1987 at the age of 83, he was considered one of the world's foremost authorities on mythology, the Stories and legends told by human beings through the ages to explain the universe and their place in it. The 20 books he wrote or edited have influenced artists and performers, as well as scholars and students. When he died, he was working on a monumental Historical Atlas of World Mythology, his effort to bring under one roof the spiritual and intellectual wisdom of a lifetime.

Some of his books are classics: *The Hero with a Thousand Faces*, which established his fame 40 years ago; and his four-volume study of mythology, *The Masks of God*. Joseph Campbell was one of the most spiritual men I ever met, but he didn't have an ideology or a theology. Mythology was to him the song of the universe, music so deeply embedded in our collective unconscious that we dance to it, even when we can't name the tune. Over the last two summers of his life, we taped these conversations in California, at Skywalker Ranch, the home of his friend, George Lucas, whose movie trilogy *Star Wars* had been influenced by Campbell's work. We talked about the message and meaning of myth, about the first storytellers, about love and marriage, gods and goddesses, religion, ritual, art and psychology. But we always came around to his favorite subject, the hero with a thousand faces. Why the hero with a thousand faces?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Well, because there is a certain typical hero sequence of actions, which can be detected in stories from all over the world, and from many, many periods of history. And I think it's essentially, you might say, the one deed done by many, many different people.

BILL MOYERS: Why are there so many stories of the hero or of heroes in mythology?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Well, because that's what's worth writing about. I mean, even in popular novel writing, you see, these the main character is the hero or heroine, that is to say, someone who has found or achieved or done something beyond the normal range of achievement and experience. A hero properly is someone who has given his life to something bigger than himself or other than himself.

BILL MOYERS: So in all of these cultures, whatever the costume the hero might be wearing, what is the deed?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Well, there are two types of deed. One is the physical deed; the hero who has performed a war act or a physical act of heroism ñ saving a life, that's a hero act. Giving himself, sacrificing himself to another. And the other kind is the spiritual hero, who has learned or found a mode of experiencing the supernormal range of human spiritual life, and then come back and communicated it. It's a cycle, it's a going and a return, that the hero cycle represents.

But then this can be seen also in the simple initiation ritual, where a child has to give up his childhood and become an adult, has to die, you might say, to his infantile personality and psyche and come back as a self-responsible adult. It's a fundamental experience that everyone has to undergo, where in our childhood for at least 14 years, and then to get out of that posture of dependency, psychological dependency, into one of psychological self-responsibility, requires a death and resurrection, and that is the basic motif of the hero journey, Leaving one condition, finding the source of life to bring you forth in a richer or more mature or other condition.

BILL MOYERS: So that if we happen not to be heroes in the grand sense of redeeming society, we have to take that journey ourselves, spiritually, psychologically, inside us.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: That's right. And Otto Rank, in his wonderful, very short book called *The Myth of the Birth of the Hero*, he says that everyone is a hero in his birth. He has undergone a tremendous transformation from a little, you might say, water creature. living in a realm of the

amniotic fluid and so forth, then coming out, becoming an air-breathing mammal that ultimately will be self-standing and so forth, is an enormous transformation and it is a heroic act, and it's a heroic act on the mother's part to bring it about. It's the primary hero, hero form, you might say.

BILL MOYERS: There's still a journey to be taken after that.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: There's a big one to be taken.

BILL MOYERS: And that journey is not consciously undertaken. Do heroes go out on their own initiative, or do they

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Well, there are both kinds. A very common one that appears in Celtic myths, of someone who had followed the lure of a deer or animal that he has been following, and then carries him into a range of forest and landscape that he's never been in before. And then the animal will undergo a transformation, become the Queen of The Fairy Hills or something like that. That is one of not knowing what you're doing, you suddenly find yourself in full career of an adventure.

There's another one where one sets out responsibly and intentionally to perform the deed. For instance, when Ulysses' son Telemachus was called by Athena, "Go find your father," that father quest is a major hero adventure for young people, that is, the adventure of finding what your career is, what your nature is, what your source is. He undertakes that intentionally.

Then there's one into which you are thrown and pitched; for instance, being drafted into the army. You didn't intend it, you're in. You're in another transformation. You've undergone a death and resurrection, you put on a uniform, you're another creature.

BILL MOYERS: So does the heroism have a moral objective?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: The moral objective is that of saving a people or saving a person, or saving an idea. He is sacrificing himself for something, that's the morality of it. Now you, from another position, might say that something was something that should not have been realized, you know. That's the judgment from another side. But it doesn't destroy the heroism of what was done, absolutely not.

BILL MOYERS: Well, that's a different angle on heroes than I got when I was reading as a young boy the story of Prometheus, going after the fire and bringing it back and benefiting humanity, and suffering for it.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Yeah. I mean, Prometheus brings fire to mankind and consequently civilization. That's, by the way, a universal theme.

BILL MOYERS: Oh, it is?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: The hero the fire theft theme with aó usually with a relay race after it. Often it's a blue jay or a woodpecker or something like this, that steals the fire and then passes it

to something else, and something else, one animal after another, and they're burned by the fires as they carry it on. Well, that accounts for the different colorings of animals and so forth. It's a worldwide myth, the fire theft.

BILL MOYERS: Do these stories of the hero vary from culture to culture?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Well, it's the degree of illumination or action that makes them different. There is a typical early-culture hero who goes around slaying monsters. Now, that is in the period of history when man is shaping his world out of a wild, savage, unshaped world. Well, it has another shape, but it's not the shape for man. He goes around killing monsters.

BILL MOYERS: So the hero evolves over time, like most other concepts and ideas and adventures.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Well, he evolves as the culture evolves. Now, Moses is a hero figure in his ascent of the mountain, his meeting with Yahweh on the summit of the mountain, and coming back with the rules for the formation of a whole new society. That's the hero act. Departure, fulfillment, return. And on the way there are adventures that can be paralleled also in other traditions.

Now, the Buddha figure is like that of the Christ; of course, 500 years earlier. You could match those two traditions right down the line, even to the characters of their apostles, of their monks, Christ, now, there's a perfectly good hero deed formula represented there, and he undergoes three temptations: the economic temptation, where the devil says, "You look hungry, young man; change the stones to bread," Jesus said, "Man lives not by bread alone, but every word from the mouth of God." Next, we have the political temptation: he's taken to the top of a mountain and shown the nations of the world, and says, "You can come into control of all these if you'll bow to me." And then, "Now, you're so spiritual, let's go up to the top of Herod's temple and see you cast yourself down, and God will bear you up and you won't even bruise your heels." So he says, "You shall not tempt the Lord your God." Those are the three temptations of Christ. In the desert.

The Buddha also goes into the forest, has conferences with the leading gurus of the day, he goes past them, He comes to the bo tree, the Tree of Illumination, undergoes three temptations. They're not the same temptations, but they are three temptations, And One is that of lust another is that of fear, and another is that of social duty, doing what you're told. And then both of these men come back, and they choose disciples, who help them establish a new way of consciousness in terms of what they have discovered there. These are the same hero deeds; these are the spiritual hero deeds ñ the Moses, the Buddha, Christ, Mohammed.

Mohammed literally, and we know this about him, he was a camel caravan master. But he would leave his home and go out into a little mountain cave that he found and meditate, and meditate, and meditate and meditate. And one day a voice says, "Write," and we have the Koran, you know. It's an old story.

BILL MOYERS: Sometimes it seems to me that we ought to feel pity for the hero instead of admiration, So many of them have sacrificed their own needs.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: They all have.

BILL MOYERS: And very often what they accomplish is shattered by the inability of the followers to see.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Yes. They come out of the forest with gold and it turns to ashes, That's another motif that occurs.

BILL MOYERS: In this culture of easy religion cheaply achieved, it seems to me we've forgotten that all three of the great religions teach that the trials of the hero journey are a significant part of it, that there's no reward without renunciation and without a price, The Koran speaks, "Do you think that you shall enter the garden of bliss without such trials as come to those who passed before you?"

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Well, if you realize what the real problem is, and that is of losing primary primarily thinking about yourself and your own self-protection. Losing yourself, giving yourself to another, that's a trial in itself, is it not? There's a big transformation of consciousness that's concerned. And what all the myths have to deal with is transformation of consciousness. That you're thinking in this way, and you have now to think in that way.

BILL MOYERS: Well, how is the consciousness transformed?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: By the trials.

BILL MOYERS: The tests that the hero undergoes.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: The tests or certain illuminating revelations. Trials and revelations are what it's all about.

BILL MOYERS: Well, who in society today is making any heroic myth at all for us? Do movies do this, do movies create hero myths?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: I don't know. Now, my experience of movies, I mean, the significant experience I had of movies, was when I was a boy, and they were all really movies, They weren't talkies, they were black and white movies, And I had a hero figure who meant something to me, and he served as a kind of model for myself in my physical character, and that was Douglas Fairbanks. I wanted to be a synthesis of Douglas Fairbanks and Leonardo da Vinci, that was my idea. But those were models, were roles, that came to me.

BILL MOYERS: Does a movie like Star Wars fill some of that need for the spiritual adventure, for the hero?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Oh, perfect, it does the cycle perfectly. It's not simple morality play. It has to do with the powers of life and their inflection through the action of man. One of the wonderful things, I think, about this adventure into space, is that the narrator, the artist, the one thinking up the story, is in a field that is not covered by our own knowledge" you know, Though it's much of the adventure in the old stories is where they go into regions that no one's been in before. Well, we've now conquered the planet, so there are no empty spaces for the imagination to go forth and fight its own war, you know, with the powers, and that was the first thing I felt, there's a whole new realm for the imagination to open out and live its forms.

BILL MOYERS: Do you, when you look at something like Star Wars, recognize some of the themes of the hero throughout mythology?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Well, I think that George Lucas was using standard mythological figures. The old man as the adviser, well, specifically what he made me think of is the Japanese swordmaster.

(Clip from "Star Wars")

OBI WAN KENOBI:Remember, a Jedi can feel the force flowing through him.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: I've known some of those people, and this man has a bill of their character.

BILL MOYERS: Well, there's something mythological, too, isn't there, in the sense that the hero is helped by this stranger who shows up and gives him some instrument, a sword or a sheaf of light, shaft of light?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Yes, but he gives him not only a physical instrument, but a psychological commitment and a psychological center,

(Clip from "Star Wars")

OBI WAN KENOBI: This time, let go your conscious self and act on instinct.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: When he had him exercising with that strange weapon, and then pulled the mask over, that's real Japanese Stuff.

(Clip from "Star Wars")

DARTH VADER: I'll take them myself.

BILL MOYERS: When I took our two sons to see it, they did the same thing the audience did; at that moment when the voice of Ben Kenobi says to Luke Skywalker in the climactic moment

(Clip from "Star Wars"),

OBI WAN KENOBI: Use the force, Luke. Let go. Luke.

BILL MOYERS: The audience broke out into elation and into applause.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: “They did. Well, you see, this thing communicates. It is in a language that is talking to young people today, And that’s marvelous.

BILL MOYERS: So the hero goes for something, he doesn’t just go along for the ride. He’s not a mere adventurer.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Well, a serendipitous adventure can take place, also, You know, what the word serendipity comes from? Comes from the Sanskrit Swarandwipa, the Isle of Silk, which was formerly the name of Ceylon, And it’s a story about a family that’s just rambling on it’s way to Ceylon, and all these adventures take place. And so you can have the serendipitous adventure as well.

BILL MOYERS: Is the adventurer who takes that kind of trip a hero in the mythological sense?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Yes, He is ready for it. This is a very interesting thing about these mythological themes. The achievement of the hero is one that he is ready for, and it’s really a manifestation of his character. And it’s amusing, the way in which the landscape and the conditions of the environment match the readiness of the hero. The adventure that he’s ready for is the one that he gets.

(Clip from “Star Wars”)

HAN SOLO: Look, I ain’t in this for your revolution and I’m not in it for you, Princess. I expect to be well paid. I’m in it for me.

BILL MOYERS: The mercenary, Solo, begins as a mercenary and ends up as a hero.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: He was a very practical guy, a materialist in his character, at least as he thought of himself. But he was a compassionate human being at the same time, and didn’t know it. The adventure evoked a quality of his character that he hadn’t known he possessed.

(Clip from “Star Wars”)

PRINCESS LEIA: I love you.

HAN SOLO: I know.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: He thinks he’s an egoist, he really isn’t, and that’s a very lovable kind of human being, I think, and there are lots of them functioning beautifully in the world. They think they’re working for themselves, very practical and all, but no, there’s something else pushing them.

BILL MOYERS: What did you think about the scene in the bar?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: That's my favorite, not only in this piece, but of many, many pieces I've ever seen.

BILL MOYERS: Why?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Well, where you are is on the edge, you're about to embark into the outlying spaces. And—

BILL MOYERS: The real adventure.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: The real adventure. This is the jumping-off place, and there is where you meet people who've been out there, and they run the machines that go out there, and you haven't been there. It reminds me a little bit in Robert Louis Stevenson's *Treasure Island*, the atmosphere before you start off the adventure. You're in the seaport, and there's old salts, seamen who've been on the sea, and that's their world, and these are the space people, also.

(Clip from "Star Wars")

HAN SOLO: I've got a bad feeling about this.

LUKE SKYWALKER: The walls are moving!

PRINCESS LEIA: Don't just stand there, try and brace it with something.

BILL MOYERS: My favorite scene was when they were in the garbage compacter, and the walls were closing in, and I thought, that's like the belly of the whale that Jonah came out of.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: That's what it is, yes, that's where they were, down in the belly of the whale.

BILL MOYERS: What's the mythological significance of the belly?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: It's the descent into the dark. Jonah in the whale, I mean, that's a standard motif of going into the whale's belly and coming out again.

BILL MOYERS: Why must the hero do that?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: The whale represents the personification, you might say, of all that is in the unconscious. In reading these things psychologically, water is the unconscious. The creature in the water would be the dynamism of the unconscious, which is dangerous and powerful and has to be controlled by consciousness.

The first stage in the hero adventure, when he starts off on adventure, is leaving the realm of light, which he controls and knows about. and moving toward the threshold. And it's at the

threshold that the monster of the abyss comes to meet him. And then there are two or three results: one, the hero is cut to pieces and descends into the abyss in fragments, to be resurrected; or he may kill the dragon power, as Siegfried does when he kills the dragon. But then he tastes the dragon blood, that is to say, he has to assimilate that power. And when Siegfried has killed the dragon and tasted the blood, he hears the song of nature; he has transcended his humanity, you know, and reassociated himself with the powers of nature, which are the powers of our life, from which our mind removes us.

You see, this thing up here, this consciousness, thinks it's running the shop. It's a secondary organ; it's a secondary organ of a total human being, and it must not put itself in control. It must submit and serve the humanity of the body.

(Clip from "Star Wars")

DARTH VADER: Join me, and I will complete your training.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: When it does put itself in control, you get this Vader, the man who's gone over to the intellectual side.

(Clip from "Star Wars")

LUKE SKYWALKER: I'll never join you!

DARTH VADER: If you only knew the power of the dark side.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: He isn't thinking, or living in terms of humanity, he's living in terms of a system. And this is the threat to our lives; we all face it, we all operate in our society in relation to a system. Now, is the system going to eat you up and relieve you of your humanity, or are you going to be able to use the system to human purposes?

BILL MOYERS: Would the hero with a thousand faces help us to answer that question, about how to change the system so that we are not serving it?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: I don't think it would help you to change the system, but it would help you to live in the system as a human being.

BILL MOYERS: By doing what?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Well, like Luke Skywalker, not going over, but resisting its impersonal claims.

BILL MOYERS: But I can hear someone out there in the audience saying, "Well, that's all well and good for the imagination of a George Lucas or for the scholarship of a Joseph Campbell, but that isn't what happens in my life."

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: You bet it does. If the person doesn't listen to the demands of his own spiritual and heart life, and insists on a certain program, you're going to have a schizophrenic crack-up. The person has put himself off-center; he has aligned himself with a programmatic life, and it's not the one the body's interested in at all. And the world's full of people who have stopped listening to themselves. In my own life, I've had many opportunities to commit myself to a system and to go with it, and to obey its requirements. My life has been that of a maverick; I would not submit.

BILL MOYERS: You really believe that the creative spirit ranges on its own out there, beyond the boundaries?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Yes, I do.

BILL MOYERS: Something of the hero in that, I don't mean to suggest that you see yourself as a hero.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: No, I don't, but I see myself as a maverick.

BILL MOYERS: So perhaps the hero lurks in each one of us, when we don't know it

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Well, yes, I mean, our life evokes our character, and you find out more about yourself as you go on. And it's very nice to be able to put yourself in situations that will evoke your higher nature, rather than your lower.

BILL MOYERS: Give me an example.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: I'll give you a story. I'm dealing with an Iroquois story right now. There's a motif that comes in American Indian stories very often, what I call the refusal of suitors. A girl with her mother lived in a wigwam on the edge of the village. She was a very handsome girl, but extremely proud and would not accept any of the boys. They proposed to her through the mother, and the mother was terribly annoyed with her. Well, one day they're out collecting wood, and they have gone a long way from the village. And while they are collecting the wood, a terrific darkness comes over them. Now, this wasn't the darkness of night descending; when you have a darkness like that, there's some magician at work somewhere. So the mother says, "Well, let's gather some bark and make a little wigwam of bark, wigwam for ourselves, and collect wood for a fire, and we'll just spend the night here." So they do that, and the mother falls asleep.

And the girl looks up and there's this magnificent guy standing there with a wampum sash, glorious, and feathers and all this kind-black feathers. He says, "I have come to marry you, and I'll await your reply." She accepts the guy, and the mother accepts the man, and he gives the mother the wampum belt to prove that he's serious about all this. So he goes away with the girl; she has acquiesced. Mere human beings weren't good enough for her, but here's something that really— ah. So she's in another domain.

Now, the adventure is marvelous. She goes with him to his village, and they enter his lodge. The people in there greet her and she feels very comfortable about it and all. And then the next day he says, "I'm going off to hunt." So he leaves the lodge and the door is closed with a flap, there's a flap. When he closes the flap, she hears this strange sound. So there's the whole day and she's just in the hut, and as evening comes, she hears that strange sound again. And the door flap is flung off and in comes this prodigious serpent with his tongue darting, and he puts his head in her lap, and says, "Now, you must search my head for lice," and things like that, and she finds all kinds of horrible things there and kills them all. And then he withdraws, and in a moment after the door has been closed, it opens again and in he comes, he's the same beautiful young man again, and said, "Were you afraid of me when I came in just now?" No, she says, she wasn't at all afraid.

Next day he goes off to hunt, and then she leaves the lodge to gather wood. And the first thing she sees is an enormous serpent basking on the rocks. And then another, and then another, and she begins to feel very badly, very homesick and discouraged. Then the evening. the serpent and then the man again. The third day when he leaves, she decides she's going to try to get out of this place. So she goes out and she's standing in the woods thinking, and a voice speaks to her. She turns, and there's a little old man there, and he says, "Darling, you are in trouble. The man that you've married is one of seven brothers. They are great magicians, and like many people of this kind, their hearts are not in their bodies. There's a collection of seven hearts in a bag that is hidden under the bed of the eldest, to whom you are married. You must go get that, and then we'll deal with the next part of the adventure."

She goes in and finds the bag of hearts and is running out, and a voice calls after her. "Stop. stop." It's the voice of the magician. And she continues to run and he says. "You may think you can get away from me, but you never can." And just at that point, she hears the voice of the old man, he says, "I'll help you, dear." And he's pulling her out of the water; she didn't even know that she was in water.

BILL MOYERS: What does that say to you?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: That's to say you have moved out of the hard land, the solid earth, and are in the field of the unconscious. And she had pulled herself into the transcendent realm and got caught in the negative powers of the abyss, and she's being rescued now by the upper powers. What you have done has been to elevate yourself out of the local field and put yourself in the field of higher power, higher danger. And are you going to be able to handle it? If you are not eligible for this place into which you've put yourself, it's going to be a demon marriage, it's going to be a real mess. If you are eligible, it can be a glory that will give you a life that is yours, in your own way.

BILL MOYERS: So these stories of mythology are simply trying to express a truth that can't be grasped any other way.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: It's the edge, the interface between what can be known and what is never to be discovered, because it is a mystery transcendent of all human research. The source of life: what is it? No one knows.

BILL MOYERS: Why are stories important for getting at that?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Well. I think it's important to live life with a knowledge of its mystery and of your own mystery, and it gives life a new zest, a new balance, a new harmony to do this. I mean, in therapy, in psychological therapy, when people find out what it is that's ticking in them, they get straightened out. And what is it that life is. I find thinking in mythological terms has helped people, visibly you can see it happen.

BILL MOYERS: How, what does it do?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: It erases anxieties, it puts them in accord with the inevitables of their life, and they can see the positive values of what are the negative aspects of what is positive. It's whether you're going to say no to the serpent or yes to the serpent, as easy as that.

BILL MOYERS: No to the adventure?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Yes. The adventure of being alive, of living.

BILL MOYERS: When I was growing up, tales of King Arthur, tales of the medieval knights, tales of the dragon slayers were very strong in my world.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Dragons represent greed, really. The European dragon guards things in his cave, and what he guards are heaps of gold and virgins. And he can't make use of either of them, but he just guards. There's no vitality of experience, either of the value of the gold or of the female whom he's guarding there. Psychologically, the dragon is one's own binding of oneself to one's ego, and you're captured in your own dragon cage. And the problem of the psychiatrist is to break that dragon, open him up, so that you can have a larger field of relationships.

Jung had a patient come to him who felt alone, and she drew a picture of herself as caught in the rocks, from the waist down she was bound in rocks. And this was on a windy shore, and the wind blowing and her hair blowing, and all the gold, which is the sign of the vitality of life, was locked in the rocks. And the next picture that he had her draw had followed something he had said to her. Suddenly a lightning flash hit the rocks, and the gold came pouring out, and then she found reflected on rocks round about the gold. There was no more gold in the rocks, it was all available on the top. And in the conferences that followed, those patches of gold were identified. They were her friends. She wasn't alone, but she had locked herself in her own little room and life, but she had friends. Do you see what I mean? This is killing the dragon. And you have fears and things, this is the dragon; that's exactly what's that all about. At least the European dragon; the Chinese dragon is different.

BILL MOYERS: What is it?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: It represents the vitality of the swamps and the dragon comes out beating his belly and saying "Ha, ha, ha, ha, ha." You know, that's another kind of dragon. And

he's the one that yields the bounty and the waters and all that kind of thing. He's the great glorious thing. But this is the negative one that cuts you down.

BILL MOYERS: So what you're saying is, if there are not dragons out there, and there may not be at any one moment.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: The real dragon is in you.

BILL MOYERS: And what is that real dragon?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: That's your ego, holding you in.

BILL MOYERS: What's my ego?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: What I want, what I believe, what I can do, what I think I love, and all that. What I regard as the aim of my life and so forth. It might be too small. It might be that which pins you down. And if it's simply that of doing what the environment tells you to do, it certainly is pinning you down. And so the environment is your dragon, as it reflects within yourself.

BILL MOYERS: How do I slay...

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: How do you?

BILL MOYERS: Slay that dragon in me? What's the journey I have to make, you have to make, each of us has to make? You talk about something called the soul's high adventure.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: My general formula for my students is, follow your bliss, I mean, find where it is, and don't be afraid to follow it.

BILL MOYERS: Can my bliss be my life's love, or my life's work?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Well, it will be your life.

BILL MOYERS: Is it my work or my life?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Well, if the work that you're doing is the work that you chose to do because you are enjoying it, that's it. But if you think, "Oh, gee, I couldn't do that," you know, that's your dragon blocking you in. "Oh, no, I couldn't be a writer, oh, no, I couldn't do what so-and-so is doing."

BILL MOYERS: Unlike the classical heroes, we're not going on our journey to save the world, but to save ourselves.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: And in doing that, you save the world. I mean, you do. The influence of a vital person vitalizes, there's no doubt about it. The world is a wasteland. People have the

notion of saving the world by shifting it around and changing the rules and so forth. No, any world is a living world if it's alive, and the thing is to bring it to life. And the way to bring it to life is to find in your own case where your life is, and be alive yourself, it seems to me.

BILL MOYERS: But you say I have to take that journey and go down there and slay those dragons. Do I have to go alone?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: If you have someone who can help you, that's fine, too. But ultimately the last trick has to be done by you.

BILL MOYERS: In all of these journeys of mythology, there's a place everyone wishes to find. What is it? The Buddhists talk of nirvana; Jesus talks of peace. There's a place of rest and repose. Is that typical of the hero's journey, that there's a place to find?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: That's a place in yourself of rest. Now this I know a little bit about from athletics. The athlete who is in championship form has a quiet place in himself. And it's out of that that his action comes. If he's all in the action field, he's not performing properly. There's a center out of which you act. And Jean, my wife, a dancer, tells me that in dance this is true, too, there's the center that has to be known and held. There it's quite physically recognized by the person. But unless this center has been found, you're torn apart, tension comes. Now, the Buddha's word is nirvana; nirvana is a psychological state of mind. It's not a place, like heaven, it's not something that's not here; it is here, in the middle of the turmoil, what's called samsara, the whirlpool of life conditions. That nirvana is what, is the condition that comes when you are not compelled by desire or by fear, or by social commitments, when you hold your center and act out of there.

BILL MOYERS: And like all heroes, the Buddha doesn't show you the truth, the illumination; he shows you the way to it.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: The way. But it's got to be your way, too. I mean, how should I get rid of fear? The Buddha can't tell me how I'm going to do it. There are exercises that different teachers will give you, but they may not work for you. And all a teacher can do is give you a clue of the direction. He's like a lighthouse that says there are rocks over here, and steer clear.

BILL MOYERS: You talk a lot about consciousness.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Yes.

BILL MOYERS: Most people hear that term and like me, have only a veiled understanding of it. What is it?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Jean and I are living in Hawaii, and we're living right by the ocean. And we have a little lanai, a little porch, and there's a coconut tree that grows up through the porch and it goes on up. And there's a kind of vine, plant, big powerful thing with leaves like this, that has grown up the coconut tree. Now, that plant sends forth little feelers to go out and clutch the plant, and it knows where the plant is and what to do— where the tree is, and it grows

up like this, and it opens a leaf, and that leaf immediately turns to where the sun is. Now, you can't tell me that leaf doesn't know where the sun is going to be. All of the leaves go just like that, what's called heliotropism, turning toward where the sun is. That's a form of consciousness. There is a plant consciousness, there is an animal consciousness. We share all of these things. You eat certain foods, and the bile knows whether there's something there for it to go to work on. I mean, the whole thing is consciousness. I begin to feel more and more that the whole world is conscious; certainly the vegetable world is conscious, and when you live in the woods, as I did as a kid, you can see all these different consciousnesses relating to themselves.

BILL MOYERS: Scientists are beginning to talk quite openly about the Gaia principle.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: There you are, the whole planet as an organism.

BILL MOYERS: Mother Earth.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: And you see, if you will think of ourselves as coming out of the earth, rather than as being thrown in here from somewhere else, you know, thrown out of the earth, we are the earth, we are the consciousness of the earth. These are the eyes of the earth, and this is the voice of the earth. What else?

BILL MOYERS: How do we raise our consciousness?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Well, that's a matter of what you are disposed to think about, and that's what meditations are for. And all of life is a meditation, most of it unintentional. A lot of people spend most of it in meditating on where their money's coming from and where it's going to go, but that's a level of meditation. Or, if you have a family to bring up, you're concerned for the family. These are all perfectly, very important concerns, but they have to do with physical conditions, mostly, and spiritual conditions of the children, of course. But how are you going to communicate spiritual consciousness to the children if you don't have it yourself? So how do you get that? Then you think about the myths. What the myths are for is to bring us into a level of consciousness that is spiritual.

Just for example, I walk off 52nd Street and Fifth Avenue into Saint Patrick's Cathedral. I have left a very busy city and one of the most fiercely economically inspired cities on the planet. I walk into that cathedral, and everything around me speaks of spiritual mystery. The mystery of the cross; what's that all about there? The stained glass windows which bring another atmosphere in. My consciousness has been brought up onto another level altogether, and I am on a different platform. And then I walk out and I'm back in this one again. Now, can I hold something from that? Well, certain prayers or meditations that are associated with the whole context there; these are what are called mantras in India, little meditation themes that hold your consciousness on that level instead of letting it drop down here all the way. And then what you can finally do is to recognize that this is simply a lower level of that.

BILL MOYERS: The cathedral at Chartres, which you love so much...

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Oh, well.

BILL MOYERS: It also expresses a relationship of the human to the cosmos, doesn't it?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Well, I think everyone who has spent any time at Chartres has felt something very special about this cathedral. I've been there about eight times. When I was a student in Paris, I went down there about five times and spent one whole weekend, and I identified and looked at every single figure in that cathedral. I was there so much that the concierge, this little old fellow who took care of the cathedral, he came to me one noontime and he said, "Would you like to go up with me and ring the bells?" I said, "I sure would." So we climbed the fleche, the tower up to where the great bell was, the great enormous bronze bell, and there was a little, like a seesaw. And he stood on one end of the seesaw, and I stood on the other end of the seesaw, and there was a little bar there for us to hold onto. And he gave the thing a push and then he was on it and I was on it, and we started going up and down, and the wind blowing through our hair up there in the cathedral, and then it began underneath. Bong, you know, bong, bong... I tell you, it was one of the most thrilling adventures in my life.

And when it was all over, he brought me down, he said, "I want to show you where my room is." Well, in a cathedral you have the nave and then the transept, and then the apse. And around the apse is the choir screen. Now the choir screen in Chartres is about that wide, and he took me in a little door into the middle of the choir screen, and there was his little bed and a little table with a lamp on it, and when I looked out, there was the Black Madonna, the vitrine, the window of the Black Madonna and that was where he lived. Now, there was a man living in a meditation, him? A constant meditation, I mean, that was a very moving, beautiful thing. Oh, I've been there time and time again, since.

BILL MOYERS: What do you find when you go there? What does it say about all that we've been discussing?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Well, first thing it says is, it takes me back to a time when these principles informed the society. I mean, you can tell what's informed the society by the size of the what the building is that's the tallest building in the place. When you approach a medieval town, the cathedral's the tallest thing in the place. When you approach a 17th century city, it's the political palace that's the tallest thing in the place. And when you approach a modern city, it's office buildings and dwellings that are the tallest things in the place.

And if you go to Salt Lake City, you'll see the whole thing illustrated right in front of your face. First, the temple was built. The temple was built right in the center of the city. I mean, this was the proper organization, that's the spiritual center from which all flows in all directions. And then the capitol was built right beside the temple, and it's bigger than the temple. And now the biggest thing is the office building that takes care of the affairs of both the temple and the political building. That's the history of Western civilization, from the Gothic through the princely periods of the 16th, 17th, 18th centuries, to this economic world that we're in now.

BILL MOYERS: In New York now the debate is over who can build the tallest building, not to praise but to build the tallest building.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Yes, and they are magnificent. I mean, some of the things that are going up in New York now really are, and this is a kind of architectural triumph. And what it is, is the statement of the city; we are a financial power center and look what we can do. It's a kind of virtuosic acrobatics done.

BILL MOYERS: Will new myths come from there?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Well, something might. You can't predict what a myth is going to be, any more than you can predict what you're going to dream tonight. Myths and dreams come from the same place; they come from realizations of some kind that have then to find expression in symbolic form. And the myth, the only myth that's going to be worth thinking about in the immediate future is one that's talking about the planet not this city, not these people, but the planet and everybody on it. That's my main thought for what the future myth is going to be. And what it will have to deal with will be exactly what all myths have dealt with: the maturation of the individual, the gradual the pedagogical way to follow, from dependency through adulthood to maturity, and then to the exit and how to do it. And then how to relate to this society, and how to relate this society to the world of nature and the cosmos. That's what the myths have all talked about; that's what this one's got to talk about. But the society that it's going to talk about is the society of the planet, and until that gets going, you don't have anything.

BILL MOYERS: There's that wonderful photograph you have of the Earth seen from space, and it's very small and at the same time, it's very grand.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: You don't see any divisions there of nations or states or anything of the kind. This might be the symbol, really, for the new mythology to come. That is the country that we are going to be celebrating, and those are the people that we are one with.

BILL MOYERS: Genesis 1: "In the beginning, God created the heavens and the earth. The earth was without form and void, and darkness was upon the face of the deep."

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: This is the song of the world, from a legend of the Pima Indians: "In the beginning there was only darkness everywhere, darkness and water. And the darkness gathered thick in places, crowding together and then separating, crowding and separating."

BILL MOYERS: "And the spirit of God was moving over the face of the waters, and God said, 'Let there be light.'"

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: This is from the Hindu Upanishad: "In the beginning there was only the great self, reflected in the form of a person. Reflecting, it found nothing but itself, and its first word was, 'This am I.'"

BILL MOYERS: When Joseph Campbell was a little boy, his father took him to the Museum of Natural History in New York, and he was transfixed by the totem poles and masks. Who made them, he wondered, what did they mean? He began to read everything he could about Indians, their myths and legends. By ten, he was into the pursuit that made him one of the world's leading scholars of mythology, and one of the most exciting teachers of our time. It was said that he could make the bones of folklore and anthropology live.

The driving idea of his life was to understand the power of the stories and legends of the human race, especially those common themes and deep principles which energized our imagination down through the ages. The jealous god of Abraham is not the god of the stories of India, who shows neither wrath nor mercy, but however the mystic traditions differ, Campbell said, they're in accord in this respect: they call men and women to a deeper awareness of the very act of living itself, and they guide us through trials and traumas, from birth to death.

Joseph Campbell once said to his students at Sarah Lawrence College, "If you really want to help this world, what you will have to teach is how to live in it." That's what he taught. Over the last two summers of his life, in hours of conversations recorded in the library of Lucasfilm in California, we talked about how mythology can still awaken a sense of awe, gratitude and even rapture. Why myths? Why should we care about myths? What do they have to do with my life?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Well, my first answer would be, well, go on, live your life, it's a good life, you don't need this. I don't believe in being interested in subjects because they're said to be important and interesting. I believe in being caught by it somehow or other. But you may find that with a proper introduction, this subject will catch you.

And so what can it do for you when it does catch you? These bits of information from ancient times, which have to do with the themes that have supported man's life, built civilizations, informed religions over the millennia, have to do with deep inner problems, inner mysteries, inner thresholds of passage and if you don't know what the guide signs are along the way, you have to work it out yourself. But once this catches you, there is always such a feeling from one or another of these traditions of information, of a deep, rich life-vivifying sort, that you won't want to give it up.

BILL MOYERS: So myths are stories of the search by men and women through the ages for meaning, for significance, to make life signify, to touch the eternal, to understand the mysterious, to find out who we are.

CAMPBELL: People say that what we're all seeking is a meaning for life. I don't think that's what we're really seeking. I think what we're seeking is an experience of being alive, so that the life experiences that we have on the purely physical plane will have resonances within that are those of our own innermost being and reality. And so that we actually feel the rapture of being alive, that's what it's all finally about, and that's what these clues help us to find within ourselves.

BILL MOYERS: Myths are clues?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Myths are clues to the spiritual potentialities of the human life.

BILL MOYERS: What we're capable of knowing within?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Yes.

BILL MOYERS: And experiencing within.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Yes.

BILL MOYERS: I liked your defin-you changed the definition of a myth from the search for meaning to the experience of meaning.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: The experience, the experience.

BILL MOYERS: The experience of life.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: The experience of life. The mind has to do with meaning; in here, what's the meaning of a flower? That Zen story of the sermon of the Buddha when his whole company was gathered, and he simply lifted a flower. And there's only one man, Kashyapa, who gave him a sign with his eye that he understood what was said.

What's the meaning of the universe? What's the meaning of a flea? It's just there, that's it, and your own meaning is that you're there. Now we are so engaged in doing things, to achieve purposes of outer value, that we forget that the inner value, the rapture that is associated with being alive, is what it's all about.

Now, we want to think about God. God is a thought, God is a name, God is an idea, but its reference is to something that transcends all thinking. The ultimate mystery of being is beyond all categories of thought. My friend Heinrich Zimmer of years ago used to say, "The best things can't be told." Because they transcend thought. The second best are misunderstood, because those are the thoughts that are supposed to refer to that which can't be thought about, you know. And one gets stuck with the thoughts. The third best are what we talk about, you see. And myth is that field of reference, metaphors referring to what is absolutely transcendent.

BILL MOYERS: What can't be known.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: What can't be known.

BILL MOYERS: Or can't be named.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Yes.

BILL MOYERS: Except in our own feeble attempt to clothe it in language.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: And the ultimate word in our language for that which is transcendent is God.

BILL MOYERS: Do you remember what went through your mind the first time you saw Michelangelo's Creation?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: By the time I became aware of that, my notion of divinity was not quite so personal, you know. The idea of God, that he's a bearded old man of some kind, with certain not very pleasant temperament, that is I would say a sort of materialistic way of talking about the transcendent.

BILL MOYERS: There's just the opposite of it found on an island in the harbor of Bombay, from around the eighth century.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: This is a wonderful cave. You enter the cave from a bright sky. Of course, moving into the darkness, your eyes are blacked out. But if you just keep walking slowly, gradually the eyes adjust, and this enormous thing, it's about 19-feet high and 19-feet across, the central head is the mask of eternity. This is the mask of God.

BILL MOYERS: The mask of eternity.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: That is the metaphor through which eternity is to be experienced as radiance.

BILL MOYERS: And these other two figures?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Whenever one moves out of the transcendent, one comes into a field of opposites. These two pairs of opposites come forth as male and female from the two sides. What has eaten of the tree of the knowledge, not only of good and evil, but of male and female, of right and wrong, of this and that, and light and dark. Everything in the field of time is dual, past and future, dead and alive. All this, being and nonbeing, is, isn't.

BILL MOYERS: And what's the significance of them being beside the mask of God, the mask of eternity? What is this sculpture saying to us?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: The mask represents the middle, and the two represent the two opposites, and they always come in pairs. And put your mind in the middle; most of us put our minds on the side of the good against what we think of as evil. It was Heraclitus, I think, who said, "For God all things are good and right and just, but for man some things are right and others are not." You're in the field of time when you're man, and one of the problems of life is to life in the realization of both terms. That is to say, I know the center and I know that good and evil are simply temporal apparitions.

BILL MOYERS: Well, are some myths more or less true than others?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: They're true in different senses, do you see? Here's a whole mythology based on the insight that transcends duality. Ours is a mythology that's based on the insight of duality. And so our religion tends to be ethical in its accent, sin and atonement, right and wrong. It started with a sin, you see. In other words, moving out of the mythological zone, the garden of paradise where there is no time, and where men and women don't even know that they're different from each other, there the two are just creatures. And God and man are practically the same: "He walks in the cool of the evening in the garden where we are." And then they eat the apple, the knowledge of the pairs of opposites, and man and woman then cover their shame, that they're different; God and man, they're different; man and nature, as against man.

I once heard a wonderful lecture by Daisetz Suzuki, you remember, this wonderful old Zen philosopher, who was over here. He was in his 90s. He started to lecture in Switzerland that I heard in Ascona. He stood up with his hands on his side, and he said, "God against man, man against God, man against nature, nature against man, nature against God, God against nature. Very funny religion."

Now, in the other mythologies, one puts oneself in accord with the world. If the world is a mixture of good and evil, you do not put yourself in accord with it. You identify with the good and you fight against the evil, and this is a religious system which belongs to the Near East, following Zarathustra's time. It's in the biblical tradition, all the way, in Christianity and in Islam as well. This business of not being with nature, and we speak with sort of derogation of "the nature religions." You see, with that fall in the garden, nature was regarded as corrupt. There's a myth for you that corrupts the whole world for us. And every spontaneous act is sinful, because nature is corrupt and has to be corrected, must not be yielded to. You get a totally different civilization, a totally different way of living according to your myth as to whether nature is fallen or whether nature is itself a manifestation of divinity, and the spirit being the revelation of the divinity that's inherent in nature.

BILL MOYERS: Don't you think that Americans, modern Americans, have rejected this idea, this Indian idea, this ancient idea of nature as revealing the divinity, because it would have kept us from achieving dominance over nature?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Yeah, but that's the biblical condemnation of nature that they inherited from their own religion and brought with them. God is not in nature, God is separate from nature, and nature is not God, and this distinction between God and the world is not to be found in basic Hinduism or Buddhism, either.

I'll never forget the experience I had when I was in Japan. To be in a place that never heard of the fall in the garden of Eden. To be in a place where I can read in one of the Shinto texts, "The processes of nature cannot be evil." When every impulse, every natural impulse, is not to be corrected, but to be sublimated, you know, to be beautified. And the glorious interest in the beauty of nature and cooperation with nature, and coordination, so that in some of those gardens you don't know where nature begins and art ends. This to me was a tremendous experience, and it's another mythology.

BILL MOYERS: Speaking of different mythologies, let's just have a little fun here. I took these from your atlas.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Oh, yes.

BILL MOYERS: I'll read from Genesis, and then you identify and read from the corresponding ...

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Oh, yes.

BILL MOYERS: Genesis 1: So God created man in his own image, in the image of God he created him, male and female he created them. Then God blessed them and God said to them, 'Be fruitful and multiply.'

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: And now this is from a legend of the Bassari people of West Africa. "Unumbotte made a human being, its name was Man. Unumbotte next made all antelope, named Antelope. Unumbotte made a snake, named Snake. And Unumbotte said to them, 'The earth has not yet been pounded. You must pound the ground smooth where you are sitting.' Unumbone gave them seeds of all kinds and said, 'Go plant these.'"

BILL MOYERS: And Genesis 1: "And God saw everything that he had made, and behold, it was very good."

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: And from the Upanishad: "Then he realized, I indeed am this creation, for I have poured it forth from myself. In that way he became this creation, and verily he who knows this becomes in this creation a creator." That's the clincher there. When you know this, then you've identified with the creative principle yourself, which is the God-power in the world, which means in you. It's beautiful.

BILL MOYERS: What do you think we're looking for, when we subscribe to one of these theories of creation, one of these stories of creation? What are we looking for?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Well, I think what we're looking for is a way of experiencing the world in which we are living, that will open to us the transcendence that informs it, and at the same time informs ourselves within it. That's what people want, that's what the soul asks for.

BILL MOYERS: You mean we're looking for some accord with the mystery that informs all things, what you call that vast ground of silence which we all share?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Yes, but not only to find it, but to find it actually in our environment, in our world, to recognize it, to have some kind of instruction that will enable us to see the divine presence.

BILL MOYERS: In the world and in us.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: In India, this wonderful Anjali, this greeting, you know what that means?

BILL MOYERS: No.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: That's the greeting of prayer, isn't it? That's what we use for prayer. They greet you with that, that's greeting the god that's in you as you come in. These people are aware of the divine presence. When you enter an Indian home as a guest, you are a visiting deity, and you feel it, by God, the way they treat you. It's something in the way of a hospitality that you don't get where you have simply one person and another person. It's a recognition of the identity.

BILL MOYERS: But weren't people who told these stories and believed them and acted on them asking far more simple questions, you know, who made the world, how was the world made, why was the world made? Aren't these the questions that these creation stories are trying to address?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: No. It's through that answer that they see that the creator is present in the whole world. Do you see what I mean? This story that we've just read, "I see that I am this creation," says the god. When you see that God says he is the creation and then you are a creature, well, the god is within you and the man you're talking to, also. And so there's that realization, two aspects of the one divinity.

BILL MOYERS: Accord again, harmony again.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Wonderful thing.

BILL MOYERS: Let me ask you some questions about these common features in these stories, the significance of the forbidden fruit.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Well, there's a standard folktale motif called "The One Forbidden Thing." Remember, in Bluebeard, "Don't open that closet." You know, and then one always does it. And in the Old Testament story, God gives the one forbidden thing, and he knows very well, now I'm interpreting God, he knows very well that man's going to eat the forbidden fruit. But it's by doing that that man becomes the initiator of his own life. Life really begins with that.

BILL MOYERS: I also find in some of these early stories, the human tendency to find someone to blame.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Yeah.

BILL MOYERS: Let me read Genesis 1, then I'll ask you to read one from the Bassari legend.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: All right.

BILL MOYERS: Genesis 1: “And God said, ‘Have you eaten from the tree which I commanded you that you should not eat?’ Then the man said, ‘The woman whom you gave to be with me, she gave me of the tree and I ate.’ And the Lord God said to the woman, ‘What is this you’ve done?’ And the woman said, ‘The serpent deceived me, and I ate.’ Now, I mean, you talk about buck-passing, it starts very early.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: That’s right.

BILL MOYERS: And then there’s the Bassari legend.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: It’s been tough on serpents, too. “One day Snake said, ‘We too should eat these fruits. Why must we go hungry?’ Antelope said, ‘But we don’t know anything about this fruit.’ Then Man and his wife took some of the fruit and ate it. Unumbotte came down from the sky and asked, ‘Who ate the fruit?’ They answered, ‘We did.’ Unumbotte asked, ‘Who told you that you could eat that fruit?’ They replied, ‘Snake did.’ It’s the same story.

BILL MOYERS: Poor Snake.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: It’s the same story.

BILL MOYERS: What do you make of this, that in all of these stories the principal actors are pointing to someone else as the initiator of the fall?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Yeah, but it turns out to be Snake. And Snake in both of these stories is the symbol of life throwing off the past and continuing to live.

BILL MOYERS: Why?

“Let me tell you what happens to me when I read these stories, no matter the culture of their origin. I feel first this sense of wonder at the spectacle of the human imagination, simply groping to try to understand this existence.” — Bill Moyers

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: The power of life, because the snake sheds its skin, just as the moon sheds its shadow. The snake in most cultures is positive. Even the most poisonous thing, in India, the cobra, is a sacred animal. And the serpent, Naga, the serpent king, Nagaraga, is the next thing to the Buddha, because the serpent represents the power of life in the field of time to throw off death, and the Buddha represents the power of life in the field of eternity to be eternally alive.

Now, I saw a fantastic thing of a Burmese priestess, a snake priestess, who had to bring rain to her people by calling a king cobra from his den and kissing him three times on the nose. There was the cobra, the giver of life, the giver of rain, which is of life, as the divine positive, not negative, figure.

BILL MOYERS: The Christian stories turn it around, because the serpent was the seducer.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Well, what that amounts to is a refusal to affirm life. Life is evil in this view. Every natural impulse is sinful unless you've been baptized or circumcised, in this tradition that we've inherited. For heaven's sakes!

BILL MOYERS: By having been the tempter, women have paid a great price, because in mythology, some of this mythology, they are the ones who led to the downfall.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Of course they did. I mean, they represent life. Man doesn't enter life except by woman, and so it is woman who brings us into the world of polarities and pair of opposites and suffering and all. But I think it's a really childish attitude, to say "no" to life with all its pain, you know, to say this is something that should not have been.

Schopenhauer, in one of his marvelous chapters, I think it's in *The World as Will and Idea*, says: "Life is something that should not have been. It is in its very essence and character, a terrible thing to consider, this business of living by killing and eating." I mean, it's in sin in terms of all ethical judgments all the time.

BILL MOYERS: As Zorba says, you know, "Trouble? Life is trouble. Only death is no trouble."

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: That's it. And when people say to me, you know, do you have optimism about the world, you know, how terrible it is, I said, yes, just say, "It's great!" Just the way it is.

BILL MOYERS: But doesn't that lead to a rather passive attitude in the face of evil, in the face of wrong?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: You participate in it. Whatever you do is evil for somebody.

BILL MOYERS: But explain that for the audience.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Well, when I was in India, there was a man whose name was Sri Krishnamenon and his mystical name was Atmananda and he was in Trivandrum, and I went to Trivandrum, and I had the wonderful privilege of sitting face to face with him as I'm sitting here with you. And the first question, first thing he said to me is, "Do you have a question?" Because the teacher there always answers questions, he doesn't tell you what anything, he answers. And I said, "Yes, I have a question." I said, "Since in Hindu thinking all the universe is divine, is a manifestation of divinity itself, how can we say 'no' to anything in the world, how can we say 'no' to brutality, to stupidity, to vulgarity, to thoughtlessness?" And he said, "For you and me, we must say yes."

Well, I had learned from my friends who were students of his, that that happened to have been the first question he asked his guru, and we had a wonderful talk for about an hour there on this theme, of the affirmation of the world. And it confirmed me in a feeling that I have had, that who are we to judge? And it seems to me that this is one of the great teachings of Jesus.

BILL MOYERS: Well, I see now what you mean in one respect; in some classic Christian doctrine the world is to be despised, life is to be redeemed in the hereafter, it is heaven where our rewards come, and if you affirm that which you deplore, as you say, you're affirming the world, which is our eternity of the moment.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: That's what I would say. Eternity isn't some later time; eternity isn't a long time; eternity has nothing to do with time. Eternity is that dimension of here and now which thinking in time cuts out.

BILL MOYERS: This is it.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: This is it.

BILL MOYERS: This is my ...

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: If you don't get it here, you won't get it anywhere, and the experience of eternity right here and now is the function of life.

There's a wonderful formula that the Buddhists have for the Bodhisattva. The Bodhisattva, the one whose being, satra, is illumination, bodhi, who realizes his identity with eternity, and at the same time his participation in time. And the attitude is not to withdraw from the world when you realize how horrible it is, but to realize that this horror is simply the foreground of a wonder, and come back and participate in it. "All life is sorrowful," is the first Buddhist saying, and it is. It wouldn't be life if there were not temporality involved, which is sorrow, loss, loss, loss.

BILL MOYERS: That's a pessimistic note.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Well, I mean, you got to say yes to it and say it's great this way. I mean, this is the way God intended it.

BILL MOYERS: You don't really believe that?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Well, this is the way it is, and I don't believe anybody intended it, but this is the way it is. And Joyce's wonderful line, you know, "History is a nightmare from which I'm trying to awake." And the way to awake from it is not to be afraid and to recognize, as I did in my conversation with that Hindu guru or teacher that I told you of, that all of this as it is, is as it has to be, and it is a manifestation of the eternal presence in the world. The end of things always is painful; pain is part of there being a world at all.

BILL MOYERS: But if one accepted that isn't the ultimate conclusion, to say, well, 'I won't try to reform any laws or fight any battles.'

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: I didn't say that.

BILL MOYERS: Isn't that the logical conclusion one could draw, though, the philosophy of nihilism?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Well, that's not the necessary thing to draw. You could say I will participate in this row, and I will join the army, and I will go to war.

BILL MOYERS: I'll do the best I can on earth.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: I will participate in the game. It's a wonderful, wonderful opera, except that it hurts. And that wonderful Irish saying, you know, "Is this a private fight, or can anybody get into it?" This is the way life is, and the hero is the one who can participate in it decently, in the way of nature, not in the way of personal rancor, revenge or anything of the kind.

Let me tell you one story here, of a samurai warrior, a Japanese warrior, who had the duty to avenge the murder of his overlord. And he actually, after some time, found and cornered the man who had murdered his overlord. And he was about to deal with him with his samurai sword, when this man in the corner, in the passion of terror, spat in his face. And the samurai sheathed the sword and walked away. Why did he do that?

BILL MOYERS: Why?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Because he was made angry, and if he had killed that man then, it would have a personal act, of another kind of act, that's not what he had come to do.

BILL MOYERS: Let me tell you what happens to me when I read these stories, no matter the culture of their origin. I feel first this sense of wonder at the spectacle of the human imagination, simply groping to try to understand this existence. Does that ever happen to you?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: I tell you, mythology I think of as the homeland of the Muses, the inspirers of poetry. And to see life as a poem, and yourself participating in a poem, is what the myth does for you.

BILL MOYERS: What do you mean, a poem?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: I mean a vocabulary in the form, not of words, but of acts and adventures, which is connotative, which connotes something transcendent of the action here and which yet informs the whole thing, so that you always feel in accord with the universal being.

BILL MOYERS: Well, the interesting thing to me is, that far from undermining my faith, your work in mythology has liberated my faith from the cultural prisons to which it had been sentenced.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: It liberated my own. I know it's going to do it with everybody who really gets the message. Every mythology, every religion is true in this sense, it is true as metaphorical of the human and cosmic mystery. But when it gets stuck to the metaphor, then you're in trouble.

BILL MOYERS: The metaphor being ...

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Well, Jesus ascended to heaven. The story is, he ascended bodily to heaven. The story is that his mother, still alive, asleep, ascended to heaven. So this is metaphorical of something; you don't have to throw it away, all you have to find is what it's saying.

BILL MOYERS: What do you think it is saying?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: What it's saying is he didn't go out there, he went in here, which is where you must go, too, and ascend to heaven through the inward space to that source from which you and all life came. That's the sense of that.

BILL MOYERS: But aren't you undermining one of the great cardinal doctrines of the tradition of classic Christian faith, the death, of the burial and the resurrection of Jesus prefiguring our own and overcoming the body with a higher physical truth.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Well, that would be what I would call a mistaken reading of the symbol. That's reading it in terms of prose instead of in terms of poetry. That's reading a metaphor in terms of the denotation, instead of in terms of the connotation, do you understand that? A purely literary problem.

BILL MOYERS: The poetry gets to the unseen reality.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: That which is beyond even the concept of reality. It's that which transcends all thought. It's putting you there all the time, and in some way giving you a line to connect with that mystery which you are, and the myths do it, by gosh, they do it.

Now, according to the normal way of thinking about the Christian religion, we cannot identify with Jesus, we have to imitate Jesus. But to say I am God, as Jesus said, is for us blasphemy. However, in the Thomas gospel, Jesus says, "He who drinks from my mouth will become as I am, and I shall be he."

Wow. That's Buddhism. We are all manifestations of Buddha consciousness, only don't know. And the Buddha, the word means, the awakened one, the one who woke up to the fact that he was Buddha consciousness, and we are all to do that. To wake up to our Jesus within us, this is blasphemy in the normal way of thinking in Christianity, but it's the very essence of gnosticism and of the Thomas gospel.

BILL MOYERS: And heaven, that desired goal of most people, is within us?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Heaven and hell are within us, and all the gods are within us. This is the great realization of the Upanishads of India, already in the ninth century B.C. All the gods, all the heavens, all the worlds are within us. They are magnified dreams, and what dreams are, are manifestations in image form of the energies of the body in conflict with each other. And that's all myth is. Myth is a manifestation in symbolic images, metaphorical images, of the energies within us, moved by the organs of the body, in conflict with each other. This organ wants this, this organ wants this: the brain is one of the organs.

BILL MOYERS: So when we dream, are we fishing in some vast ocean of mythology...

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: That goes down and down and down. And you can get all mixed up with complexes, you know, things like that, but you're standing on the lord of the abyss, really. There's a Polynesian saying that frequently comes to my mind: "Standing on a whale, fishing for minnows." We are standing on a whale. The ground of being is the ground of our being, and the outward turned, we see all these little problems here, but inward, we are the source of them all. That's the big mystical teaching.

BILL MOYERS: You've seen what's happened to primitive societies that are unsettled by white men's civilization. They go to pieces, they disintegrate, they succumb to vice and disease. And isn't that the same thing that's been happening to us since our myths began to disappear?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Absolutely it is.

BILL MOYERS: Isn't that why conservative religious folk today are calling for a return to the old-time religion?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: That's right.

BILL MOYERS: I understand the yearning. In my youth I had fixed stars; they comforted me with their permanence, they gave me a known horizon; they told me that there's a loving, kind and just father out there looking down on me, ready to receive me, thinking of my concerns all the time. Now science, medicine has made a house-cleaning of belief, and I wonder what happens to children who don't have that fixed star, that known horizon, those myths to sustain them?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: All you have to do is read the newspaper. I mean, it's a mess. But what the myth has to provide, I mean, just on this immediate level of life instruction, the pedagogical aspect of myth, it has to give life models. And the models have to be appropriate to the possibilities of the time in which you're living. And our time has changed, and it's changed and changed, and it continues to change so fast, that what was proper 50 years ago is not proper today. So the virtues of the past are the vices of today, and many of what were thought to be the vices of the past are the necessities of today. And the moral order has to catch up with the moral necessities of actual life in time, here and now, and that's what it's not doing, and that's why it's ridiculous to go back to the old-time religion.

A friend of mine composed a song based on the old-time religion, "Give me the old-time religion, give me that old time. Let us worship Zarathustra, just the way we used to, I'm a Zarathustra booster, he's good enough for me. Let us worship Aphrodite, she's beautiful but flighty, she doesn't wear a nightie, but she's good enough for me."

And when you go back to the old-time religion, you're doing something like that. It belongs to another age, another people, another set of human values, another universe. So the old period of the Old Testament, no one had any idea. The world was a little three layer cake, and the world consisted of something a few hundred miles around the Near Eastern centers there. No one ever

heard of the Aztecs, you know, or the Chinese, even. And so those whole peoples were not considered, even, as part of the problem to be dealt with. The world changes, then the religion has to be transformed.

BILL MOYERS: But it seems to me that is what we are in fact doing here.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: That's in fact what we better do. But my notion of what the real horror today is what you see in Beirut, where you have the three great Western religions, Judaism, Christianity and Islam, and because the three of them have three different names for the same biblical God, they can't get on together, they're stuck with their metaphor, and don't realize it's reference.

BILL MOYERS: So each needs a new myth.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Each needs its own myth, all the way. "Love thine enemy." you know, open up, don't judge.

BILL MOYERS: Given what you know about human beings, is it conceivable to you that there is a point of wisdom beyond the conflicts of truth and illusion by which our lives can be put back together again, that we can develop new models?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Sure. It's in the religions. All religions are true for their time. If you can find what the truth is and separate it from the temporal inflection, just bring your same old religion into a new set of metaphors, and you've got it.

BILL MOYERS: Do you see some new metaphors emerging in the modern medium for the old universal truths that you've talked about, the old story?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Well, I think that Star Wars is a valid mythological perspective. It shows the state as a machine and asks: Is the machine going to crush humanity, or serve humanity? And humanity comes not from the machine, but from the heart.

(Clip from Star Wars)

DARTH VADER: Luke. Help me take this mask off.

LUKE SKYWALKER: But you'll die.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: I think it was in The Return of the Jedi when Skywalker unmasks his father. The father had been playing one of these machine roles, a state role. He was the uniform, you know? And the removal of that mask, there was an undeveloped man there, there was a kind of a worm. By being executive of a system, one is not developing one's humanity. I think that George Lucas really, really did a beautiful thing there.

BILL MOYERS: The idea of machine is the idea that we want the world to be made in our image, and what we think the world ought to be.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Well, the first time anybody made a tool, I mean, taking a stone and chipping it so that you can handle it, that's the beginning of a machine. It's turning outer nature into your service. But then there comes a time when it begins to dictate to you. I'm having a bit of struggle with my computer, actually.

BILL MOYERS: Your computer?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: I just bought one a couple of months ago, and I can't help thinking of it as having a personality there, because it talks back, and it behaves in a whimsical way, and all of that. So I'm personifying that machine. To me, that machine is almost alive. I could mythologize that damn thing.

BILL MOYERS: There was a wonderful story about, I think, President Eisenhower, when the computer was first being built. You remember that story?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Eisenhower went into a room full of computers, and he puts a question to these machines, "Is there a God?" And they all start up and there's all those lights flashing and wheels turning and things like that, and after about 10 minutes of that kind of thing, a voice comes forth, and the voice says, "Now there is."

Well, I bought this wonderful machine, IBM machine, and it's there. And I'm rather an authority on gods, so I identified the god, and it seems to me an Old Testament god with a lot of rules, and no mercy.

BILL MOYERS: It's unforgiving, isn't it.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Catch you picking up sticks on Saturday and you're out, that's all.

BILL MOYERS: But isn't it possible to develop toward the computer, the computer you're wrestling with at this very moment, isn't it possible to develop the same kind of attitude of the Pawnee chieftain who said that in the legends of his people, all things speak of Tirawa, all things of speak of God. It wasn't a special privileged revelation, God is everywhere in his works, including the computer.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Well, indeed so. I mean, the miracle of what happens on that screen, you know, have you ever looked inside one of those things?

BILL MOYERS: No.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: You can't believe it. It's a whole hierarchy of angels, all on slats, and those little tubes, those are miracles, those are miracles, they are.

BILL MOYERS: One can feel a sense of awe.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Well, I've had a revelation from my computer about mythology, though. You buy a certain software, and there's a whole set of signals that lead to the

achievement of your aim, you know. And once you've set it for, let's say, DW3, enter, if you begin fooling around with signals that belong to another system, they just won't work, that's all. You have a system there, a code, a determined code that requires you to use certain terms.

Now, similarly in mythology, each religion is a kind of software that has its own set of signals and will work. It'll work. But suppose you've chosen this one. Now, if a person is really involved in a religion and really building his life on it, he'd better stay with the software that he's got. But a chap like myself, who likes to play with

BILL MOYERS: Cross the wires?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: the various softwares, I can run around, but I probably will never have an experience comparable to that of a saint.

BILL MOYERS: But do you think that the machine is inventing new myths for us, or that we with the machine are inventing new myths?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: No. The myth has to incorporate the machine.

BILL MOYERS: a pagan deity?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Just as the old myths incorporated the tools that people used, the forms of the tools and so forth are associated with power systems that are involved in the culture. We have not a mythology that incorporates these. The new powers are being, so to say, surprisingly announced to us by what the machines can do. We can't have a mythology for a long, long time to come; things are changing too fast. The environment in which we're living is changing too fast for it become mythologized.

BILL MOYERS: How do we live without myths, then?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Well, we're doing it. The individual has to find the aspect of myth that has to do with the conduct of his life. There are a number of services that myths serve. The basic one is opening the world to the dimension of mystery. If you lose that, you don't have a mythology, to realize the mystery that underlies all forms. But then there comes the cosmological aspect of myth, seeing that mystery as manifest through all things, so that the universe becomes as it were a holy picture, you are always addressed to the transcendent mystery through that. But then there's another function, and that's the sociological one, of validating or maintaining a certain society. That is the side of the thing that has taken over in our world.

BILL MOYERS: What do you mean?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Ethical laws, the laws of life in the society, all of Yahweh's pages and pages and pages of what kind of clothes to wear, how to behave to each other, and all that, do you see, in terms of the values of this particular society. But then there's a fourth function of myth, and this is the one that I think today everyone must try to relate to, and that's the

pedagogical function. How to live a human lifetime under any circumstances. Myth can tell you that.

There's a wonderful story in one of the Upanishads, the Brahmaparvita Upanishad, of Indra, this god who is the counterpart, really, of Yahweh. He is the god patron of a certain people and of historical life and time, with all kinds of rules for people to live by and that sort of thing. And there was a time when a great monster named Vritra had closed all the waters of the Earth, and so there was a drought, a terrible drought, and the world was in very bad condition.

Well, it took this god Indra quite a while to realize that he had a box of thunderbolts there, and all he had to do was drop a thunderbolt in Vritra and then blow him up. And when he did that, of course, he blew Vritra up and the waters flowed and the world was refreshed. And he said, "What a great boy am I."

So, thinking what a great boy am I, he goes up to the cosmic mountain, which is the central mountain of the world, and so he decided he would build a new world up there, a new city, and particularly his palace was going to be a palace worthy of such as he. So he calls Vishvakarman, the main carpenter of the gods, and gives him the assignment to build this palace. So Vishvakarman goes to work, and in very quick order he gets the palace into pretty good condition, and then Indra comes, but every time Indra arrived, he had bigger ideas about how big and grandiose the palace should be.

So finally Vishvakarman says, "My gosh," he says, "we're both immortal and there's no end to his desires. I'm caught for life." So he decided to go to Brahma, known as the creator, and complain. Well, now, Brahma sits on a lotus, this is the symbol of divine energy and divine grace, and the lotus grows from the navel of Vishnu, who is the sleeping god, whose dream is the universe. So here's Brahma on his lotus, and Vishvakarman comes to the edge of the great lotus pond of the universe, and down, and he tells his story. Brahma says, "You go home," he says, "I'll fix this up."

So next morning, at the gate of the palace that's being built there appears a beautiful blue-black boy, with a lot of children around him, just in admiration of his beauty. So in comes the boy and Indra on his throne, he's the king god, he says, "Young man, welcome, and what brings you to my palace?" "Well," says the boy, with a voice like thunder rolling on the horizon, "I have been told that you're building such a palace as no Indra before you ever built" And he said, "I've surveyed the grounds and looked things over, it seems this is quite true. No Indra before you has ever built such a palace." Well, Indra says, "Indras before me! Young man, what are you talking about?"

The boy says, "Indras before you?" He says, "I have seen them come and go, come and go." He said, "Just think: Vishnu sleeps in the cosmic ocean, the lotus of the universe grows from his navel. On there sits Brahma the creator. Brahma opens his eyes, a world comes into being, governed by an Indra. Closes his eyes, the world goes out of being. Opens his eyes, the world comes into being; closes his eyes ... And the life of a Brahma is 432,000 years, and he dies. The lotus goes back, another lotus, another Brahma. And then think of the galaxies beyond galaxies in infinite space; each a lotus with the Brahma sitting on it, opening his eyes, closing his eyes

with Indras. There may be wise men in your court who would volunteer to count the drops of water in the oceans of the world, or the grains of sand on the beaches, but no one would count those Brahmas, let alone those Indras.”

And while he’s talking, there comes in parade across the floor of the palace an army of ants in perfect range. And the boy laughs when he sees them. And Indra’s hair goes up, and he says to the boy, “Why do you laugh?” And the boy says, “Don’t ask unless you are willing to be hurt.” And Indra says, “I ask. Teach.” The boy says, “Former Indras, all. Through many lifetimes they rise from the lowest conditions spiritually to highest illumination, and then they drop their thunderbolt in Vritra, and they think, ‘What a good boy am I,’ and down they go again.”

And then Indra sits there on the throne and he’s completely disillusioned, completely shot, and he thinks, well, let’s quit the building of this palace. He calls Vishvakarman and says, “You’re dismissed, you don’t have to” so Vishvakarman got his intention, he’s dismissed from the job and there’s no more house-building going on. And Indra decides, “I’m going out and be a yogi and just meditate on the lotus feet of Vishnu.” But he had a beautiful queen named Indrani, and when Indrani hears this, she goes to the priest, the chaplain of the gods, and she says, “Now, he’s got this idea in his head, he’s going out to become a yogi.” “Well,” says the Brahmin, “come in with me, darling, and we’ll sit down and I’ll fix this up.”

So he talks to Indra, they come in and they sit down before the king’s throne, and he tells him, “Now, I wrote a book for you some years ago on the art of politics. You are in the position of the king. You are in the position of the king of gods. You are a manifestation of the mystery of Brahma in the field of time. This is a high privilege, appreciate it, honor it, and deal with life as though you were what you really are.” And with this set of instructions, Indra gives up his idea of going out and becoming a yogi, and finds that in life he can represent the eternal in the way of a symbol, you might say, of the Brahmin and the ultimate truth.

So each of us is, in a way, the Indra of his own life, and you can make a choice, either to go out in the forest and meditate and throw it all off, or stay in the world and in the life either of your job, which is the kingly job of the politics and achievement, and as well in the love life with your wife and family, you are realizing the truth. Now, this is a very nice myth, it seems to me.

BILL MOYERS: Do we ever know the truth? Do we ever find it?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Well, each person can have his own depth experience and some conviction of being in touch with his own satyananda, his own being, true consciousness and true bliss. But the religious people tell us we really won’t experience it until we go to heaven, you know, till you die. I believe in having as much as you can of this experience while you’re alive.

BILL MOYERS: Our bliss is now.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: I think in heaven you’ll be having such a marvelous time looking at God that you won’t get your own experience at all. That’s not the place to have it. Here’s the place to have the experience.

BILL MOYERS: Here and now.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Here and now.

‘The First Storytellers’

JOSEPH CAMPBELL (reading): The animal envoys of the Unseen Power no longer serve, as in primeval times, to teach and to guide mankind. Bears, lions, elephants and gazelles are in cages in our zoos. Man is no longer the newcomer in a world of unexplored plains and forests, and our immediate neighbors are not wild beasts, but other human beings contending for goods and space on a planet that is whirling without end around the fireball of a star. Neither in body nor mind do we inhabit the world of those hunting races of the Paleolithic millennia, to whose lives and lifeways we nevertheless owed the very forms of our bodies and structures of our minds.

Memories of their animal envoys still must sleep, somehow, within us, for they wake a little and stir when we venture into wilderness. They wake in terror to thunder. And again they wake with a sense of recognition when we enter any one of those great painted caves. Whatever the inward darkness may have been to which the shamans of those’ caves descended in their trances, the same must lie within ourselves nightly visited in sleep.

BILL MOYERS: When we look at the magnificent cave paintings left by our primal ancestors, we realize how the hunters of those early tribes were influenced by their natural surroundings, and by their feelings toward the animals they depended on for food religious feelings. They told stories to themselves about the animals, and about the supernatural world to which the animals seemed to go when they died. And the hunters performed rituals of atonement to the departed spirits of the animals, hoping to coax them back to be sacrificed again.

Joseph Campbell devoted his life to the study of these myths and rituals. For him, mythic stories were not simply entertaining tales to be told for amusement around ancient campfires, they were powerful guides to the life of the spirit. Campbell’s odyssey as scholar and teacher led him from the exhibits at the American Museum of Natural History, which impressed him as a boy, to cultures all over the world. In his words, “Whether we listen with aloof amusement to the mumbo jumbo of some witch doctor of the Congo, or read with cultivated rapture translations from sonnets of Lao-tze, or now and again crack the hard nutshell of an argument of Thomas Aquinas, or catch suddenly the shining meaning of a bizarre Eskimo fairy tale, we’re hearing echoes of the first story.”

In this hour, one of the many I taped with Joseph Campbell during the last two years of his life, we talked about our relationship to the first stories and to the people who told them. Like them, we too perform rituals to enact what we believe about the world beyond this one, and we try to bring our mind into harmony with questions of immortality and our body with its destiny of death.

(interviewing) What do you think our souls owe to ancient myths?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Well, the ancient myths were designed to put the minds, the mental system, into accord with this body system, with this inheritance of the body.

BILL MOYERS: A harmony?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: To harmonize. The mind can ramble off in strange ways, and want things that the body does not want. And the myths and rites were means to put the mind in accord with the body, and the way of life in accord with the way that nature dictates.

BILL MOYERS: So in a way these old stories live in us.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: They do indeed, and the stages of a human development are the same today as they were in the ancient times. And the problem of a child brought up in a world of discipline, of obedience, and of his dependency on others, has to be transcended when one comes to maturity so that you are living now not in dependency but with self-responsible authority. And the problem of the transition from childhood to maturity, and then from maturity and full capacity to losing those powers and acquiescing in the natural course of, you might say, the autumn-time of life and the passage away, myths are there to help us go with it, accept nature's way and not hold to something else.

BILL MOYERS: The stories are sort of to me like messages in a bottle from shores someone else has visited first.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Yes, and you're visiting those shores now.

BILL MOYERS: And these myths tell me how others have made the passage, and how I can make the passage.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: And also what the beauties are of the way. I feel this now, moving into my own last years, you know, the myths help me to go with it.

BILL MOYERS: What kind of myth? Give me one that has actually helped you.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Well, the tradition in India, for instance, of actually changing your whole way of dress, even changing your name, as you pass from one stage to another. When I retired from teaching, I knew that I had to create a new life, a new way of life, and I changed my manner of thinking about my life just in terms of that notion, moving out of the sphere of achievement into the sphere of enjoyment and appreciation and relaxing into the wonder of it all.

BILL MOYERS: And then there is that final passage through the dark gate?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Well, that's no problem at all. The problem in middle life, when the body has reached its climax of power and begins to lose it, is to identify yourself, not with the body, which is falling away, but with the consciousness of which it is a vehicle. And when you can do that, and this is something learned from my myths, What am I? Am I the bulb that carries the light, or am I the light of which the bulb is a vehicle? And this body is a vehicle of consciousness, and if you can identify with the consciousness, you can watch this thing go, like an old car there goes the fender, there goes this. But it's expectable, you know, and then gradually the whole thing drops off and consciousness rejoins consciousness. I mean, that's it's no longer in this particular environment.

BILL MOYERS: And the myths, the stories have brought this consciousness to ours.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Well, I live with these myths and they tell me to do this all the time. And this is the problem which can be then metaphorically understood as identifying with the Christ in you, and the Christ in you doesn't die. The Christ in you survives death and resurrects. Or it can be with Shiva. Shiva hung, I am Shiva. And this is the great meditation of the yogis in the Himalayas. And one doesn't have even to have a metaphorical image like that, if one has a mind that's willing to just relax and identify itself with that which moves it.

BILL MOYERS: You say that the image of death is the beginning of mythology. What do you mean? How is that?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Well, all I can say to that is that the earliest evidence we have of anything like mythological thinking is associated with grave burials.

BILL MOYERS: And they suggest what, that men, women, saw life and then they didn't see it, and they wondered about it?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: It must have been, I mean, one has only to, you know, imagine what one's own experience would be. The person was alive and warm before you and talking to you, is now lying there, getting cold, beginning to rot. Something was there that isn't there, and where is it? Now, animals have this experience, certainly, of their companions dying and so forth, but there's no evidence that they've had any further thoughts about it. Also before the time of Neanderthal man it's in his period that the first burials appeared of which we have evidence people were dying and they were just thrown away. But here this, a concern.

BILL MOYERS: Have you ever visited any of these burial sites?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: I've been to Le Moustier, that was one of the earliest burial caves that were found.

BILL MOYERS: And you find there what they buried with the dead?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Yes. These grave burials with grave gear, that is to say weapons and sacrifices round about, certainly suggest the idea of the continued life beyond the visible one. The first one that was discovered, the person was put down resting as though asleep, a young boy, with a beautiful hand ax beside him. Now, at the same time we have evidence of shrines devoted to animals that have been killed. The shrines specifically are in the Alps, very high caves, and they are of cave bear skulls. And there is one very interesting one with the long bones of the cave bear in the cave bear's jaw.

BILL MOYERS: What does that say to you?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Burials. My friend has died and he survives. The animals that I've killed must also survive. I must make some kind of atonement relationship to them. The indication is of the notion of a plane of being that's behind the visible plane, and which is somehow supportive of the visible one to which we have to relate. I would say that's the basic theme of all mythology.

BILL MOYERS: That there is a world?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: That there is an invisible plane supporting the visible one. Now, whether it is thought of as a world or simply as energy, that differs from time and time and place to place.

BILL MOYERS: What we don't know supports what we do know.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: That's right. The basic hunting myth, I would say, is of a kind of covenant between the animal world and the human world, where the animal gives its life willingly. They are regarded generally as willing victims, with the understanding that their life, which transcends their physical entity, will be returned to the soil or to the mother through some ritual of restoration. And the principal rituals, for instance, and the principal divinities are associated with the main hunting animal, the animal who is the master animal, and sends the flocks to be killed, you know. To the Indians of the American plains, it was the buffalo. You go to the northwest coast, it's the salmon. The great festivals have to do with the run of salmon coming in. When you go to South Africa, the eland, the big, magnificent antelope, is the principal animal to the Bushmen, for example.

BILL MOYERS: And the principal animal, the master animal

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Is the one that furnishes the food.

BILL MOYERS: So there grew up between human beings and animals, a bonding, as you say, which required one to be consumed by the other.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: That's the way life is.

BILL MOYERS: Do you think this troubled early man, too

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Absolutely, that's why you have the rites, because it did trouble him.

BILL MOYERS: What kind of rites?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Rituals of appeasement to the animals, of thanks to the animal. A very interesting aspect here is the identity of the hunter with the animal.

BILL MOYERS: You mean, after the animal has been shot.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: After the animal has been killed, the hunter then has to fulfill certain rites in a kind of "participation mystique," a mystic participation with the animals whose death he has brought about, and whose meat is to become his life. So the killing is not simply slaughter, at any rate, it's a ritual act. It's a recognition of your dependency and of the voluntary giving of this food to you by the animal who has given it. It's a beautiful thing, and it turns life into a mythological experience.

BILL MOYERS: The hunt becomes what?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: It becomes a ritual. The hunt is a ritual.

BILL MOYERS: Expressing a hope of resurrection, that the animal was food and you needed the animal to return.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: And some kind of respect for the animal that was killed; that's the thing that gets me all the time in this hunting ceremonial system.

BILL MOYERS: Respect for the animal.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: The respect for the animal and more than respect, I mean, that animal becomes a messenger of divine power, do you see.

BILL MOYERS: And you wind up as the hunter killing the messenger.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Killing the god.

BILL MOYERS: What does this do? Does it cause guilt, does it cause

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Guilt is what is wiped out by the myth. It is not a personal act; you are performing the world of nature, For example, in Japan, in Hokkaido in northern Japan among the Ainu people, whose principal mountain deity is the bear, when it is killed there is a ceremony of feeding the bear a feast of its own flesh, as though he were present, and he is present. He's served his own meat for dinner, and there's a conversation between the mountain god, the bear and the people. They say, "If you'll give us the privilege of entertaining you again, we'll give you the privilege of another bear sacrifice."

BILL MOYERS: If the cave bear were not appeased, the animals wouldn't appear, and these primitive hunters would starve to death. So they began to perceive some kind of power on which they were dependent, greater than their own.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: And that's the power of the animal master. Now, when we sit down to a meal, we thank God, you know, or our idea of God, for having given us this. These people thanked the animal.

BILL MOYERS: And is this the first evidence we have of an act of worship?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Yes.

BILL MOYERS: — of power superior to man?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Yeah.

BILL MOYERS: And the animal was superior, because the animal provided food.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Well, now, in contrast to our relationship to animals, where we see animals as a lower form of life, and in the Bible we're told, you know, we're the masters and so forth, early hunting people don't have that relationship to the animal. The animal is in many ways superior, He has powers that the human being doesn't have.

BILL MOYERS: And then certain animals take on a persona, don't they the buffalo, the raven, the eagle.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Oh, very strongly. Well, I was up on the northwest coast back in 1932, a wonderful trip, and the Indians along the way were still carving totem poles. The villages had new totem poles, still. And there we saw the ravens and we saw the eagles and we saw the animals that played roles in the myths. And they had the character, the quality, of these animals. It was a very intimate knowledge and friendly, neighborly, relationship to these creatures. And then they killed some of the. You see.

The animal had something to do with the shaping of the myths of those people, just as the buffalo for the Indians of the plains played an enormous role. They are the ones that bring the tobacco gift, the mystical pipe and all this kind of thing, it comes from a buffalo. And when the animal becomes the giver of ritual and so forth, they do ask the animal for advice, and the animal becomes the model for how to live.

BILL MOYERS: You remember the story of the buffalo's wife?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: That's a basic legend of the Blackfoot tribe, and is the origin legend of their buffalo dance rituals, by which they invoke the cooperation of the animals in this play of life.

When you realize the size of some of these tribal groups, to feed them required a good deal of meat. And one way of acquiring meat for the winter would be to drive a buffalo herd, to stampede it over a rock cliff. Well, this story is of a Blackfoot tribe long, long ago, and they couldn't get the buffalo to go over the cliff. The buffalo would approach the cliff and then tum aside. So it looked as though they weren't going to have any meat for that winter.

Well, the daughter of one of the houses, getting up early in the morning to draw the water for the family and so forth, looks up and there right above the cliff were the buffalo. And she said, "Oh, if you'd only come over, I'd marry one of you." And to her surprise, they all began coming over. That was surprise number one. Surprise number two was when one of the old buffalos, the shaman of the herd, comes and says, "All right, girlie, off we go." "Oh, no," she says. "Oh, yes," he says, "you made your promise. We've kept our side of the bargain, look at all my relatives here dead. Off we go."

Well, the family gets up in the morning and they look around, and where's Minnehaha, you know. The father, and you know how Indians are, he looked around and he said, "She's run off with a buffalo." He could see by the footsteps. So he says, "Well. I'm going to get her back." So he puts on his walking moccasins, bow and arrow and so forth, and goes out over the plains. He's gone quite a distance when he feels he'd better sit down and rest, and he comes to a place that's called a buffalo wallow, where the buffalo like to come and roll around, get the lice off, and roll around in the mud.

So he sits down there and is thinking what he should do now, when along comes a magpie. Now, that's a beautiful, flashing bird, and it's one of those clever birds that has shamanic qualities.

BILL MOYERS: Magical qualities.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Magical. And the man says to him, "Oh, beautiful bird, my daughter ran away with a buffalo. Have you seen, will you hunt around and see if you can find her out on the plain somewhere?" And the magpie says, "Well, there's a lovely girl with the buffalos right now, over there just a bit away." "Well," said the man, "would you go tell her that her daddy's here, her father's here at the buffalo wallow?" Magpie flies over and the girl is there among the buffalo; they're all asleep. I don't know what she's doing, knitting or something of the kind. And the magpie comes over close to her and he says, "Your father's over at the wallow waiting for you." "Oh," she says, "this is very terrible, this is dangerous, I mean, these buffalo, they'll kill us. You tell him to wait, I'll be over, I'll try to work this out."

So her buffalo husband's behind her and he wakes up and takes off a horn, he says, "Go to the wallow and get me drink." So she takes the horn and goes over and there's her father. And he grabs her by the arm and he says, "Come." She says, No, no, no, this is real dangerous. The whole herd there, they'll be right after us. I have to work this thing out, now let me just go back." So she gets the water and goes back and he, "Fe, Fi, Fo, Fum, I smell the blood of an Indian." You know, that sort of thing. And she says, "No, nothing of the kind." And he says, "Yes, indeed." So he gives a buffalo bellow and they all get up and they all do a slow buffalo dance with their tails raised, and they go over and they trample that poor man to death, so that he disappears entirely, he's just all broken up to pieces, all gone.

The girl's crying, and her buffalo husband says, "So you're crying." "This is my daddy." He said, "Yeah, but what about us? There are children, our wives, our parents, and you crying about your daddy." Well, apparently he was a kind of sympathetic compassionate buffalo, and he said, "Well, I'll tell you, if you can bring your daddy back to life again, I'll let you go." So she turns to the magpie and says, "See, peck around a little bit and see if you can find a bit of Daddy." And the magpie does so, and he comes up finally with a vertebra, just one little bone.

And the little girl says, "That's plenty. Now, we'll put this down on the ground," and she puts her blanket over it, and she sings a revivifying song, a magical song with great power. And presently, yes, there's a man under the blanket. She looks, Daddy all right, but he's not breathing yet. A few more stanzas of whatever the song was, and he stands up, and the buffalo are amazed. And they say, "Why don't you do this for us? We'll teach you now our buffalo dance, and when you will have killed our families, you do this dance and sing this song, and we'll all be back to life again."

That's the basic idea, that through the ritual, that dimension is struck which transcends temporality and out of which life comes and back into which it goes.

BILL MOYERS: And it goes back to this whole idea of death, burial and resurrection, not only for human beings, but for...

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: But for the animals, too.

BILL MOYERS: So the story of the buffalo's wife was told to confirm the reverence.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: That's right.

BILL MOYERS: What happened when the white man came and slaughtered this animal of reverence?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: That was a sacramental violation. I mean, in the eighties, when the buffalo hunt was undertaken, you know, with Kit Carson...

BILL MOYERS: The 1880s, a hundred years ago.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: — and Buffalo Bill and so forth. When I was a boy, whenever we went for sleigh rides we had a buffalo robe. Buffalo, buffalo, buffalo robes all over the place. This was the sacred animal to the Indians. These hunters go out with repeating rifles, and then shoot down the whole herd and leave it there. Take the skin to sell and the body's left to rot. This is a sacrilege, and it really is a sacrilege.

BILL MOYERS: It turned the buffalo from a "thou-"

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: To an "it."

BILL MOYERS: The Indians addressed the buffalo as "thou."

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: As a “thou”.

BILL MOYERS: As an object of reverence.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: The Indians addressed life as a “thou,” I mean, trees and stones, everything else. You can address anything as a “thou”, and you can feel the change in your psychology as you do it. The ego that sees a “thou” is not the same ego that sees an “it.” Your whole psychology changes when you address things as an “it.” And when you go to war with a people, the problem of the newspapers is to turn those people into its, so that they’re not “thous.”

BILL MOYERS: That was an incredible moment in the evolution of American society, when the buffalo were slaughtered. That was the final exclamation point behind the destruction of the Indian civilization, because you were destroying...

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Can you imagine what the experience must have been for a people within 10 years to lose their environment, to lose their food supply, to lose the object of the... the central object of their ritual life?

BILL MOYERS: So it is in your belief that it was in this period of hunting man and woman, the time of hunting man, that human beings begin to sense a stirring of the mythic imagination, the wonder of things that they didn’t know.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: There is this burst of magnificent art and all the evidence you need of a mythic imagination in full career.

BILL MOYERS: You visited some of the great painted caves in Europe.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Oh, yes.

BILL MOYERS: Tell me what you remember when first you looked upon those underground caves.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Well, you didn’t want to leave. Here you come into an enormous chamber, like a great cathedral, with these animals painted. And they’re painted with a life like the life of an ink on silk, the Japanese painting. And well, you realize the darkness is inconceivable. We’re there with electric lights, but in a couple of instances, the concierge, the man who was showing us through, turned off the lights and you were never in darker darkness in your life. It’s like a, I don’t know, just a complete knockout of, you don’t know where you are, whether you’re looking north, south, east or west. All orientation is gone, and you’re in a darkness that never saw the sun. Then they turn the lights on again, and you see these gloriously painted animals. A bull that will be 20 feet long, and painted so that the haunches will be represented by a swelling in the rock, you know, they take account of the whole thing. It’s incredible.

BILL MOYERS: Do you ever look at these primitive art objects, and think not of the art but of the man or woman standing there, painting or creating? I find that’s where I speculate.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Oh, this is what hits you when you go into those caves, I can tell you that. What was in their mind when they were doing that? And that's not an easy thing to do. And how did they get up there? And how did they see anything? And what kind of light did they have the little flashing torches throwing flickering things on it, to get something of that grace and perfection? And with respect to the problem of beauty, is this beauty intended, or is this something that is the natural expression of a beautiful spirit. You know what I mean? When you hear a bird sing, the beauty of the bird's song, is this intentional, in what sense is it intentional? But it's the expression of the bird, the beauty of the bird's spirit, you might almost say, and I think that way very often about

this art. To what degree was the intention of the artist, what we would call "aesthetic," or to what degree expressive, you know, and to what degree something that they simply had learned to do that way? It's a difficult point. When a spider makes a beautiful web, the beauty comes out of the spider's nature, you know, it's instinctive beauty. And how much of the beauty of our own lives is the beauty of being alive, and how much of it is conscious intention? That's a big question.

BILL MOYERS: You call them temple caves.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Yes.

BILL MOYERS: Why temple?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Temple with images and stained glass windows, cathedrals, are a landscape of the soul. You move into a world of spiritual images, that's what this is. When lean and I, my wife and I, drove down from Paris to this part of France, we stopped off at Chartres Cathedral. There is a cathedral. When you walk into the cathedral, it's the mother, womb of your spiritual life Mother church All the forms around are significant of spiritual values, and the imagery is in anthropomorphic form God and Jesus and the saints and all, in human form.

BILL MOYERS: In human form.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Then we went down to the Lascaux. The images were in animal form. The form is secondary; the message is what's important

BILL MOYERS: And the message of the cave?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: The message of the cave is of a relationship of time to eternal powers that is somehow to be experienced in that place. Now, I tell you, when you're down in those caves, it's a strange transformation of consciousness you have. You feel this is the womb, this is the place from which life comes, and that world up there in the sun with all those ... that's a secondary world: this is primary. I mean, this just overcomes you.

BILL MOYERS: You had that feeling when you were there?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: I had it every time. Now, what were these caves used for? The speculations that are most common of scholars interested in this, is that they had to do with the

initiation of boys into the hunt. You go in there, it's dangerous, it's very dangerous. It's completely dark. It's cold and dank. You're banging your head on projections all the time, and it was a place of fear. And the boys were to overcome all that, and go into the womb of the earth. And the shaman, or whoever it was that would be helping you through, would not be making it easy.

BILL MOYERS: And then there was a release, once you got into that vast, torchlit chamber down there. What was the tribe, what was the tradition trying to say to the boy?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: That is the womb land from which all the animals come.

BILL MOYERS: I see.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: And the rituals down there have to do with the generation of a situation that will be propitious for the hunt. And the boys were to learn not only to hunt, but how to respect the animals and what rituals to perform, and how in their own lives no longer to be little boys but to be men. Because those hunts were very, very dangerous hunts, believe me, and these are the Original men's rite sanctuaries, when: the boys became no longer their mothers' sons, but their fathers' sons.

BILL MOYERS: Don't you wonder what effect this had on a boy?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Well, you can go through it today, actually, in cultures that are still having the initiations with young boys. They give them an ordeal, a terrifying ordeal, that the youngster has to survive, makes a man of him, you know.

BILL MOYERS: What would happen to me as a child, if I went through one of these rites, as far as we can...

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Well, we know what they do in Australia. Now, when a boy gets to be, you know, a little bit ungovernable, one fine day the men come in, and they're naked except for stripes of white down that has been stuck on their bodies, and stripes with their men's blood. They used their own blood for gluing this on. And they're swinging the bull-roarers, which are the voice of the spirits, and they come as spirits. The boy will try to take refuge with his mother; she'll pretend to try to protect him. The men just take him away, a mother's no good from then on, you see, he's no longer a little boy. He's in the men's group, and then they put him really through an ordeal. These are the rites, you know, of circumcision, subincision, and so forth.

BILL MOYERS: And the whole purpose is to...

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Turn him into a member of the tribe.

BILL MOYERS: And a hunter.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: And a hunter.

BILL MOYERS: Because that was the way of life.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Yeah, but most important is to live according to the needs and values of that tribe. He is initiated in a Short period of time into the whole culture context of his people.

BILL MOYERS: So myth relates directly to ceremony and tribal ritual, and the absence of myth can mean the end of ritual.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: A ritual is the enactment of a myth. By participating in a ritual, you are participating in a myth.

BILL MOYERS: And what does it mean, do you think, to young boys today. that we are absent these myths?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Well, the confirmation ritual is the counterpart today of these rites. As a little Catholic boy, you choose your confirmed name, the name you're going to be confirmed by, and you go up. But instead of having them scarify you, knock your teeth out and all, the bishop gives you a mild slap on the cheek. It's been reduced to that, and nothing's happened to you. The Jewish counterpart is the bar mitzvah, and whether it works actually to effect a psychological transformation, I suppose, will depend on the individual case. There was no problem in these old days. The boy came out with a different body, and he'd gone through something.

BILL MOYERS: What about the female? I mean, most of the figures in the temple caves are male. Was this a kind of secret society for males only?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: It wasn't a secret society, it was that the boys had to go through it. Now, we don't know exactly what happens with the female in this period, because we have very little evidence to tell us. In primary cultures today, the girl becomes a woman with her first menstruation. It happens to her; I mean, nature does it to her. And so she has undergone the transformation, and what is her initiation? Typically it is to sit in a little hut for a certain number of days, and realize what she is.

BILL MOYERS: How does she do that?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: She sits there. She's now a woman. And what is a woman? A woman is a vehicle of life, and life has overtaken her. She is a vehicle now of life. A woman's what it's all about; the giving of birth and the giving of nourishment. She's identical with the earth goddess in her powers, and she's got to realize that about herself. The boy does not have a happening of that kind. He has to be turned into a man, and voluntarily become a servant of something greater than himself. The woman becomes the vehicle of nature; the man becomes the vehicle of the society, the social order and the social purpose.

BILL MOYERS: So what happens when a society no longer embraces powerful mythology?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: What we've got on our hands. As I say, if you want to find what it means not to have a society without any rituals, read The New York Times.

BILL MOYERS: And you'd find?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Well, the news of the day.

BILL MOYERS: Wars...

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Young people who don't know how to behave in a civilized society. Half the...I imagine that 50% of the crime is by young people in their 20s and early 30s that just behave like barbarians.

BILL MOYERS: Society has provided them no rituals by which they become members.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: None. There's been a reduction, a reduction, a reduction of ritual. Even in the Roman Catholic Church, my God, they've translated the Mass out of the ritual language into a language that has a lot of domestic associations. So that, I mean, every time now that I read the Latin of the Mass, I get that pitch again that it's supposed to give, a language that throws you out of the field of your domesticity, you know. The altar is turned so that the priest, his back is to you, and with him you address yourself outward like that. Now they've turned the altar around, looks like Julia Child giving a demonstration, and it's all homey and cozy.

BILL MOYERS: And they play a guitar.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: They play a guitar. Listen, they've forgotten what the function of a ritual is, is to pitch you out, not to wrap you back in where you have been all the time.

BILL MOYERS: So ritual that once conveyed an inner reality is now merely form, and that's true in the rituals of society, and the personal rituals of marriage and religion.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Well, with respect to ritual, it must be kept alive. And so much of our ritual is dead. It's extremely interesting to read of the primitive, elementary cultures, how the folktales, the myths, they are transforming all the time, in terms of the circumstances of those people. People move from an area where, let's say the vegetation is the main support, out into the plains. Most of our Plains Indians in the period of the horse-riding Indians, you know, had originally been of the Mississippian culture along the Mississippi in settled dwelling towns, and agriculturally based villages. And then they received the horse from the Spaniards, and it makes it possible then to venture out on the plains and handle a great hunt of the buffalo herds, you see. And the mythology transforms from vegetation to buffalo. And you can see the structure of the earlier vegetation mythologies under the mythologies of the Dakota Indians and the Pawnee Indians and the Kiowa and so forth.

BILL MOYERS: You're saying that the environment shapes the story?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: They respond to it. Do you see? But we have a tradition that comes from the first millennium B.C. somewhere else, and we're handling that. It has not turned over and assimilated the qualities of our culture, and the new things that are possible, and the new vision of the universe. It must be kept alive. The only people that can keep it alive are artists of one kind or another.

BILL MOYERS: Artists?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: That artist is...his function is the mythologization of the environment and the world.

BILL MOYERS: Artists being the poet, the musician, the author, writer.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Exactly, yes. I think we've had a couple of greats in the recent times. I think of James Joyce as such a revealer of the mysteries of growing up and becoming a human being. And for me, he and Thomas Mann were my principal gurus, you might say, as I was trying to shape my own life. I think in the visual arts there were two men whose work seemed to me to handle mythological themes in a marvelous way, and one was Paul Klee, and the other Picasso. These two men really knew what they were doing all the way, I think, and had a great versatility in their revelations.

BILL MOYERS: You mean, our artists are the mythmakers of our day?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: The mythmakers in earlier days were the counterparts of our artists.

BILL MOYERS: They drew the paintings on the wall

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Yes.

BILL MOYERS: —they performed the rituals.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: There's an old romantic idea, in German, *das Volkstische*. That's that the poetry of the traditional cultures and the ideas come out of the folk. They do not; they come out of an elite experience, the experience of people, particularly gifted, whose ears are open to the song of the universe. And they speak to the folk and there is an answer from the folk which is then received, there's an interaction, but the first impulse comes from above, not from below, in the shaping of folk traditions.

BILL MOYERS: So who would have been in these early elementary Cultures, as you call them, the equivalent of the poets today?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: The shamans. The shaman is the person who has in his late childhood, early youth, could be male or female, had an overwhelming psychological experience that turns them totally inward. The whole unconscious has opened up and they've fallen into it. And it's been described many, many times, and it occurs all the way from Siberia right through the

Americas down to Tierra del Fuego. It's a kind of schizophrenic crack-up, the shaman experience.

BILL MOYERS: What kind of experience?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Dying and resurrecting, you know, being on the brink of death and coming back, actually experiencing the death experience. People who have very deep dreams dream is a great source of the spirit and then people who in the woods have had mystical encounters.

BILL MOYERS: Let me ask...let me try to be specific about it. The shaman becomes some person in a society who is drawn by experience from the normal world into the world of the gifted?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: That's right.

BILL MOYERS: Most of us think of shaman as a magician, but they play a much more important role than simply being a trickster.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Oh, no, they play the role that the priesthood plays in our society.

BILL MOYERS: Ah. These are the first priests?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Well, there's a major difference as I see it between a shaman and a priest. A priest is a functionary of a social sort. The society worships certain deities in a certain way, and the priest becomes ordained as a functionary to carry on that ritual. And the deity to whom he is devoted is a deity that was there before he came along. The shaman's powers are symbolized in familiars, deities of his own personal experience, and his authority comes out of a psychological experience, not a social ordination. Do you understand what I mean?

BILL MOYERS: And the one who had this psychological experience, this traumatic experience, this ecstasy, would become the interpreter for others of things not seen?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: He would become the interpreter of the heritage of mythological life, you might say, yes.

BILL MOYERS: And ecstasy was a part of it, very often, in the shamanic tradition.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: It is ecstasy, there's no doubt about it.

BILL MOYERS: The trance dance, for example, in the Bushman society.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Now, there's a fantastic example of something. The little Bushman groups, the whole life is one of great, great tension. The male and female sexes are, what we say, in a disciplined way, separate. The men have a certain field of concerns, their weapons and the poisons and the hunt and all that, and the women have a certain field of concern, bringing up the

children, the nourishing of the children, and so forth and so on. Only in the dance do the two come together, and they come together this way. The women sit in a circle or a group, and they then become the center around which the men dance. And they control the dance and what goes on with the men through their own singing and beating of the thighs.

BILL MOYERS: What's the significance of that, that the woman is controlling the dance?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Well, the woman is life, and the man is the servant of life, and during the course of this circling, circling, it's a very tense style of movement the men have, suddenly one of them will pass out. He's in trance now, and this is a description of an experience.

“When people sing. I dance. I enter the earth. I go in at a place like a place where people drink water. I travel a long way, very far. When I emerge, I am already climbing. I'm climbing threads. I climb one and leave it, then I climb another one. Then I leave it, and I climb another. When you arrive at God's place, you make yourself small. You come in small to God's place. You do what you have to do there. Then you return to where everyone is. You come and come and come and finally you enter your body again. All the people who have stayed behind are waiting for you. They fear you. You enter, enter the earth, and you return to enter the skin of your body. And you say A-a-i-i-e-e That is the sound of your return to your body. Then you begin to sing. The ntum-masters are there around. They take hold of your head and blow about the sides of your face. This is how you manage to be alive again. Friends, if they don't do that to you, you die. You just die and are dead. Friends, this is what it does, this untum that I do, this untum here that I dance.”

This is an actual experience of transit from the earth through the realm of mythological images to God, or to the seat of power.

BILL MOYERS: It becomes something of the other mind of us.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: It is exactly the other mind. And the way God is imaged, God is transcendent finally of anything like a name of God. As the Hindus say, “Beyond names and forms.” Beyond damarupan, beyond names and forms. “No tongue has soiled it, no word has reached it.”

BILL MOYERS: But Joe, can Westerners grasp this kind of mystical trance theological experience? It does transcend theology, it leaves theology behind. I mean, if you're locked to the image of God in a culture where science determines your perceptions of reality, how can you experience this ultimate ground that the shamans talk about?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: The best example I know in our literature is that beautiful book by John Neihardt called Black Elk Speaks.

BILL MOYERS: Black Elk was?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Black Elk was a young Sioux or Dakota, as they are often called, boy around nine years old, before the American cavalry had encountered the Sioux. They were the great people of the plains. And this boy became sick, psychologically sick. His family...I'm

telling the typical shaman story. The child begins to tremble, and is immobilized, and the family's terribly concerned about it. And they send for a shaman who had had the experience in his own youth, to come as a psychoanalyst, you might say, and pull the youngster out of it. But instead of relieving him of the deities, he is adapting him to the deities, and the deities to himself, you might say. It's a different problem from that of psychoanalysis. I think it was Nietzsche who said, "Be careful, lest in casting out your devil, you cast out the best thing that's in you." Here, the deities who have been encountered the powers, let's call them are retained. The connection is retained, it's not broken. And these men then become the spiritual advisers and gift-givers of their people.

Well, what happened with this young boy, he was about nine years old, was he had a vision, and the vision is described, and it's a vision prophetic of the terrible future that his tribe was to have. But it also spoke of the possible positive aspects of it. It was a vision of what he called the hoop of his nation, realizing that it was one of many hoops which is something that we haven't all learned well enough yet and the cooperation of all the hoops and all the nations and grand processions and so forth. But more than that, it was an experience of himself as going through the realms of spiritual imagery that were of his culture, and assimilating their import. And it comes to one great statement, which for me is a key statement of the understanding of myth and symbols. He says. "I saw myself on the central mountain of the world, the highest place. And I had a vision, because I was seeing in a sacred manner, of the world." And the sacred central mountain was Harney Peak in South Dakota. And then he says, "But the central mountain is everywhere." That is a real mythological realization.

BILL MOYERS: Why?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: It distinguishes between the local cult image, Harney Peak, and its connotation, the center of the world. The center of the world is the hub of the universe, axis mundi, do you know, the central point, the pole star around which all revolves. The central point of the world is the point where stillness and movement are together. Movement is time, stillness is eternity, realizing the relationship of the temporal moment to the eternal not moment, but forever -is the sense of life. Realizing how this moment in your life is actually a moment of eternity, and the experience of the eternal aspect of what you're doing in the temporal experience is the mythological experience, and he had it. So is the central mountain of the world Jerusalem, Rome, Banaras. Lhasa, Mexico City, you know? Mexico City, Jerusalem, is symbolic of a spiritual principle as the center of the world.

BILL MOYERS: So this little Indian was saying, there is a shining point where all lines intersect?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: That's exactly what he said.

BILL MOYERS: He was saying God has no circumference.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: God is an intelligible sphere, let's say a sphere known to the mind, not to the senses, whose center is everywhere and circumference nowhere. And the center, Bill, is

right where you're sitting, and the other one is right where I'm sitting. And each of us is a manifestation of that mystery.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL AND THE POWER OF MYTH

Ep. 4: Joseph Campbell and the Power of Myth — 'Sacrifice and Bliss'

March 8, 2013,

In the fourth episode of *The Power of Myth*, Bill Moyers and mythologist Joseph Campbell discuss the role of sacrifice in myth — including a mother's sacrifice for her child — and the need for all of us to find our sacred places in the midst of today's fast-paced world. In this clip, the two discuss where heroism can be witnessed in modern society.

Released in 1988, [The Power of Myth](#) was one of the most popular TV series in the history of public television, and continues to inspire new audiences.

TRANSCRIPT

JOSEPH CAMPBELL (words of Chief Seattle, 1852): "The President in Washington sends word that he wishes to buy our land. But how can you buy or sell the sky, the land? The idea is strange to us. Every part of this earth is sacred to my people. Every shining pine needle, every sandy shore, every mist in the dark woods, every meadow, all are holy in the memory and experience of my people. We're part of the earth and it is part of us. The perfumed flowers are our sisters. The bear, the deer, the great eagle, these are our brothers. Each ghostly reflection in the clear water of the lakes tells of events and memories in the life of my people. The water's murmur is the voice of my father's father; the rivers are our brothers. They carry our canoes and feed our children.

If we sell you our land, remember that the air is precious to us, that the air shares its spirit with all the life it supports. The wind that gave our grandfather his first breath also receives his last sigh. This we know: the earth does not belong to man. Man belongs to the earth. All things are connected, like the blood that unites us all. Man did not weave the web of life, he is merely a strand in it. Whatever he does to the web, he does to himself.

"Your destiny is a mystery to us. What will happen when the buffalo are all slaughtered? What will happen when the secret corners of the forest are heavy with the scent of many men, and the view of the ripe hills is blotted by talking wires? The end of living and the beginning of survival. When the last red man has vanished with his wilderness and his memory is only the shadow of a cloud moving across the prairie, will these shores and forests still be here? Will there be any spirit of my people left? We love this earth as the newborn loves its mother's heartbeat. So, if we sell you our land, love it as we have loved it; care for it as we've cared for it, hold in your mind the memory of the land as it is when you receive it. Preserve the land for all children and love it,

as God loves us all. One thing we know, there is only one God; no man be he red man or white man can be apart. We are brothers, after all.”

BILL MOYERS: Sacred places: Delphi, Machu Picchu, Stonehenge, Jerusalem. We recognize these as places where societies came together to express their spiritual concerns. But for some very early societies, as Joseph Campbell points out in his Historical Atlas of World Mythology, the whole earth was a sacred place, whether living on the wide plains under the great dome of the open sky, or in dense forest under a canopy of trees, our ancestors saw the sacred in everything around them. The voices of the gods spoke from the wind and thunder, and the spirit of God flowed in every mountain stream. It was a geography not of city and nation-states, but of sacred places, the realm of the mythic imagination.

As our ancestors turned from hunting to planting, the stories they told to interpret the mysteries of life changed, too. Now the seed instead of the animal became the symbol of life, death and resurrection. The plant died, was buried, and its seed born again. To spiritual visionaries this image reveals a divine truth as well as a principle of life itself. From death comes life; from sacrifice, bliss.

Joseph Campbell explored the nature of these places and the relation of myth to landscape. He visited many of the world’s sacred places in preparing the first two volumes of his Atlas: The Way of the Animal Powers and The Way of the Seeded Earth. But as he often reminded his students at Sarah Lawrence College, “You don’t have to go on a pilgrimage to find your own sacred place, where you can follow your bliss and nourish the activity of your own creative imagination.”

(interviewing) What does it mean, to have a sacred place?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: This is a term I like to use now as an absolute necessity for anybody today. You must have a room, or a certain hour a day or so, where you do not know what was in the newspapers that morning, you don’t know who your friends are, you don’t know what you owe to anybody, you don’t know what anybody owes to you, but a place where you can simply experience and bring forth what you are and what you might be. This is the place of creative incubation. And first you may find that nothing’s happening there, but if you have a sacred place and use it, and take advantage of it, something will happen.

BILL MOYERS: This place does for you what the plains did for the hunter...

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: For them the whole thing was a sacred place, do you see? But most of our action is economically or socially determined, and does not come out of our life. I don’t know whether you’ve had the experience I’ve had, but as you get older, the claims of the environment upon you are so great that you hardly know where the hell you are. What is it you intended? You’re always doing something that is required of you this minute, that minute, another minute. Where is your bliss station, you know? Try to find it. Get a phonograph and put on the records, the music, that you really love. Even if it’s corny music that nobody else respects, I mean, the one that you like or the book you want to read, get it done and have a place in which

to do it. There you get the “thou” feeling of life. These people had it for the whole world that they were living in.

BILL MOYERS: We talked about the effect of the spreading plain on mythology, this plain clearly bounded by a circular horizon with that great blue dome of an exalting heaven above. Hawks and eagles hovering, the blazing sun passing, the night moon rising. And I can see the effect on people’s stories of that, but what about the people who lived in the dense foliage of the jungle?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Total transformation of environment and of psychology and everything else.

BILL MOYERS: No horizon?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: No horizon.

BILL MOYERS: No dome of the sky?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: No dome of the sky. A lot of birds up there, and the heavy vegetation underneath, with scorpions and poisonous serpents, and in between, distances of trees and trees and trees. No sense of perspective. Colin Turnbull tells us a marvelous story of bringing a pygmy out of the forest. He brings this pygmy, who had never been out of the jungle, onto a mountaintop, and suddenly they come over the hill, and there’s an extensive plain out there. And the poor little fellow was utterly terrified, had no way of judging perspective and distance, he thought that the animals grazing on the plain out there were so small that they were ants, that they were just across the way, and so forth, and just totally baffled, he rushes back into the forest. You have a different mythology there, you have a different relationship to the hunt and everything else.

The forest is home. You are at home in the forest, where you and I would be perhaps ill at ease, thinking what’s behind that tree, and all this kind of thing. The sense of the beautiful, simple delight in there, the forest and the deities, the master of the forest, the forest master.

BILL MOYERS: What impresses me is that these people, the hunters and the searchers for the roots and for the berries, they’re participating in their landscape, they are part of that world.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Absolutely.

BILL MOYERS: And it becomes sacred to them. Place becomes sacred.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Every feature of it does.

BILL MOYERS: We moderns are stripping the world of its natural revelations of nature.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: I know it.

BILL MOYERS: I think of a ... remember that wonderful pygmy legend of the little boy who finds the song of the most beautiful ... the bird of the most beautiful song in the forest?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: And he brings it home, doesn't he? And he asks his father to bring food for the bird, and the father doesn't want to feed only a bird. And one time the father kills the bird, and when he killed the bird, he killed his own life, and he died.

BILL MOYERS: That's it. And the legend says, the man killed the bird, and with the bird he killed the song, and with the song himself. Isn't that a story about what happens when human beings destroy their environment, destroy their world, destroy nature and the revelation of nature?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Destroy their own nature.

BILL MOYERS: Human nature, too. They kill the song.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: They kill the song.

BILL MOYERS: And isn't mythology the story of the song?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Mythology is the song. It's the flight of the imagination, inspired by the energies of the body and in its life.

BILL MOYERS: What happened as human beings turned from the hunting of animals to the planting of seeds? What happened to the mythic imagination?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Well, I try to think of it this way. An animal, as I think I've said before, is sort of a total entity, and when you kill that animal, that animal is dead. But when you cut down a plant, new sprouts come out. Pruning is, you know, helpful to a plant. Also in forests where a good deal of the origination of myth is to be recognized, out of rock comes life, even in these forests here, of the beautiful redwoods. I was in a wonderful forest right near Mendocino, and there are some great, great stumps from enormous trees that were cut down some decades and decades ago. And out of them are coming these bright new little children who are part of the same plant. So there's a sense of death as not death somehow, that death is required for new fresh life and so on. And the individual isn't quite an individual, he is a member of a plant. Jesus uses the term, you know, where he says, "I am the vine and you are the branches." That vineyard idea is a totally different one from the separate entity of the animal.

BILL MOYERS: And this makes a difference on the stories you tell about...

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Oh, the whole feeling about what life is.

BILL MOYERS: What stories did this experience of the planter give rise to? Your favorite stories in plant mythology.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Well, the cutting up and burial and then growing of the plant world, the world of the plant that you eat being already a cut up dead body, is the dominant motif, I would say, in the most of the tales. It occurs all over the place, particularly in the Pacific cultures and in the Americas.

BILL MOYERS: Tell me that story of the origin of maize, as Longfellow borrowed it from the Chippewas, didn't he, or the Algonquins?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Well, it's an Algonquian story, and it is simply of the boy in his vision, he sees a young man come to him with plumes on his head, and green and so forth, and visitant invites the young man to a wrestling match, and allows him to win. He wins and wins, this happens three or four times; but he tells him, "The last time I come, you must kill me and bury me, and take care of the place where you will have buried me." And the boy then in the last one actually does what he has been told to do, plants the man, the visitant, and in time comes back and sees the corn growing. And it was a boy who had been concerned for his father, who was a hunter but old, and he was thinking, isn't there some other way to get food besides this one. And so it came to him out of his intentions. A lovely story.

BILL MOYERS: Some other way of getting food than hunting.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Yes.

BILL MOYERS: But the idea is that this visitor, this figure in the vision, has to die and be buried before the plant can grow from the remains of his body.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: That's the main theme. It comes up, I mean, almost the duplicate of this one, throughout Polynesia, for instance.

BILL MOYERS: Well, there's one in Polynesia about the legend of the maiden Hina, do you remember that one?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Well, all of the legends in the Polynesian area have a maiden named Hina. And she's associated with the moon, and you know, the death and resurrection of the moon is a dominant theme.

BILL MOYERS: What happens to her in this legend?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Well, the girl who loves to bathe in a certain pool, and there's a great eel that is swimming around in the pool, and day after day he scrapes across her thigh as she's bathing. And then one fine lovely day he turns into a young man, and he becomes her lover for a moment, and then goes away and comes back again and back again, and then one time when he comes he says, just as the Algonquian visitant, "Now, next time I come to visit you, you must kill me, and cut off my head and bury my head." And she does so, and there grows from the buried head a coconut tree. And when you pick a coconut and look at the coconut, you can see it's just the size of the head, and you can see eyes and things in the little nodules that simulate the head.

BILL MOYERS: So what you have is the same story springing up in cultures unrelated to each other. What is this saying?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Well, to such an extent that it's stunning. And after years and years and years of reading these things, I am still overwhelmed at the similarities in cultures that are far, far apart. There are two explanations of this. Now, one explanation is that the human psyche is essentially the same all over the world. It is the inward aspect of the human body, which is essentially the same all over the world, with the same organs, with the same instincts, with the same impulse systems, with the same conflicts, the same fears.

There is also the counter theory of diffusion. Now, for instance, when agriculture is first developed, let's say, in the Near East or in Southeast Asia, I mean, these are the two big centers in the old world, then the art of tilling the soil goes forth from this area. And along with it goes a mythology that has to do with fertilizing the earth and bringing up the plants, killing the body, cutting it up, burying it and having the plant come. That myth will go with the agricultural tradition. You won't find it in a planting in a hunting culture tradition. So that there are historical as well as psychological aspects of this problem.

BILL MOYERS: In all of these stories there is someone dying, a hero dying, in order for life to appear again. What does that say to you?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Let me tell you one story here. This isn't a story, this is a ritual. It's in New Guinea, and it's associated with the men's societies in New Guinea, and they are horror societies, because they really enact the myth of death and resurrection and cannibalistic consumption. And you have the myth there of the buried body and the life coming out of it, you know, this is the basic myth. Now we're going to enact it.

So here's this sacred field, the drums going and chants going and then pauses, and this went on for three or four or five days, on and on. And rituals are boring, they just wear you out, you know, and then you break through to something else. Then comes the great moment: the young boys who were being initiated into manhood were now to have their first sexual experience. There was a great shed of enormous logs, supported by two uprights over here, and the young woman comes in, all ornamented as a deity, and she is brought to lie down in this place, beneath the great roof. And the boys then, with the drums going and chanting going on, one after another, there are about six boys, have their first permitted or public intercourse with the girl. And when the last boy is with her in full embrace, the supports are withdrawn, the logs drop, and the couple are killed.

There is the union of male and female again as they were in the beginning before the separation took place, there is the union of begetting, and death again, and they're both the same thing. The little pair are pulled out and roasted and eaten right that evening, enacting the myth in its essential character. You can't beat that.

BILL MOYERS: And the truth to which there...

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: That's the sacrifice of the mass. One of the wonderful things in the Catholic ritual is going to communion. There you're taught that this is the body and blood of the Saviour, and you take it to you and you turn inward, and there he's working within you.

BILL MOYERS: The truth to which the ritual points is?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: The nature of life itself had to be realized in the acts of life. When in the hunting cultures a sacrifice is made, it is as it were a gift, a bribe, as it were, to the deity that is being invited to do something for us, or to give us something. When a figure is sacrificed in the planting culture, that figure is the god. The person who died, was buried and became the food is Christ crucified, from whose body the food of the spirit comes. There is a sublimation of what originally was a very solid vegetal image. He is on Holy Rood, the tree. He is himself the fruit of the tree. Jesus is the fruit of eternal life which was on the second tree in the garden of Eden.

When man had eaten of the fruit of the first tree, the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, he is said to have been expelled from the garden. He had already expelled himself from the garden. The garden is the place of unity, nonduality, nonduality of male and female, nonduality of man and God, nonduality of good and evil. You eat the duality, and you're on the way out. So this tree of the nonduality, is the tree of the exit.

Now, the tree of coming back to the garden is the tree of immortal life. Where you know that "I and the father are one." And the two that seem to become one again. And this is exactly the tree under which the Buddha sits.

BILL MOYERS: The tree of wisdom?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: The tree of immortal life, of the knowledge of immortal life. And the Buddha under his tree, and Christ hanging on his tree are the same image. They are the same image. The one who has died to the flesh and been reborn in the spirit. This is an essential experience of any mystical realization; you die to your flesh and are born to your spirit. You identify yourself with the consciousness and life of which your body is but the vehicle. You die to the vehicle and become identified in your consciousness with that of which the vehicle is the carrier, do you understand me? And that is the god.

So that what you get in the vegetation traditions is this notion of identity behind the surface display of duality, identity behind it all. All of these are manifestations of the One. The one radiance shines through all things. The function of art, in a way, is to reveal through the object here the radiance, and that's what you get when you see the beautiful organization of a fortunately composed work of art. You just say, aha. Somehow it speaks to the order in your own life. 'This is a realization through art of the very thing that the religions are concerned to render.

BILL MOYERS: That death is life and life is death, and that the two are in accord.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: You have to have a balance between death and life. They're two aspects of the same thing, which is being/becoming.

BILL MOYERS: And that's in all of these stories?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: All of them. I don't know one where death is rejected.

BILL MOYERS: This idea of sacrifice is so foreign to our world today.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Well, the old idea of being sacrificed is not what we think at all.

BILL MOYERS: No?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Just consider: I think the great model of sacrifice is the Mayan Indian ball game. You know they had a kind of basketball game, there's a loop there up in the stadium wall, and the idea was to get this big heavy ball through that. I don't know how they did it, with their shoulders or heads or something or other. And the captain of the winning team was sacrificed on the field by the captain of the losing team, his head was cut off. And going to your sacrifice as the winning stroke of your life is the essence of the early sacrificial idea.

There's a wonderful story that I found in the Jesuit relations, you know, the Jesuits here in the 17th century as missionaries up in Canada and northern New York state and so forth, of a young Iroquois boy who had just been captured by the Hurons or perhaps it was the other way around, I've forgotten. And he was being brought to be tortured to death. The Northeast Indians engaged in a systematic torture, which would go on for a long time, and the ordeal was to be sustained with a smile, without flinching, that was it. That was real manhood.

But the boy is brought to this as though he were being brought to his wedding. He is singing, and the people with him are treating him as though they were his hosts and he was the honored guest. And he played the game with them, knowing where he was going. And the priests describing the thing are absolutely bewildered by the situation, and they say that the mockery of this kind of hospitality for people who are then going to become the brutes. No, those people were the priests! And this was the sacrifice of the altar, and that boy was Jesus, you know, by analogy. And the priest every day is celebrating mass, which is an imitation or repetition actually of the sacrifice of the cross. That's what this priest was witnessing.

But then you have it also, in John, in the Acts of John: Jesus, before going to crucify the Jesus dance, that's one of the most beautiful passages in the Christian tradition. In the Matthew, Mark, Luke and John gospels, it's certainly mentioned that we sang a hymn and Jesus went forth. Well, here you have the whole hymn described: in a ring, Jesus in the center, saying, 'join hands and we'll sing and we'll dance,' and he says, 'I am this, I am that, I am so forth and so forth, amen, amen.' Oh, my God, it's grand. And then he walks out to be crucified. When you go to your death that way as a god, you are going to your eternal life. What's sad about that? Let's make it great And they do.

BILL MOYERS: The god of death is the lord of the dance.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: The god of death is the lord of sex at the same time.

BILL MOYERS: What do you mean?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: It's a marvelous thing. One after another, you can see these gods Ghede, the death god of the Haitian voodoo, is also the sex god. Wotan had one eye covered and the other uncovered, do you see, and at the same time was the lord of life. Osiris, the lord of death and the lord of the generation of life. It's a basic theme: that which dies is born. You have to have death in order to have life.

Now, this is the origin thought really of the head hunt, in Southeast Asia and particularly in the Indonesian zone. The head hunt, right up to now, has been a sacred act, it's a sacred killing: Unless there is death, there cannot be birth, and a young man, before he can be permitted to marry and become a father, must have gone forth and had his kill.

BILL MOYERS: What does that say to you?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Well, that every generation has to die in order that the next generation should come. As soon as you beget or give birth to a child, you are the dead one; the child is the new life and you are simply the protector of that new life.

BILL MOYERS: Your time has come and you know it.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Yeah, well, that's why there is this deep psychological association of begetting and dying.

BILL MOYERS: Isn't there some relationship between what you're saying and this fact, that a father will give his life for his son, a mother will give her life for her child?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: There's a wonderful paper. I don't whether you knew it that I would love to talk to this point there's a wonderful paper by Schopenhauer, who's one of my three favorite philosophers, called "The Foundation of Morality." There he asks exactly the question that you've asked. How is it that a human being can so participate in the peril or pain of another, that without thought, spontaneously, he sacrifices his own life to the other? How can this happen? That what we normally think of as the first law of nature, namely self-preservation, is suddenly dissolved, there's a breakthrough.

In Hawaii, some four or five years ago, there was an extraordinary adventure that represents this problem. There's a place there called the Pali, where the winds from the north, the trade winds from the north, come breaking through a great ridge of rocks and of mountain, and they come through with a great blast of wind. The people like to go up there to get their hair blown around and so forth, or to commit suicide, you know, like jumping off the Golden Gate Bridge. Well, a police car was on its way up early, a little road that used to go up there, and they saw just beyond the railing that keeps cars from rolling over, a young man actually clearly about to jump and prepare himself to jump. The police car stopped. The policeman on the right jumps out to grab the boy, and grabs him just as he jumped and was himself being pulled over, and would have gone over if the second cop hadn't gotten around, grabbed him and pull the two of them back. There was a long description of this, it was a marvelous thing, in the newspapers at that time.

And the policeman was asked, “Why didn’t you let go? I mean, you would have lost your life?” And you see what had happened to that man, this is what’s known as one pointed meditation everything else in his life dropped off. His duty to his family, his duty to his job, his duty to his own career, all of his wishes and hopes for life, just disappeared and he was about to go. And his answer was, “I couldn’t let go. If I had,” and I’m quoting almost word for word, “if I’d let that young man go, I could not have lived another day of my life.”

How come? Schopenhauer’s answer is, this is the breakthrough of a metaphysical realization that you and the other are one. And that the separateness is only an effect of the temporal forms of sensibility of time and space. And a true reality is in that unity with all life. It is a metaphysical truth that becomes spontaneously realized, because it’s the real truth of your life. Now, you might say the hero is the one who has given his physical life, you might say, to some order of realization of that truth. It may appear that I’m one with my tribe, or I’m one with people of a certain kind, or I’m one with life. This is not a concept; this is a realization, do you see what I mean?

BILL MOYERS: No, explain it.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: And the concepts of love your neighbor and all are to put you in tune with that fact, but whether you love your neighbor or not, bingo, the thing grabs you and you do this thing. You don’t even know who it is. That policeman didn’t know who that young man was. And Schopenhauer says in small ways you can see this happening every day all the time. This is a theme that can be seen moving life in the world, people doing nice things for each other.

BILL MOYERS: What do you think has happened to this mythic idea of the hero in our culture today?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: It comes up in an experience. I think, I remember during the Vietnam war, seeing on the television the young men in helicopters going out to rescue one of their companions at great risk to themselves. They didn’t have to rescue that young man; that’s the same thing working. It puts them in touch with the experience of being alive. Going to the office every day, you don’t get that experience, but suddenly you’re ripped out into being alive. And life is pain and life is suffering and life is horror, but by God, you’re alive and it’s spectacular. And this is a case of being alive, rescuing that young man.

BILL MOYERS: But I also know a man who said once, after years of standing on the platform of the subway, “I die a little bit down there every day, but I know I’m doing so for my family.” There are small acts of heroism that occur without regard to the nobility or the notoriety that you attract for it.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: That’s right, that’s right.

BILL MOYERS: And the mother does it by the isolation she endures in behalf of the family, of raising...

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Motherhood is a sacrifice. On our veranda in Hawaii, there are little birds that come that Jean likes to feed. And each year there have been one or two mothers, mother birds. And if you've ever seen a mother bird plagued by her progeny for food, that the mother should regurgitate their meal to them, and the two of them, or five of them in one case, flopping all over this poor little mother, they bigger than she in some cases, you just think, well, this is the symbol of motherhood. This is just giving of your substance, every thing, to this progeny.

There should be it in marriage. A marriage is a relationship. When you make a sacrifice in marriage, you're not sacrificing to the other, you're sacrificing to the relationship. And this is symbolized, for example, in that Chinese image of the tai chi, the tao, you know, with the dark and the light interacting, it's a well-known sign. That is the relationship of yang and yin, male and female, which is what a marriage is. And that's what you are, you're no longer this, you're the relationship. And so marriage, I would say, is not a love affair, it's an ordeal.

BILL MOYERS: An ordeal?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: The ordeal is sacrifice of ego to the relationship, of a two-ness which now becomes the one.

BILL MOYERS: One not only biologically but spiritually, and primarily spiritually.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Primarily spiritually.

BILL MOYERS: But the necessary function of marriage, in order to create our own images and perpetuate ourselves in children, but it's not the primary one, as you say.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: No, that's really just the elementary aspect of marriage. There are two completely different stages of marriage. First is the youthful marriage, following the wonderful impulse, you know, that nature has given us, in the interplay of the sexes biologically. And in the reproduction of children. But there comes a time when the child graduates from the family, and the family is left. I've been amazed at the number of my friends who in their forties or fifties go apart, who have had a perfectly decent life together with the child, but they interpreted their union in terms of relationship through the child. They did not interpret it in terms of their own personal relationship to each other.

BILL MOYERS: Utterly incompatible with the idea of doing one's own thing?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: It's not one's own thing, you see. It is in a sense one's own thing, but the one isn't just you, it's the two together. And that's a purely mythological image, of the sacrifice of the visible entity for a transcendent unit, cracking eggs to make an omelet, you know? And by marrying the right person, we reconstruct the image of the incarnate god, and that's what marriage is.

BILL MOYERS: The right person. How does one choose the right person?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Your heart tells you; it ought to.

BILL MOYERS: Your inner being.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: That's the mystery.

BILL MOYERS: You recognize your other self.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Well, I don't know, but there's a flash that comes and something in you knows that this is the one.

BILL MOYERS: What has mythology told you about death? What do you think about death?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Well, the way, if one can identify with the consciousness of which the body is a vehicle, and really achieve an identification with the consciousness of which the body is a vehicle, not knowing what it is, undifferentiated consciousness, one can let the body go. I like what I heard of Woody Allen, you know, "I'm not afraid to die, I just don't want to be there when it happens." You can have disengaged yourself from the body, and not be there, you might say.

BILL MOYERS: And yet you know from myth and nature that the body dies. It perishes, it rots we're back to the beginning of the...

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: So you expect it. Growing old, I mean. You know what's happening. The body is rotting, it's dying, it's losing its energy, there's more mass than energy here. And the identification then with the life which in a plant survives pruning, cutting and even eating. The plant is right back there again, is as you might say, a biological image that is metaphorical of the spiritual mystery.

BILL MOYERS: There's the wonderful report of the Indians riding into the rain of bullets from Custer's men, and they're saying, "It's a good day to die."

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: "It's a great day to die." They're not hanging on. That's the message of the myth. You as you know yourself are not the final term of your being. And you must die to that, one way or another, in giving of yourself to something, or in being annihilated actually physically, to return, you might say, or to recognize. Life is always on the edge of death, always, and one should lack fear and have the courage of life. That's the principle initiation of all of the heroic stories.

BILL MOYERS: What's the central story? Do you have a story that's central to this?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: The Sir Gawain and the Green Knight. The Green Knight, Arthur's court is in session, and there rides into the court on a great big green horse a giant knight. And the knight says. "I have a challenge. I have an adventure. I challenge anyone here to come down here and take this great big ax and cut my head off and then one year from today, meet me at a green chapel," and he tells them roughly where the green chapel is, "and I'll cut his head off."

And the only knight who had the courage to accept this curious invitation was Gawain. And the knight gets off his horse, sticks out his neck, Gawain comes down with his axe, and there's the head. And then the knight stands up, picks up the head, gets on the horse and rides off, says. "I'll see you in a year."

Well, that year everybody was very generous to Gawain, and he rides off for the year. As the day approaches, he finds himself before a little hunter's cabin, and he thinks he'll ask advice here as to where the green chapel is, and tells them, "I've got to be there in three days." Then the hunter greets him and Gawain tells his story, and the hunter says, "Well, the green chapel, it's just down the way here. It's about a couple of hundred yards. And why don't you just spend the next three days with us, and we'll entertain you, and then you can go to this adventure." "All right, very well." So the hunter says. "Well, I've got to go out for the day on the hunt," and he says, "you'll spend the night with us, and then in the morning I'll go forth and in the evening I'll come back and I'll give everything I will have got during the day to you, and you give to me what you will have got during the day."

Well, in the morning the hunter rides off, and Gawain's in bed, and in comes the hunter's gorgeous, beautiful wife. And she tickles Gawain's chin and invites him to love. Well, he's an Arthurian knight, a knight of Arthur's court, and to betray his host is the last thing that a knight can submit to, so he resists this woman. And she's very, very aggressive, and he's very, very stern in his position, and finally she says, "Well, let me give you a kiss, anyhow." So she gives him one big smack, and that's that. In the evening the hunter comes back with a great haul of game, throws it on the floor, and Gawain gives him a kiss, and they laugh, and that's that.

Second morning, a similar event, the wife comes in and Gawain gets two kisses. And the hunter comes back with about half as much game and he gets two kisses, and they laugh, and that's that.

The third morning, the wife comes in, and now here's a man about to meet his death. He's about to have his head chopped off, a beautiful woman, the last moment, I mean, of the possibility of this one fulfillment, and again he resists. She gives him three kisses and her garter. And she says, "This will protect you against any danger." The hunter comes home with just one silly smelly fox, throws it on the ground, and he gets three kisses but no garter.

So comes the time now to go and have your head chopped off. Do you see what the tests are of the knight here? One is sex, you know, lust, and the other is courage. So he approaches the chapel, the green chapel, with the Green Knight whom he's about to encounter, and he hears the knight whetting this great knife, this great ax, whew-whew-whew-whew, and he comes to it. And the knight is there, certainly, the great big green fellow, and he greets him. And says, "Okay, put your neck out there on this block, and I'll chop your head off." And he lifts the ax, and he says, "No, stretch out a little more." He does this three times. And then the ax comes down and whew just cuts his neck a little bit. And the Green Knight says, "That's for the garter."

Well, this is the original legend of the Knights of the Garter. Here's a knight who really transcended the two great temptations, fear of death and lust for sex and the joys of life.

BILL MOYERS: And the moral?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: And the moral is that the realization of your bliss, your true being, comes when you have put aside the, what might be called passing moment, with its terror and with its temptations and its statement of requirements of life, that you should live this way.

BILL MOYERS: What is that story about and I forget where it comes from about the camel and then the lion, and along the way you lose the burden of youth?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: The three transformations of the spirit. That's Nietzsche. That's the prologue to Thus Spoke Zarathustra.

BILL MOYERS: Tell me that story.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: When you are a child, when you are young and a young person, you are a camel. The camel gets down on its knees and says, "Put a load on me." This is obedience. This is receiving the instruction, information that your society knows you must have in order to live a competent life. When the camel is well loaded, he gets up on his feet, struggles to his feet, and runs out into the desert, where he becomes transformed into a lion. The heavier the load, the more powerful the lion. The function of the lion is to kill a dragon, and the name of the dragon is "Thou Shalt." And on every scale of the dragon there is a "Thou Shalt" imprinted. Some of it comes from 2,000 years, 4,000 years ago. Some of it comes from yesterday morning's newspaper headline. When the dragon is killed, the lion is transformed into a child, an innocent child living out of its own dynamic. And Nietzsche uses the term, ein aus sich rollendes Rad, a wheel rolling out of its own center. That's what you become. That is the mature individual.

The "Thou Shalt" is the civilizing force, it turns a human animal into a civilized human being. But the one who has thrown off the "Thou Shalts" is still a civilized human being. Do you see? He has been humanized, you might say, by the "Thou Shalt" system, so his performance now as a child is not simply childlike at all. He has assimilated the culture and thrown it off as a "Thou Shalt." But this is the way in any art work. You go to work and study an art. You study the techniques, you study all the rules, and the rules are put upon you by a teacher. Then there comes a time of using the rules, not being used by them. Do you understand what I'm saying? And one way is to follow...and I always tell my students, follow your bliss.

BILL MOYERS: Follow your bliss?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Your bliss, where the deep of sense of being in form and going where your body and soul want to go, when you have that feeling, then stay with it and don't let anyone throw you off. Have you ever read Sinclair Lewis's Babbitt?

BILL MOYERS: Not in a long time.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Do you remember the last line? "I've never done a thing I wanted to in all my life."

BILL MOYERS: Quite an admission.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: That's the man who never followed his bliss. Well, I heard that line. I was living in Bronxville when I was teaching at Sarah Lawrence. Before I was married, I used to be eating out in the restaurants of the town for my lunch and dinners. And Thursday night was the maid's night off in Bronxville, so that all the families were out in the restaurants. And one fine evening, I was in my favorite restaurant there. It was a Greek restaurant. And at a table was sitting a father, a mother, and a scrawny little boy here, about 12 years old. And the father says to the boy, "Drink your orange drink your tomato juice." And the boy says, "I don't want to." And the father with a louder voice says, "Drink your tomato juice." And the mother says, "Don't make him do what he doesn't want to do." The father looks at her, and he says, "He can't go through life doing what he wants to do." Said, "If he does only what he wants to do, he'll be dead. Look at me, I've never done a thing I wanted to in all my life." I said, My God, Babbitt incarnate. And that's the man who never followed his bliss.

Well, you may have a success in life, but then just think of it, what kind of life was it, what good is it? You've never done a thing you wanted to in all your life.

BILL MOYERS: What happens when you follow your bliss?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: You come to bliss. This should be it in marriage. I mean, that's the sense of the marriage ceremony. In the Middle Ages, a favorite image that occurs in many, many contexts is the wheel of fortune. There's the hub of the wheel, and there's the revolving rim of the wheel. And if you attached to the rim of the wheel, let's say fortune, you will be either above, going down, at the bottom, or coming up. But if you are at the hub, you're in the same place all the time. And that's the sense of the marriage vow, you know. I take you in health or sickness, you know, in wealth or poverty, but I take you and you are my bliss, not the wealth that you might bring me, nor the social prestige, but you. And that's following your bliss.

I came to this idea of bliss because in Sanskrit which is the great spiritual language of the world, and they know all about it and have known about it for a long time, the transcendent is transcendent. But there are three terms that bring you to the brink, you might say the jumping off place to the ocean. And the three terms are sat, chit, ananda. And sat, the word sat means "being." Chit means "full consciousness." And ananda means "rapture." So I thought, I don't know whether my consciousness is full consciousness or not, I don't know whether my being is proper being or not, but I do know where my rapture is. So let me hang on to rapture and that'll bring me both being and full consciousness, and it worked.

BILL MOYERS: What was your rapture?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Well, it started with Indians, and then it went on into more and more mythological matters and the realm of the arts, music, and when I met Jean, then the dance came in, and this is it, just stay with that.

BILL MOYERS: And one doesn't have to be a poet to do this, carpenters do it, farmers do it.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: A poet is simply one who's made a profession and a lifestyle of being in touch with that. Most people have to be concerned with other things. They get themselves

involved in economic and other activities, or you're drafted into a war that isn't the one you're interested in, and how to hold to this umbilical, you might say, under those circumstances? That's a technique each one has to work out for himself somehow. But most people living in that realm of what might be called occasional concerns, they all have the capacity that's waiting to be awakened, to move to this other place. I know it, I've seen it happen in students. A wonderful way of teaching we have at Sarah Lawrence, where I taught for 38 years, I'd have an individual conference with every one of my students at least once a fortnight for half an hour or so. And there you're talking on about the things that students ought to be reading, and suddenly you hit on something that the student really responds to. You could see the eyes open, the complexion changes, a life possibility has opened there. And all you can say to yourself is, I hope this child hangs onto that, you know. They may or may not, but when they do, they've found a life right there in the room with you.

BILL MOYERS: How would you advise somebody to tap that spring of eternal life, that joy, that is right there?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Well, we're having experiences all the time which may on occasion render some sense of this, a little intuition of where your joy is. Grab it; no one can tell you what it's going to be. I mean, you've got to learn to recognize your own depths.

BILL MOYERS: Do you ever have this sense, when you're following your bliss, as I have at moments, of being helped by hidden hands?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: All the time. It's miraculous. I even have a superstition that has grown on me as the result of invisible hands coming all the time. Namely, that if you do follow your bliss, you put yourself on a kind of track that has been there all the while, waiting for you, and the life that you ought to be living is the one you're living somehow. And well, you can see it. You begin to deal with people who are in the field of your bliss, and they open doors to you. I say, follow your bliss, and don't be afraid, and doors will open where you didn't know they were going to be.

BILL MOYERS: Do you ever have sympathy for the man who has no invisible means of support?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Who has no invisible means yes, he's the one that evokes compassion, you know, the poor chap. And to see him stumbling around, when the water of immortal life is right there, is really evokes one's pity.

BILL MOYERS: Right there? Right there? You believe that?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Yes, yes.

BILL MOYERS: The waters of eternal life?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Right there.

BILL MOYERS: Where?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Wherever you are if you're following your bliss. I mean, you're having that joy, that refreshment, that life, all the time.

‘Love and the Goddess’

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: “So through the eyes love attains the heart, for the eyes are the scouts of the heart. And the eyes go reconnoitering for what it would please the heart to possess. And when they are in full accord and firm, all three in one resolve, at that time perfect love is born from what the eyes have made welcome, to the heart. For as all true loves know, love is perfect kindness, which is born, there is no doubt, from the heart and the eyes.”

BILL MOYERS: One of Joseph Campbell's most eloquent essays was called simply, “The Mythology of Love.” “What a wonderful theme,” he wrote, “and what a wonderful world of myth one finds in celebration of this universal mystery.” Stories of love fascinate the human race, and Campbell made their interpretation one of the great passions of his life as a scholar, teacher and philosopher. Like a weaver of fine cloth, he spun the tales and legends of love into an amazing tapestry of the human psyche.

He gathered his materials everywhere, from the erotic mysticism of India to the Old Testament Song of Songs; from the life of Christ and the teachings of the Ramakrishna, to Saint Paul and Bernard of Clairvaux, and William Blake, Thomas Mann and many others, for whom love was the controlling principle of art.

Campbell thought the greatest love stories were told in the Middle Ages, when “noble and gentle hearts,” as he called them, produced the romantic love that transcended lust. This love between individual men and women, Amor, was celebrated by wandering minstrels, who sang of “What the eyes have made welcome to the heart.” It helped create a distinctive Western consciousness that exalted the individual experience of men and women over the authority and traditions of the church and state.

(interviewing) Let's talk about love.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Let's talk about love, fine.

BILL MOYERS: But it's such a vast subject, that if, in mythology, that if I had come to you and said, "Let's talk about love, but where should we begin?" — what would your answer have been?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: I think my answer would have been the troubadours in the 12th century, let's begin there.

BILL MOYERS: Why the troubadours?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Well, because they're the first ones in the West that really considered love in the sense that we think of it now, as a person-to-person relationship.

BILL MOYERS: You're talking about romantic love?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Yes. It's the seizure that comes in recognizing as where your soul's counterpart in the other person, and that's what the troubadours stood for, and that has become the ideal in our lives today.

BILL MOYERS: What had it been before that?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Well, the idea of love as Eros, the god who excites you to sexual desire, this is not the person-to-person thing, of the falling in love in the way the troubadours understood it. I have a definition for Eros, the erotic biological urge, as the zeal of the organs for each other, and the personal factor doesn't matter.

BILL MOYERS: Where did Eros come from?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Well, Eros is Cupid, and in India the god of love is Kama, and he's no Cupid, he's a big, vigorous youth with a bow and a quiver of arrows, and the names of the arrows are such things as "Death-Bringing Agony," and "Open Up," and really, he just drives this thing into you, so that it's a total physiological, psychological explosion that takes place. Then the other love, the Christian love of Agape, spiritual love, in love thy neighbor as thyself, again it doesn't matter who the person is, I mean, it's your neighbor, you must have that kind of love. But the kind of seizure that comes from the meeting of the eyes, as they say in the troubadour tradition, and the purely personal, person-to-person thing, as far as I know it originates as an ideal to be lived for, with the troubadours.

BILL MOYERS: You've said that what happened in the 12th and 13th centuries "was one of the most important mutations of human feeling and spiritual consciousness, that a new way of experiencing love came to expression."

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Yes.

BILL MOYERS: And it was in opposition to that ecclesiastical despotism of the heart.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Yes.

BILL MOYERS: Which required people, particularly young girls barely out of adolescence to marry whomever the Church or their parents wanted them to marry.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: That's right.

BILL MOYERS: And what had this done to the passion of the heart?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Well, the ... to say a word for the other before I do this, the usual marriage in traditional cultures is arranged for by the families. It's not a person-to-person decision at all, and this is true to this day in many parts of the world. This is not to say that in arranged marriages of this kind there is no love; there is a lot of love, there's family love and a rich love life on that level. So in the Middle Ages, of course, that was the kind of marriage that was sanctified by the Church. And so the idea of a real person-to-person marriage was very dangerous.

BILL MOYERS: Dangerous because it was heresy.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: It was not only heresy, it was adultery, and that was punishable by death. For instance, in the Tristan romance, that's the crucial romance, of.

BILL MOYERS: Tristan and Isolde?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Yes. Isolde was engaged to marry King Mark. They had never seen each other. And Tristan was sent over to fetch Isolde to Mark. And Isolde's mother prepares a love potion, so that the two who are to be married will have real love for each other. And these two youngsters, they think the love potion is wine, and they drink it and then they're overtaken with this love. But Brangene, the nurse of Isolde, realized what had happened. She went to Tristan and said, "You have drunk your death." And Tristan said, "If by my death you mean this agony of love, that is my life. If by my death you mean the punishment that we are to suffer if discovered, which is namely execution, I accept that. But if by my death you mean eternal punishment in the fires of hell," in which these people believed, "I accept that, too."

BILL MOYERS: That was quite...

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: That's big stuff.

BILL MOYERS: For a medieval Catholic, because they believed in a literal hell and...

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Well, these people did.

BILL MOYERS: Yes. So what's the significance of what he was saying?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: What he was saying is that this love is bigger even than death, than pain, than anything. This is the affirmation of the pain of life in a big way.

BILL MOYERS: And I would choose this pain for love now, even though it might mean everlasting pain and damnation in hell.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: That's right.

BILL MOYERS: And that was a marked change in how people...

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Well, that is, any life career that you choose in following your bliss should be chosen with that sense, nobody can frighten me off from this thing.

BILL MOYERS: This is sort of the beginning of the romantic idea of the Western individual taking mailers into his or her own hands.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Well, absolutely. I mean, you can see, there are examples in Oriental stories of this kind of thing, but it did not become a social system. It has now become the ideal, at any rate, of love in the Western world.

BILL MOYERS: Love from one's own experience.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Right. That's a very mysterious thing, that electric thing that happens. And then the agony that can follow, which is that which the troubadours celebrate, you know, the agony of the love, the sickness that the doctors cannot cure; the wounds that can be healed only by the weapon that delivered the wound.

BILL MOYERS: Meaning?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Well, the wound is the wound of my passion and agony of love for this creature, and the only one who can heal me is the one who delivered the blow, you know.

BILL MOYERS: So we often hurt most the person we love, and heal the hurt by the love that hurt.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: That's something like that, that's the paradox of the job.

BILL MOYERS: What did you mean, Joe, when you said that the triumph of Tristan's view of love and vision of love, this beginning of romantic love in the West was "libido over credo"?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Well, the credo, "I believe," and I believe not only in the laws, but I believe that these laws were instituted by God, and there's no arguing with God. I mean, these laws are just a heavy weight on me, and disobeying those is sin, and it has to do with my eternal character.

BILL MOYERS: And the libido?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: The libido is the impulse to life.

BILL MOYERS: Comes from where?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Comes from the heart.

BILL MOYERS: And the heart is what?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: The heart is the organ of opening up to somebody else. That's the human quality, as opposed to the animal qualities, which have to do with, primarily with self-interest. Opening up to that which is other is the opening of the heart, and that's as the troubadours saw it, it is the opening of the heart.

BILL MOYERS: I can certainly understand, though, why the Church was threatened by this, because how can you have a church if everyone's libido is his or her own god?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Why not? Why can't the Church handle that? If you can sanctify a marriage that has been arranged, why can't you sanctify a marriage where two people have joined each other?

BILL MOYERS: So the courage to love became the courage to affirm against tradition, whatever knowledge stands confirmed in one's own experience.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Yeah.

BILL MOYERS: Why was that important in the evolution of the West?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Well, it was important in that it gives the West this accent, as I've been saying, on the individual, that he should have faith in his experience, and not simply mouth terms that have come to him from other mouths. I think that's the great thing in the West. The validity of the individual's experience of what humanity is, what life is, what values are, against the monolithic system.

BILL MOYERS: Was there some of this in the legend of the Holy Grail?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Yes. Wolfram has a very interesting statement about the origin of the Grail. He says the Grail was brought from heaven by the neutral angels. There was the war in heaven between God and Lucifer, and the angelic hosts that sided one group with Lucifer, and the other with God. Pair of opposites, good and evil, God and Satan. The Grail was brought down through the middle, the way of the middle, by the neutral angels.

BILL MOYERS: What is the Grail representing, then?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Well, the Grail becomes the, what we call it, that which is attained and realized by people who have lived their own lives. So the story very briefly is of this — I'm giving it now as Wolfram gives it — but this is just one version. The Grail King was a lovely young man, but he had not earned that position. And the Grail represents the fulfillment of the highest spiritual potentialities of the human consciousness. And he was a lovely young man, and

he rode forth from his castle with the war cry, "Amor!" And as he's riding forth, a Moslem, a pagan warrior, a Mohammedan warrior, comes out of the woods, a knight. And they both level their lances at each other, they drive at each other, and the lance of the grail king kills the Mohammedan, but the Mohammedan lance castrates the Grail King.

What that means is that the Christian separation of matter and spirit, of the dynamism of life and the spiritual, natural grace and supernatural grace, has really castrated nature. And the European mind, the European life, has been as it were, emasculated by this; true spirituality, which would have come from this, has been killed. And then what did the pagan represent? He was a person from the suburbs of Eden. He was regarded as a nature man, and on the head of his lance was written the word, "Grail." That is to say, nature intends the grail. Spiritual life is the bouquet of natural life, not a supernatural thing imposed upon it. And so the impulses of nature are what give authenticity to life, not obeying rules come from a supernatural authority, that's the sense of the Grail.

BILL MOYERS: And the Grail that these romantic legends were searching for is the union once again of what had been divided? The peace that comes from joining?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: The grail becomes symbolic of an authentic life that has lived in terms of its own volition, in terms of its own impulse system, which carries it between the pairs of opposites, of good and evil, light and dark. Wolfram starts his epic with a short poem saying, "Every act has both good and evil results." Every act in life yields pairs of opposites in its results. The best we can do is lean toward the light, that is to say, intend the light, and what the light is, is that of the harmonious relationships that come from compassion, with suffering, understanding of the other person. This is what the Grail is about.

BILL MOYERS: When we say God is love, does that have anything to do with romantic love? Does mythology ever link romantic love and God?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Well, that's what it did do. Love was a divine visitation, and that's why it was superior to marriage. That was the troubadour idea. If God is love, well, then, love is God, okay.

BILL MOYERS: There's that wonderful passage in Corinthians by Paul, where he says "Love beareth all things, endureth all things."

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Well, that's the same business. Love knows no pain.

BILL MOYERS: And yet, one of my favorite stories of mythology is out of Persia, where there is the idea that Lucifer was condemned to hell because he loved God so much.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Yeah, and that's a basic Muslim idea, about Iblis, that's the Muslim name for Satan, being God's greatest lover. Why was Satan thrown into hell? Well, the standard Story is that when God created the angels, he told them to bow to none but himself. Then he created man, whom he regarded as a higher form than the angels, and he asked the angels then to serve man. And Satan would not bow to man. Now, this is interpreted in the Christian tradition,

as I recall from my boyhood instruction, as being the egotism of Satan, he would not bow to man. But in this view, he could not bow to man, because of his love for God, he could bow only to God. And then God says, "Get out of my sight." Now, the worst of the pains of hell insofar as hell has been described is the absence of the beloved, which is God. So how does Iblis sustain the situation in hell? By the memory of the echo of God's voice when God said, "Go to hell." And I think that's a great sign of love, do you agree?

BILL MOYERS: Well, it's certainly true in life that the greatest hell one can know is to be separated from the one you love.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Yeah.

BILL MOYERS: That's why I've liked the Persian myth for so long. Satan as God's lover.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Yeah. And he is separated from God, and that's the real pain of Satan.

BILL MOYERS: You once took the saying of Jesus. "Love your enemies and pray for those who persecute you, so that you may be sons of your father who is in heaven, for he makes the sun to rise on the evil and the good and sends rain on the just and the unjust." You once took that to be the highest, the noblest, the boldest of the Christian teachings. Do you still feel that way?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Well, I think the main teaching of Christianity is, "Love your enemies."

BILL MOYERS: Hard to do.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: I know, well, that's it — I mean, when Peter drew his sword and cut off the servant's ear there, in the Gethsemane affair, and Jesus said, "Put up your sword, Peter," and put the ear back on, Peter has been drawing his sword ever since. And one can speak about Petrine or Christian Christianity in that sense. And I would say that the main doctrine of Christianity is the doctrine of Agape, of true love for he who is yours, him who is your enemy.

BILL MOYERS: How does one love one's enemy without condoning what the enemy does, accepting his aggression?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Well, I'll tell you how to do that. "Do not pluck the mole from your enemy's eye, but pluck the beam from your own," do you know?

Now, I have a friend whom I met by chance, a young Buddhist monk from Tibet. You know, in 1959 the Communists crashed down and bombed the palace of the Dalai Lama, bombarded Lhasa, and people murdered and all that kind of thing. And he escaped, he escaped at the time of the Dalai Lama. And those monasteries, I mean, there were monasteries with 5,000 monks, 6,000 monks, all wiped out, tortured and everything else. I haven't heard one word of incrimination of the Chinese from that young man. There is absolutely no condemnation of the Chinese here. And you hear this from the Dalai Lama himself. You will not hear a word of condemnation. This recognition of the way of life through which that vitality of the spirit is moving in its own way. I

mean, these men are sufferers of terrific violence, and there's no animosity. I learned religion from them.

BILL MOYERS: Do most of the stories of mythology, from whatever culture, say that suffering is intrinsically a part of life and that there's no way around it?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: I think I'd be willing to say that they do. I can't think of anything now that says if you're going to live, you won't suffer. It'll tell you how to understand and bear and interpret suffering, that it will do. And when the Buddha says there is escape from suffering, the escape from sorrow is nirvana. Nirvana is a psychological position where you are untouched by desire and fear.

BILL MOYERS: But is that realistic? Does that happen?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Yes, certainly.

BILL MOYERS: And your life becomes what?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Harmonious, well-centered and affirmative of life.

BILL MOYERS: Even with suffering.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Exactly. There's a passage in Paul's Epistle to the Philippians, isn't there? Be as Christ, for Christ did not think godhood something to be hung on to, to be clung to, but let go and came down and took life in the form of a servant, a servant even unto death. Let's say, come in and accept the suffering, and affirm it.

BILL MOYERS: So you would agree with Abelard in the 12th century, who said that Jesus' death on the cross was not as ransom paid, as a penalty applied, but it was an act of atonement, atonement at one with the race.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: That's the most sophisticated interpretation of why Christ had to be crucified. Abelard's idea was that this ... oh, this is connected with the Grail King and everything else ... that the coming of Christ to be crucified and illustrating thus the suffering of life, removes man's mind from commitment to the things of this world in compassion. It's in compassion with Christ that we turn to Christ, and so the injured one becomes the savior. It is the suffering that evokes the humanity of the human heart.

BILL MOYERS: So you would agree with Abelard that mankind yearning for God and God yearning for mankind in compassion met at that cross.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Yes. And by contemplating the cross, you are contemplating the true mystery of life. And that love for this experience, no matter how horrific the experience, the love for it

BILL MOYERS: So there's joy and pain in love.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Yeah, there is. Love, you might say, is the burning point of life, and since all life is sorrowful, so is love. And the stronger the love, the more that pain, but love bears all things. Love itself is a pain, you might say, but is the pain of being truly alive.

BILL MOYERS: As Joseph Campbell pursued his quest across Europe for the stories of love and chivalry, he paused often to visit the great cathedrals. They too reflected the glory of love, the love of Mary, mother of God. Reverence for the power of the female is another grand theme in ancient mythology. In the primitive planting cultures, woman contributed importantly to the economic life of the community by participating in the growing and reaping of crops. And as the mother and nourisher of life, she was thought to assist the earth symbolically in its fertility. In fact, some believe there was even a golden age of the goddess until she was driven from the imagination by the emergence of patriarchal authority.

Of late, however, scientists have resurrected the name of an ancient goddess, Gaia, to express the idea of Earth as a living body on which we depend for life. In the last half of this conversation with Joseph Campbell, he takes us back to the time when the love of God meant the love for mother goddess, and he unites these themes in one image, the virgin birth, which to him represents the birth of spirit from matter, the birth of compassion in the heart.

(interviewing) The Lord's Prayer begins, "Our Father which art in heaven."

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Yes.

BILL MOYERS: Could it have begun, "Our Mother"?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: This is a metaphorical image, this is a symbolic image, and to make the point that it's not your father, your physical father, we have "Our Father who art in heaven." But heaven again is a symbolic idea, where would it, heaven, be? It is no place. All of the references of religious and mythological images are to planes of consciousness or fields of experience potential in the human spirit, and these are to evoke attitudes and experiences that are appropriate to a meditation on the mystery of the source of your own being, I would say. So there have been systems of religion where the mother is the prime parent, the source, and she's really a more immediate parent than the father, because one is born from the mother, and then the first experience of any infant is the mother, so that the image of woman is the image of the world. You might say that mythology is simply a translation of the world into a mother image. We talk of Mother Earth and so forth.

BILL MOYERS: But what happened along the way, Joe, to this reverence that in primitive societies was directed toward the goddess figure, the great goddess, the Mother Earth? What happened to that?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: That comes in primarily with agriculture and the agricultural societies.

BILL MOYERS: Fertility and all of that?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: It has to do with the earth, the human woman does give birth as the earth gives birth to the plants. She gives nourishment as the plants do. So woman magic and earth magic are the same, they are related. And the personification, then, of this energy which gives birth to forms and nourishes forms is properly female. And so it is in the agricultural world of ancient Mesopotamia, the Egyptian Nile, but also in the earlier planting culture systems, that the goddess is the mythic form that is dominant.

BILL MOYERS: Because of this obvious perception of creation issue, fertility.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: That's right, and when you have a goddess as the creator, it's her own very body that is the universe. She is identical with the universe. And in Egypt, you have the mother heavens, Nut, the goddess Nut, who is represented as the whole heavenly sphere.

BILL MOYERS: So it would be natural for people trying to explain the wonders of the universe to look to the female figure as the explanation for what they saw in their own lives.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Not only that, but then when you move to a philosophical point of view, the female represents what in Kantian terminology we call the forms of sensibility. The female represents time and space itself. She is time and space, and the mystery beyond her is beyond pairs of opposites, so it isn't male and it isn't female. It neither is nor isn't, but everything is within her, so that the gods are her children. Everything you can think of, everything you can see, is the production of the goddess.

Oh, this is a wonderful story. The Vedic gods are together and they see a strange son of amorphous thing down the way, like a kind of smoky fog. And they say, "What's that?" They don't know what it is. And Agni, the god of fire, says, "I'll go find out who that is." So he goes up to this smoky thing and he says, "Who are you?" And from the smoky thing the voice says, "Who are you?" And he says, "I'm Agni, I'm the lord of fire, I can burn anything." And out of the fog there comes a piece of straw, it falls on the ground, it says, "Let's see you burn that" He can't burn it. He goes back, he says, "This is strange."

Well, Vayu, the lord of winds, says, "I'll try." So he goes and the same thing, "I can blow anything around." Throws it down, "Now, let's see you blow that" Well, he can't. He goes back. Then a woman arrives, a beautiful, mysterious, mystic woman. And she instructs the gods and tells them who that is. "That is the ultimate mystery of being, from which you boys have received your strength. And he can turn it on or off for you," you know. And there she comes as the one who illuminates the gods themselves concerning the ultimate ground of their own being.

BILL MOYERS: It's the female wisdom.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: It's the female as the giver of forms. She is the one who gave the forms and she knows where they came from.

BILL MOYERS: I wonder what it would have meant to us if somewhere along the way, we had begun the prayer "Our Mother," instead of "Our Father." What psychological difference would it have made?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Well, it makes a psychological difference in the character of the cultures. You have the basic birth of civilization in the Near East with the great river valleys then as the main source areas, the Nile, the Tigris-Euphrates, and then over in India, the Indus valley and later the Ganges. This is the world of the goddess; all these rivers have goddess names finally.

Then there come the invasions. These fighting people are herding people. The Semites are herders of goats and sheep, and the Indo-Europeans of cattle. They were formerly the hunters. They translate a hunting mythology into a herding mythology, but it's animal oriented. And when you have hunters you have killers, and when you have herders, you have killers, because they're always in movement, nomadic, coming into conflict with other people and they have to conquer the area they move into. This comes into the Near East, and this brings in the warrior gods, like Zeus, like Yahweh.

BILL MOYERS: The sword and death, instead of fertility.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Right. Particularly the Hebrews. They really wipe out the goddess. The term for the goddess, the Canaanite goddess, that's used in the Old Testament, is "the abomination." And there was a very strong accent against the goddess in the Hebrew, which you do not find in the Indo-European. There you have Zeus marrying the goddess and then the two play together. I think it's an extreme case that we have in the Bible, and our own Western subjugation of the female is really, I think, a function of biblical thinking.

BILL MOYERS: Because when you substitute the male for the female, you get a different psychology, a different cultural bias.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Particularly if you cut the female out and don't have any — I mean, if the male is on top like this and the female is the subordinate all the way, you have a totally different system from that when the two are facing each other.

BILL MOYERS: And it's permissible in your culture to do what your gods do, so you just...

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Well, that's exactly it. So I would see three situations here. One, the early one of the sheer goddess, when the male is hardly a significant divinity, you see, she is the total thing. And then this other one of the Hebrew, of the goddess-the male the total thing; in fact, he takes over her role. And finally then the classical one where the two are in interaction.

BILL MOYERS: There are women today who say that the spirit of the goddess has been in exile for 5,000 years, since the events that you...

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Well, not that... you can't put it that far back. 5,000 years. She was a very potent figure in Hellenistic times in the Mediterranean. And she came back with the Virgin in the Roman Catholic tradition. I mean, you don't have a tradition with the goddess celebrated any more beautifully and marvelously than in the 12th and 13th century French cathedrals, every one of which is called "Notre Dame."

BILL MOYERS: What about the virgin birth? Suddenly the goddess reappears in the form of the chaste and pure vessel chosen for God's action.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Well, in the history of Western religions, this is an extremely interesting development. The virgin birth comes in by way of the Greek tradition. When you read your four gospels, the only one with the virgin birth in it is the gospel according to Luke, and Luke was a Greek.

BILL MOYERS: And there was in the Greek tradition images, legends, myths of virgin births?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: All of them. I mean, Leda and the swan, and Persephone and the serpent, and this one and that one and the other one. The virgin birth is represented throughout.

BILL MOYERS: This was not a new idea, then, in Bethlehem and...

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: No. What is the meaning of the virgin birth? In India, there is this system of the kundalini, as it's called, the idea of the centers, psychological centers up the spine. And they represent the psychological planes of concern and consciousness and action. The first is at the rectum, and this is that of alimentation. The serpent represents this, you know, a traveling esophagus going along just eating, eating, eating, eating. And all of us are — we wouldn't be here if we weren't eating. And then the second, the second center is at the sex organ center, and that's the urge to procreation. The third center's called, is at the navel, and this is where you eat and want to consume. And it's not the alimentary eating, it's the mastering and smashing and trashing of others, do you see? This is the aggressive mood.

Now, the first is an animal instinct, the second is an animal instinct, the third is an animal instinct, and these three centers are located in the pelvic base, do you see. The next one is at the level of the heart, and this is the opening of compassion. And there you move out of the field of animal action into a field that is properly human and spiritual. Now, in each of these centers there is a symbolic form. At the base, the first one, there is the form of the lingam and yoni, the male and female organs in conjunction. At the heart chakra, there is again the male and female organs in conjunction, but in gold. This is the virgin birth. It's the birth of spiritual man out of the animal man. Do you understand?

BILL MOYERS: And it happens?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: When you are awakened at the level of the heart to compassion and to suffering with the other person. That's the beginning of humanity. And the meditations of religion properly are on that level, the heart level.

BILL MOYERS: You say it's the beginning of humanity, but in these Stories, that's the moment when gods are born, the virgin birth, it's a god who emerges from that chemistry.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Yeah, and you know who that god is? It's you. All of these symbols in mythology refer to you. You can get stuck out there and think it's all out there, and so you're thinking of Jesus and all the sentiments about how he suffered and all; what that suffering is, is

what ought to be going on in you. Have you been reborn? Have you died to your animal nature and come to life as a human incarnation?

BILL MOYERS: Why is it significant that this is of a virgin?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Well, it is that the begetter is the spirit. It is a spiritual birth. The virgin conceived of the Word, through the ear.

BILL MOYERS: The Word came like a shaft of light.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Yes. And now, the Buddha was born from his mother's side, at the level of the heart chakra. That's a symbolic birth; he wasn't born from his mother's side, but symbolically he was.

BILL MOYERS: But the Christ came the way you and I come.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Yes, but of a virgin.

BILL MOYERS: Which is a power greater than...

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: And then, according to Roman Catholic doctrine, her virginity was restored. So nothing happened physically, you might say. It's not a physical birth. It's symbolic of a spiritual transformation, that's what the virgin birth is about. And so deities are born that way who represent beings who act in terms of compassion, and not in terms of the lower three centers.

BILL MOYERS: If you go back into antiquity, do you find images of the Madonna as the mother of the savior child?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Well, what you have as the model for the Madonna actually is Isis, with her child Horus at her breast. This was the actual model for the Madonna symbol.

BILL MOYERS: Isis? Tell me that story.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: This is a prime myth in this period of the Goddess as the redeemer, the one who goes in quest of the lost spouse or lover, and through her loyalty and descent into the realm of death, recovers him. Isis and her husband Osiris were twins who were born of the goddess Nut. And their younger relatives were Seth and Nephthys, who were also twins born from Nut. Seth planned to kill his brother Osiris, and he took Osiris measurements secretly and had a wonderful sarcophagus built that would exactly fit Osiris. So there was a hilarious party in progress one time among the gods, and Seth trots in this sarcophagus, and he says, "Anyone whom this perfectly fits can have it as his sarcophagus." And everybody at the party tried, and when Osiris got in, of course he perfectly fit. Just at that time, 72 accomplices come rushing out and they clap the lid on, strap it together and throw it in the Nile.

Now, this is the death of the god. Whenever you have a death of an incarnation, a god like this, you're going to have a resurrection, you can wait for that. So he goes floating down the Nile and is washed ashore in Syria. And a beautiful tree grows up and incorporates the sarcophagus in its own trunk. So this is this wonderful tree with a glorious aroma. And the local king has just had a son born to him, and he is also at the same time going to build a palace. The aroma of this tree is so wonderful, he cuts it down and brings it in to be a central pillar in the main room of the palace.

Poor little Isis, whose husband has been thrown into the Nile, starts this wonderful quest for Osiris, So she comes to the place where the palace is, and learns of the wonderful aroma and she suspects this is Osiris. And she gets a job as nurse to the just-born little child. Well, she lets the child nurse from her finger. And she loves the little child, and she decides to give it immortality. So she does this by placing him in the fireplace in the fire, to burn away gradually his mortal body. But being a goddess she could keep that from killing him, you understand. And when that would happen, she would convert herself into a swallow, and fly mournfully around the pillar where her husband is.

Well, one evening the child's mother came in to this room while this scene was in progress, saw her child in the fireplace, let out a scream, and that broke the spell, and they had to rescue the child from incineration. Meanwhile the swallow had turned into this gorgeous nurse, Isis, and the nurse gave an explanation of the situation, and she said, "By the way, it's my husband that's in that pillar there, and I'd be grateful if you could just let me take it home." So the king came in and he said, "Certainly." So he removes the pillar, gives it to Isis and it's put on a barge. So on the way back to the Nile, she removes the lid, the cover of the sarcophagus and lies on top of her dead spouse and conceives of her dead spouse this is an image that occurs in Egyptian art all the time, out of death comes life and all this kind of business and when they land she in the papyrus swamp gives birth to her child Horus with the dead Osiris beside her.

This is the motif for the Madonna, actually, it becomes the Madonna. In Egyptian symbology, Isis represents the throne, the Pharaoh sits on the throne of Isis, as the child sits on the mother lap. And when you look in the cathedral of Chartres in the west portal, you will see the Madonna as the throne with the little child Jesus as the world emperor on her lap: That is the same image that's come over.

BILL MOYERS: And you say the Christian fathers took this image?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Definitely, and they really say so. You read the second letter of Peter, and he says those forms which were merely mythological forms in the past, are now incarnate and actual in our savior. There was a mythology of the savior, the dead and resurrected god, and it's associated with the moon, which dies and is resurrected every month. And you have the three nights dark, and you have Christ three nights in the tomb, and three days in the tomb, and all this kind of thing. It's an intentional saying, that which was merely talked about is now fact. And no one knows what the date of Christmas ought to be, but it's put on the date of the winter solstice, when the nights begin to be shorter and the days longer, the birth of light. And so there is an idea of death to the past and birth to the future in our lives and in our thinking all the time. Death to

the animal nature, birth to the spiritual, and these symbols are talking about it one way or another.

BILL MOYERS: So when the...

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: And the goddess is the one who brings it about. The second birth is through the second mother. Notre Dame de Paris, Notre Dame de Chartres, our mother church, we are reborn by entering and leaving a church.

BILL MOYERS: And it doesn't mean physically, it means...

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Spiritually.

BILL MOYERS: That there's a power that's unique to the feminine principle.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: It can be put that way. You can... it's not necessarily unique to her, you can have rebirth through the male, also. But using this system of symbols, the woman becomes the regenerator.

BILL MOYERS: There's that wonderful saying in the New Testament of Jesus. "In Jesus there is no male or female." In the ultimate sense of things there is neither.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: That would have to be. I mean, if Jesus represents the source of our being, we are all as it were thoughts in the mind of Jesus. He is the word that has become flesh in us, too.

BILL MOYERS: You and I would possess characteristics that are both male and female.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Well, actually the body does, And in that Yin-Yang figure from China, you know, in the dark fish or whatever you want to call it, there's a light spot and in the light one there's a dark spot. That's how they can relate; you couldn't relate at all to something that, of which you did not participate, into which you did not participate at all. That's why the idea of God as the absolute other is a ridiculous idea, there could be no relationship to that which is absolute other.

BILL MOYERS: The question arises, in discussing the male-female principle, the virgin birth, the spiritual power that gives us the second birth. The wise people of all time have said that we can live the good life if we learn in fact to live spiritually. But how does one learn to live spiritually when one is of the flesh? Remember, Paul said, "the desires of the flesh are against the spirit, and the desires of the spirit are against the flesh." How do we learn to live spiritually?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Well, that was the in ancient times and in primitive times, the business of the teacher. He was to give you the clues to a spiritual life, that was what the priest was for. Also, that was what the ritual was for. A ritual can be defined as an enactment of a myth, by participating in a good, sound ritual, you are actually experiencing a mythological life. And it's out of that that one can learn to live spiritually.

BILL MOYERS: These stories of mythology actually point the way to the spiritual life.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Yes. You've got to have a clue. You've got to have a road map of some kind, and these are all around us. They're here.

BILL MOYERS: And the road map to which the goddess stories are pointing is the map of elevating the spiritual to an equality with the physical, so that you live in union with those two.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Yes. There you've come to the real sanctity of the earth itself, because that is the body of the goddess. When Yahweh creates, he creates the earth and breathes his life into it. He's not there, she's there. Your body is her body. And there's that kind of identity.

BILL MOYERS: Well, that's why I'm not so sure that the future of the race and the salvation of the journey is in space. I think it is well right here on earth in the body, in the womb of all of our being.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Well, it certainly is. I mean, when you go out into space what you're carrying is your body and if that hasn't been transformed, space won't transform it for you. But thinking about space may help you to realize something.

BILL MOYERS: You certainly thought about space in this wonderful passage. You were describing a page out of the National Geographic Atlas of the World, but you read this and something happened to you.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: "What these pages opened to me was the vision of a universe of unimaginable magnitude and inconceivable violence. Billions upon billions, literally, of roaring thermonuclear furnaces scattering from each other, each thermonuclear furnace being a star and our sun among them. Many of them actually blowing themselves to pieces, littering the outermost reaches of space with dust and gas, out of which new stars with circling planets are being born right now. And then from still more remote distances beyond all these there come murmurs, microwaves, which are echoes of the greatest cataclysmic explosion of all, namely, the Big Bang of creation, which, according to recent reckonings, must have occurred some 18 billion years ago."

That's where we are, kiddo. And if you realized that, you realize how really important you are, you know, one little microbit in this great magnitude. And then out of that must come the experience that you and that are in some sense one, and that you partake of all of that

BILL MOYERS: And it begins here.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: It begins here.

6 'Masks of Eternity'

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: We want to think about God. God is a thought, God is an idea, but its reference is to something that transcends all thinking. I mean, he's beyond being, beyond the category of being or nonbeing. Is he or is he not? Neither is nor is not.

Every god, every mythology, every religion, is true in this sense: it is true as metaphorical of the human and cosmic mystery.

He who thinks he knows doesn't know. He who knows that he doesn't know, knows.

There is an old story that is still good — the story of the quest, the spiritual quest, that is to say, to find the inward thing that you basically are. All of these symbols in mythology refer to you — have you been reborn? Have you died to your animal nature and come to life as a human incarnation? You are God in your deepest identity. You are one with the transcendent.

BILL MOYERS: The images of God are many. Joseph Campbell called them “the masks of eternity,” and said they both cover and reveal the face of glory. All our names and images for God are masks, Campbell said, they signify that ultimate reality, which by definition transcends language and art.

A myth is a mask of God, too, a metaphor for what lies behind the visible world. As teacher, scholar and writer, Joseph Campbell spent his life in the study of comparative religion. He wanted to know what it means that God assumes such different masks in different cultures. We go east of Suez and see people dancing before a bewildering array of fantastic gods. When those people come here, well, Campbell told the story of the young Hindu who called on him in New York and said, “When I visit a foreign country, I like to acquaint myself with its religion. So I bought myself a Bible and for some months now have been reading it from the beginning. But, you know, I can't find any religion in it.”

Campbell, who became president of the American Society for the Study of Religion, was at home in the sacred scriptures of all the world's great faiths. He found comparable stories in them: stories of creation, of virgin births, incarnations, death and resurrection, second comings, judgment days. Quoting one of his favorite Hindu scriptures which he translated from the Sanskrit, he concluded that “truth is one, the sages speak of it by many names.”

Joseph Campbell began his journey into this literature of the spirit after his imagination was excited by a visit to the Museum of Natural History in New York when he was just a boy. We met there a few months before his death and talked through a long evening, about the masks or eternity.

Is there something in common in every culture that creates this need for God?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Well, I think anyone who has an experience of mystery and awe knows that there is a dimension, let's say, or the universe that is not that which is available to his senses. There's a wonderful saying in one of the Upanishads, "When, before a sunset or a mountain and the beauty of this or that, you pause and say, 'Ah, that is participation in divinity.'" And I think that's what it is, it's the realization of wonder. And also the experience of tremendous power, which people of course living in the world of nature are experiencing all the time. You know there's something there that's much bigger than the human dimension.

And our way of thinking in the West largely is that God is the source of the energy. The way in most Oriental thinking, and I think in most of what we call primitive thinking, also, is that God is the manifestation of the energy, not its source, that God is the vehicle of the energy. And the level of energy that is involved or represented determines the character of the god. There are gods of violence, there are gods of compassion, there are gods that unite the two, there are gods that are the protectors of kings in their war campaigns. These are personifications of the energy that's in play, and what the source of the energy is. What's the source of the energy in these lights around us? I mean, this is a total mystery.

BILL MOYERS: Doesn't this make of faith an anarchy, a sort of continuing war among principalities?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: As life is, yes. I mean, even in your mind, when it comes to doing anything, there will be a war. A decision as to priorities, what should you do now? Or, in relationship to other people, there will be four or five possibilities of my way of action. And the notion of divinity or divine life in my mind would be what would determine my decision. If it were rather crude, it would be a rather crude decision.

BILL MOYERS: But is divinity just what we think?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Yes.

BILL MOYERS: What does that do to faith?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Well, it's a tough one about faith.

BILL MOYERS: You are a man of faith-

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: I'm not...

BILL MOYERS: You're a man of wonder and...

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Yeah, I don't have to have faith, I have experience.

BILL MOYERS: What kind of experience?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Well, I've experience of the wonder, of the life, I have experience of love, I have experience of hatred, malice — I'd like to punch the guy's jaw, and I admit this. But

those are different divinities, I mean, from the point of view of a symbolic imaging. Those are different images operating in me.

For instance, when I was a little boy and was being brought up a Roman Catholic, I was told I had a guardian angel on my right side and a tempting devil on my left, and when it came to making a decision of what I would do, the decision would depend on which one had most influence on me. And I must say that in my boyhood, and I think also in the people who were teaching me, they actually concretized those thoughts.

BILL MOYERS: They did what?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: It was an angel. That angel is a fact and the devil is a fact, do you see; otherwise, one thinks of them as metaphors for the energies that are afflicting and guiding you.

BILL MOYERS: And those energies come from?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: From your own life. The energy of your own body, the different organs in your body, including your head, are the conflict systems.

BILL MOYERS: And your life comes from where?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Well, there you are. From the ultimate energy that's the life of the universe. And then you say, well, somebody has to generate that. Why do you have to say that? Why can't it be impersonal? That would be Brahman, that would be the transcendent mystery, that you can also personify.

BILL MOYERS: Can men and women live with an impersonality?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Yes, they do all over the place. Just go east of Suez. In the East, the gods are much more elemental.

BILL MOYERS: Elemental?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Elemental, less human and more like the powers of nature. I see a deity as representing an energy system, and part of the energy system is the human energy systems of love and malice, hate, benevolence, compassion. And in Oriental thinking, the god is the vehicle of the energy, not its source.

BILL MOYERS: Well, of course the heart of the Christian faith is that these elemental forces you're talking about embodied themselves in a human being in reconciling mankind to God.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Yes. And the basic Buddhist idea is that that is true of you, as well, and that what Jesus was a person who realized that in himself, and lived out of the Christhood of his nature.

BILL MOYERS: What do you think about Jesus?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: We just don't, know about Jesus. All we know are four contradictory texts that tell us what he did.

BILL MOYERS: Written many years after he lived.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: But I think we know what Jesus said. I think the sayings of Jesus are probably pretty close. But when you read the Thomas gospel, the Gospel According to Thomas, which was dug up there in that, with those other gnostic texts, it has all the flavor of one of the synoptics, Matthew, Mark or Luke, except that it doesn't say quite the same thing.

There's one wonderful passage, it's the last one in the gospel, actually. "When will the kingdom come?" Now, in Mark 13, I think it is, we hear that the end of the world is going to come. That is to say, a mythological image, that is, the end of the world, is taken as a reference to an actual, physical, historical fact to be. When you read the Thomas gospel, Jesus says, "The kingdom of the father will not come by expectation; the kingdom of the father is spread upon the earth and men do not see it."

So I look at you now in that sense and the radiance of the presence of the divine is known to me, through you.

BILL MOYERS: Through me?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: You, sure.

BILL MOYERS: A journalist?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Jesus also says in this text, "He who drinks from my mouth will become as I am, and I shall be he. "He's talking from the point of view of that being of beings which we call the Christ, who is the being of all of us. And anyone who lives in relation to that is as Christ. And anyone who incarnates, or rather brings into his life the message of the Word, is equivalent to Jesus. That's the sense of that.

BILL MOYERS: So that's what you mean when you say, "I am radiating God to you."

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: You are, yes.

BILL MOYERS: And you to me.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: And I'm speaking this seriously, yes.

BILL MOYERS: Oh, I take it seriously. I happen to believe the same as you without being able to articulate it as you do. I do sense that there is divinity. The divinity is in the other.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: So you are the vehicle, you are as it were radiant of the spirit. And that's...why not recognize it?

BILL MOYERS: I'll tell you what the most gripping scripture in the Christian New Testament is for me. It says, "I believe. Help thou my unbelief."

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: I believe in what?

BILL MOYERS: I believe in this ultimate reality, and that I can experience it, that I do experience it, but I don't have answers to my questions. I believe in the question, Is there a God?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: I had a very amusing experience, which might be well worth telling. I was in the New York Athletic Club swimming pool, and you know, you don't wear your collar this way or that way when you're in a swimming pool. And I was introduced to a priest, "This is Father So-and-so, this is Joseph Campbell." I'm a professor, he's a professor at one of our Catholic universities. So after I'd had my swim, I came and sat down beside, in what we call, you know, the horizontal athlete situation, and the priest is beside me. And he said, "Mr. Campbell, are you a priest?" I said, "No, Father." He said, "Are you a Catholic?" I said, "I was, Father." He said, and now he had the sense to ask it this way, "Do you believe in a personal God?" I said, "No, Father." And he said, "Well, I suppose there is no way to prove by logic the existence of a personal God." And I said, "If there were, Father, what would be the value of faith?" "Well, Mr. Campbell, it's nice to have met you." And he was off. I really felt I had done a jujitsu trick there.

But that was a very illuminating conversation to me. The fact that he asked, "Do you believe in a personal God?" that meant that he also recognized the possibility of the Brahman, of the transcendent energy.

BILL MOYERS: Well, then, what is religion?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Well, the word religion means religio, linking back, linking back the phenomenal person to a source. If we say it is the one life in both of us, then my separate life has been linked to the one life, religio, linked back. And this becomes symbolized in the images of religion, which represent that connecting link.

BILL MOYERS: Your friend Jung, the great psychologist, says that the most powerful religious symbol is the circle. He says, "The circle is one of the great primordial images of mankind, that in considering the symbol of the circle, we are analyzing the self." And I find you, in your own work throughout the course of your life, coming across the circle, whether it's in the magical designs of the world over, whether it's in the architecture both ancient and modern, whether it's in the dome-shaped temples of India or the calendar stones of the Aztecs, or the ancient Chinese bronze shields, or the visions of the Old Testament prophet Ezekiel, whom you talk about, the wheel in the sky. You keep coming across this image.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Yes, it's an ever-present thing. It's the center from which you've come, back to which you go. I remember reading in a book about the American Indians, called *The Indian Book*, by Natalie Curtis, it was published around 1904, her conversation with a chief. I think it was a chief of the Pawnee tribe. And among the things he said was, "When we pitch camp, we pitch the camp in a circle. When we looked at the horizon, the horizon was in a circle.

When the eagle builds a nest, the nest is in circle.” And then you read in Plato somewhere, the soul is a circle. I suppose the circle represents totality. Within the circle is one thing, it is encircled, it’s enframed. That would be the spatial aspect, but the temporal aspect of the circle is, you leave, go somewhere and come back, the alpha and omega. God is the alpha and omega, the source and the end. Somehow the circle suggests immediately a completed totality, whether in time or in space.

BILL MOYERS: No beginning, no end.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Well, round and round and round. The year, well, this is November again, you know, and we’re about to have Thanksgiving again. We’re about to have Christmas again. And then not only the year, but the month, the moon cycle, and the day cycle. And this is we’re reminded of this when we look on our watch and see the cycle of time, it’s the same hour, the same hour but another day, and all that sort of thing.

BILL MOYERS: Why do you suppose the circle became so universally symbolic?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Well, because it’s experienced all the time. You experience it in the day and the year, just as we’ve said, and you experience in leaving home, going on your adventure, hunting or whatever it may be, and coming back to home. And then there’s a deeper one also, that mystery of the womb and the tomb. When people are buried it’s for rebirth, I mean, that’s the origin of the burial idea, you’re put back into the womb of Mother Earth for rebirth.

BILL MOYERS: And Jung kept returning to that theme of the circle as being the sort of universal symbol.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Well, Jung used it as a pedagogical device, actually, what he called the mandala. This was actually a Hindu term for a sacred circle.

BILL MOYERS: Here is one of the pictures.


JOSEPH CAMPBELL: That’s a very elaborate mandala. You have the deity at the center, with the power source, the illumination source, and these are the manifestations or aspects of its radiance. But in working out a mandala for oneself, what one does is draw a circle and then think of the different impulse systems in your life, the different value systems in your life, and try then to compose them and find what the center is. It’s kind of discipline for pulling all those scattered aspects of your life together, finding a center and ordering yourself to it. So you’re trying to coordinate your circle with the universal circle.

BILL MOYERS: To be at the center.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: At the center. The Navaho have that wonderful image of what they call the pollen path. And when you realize what pollen is, it’s the life source. And it’s a single, single path, the center, and then they were saying, “Oh, beauty before me, beauty behind me, beauty to the right of me, beauty to the left of me, beauty above me, beauty below me, I’m on the pollen path.”

Navaho pollen path

So the little cosmos of one's own life and the macrocosm of the world's life are in some way to be coordinated. Well, for instance, among the Navaho Indians, healing ceremonies were conducted by way of sand paintings, which were mostly mandalas, on the ground and then the person who is to be treated moves into the mandala. There will be a mythological context that he will be identifying with, and he identifies himself with that power. And this idea of sand painting with mandalas and used for meditation purposes appears also in Tibet in the great Tantric monasteries outside of Lhasa. For instance, Rgyud Stod, they practiced sand painting, cosmic images and so forth indicating the forces of the spiritual powers that operate in our lives.



BILL MOYERS: Now, what do you make of that, that in two very different cultures, the same imagery emerges?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Yes, well, there are only two ways to explain it, and one is by diffusion, that an influence came from there to here, and the other is by separate development. And when you have the idea of separate development, this speaks for certain powers in the psyche which are common to all mankind. Otherwise you couldn't have — and to the detail the correspondences can be identified, it's astonishing when one studies these things in depth, the degree to which the agreements go between totally separated cultures.

BILL MOYERS: Which says something about the commonality of the species, doesn't it?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Well, yes, that was Carl Jung's idea, which he calls the archetypes, archetypes of the collective unconscious.

BILL MOYERS: What do you mean by archetypes?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: An archetype is a constant form, a basic fundamental form which appears in the works of that person over there, and this person over here, without connecting them. They are expressions of the structure of the human psyche.

BILL MOYERS: So if you find in a variety of cultures, each one telling the story of creation or the story of a virgin birth or the story of a savior who comes and dies and is resurrected, you're saying something about what is inside us and the need to understand.

One can say that the images of myth are reflections of spiritual and depth potentialities of every one of us. And that through contemplating those, we evoke those powers in our own lives to operate through ourselves.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: That's right. One can say that the images of myth are reflections of spiritual and depth potentialities of every one of us. And that through contemplating those, we evoke those powers in our own lives to operate through ourselves. There was a very important anthropologist — he's the one with whom my works begin, you might say, my studies — Bastian in Germany, end of the last century and first part of this. He was a world traveler and recognized very soon that there were certain motifs that appeared in all of the religions and all of the mythologies of the world. Such an idea, for example, as a spiritual power, that's an archetypal image that appears everywhere. And he called these "elementary ideas." But they appear in very different forms and different provinces and at different times, and those different forms are costumes he called ethnic or folk ideas. But within the ethnic idea is the elementary idea, and it is those elementary ideas that Carl Jung then began studying and called "archetypes of the unconscious." When you say elementary idea, they seem to come from up here. When you say archetypes of the unconscious, they come from up here, and they appear in our dreams, as well as in myths.

BILL MOYERS: So when one scripture talked about being made in his image, in God's image, it's being, it's being created with certain qualities that every human being possesses, no matter what that person's religion or culture or geography or heritage.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: God would be the ultimate elementary idea of man.

BILL MOYERS: The primal need.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: And we are all made in the image of God, okay? So that is the ultimate elementary idea or archetype of man.

BILL MOYERS: I feel stronger in my own faith, knowing that others had the same yearnings and were seeking for the same images to try to express an experience that couldn't be costumed in ordinary human language.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: That's right.

BILL MOYERS: I feel much more kinship with all those who follow other ways, because it seems...

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: This is why clowns are good.

BILL MOYERS: Clowns?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Clown religions, because they show that the image is not a fact, but it's a reflex of some kind.

BILL MOYERS: So does this help explain the trickster gods that show up at times?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: They're very much that, yes. Some of the best trickster stories are associated with our American Indian tales. Now, these figures are clownlike figures, and yet they are the creator god at the same time, very often. And this makes the point, I am not the ultimate image. I am transparent to something. Through me, through my funny form, and mocking it, and turning it into a grotesque action, you really get the sense which, if I had been a big sober presence, you get stuck with the image.

BILL MOYERS: There's a wonderful story in some African tradition of the god who's walking down the road, and the god has on a hat that is colored red on one side and blue on the other side. So when the people, the farmers in the field go into the village in the evening, they said, "Did you see that fellow, that god with the blue hat?" And the others said, "No, no, he had a red hat on," and they get into a fight.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Yes. He even makes it worse by first walking along this direction, and then turning around and turning his hat around, so that again, it'll be red and black or whatever and then when these two chaps fight and are brought before the king or chief for judgment, this fellow appears and he says, "It's my fault, I did it. Spreading strife is my greatest joy."

BILL MOYERS: And there's a truth in that...

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: There sure is, yes.

BILL MOYERS: Which is?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: No matter what system of thought you have, it can't possibly include boundless life. And when you think everything is just that way, the trickster comes in and it all blows, and you get the becoming thing again. Now, Jung has a wonderful saying somewhere that, "Religion is a defense against a religious experience."

BILL MOYERS: Well, you have to explain that.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Well, that means it has reduced the whole thing to concepts and ideas, and having the concept and idea short-circuits the transcendent experience. The experience of deep mystery is what one has to regard as the ultimate religious experience.

BILL MOYERS: Well, there are many Christians who believe that to find out who Jesus is, you have to go past the Christian faith, past the Christian doctrine, past the Christian church. And I know that's heresy to a lot of people, but...

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Well, you have to go past the image of Jesus. The image of God becomes the final obstruction. Your God is your ultimate barrier. This is basic Hinduism, basic Buddhism. You know, the idea of the ascent of the spirit through the centers, the chakras, as they call them, or lotuses, the different centers of experience. The animal experiences of hunger and greed or just the zeal of reproduction or the physical mastery of one kind or another, these are all

stages of power. But then when the center of the heart is reached, and the sense of compassion on another person, mercy and participation, and I and you are in some sense of the same being this is what marriage is based on there's a whole new stage of life experience opens up with the opening of the heart.

And this is what's called the virgin birth, actually, the birth of a spiritual life in what formerly was simply a human animal, living for the animal aims of health, progeny, wealth and a little fun. But now you come to something else: to participate in this sense of accord with another, or accord with some principle that has lodged in your mind as a good to be identified with, then a whole new life comes. And this is in Oriental thinking, the awakening of the religious experience.

And then this can go on even to the quest for the experience of the ultimate mystery, that is, the ultimate mystery can be experienced in two senses, one without form and the other with form. And in this Oriental thinking, you experience God with form here, this is heaven, that's the identification with your own being, because that which God refers to is the ultimate mystery of being, which is the mystery of your being as well as of the world, so it's...this is it.

BILL MOYERS: How do you explain what the psychologist Maslow calls "peak experiences," and what your friend James Joyce called epiphanies. I love that word, epiphany.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Oh, well, they're not quite the same, but...

BILL MOYERS: I know.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: The peak experience refers to actual moments of your life when you feel that this has told you something, something has come through in your experience of your relationship to the harmony of being. It can come...my peak experiences, I mean, the ones that I knew were peak experiences after I had them, all came in athletics.

BILL MOYERS: Which was the Everest of your experience.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Yeah, well...

BILL MOYERS: Which one was it, was it when you were running at Columbia?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Yes, of course. And I ran a couple of races that were just beautiful, and the whole race, I knew I was going to win and there was no reason for me to know I was going to win, because I was touched off anchor in the relay with the first man 30 yards ahead of me, and I just knew, knew, it was a peak experience. Nobody could beat me today. That's a kind of being in full form and really doing it. I don't think I've ever done anything in my life as competently as I ran those two races. And those consequently were the experience of really being at my full and doing perfect job. I don't think I've ever had anything like that, quite, that I really came up to anything quite that way.

BILL MOYERS: Do you think you, Joseph Campbell, have to...it has to be physical?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: No, but it can be a peak experience there are other kinds of peak experiences, which I know were superior to those, but those are the ones that when I read Maslow and read of peak experience, I just know that those were peak experiences.

BILL MOYERS: What about James Joyce's epiphanies?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Now, that's another thing. This has to do with the esthetic experience. Joyce's formula for the esthetic experience is that it does not move you to want to possess the object, that he calls pornography; nor does it move you to criticize and reject the object, that he calls didactics, social criticism in art and all that kind of thing. It is the holding the object, and he says you put a frame around it and see it as one thing, and then seeing it as one thing, you become aware of the relationship of part to part, the part to the whole and the whole to each of the parts. This is the essential esthetic factor rhythm, the rhythm, the rhythmic relationships. And when a fortunate rhythm has been struck by the artist, there is a radiance. That's the epiphany. And that is what would be the Christ coming through, do you understand what I'm saying?

BILL MOYERS: The face of the saint beholding God.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: And it doesn't matter who it is. I mean, you could take someone who you would think of as being a monster, that is an ethical judgment on the life, and this is transcendent of ethics, no didactics.

BILL MOYERS: But see, that's where I would disagree with you, because it seems to me in order to experience the epiphany, that which you behold but do not want to possess must be beautiful in some way. A moment ago, when you talked about your peak experience, running, you said it was beautiful. Beautiful is an esthetic word.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Yeah, that's right.

BILL MOYERS: And how can you behold a monster?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: I tell you, there's another emotion associated with art which is not of the beautiful, but of the sublime. And what we call monsters can be seen as sublime. And they represent powers too great for the mere forms of life to survive. Prodigious expanse of space is sublime. This is a thing that the Buddhists know how to achieve in their temples. Particularly when I was in Kyoto, I was there for seven glorious months.

BILL MOYERS: In Japan.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Yeah, visiting some of the temple gardens. They are so designed that you're experiencing something here, and then you break past a screen and a whole new horizon opens out. And somehow with the diminishment of your own ego, the consciousness expands. This is the experience of the sublime. Another experience of the sublime is not of tremendous space, but of tremendous energy and power. And I have known a couple of people who were in central Europe during the saturation bombings that were conducted over those cities, and there was the...you just have the experience of the sublime there.

BILL MOYERS: I once interviewed a veteran of the Second World War, and I was talking to him about his experience at the Battle of the Bulge, with the assault of the Germans about to succeed. And I said, "Well, as you look back on it, what was it?" And he said, "It was sublime."

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: And so the monster comes through there.

BILL MOYERS: What do you mean by monster?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Well, by a monster I mean someone who breaks all of your standards for harmony and for ethical conduct.

BILL MOYERS: Is there a story in mythology that illustrates the sublime in the monster?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Well, the god of the end of the world, Vishnu, at the end of the world is a monster. I mean, good night, he's destroying the world, first with fire and then with a torrential flood that drowns out the fire and everything else and nothing's left but ash, the whole universe has been wiped out. That's God.

BILL MOYERS: Well, the Christian millennialists talk of the rapture.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Well, read Chapter 13 in Mark.

BILL MOYERS: Which says?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: That's the end of the world. You see, these are experiences that go past ethical judgments. Ethics is wiped out. Our religions, with the accent on the human, as I mentioned a little while ago, also stress the ethical. God is good. God is horrific the end of the world? There's an Arab saying that I read somewhere in The Arabian Nights that the angel of death, when the angel of death comes it is terrible; when he has reached you, it is bliss.

Now, in the Buddhist systems, particularly as we get them from Tibet, the Buddhas appear in two aspects; there is the peaceful aspect and there is the wrathful aspect of the deity. Now, if you're clinging to your ego and its little world and hanging on, and the deity wants to open you, the wrathful aspect comes. It seems to you terrible. But if you are open, and open enough, then that same deity would be experienced as bliss.

BILL MOYERS: Well, Jesus talked of bringing a sword, and I don't believe he meant that in terms of using it against your fellow [man], but he meant it in terms of opening the ego, I came to cut you free from the blinding ego of your own self-centeredness.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: This is what's known in Sanskrit as Viveka, discrimination, and there is a Buddha figure called Manjushri, who will be...who's shown with a flaming sword over his head.

BILL MOYERS: Yes.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: And what is the sword for? It's to distinguish the merely temporal from the eternal. It's the sword that distinguishes that which is enduring from that which is merely passing. The tick-tick-tick of time shuts out eternity, and we live in the field of time. But what is living in the field of time is an eternal principle that's inflected this way.

BILL MOYERS: What's the eternal principle?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Brahman.

BILL MOYERS: Which is?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Well, we call it God, but that personifies it, do you see. That's...

BILL MOYERS: It is the experience of eternity.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Yeah.

BILL MOYERS: The experience of the eternal.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: As what you are.

BILL MOYERS: Yes.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: I would say, that's...

BILL MOYERS: That whatever eternity is, is here right now.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: And nowhere else, or everywhere else. If you don't experience it now, you're never going to get it. Because when you get to heaven, that's not eternal, that's just everlasting. Heaven lasts a long time; it's not eternal, it's everlasting.

BILL MOYERS: I don't follow that, now.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: The eternal is beyond time; the concept of time shuts out eternity.

BILL MOYERS: Time is our invention.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Our experience, yeah. But the ultimate, unqualified mystery is beyond human experience, it becomes inflected. As they say, there is a condescension on the part of the infinite to the mind of man, and that is what looks like God.

BILL MOYERS: So whatever it is we experience, we have to express in language that is just not up to the occasion.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: That's it.

BILL MOYERS: It's inadequate.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: That's what poetry is for. Poetry is a language that has to be penetrated, it doesn't shut you off, it opens, it's the rhythm, the precise choice of words that will have implications and suggestions that go past the word, is what has to happen. And then you get what Joyce calls the radiance, the epiphany. The epiphany is the showing through of the essence, what Aquinas called the quidditas, the whatness. The whatness is the Brahman.

BILL MOYERS: Why do you think it is there is in so many people this deep yearning to live forever, to secure my place in heaven?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: When you realize what heaven is, I mean, in the works of such persons as Thomas Aquinas, it is the beholding of the beatific image of God, which is a timeless moment, you know, time explodes. So again, eternity is not something everlasting, and you can have it right here now in your relationships. I've lost a lot of friends, and my parents and all, and a realization that has come to me very, very keenly is that I haven't lost them, that that moment when I was with them had an everlasting quality about it that is now still with me. What it gave me is still with me. And there's a kind of intimation of immortality in that. Do you see what I mean?

Now, there's a wonderful work of Schopenhauer's; he says, "When you reach a certain age," and he wrote this when he was in his 60s or so, "and look back over your life, it seems to have had an order. It seems to have had been composed by someone. And those events that when they occurred seemed merely accidental and occasional and just something that happened, turn out to be the main elements in a consistent plot." So he says, "Who composed this plot?" And he said, "And just as your dreams are composed by an aspect of yourself, of which your consciousness is unaware, so your whole life has been composed by the will within you." Then he says, "Just as those people whom you met by chance became effective agents in the structuring of your life, so you have been an agent in the structuring of other lives, and the whole thing gears together like one big symphony," he says, "everything influencing and structuring everything else." And he said, "It's as though our lives were the dream of a single dreamer, in which all the dream characters are dreaming too, and so everything links to everything else, moved out of the will in nature."

That's a beautiful idea. It's an idea that occurs in India, in the image of what's called the "Nee of Indra" or the net of gems. Where it's a net of gems where every gem reflects all the other ones. And they also have the idea of a spontaneous and simultaneous arising. Everything arises in relation to everything else, and so you can't blame anybody for anything; it's all working around. It's a marvelous idea. It's as though there were an intention behind it, and yet it all is by chance. None of us has lived the life that he intended.

BILL MOYERS: And yet we all have lived a life that had a purpose. Do you believe that?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: I don't believe life has a real purpose. I mean, when you really see what life is, it's a lot of protoplasm with an urge to reproduce and continue in being.

BILL MOYERS: Not true. That's, not true, you...

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Well, now, wait a minute. Just sheer life can't be said to have a purpose, because look at all the different purposes it has all over the lot. But each incarnation, you might say, has the potentiality and the function of life is to live that potentiality. Well, how do you do it? Well, again when my students would ask, you know, should I do this, should I do that? Dad says I should do this, and my answer is, follow your bliss. There's something inside you that knows you're in the center, that knows you're on the beam, that knows you're off the beam. And if you get off the beam to earn money, you've lost your life.

BILL MOYERS: So it is not the destination that counts, it's the journey.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Yes. There is a wonderful old man, I think he's, still alive, in Germany, the Graf Karlfried, Karlfried Graf Durckheim. And he says, "When you're on a journey and the end keeps getting further and further away, then you've realized that the real end is the journey." That's not bad. This is it, this moment now is the heavenly moment, and...

BILL MOYERS: I like the idea that Eden was not: Eden will be.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Eden is. "The kingdom of the father is spread upon the earth, and men do not see it" I mean, Eden is.

BILL MOYERS: There's some image of Shiva, the god Shiva surrounded by circles of flames, rings of fire.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: That's the dance of the world, the dancer whose dance is the universe. And in this hand he has a little drum that goes tick-tick-tick. That is the drum of time. The tick of time, which shuts out eternity, and we are enclosed in that. In this hand there is a flame, which burns away the veil of time and opens us up to eternity. And in his hair is a skull and a new moon, the death and rebirth at the same moment, the moment of becoming.

BILL MOYERS: That's a powerful image for any life, not just...

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Well, the goal of your quest for yourself is to find that burning point in your point, that becoming thing in yourself, which is fearless and desireless, but just becoming. This is the condition of warrior going into battle with perfect courage. That's life in movement. A plant growing, I think of grass, you know. Every two weeks a chap comes out with a lawn mower and cuts it down. Suppose the grass were to say, well, for Pete's sake, what's the use? It's the coming into being that's it, and that's the life point in you, and that's what these myths are concerned to communicate to you.

BILL MOYERS: Well, I've always interpreted that powerful, mysterious statement, "The Word was made flesh," as the eternal principle finding itself in the human journey, the human experience.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Yes.

BILL MOYERS: Now, I don't know what the Word is, and I don't even know what flesh is, but I know that there is that experience of epiphany, when you meet what you don't know and understand it.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Yeah, and you can find it in yourself, too, the Word in yourself.

BILL MOYERS: Where do you find it, if you don't find it in yourself?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Well, right. Goethe says, "All things are metaphors." Alles vergangliche ist nur ein gleiches." Everything that's transitory is but a metaphorical reference. That's what we all are, and to see the Word, getting back to that, your radiance that we spoke of before comes out here again now.

BILL MOYERS: But how does one worship a metaphor, love a metaphor, die for a metaphor?

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Well, that's what people are doing all over the place. That's what people are doing all over the place, dying for metaphors. And when you really realize the sound Aum, the sound of the mystery of the Word everywhere, then you don't have to go out and die for anything, because it's right there all around, and just sit still and see it and experience it and know it.

BILL MOYERS: Explain "Aum." That's the first time you've used that.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Well, "Aum" is a word that, what can I say, represents to our ears that sound of the energy of the universe, of which all things are manifestations. And "Aum", it's a wonderful word, it's written A-U-M. You start in the back of the mouth, Ah, and then, Ooh, you fill the mouth, and M-m-m, closes it, the mouth. And when you have pronounced this properly, all vowel sounds are in that pronunciation: "Aum". And consonants are regarded simply as interruptions of "Aum", and all words are thus fragments of "Aum", as all images are fragments of the form of forms, of which all things are just reflections. And so "Aum" is a symbol, a symbolic sound, that puts you in touch with that throbbing being that is the universe.

And when you hear some of these Tibetan monks that are over here from the Rgyud Stod monastery outside of Lhasa, when they sing the "Aum," you know what it means, all right That's the zoom of being in the world. And to be in touch with that and to get the sense of that, that is the peak experience of all. "Ab-oo-h-mm." The birth, the coming into being, and the solution to the cycle of that. And it's just called the four-element syllable. What is the fourth element? "Ah-oo-h-mm," and the silence out of which it comes, back into which it goes, and which underlies it.

Now, my life is the "Ah-oo-h-mm," but there is a silence that underlies it, and that is what we would call the immortal. This is the mortal, and that's the immortal, and there wouldn't be this if there weren't that.

BILL MOYERS: The meaning is essentially wordless.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: Yes. Well, words are always qualifications and limitations.

BILL MOYERS: And yet, Joe, all we puny human beings are left with is this miserable language, beautiful though it is, that falls short of trying to describe...

JOSEPH CAMPBELL: That's right And that's why it's a peak experience to break past all that every now and then, to realize "oh, ah," I think so.

See [all features related to Joseph Campbell and the Power of Myth](#).

Karl Polyani
from The Great Transformation, Rinehart & Company, Inc, 1944

Chapter IV, SOCIETIES AND ECONOMIC SYSTEMS (pp 43 - 55)

Before we can proceed to the discussion of the laws governing a market economy, such as the nineteenth century was trying to establish, we must first have a firm grip on the extraordinary assumptions underlying such a system. (43)

Market economy implies a self-regulating system of markets; in slightly more technical terms, it is an economy directed by market prices and nothing but market prices. Such a system capable of organizing the whole of economic life without outside help or interference would certainly deserve to be called self-regulating. These rough indications should suffice to show the entirely unprecedented nature of such a venture in the history of the race. (43)

Let us make our meaning more precise. No society could, naturally, live for any length of time unless it possessed an economy of some sort; but previously to our time no economy has ever existed that, even in principle, was controlled by markets. In spite of the chorus of academic incantations so persistent in the nineteenth century, gain and profit made on exchange never before played an important part in human economy. Though the institution of the market was fairly common since the later Stone Age, its role was no more than incidental to economic life. (43)

We have good reason to insist on this point with all the emphasis at our command. No less a thinker than Adam Smith suggested that the division of labor in society was dependent upon the existence of markets, or, as he puts it, upon man's "propensity to barter, truck and exchange one thing for another." This phrase was later to yield the concept of the Economic Man. In retrospect it can be said that no misreading of the past ever proved more prophetic of the future. For while up to Adam Smith's time that propensity had hardly shown up on a considerable scale in the life of any observed community, and had remained, at best, a subordinate feature of economic life, a hundred years later an industrial system was in full swing over the major part of the planet which, practically and theoretically, implied that the human race was swayed in all its economic activities, if not also in its political intellectual, and spiritual pursuits, by that one particular propensity. Herbert Spencer, in the second half of the nineteenth century, could without more than a cursory acquaintance with economics, equate the principle of the division of labor with barter and exchange, and another fifty years later, Ludwig von Mises and Walter Lippmann could repeat the same fallacy. By that time there was no need for argument. A host of writers on political economy, social history, political philosophy, and general sociology had followed in Smith's wake and established his paradigm of the bartering savage as an

axiom of their respective sciences. In point of fact, Adam Smith's suggestions about the economic psychology of early man were as false as Rousseau's were on the political psychology of the savage. Division of labor, a phenomenon as old as society, springs from differences inherent in the facts of sex, geography, and individual endowment; and the alleged propensity of man to barter, truck, and exchange is almost entirely apocryphal. While history and ethnography know of various kinds of economies, most of them comprising the institution of markets they know of no economy prior to our own, even approximately controlled and regulated by markets. This will become abundantly clear from a bird's-eye view of the history of economic systems and of markets, presented separately. The role played by markets in the internal economy of the various countries it will appear, was insignificant up to recent times and the changeover to an economy dominated by the market pattern will stand out all the more clearly. (43, 44)

To start with, we must discard some nineteenth century prejudice that underlay Adam Smith's hypothesis about primitive man's alleged predilection for gainful occupations. Since his axiom was much more relevant to the immediate future than to the dim past, it induced in his followers a strange attitude toward man's early history. On the face of it, the evidence seemed to indicate that primitive man, far from having a capitalistic psychology, had, in effect, a communistic one (later this also proved to be mistaken). Consequently, economic historians tended to confine their interest to that comparatively recent period of history in which truck and exchange were found on any considerable scale, primitive economics was relegated to prehistory. Unconsciously, this led to a weighting of the scales in favor of a marketing psychology, for within the relatively short period of the last few centuries everything might be taken to tend towards the establishment of that which we eventually established, ie., a market system, irrespective of other tendencies which were temporarily submerged. The corrective of such a "short-run" perspective would obviously have been the linking up of economic history with social anthropology, a course which was consistently avoided. (44, 45)

We cannot continue today on these lines. The habit of looking at the last ten thousand years as well as at the array of early societies as a mere prelude to the true history of our civilization which started approximately with the publication of the Wealth of Nations in 1776, is, to say the least, out of date. It is this episode, which has come to a close in our days, and in trying to gauge the alternatives of the future, we should subdue our natural proneness to follow the proclivities of our fathers. But the same bias which made Adam Smith's generation view primeval man as bent on barter and truck induced their successors to disavow all interest in early man, as he was now known not to have indulged in those laudable passions. The tradition of the classical economists, who attempted to base the law of the market on the alleged propensities of man in the state of nature, was replaced by an abandonment of all interest in the cultures of "uncivilized" man as irrelevant to an understanding of the problems of our age. (45)

Such an attitude of subjectivism in regard to earlier civilizations should make no appeal to the scientific mind. The differences existing between civilized and "uncivilized" peoples have been vastly exaggerated, especially in the economic sphere. According to the historians, the forms of industrial life in agricultural Europe were, until recently, not much different from what they had been several thousand years. Ever since the introduction of the plow – essentially a large hoe drawn by animals – the methods of agriculture remained substantially unaltered over the major part of Western and Central Europe until the beginning of the modern age. Indeed, the progress of civilization was, in these regions, mainly political intellectual and spiritual; in respect to material conditions, the Western Europe of 1100 AD had hardly caught up with the Roman world of a thousand years before. Even later, change flowed more easily in the channels of statecraft, literature, and the arts, but particularly in those of religion and learning, than in those of industry. In its economics, medieval Europe was largely on a level with ancient Persia, India, or China, and certainly not rival in riches and culture the New Kingdom of Egypt, two thousand years before. Max Weber was the first among modern historians to protest against the brushing aside of primitive economics as irrelevant to the question of the motives and mechanisms of civilized societies. The subsequent work of social anthropology proved him emphatically right. For, if one conclusion stands out from the recent study of early societies it is the changelessness of man as a social being. His natural endowments reappear with societies of all times and places; and the necessary preconditions of the survival of human society appear to be immutably the same. (45, 46)

The outstanding discovery of recent historical and anthropological research is that man's economy, as a rule, is submerged in his social relationships. He does not act so as to safeguard his individual interest in the possession of material goods; he acts so as to safeguard his social standing, his social claims, his social assets. He values material goods only in so far as they serve this end. Neither the process of production nor that of distribution is linked to specific economic interests attached to the possession of goods; but every single step in that process is geared to a number of social interests, which eventually ensure that the required step be taken. These interests will be very different in a small hunting or fishing community from those in a vast despotic society, but in either case the economic system will be run on non-economic motives.

The explanation, in term of survival, is simple. Take the case of a tribal society. The individual's economic interest is rarely paramount for the community keeps all its members from starving unless it is itself borne down by catastrophe, in which case interests are again threatened collectively, not individually. The maintenance of social ties, on the other hand, is crucial. First, because by disregarding the accepted code of honor, or generosity, the individual cuts himself off from the community and becomes an outcast; second, because, in the long run, all social obligations are reciprocal, and their fulfillment serves also the

individual's give-and-take interests best. Such a situation must exert a continuous pressure on the individual to eliminate economic self-interest from his consciousness to the point of making him unable, in many cases (but by no means in all), even to comprehend the implication of his own actions in term of such an interest. This attitude is reinforced by the frequency of communal activities such as partaking of food from the common catch or sharing in the results of some far-flung and dangerous tribal expedition. The premium set on generosity is a great when measured in terms of social prestige as to make any other behavior than that of utter self-forgetfulness simply not pay. Personal character has little to do with the matter. Man can be as good or evil as social or asocial, jealous or generous, in respect to one another. Not to allow anybody reason for jealousy is, indeed, an accepted principle of ceremonial distribution, just as publicly bestowed praise is the due of the industrious, skillful, or otherwise successful gardener (unless he be too successful, in which case he may deservedly be allowed to wither away under the delusion of being the victim of black magic). The human passions, good or bad, are merely directed towards non-economic ends. Ceremonial display serves to spur emulation to the utmost and the custom of communal labor tends to up both quantitative and qualitative standards to the highest pitch. The performance of all acts of exchange as free gifts that are expected to be reciprocated though not necessarily by the same individuals – a procedure minutely articulated and perfectly safeguarded by elaborate methods of publicity, by magic rites, and by the establishment of "dualities" in which groups are linked in mutual obligations – should in itself explain the absence of the notion of gain or even of wealth other than that consisting of objects traditionally enhancing social prestige. (46, 47)

In this sketch of the general traits characteristic of a Western Melanesian community we took no account of its sexual and territorial organization, in reference to which custom, law, magic, and religion exert their influence, as we only intended to show the manner in which so-called economic motives spring from the context of social life. For it is on this one negative point that modern ethnographers agree: the absence of the motive of gain; the absence of the principle of laboring for remuneration; the absence of the principle of least effort; and, especially, the absence of any separate and distinct institution based on economic motives. But how, then, is order in production and distribution ensured? The answer is provided in the main by two principles of behavior not primarily associated with economics: reciprocity, and redistribution. With the Trobriand Islanders of Western Melanesia, who serve as an illustration of this type of economy, reciprocity works mainly in regard to the sexual organization of society, that is, family and kinship; redistribution is mainly effective in respect to all those who are under a common chief and is, therefore, of a territorial character. Let us take these principles separately. (47)

The sustenance of the family - the female and the children - is the obligation of matrilineal relatives. The male, who provides for his sister, and her family by delivering the finest specimens of his crop, will mainly earn credit due to his good

behavior, but will reap little immediate material benefit in exchange; if he is slack, it is first and foremost his reputation that will suffer. It is for the benefit of his wife and her children that the principle of reciprocity will work, and thus compensate him economically for his acts of civic virtue. Ceremonial display of food both in his own garden and before the recipient's storehouse will ensure that the high quality of his gardening be known to all. It is apparent that the economy of garden and household here forms part of the social relations connected with good husbandry and fine citizenship. The broad principle of reciprocity helps to safeguard both production and family sustenance. (47, 48)

The principle of redistribution is no less effective. A substantial part of all the produce of the island is delivered by the village headmen to the chief who keeps it in storage. But as all communal activity centers around the feasts, dances, and other occasions when the islanders entertain one another as well as their neighbors from other islands (at which the results of long distance trading are handed out, gifts are given and reciprocated according to the rules of etiquette, and the chief distributes the customary presents to all), the overwhelming importance of the storage system becomes apparent. Economically, it is an essential part of the existing system of division of labor, of foreign trading, of taxation for public purposes, of defense provisions. But these functions of an economic system proper are completely absorbed by the intensely vivid experiences, which offer superabundant non-economic motivation for every act performed in the frame of the system as a whole. (48)

However, principles of behavior such as these cannot become effective unless existing institutional patterns lend themselves to their application. Reciprocity and redistribution are able to ensure the working of an economic system without the help of written records and elaborate administration only because the organization of the societies in question meets the requirements of such a solution with the help of patterns such as symmetry and centrality. (48)

Reciprocity is enormously facilitated by the institutional pattern of symmetry, a frequent feature of social organization among non-literate peoples. The striking "duality" which we find in tribal subdivisions lends itself to the pairing out of individual relations and thereby assists the give-and-take of goods and services in the absence of permanent records. The moieties of savage society, which tend to create a "pendant", to each subdivision, turned out to result from, as well as help to perform, the acts of reciprocity on which the system rests. Little is known of the origin of "duality"; but each coastal village on the Trobriand Islands appears to have its counterpart in an inland village, so that the important exchange of breadfruits and fish, though disguised as a reciprocal distribution of gifts, and actually disjoint in time, can be organized smoothly. In the Kula trade, too, each individual has his partner on another isle, thus personalizing to a remarkable extent the relationship of reciprocity. But for the frequency of the symmetrical pattern in the subdivisions of the tribe, in the location of settlements,

as well as in intertribal relations, a broad reciprocity relying on the long run working of separated acts of give-and-take would be impracticable. (48, 49)

The institutional pattern of centrality, again, which is present to some extent in all human groups, provides a track for the collection, storage, and redistribution of goods and services. The members of a hunting tribe usually deliver the game to the headman for redistribution. It is in the nature of hunting that the output of game is irregular, besides being the result of a collective input. Under conditions such as these no other method of sharing is practicable if the group is not to break up after every hunt. Yet in all economies of kind a similar need exists, be the group ever so numerous. And the larger the territory and the more varied the produce, the more will redistribution result in an effective division of labor, since it must help to link up geographically differentiated groups of producers. (49)

Symmetry and centrality will meet halfway the needs of reciprocity and redistribution; institutional patterns and principles of behavior are mutually adjusted. As long as social organization runs in its ruts, no individual economic motives need come into play; no shirking of personal effort need be feared; division of labor will automatically be ensured; economic obligations will be duly discharged; and, above all, the material means for an exuberant display of abundance at all public festivals will be provided. In such a community the idea of profit is barred; higgling and haggling is decried; giving freely is acclaimed as a virtue; the supposed propensity to barter, truck, and exchange does not appear. The economic system is, in effect, a mere function of social organization. (49)

It should by no means be inferred that socioeconomic principles of this type are restricted to primitive procedures or small communities; that a gainless and marketless economy must necessarily be simple. The Kula ring, in western Melanesia, based on the principle of reciprocity, is one of the most elaborate trading transactions known to man; and redistribution was present on a gigantic scale in the civilization of the pyramids. (49, 50)

The Trobriand Islands belong to an archipelago forming roughly a circle, and an important part of the population of this archipelago spends a considerable proportion of its time in activities of the Kula trade. We describe it as trade though no profit is involved, either in money or in kind; no goods are hoarded or even possessed permanently; the goods received are enjoyed by giving them away; no biggling and haggling, no truck, barter, or exchange enters; and the whole proceedings are entirely regulated by etiquette and magic. Still, it is trade, and large expeditions are undertaken periodically by natives of this approximately ring-shaped archipelago in order to carry one kind of valuable object to peoples living on distant islands situated clockwise, while other expeditions are arranged carrying another kind of valuable object to the islands of the archipelago lying counterclockwise. In the long run, both sets of objects—white-shell armbands and redshell necklaces of traditional make—will move round the archipelago, a trajectory which may take them up to ten years to complete. Moreover, there are, as a rule,

individual partners in Kula who reciprocate one another Kula gift with equally valuable armbands and necklaces, referably such that have previously belonged to distinguished persons. Now, a systematic and organized give-and-take of valuable objects transported over long distances is justly described as trade. Yet this complex whole is exclusively run on the lines of reciprocity. An intricate time-space-person system covering hundreds of miles and several decades, linking many hundreds of people in respect to thousands of strictly individual objects, is being handled here without any records or administration, but also without any motive of gain or truck. Not the propensity to barter, but reciprocity in social behavior dominates. Nevertheless, the result is a stupendous organizational achievement in anomic field. Indeed, it would be interesting to consider whether even the most advanced modern market organization, based on exact accountancy, would be able to cope with such a task, should it care to undertake it. It is to be feared that the unfortunate dealers, faced innumerable monopolists buying and selling individual objects with extravagant restrictions attached to each transaction, would fail to make a standard profit and might prefer to go out of business. (50)

Redistribution also has its long and variegated history, which leads up almost to modern times. The Bergdama returning from his hunting excursion, the woman coming back from her search for roots, fruit, or leaves are expected to offer the greater part of their spoil for the benefit of the community. In practice, this means that the produce of their activity is shared with the other persons who happen to be living with them. Up to this point the idea of reciprocity prevails: today's giving will be recompensed by tomorrow's taking. Among some tribes, however, there is an intermediary in the person of the headman or other prominent member of the group; it is he who receives and distributes the supplies, especially if they need to be stored. This is redistribution proper. Obviously, the social consequences of such a method of distribution may be far reaching, since not all societies are as democratic as the primitive hunters. Whether the redistributing is performed by an influential family or an outstanding individual, a ruling aristocracy or a group of bureaucrats, they will often attempt to increase their political power by the manner in which they redistribute the goods. In the potlatch of the Kwakiutl it is a point of honor with the chief to display his wealth of hides and to distribute them; but he does this also in order to place the recipients under an obligation, to make them his debtors, and ultimately, his retainers. (51)

All large-scale economies in kind were run with the help of the principle of redistribution. The kingdom of Hammurabi in Babylonia and, in particular, the New Kingdom of Egypt were centralized despotisms of a bureaucratic type founded on such an economy. The household of the patriarchal family was reproduced here on an enormously enlarged scale, while its "communistic" distribution was graded, involving sharply differentiated rations. A vast number of storehouses was ready to receive the produce of the peasant's activity, whether he was cattle breeder, hunter, baker, brewer, potter, weaver, or whatever else. The produce was minutely registered and, in so far as it was not consumed

locally, transferred from smaller to larger storehouses until it reached the central administration situated at the court of the Pharaoh. There were separate treasure houses for cloth, works of art, ornamental objects, cosmetics, silverware, the royal wardrobe; there were huge grain stores, arsenals, and wine cellars.(51)

But redistribution on the scale practiced by the pyramid builders was not restricted to economies which knew not money. Indeed, all archaic kingdoms made use of metal currencies for the payment of taxes and salaries, but relied for the rest on payments in kind from granaries and warehouses of every description, from which they distributed the most varied goods for use and consumption mainly to the non producing part of the population, that is, to the officials, the military, and the leisure class. This was the system practiced in ancient China, in the empire, of the Incas, in the kingdoms of India, and also in Babylonia. In these, and many other civilizations of vast economic achievement, an elaborate division of labor was worked by the mechanism of redistribution.(51, 52)

Under feudal conditions also this principle held. In the ethnically stratified societies of Africa it sometimes happens that the superior consist of herdsmen settled among agriculturalists who are still strating the digging stick or the hoe. The gifts collected by the herdsmen are mainly agricultural - such as cereals and beer - while the gifts distributed by them may be animals, especially sheep or goats. In these cases there is division of labor, though usually an unequal one, between the various strata of society: distribution may often cover up a measure of exploitation, while at the same time the symbiosis benefits the standards of both strata owing to the advantages of an improved division of labor. Politically, such societies live under a regime of feudalism, whether cattle or land be the privileged value. There are "regular cattle fiefs in East Africa." Thurnwald, whom we follow closely on the subject of redistribution, could therefore say that feudalism implied everywhere a system of redistribution. Only under very advanced conditions and exceptional circumstances does this system become predominantly political as happened in Western Europe, where the change arose out of the vassal's need for protection, and gifts were converted into feudal tributes.(52)

These instances show that redistribution also tends to enmesh the economic system proper in social relationships. We find, as a rule, the process of redistribution forming part of the prevailing political regime, whether it be that of tribe, city-state, despotism, or feudalism of cattle or land. The production and distribution of goods is organized in the main through collection, storage, and redistribution, the pattern being focused on the chief, the temple, the despot, or the lord. Since the relations of the leading group to the led are different according to the foundation on which political power rests, the principle of redistribution will involve individual motives as different as the voluntary sharing of the game by hunters and the dread of punishment which urges the fellaheen to deliver his taxes in kind. (52)

We deliberately disregarded in this presentation the vital distinction between homogeneous and stratified societies, i.e., societies which are on the whole socially unified, and such as are split into rulers and ruled. Though the relative status of slaves and masters may be worlds apart from that of the free and equal members of some hunting tribes, and consequently, motives in the two societies will differ widely, the organization of the economic system may still be based on the same principles, though accompanied by very different culture traits, according to the very different human relations with which the economic system is intertwined.(52, 53)

The third principle, which was destined to play a big role in history and which we will call the principle of house holding, consists in production for one's own use. The Greeks called it *oekonomia*, the etymon of the word "economy." As far as ethnographical records are concerned, we should not assume that production for a person's or group's own sake is more ancient than reciprocity or redistribution. On the contrary, orthodox tradition as well as some more recent theories on the subject have been emphatically disproved. The individualistic savage collecting food and hunting on his own or for his family has never existed. Indeed, the practice of catering for the needs of one's household becomes a feature of economic life only on a more advanced level of agriculture; however, even then it has nothing in common either with the motive of gain or with the institution of markets. Its pattern is the closed group. Whether the very different entities of the family or the settlement or the manor formed the self-sufficient unit, the principle was invariably the same, namely, that of producing and storing for the satisfaction of the wants of the members of the group. The principle is as broad in its application as either reciprocity or redistribution. The nature of the institutional nucleus is indifferent: it may be sex as with the patriarchal family, locality as with the village settlement, or political power as with the seigneurial manor. Nor does the internal organization of the group matter. It may be as despotic as the Roman *familia* or as democratic as the South Slav *zadruga*; as large as the, great domains of the Carolingian magnates or as small as the average peasant holding of Western Europe. The need for trade or markets is, no greater than in the case of reciprocity or redistribution.(52, 53)

It is such a condition of affairs which Aristotle tried to establish as a norm more than two thousand years ago. Looking back from the rapidly declining heights of a world-wide market economy we must concede that his famous distinction of householding proper and moneymaking, in the introductory chapter of his *Politics*, was probably the most prophetic pointer ever made in the realm of the social sciences; it is certainly still the best analysis of the subject we possess. Aristotle insists on production for use as against production for gain as the essence of householding proper; yet accessory production for the market need not, he argues, destroy the self-sufficiency of the household as long as the cash crop would also otherwise be raised on the farm for sustenance, as cattle or grain; the sale of the surpluses need not destroy the basis of householding. Only

a genius of common sense could have maintained, as he did, that gain was a motive peculiar to production for the market, and that the money factor introduced a new element into the situation, yet nevertheless, as long as markets and money were mere accessories to an otherwise self-sufficient household, the principle of production for use could operate. Undoubtedly, in this he was right, though he failed to see how impracticable it was to ignore the existence of markets at a time when Greek economy had made itself dependent upon wholesale trading and loaned capital. For this was the century when Delos and Rhodes were developing into emporia of freight insurance, sea-loans, and giro-banking, compared with which the Western Europe of a thousand years later was the very picture of primitivity. Yet Jowett, Master of Balliol, was grievously mistaken when he took it for granted that his Victorian England had a fairer grasp than Aristotle of the nature of the difference between householding and moneymaking. He excused Aristotle by conceding that the "subjects of knowledge that are concerned with man run into one another; and in the age of Aristotle were not easily distinguished." Aristotle, it is true, did not recognize clearly the implications of the division of labor and its connection with markets and money; nor did he realize the uses of money as credit and capital. So far Jowett's strictures were justified. But it was the Master of Balliol, not Aristotle, who was impervious to the human implications of money-making. He failed to see that the distinction between the principle of use and that of gain was the key to the utterly different civilization the outlines of which Aristotle accurately forecast two thousand years before its advent out of the bare rudiments of a market economy available to him, while Jowett, with the full-blown specimen before him, overlooked its existence. In denouncing the principle of production for gain "as not natural to man," as boundless and limitless, Aristotle was, in effect, aiming at the crucial point, namely the divorcedness of a separate economic motive from the social relations in which these limitations inhered. (53, 54)

Broadly, the proposition holds that all economic systems known to us up to the end of feudalism in Western Europe were organized either on the principles of reciprocity or redistribution, or householding, or some combination of the three. These principles were institutionalized with the help of a social organization which, inter alia, made use of the patterns of symmetry, centrality, and autarchy. In this framework, the orderly production and distribution of goods was secured through a great variety of individual motives disciplined by general principles of behavior. Among these motives gain was not prominent. Custom and law, magic and religion co-operated in inducing the individual to comply with rules of behavior which, eventually, ensured his functioning in the economic system. (54, 55)

The Greco-Roman period, in spite of its highly developed trade, represented no break in this respect; it was characterized by the grand scale on which redistribution of grain was practiced by the Roman administration in an otherwise householding economy, and it formed no exception to the rule that up to the end

of the Middle Ages, markets played no important part in the economic system; other institutional patterns prevailed.(55)

From the sixteenth century onwards markets were both numerous and important. Under the mercantile system they became, in effect, a main concern of government; yet there was still no sign of the coming control of markets over human society. On the contrary. Regulation and regimentation were stricter than ever; the very idea of a self-regulating market was absent. To comprehend the sudden changeover to an utterly new type of economy in the nineteenth century, we must now turn to the history of the market, an institution we were able practically to neglect in our review of the economic systems of the past. (55)

LORD MACAULAY

MINUTE ON INDIAN EDUCATION of the 2nd of February, 1835.

(EMPHASIS ADDED)

As it seems to be the opinion of some of the gentlemen who compose the Committee of Public Instruction, that the course which they have hitherto pursued was strictly prescribed by the British Parliament in 1813, and as, if that opinion be correct, a legislative act will be necessary to warrant a change, I have thought it right to refrain from taking any part in the preparation of the adverse statements which are now before us, and to reserve what I had to say on the subject till it should come before me as a member of the Council of India.

It does not appear to me that the Act of Parliament can, by any art of construction, be made to bear the meaning, which has been assigned to it. It contains nothing about the particular languages or sciences, which are to be studied. A sum was set apart **'for the revival and promotion of literature and the encouragement of the learned natives of India, and for the introduction and promotion of a knowledge of the sciences among the inhabitants of the British territories.'** It is argued, or rather taken for granted, that by literature, the Parliament can have meant only Arabic and Sanscrit literature, that they never would have given the honorable appellation of 'a learned native' to a native who was familiar with the poetry of Milton, the Metaphysics of Locke, and the Physics of Newton; but that they meant to designate by that name only such persons as might have studied in the sacred books of the Hindoos all the uses of cusa-grass, and all the mysteries of absorption into the Deity. This does not appear to be a very satisfactory interpretation. To take a parallel case; suppose that the Pacha of Egypt, a country once superior in knowledge to the nations of Europe, but now sunk far below them, were to appropriate a sum for the purpose of 'reviving and promoting literature, and encouraging learned natives of Egypt,' would anybody infer that he meant the youth of his pachalic to give years to the study of hieroglyphics, to search into all the doctrines disguised under the fable of Osiris, and to ascertain with all possible accuracy the ritual with which cats and onions were anciently adored? Would he be justly charged with inconsistency, if, instead of employing his young subjects in deciphering obelisks, he were to order them to be instructed in the English and French languages, and in all the sciences to which those languages are the chief keys?

The words on which the supporters of the old system rely do not bear them out, and other words follow which seem to be quite decisive on the other side. This lac of rupees is set apart, not only for 'reviving literature in India,' the phrase on which their whole interpretation is founded, but also for 'the introduction and promotion of a knowledge of the sciences among the inhabitants of the British territories,' - words which are alone sufficient to authorise all the changes for which I contend.

If the Council agree in my construction, no legislative act will be necessary. If they differ from me, I will prepare a short Act rescinding that clause of the Charter of 1813, from which the difficulty arises.

The argument, which I have been considering, affects only the form of proceeding. **But the admirers of the Oriental system of education have used another argument, which, if we admit it to be valid, is decisive against all change. They conceive that the public faith is pledged to the present system, and that to alter the appropriation of any of the funds, which have hitherto been spent in encouraging the study of Arabic and Sanscrit, would be down-right spoliation. It is not easy to understand by what process of reasoning they can have arrived at this conclusion. The grants, which are made from the public purse for the encouragement of literature, differed in no respect from the grants, which are made from the same purse for other objects of real or supposed utility.** We found a sanatorium on a spot, which we suppose to be healthy. Do we thereby pledge ourselves to keep a sanatorium there, if the result should not answer our expectation? We commence the erection of a pier. Is it a violation of the public faith to stop the works, if we afterwards see reason to believe that the building will be useless? The rights of property are undoubtedly sacred. But nothing endangers those rights so much as the practice, now unhappily too common, of attributing them to things to which they do not belong. **Those who would impart to abuses the sanctity of property are in truth imparting to the institution of property the unpopularity and the fragility of abuses. If the Government has given to any person a formal assurance; nay, if the Government has excited in any person's mind a reasonable expectation that he shall receive a certain income as a teacher or a learner of Sanscrit or Arabic, I would respect that person's pecuniary interests - I would rather err on the side of liberality to individuals than suffer the public faith to be called in question. But to talk of a Government pledging itself to teach certain languages and certain sciences, though those languages may become useless, though those sciences may be exploded, seems to me quite unmeaning. There is not a single word in any public instructions, from which it can be inferred that the Indian Government ever intended to give any pledge on this subject, or ever considered the destination of these funds as unalterably fixed. But had it been otherwise, I should have denied the competence of our predecessors to bind us by any pledge on such a subject.** Suppose that a Government had in the last century enacted in the most solemn manner that all its subjects should, to the end of time, be inoculated for the small-pox: would that Government be bound to persist in the practice after Jenner's discovery? These promises, of which nobody claims the performance, and from which nobody can grant a release; these vested rights, which vest in nobody; this property without proprietors; this robbery, which makes nobody poorer, may be comprehended by persons of higher faculties than mine. - I consider this plea merely as a *et form* of words, regularly used both in English and in India, in defence of every abuse for which no other plea can be set up.

I hold this lac of rupees to be quite at the disposal of the Governor-General in Council, for the purpose of promoting learning in India, in any way, which may be thought most advisable. I hold his Lordship to be quite as free to direct that it shall no longer be

employed in encouraging Arabic and Sanscrit, as he is to direct that the reward for killing tigers in Mysore shall be diminished, or that no more public money shall be expended on the chanting at the cathedral.

We now come to the gist of the matter. We have a fund to be employed as Government shall direct for the intellectual improvement of the people of this country. The simple question is, what is the most useful way of employing it?

All parties seem to be agreed on one point, that the dialects commonly spoken among the natives of this part of India, contain neither literary nor scientific information, and are, moreover, so poor and rude that, until they are enriched from some other quarter, it will not be easy to translate any valuable work into them. It seems to be admitted on all sides, that the intellectual improvements of those classes of the people who have the means of pursuing higher studies can at present be effected only by means of some language not vernacular amongst them.

What then shall that language be? One-half of the Committee maintain that it should be the English. The other half strongly recommends the Arabic and Sanscrit. The whole question seems to me to be, which language is the best worth knowing?

I have no knowledge of either Sanscrit or Arabic. But I have done what I could to form a correct estimate of their value. I have read translations of the most celebrated Arabic and Sanscrit words. I have conversed both here and at home with men distinguished by their proficiency in the Eastern tongues. **I am quite ready to take the Oriental learning at the valuation of the Orientalists themselves. I have never found one among them who could deny that a single shelf of a good European library was worth the whole native literature of India and Arabia. The intrinsic superiority of the Western literature is, indeed, fully admitted by those members of the Committee who support the Oriental plan of education.**

It will hardly be disputed, I suppose, that the department of literature in which the eastern writers stand highest in poetry. And I certainly never met with any Orientalist who ventured to maintain that the Arabic and Sanscrit poetry could be compared to that of the great European nations. But when we pass from works of imagination to works in which facts are recorded, and general principles investigated, the superiority of the Europeans becomes absolutely immeasurable. It is, I believe, no exaggeration to say, that all the historical information, which has been collected from all the books written in the Sanscrit, language is less valuable than what may be found in the most paltry abridgements used at preparatory schools in England. In every branch of physical or moral philosophy, the relative position of the two nations is nearly the same.

How, then, stands the case? We have to educate a people who cannot at present be educated by means of their mother-tongue. We must teach them some foreign language. The claims of our own language it is hardly necessary to recapitulate. It stands preeminent even among the languages of the west. It abounds with works of

imagination not inferior to the noblest which Greece has bequeathed to us; with models of every species of eloquence; with historical compositions, which, considered merely as narratives, have seldom been surpassed, and which, considered as vehicles of ethical and political instruction, have never been equalled; with just and lively representations of human life and human nature; with the most profound speculations on metaphysics, morals, government, jurisprudence, and trade; with full and correct information respecting every experimental science which tends to preserve the health, to increase the comfort, or to expand the intellect of man. Whoever knows that language has ready access to all the vast intellectual wealth, which all the wisest nations of the earth have created and hoarded in the course of ninety generations. It may safely be said, that the literature now extant in that language is of far greater value than all the literature which three hundred years ago was extant in all the languages of the world together. **Nor is this all. In India, English is the language is the spoken by the ruling class. It is spoken by the higher class of natives at the seats of Government. It is likely to become the language of commerce throughout the seas of the East. It is the language of two great European communities which are rising, the one on the south of Africa, the other in Australasia; communities which are every year becoming more important, and more closely connected with our Indian empire. Whether we look at the intrinsic value of our literature, or at the particular situation of this country, we shall see the strongest reason to think that, of all foreign tongues, the English tongue is that which would be the most useful tour native subjects.**

The question now before us is simply whether, when it is in our power to teach this language, we shall teach languages in which, by universal confession, there are no books on any subject which deserve to be compared to our own; whether, when we can teach European science, we shall teach systems which, by universal confession, whenever they differ from those of Europe, differ for the worse; and whether, when we can patronise sound Philosophy and true History, we shall countenance, at the public expense, medical doctrines, which would disgrace an English farrier, - Astronomy, which would move laughter in girls at an English boarding school, - History, abounding with kings thirty feet high, and reigns thirty thousand years long, - and Geography, made up of seas of treacle and seas of butter.

We are not without experience to guide us. History furnishes several analogous cases, and they all teach the same lesson. There are in modern times, to go nor further, two memorable instances of a great impulse given to the mind of a whole society, - of prejudices overthrown, - of knowledge diffused, - of taste purified, - of arts and sciences planted in countries which had recently been ignorant and barbarous.

The first instance to which I refer, is the great revival of letters among the Western nations at the close of the fifteenth and the beginning of the sixteenth century. At that time almost every thing that was worth reading was contained in the writings of the ancient Greeks and Romans. Had our ancestors acted as the Committee of Public Instruction has hitherto acted; had they neglected the language of Cicero and Tacitus; had they confined their attention to the old dialects of our own island; had they printed nothing and taught nothing at the universities but Chronicles in Anglo-

Saxon, and Romances in Norman-French, would England have been what she now is? What the Greek and Latin were to the contemporaries or More and Ascham, our tongue is to the people of India. The literature of England is now more valuable than of classical antiquity. I doubt whether the Sanscrit literature be as valuable as that of our Saxon and Norman progenitors. In some departments, - in History, for example, I am certain that it is much less so.

Another instance may be said to be still before our eyes. Within the last hundred and twenty years, a nation which had previously been in a state as barbarous as that in which our ancestors were before the crusades, has gradually emerged from the ignorance in which it was sunk, and has taken its place among civilised communities. - I speak of Russia. There is now in that country a large educated class, abounding with persons fit to serve the state in the highest functions, and in no wise inferior to the most accomplished men who adorn the best circles of Paris and London. There is reason to hope that this vast empire, which in the time of our grandfathers was probably behind the Punjab, may, in the time of our grandchildren, be pressing close on France and Britain in the career of improvement. And how was this change effected? Not by flattering national prejudices: not by feeding the mind of the young Muscovite with the old women's stories which his rude fathers had believed: not by filling his head with lying legends about St. Nicholas: not by encouraging him to study the great question, whether the world was or was not created on the 13th of September: not by calling him 'a learned native,' when he has mastered all these points of knowledge: but by teaching him those foreign languages in which the greatest mass of information within his reach. **The languages of Western Europe civilised Russia. I cannot doubt that they will do for the Hindoo what they have done for the Tartar.**

And what are the arguments against that course which seems to be alike recommended by theory and by experience? It is said that we ought to secure the co-operation of the native public, and that we can do this only by teaching Sanscrit and Arabic.

I can by no means admit that when a nation of high intellectual attainments undertakes to superintend the education of a nation comparatively ignorant, the learners are absolutely to prescribe the course, which is to be taken by the teachers. It is not necessary, however, to say any thing on this subject. **For it is proved by unanswerable evidence that we are not at present securing the co-operation of the natives. It would be bad enough to consult their intellectual taste at the expense of their intellectual health. But we are consulting neither, - we are withholding from them the learning for which they are craving, we are forcing them the mock-learning which they nauseate.**

This is proved by the fact that we are forced to pay our Arabic and Sanscrit students, while those who learn English are willing to pay us. All the declamations in the world about the love and reverence of the natives for their sacred dialects will never, in the mind of any impartial person, outweigh the undisputed fact, that we cannot find, in all our vast empire, a single student who will let us teach him those dialects unless we will pay him.

I have now before me the accounts of the Madrassa for one month, - the month of December, 1833. The Arabic students appear to have been seventy-seven in number. All receive stipends from the public. The whole amount paid to them is above 500 rupees a month. On the other side of the account stands the following item: Deduct amount realized from the out-students of English for the months of May, June and July last, 103 rupees.

I have been told that it is merely from want of local experience that I am surprised at these phenomena, and that it is not the fashion for students in India to study at their own charges. This only confirms me in my opinion. Nothing is more certain than that it never can in any part of the world be necessary to pay men for doing what they think pleasant and profitable. India is no exception to this rule. The people of India do not require to be paid for eating rice when they are hungry, or for wearing woollen cloth in the cold season. To come nearer to the case before us, the children who learn their letters and a little elementary Arithmetic from the village school-master are not paid by him. He is paid for teaching them. Why then is it necessary to pay people to learn Sanscrit and Arabic? Evidently because it is universally felt that the Sanscrit and Arabic are languages, the knowledge of which does not compensate for the trouble of acquiring them. On all such subjects the state of the market is the decisive test.

Other evidence is not wanting, if other evidence were required. A petition was presented last year to the Committee by several ex-students of the Sanscrit College. The petitioners stated that they had studied in the college ten or twelve years; that they had made themselves acquainted with Hindoo literature and science; that they had received certificates of proficiency: and what is the fruit of all this! 'Notwithstanding such testimonials,' they say, 'we have but little prospect of bettering our condition without the kind assistance of your Honorable Committee, the indifference with which we are generally looked upon by our countrymen leaving no hope of encouragement and assistance from them.' They therefore beg that they may be recommended to the Governor General for places under the Government, not places of high dignity or emolument, but such as may just enable them to exist. 'We want means,' they say, 'for a decent living, and for our progressive improvement, which, however, we cannot obtain without the assistance of Government, by whom we have been educated and maintained from childhood.' They conclude by representing, very pathetically, that they are sure that it was never the intention of Government, after behaving so liberally to them during their education, to abandon them to destitution and neglect.

I have been used to see petitions to Government for compensation. All these petitions, even the most unreasonable of them, proceeded on the supposition that some loss had been sustained - that some wrong had been inflicted. These are surely the first petitioners who ever demanded compensation for having been educated gratis, - for having been supported by the public during twelve years, and then sent forth into the world well furnished with literature and science. They represent their education as an injury, which gives them a claim on the Government for redress, as an injury for which the stipends paid to them during the infliction were a very

inadequate compensation. And I doubt not that they are in the right. They have wasted the best years of life in learning what procures for them neither bread nor respect. Surely we might, with advantage, have saved the cost of making these persons useless and miserable; surely, men may be brought up to be burdens to the public and objects of contempt to their neighbours at a somewhat smaller charge to the state. But such is our policy. We do not even stand neuter in the contest between truth and falsehood. We are not content to leave the natives to the influence of their own hereditary prejudices. To the natural difficulties, which obstruct the progress of sound science in the East, we add fresh difficulties of our making. Bounties and premiums, such as ought not to be given even for the propagation of truth, we lavish on false taste and false philosophy.

By acting thus we create the very evil which we fear. We are making that opposition which we do not find. What we spend on the Arabic and Sanscrit colleges is not merely a dead loss to the cause of truth; it is bounty-money paid to raise up champions of error. It goes to form a nest, not merely of helpless place-hunters, but of bigots prompted alike by passion and by interest to raise a cry against every useful scheme of education. If there should be any opposition among the natives to the change, which I recommend, that opposition will be the effect of our own system. It will be headed by persons supported by our stipends and trained in our colleges. The longer we persevere in our present course, the more formidable will that opposition be. It will be every year reinforced by recruits whom we are paying. **From the native society left to itself, we have no difficulties to apprehend; all the murmuring will come from that oriental interest which we have, by artificial means, called into being, and nursed into strength.**

There is yet another fact, which is alone sufficient to prove that the feeling of the native public, when left to itself, is not such as the supporters of the old system represent it to be. **The Committee have thought fit to lay out above a lac of rupees in printing Arabic and Sanscrit books. Those books find no purchasers. It is very rarely that a single copy is disposed of. Twenty-three thousand volumes, most of them folios and quartos, fill the libraries, or rather the lumber-rooms, of this body. The Committee contrive to get rid of some portion of their vast stock of oriental literature by giving books away. But they cannot give so fast as they print. About twenty thousand rupees a year are spent in adding fresh masses of waste paper to hoard which, I should think, is already sufficiently ample. During the last three years, about sixty thousand rupees have been expended in this manner. The sale of Arabic and Sanscrit books, during those three years, was not yielded quite one thousand rupees.** In the mean time the School-book Society is selling seven or eight thousand English volumes every year, and not only pays the expenses of printing, but realises a profit of 20 per cent on its outlay.

The fact that the Hindoo law is to be learned chiefly from Sanscrit books, and the Mahometan law from Arabic books, has been much insisted on, but seems not to bear at all on the question. We are commanded by Parliament to ascertain and digest the laws of India. The assistance of a law Commission has been given to us for that purpose. As soon as the code is promulgated, the Shasters and the Hedaya

will be useless to a Moonsiff or Sudder Ameen. I hope and trust that before the boys who are now entering at the Madrassa and the Sanscrit college have completed their studies, this great work will be finished. It would be manifestly absurd to educate the rising generation with a view to a state of things, which we mean to alter before they reach manhood.

But there is yet another argument, which seems even more untenable. It is said that the Sanscrit and Arabic are the languages in which the sacred books of a hundred millions of people are written, and that they are, on that account, entitled to peculiar encouragement. Assuredly it is the duty of the British Government in India to be not only tolerant, but neutral on all religious questions. But to encourage the study of a literature admitted to be of small intrinsic value, only because that literature inculcates that most serious errors on the most important subjects, is a course hardly reconcilable with reason, with morality, or even with that very neutrality which ought, as we all agree, to be sacredly preserved. It is confessed that a language is barren of useful knowledge. We are to teach it because it is fruitful of monstrous superstitions. We are to teach false History, false Astronomy, false Medicine, because we find them in company with a false religion. **We abstain, and I trust shall always abstain, from giving any public encouragement to those who are engaged in the work of converting natives to Christianity. And while we act thus, can we reasonably and decently bribe men and out of the revenues of the state to waste their youth in learning how they are to purify themselves after touching an ass, or what text of the Vedas they are to repeat to expiate the crime of killing a goat?**

It is taken for granted by the advocates of Oriental learning, that no native of this country can possibly attain more than a mere smattering of English. They do not attempt to prove this; but they perpetually insinuate it. They designate the education, which their opponents recommend as a mere spelling book education. They assume it as undeniable, that the question is between a profound knowledge of Hindoo and Arabian literature and science on the one side, and a superficial knowledge of the rudiments of English on the other. This is not merely an assumption, but an assumption contrary to all reason and experience. We know that foreigners of all nations do learn our language sufficiently to have access to all the most abstruse knowledge which it contains, sufficiently to relish even the more delicate graces of our most idiomatic writers. There are in this very town natives who are quite competent to discuss political or scientific questions with fluency and precision in the English language. I have heard the very question on which I am now writing discussed by native gentlemen with a liberality and an intelligence which would do credit to any member of the Committee of Public Instructions. Indeed it is unusual to find, even in the literary circles of the continent, any foreigner who can express himself in English with so much facility and correctness as we find in many Hindoos. Nobody, I suppose, will contend that English is so difficult to a Hindoo as Greek to an Englishman. Yet an intelligent English youth, in much smaller number of years than our unfortunate pupils pass at the Sanscrit college, becomes able to read, to enjoy, and even to imitate, not unhappily, the compositions of the best Greek Authors. Less than half the time which enables an

English youth to read Herodotus and Sophocles, ought to enable a Hindoo to read Hume and Milton.

To sum up what I have said, I think it clear that we are not fettered by the Act of Parliament of 1813; that we are not fettered by any pledge expressed or implied; that we are free to employ our funds as we choose; that we ought to employ them in teaching what is best worth knowing; that English is better worth knowing than Sanscrit or Arabic; that the natives are desirous to be taught English, and are not desirous to be taught Sanscrit or Arabic; that neither as the languages of law, nor as the languages of religion, have the Sanscrit and Arabic any peculiar claim to our engagement; that it is possible to make natives of this country thoroughly good English scholars, and that to this end our efforts ought to be directed.

In one point I fully agree with the gentlemen to whose general views I am opposed. I feel with them, that it is impossible for us, with our limited means, to attempt to educate the body of the people. We must at present do our best to form a class who may be interpreters between us and the millions whom we govern; a class of persons, Indian in blood and colour, but English in taste, in opinions, in morals, and in intellect. To that class we may leave it to refine the vernacular dialects of the country, to enrich those dialects with terms of science borrowed from the Western nomenclature, and to render them by degrees fit vehicles for conveying knowledge to the great mass of the population.

I would strictly respect all existing interests. I would deal even generously with all individuals who have had fair reason to expect a pecuniary provision. But I would strike at the root of the bad system, which has hitherto been fostered by us. I would at once stop the printing of Arabic and Sanscrit books, I would abolish the Madrassa and the Sanscrit college at Calcutta. Benares is the great seat of Brahmanical learning; Delhi, of Arabic learning. If we retain Sanscrit college at Benares and the Mahometan college at Delhi, we do enough, and much more than enough in my opinion, for the Eastern languages. If the Benares and Delhi colleges should be retained, I would at least recommend that no stipends shall be given to any students who may hereafter repair thither, but that the people shall be left to make their own choice between the rival systems of education without being bribed by us to learn what they have no desire to know. The funds which would thus have placed at our disposal would enable us to give larger encouragement to the Hindoo college at Calcutta, and to establish in the principal cities throughout the Presidencies of Fort William and Agra schools in which the English language might be well and thoroughly taught.

If the decision of his Lordship in Council should be such as I anticipate, I shall enter on the performance of my duties with the greatest zeal and alacrity. If, on the other hand, it be the opinion of the Government that the present system ought to remain unchanged, I beg that I may be permitted to retire from the chair of the Committee. I feel that I could not be of the smallest use there - I feel, also, that I should be lending my countenance to what I firmly believe to be a mere delusion. I believe that the present system tends, not to accelerate the progress of truth, but to delay the natural death of expiring errors. I

conceive that we have at present no right to the respectable name of a Board of Public Instruction. We are a Board for wasting public money, for printing books which are of less value than the paper on which they are printed was while it was blank; for giving artificial encouragement to absurd history, absurd metaphysics, absurd physics, absurd theology; for raising up a breed of scholars who find their scholarship an encumbrance and a blemish, who live on the public while they are receiving their education, and whose education is so utterly useless to them that when they have received it they must either starve or live on the public all the rest of their lives. Entertaining these opinions, I am naturally desirous to decline all share in the responsibility of a body, which, unless it alters its whole mode of proceeding, I must consider not merely as useless, but as positively noxious.

JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU ON GOVERNANCE

“When a great multitude of men, all strangers to one another, are brought together by the concentration of a central government in one place, talents lie buried; virtues are ignored, and vice tend to be unpunished. The rulers, overburdened with work, have first hand knowledge of nothing. The real governor of the State, in such cases is the Civil servant. The general effort is devoted to maintaining a governmental authority which it many scattered officials are forever trying either to avoid or to impose. Little enough is left over for the fostering of the public well being, and barely sufficient to guarantee national defense when the need arises. Consequently, when a body politic is too large for its constitution, it tends to collapse under the weight of its own superstructure.” Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Book II, Chapter IX, ‘Of the People’ in “The Social Contract”, 1762.

“He, therefore, who asks what, in an absolute sense, is the best sort of government, is putting a question which cannot be answered because it is indeterminate. In other words, it admits of as many good solutions as there are possible combinations in the absolute and relative situations of various peoples.

But if it be asked by what signs one may know whether a people be well or badly governed, the case is different, and the question of fact can be resolved

It never is resolved, however, because each man wishes to answer the question in his own way. The subject boasts of public law and order, the citizen of the freedom enjoyed by the individual. The first prefers security of property, the second that of the person. The first will maintain that the harshest government is the best, the second, the gentlest. The first wants to see crime punished, the second to make crime impossible. The first thinks it is fine thing for a country should be feared by its neighbors, the second prefers that they should ignore it. The first is happy when money circulates, the second demands bread for the people. Even if agreement be reached on these and similar points, are we any nearer to the answer there is no scale by which moral quantities can be assessed. We may agree on the signs, but can we agree about their relative merits?” Jean –Jacques Rousseau, Book III, Chapter IX, ‘Of the Marks of a Good government’ in “The Social Contract”, 1762

RUSSIA AT THE TURN OF THE MILLENNIUM

Vladimir Putin

The humankind lives under the sign of two signal events: the new millennium and the 2000th anniversary of Christianity. I think the general interest for and attention to these two events mean something more than just the tradition to celebrate red-letter dates.

New Possibilities, New Problems

It may be a coincidence - but then, it may be not - that the beginning of the new millennium coincided with a dramatic turn in world developments in the past 20-30 years. I mean the deep and quick changes in the life of humankind connected with the development of what we call the post-industrial society. Here are its main features.

*Changes in the economic structure of society, with the diminishing weight of material production and the growing share of secondary and tertiary sectors.

* The consistent renewal and quick introduction of novel technologies and the growing output of science-intensive commodities.

* The landslide development of the information science and telecommunications.

* Priority attention to management and the improvement of the system of organisation and guidance of all spheres of human endeavour.

* And lastly, human leadership. It is man and high standards of his education, professional training, business and social activity that are becoming the guiding force of progress today.

The development of a new type of society is a sufficiently lengthy process for the careful politicians, statesmen, scientists and all those who can use their brains to notice two elements of concern in this process.

The first is that changes bring not only new possibilities to improve life, but also new problems and dangers. They were initially and most clearly revealed in the ecological sphere. But other, and acute, problems were soon detected in all other spheres of social life. Even the most economically advanced states are not free from organised crime, growing cruelty and violence, alcoholism and drug addiction, the weakening durability and educational role of the family, and the like.

And the other alarming element is that far from all countries can use the boons of modern economy and the new standards of prosperity offered by it. The quick progress of science, technologies and advanced economy is underway in only a small number of states, populated by the so-called golden billion.

Quite a few other countries reached new economic and social development standards in this outgoing century. But it cannot be said that they joined the process of creating a post-industrial society. Most of them are still far away from the mere approaches to it. And there are grounds to believe that this gap will persist for quite some time yet.

This is probably why the humankind is peering into the future with both hope and fear at the turn of the new millennium.

Modern Situation in Russia

It would not be exaggeration to say that this feeling of hope and fear is expressed especially graphically in Russia. For there are few states in the world which faced so many trials as Russia in the 20th century.

First, Russia is not a state symbolising top standards of economic and social development now. And second, it is facing difficult economic and social problems.

Its GDP nearly halved in the 1990s, and its GNP is ten times smaller than in the USA and five times smaller than in China. After the 1998 crisis, the per capita GDP dropped to roughly 3,500 dollars, which is roughly five times smaller than the average indicator for the G7 states.

The structure of the Russian economy changed, with the key positions held by the fuel industry, power engineering, and the ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy. They account for some 15% of the GDP, 50% of the overall industrial output, and over 70% of exports.

Productivity in the real economy sector is extremely low. It rose to well nigh the world average in the production of raw materials and electricity, but is 20-24% of the US average in the other industries.

The technical and technological standards of finished commodities largely depend on the share of equipment that is less than five years old. It dwindled from 29% in 1990 to 4.5% in 1998. Over 70% of our machinery and equipment are over ten years old, which is more than two times the figure in the economically developed countries. This is the result of the consistently dwindling national investments, above all to the real economy sector. And foreign investors are not in a hurry to contribute to the development of Russian industries. The overall volume of direct foreign investments in Russia amounts to barely 11.5 billion dollars. China received as much as 43 billion dollars in foreign investments.

Russia has been reducing allocations on R&D, while the 300 largest transnational companies provided 216 billion dollars on R&D in 1997, and some 240 billion dollars in 1998. Only 5% of Russian enterprises are engaged in innovative production, whose scale is extremely low.

The lack of capital investments and insufficient attitude to innovations resulted in a dramatic fall in the production of commodities that are world competitive in terms of price-quality ratio. Foreign rivals have pushed Russia especially far back on the market of science-intensive civilian commodities. Russia accounts for less than 1% of such commodities on the world market, while the USA provides 36% and Japan, 30% of them.

The real incomes of the population have been falling since the beginning of the reforms. The deepest fall was registered after the August 1998 crisis, and it will be impossible to restore the pre-crisis living standards this year. The overall monetary incomes of the population, calculated by the UN methods, add up to less than 10% of the US figure. Health and the average life span, the indicators that determine the quality of life, deteriorated, too.

The current dramatic economic and social situation in the country is the price, which we have to pay for the economy we inherited from the Soviet Union. But then, what else could we inherit? We had to install market elements into a system based on

completely different standards, with a bulky and distorted structure. And this was bound to affect the progress of the reforms.

We had to pay for the excessive focus of the Soviet economy on the development of the raw materials sector and defence industries, which negatively affected the development of consumer production and services. We are paying for the Soviet neglect of such key sectors as information science, electronics and communications.

For the absence of competition between producers and industries, which hindered scientific and technological progress and made Russian economy non-competitive on the world markets. This is our payment for the brakes, and even a ban, put on the initiative and enterprise of enterprises and their personnel. And today we are reaping the bitter fruit, both material and mental, of the past decades.

On the other hand, we could have avoided certain problems in this renewal process. They are the result of our own mistakes, miscalculation and lack of experience. And yet, we could not have avoided the main problems facing Russian society. The way to the market and democracy was difficult for all states that entered it in the 1990s.

They all had roughly the same problems, although in varying degrees. Russia is completing the first, transition stage of economic and political reforms. Despite problems and mistakes, it has entered the highway by which the whole of humanity is travelling. Only this way offers the possibility of dynamic economic growth and higher living standards, as the world experience convincingly shows. There is no alternative to it.

The question for Russia now is what to do next. How can we make the new, market mechanisms work to full capacity? How can we overcome the still deep ideological and political split in society? What strategic goals can consolidate Russian society? What place can Russia occupy in the international community in the 21st century? What economic, social and cultural frontiers do we want to attain in 10-15 years? What are our strong and weak points? And what material and spiritual resources do we have now?

These are the questions put forward by life itself. Unless we find clear answers to them which would be understandable to all the people, we will be unable to move forward at the pace and to the goals which are worthy of our great country.

The Lessons Russia has to Learn

The answers to these questions and our very future depend on what lessons we will learn from our past and present. This is a work for society as a whole and for more than one year, but some of these lessons are already clear.

1. For almost three-fourths of the outgoing century Russia lived under the sign of the implementation of the communist doctrine. It would be a mistake not to see and, even more so, to deny the unquestionable achievements of those times. But it would be an even bigger mistake not to realise the outrageous price our country and its people had to pay for that Bolshevik experiment.

What is more, /it would be a mistake/ not to understand its historic futility. Communism and the power of Soviets did not make Russia a prosperous country with a dynamically developing society and free people. Communism vividly demonstrated its inaptitude for sound self-development, dooming our country to a steady lag behind

economically advanced countries. It was a road to a blind alley, which is far away from the mainstream of civilisation.

2. Russia has used up its limit for political and socio-economic upheavals, cataclysms and radical reforms. Only fanatics or political forces which are absolutely apathetic and indifferent to Russia and its people can make calls to a new revolution.

Be it under communist, national-patriotic or radical-liberal slogans, our country, our people will not withstand a new radical break-up. The nation's tolerance and ability both to survive and to continue creative endeavour has reached the limit: society will simply collapse economically, politically, psychologically and morally.

Responsible socio-political forces ought to offer the nation a strategy of Russia's revival and prosperity based on all the positive that has been accumulated over the period of market and democratic reforms and implemented only by evolutionary, gradual and prudent methods. This strategy should be carried out in a situation of political stability and should not lead to a deterioration of the life of the Russian people, of any of its sections and groups. This indisputable condition stems from the present situation of our country.

3. The experience of the 90s vividly shows that our country's genuine renewal without any excessive costs cannot be assured by a mere experimentation in Russian conditions with abstract models and schemes taken from foreign text-books. The mechanical copying of other nations' experience will not guarantee success, either.

Every country, Russia included, has to search for its own way of renewal. We have not been very successful in this respect thus far. Only in the past year or the past two years we have started groping for our road and our model of transformation. We can pin hopes for a worthy future only if we prove capable of combining the universal principles of a market economy and democracy with Russian realities.

It is precisely with this aim in view that our scientists, analysts, experts, public servants at all levels and political and public organisations should work.

A Chance for a Worthy Future

Such are the main lessons of the outgoing century. They make it possible to outline the contours of a long-term strategy which is to enable us, within a comparatively short time, by historic standards, to overcome the present protracted crisis and create conditions for our country's fast and stable economic and social headway. The paramount word is "fast", as we have no time for a slow start.

I want to quote the calculations made by experts. It will take us approximately fifteen years and an annual growth of our Gross Domestic Product by 8 percent a year to reach the per capita GDP level of present-day Portugal or Spain, which are not among the world's industrialised leaders. If during the same fifteen years we manage to ensure the annual growth of our GDP by 10 percent, we will then catch up with Britain or France.

Even if we suppose that these tallies are not quite accurate, our current economic lagging behind is not that serious and we can overcome it faster, it will still require many years of work. That is why we should formulate our long-term strategy and start fulfilling it as soon as possible.

We have already made the first step in this direction. The Strategic Research Centre created on the initiative and with the most active participation of the Government began its work in the end of December. This Centre is to put together the best minds of our country to draft recommendations for the government and proposals and theoretical and applied projects which are to help elaborate the strategy itself and the more effective ways of tackling the tasks which will come up in the process of its implementation.

I am convinced that ensuring the necessary growth dynamics is not only an economic problem. It is also a political and, in a certain sense, - I am not afraid to use this word - ideological problem. To be more precise, it is an ideological, spiritual and moral problem. It seems to me that the latter is of particular importance at the current stage from the standpoint of ensuring the unity of Russian society.

(A) Russian Idea

Fruitful and creative work which our country needs so badly today is impossible in a split and internally disintegrated society, a society where the main social sections and political forces have different basic values and fundamental ideological orientations. Twice in the outgoing century has Russia found itself in such a state: After October 1917 and in the 90s.

In the first case, civil accord and unity of society were achieved not so much by what was then called "ideological- educational work" as by power methods. Those who disagreed with the ideology and policy of the regime were subjected to different forms of persecution up to repression.

As a matter of fact, this is why I think that the term "state ideology" advocated by some politicians, publicists and scholars is not quite appropriate. It creates certain associations with our recent past. Where there is a state ideology blessed and supported by the state, there is, strictly speaking, practically no room for intellectual and spiritual freedom, ideological pluralism and freedom of the press, that is, for political freedom.

I am against the restoration of an official state ideology in Russia in any form. There should be no forced civil accord in a democratic Russia. Social accord can only be voluntary.

That is why it is so important to achieve social accord on such basic issues as the aims, values and orientations of development, which would be desirable for and attractive to the overwhelming majority of Russians. The absence of civil accord and unity is one of the reasons why our reforms are so slow and painful. Most of the strength is spent on political squabbling, instead of the handling of the concrete tasks of Russia's renewal.

Nonetheless, there have appeared some positive changes in this sphere in the past year or a year and a half. The bulk of Russians show more wisdom and responsibility than many politicians. Russians want stability, confidence in the future and possibility to plan it for themselves and for their children not for a month but for years and even decades to come. They want to work in a situation of peace, security and a sound law-based order. They wish to use the opportunities and prospects opened by the diversity of the forms of ownership, free enterprise and market relations.

It is on this basis that our people have begun to perceive and accept supra-national universal values which are above social, group or ethnic interests. Our people have

accepted such values as freedom of expression, freedom to travel abroad and other fundamental political rights and human liberties. People value that they can have property, be engaged in free enterprise, and build up their own wealth, and so on, and so forth.

Another foothold for the unity of Russian society is what can be called the traditional values of Russians. These values are clearly seen today.

Patriotism.

This term is sometimes used ironically and even derogatively. But for the majority of Russians it has its own and only original and positive meaning. It is a feeling of pride in one's country, its history and accomplishments. It is the striving to make one's country better, richer, stronger and happier. When these sentiments are free from the tints of nationalist conceit and imperial ambitions, there is nothing reprehensible or bigotedly about them. Patriotism is a source of the courage, staunchness and strength of our people. If we lose patriotism and national pride and dignity, which are connected with it, we will lose ourselves as a nation capable of great achievements.

Belief in the greatness of Russia.

Russia was and will remain a great power. It is preconditioned by the inseparable characteristics of its geopolitical, economic and cultural existence. They determined the mentality of Russians and the policy of the government throughout the history of Russia and they cannot but do so at present.

But Russian mentality should be expanded by new ideas. In the present world the might of a country as a great power is manifested more in its ability to be the leader in creating and using advanced technologies, ensuring a high level of people's wellbeing, reliably protecting its security and upholding its national interests in the international arena, than in its military strength.

Statism.

It will not happen soon, if it ever happens at all, that Russia will become the second edition of, say, the US or Britain in which liberal values have deep historic traditions.

Our state and its institutes and structures have always played an exceptionally important role in the life of the country and its people. For Russians a strong state is not an anomaly which should be got rid of. Quite the contrary, they see it as a source and guarantor of order and the initiator and main driving force of any change.

Modern Russian society does not identify a strong and effective state with a totalitarian state. We have come to value the benefits of democracy, a law-based state, and personal and political freedom. At the same time, people are alarmed by the obvious weakening of state power. The public looks forward to the restoration of the guiding and regulating role of the state to a degree which is necessary, proceeding from the traditions and present state of the country.

Social Solidarity.

It is a fact that a striving for corporative forms of activity has always prevailed over individualism. Paternalistic sentiments have struck deep roots in Russian society. The majority of Russians are used to connect improvements in their own condition more

with the aid and support of the state and society than with their own efforts, initiative and flair for business. And it will take a long time for this habit to die.

Do not let us try to answer the question whether it is good or bad. The important thing is that such sentiments exist. What is more, they still prevail. That is why they cannot be ignored. This should be taken into consideration in the social policy, first and foremost.

I suppose that the new Russian idea will come about as an alloy or an organic unification of universal general humanitarian values with traditional Russian values which have stood the test of the times, including the test of the turbulent 20th century.

This vitally important process must not be accelerated, discontinued and destroyed. It is important to prevent that the first shoots of civil accord be crushed underfoot in the heat of political campaigns, of some or other elections.

The results of the recent elections to the State Duma inspire great optimism in this respect. They reflected the turn towards stability and civil accord, which is being completed in our society. The overwhelming majority of Russians said No to radicalism, extremism and the opposition with a revolutionary tint. It is probably the first time since the reforms have begun that such favourable conditions have been created for constructive cooperation between the executive and legislative branches of power.

Serious politicians whose parties and movements are represented in the new State Duma, are advised to draw conclusions from this fact. I am positive that the feeling of responsibility for the destinies of the nation will have the upper hand, and Russian parties, organizations and movements and their leaders will not sacrifice the common interests of and prospects in store for Russia, which call for a solidary effort of all healthy forces, to the narrow partisan and time-serving considerations.

(B) Strong State

We are at a stage where even the most correct economic and social policy starts misfiring while being realized due to the weakness of the state power, of the managerial bodies. A key to Russia's recovery and growth is in the state-policy sphere today.

Russia needs a strong state power and must have it. I am not calling for totalitarianism. History proves all dictatorships, all authoritarian forms of government are transient. Only democratic systems are intransient. Whatever the shortcomings, mankind has not devised anything superior. A strong state power in Russia is a democratic, law-based, workable federative state.

I see the following directions of its formation:

- a streamlined structure of the bodies of state authority and management, higher professionalism, more discipline and responsibility of civil servants, keener struggle against corruption;
- a restructuring of the state personnel policy on the basis of a selection of the best staffs;

- creating conditions beneficial for the rise in the country of a full-blooded civil society to balance out and monitor the authorities;
- a larger role and higher authority of the judiciary;
- improved federative relations, including in the sphere of budgets and finances; and
- an active offensive on crime.

Amending the Constitution does not seem to be an urgent, priority task. What we have is a good Constitution. Its provisions dealing with the individual rights and freedoms are seen as the best Constitutional instrument of its kind in the world. It is a serious task, indeed, to make the current Constitution and the laws made on the basis thereof, the norm of life of the state, society and every individual, rather than draft a new Basic Law for the country.

The Constitutional nature of laws in the making is a major problem in this respect. Russia currently operates over a thousand federal laws and several thousand laws of the republics, territories, regions and autonomous areas. Not all of them correspond to the above criterion. If the justice ministry, the prosecutor's office and the judiciary continue to be as slow in dealing with this matter as they are today, the mass of questionable or simply un-Constitutional laws may become critical legally and politically. The Constitutional safety of the state, the federal Center's capabilities, the country's manageability and Russia's integrity would then be in jeopardy.

Another serious problem is inherent in that tier of authority which the government belongs to. The global experience prompts the conclusion that the main threat to human rights and freedoms, to democracy as such emanates from the executive authority. Of course, a legislature which makes bad laws also does its bit. But the main threat emanates from the executive authority. It organizes the country's life, applies laws and can objectively distort, substantively and not always maliciously, these laws by making executive orders.

The global trend is that of a stronger executive authority. Not surprisingly, society endeavors to better control it in order to preclude arbitrariness and misuses of office.

This is why I, personally, am paying priority attention to building partner relations between the executive authority and civil society, to developing the institutes and structures of the latter, and to waging an active and tough onslaught on corruption.

(C) Efficient Economy

I have already said that the reform years have generated a heap of problems that have accumulated in the national economy and social sphere. The situation is complex, indeed. But, to put it mildly, it is too early to bury Russia a great power. All troubles notwithstanding, we have preserved our intellectual potentiality and human resources. A number of R&D advances, advanced technologies have not been wasted. We still have our natural resources. So the country has a worthy future in store for it.

At the same time, we must learn the lessons of the 1990s and ponder the experience of market transformations.

1. I see one of the main lessons in that throughout these years we have been groping in the dark without having a clear understanding of national objectives and advances which would ensure Russia's standing as a developed, prosperous and great country

of the world. The lack of a long-range development strategy for the next 15-20 and more years, is badly felt in the economy.

The government firmly intends to build its activity on the basis of the principle of unity of the strategy and tactics. Without it, we are doomed to close holes and operate in the mode of fire-fighting. Serious politics, big business are done differently. The country needs a long-term national strategy of development. I have already said that the government has started devising it.

2. Another important lesson of the 1990s is the conclusion that Russia needs to form a wholesome system of state regulation of the economy and social sphere.

I do not mean to return to a system of planning and managing the economy by fiat, where the all-pervasive state was regulating all aspects of any factory's work from top to bottom. I mean to make the Russian state an efficient coordinator of the country's economic and social forces that balances out their interests, optimizes the aims and parameters of social development and creates conditions and mechanisms of their attainment.

The above naturally exceeds the commonplace formula which limits the state's role in the economy to devising rules of the game and controlling their observance. With time, we are likely to evolve to this formula. But today's situation necessitates deeper state involvement in the social and economic processes. While setting the scale and planning mechanisms for the system of state regulation, we must be guided by the principle: The state must be where and as needed; freedom must be where and as required.

3. The third lesson is the transition to a reform strategy that would be best suited for our conditions. It should proceed in the following directions.

3.1. To encourage a dynamic economic growth.

The first to come here should be the encouragement of investments. We have not yet resolved this problem. Investments into the real economy sector fell by 5 times in the 1990s, including by 3.5 times into fixed assets. The material foundations of the Russian economy are being undermined.

We call for pursuing an investment policy that would combine purely market mechanisms with measures of state guidance.

At the same time, we will continue working to create an investment climate attractive to foreign investors. Frankly speaking, the rise would be long and painful without foreign capital. But we have no time for this. Consequently, we must do our best to attract foreign capital to the country.

3.2. To pursue an energetic industrial policy.

The future of the country, the quality of the Russian economy in the 21st century will depend above all on progress in the spheres that are based on high technologies and produce science-intensive commodities. For 90% of economic growth is ensured today by the introduction of new achievements and technologies.

The government is prepared to pursue an economic policy of priority development of industries that lead in the sphere of research and technological progress. The requisite measures include:

- assist the development of extra-budgetary internal demand for advanced technologies and science-intensive products, and support export-oriented high-tech productions;
- support non-raw materials industries working mostly to satisfy internal demand;
- buttress the export possibilities of the fuel and energy and raw-materials complexes.

We should use the mechanisms, which have long been used in the world, to mobilise the funds necessary for pursuing this policy. The most important of them are the target-oriented loan and tax instruments and the provision of privileges against state guarantees.

3.3. To carry out a rational structural policy.

The government thinks that like in other industrialised countries, there is a place in the Russian economy for the financial-industrial groups, corporations, small and medium businesses. Any attempts to slow down the development of some, and artificially encourage the development of other economic forms would only hinder the rise of the national economy. The policy of the Government will be spearheaded at creating a structure that would ensure an optimal balance of all economic forms of management.

Another major sphere is the rational regulation of the operation of natural monopolies. This is a key question, as they largely determine the structure of production and consumer prices. And hence they influence both the economic and financial processes, and the dynamics of the people's incomes.

3.4. To create an effective financial system.

This is a challenging task, which includes the following directions:

- to raise the effectiveness of the budget as a major instrument of the economic policy of the state;
- to carry out a tax reform;
- to get rid of non-payments, barter and other pseudo-monetary forms of settlement;
- to maintain a low inflation rate and stability of the rouble;
- to create civilised financial and stock markets, and turn them into an instrument of accumulating investment resources;
- to restructure the bank system.

3.5. To combat the shadow economy and organised crime in the economic and financial-credit sphere.

All countries have shadow economies. But their share in the GDP does not exceed 15-20% in industrialised countries, while the figure for Russia is 40%. To resolve this painful problem, we should not just raise the effectiveness of the law-enforcement agencies, but also strengthen the license, tax, hard currency and export control.

3.6. To consistently integrate the Russian economy into world economic structures.

Otherwise we would not rise to the high level of economic and social progress that has been attained in the industrialised countries. The main directions of this work are:

- to ensure an active support of the state to the foreign economic operation of Russian enterprises, companies and corporations. In particular, the time is ripe for creating a federal agency to support exports, which would provide guarantees to the export contracts of Russian producers;
- to resolutely combat the discrimination of Russia on the world markets of commodities, services and investments, and to approve and apply a national anti-dumping legislation;
- to incorporate Russia into the international system of regulating foreign economic operation, above all the WTO.

3.7. To pursue a modern agrarian policy.

The revival of Russia will be impossible without the revival of the countryside and agriculture. We need an agrarian policy that would organically combine measures of state assistance and state regulation with the market reforms in the countryside and in land ownership relations.

4. We must admit that virtually all changes and measures entailing a fall in the living conditions of the people are inadmissible in Russia. We have come to a line beyond which we must not go.

Poverty has reached a mind-boggling scale in Russia. In early 1998, the average-weighted world per capita income amounted to some 5,000 dollars a year, but it was only 2,200 dollars in Russia. And it dropped still lower after the August 1998 crisis. The share of wages in the GDP dropped from 50% to 30% since the beginning of reforms.

This is the most acute social problem. The Government is elaborating a new income policy designed to ensure a stable growth of prosperity on the basis of the growth of real disposable incomes of the people.

Despite these difficulties, the Government is resolved to take new measures to support science, education, culture and health care. For a country where the people are not healthy physically and psychologically, are poorly educated and illiterate, will never rise to the summits of world civilisation.

Russia is in the midst of one of the most difficult periods in its history. For the first time in the past 200-300 years, it is facing a real threat of sliding to the second, and possibly even third, echelon of world states. We are running of time left for removing this threat. We must strain all intellectual, physical and moral forces of the nation. We need coordinated creative work. Nobody will do it for us.

Everything depends on us, and us alone. On our ability to see the size of the threat, to pool forces and set our minds to hard and lengthy work.

Yehezkel Dror

THE
CAPACITY
TO
GOVERN

Report to the
CLUB OF ROME

Executive Summary

July 1994

CIRCULO DE LECTORES

Editors note

Since its constitution in 1968, and notably the 1972 publication of its first report, *The Limits of Growth*, the club of Rome has become an undisputed moral authority of global recognition and the voice of consciousness, which raises the great questions of a world, which is becoming increasingly complex every day.

Since its latest report, *The First Global Revolution*, which received widespread public interest, the Club of Rome has renewed the trust in Circulo de Lectores, this time for the worldwide distribution of its newest report, *The Capacity to Govern*, written by Yehezkel Dror, Professor of Political Science of the University of Jerusalem, and acknowledged international authority in his field. The book will be launched at the end of this year in its Spanish version and during the year of 1995 in the editions of other languages.

CIRCULO DE LECTORES
Barcelona, August 15, 1994

Introduction

The problem of governance was central to the concerns that led to the creation of the Club of Rome. The Club's founders were struck by the inability of governments to take a long-term view because they were instead too absorbed in dealing with day-to-day problems and political difficulties. This lack of vision and the impotence of governments and international institutions in the face of the extremely serious problems already besetting the modern world (unemployment, underdevelopment, protection of the environment, the bloody conflicts raging in Africa and elsewhere, AIDS etc.) raise fundamental questions about the structures and methods of governance, and the competence of politicians.

For this reason, the Executive Board of the club of Rome asked Professor Yehezkel Dror to prepare a Report, analyzing the root causes of the incapacities of governments to fulfill their responsibilities and suggesting how governance might be improved and enabled to cope with the global transformations now under way.

This executive summary has been made possible through the help of Circulo de Lectores, belonging to the Bertelsmann publishing group, and the close cooperation of the BBV Foundation in the exchange of opinion discussing this books content.

This executive Summary presents a sample of the findings and recommendations from the Report, chapter by chapter.

RICARDO DIEZ HOCHLEITNER
President of the Club of Rome

Leitmotif: Redesigning Governance for Global Transformations

We are living through a critical period in human history, marked by rapid global change. While more people are better off than ever before, and exciting possibilities are opening up, humanity also faces complex problems, which, if mishandled, will cause great suffering and even threaten our very survival.

This situation offers particular challenges for governance, since decisions taken now will inevitably shape future trajectories and alter the fate of nations and of humankind as a whole. Yet governments have evolved very little recently, and in their present form they are clearly not equipped to cope with change and uncertainty, to exploit the opportunities or avoid the dangers ahead. Significant redesign of key aspects of governance is therefore needed urgently.

1. Mission Improving capacities to Govern

The widespread tendency to blame the failure of governments to cope with contemporary problems on the fact that society is “un-governable”, is mistaken. *The fault lies rather in inadequate capacities to govern.*

Although grass-roots movements, non-governmental organizations, and local and regional authorities are becoming increasingly powerful, national central governments are likely to remain the dominant form of governance for the foreseeable future. Efforts to improve capacities to govern should therefore focus on that level, as well as on the institutions of supra-national and global governance now starting to emerge.

The solution is not to transfer government functions as far as possible to markets. While markets can and should take on more service delivery functions, they cannot handle many critical public choices of the kind now increasingly arising.

2. The Contributions of Political Philosophy

Like all praxis, however apparently pragmatic, effective action in response to global transformations must be based on sound moral reasoning. However, contemporary political philosophy has so far failed to provide the innovative thinking required in order to handle the complex issues facing humankind, such as “global equity”.

Fresh approaches are also needed to the traditional problems of what constitutes “the good life” and how governance should promote it. Western liberal democratic principles tend not to deal adequately with three difficult issues: how to provide representation for future generations; how to cope with individuals or minorities who act counter-productively in pursuit of their notions of the good life; and societies that give priority to collective rather than individual choices (for example, religious fundamentalism).

However, sophisticated versions of democracy as a mixed regime of offer possible solutions, for example via pluralist governance elites (with appropriate democratic safeguards) responsible for a wide interpretation of the public interest that takes account of the needs of humanity as a whole.

An important new concept here is *raison d'humanite*, understood as a constructive substitute for *raison d'etat*, which it should displace as far as possible. It expresses the idea that humanity as a whole has needs and aspirations that governance at all levels should promote as one of its main tasks, and it establishes categorical moral imperatives binding on all forms of governance (for example, an absolute prohibition of acts of genocide).

Many governance issues require fundamental reconsideration as a result of global transformations, for example: notions of human rights and responsibilities, cultural pluralism and solidarity. How and to what extent should governance promote moral education? How should advancement of democracy be combined with recognition of the right to prefer alternative regimes? Imaginative political thinking is needed on a wide range of topics to assist governance as it faces unprecedented problems and tasks.

I. The Problematique

3. Unprepared Societies and Obsolete Governments

Contemporary societies are unprepared for global transformations, and present forms of governance are in varying degrees obsolete and not equipped to cope with the needs and opportunities now emerging. Developments in demography, science and technology, and changing values create novel predicaments that require far-reaching redesign of institutions and practices intended for very different circumstances. Failure to adapt in time could carry huge risks of environmental degradation, wars and new forms of barbarism.

4. Predicaments and Opportunities

Governance must contend with several key features of the modern world that have important consequences for the future. Global change is creating increasing uncertainty and disorientation. Largely thanks to better communications, the world is becoming more interactive, which has both its positive and negative aspects. And despite greater general prosperity, there is widespread frustration, despondency and unrest. In addition, high population growth is now concentrated in some of the poorest countries and in mega cities – and the resulting migration flows will only increase as global inequalities worsen. Advances in science and medicine are radically altering the prospects for energy production, human health and life expectancy; new technologies are having an enormous impact on labor markets. The biosphere offers obvious challenges, but also potential models for global governance. Finally, shifts in values and ideologies are a source of

considerable uncertainty, even when they are initially for the better, as in the former USSR or South Africa.

No existing governance is geared to dealing with such sudden and radical changes in opportunities and dangers. Most governments are less and less able to cope with the demands made upon them, although some distinguished exceptions demonstrate that improvements are feasible.

5. Difficulties Arising from Political Culture

Governments frequently find themselves in a political impasse, because of strong pressures in modern democracies to give priority to short-term considerations, although this will almost certainly have serious consequences in the long run. There are also conflicts between domestic political cultures and external requirements: for example, the rich countries will probably ignore both the moral imperatives and the arguments from *realpolitik* urging them to make large-scale transfers of funds to the poor countries because there would be little domestic support for such policies. Many developing countries are in the impossible position of being pressed by strong international actors, such as the World Bank, to adopt policies which are not feasible in terms of political culture and which will often destabilize regimes.

Many other features of political culture aggravate the deficiencies of governance. The mass media, image-makers and lobbies can use their influence to distort the political process, especially given the growing cynicism and apathy of the general public. Politics is becoming less ideological but more emotional, and governance seems ill equipped to deal with racial intolerance and vicious nationalism.

Other tensions may occur as a result of efforts to spread western liberal democracy, sometimes with mixed results. Ideas and institutions need to be adapted to local political cultures, and may function quite differently in practice (consider, for example, the contrast between the Netherlands and India). Democracy cannot be expected to catch on rapidly everywhere.

Nevertheless, some share elements of political culture must be developed to serve as a basis for global governance and the advancement of *raison d'humanite* in an increasingly interactive world.

6. The Higher-order Tasks of Governance

Governments must play a major role in making critical choices that are beyond the scope, capacity and legitimate domain of other social mechanisms, including markets. Improving capacities to govern is therefore not so much a matter of efficiency, effectiveness, cost cutting, quality of service delivery and ability to handle current problems. Rather, it is essential for governments to be better equipped to cope with the higher-order tasks that shape the future of individual societies and humanity as a whole.

This applies in particular to central governments and supra-national governance, such as the European Union.

Examples of higher-order tasks are inventing and developing new policy options such as: encouraging constant societal learning and innovativeness, promoting education, and integrating governance into inter-state and global processes since states are increasingly unable to handle major tasks alone. Global transformations also mean that governments are constantly faced by value judgments relating to global justice, the environment, society (e.g. bio-engineering, abortion); they must be enabled to make these “tragic choices” according to agreed procedural rules and declared ethical priorities.

II. The resolutique

7. Approaches to Redesign

Radical redesigns are needed, but it is pointless to make proposals that are not feasible – hence the recommended strategy of “selective radicalism”, concentrating on the most important components of governance. Crash reforms must be combined with more gradual ones.

The proposals relate to the main levels from grass roots to global governance, and focus on capacities to carry out higher-order tasks. The principal dimensions of governance are addressed, including values, jurisdictions, structures, staffing, processes and culture. In terms of traditional categories, reforms concern the legislature, the judiciary, the executive and also the “censorial” function identified by Chinese political theory, meaning the evaluation of the performance of the other branches.

8. A Proto-Model for Achieving Adequate Governance

The best that governance is capable of achieving may in fact be only barely adequate to meet the likely challenges and opportunities. At the very least, governance must be redesigned to be much more moral, consent-based, high-energy, deep-thinking, learning and creative, pluralistic and decisive.

The various proposals for redesign are aimed at these seven dimensions, which add up to a proto-model of governance capable of coping with global transformations, the subsequent chapters of the resolutique discuss ways of moving toward this proto-model, both directly and by removing impediments to good governance.

9. Fostering Raison d’humanite

Unless all levels of governance are guided in their decisions and acts by *raison d’humanite*, the fundamental problems of humanity in the long term will not be handled appropriately, resulting in both risks and missed opportunities.

The values involved in *raison d'humanite* must first be debated and clarified outside governance, by political philosophers, religious leaders, concerned individuals and the general public. The definition must be pluralistic and allowed to evolve as circumstances change. Certain notions are unacceptable, such as “sustainability”, which is too static and risk-averse. The categorical moral imperatives mentioned earlier (prohibition of atrocities such as genocide, the spread of nuclear weapons and other activities threatening human survival) should be included and ultimately enforced through international criminal law.

Once established as a basis for the morality of governance, commitment to *raison d'humanite* must be fostered reciprocally, by governance and political culture.

Even minimum conceptions of *raison d'humanite* will require far-reaching redesign of governance. Global governance must be strengthened, and both governance elites and populations at large must be educated to think and feel more in terms of human solidarity. More specific implications will emerge in the course of the resolutique.

Concern for *raison d'humanite* must not, however, be an excuse for diverting attention from efforts to achieve greater equity within countries, where the ethical issues raised may be more acute than in the global arena.

10. Facing Virtues and Vices

The low standards of morality among politicians are a cause of much concern, reducing public trust in governance. The prevailing cultural values of consumerism, commercial ethics, permissiveness, and rights without duties aggravate the problem; the sense of shame has largely disappeared from politics.

The financial costs of achieving political success add an institutional incentive to be corrupt in both poor and rich countries, as revelations in Italy and Japan show. Efforts like the “clean hands” crusade in Italy will have only short-term results unless more radical, institutional reforms are undertaken. The pressures on politicians to seek vast sums of money should be reduced, for example by public funding of election campaigns within strictly enforced limits. Senior politicians and civil servants should receive high salaries and pensions, and be harshly punished for corrupt behavior. Determined global action (military if necessary) should be taken against drug cartels, clearly corrupt rulers and those who commit crimes against humanity. An international Criminal court should be set up, expanding on the court created in 1993 to deal with atrocities in former Yugoslavia.

These and other institutional redesigns must be accompanied by strenuous efforts to create high-quality senior governance elites in order to improve the moral standards of governance and ensure that senior politicians have the wisdom and knowledge they need. The recruitment, election, promotion and oversight of these elites should be redesigned so that they are open and pluralistic, and possess a sense of mission and service.

The following code of ethics is proposed as a step in the recommended direction:

CODE OF ETHICS FOR SENIOR POLITICIANS

1. Regard your position in governance as a trust and a mission that is “sacred”. It is preferable to lose your position or resign than to lose your integrity by subordinating the duties of governance to personal considerations.
2. However clever and knowledgeable you are, the tasks of governance require much more. Devote strenuous efforts to learning and reflection, and surround yourself with high-quality advisers whom you encourage to remonstrate with you.
3. Serving as an “educator” of the public is one of your main tasks, with special attention to taking a long-range and more global view. Tell the truth, even when your followers and electors do not like to hear it.
4. Your private life should serve as an example. Practice restraint in your sexual and financial appetites.
5. Reveal in public all information that may be relevant to your performance, including age, health, income and special personal problems. And resign when you feel inadequate, or your personal physicians tell you that your capacities are waning.
6. Do not accept any income or benefits, directly or indirectly, other than those formally allocated to you. After retirement, avoid large payments for activities related to your former positions and declare publicly all such earnings.
7. Accept the grooming of successors as one of your main tasks. And help your successor through the transition, even if he or she is anathema to you.
8. Keep records of major decisions and activities, so as to be able to give accounts and accept responsibility, and later on to write memoirs that will have a historical value, providing lessons of experience.

11. Empowering the People with Understanding

Empowerment of the people is essential in order to strengthen democratic capacities to govern, but unless people’s understanding of complex public issues and their sense of human solidarity are much enhanced, democracy will either become more of a fiction or else will fail abysmally in its tasks.

We cannot rely on “ the information society” automatically to create an enlightened public – present indications suggest that the opposite is more likely – so that deliberate efforts must be made to educate people and foster greater identification with humanity as a whole. This means, among other things, that senior politicians should try to explain major policy issues and should also admit that they often do not know what to do. Television channels should be encouraged to do more to present complex and controversial issues in interesting and comprehensible ways. Schools

and universities should introduce more sophisticated courses covering global perspectives.

Electoral processes should be improved so as to enable the public to make better-informed choices. The main candidates should be obliged to make full declarations of their wealth, health, education, past activities, etc; the right to privacy should not apply to those whom aspire to high office. Instead of dramatic stage-managed confrontations on television, voters should be given a chance to see behind the candidates' appearances and assess their true worth. An urgent recommendation is that major politicians should be subjected to extensive questioning on television by an independent panel of "candidate examiners", made up of public figures of the highest standing and some representatives of the public chosen by lottery, in order to explore their world views, knowledge, opinions, proposed policies, etc.

Efforts should be made to increase participatory democracy, and experiments might be pursued in the use of referenda and new techniques of direct democracy. Some balance must be achieved between making governance more responsive to the public will, which requires more frequent elections, and reducing the distortions caused by electoral cycles; the solution may lie in longer electoral cycles combined with more opportunities to call special elections.

12. Refashioning Governance Elites

Even after everything possible has been done to empower the people, momentous decisions will still be made by a few individuals. The elitist nature of governance must be recognized, together with the need for deliberate and consistent efforts to raise the standards of senior governance elites, morally and intellectually.

Senior governance elites should be open, pluralistic and representative, subject to oversight and recall; they should possess superior knowledge and moral character, and be committed to service. *Democratic election is a necessary but not sufficient condition for holding high office.*

Unfortunately, many senior politicians lack the right knowledge and abilities for the job, such as the capacity to be detached, to consider controversial issues with a cool head, or to change their minds by learning rather than by panic reactions. To pick one example of ignorance of a critical area: although science and technology are of enormous importance in shaping the future, many senior politicians and civil servants are scientifically illiterate.

A first requirement is to attract better-qualified candidates into politics. A second step is to provide those in office with opportunities and incentives to learn and to re-educate themselves. Proposals to meet this need include setting up policy colleges where politicians and others concerned with or knowledgeable about public policy can spend time studying major policy issues in depth; organizing shorter, intense workshops and

retreats for top politicians; and encouraging a revival of professional statecraft literature along the lines of earlier “mirrors for princes”.

The quality of elites matters a great deal because of the tiny number of people responsible for crucial decisions, but even more is at stake because of the current trend to concentrate ever-greater power in the hands of heads of state or government in both presidential and parliamentary regimes. Reliance on “personal chemistry” at summit meetings adds to the dangers of basing important actions on the accidents of personality. It is therefore essential to redesign political career structures, so as to ensure that candidates pass through minor and middle-ranking governance positions and graduated learning experiences. Also necessary are better advisory staffs and strictly enforced ethical codes.

Imaginative new policies are required to raise standards in the civil service, committed professional staffs to share the tasks of governance with elected politicians. Senior civil servants should be both numerate and able to “think in history”, they should understand global transformations as well as the dynamics of their own society; and they should bring both scientific literacy and humanistic considerations to policy deliberations. These suggestions also apply to the United Nations family, which must be reformed in order to build up a high-quality staff where representativeness is combined with, but subordinated to, professionalism and high moral standards.

13. Deepening Policy Reflection

Faced by global transformations, governance could well find itself able to act but unsure of what to do, because past options are increasingly and obviously useless, and no new and better ones are forthcoming. Too much current policy thinking is shallow, with misplaced reliance on “common sense” and “quick fixes” to cope with “uncommon” and unmanageable problems. Even if senior politicians had greater power and resources, issues such as drugs, the future of work, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, ethnic conflicts and the widening gulf between rich and poor would still lack adequate answers. Furthermore, some of the old policy tools, such as certain economic theories, have lost credibility.

A new kind of statecraft is needed, applicable to the problems of humanity as a whole. To achieve this, policy reflection must be expanded and deepened in accordance with a clear set of principles. One dimension is moral, as expressed in the idea of *raison d’humanite*. Others are long-term and dynamic, in order to understand the complex global processes now occurring, as well as explore long-range goals and ways of achieving them. Greater creativity, constant learning and flexibility are required. Better linkages are needed with both policy professionals and the civil society. Policy thinking must take full account of legal issues, institutions and resources, yet there is also a place for grand designs and great enterprises. The past and the future must be used creatively, via “thinking in history” and sophisticated policy gambling as a means of coping with uncertainty. There must be a clear conceptual distinction between politics and policy,

however much they are interrelated and often overlap – governance involves and needs both, and policy reflection cannot neglect politics, especially where global issues are concerned.

Since policy reflection involved mental processes, it is much harder to change than structures, training, recruitment and other “material” facets of governance. But substantial improvements must be achieved in the quality of policy thinking, because of its decisive influence on governance actions and on choices determining future trajectories.

14. Improving Central Minds of Governments

Whether we like it or not, strong executive leadership will continue to be important for the fore-seeable future. But strong executive leadership is like a kind of *pharmakon*, in the Greek sense of both poison and antidote, both sickness and cure. Where leadership is weak, as in United Nations, it should be reinforced; where it is already strong, as in presidential and prime ministerial systems, its quality should be improved and safeguards applied.

Strong democratic rulership often seems to be essential to enable governance to carry out its higher-order tasks and to ensure a certain coherence of policies and actions. Much greater use should be made of advice from well-qualified policy professionals. Units should be established close to top decision-makers to help them make long-range, integrative strategic choices and offer discreet guidance on global transformations. At present, few offices of heads of governments are supported by such staff, partly because many top politicians are cocksure, and want aides to execute their ideas, not strong staffs who point out their errors, while others are afraid of exposing their ignorance by working with high-quality professionals.

Such units are far from enough. Governance desperately lacks good ideas on how to cope with increasingly pressing issues. To meet this need, Policy Research and Development Organizations (or think tanks) should be set up at national and global level, so that teams of qualified and experienced professionals can work full time on developing and analyzing major long-term policy issues. However, many political systems lack the prerequisites for staffing and maintaining think tanks, for letting them operate freely enough to perform well, and for feeding the results of their studies into policy-making on crucial issues.

Another major weakness of governance, exacerbated by contemporary democratic political cultures, is its neglect of the longer term. Carefully selected, non-elected but broadly representative consultative councils should be created to examine critical long-term issues, and present analyses, options and recommendations to governance and the public at large. The Secretary-General of the United Nations should consider establishing a similar body to advise on global issues. Governance also needs expert

advice an integral part of considering major policies, and non-governmental organizations should be given a key role in such activities.

Most vexing of all are the moral issues now emerging, such as genetic engineering, which have enormous implications for the future. Although binding decisions must always be made by democratic political processes, strongly ethical issues are beyond the reasoning capacities of governments and outside their ability either to build consensus or enforce decisions. “Ethics Deliberation Forums” should therefore be set up, consisting of religious personalities, moral philosophers, poets, judges and other non-political public figures, together with people with considerable political and policy-making experience. Their remit should be to consider and advise on policy issues that are mainly moral in character.

15. Restructuring Inter-Governance Relations

Although power is still the main determinant of inter-governance relations, its forms, distribution, expressions and uses are changing as a result of global transformations. Nation states will continue to be the principal actors for the foreseeable future, but they are increasingly inadequate for handling the complexities of the problematique. Significant restructuring of inter-governance relations is therefore needed, with nation states transferring functions and authority to other levels and forms of collective action, as well as depending more on cooperation with different forms of governance.

In particular, global and continental governance at one end of the spectrum, and local and grass-roots governance at the other, should be reinforced. One of the most promising inventions of governance of this century is the European Union: it demonstrates that radical designs of inter-governance relations are possible, however difficult. Comparable supra-national governance structures, with partly fused sovereignty and adapted to local circumstances, should be developed in other parts of the world; they constitute basic elements of global governance.

In general, relations between tiers of governance should be guided by the triple principle of “subsidiary” and “enabling” (i.e. authority, tasks and functions are located at the lowest level where they can be performed well, and higher level governance actively assists lower levels to take on additional responsibilities), subject to “override”.

As part of restructuring relations within governance, public governance as a whole needs to be strengthened in its relations with private governance, while preserving much of the latter’s autonomy so as not to impair its performance. Among other things, public governance should exercise better control over global markets, the influence of privately owned mass media and potentially dangerous scientific activities – but these are difficult areas, where outstanding governmental capacities are required and too much or inept intervention should be avoided.

16. Making Global Governance more Resolute

Considerable progress has been made recently in international cooperation, to be seen for example in measures to protect the environment and endangered species, certain United Nations peacekeeping efforts and ratification of the Law of the Sea. But in general, global governance is grossly inadequate, and many useful proposals for global action are not adopted or implemented. Global governance must therefore become more resolute.

Accordingly, a key recommendation is to strengthen the United Nations as the core of emerging global governance. Specific proposals include: making membership of the United Nations obligatory; restructuring the Security Council, with weighted voting rather than veto rights; strengthening the UN Social and Economic Council and adding an Environment Council (similar to the Security Council, but with different membership); setting up a Global Consultative Assembly, either directly elected or composed of representatives of national parliaments. In addition, as mentioned in earlier chapters, global criminal jurisdiction should be augmented, and the international civil service should be radically restructured.

17. Augmenting Oversight

The expanded conceptions of governance as a result of its responsibilities for higher-order tasks make rigorous oversight more important than ever, especially to guard against misuse of enhanced capacities.

Minor proposals include strengthening the positions of comptrollers and ombudsmen in national governance and the United Nations; and conducting a critical assessment of existing governance in order to identify and “kill off” obsolete elements. Otherwise governance processes may become clogged as new entities are added in the course of redesigns.

As global governance develops, greater legal oversight is needed; an international independent inspectorate should be created, with free right of movement and information-gathering in all countries, to oversee compliance with global rules and norms, in areas such as human rights, environmental protection, arms limitation, etc. Concomitantly, private individuals and representative groups should have an increasing right to apply to the global court system against governments that infringe categorical humankind imperatives or do not respect obligatory global norms and decisions.

18. Gearing Governance for Transformation Crises

Global transformations will inevitably cause a great deal of turmoil, and many countries are likely to undergo far-reaching changes. Extraordinary conditions require extraordinary governance, yet many governments are poorly equipped to deal even with

“routine” crisis management. Preparations for crises of all kinds, including if need be constitutional provision for temporary “emergency regimes”, are therefore essential.

Where societies are disintegrating or evil rulers engage in crimes against humanity, more drastic measures are required. In such circumstances, the United Nations should impose a trusteeship regime, approved by special majority of the Security Council or the General Assembly, without veto rights. Trusteeship regimes should last for a maximum of two years, unless renewed by special majority vote of both the Security Council and the General Assembly. Such radical steps, subject to other safeguards including judicial review by a global court, are necessary to protect individuals and humanity against the aberrant behavior endemic during a period of global transformation.

Finale: Governance Redesign Pending a Quantum Jump

However radical some of the proposals in this Report may seem, they may be barely enough to enable humankind to survive the next stages of human history. We cannot know what will happen: what is really needed is a quantum jump in the consciousness and deeply embedded values of humanity, but this is beyond deliberate human choice. However, we can and should try to improve the chances of human survival and to foster the “good life” by influencing the ways societies develop, though this is a difficult and fragile process with uncertain outcomes.

Redesign of governance is one of the interim measures available – indeed it is essential in order to avoid catastrophe and, as far as possible, to support continuous human development. Innovations may become feasible as the result of crises, as has sometimes happened in the past; public pressures, visible governance failures and enlightened leaders can also bring about reforms. However, redesigns must not only be practical, but powerful enough to make a real difference to governance capacities to handle higher-order tasks. Significant improvements, such as mass democracy, empowerment of the people, division of functions, recognition of human rights and the rule of law, show that major change can be achieved. But, with the exception of some of the initiatives of the European Union, there is at present a dearth of imaginative ideas radical reforms.

More concerned work on governance redesign must be undertaken, from grass roots movements to high-level think tanks. Experienced government and political practitioners should participate, together with professionals and scholars. But the greatest need is for creative minds; pluralism in cultural background is essential, together with commitment to *raison d’humanite*. The proposals offered here must be evaluated and improved; concrete governance situations must be studied, so as to identify appropriate needs and possibilities; suggestions for redesigns must be tested against different realities; and novel alternatives devised and developed.

If this Report stimulates deeper thinking and more determined action to improve capacities to govern, it will have fulfilled its mission.

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The Education of a Ruling Caste: The Indian Civil Service in the Era of Competitive Examination

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*The education of a ruling caste: the Indian
civil service in the era of competitive
examination*

THE educational *milieu* in which the members of a bureaucracy spend their intellectually formative years invariably influences their responses to the administrative problems that subsequently confront them. The British civil servants who ruled late nineteenth-century India were no exception. Until 1856 the great majority of the Honourable East India Company's servants were selected through a system of patronage and educated at a college specially established to prepare them for an Indian career – Haileybury. Around the content of the education imparted at Haileybury and its influence on British policies in India one of the most fertile themes in British-Indian historiography has grown.¹ But no comparable interest has been shown in the education of the Indian civil servant in the period after this convenient institutional focus was abolished.² Yet in the era of competitive examination the education of the Indian civil service changed as drastically as it had done in the first half of the nineteenth century; and the effects of that change on the formulation of policy in India were no less pervasive. There was an element of institutional obsolescence and replacement, familiar at least in outline: the movement from patronage to competitive examination, from Haileybury to the crammers and Oxbridge. But the altered *content* of the education civil servants received, the corollary of institutional change, was more significant than the institutional changes themselves; for it was through the altered content of their education that successive generations of Indian civil servants

1. For Haileybury, see Bernard Cohen, 'Recruitment and Training of British Civil Servants in India, 1800-1860', in Ralph Braibanti, (ed.), *Asian Bureaucratic Systems Emergent from the British Imperial Tradition* (Durham, N.C.: 1966), pp. 87-140. For the abolition of Haileybury and the introduction of competitive examination see R. J. Moore, 'The Abolition of Patronage in the ICS and the Closure of Haileybury College', *Historical Journal*, 1964, 248-57; Edward Hughes, 'Sir Charles Trevelyan and Civil Service Reform, 1853-5', *ante*, 1949, lxiv, 53-88, 206-34; Edward Hughes, 'Civil Service Reform, 1853-5', *History*, xxvii, (1942), 51-83; Maurice Wright, *Treasury Control of the Civil Service, 1854-1874* (Cambridge U.P. 1969).

2. Two very interesting papers have recently appeared on the problems of *recruitment* through competitive examination: J. M. Compton, 'Open Competition and the ICS, 1854-76', *ante*, lxxxiii, (1968), 261-84; and B. Spangenberg, 'The Problem of Recruitment for the Indian Civil Service in the late Nineteenth Century'. *Journal of Asian Studies*, xxx, (1971), 341-60. Dr. Compton discusses the examination system's failure to recruit the scholar-gentlemen idealized by its architects; Dr. Spangenberg explains the failure (largely) in terms of worsening official salaries, as inflation and deteriorating exchange rates lowered the purchasing power of salary scales unchanged for more than sixty years. But neither touches, except incidentally, on the content of the Indian civil servant's education.

escaped from Haileybury's utilitarian mould to participate in the late Victorian intellect's unfolding phases.

I Institutional change: the capture of the Indian civil service by the universities.

The Reforms of 1854-6.

'Macaulay annexed the Indian civil service to the universities.' Thus G. M. Young summed up the achievement of the 1854 committee on the recruitment of the Honourable East India company's servants. But summaries so brief, however inspired, inevitably oversimplify. Macaulay was not the sole or perhaps even the chief protagonist of annexation; and the process of annexation was a long drawn-out struggle – in which the universities experienced reverses as well as triumphs – rather than a suddenly accomplished fact.

The peculiar relationship between Whig grandees and intelligentsia in mid-Victorian England was the axis on which the fate of the 1854 committee's recommendations hung. At the outset of the century linkages between Whigs and intellectuals were tenuous and politically irrelevant; but gradually, as a secular intelligentsia came into existence, a loose association arose – until natural lines of party allegiance were disrupted by the Irish question. Just as an earlier utilitarian generation entered the permanent civil service (the two Mills, Sir James Stephen) as subordinate partners of ministerial magnates, so in the second half of the century successive reform acts and the enhanced role of communications made it possible for liberal intellectuals (a Fawcett or a Morley) to enter politics as heirs and equals of the Whigs. At the same time old Whig families embraced education. The scions of territorial families appeared, for the first time, in Oxbridge *honours* lists – a Wood, a Grenville, a Hartington. And on the peripheries of both groups, especially after the absorption of the Peelites, a species of intermediary arose – half Whig, half intellectual. Macaulay, Trevelyan, Northcote, Gladstone were the link-men through whom an old aristocracy of birth concluded an alliance with a new aristocracy of intellect; and from their fusion the chief impulse to reform derived.

Within the web of influence momentarily activated to secure acceptance of the principle of recruitment by open competitive examination stood representatives of all three groups. Inside the cabinet Aberdeen (premier), Sir Charles Wood (president of the board of control), and Grenville were the Whigs most directly involved; while Jowett (tutor, later master of Balliol), Vaughan (headmaster of Harrow), and Liddell (headmaster of Westminster, later dean of Christ Church) represented the educational establishment. Between them Macaulay, Gladstone (chancellor of the

exchequer), and Trevelyan (assistant secretary at the treasury) served as mediators. For different reasons all three groups desired reforms; their interaction – along already established lines of connection – determined the shape reform assumed.

Why the universities should desire reform, Jowett eloquently explained to Gladstone:

I cannot conceive a greater boon which could be conferred on the University than a share in the Indian appointments. The inducement thus offered would open to us a new field of knowledge: it would give us another root striking into a new soil of society: it would provide what we have always wanted, a stimulus reaching beyond the Fellowships, for those not intending to take orders: it would give an answer to the dreary question which a College Tutor so often hears asked by a B.A. even after obtaining a first class Fellowship: 'What line of life shall I choose, with no calling to take orders and no taste for the Bar and no connexions who are able to put me forward in life?'¹

The lasting impression left by this much-quoted passage is that the academics who pressed for the introduction of recruitment by competitive examination did so because they saw it as a partial solution to the problem of graduate unemployment – as a transfer of pelf from the nominees of the directors of the East India Company to the university graduates. But such an impression does less than justice to the complexity of their motives. In 1854 the ancient universities had just entered a period of crisis and reform. One minor aspect of that crisis was the problem of graduate employment. Throughout the early nineteenth century the number of graduations had steadily risen, probably without a corresponding growth in the number of job opportunities in professions – education, the church, the bar – traditionally open to graduates. But of far greater moment to academic politicians was the ancient universities' general crisis of identity. Under the impact of successive commissions of enquiry – royal, statutory and executive – which sat from 1850 to the 1880s, they were compelled to present a *compte rendu* to the nation. It became necessary, through reform, to satisfy the strong feeling that the universities – founded for the whole nation – had been diverted to sectional ends. 'Is it at all possible,' Jowett had earlier asked, 'that we shall be allowed to remain as we are for twenty years longer, the one solitary exclusive unnational corporation . . . our enormous wealth without any manifest utilitarian purpose?'²

In this context, the capture of the ICS by the universities was an episode in their quest for 'manifest utilitarian purpose'. It offered something to both of the 'reform' camps into which Oxford had

1. Cited by R. J. Moore, *ubi supra*, p. 250.

2. John Roach, 'Victorian Universities and the Liberal Intelligentsia', *Victorian Studies*, (1959), p. 135, citing Sir Geoffrey Faber, *Jowett: A Portrait with Background* (London, 1967), p. 197.

split. Jowett's solution to the crisis of identity was to convert the ancient universities into training-grounds for politicians and administrators; the simultaneous introduction of recruitment by competitive examination for both Home and Indian services was an essential pre-requisite of that conversion. But Jowett's goal was not Oxford's. There was an alternative programme; and to its proponents the conversion of the ancient universities into a kindergarten for politicians and civil servants was abhorrent. The alternative programme – for which Pattison, rector of Lincoln, was chief spokesman – demanded that the ancient universities reform on German lines; that they become centres of research and scholarship, training scholars, not rulers.¹ Victory for Jowett in civil service reform could be equated with defeat for Pattison and his friends; always there was the possibility that strong opposition would emerge to the provision by the university of the teaching necessary if prospective candidates for the civil service were to find an Oxford education conducive to success in the competitive examinations. But opposition remained dormant. It was neutralized by the prospect of 'a new field of knowledge' – Indian studies. Existing teaching in the field of oriental languages – one of the specialities *par excellence* of German universities – would be re-vitalized and expanded; to it might be added Indian geography, Indian history, the whole gamut of the ICS examinations. And this expansion of teaching, aided by otherwise non-existent grants from the state, would at least provide more posts for scholars, more opportunity for research.

Outside Oxbridge, also, educationalists anticipated substantial benefits from the introduction of competitive examinations. When the largest and richest Cambridge college, Trinity, opened four of its fellowships to competition the effects of its decision were felt in every subject taught at Cambridge and every school supplying entrants. The effects at Oxford of Balliol's decision to open its fellowships to all comers had been the same. How much more, Macaulay argued, could the annual award of forty Indian appointments – offering far higher salaries, a pension and the possibility of marriage – do to quicken 'every seat of learning throughout the realm.'² It would do this by inducing students to take up new disciplines – history, jurisprudence, modern languages, natural sciences – besides the traditional staples, classics and mathematics; and by providing fresh incentives for the middle and lower classes to attain high educational standards.

Within the cabinet, however, there were those who doubted whether the parliamentary system could work without patronage.

1. For the rivalry of Jowett and Pattison see John Sparrow, *Mark Pattison and the Idea of a University* (Cambridge, 1967), and Faber, *op. cit.*

2. *Parliamentary Papers*, 1854–5, xx, 'Papers relating to the re-organization of the civil service', p. 231.

'Before the Revolution', Graham wrote to Gladstone, 'the crown struggled to maintain its supreme power by prerogative; since the Revolution it has succeeded in upholding government by influence . . . I am not sure that Parliamentary Government can be conducted on such principles of purity'.¹ Others were more confident. As Gladstone replied, if, at the Revolution, 'We passed over from prerogative to patronage . . . since the Revolution we have also passed from bribery to influence . . . (and) I cannot think that the process will end here'.² Another reform act was imminent, and it seemed politic to take the credit for a voluntary renunciation of patronage – converted by rising standards of political morality from legitimate influence into illegitimate corruption – before further extensions of the franchise created yet more constituencies too large to be amenable to 'management'. The East India company's patronage was especially vulnerable. It was still used, on the eve of the company's dissolution, to mobilize political support; and it must have provided a basis for several directors' political careers. But, controlled as it was by a small and stable directorate, it was less accessible to ministers and backbenchers than ordinary crown patronage. Sacrifice of the East India company's patronage accordingly appealed to two great Whig traditions: their antipathy, developed over decades of opposition, to executives strong through the exercise of patronage; and their more recently acquired flair for intelligent minimal concession to mass political discontent. Neither the educational nor the political arguments for reform, however, sounded as plausible in Whig ears as the argument from administrative efficiency. The promise of a revolution in the quality of government – to be brought about by recruitment from a vastly enlarged pool of proven intellectual (and prospective administrative) talent – was what gained open competitive examinations public acceptance and cabinet approval. The primary function of both home and Indian civil services was, after all, neither to benefit the educational system nor to ensure political acquiescence; it was to administer, and to administer efficiently in an age in which the functions of central governments were expanding, throwing more and more responsibility for the formulation and execution of policies on to the shoulders of permanent civil servants. In both England and India (there was a sort of reciprocal demonstration effect between the two), a new type of civil service seemed necessary; a civil service selected for competence, not connection, and promoted for ability, not seniority. No party was more sensitive to this need than the Liberals. Reform – political adjustment to economic and social realities – was the Liberal party's *raison d'être*. But there were all too few reforms on which all the congeries of dissimilar or

1. J. B. Conacher, *The Aberdeen Coalition, 1852-1855* (Cambridge, 1968), p. 319.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 322.

mutually repugnant groups making up the Liberal party could enthusiastically unite. For the party, despite its long tenure of office, remained an unstable coalition whose Whig leadership had little in common with the rank and file. Many reforms – Ireland, the church, education – threatened thinly-cemented alliances with dissolution; but administrative efficiency was a goal to which territorial magnate and Methodist lay-preacher could both subscribe. The Whigs' old pose as pure and efficient administrators, lent plausibility by their absorption of the Peelites, grew on them until life followed art; while at the level of the rank and file the abolition of patronage was associated with a whole complex of 'business methods' – the recording of individual performance, the separation of 'intellectual' and 'mechanical' work, rudimentary time and motion study – which exercised a powerful appeal for the business class on which urban liberalism was critically dependent. Elite and mass were also united by a common faith in achieved as opposed to ascribed status. To vote Liberal was an assertion of independence, of individual adequacy; it was a statement of faith in the autonomously-directed self-made man. From this fact much of the moral fervour of popular liberalism derived: and the institution of recruitment by competitive examination appeared to open a new profession to those who achieved status through their own unaided efforts.

It was the intermediaries, on the peripheries of the party's constituent groups, who were most sensitive to the issues around which the party could cohere; and it was the intermediaries whose personal experience as English or Indian civil servants enabled them to define the criteria that competition-wallahs must satisfy. By common agreement, the state of the home civil service was far worse than that of the Indian civil service; but it was more important that the Indian civil service should be efficient, for the Indian civil servant exercised a power for good or evil which no English civil servant – perhaps no functionary in the world – possessed. 'You might read the character of the collector', Macaulay informed the house of commons,

in the eyes and in the garb of the population – in the appearance of the fields and of the houses. When there was an incompetent collector, the peasantry were brokenhearted. In the first place, the ornaments of the women, in which the peasantry of India lay up their wealth, and which they so greatly prize, are sold – then the pressure overcomes their fondness for the village to which they belong, and emigration by hundreds and thousands took place. The villages became desolate, jungle surrounded a country before cultivated, and wild beasts made dens where human habitations stood before. But let a good collector replace the bad one, and the whole scene is altered. Cultivation reappears, the jungle recedes, the tigers and beasts of prey are driven back to their former

haunts, the houses rise again, and the fugitive population comes back to their villages.¹

Only men in the intermediaries' own image could be entrusted with such power – men who were products of a similar education, preferably of a similar social background. In the upper echelons of Oxbridge class-lists the appropriate scholar-gentlemen congregated. They had experienced 'the best, the most liberal, and the most finished' education; and it had conferred on them not only essential intellectual attributes – a grasp of principle, articulateness, dialectical skill, a trained memory – but equally desirable moral qualities. Outstanding success in mastering any academic subject, however *recherché*, created a presumption of universal competence. 'Is not', Macaulay asked, 'our history full of instances which prove that fact? Look at the Church, Parliament, the bar. Has it not always been the case that the men who were first in the competition of the schools have been first in the competition of life?' And if examination success and success in men's subsequent careers were correlated, so was examination success and 'character'. The industry and self-discipline required to take high honours were incompatible with 'dissolution'; gentle birth, often the sole qualification of the beneficiaries of patronage, afforded no such guarantee. And character, as a senior civil servant explained, was a highly desirable quality:

The first and cardinal quality that you want is a deep self-sacrificing sense of duty; not a conventional one, satisfied by doing and avoiding certain prescribed or proscribed things: but such as is only satisfied when it has done its best, whether the sacrifice demanded thereby be that of ease, personal feeling, or private opinion. This sense of duty is one of the quietest and least demonstrative of qualities, because it finds so much of its reward in itself. You cannot go into the general market and lay your hands upon it as a visible commodity.²

But you could be certain that the pursuit of excellence as an end in itself was more likely to be found in those who had pursued and achieved a high degree of academic excellence than in those who had not.

The Review of 1874–6.

The recruitment of graduates who had taken high honours, preferably at Oxbridge: this was the object of the 1854 committee's recommendations. In painstaking detail, Macaulay spelt out the examination scheme which would secure this end. Introduced virtually without modification, it seemed at first completely successful. In the first year in which the open examination was held (1855) 70 per cent of the successful candidates were Oxbridge-educated and the average for the first five years was almost 60 per cent. But

1. *Hansard*, 3rd. series xix, col. 524 ff. (10 July 1833).

2. R. S. Lingren, *PP cit.*, pp. 98 ff.

after 1859 a decline set in, and by 1864 only 10 per cent of the ICS recruits were Oxbridge graduates. Over the same period, too, the proportion of the successful candidates who were graduates of *any* university fell, though less steeply. Something, obviously, had gone wrong.

It was not that the ICS examination had failed to attract candidates of university calibre. If anything, the examination had proved too popular. As the civil service commissioners reported:

The emoluments of a writership; the steady advancement in the service of those who devote themselves to it with zeal and perseverance; the infinite opportunities of public usefulness which it presents; the dignity, honour and influence of the positions to which it may not improbably lead; and the liberal and judicious provision for retirement at a moderate age; all render the Indian civil service a career full of interest and of pecuniary advantage . . . We feel convinced, that when this system of competitive examination for the East India Company's service is generally made known and fully understood, it will draw away many young University men from the severe and uncertain competition of the bar, the moderate expectations of the church, and still more from the laborious future which the various employments of a scholastic nature hold out.¹

But candidates eager to secure such dazzling prizes discovered that universities were inefficient places at which to prepare for the open examination. There was a more effective alternative: the crammer. Crammers were a mid-Victorian phenomenon, the response of a market economy to a flood of examinations – examinations to gain qualifications conferred by the new centrally-supervised educational system, or to obtain public employment at every level from postman to permanent secretary. And in the case of the open examination for the Indian civil service, two characteristics of the examinations enhanced the crammers' popularity: the low maximum age for entry, and the multi-disciplinary spread.

For an examination supposedly designed to attract Oxbridge graduates, Macaulay's scheme made surprisingly few concessions to the courses of instruction they actually pursued. The public schools were geared as narrowly as any crammer's to the honours examinations at Oxbridge – which in 1854 meant mathematics (dominant at Cambridge) and classics (dominant at Oxford) – where success lay in ruthless concentration on a single subject, and within that subject on the specific requirements of tripos and schools: but the ICS examination allocated only 19 per cent of the maximum possible marks to classics and 20 per cent to mathematics. No classic or mathematician could hope to pass Macaulay's examination by virtue of his excellence at classics or mathematics alone, however highly-developed.

1. *PP* 1854-5, xl, 'Report from the committee . . . (on) the examination of candidates for the civil service of the East India company', pp. 112 ff.

Papers were set in sixteen subjects; and as marks gained by a candidate in any paper were at first simply added together to form his final mark, candidates sat every paper in which they could conceivably scrape a mark. After a few years, to discourage superficiality, a minimum threshold was introduced, below which no marks were carried forward to a candidate's total. This effectively limited candidates to four or five subjects. Even four or five subjects, however, were enough to force candidates to have recourse to crammers; nowhere within the ordinary education system could they obtain appropriate tuition to supplement their early specialization for a university honours school. The rationale behind this examination structure – apparently so at variance with the education of the candidates it was expressly intended to attract – was a mixture of bureaucratic expediency and idealism. The broad spread of papers was in part the product of a reluctance to exclude any type of intelligence, any reputable discipline, or any university: universities and disciplines against which the examination discriminated were quick to complain, discrediting the examination system. In theory, the marking system could have been adjusted to encourage greater specialization within the wide range of subjects offered. But the examination system originated in a revulsion against the vocational education offered by Haileybury, in favour of a 'liberal education' distinguished by inutility and breadth. The most illustrious English jurists, Macaulay reminded the house of commons, 'have been men who have never opened a law book till after the close of a distinguished academical career; nor is there any reason to believe that they would have been greater lawyers if they had passed in drawing plans and conveyances the time which they gave to Thucydides, to Cicero, and to Newton'.¹ What the intermediaries sought was general intelligence, rather than particular intelligence in an exceptionally high degree. Administrative problems, whose many facets ignored academic frontiers, could only be appreciated by such an intelligence. In a small elite cadre like the ICS, confronted by an intimidating variety of administrative functions, individual versatility was at a premium.

So the need to supplement conventional educational specialization drove prospective ICS candidates to the crammers. At the same time, the progressive lowering of the maximum age limit for entry to the open examination drove them out of the universities. Most students at Haileybury had gone out to India young, at eighteen or nineteen. Obviously, if their successors were to have the benefit of a university education they would have to go out much later. The 1854 committee accordingly suggested that the maximum age at which candidates could sit the open examination should be twenty-five: that would allow graduates more than enough time after

1. *Hansard*, 3rd. series cxxviii, col. 739 ff. (24 June 1853).

graduation to attend a crammer and work up supplementary subjects. But there were disadvantages to elderly recruits. The older a man went out to India, the more difficult he found adjustment to Indian conditions – the more violent his reaction to ‘culture shock’. And the older recruits were, the more repulsive they found the drudgery, especially the tedious trials of myriads of petty civil cases, which made up the Indian civil servant’s vocational training.

There was dissatisfaction, also, with the quality of the training probationers received after their arrival in the presidency to which they had been posted. Senior civil servants were too involved in administration to teach raw recruits the grammar of Indian languages, or the principles of jurisprudence; and there was no pool of high-quality university teachers to serve as substitutes. It was felt that probationers would benefit more from a preliminary training in England; but training took time, and unless recruits were to defer their arrival in India until their late twenties, it was necessary to reduce the maximum age for admission to the open examination. Reducing the age limit, it was realized, would almost certainly reduce the number of university men competing; but since the unbridled optimism of the high pre-mutiny days, despair of ever attracting the *best* university men had set in. ‘It seems probable’, the civil service commissioners lamented, ‘that the numerous and valuable prizes now thrown open to competition at these seats of learning, combined with the lure of distinction at home, may prove more attractive than the prospect even of an Indian career’.¹ So, gradually, the civil service commissioners and the Indian office became reconciled to the abandonment of the Macaulay committee’s goal – recruitment of the cream of the universities – and accepted as a substitute recruitment of the cream of the public schools.

For reasons such as these, the maximum age limit for admission to the open examination was reduced in 1859 to twenty-three and in 1865 to twenty-one. Both reductions had immediate repercussions: the number of successful candidates who were graduates fell, and the proportion who had taken high honours fell even faster. Oxbridge, where students graduated later than at Scottish, Irish or Indian universities, was especially badly hit. The graduate no longer had time to prepare for the ICS examination after graduation; he had, instead, to spend his vacations at a crammer’s – and the time and effort he devoted to the ICS examination was so much time and effort subtracted from his preparation for his degree examinations. Candidates who tried to compete in both *cursus honorum* ran the risk of failure in both. A successful candidate who went up to Cambridge determined to get a fellowship and become a barrister, but decided in his second year as a mathematician to compete for the ICS, described the necessary adjustment:

1. *Civil Service Commissioners’ Report*, 1864, PP, 1865, xvi, pp. 176 ff.

I almost entirely left off reading mathematics, which was my strongest subject; I brushed up my Latin, which had grown rusty; I consolidated and increased my knowledge of moral science, which was desultory and disconnected; I added to my acquaintance with the principles of the natural sciences a knowledge of the leading facts and details of the one which I took up: and I was near the top of the list.¹

But the price of success in the ICS examination was relative failure in tripos: he secured only a good second instead of the anticipated first. Few men who had hope of a first were willing to jeopardize their chances in this way; yet it was such men whom the 1854 committee had hoped to recruit for Indian service.

Throughout the 1860s the crammers consolidated their position; in the 1870s almost every successful candidate had attended a crammer's. But the crammers' very success aroused a degree of official hostility which ultimately deprived them of the bulk of this lucrative trade. An inquiry initiated in 1874 by the then secretary of state for India, the duke of Argyll, revealed how extensive cramming was, and sought alternatives to it.² Cramming – so the indictment ran – was the negation of the liberal education at which the 1854 committee had aimed: it was to transfer the education of Indian civil servants to the universities, not to crammers, that Haileybury had been abolished. Cramming was intellectually superficial; worse – in an era of muscular Christianity, it neglected morality and physique.³ Its prevalence aggravated existing doubts about the quality of the competition-wallah. The competition-wallah – the product of cramming – might be more intelligent than his Haileybury-educated predecessors, more prolific and agile with a pen; but was he also a *gentleman*? Was not his physique so weakened by excessive concentration on the book work needed to succeed in the open examination that his health broke down in India? Of sedentary disposition, could he ride? Could he inspire the same respect in the natives? Subsequent inquiry in India (directed by Haileybury men) cleared the examination-wallah of these doubts, but the conviction that cramming was mischievous persisted. There seemed, however, to be no readily-available alternative: cramming was inseparable from the existing examination system. The range of subjects which candidates had to sit to have any chance of success was too wide to encourage profound learning, and could not be reduced without sacrificing the 'generalist' ideal; the maximum age-limit could not be raised without accepting all the disadvantages of valetudinarian recruits; while both public schools and universities resisted pressure

1. D. C. J. Ibbetson, *PP* 1876, xv, 'Papers relating to the selection and training of candidates for the Indian civil service', pp. 143–51. (Hereafter PRST.)

2. PRST, *passim*.

3. For contemporary educational values (and especially the transition from 'scholarly' to 'muscular' Christianity) see David Newsome, *Godliness and Good Learning* (London, 1961).

to broaden their curricula, and some of the subjects set – those which could be got up by mastering a textbook or two – were peculiarly suited to cramming.

A revived Haileybury sprang to Argyll's mind – with a little prompting from alumni.¹ It had conferred on the Indian civil service common knowledge, common interests, and common values – sources of a degree of cohesion as useful in a diminutive ruling elite as the versatility conferred by transferable intelligence. But to revive Haileybury would be expensive if it was to attract teachers as well-qualified as the universities, and the risk of such an institution's academic isolation would be great. Nor would the obvious alternative – the attendance of prospective Indian civil servants at the universities – attain the desired ends: 'the universities, being many and each containing many colleges, will not necessarily bring the future civilians into the same close daily contact.' By this chain of reasoning Argyll arrived at a compromise proposal: the revival of Haileybury as a constituent college of one of the English universities. But the cost of such a college, and the reluctance of the two ancient universities to permit its establishment, doomed Argyll's proposal. University politicians had other plans for Indian patronage than its reservation for a single specially-created college. So the universities' representatives suggested another plan: a further reduction in the maximum age limits for candidates entering the 'open' examination, to about the normal age of university entry, and the provision at the universities of a special two-year course leading to the 'further' examination for probationers successful in the 'open'. Residence at a university prepared to provide the specialist tuition (in practice Oxford, Cambridge and London) would become compulsory for probationers (who had hitherto lodged in London or the country while they attended crammers); and to meet the cost of residence they would be given state studentships by the India office. In this way, while recruits would still go out to India young, they would all receive a university education – after, rather than before, selection; and the crammers, though still essential for success in the 'open' examination, would at least be deprived of probationers preparing for the 'further'.

Before he could determine the fate of the Oxbridge proposal, Argyll went out of office with the Liberals. His successor, Salisbury, was persuaded that attendance at the universities would secure the ends Argyll had thought only a special college could attain. 'Candidates', a subsequent despatch argued, 'will be naturally thrown together without any formal arrangement for that purpose. A certain competition in Indian teaching will be set up in the universities, special excellence will be attained in particular colleges, and

1. PRST, pp. 46 ff.

to them it will probably become the habit for Indian candidates to resort'.¹ The despatch's prophecy proved correct.

The Adjustments of 1891-2

Thirty-seven years after the first open examination was held, the 1854 committee's ideal – a graduate service, in which Oxbridge men should secure the bulk of the appointments without wholly excluding outside talent – was finally realized. In the five open examinations held between 1892 and 1896 78 per cent of the successful candidates were Oxbridge men; in the five preceding examinations only 22 per cent had been. To a very limited extent Oxbridge's gain was the other universities' loss: London's share of the successful candidates appears to have fallen from 8 per cent to 4; while the share of the Scottish and Irish universities fell marginally. But, overwhelmingly, Oxbridge made its gains at the expense of the crammers: the proportion of recruits without any university experience fell from 59 per cent to 6.²

For this belated fulfilment of the 1854 committee's aspirations two adjustments made in the open examination were immediately responsible: the maximum age limit for entry was raised from 19 to 23, and the formal structure of the examination – the papers set and the number of marks allocated to each – was modified to bring it into closer accord with the chief Oxbridge honours courses. Behind each adjustment lay decades of dissatisfaction with the existing open examination, both in England and India. Salisbury's 1876 decision to reduce the maximum age limit from 21 to 19 and to send the successful candidates on a two-year probationary course had been controversial. It was opposed (not unnaturally) by universities unable or unwilling to provide the special tuition required for ICS probationers; by Jowett, who for once failed to carry Oxbridge opinion with him; and by the then viceroy, Northbrook.

Over the subsequent decade pressure for a reappraisal of the system grew. In Oxford it was led by Jowett, in Cambridge by Sidgwick. Jowett had always conceived the Indian civil service as a suitable career for undergraduates who achieved distinction in the ordinary honours examinations. The maximum age limit of 19 prevented graduates competing in the open examination; and the presence at the universities of probationers undergoing a peculiar two-year vocational training was no satisfactory substitute. Sidgwick stressed the reluctance of parents to commit their sons to an Indian career at the tender age of 16 – the age at which candidates had to begin to concentrate on preparation for the open examination; and it was the parents of the academically most promising boys who, in view of their sons' prospects in more conventional careers, were

1. *PP*, 1877, xxviii, 609-12.

2. *CJSCR*, 1892-6.

most reluctant to commit them.¹ But it was Indian dissatisfaction, not English disapproval, which finally raised the maximum age limit. A maximum age limit of 19 made it virtually impossible for Indian candidates to compete successfully in the open examination. Long residence in England was essential for Indian candidates. They had to learn a foreign language, English, until they were as proficient as their British competitors; and they had to attend a crammer's. Few Indians could hope to have done this by 19; far more could hope to have done it by 23.

Initially the rhetoric of Indian reform emphasized the denial of racial equality and the right of the governed to participate in their own government. Later, educated unemployment – a growing problem – lent material stridency to political philosophy, while new forms of political organization and agitation made it possible for groups eager to compete in the open examination to press their grievances on the British Indian bureaucracy. Successive viceroys – Ripon, Dufferin, Lansdowne – yielded to their pressure; and their sympathetic response was more than a mere placebo for political discontent. For Ripon, at least, it was a conscious attempt to fit the British Indian bureaucracy for what he believed would prove its most exacting task: the transference to India of British political institutions. If Indian constitutional evolution was to proceed without dislocation, it was essential that Indian civil servants should instinctively share the political values of the metropolitan government and electorate. If they did not, the home and Indian governments might split when confronted by the challenge of nationalism; and in a system of government dependent for its cohesion on the possession of common values, such a division could only result in the inept handling of politically-tense situations demanding delicate, flexible, treatment. It was desirable, also, that members of the Indian civil service should share principles representative of the 'best' in British political life, because of their exemplary function: their example would influence, if not dictate, the tone of Indian political life. The average Indian civil servant, however, shared the authoritarian racist outlook of the British business community rather than Ripon's 'higher' values – as he discovered when the entire European community, official and non-official alike, united in opposition to a bill empowering Indian judges to try Europeans. In the recruitment of graduates and the postponement of their arrival in India until the age of 25 Ripon saw a means of assimilating the Indian civil servant's political views to metropolitan rather than expatriate norms.² On the eve of his return to England, Ripon persuaded the secretary of state for India to appoint a commission on the employment of Indians in the British Indian bureaucracy, which

1. A. and E. M. Sidgwick, *Henry Sidgwick, a Memoir* (London, 1906), pp. 502–3.

2. *PP*, 1884–5, lviii, 135 ff.

revealed the extent of Indian dissatisfaction. The old age limit of 23 was restored as a result of its recommendations, and the number of Indian recruits increased – significantly, in comparison with the diminutive number recruited before 1891, insignificantly, in comparison with the total number of recruits.

TABLE I: UNIVERSITIES ATTENDED BY ICS RECRUITS, 1855–1896
(Percentages)

	1855–96	1855–9	1874–8	1878–82	1887–91	1892–6
Total University	67	96	40	18	40	93
Oxford	24	34	12	3	5	52
Cambridge	16	23	4	1	15	25
Irish	10	24	9	1	3	5
Scottish	10	9	8	7	6	4
London	5	6	3	5	7	4
Indian	2	0	1	0	4	3

Source: *Civil Service Commissioners' Reports*

II Educational change: "The new Science of Government"

The Indian officials whose opinion was canvassed in the course of the Argyll inquiry had views not only on the organization of their successors' education, but on its content; and the most thoughtful, detailed, and plausible proposals for change came from those who had read for an Oxbridge degree. Of this group the most prominent was Sir Henry Sumner Maine, whose career epitomized the connections between the ancient universities and the government of India. His influence on Indian policy as a lecturer at both Oxford and Cambridge, and as the author of books which he first delivered there as lectures, far outweighed his influence as a mere member of the governor-general's executive council and, later, of the council of India. It was contact with minds like Maine's, and with the schools of thought they initiated, that an Oxbridge education brought to the ICS; and as the inquiry showed, his thought had already influenced three of the most brilliant intellectuals of the rising official generation: D. C. J. Ibbetson, H. H. Risley, and C. L. Tupper.¹

It was the decade of Darwin, science-obsessed. 'Scientific method' was proving its exhilarating, terrifying power to erode the bases of traditional belief. Sceptic and enthusiast alike were overwhelmed by a sense of impending change. Laden with the prestige of victory over the forces of religious reaction, scientific method spread out

1. All three made distinguished contributions to Indian anthropology (Ibbetson to the study of caste and tribe, Risley to ethnography, and Tupper to customary law); and all three played prominent roles in the formation of agrarian policy on Mainite lines, between 1890 and 1908. Ibbetson and Risley have entries in the *Dict. Nat. Biog.*

from its heartland in the biological sciences and – metamorphosed into ‘historical method’ or ‘sociology’ – lent its new-found authority to sympathetic practitioners of the humanities. The same cast of mind – intellectual, moralist, radical – which had accepted classical political economy now turned to Darwin, Lubbock, Tylor, Maine and Spencer: but in the 70s convictions which had been the property of an intellectual coterie flowered into self-generating popular movements – distant ancestors of modern political religions. For, except in its heightened effectiveness, the wave of evangelicalism unleashed by the ‘discovery’ of induction resembled the utilitarians’ ‘discovery’ of deduction; and popular enthusiasm for the application of scientific method to the solution of social problems immensely widened acceptance of the principle of utility, threatened by the exhaustion of its ‘classical’ deductive expositions and the growing unpopularity of its (supposedly) ancillary economic individualism.

Against this backcloth the Mainite group anticipated the rise of a race of scientist-administrators, who would revolutionize the basis of British rule in India by applying scientific and historical method to every problem of administration until they created a science of government:

It is only lately that scientific methods have been applied to social, political and judicial phenomena, and the educated European world is watching with interest and expectation the rise of what may be called, under protest, archi-sociology. The new study has already made wonderful strides, and has led to results of absorbing interest – an interest which their applicability to the occurrences of every-day life has extended to the educated world in general, far more than is the case with the majority of scientific results. It requires no very great boldness to prophesy that the time is not far distant when our views on points of administrative policy will be profoundly modified, nay, more probably shaped by, the results of investigation into the history of early institutions, and that this influence will be strongest of all in India, where we have begun to doubt the universal applicability of occidental methods, and are earnestly seeking a new guide for the future.¹

The creation of that new guide for the future, the advocates of archi-sociology admitted, would necessitate a vast work of original research, but for that work no field was more promising than India, where ‘circumstances have preserved almost unaltered many of the very earliest institutions of the Aryan race to which before all others the attention of an aryan civilization is naturally turned’, and where, in the Indian civil service, a huge staff of potential field workers was already in existence. They had to be roused to a sense of the importance of the information they could gather, and to be trained in the new discipline. It would be enough for the civil service commissioners to make the subject a compulsory paper in the

1. Ibbetson, *ubi supra*; cf. H. H. Risley, PRST, pp. 70 ff.

ICS examination, and to prescribe for it the books Ibbetson carefully listed – Maine's *Early History of Institutions*, McLennan's *Primitive Marriage*, Lubbock's *Origin of Civilisation*, Tylor's works, Cox's *Aryan Myths*; the inherent interest of the subject for any Indian official could be relied on to do the rest.

The corollary of enthusiasm for new knowledge was impatience of the old. In an age of progress, learning, like technology, had developed built-in obsolescence:

The growing complexity of modern life – the astonishing advances of physical discovery – the application of the methods of physical science to the philosophy of human progress – these are facts which antiquate in the present century the breadth of mental cultivation which suffices for times past.¹

The most trenchant criticism came from a single province, the Punjab – for it was the Punjab commission which surrendered most completely to the teaching of Maine. Tupper was joined by Ibbetson in his contempt for the existing multi-volume histories of India – Mill and Markham – as too purely political and military, and, above all, too Anglo-centric. Only the first part of Elphinstone's *History* was deemed worthy of praise. For

The simple fact is that no history of India, in the widest sense of that word as now understood, exists . . . the very non-existence of recorded materials which makes the preparation of a history of India worthy of the name an impossibility for the present, is a fact more deeply to be deplored, and which it should be one of our first aims to remedy.²

Nor did Blackstone, Smith or Bentham escape unscathed:

It is mere waste of time for men acquainted with constitutional law and possessed of the general knowledge which most candidates are to study Blackstone or Adam Smith. If they are not fit to commence with Mill, let them begin with Mrs. Fawcett's Handbook on Political Economy. Who would think of beginning to teach natural history from Goldsmith and then proceed to Huxley? Yet from Adam Smith to Mill the change is but little less than this. Bentham is studied by aid of a *memoria technica* alone . . . this is "cram" pure and simple, and the book, as fostering such, should be done away with.³

In England, Maine responded warmly to his Indian disciples' programme. He emphasized, in particular, the deleterious influence of English political economy on policy-formulation in India. 'I do not deny', he wrote in an India council minute,

that Political Economy as set forth in the ordinary manuals, has sufficient precisions to be a subject for examination. But this precision is obtained in great measure by a series of assumptions which are not by any means absolutely true of India. Political Economy, as ordinarily understood,

1. C. L. Tupper, PRST, pp. 127–31.

2. Ibbetson, *ubi supra*.

3. *Ibid*.

takes for granted that private individual property exists as an institution, that its forms are perfectly distinct, and that the actual distribution has been determined by causes of so old a date that no enquiry into their propriety ought to be permitted. But, over much of India, individual property is still imperfectly disentangled from common property, its forms are often extremely indistinct, even to the most careful observer, and its distribution over whole provinces is due to measures taken not a hundred years ago, in some provinces not twenty years ago. In fact, Political Economy, if studied by itself, is a source rather of confusion of mind than of clearness of thought in Indian officials, and it is one great merit of the special studies insisted on by the Civil Service Commissioners, that they include not only Political Economy, but the history of tenure as established by the comparative method and a part of what the writer of an interesting paper in the collection calls "Archi-Sociology".¹

The Mainite critique resulted in no decisive alteration in the formal structure of the examination system, beyond lending support to the proposal to send probationers to Oxbridge; but it did produce – in the questions set, the examiners chosen, the texts prescribed – a cumulative change in the content of the ICS examination. Change, indeed, might have been more sweeping, had it not been for Maine himself. By the late seventies he was an even more pronounced conservative than he had been in his youth; and for him the existing examination system, while imperfect, still represented a tolerable compromise. It was less tolerable to his Indian disciples. But compromise was perhaps the inevitable form any complex bureaucratic selection procedure must take; and with the format of a 'neutral' compromise, a Fabian-style 'permeation' proved possible.

*The Formal Structure of the ICS Examination*²

The formal structure of the Indian civil service entrance examination dictated – at least in outline – the education of the Indian civil servant. And between 1855 and 1900, that formal structure changed – not completely, but significantly. Unlike the examination for the home civil service, it was divided into two parts: a first ('open') examination, at which recruits were selected, and – after a probationary period lasting a year or two – a second ('further') examination, designed to test the vocational training given probationers. For the open examination of 1860 papers were set in sixteen subjects; in 1900 in twenty-three. The differences between the two selections – the excisions, the additions, and the altered distribution over subjects of the total possible mark – reflected the varying fates of contending academic disciplines. The open examination of 1860 was overwhelmingly 'literary': almost two-thirds of the total possible mark

1. H. S. Maine, PRST, pp. 305 ff.

2. *Examination Papers for the Indian Civil Service* (published annually), are the best sources for the examination's changing structure, the books prescribed for study, the questions set, and the examiners who set them.

were allocated to papers in language, literature and history – ancient, modern and oriental. For an era supposedly dominated by the classically-educated, classics took a surprisingly small share of this omnibus category: only 19 per cent. English (composition, history and literature) was equally important; and modern languages (French, German, Italian) were hardly less so. The inclusion of Sanskrit and Arabic (13 per cent) was a symbolic relic of Macaulay's determination that the examination should be open to Indians, perpetuated by the establishment of schools of Oriental languages at Oxbridge and a certain sympathy for the subjects' 'relevance'. Mathematics – a concession to the Cambridge wrangler – was more important than classics (22 per cent); but natural and moral science (6 per cent each) were included only as supplementary subjects. By 1900 science, natural and social, had come of age. Including philosophy, it took almost a third of the total mark (32 per cent). Mathematics (16 per cent) and the literary papers (50 per cent) were correspondingly reduced. Within the 'literary' category, classics preserved its proportion of the total mark; while English, modern and oriental languages shrank to two-thirds of their former importance. Candidates who had formerly taken these papers were obviously expected to spread themselves over the three new social science papers: political economy and economic history; political science (including the early history of institutions and jurisprudence); and English law. In their inclusion – and the demotion of political economy from a compulsory paper in the open examination to an optional paper in the final examination (diluted by the addition of economic history) – 'the new science of government' found formal recognition.

Alterations in the formal structure of the open and further examinations were reflected in the list of texts prescribed for candidates and probationers. The early dominance of utilitarian jurists and political economists was eroded. For the jurisprudence paper an amalgam of Blackstone, Bentham and Austin – in which Bentham and Austin conspired to smother Blackstone – was supplemented by Maine's quasi-anthropological, quasi-historical approach. For political economy Ricardo was displaced by J. S. Mill, and Mill, in turn, by Marshall. And for history and geography, *Village Communities East and West* joined Elphinstone in his standing battle with the elder Mill's contempt for Indian institutions. But there was no complete *bouleversement*; no total rejection of the utilitarian heritage. Rather, a reaction against utilitarianism co-existed in the book-lists with utilitarianism itself, as if the continued presence of utilitarian works was necessary to throw the reaction into high relief. The book-lists were accretive: the civil service commissioners were reluctant ever to discard books, except on the unanimous advice of the examiners, while academic acceptance – after seemingly

delays – added new authors. A far more vivid impression of the turbulence accompanying the formation, growth and inter-action of the modern academic disciplines whose frontiers now seem so conventional is given by the questions set. Examiners were chosen from amongst the best-known university teachers: hence the sensitivity of the ICS examination papers to prevailing climates of academic opinion, current academic controversies, even individual academic idiosyncrasy.

The fate of classical political economy was representative. In the 1860s J. S. Mill – and to almost the same extent the tradition of which his *Principles* was the culmination – enjoyed the status of holy writ; candidates were called upon to regurgitate his doctrines and definitions, not to criticize them. But the crisis of confidence in classical political economy which arose in the late 1870s destroyed the synthesis Mill had so carefully nurtured. Every question that had seemed closed was re-opened. Henceforward it was the limitations and errors of the classical political economists, as detected and rectified by their successors, that fascinated examiners. W. S. Jevons, for example, set four questions in the 1879 political economy paper which called in question no less than four of the fundamental classical prescriptions. *Was political economy an inductive or a deductive study?* A revulsion against inductive logic currently threatened its utilitarian exponents; Bentham and Ricardo in particular. *What were the true determinants of wages?* Jevons himself had exploded – at least to his own satisfaction – the wages-fund theory, which he regarded as the key-stone of classical political economy. *What constituted ‘legitimate’ and ‘illegitimate’ ‘restraint of trade’?* Jevons was far more sympathetic to government intervention than earlier – or indeed most contemporary – political economists. And: *In what ways was Smith’s doctrine of rent inadequate?* Earlier versions of this question were asked in the expectation that candidates would compare Smith’s inadequate theory of rent with Ricardo’s final solution; but by 1879 candidates were expected to be familiar with Ricardo’s critics, who cumulatively rejected his theory of rent as irrelevant to Indian conditions.

A period in which the classical political economists were rebutted by candidates was followed by a period – beginning about 1890 – in which they were treated as interesting historical phenomena. There was still humour to be derived from the divorce between classical theory and economic reality: ‘Give the strict theoretical definitions of rent, wages and interest. Show that either rent, wages or profit, as actually paid or received, may include all the three elements of rent, wages, and interest, as defined in theory’ (1891). Gradually the webs of dialectic woven round ‘Utility’, ‘Value’, ‘Wealth’, ‘Labour’, ‘Profit’, ‘Wages’, were edged out; and new themes – or new variations on old themes – crept in. Methodology

and the role of the state were fresh preoccupations. Questions about the use and abuse of abstract reasoning in political economy were asked, not with reference to the classical political economists, but with reference to the two methodological pincers between which they had been squashed: historical and mathematical method. Depression and unease over Britain's precarious industrial supremacy revived the slain dragon of classical political economy, protection, and twice brought it within the sphere of practical politics: its appearance as an examination question accurately reflected its political prospects. The extension of the franchise lent substance to issues – collectivism and co-operation – which had smacked of the utopian; and secured a more sympathetic treatment of trade unions, factory legislation, graduated taxation. Within the context of a famous cultural revulsion against the social evils of industrialization, the rise of economic history as an academic discipline rendered the classical political economists' simpliste condemnation of the medieval state's attempts to regulate economic activity untenable. After the expositions of Cunningham, Ashley, Gross, Maitland, Vinogradoff and Round guilds, the manor, usury laws, even corn laws – the whole apparatus of mercantilism – were no longer self-evidently ridiculous or evil; while the Industrial Revolution itself, first defined as a historical subject by Toynbee, was converted from a triumph of progress over stagnation to a catastrophe accompanied by brutal exploitation, social division, cultural loss, squalid living conditions, and dubious economic gain.

In other papers, too – jurisprudence, philosophy, political science – a parallel infiltration by relativist thought took place. The patriarchal theory of the state was attacked and defended; kinship and land were considered as rival determinants of ancient societies; the origin of individual property rights in land and the movement from status to contract were narrated; evolutionary thinkers were compared and contrasted; ethics were re-interpreted in the light of evolution. Diverse systems of economic thought and policy, differing forms of government and law, apparently exclusive religions were all recognized – usually within an evolutionary framework – as equally apposite in the particular societies and ages in which they arose. An era which opened confident that utilitarian prescriptions were optimal in all space and time closed with the profound conviction that 'circumstances alter cases'. Such was the landslip from utilitarianism.

APPENDIX I

A note on Indian civil servants' social origins¹

Neither extreme of the social spectrum was represented in the Indian civil service. Of the 1600-odd recruits selected at the forty open examinations held between 1858 and 1897 perhaps one was the son of a manual worker, while the number of 'aristocrats' (defining aristocrat as 'son of a peer') could be counted on the fingers of one hand. Virtually the entire service was recruited from three – predominantly middle-class – groups: the sons of professional men (67 per cent), of businessmen (21 per cent), and farmers or lesser gentry (12–13 per cent). Over time, recruits' origins changed significantly but not extensively. In the first five open examinations only 7 per cent of the successful candidates were sons of 'merchants and manufacturers'; in the last five 15 per cent were. Comparing the same quinquennia, the proportion of recruits who were sons of the leisured class fell from 11 per cent to 6 per cent, while the proportion who were sons of anglican clergymen fell from 23 per cent to 15 per cent. Taken in isolation what these figures appear to reveal is the steady rise of a new and vigorous business class breaking into citadels of privilege hitherto reserved for sons of the gentry and the established church. But breakdowns made about the middle of the period reveal no such smooth transition. The apogee of the merchant and manufacturer's son was the eighteen-sixties, not the eighteen-nineties; while the nadir of the clergyman's son was the mid-seventies, which was also the high-point for sons of military and naval officers (15 per cent against an over-all average of 8 per cent) and for the sons of 'gentlemen' (14 per cent against an average of 8 per cent). Clearly, no simple sociological explanation in terms of a rising business class can contain these chronological contortions.

An alternative approach is to relate the kind of preparation required by the open examination to the kind of education ordinarily chosen for their sons by the several social groups involved. Thus, for example, it may be that the peak for officers and gentlemen in the mid 70s corresponds with age limits for admission to the open examination (19–21) especially favourable to the form of education they preferred for their sons and especially unfavourable to the kind of education clergymen chose for their sons. The sons of officers and gentlemen had a high propensity to be specially prepared by a select number of public schools for army examinations, which were somewhat similar to the ICS open examination; the sons of clergymen were ordinarily prepared for Oxbridge scholarship examinations, which were less compatible with the ICS open examinations. Significantly, the raising of the age limits for the open examination from 17–19 to 21–23 in 1892 not only increased the proportion of university-educated recruits from 40 to 93 per cent (and the proportion of Oxbridge-educated recruits from 20 to 77 per cent) but coincided with a fall in the number of recruits who were sons of officers and gentlemen (from 12 per cent to 5 per cent) and a rise in the number who were sons of anglican clergymen (from 10 per cent to 15 per cent). The proportion who were

1. Cf. Compton, *ubi supra*, pp. 281–4.

sons of non-anglican clergymen (and so far less likely to go to Oxbridge) hardly rose at all (though it would be unwise to lay any great stress on trends deduced from the very small numbers involved).

TABLE 2: THE SOCIAL ORIGINS OF THE INDIAN CIVIL SERVICE: PROFESSIONS OF RECRUITS' FATHERS, 1858-97

(Percentages)

	1858-97	1858-62	1892-6
Merchants and Manufacturers	17	7	15
Clergy: Anglican	16	23	15
Others	5	4	6
Civil Service: Home	9	3	6
Indian	3	3	3
Military and Naval Officers	9	8	5
Landowners and Independent Means	8	11	6
Solicitors and Barristers	8	6	10
Physicians and Surgeons	6	10	5
Teachers and Journalists	4	4	5
Small Tradesmen	4	6	5
Farmers and Planters	8	8	12
Miscellaneous Professions	3	3	4

Source: *Civil Service Commissioners' Reports*

APPENDIX II

A note on the schools attended by ICS recruits¹

Although figures are available in the civil service commissioners' annual *Reports*, no attempt has been made to compile a complete breakdown of the schools attended by ICS recruits over the entire period, because of the labour involved. But analysis of the schools attended by all Indian civil servants serving in 1900 confirms two characteristics immediately apparent from any *Report*: the vast majority of the intake came from a large number of public or endowed grammar schools; and a disproportionately high number came from a small group of public schools evidently specializing in preparation for the ICS examination, just as other schools specialized in preparing boys for the army or university honours. Amongst this small group were Cheltenham, Marlborough, Clifton, Bedford Grammar School, and Kingston (in Ireland). Other schools contributed largely, but in their case a high all-round level of academic attainment – rather than specialized preparation for their pupils' success. Winchester, Charterhouse, Westminster, St. Paul's and Dulwich fall in this category. Eton and Rugby contributed sizeable contingents; but the typical school attended by an ICS recruit was a second-rank public school, specializing in the preparation of boys for the 'open' professions – which

1. Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 279-81. The main difference between the secondary education of Haileybury nominees and competition-entrants was the higher propensity of nominees to be educated privately or at home.

is exactly what the break-down of fathers' professions would lead one to expect. The hegemony of the 'Clarendon prototype' was a fixed star in the Indian universe. Above and below the Clarendon prototype, however, there was a certain degree of secular change. Clarendon schools – participating in the revival of the public schools as a whole – contributed more recruits at the end of the century than they had when the competitive examination was first established; while country grammar schools – unable to compete – lost out.

The Good Administrator

By C. Rajagopalachari

(Patel Memorial Lectures - Inaugural Address broadcast from AIR, Mumbai, August 14, 1955; Taken from Patel Memorial Lectures (1955-85), Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, New Delhi, 1990)

THE MINISTER FOR Broadcasting has conferred on me a great honor by asking me to inaugurate and give the first lecture in the Patel Memorial series.

Vallabhbhai Patel was a great man. He worked for the deliverance of India from foreign rule and he lived to see it fully achieved. In the work of reconstruction that followed, he saw to the integration of all the states in the Indian union. About forty years ago Vallabhbhai Patel gave up the legal profession when the Motherland wanted one of his type for the gigantic struggle for liberation. But, alas, before India could well get on without him, death snatched him from us. It was said of Augustus that it would have been better for Rome if Augustus had never been born or had never died. This can be said with great truth about Indian and Vallabhbhai Patel.

It is not intended that this lecture should deal with Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel's life. But what I shall talk about today, viz., the efficient administration of our country, was a subject uppermost in his anxious mind when death was relentlessly approaching him.

If one wrote a book on any subject, it would be a grave defect if anything important and relevant to the subject were omitted. When writing a book, one must be careful also about the amount of emphasis that is laid on each aspect that is dealt with. The reader's mind should be left with no bias but enriched with well-balanced thoughts. In a talk of this kind one need not be so careful and lapses will be excused. Often it happens that when we exhaustively deal with any matter, putting all the *pros* and *cons* justly, weighing and balancing things one against another in a careful and proper way, we shall have done justly and well but we leave no resulting positive effect behind. This is the evil of too much of balance. We give information but little guidance. In fact we create plenty of doubt and caution and no momentum for initiative. Movement forward - always means and involves taking risks, accepting the chance of going wrong and having to rectify upon the experience gained. There are plenty of things to be said on good administration. But if I proceed to collect them all and put them before you I shall not have done anything very useful; indeed I doubt my ability to do such exhaustive analysis, with anything like satisfaction to myself, not to speak of the effect on the listeners.

We have turned the British out and we have told all the people of the land that it is good for them that they now govern themselves. But afterthoughts lead one to some doubts. Our hopes can be realized only if, and to the extent that the administrative set-up is satisfactory.

If anyone investigated into what most people in India desire as regards government - whether they want democracy, or whether they want a federal or a unitary government, or whether they want the American type of democracy or the British and so on - I guess we shall see that the people want honest, efficient, prompt, just and sympathetic officers; and they do not mind the form of government. The Constitution has been settled on the basis of democracy, universal adult suffrage being the foundation thereof. The selection of representatives, who will wield supreme power in legislation as well as in amending the Constitution itself, is left to the people, every individual's judgment weighing the same as every other's. No qualifications are prescribed for standing as candidates; anyone may be elected. Something like the principle underlying the universal postal system where distances do not count - an Anna will carry your post-card to the neighboring village as well as to distant Calcutta or Karachi or Cape Comorin - the distances and differences between men and men are ignored so far as the power to select representatives is concerned. That is a settled and final affair not to be disturbed till another Plato or Manu is born. What I shall now talk about, however, is the type of men required for the satisfactory administration of a tremendously big area and big population such as India is, or even a single State like Bombay or Uttar Pradesh or Bengal is, or even the reduced units down South. In the selection of personnel to fill official posts, whether judicial or executive, the principle of universal equality is not enforced and qualifications do count.

The people expect a rise in the general standard of comfort, and this, too, not for one class at the expense of another but among all classes generally, urban as well as rural. Apart from technical advances leading to increased average national income that will go towards bringing about a rise in the general standard of living, the importance of an efficient administrative organization is very great. No people can be happy with an inefficient government or with a government that is not firm and impartial. The psychology of the caste nexus and of class differences is strong in India. All the greater is the need for firm and impartial officials, and the common people know this.

For any administration to be good and efficient as a whole, we want the right type of men. The quality of the men placed in position is more important than the laying down of rules and methods of operation. The caste consciousness is a hard reality. It unites and divides in a very real manner today whatever be our goal. And today is most important in matters of administration. Shortsighted favoritism and concessions to produce contentment among classes and castes will be very short-lived and deteriorate into a constant pandering to

intrigues and factions if we do not look to the real efficiency of the administration.

Several causes have combined to raise the level of comfort that is aimed at, in our country among all classes now. Although desires have gone up, the national income has not materially increased in that proportion. Hence the mental condition of our people after the achievement of complete independence is not one that can at all be described as happy. This is so especially in the case of those who have received school or college education of any kind.

Religion is absolutely essential to drive away the fog that surrounds the truth in regard to what we really require. It is not less important than the devising of ways to increase national production in all directions. The spread of a sense of true values and the development of adequate spiritual strength for facing the struggles that are ever involved in life can be done only through education organized on right lines. Apart from religion and sound education of intellect as well as character, good administration is very important. An efficient and just administration can make up for a great deal of unhappiness and frustration in other respects.

For the administration to be efficient we require the right sort of men to be in positions of power and responsibility. Whatever may be believed or said in the passion or thoughtlessness of the hour that often passes for democratic thought, these men must come from our organized higher educational institutions. Splendid exceptions, meteor like, sometimes appear. Leaders and organizers with Herculean strength come up now and then without any or with little academic education. But these are exceptions. The general rule is that the men we require for running the administration must come from our higher educational institutions. They cannot be got at elsewhere. The type of equipment and mental make-up that we require for good administrators must therefore be kept in mind in the organization of higher education, for these cannot be obtained for them elsewhere or later after recruitment.

What are the requirements we should demand in a good administrator? Character is a fundamental requirement. And a fundamental requirement is a most important thing. We cannot let fundamentals take care of themselves.

But though character is a basic requirement, it should be remembered that it is not the decisive factor that makes a person specially fit for administrative tasks. A very good man may not be at all fit to be entrusted with administrative responsibility in the civil business of the State, even as it is obviously the case in the conduct of a military operation. It would be easy but perhaps dangerous to give examples of known men who have failed, though they are persons of undoubted good character.

After this has been said and admitted, we are apt to think that sound technical equipment is the decisive factor in each department of public service. But it is not so. The special equipment required for various jobs is no doubt indispensable. But experts cannot govern nor can they be safely allowed to govern, though they may wish and, if permitted, be able to dominate. In administrative key positions, the special technical equipment that comes into play in those departments is strangely enough by no means the essential requirement. To give only one example, the man responsible for the fine and rapid development of the electricity system of Madras State was not an electrician, and an electrical engineer could not have done it.

What is essential at the top is the capacity to judge upon relevant advice and to decide promptly and rightly in executive matters. Judicial officers are not the only places where the capacity to judge is essential. To decide in matters executive, quickly and correctly, is a gift of the gods. And this is it that makes a good administrator. In small as well as great affairs he proves to be a good administrator who has this talent for right judgment and quick decision. It may be that early training can develop this quality. But I am inclined to think that it is a congenital quality and all that we can do is to seek it out where it exists and make use of it.

Those who are in the employ of the Government in various capacities in the branch concerned and the people who are affected by the course of administration must know and feel that in matters of policy as well as in daily administration, they can get clear and binding decisions without delay or procrastination and that there will be no 'messaging about', no modifications and counter-orders recalling and revising and modifying decisions once taken.

Speedy decision does not mean hasty decision without due consultation or discussion. The administrator should have the capacity to obtain the best out of his expert advisers; and quickly to understand what they say. He should have the opinions and experiences of all concerned before coming to his own decision. But when after full discussion a decision is taken, every one should thereafter feel that there would be no vacillation. Those whose function is to carry out the decision should be sure that they will be supported through every difficulty or unpleasantness and will not be let down at the first hurdle under pressure from some powerful quarter. For successful and good administration in any department in a democratic set-up, this is most important. It explains the success of most great administrators as well as the failure of others.

Decisions should be speedy. They should certainly wait for full discussion but not for cosmic rays accidentally and mysteriously to improve our mental apparatus. That is to say, a thing should not be put off for the reason that one is not able to make up one's mind about it.

Often in the affairs of the world wherein generally so many complicated factors are in operation, one particular decision is not the only right decision. But any firm decision is better than indecision. It should be remembered that the decision itself very often affects and alters the environment and psychology of the people concerned. Numerous are the causes the combined effect of which produces a result. The *Bhagavad-Gita* has analyzed the matter and enumerated five causes in Sloka 14 in the eighteenth chapter. The fifth and last element is *Daivam*, which is a technical term to include all unanticipated elements. Some of the causes that produce a result are incapable of anticipation. But one of them is certainly what follows in the minds of people from the fact of a firm decision. What theoretically may be an imperfect decision becomes the right decision with the help of the environmental and psychological modifications that a firm decision brings about.

The proper moment is most important. The good administrator should not only decide quickly but should have the sagacity to know when to do a particular thing. The quality that enables one to see this is based on the ability to grasp a variety of complicated features and be able to evaluate them to know what features count and which do not. Often this explains why some succeed and some fail in spite of seeming unlikelihood.

Sagacity and imagination are terms that describe the talents required for judging aright. I have said that this quality is probably inborn and cannot be imparted. But experience does nourish and enlarge native talent. There are some people who though themselves not able to judge matters have the capacity to choose men possessing that ability and those qualities. Although one may not oneself possess imagination or sagacity in all matters, he must have the capacity to appreciate such qualities where they exist in order to be a good administrator in a key position. He should not be one who is jealous of it in others and prefers flatterers and yes-men.

The good administrator who has the capacity to make decisions without procrastination will command the loyalty of his staff if he also infuses the confidence that he will stand by a support them, however unpleasant or difficult the execution may be. He should mix with his staff freely and infuse in them the confidence that he is a firm and fair adjudicator on issues that come up. He should be even-tempered. Bad temper is not a substitute for firmness. It does not pay. It leads to being surrounded by worthless people who can stand bad temper. The better men drop off from one who exhibits ill temper or threatens every moment to do so without adequate reason. And the going away of the better men leads to a double loss. You lose good men and you get flatterers and worthless men. The capacity to size men up quickly and know what sort they are is very important. The administrator should have this special talent or he should entrust that particular job to some one else and accept his judgments without question.

When a decision is reached and it has to be executed, the administrator should bring into being a sense of social purpose among his staff of all ranks. Whatever major decision is reached, and whenever a particular piece of work has to be executed, he should see to it that his men see what it is for and realize that it is a good and laudable purpose. They should be made to feel that it would be a service to society to bring it about. There is an oft-repeated story that brings this out. I shall give it in an adapted form giving it a local and contemporary color. Someone saw stonecutters at work in Guindy Raj Bhavan at Madras and he asked one of them, "What are you doing?" He replied. "I am cutting stone, do you not see?" "What are you doing?", he asked a second man. His reply was, "Sir, I am a poor man earning my living." To the same question, a third man answered, "Sir, I am chiseling a Buddha image." A fourth man replied, "Sir, we are building the Gandhi Mandapam to serve as a holy center for prayer." It is this last man's feeling that must be infused among all those who have to carry out anything decided upon.

A hundred years ago, officials in Britain were incompetent, ignorant and frequently corrupt. Today they are efficient, well informed and of high integrity. I have taken this from a British council publication. In our country too we can hope for an ideal set of officials, provided democratic politics and communal politics allow and do not block progress and impartiality. The authority of Parliament or the State Legislature must be and is supreme, but it would be frustrating the aim of democracy to let the influence of political or social groups functioning in the legislature or outside to affect recruitment or promotion in the services. In emancipated India it was the hope that politicians who were born in revolution and civil disobedience should soon learn to become administrators. But this process has been slow. Instead, at the other end, administrators are perhaps tending to become politicians, which is bad.

I have omitted a great deal that should have been said on this subject. I have repeated what many others have said before this, because the problem I have dealt with is a very old one.

What I have said applies not only to ministers and administrators in government, but to administrators in all big non-official organizations, be it of industry or distribution or transport or other services. The days of big business may be thought to be over, on account of the Congress resolution as to the pattern of society that Congress wants to build up. But in reality it is not the case. Big organizations are still wanted and will continue. High taxation and low net-profits are no doubt elements deterrent to private enterprise. But though profits no longer accrue on the wartime scale, and though taxation is growing heavier and heavier with each budget, big business has its attractions still. As long as talent exists, there is a vocational call for big business to which men cannot say nay, profit or no profit, taxation or no taxation. Big men will continue doing big things because they cannot help it. Good

administration is a common problem for private enterprise as well as for the Welfare State.

To the fundamental requirement of character I made a brief reference, but did not dwell upon it because it must be presumed. It is true as I said that it alone is by no means enough. But without it, let it be remembered, nothing else will avail. It is like daylight, which we are apt to forget on account of its very importance. Character is as important for administrators at every level, from the Chief Secretary down to the last grade servant, as sunlight is to every form of life.

With a renewed tribute to the memory of the great man who was taken away from us before we could well dispense with his services and in whose inspiring name these annual lectures will be delivered, I close my inaugural talk. I thank you for the patience and attention with which you heard me.

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The Indus-Sarasvati Civilization and its Bearing on the Aryan Question

Text of a lecture given on 29 September 1999 at Chennai's Indian Institute of Technology (IIT-Madras), at the invitation of the students' Vivekananda Study Circle. The talk was accompanied by a slide-show illustrating various aspects of the life of the Indus Valley civilization.

We in India often take pride in Indian civilization, in its ancientness and great cultural traditions that go back to the dawn of ages. This is a legitimate feeling, if you consider that Americans or Australians, for instance, often take even greater pride in their countries though they are about two centuries old ; of course, their pride has to be mostly in their material achievements, since they have had little to show by way of culture, especially nowadays. India, by contrast, always laid stress on a deep culture before anything else, and yet, contrary to a common misconception, she never neglected material life either, except in recent centuries.

I would like to offer tonight some glimpses of the earliest civilization on the Indian subcontinent, and to show that its high practicality, and what we may call in our modern language its "technological" accomplishments, deserve our admiration, as does the cultural backdrop that made these accomplishments possible. I will also take a brief look at its relationship with later Indian civilization, and that will lead us to what is commonly known as the "Aryan problem." In doing so, we will be guided by an objective scientific spirit, taking into account the most recent findings from archaeology and other fields.


Advance of Archaeology

But first, let me note a strange fact. If you open any good book on the great civilizations of the ancient world, aimed not at scholars but at a wider readership, you will almost invariably find that Mesopotamia and ancient Egypt are given pride of place ; then come, in mixed order, ancient China, Greece, Central and South America, and the Indus Valley civilization, also called the Harappan civilization. Everyone agrees that this early civilization of the Indian subcontinent was one of the largest in extent, that it made great advances in crafts and technology, in trade and agriculture, and that its social organization appears to have been one of the most efficient, methodical and trouble-free ever ; still, in the end, it will rarely be given more than a few pages where dozens will be devoted to Mesopotamia or Egypt, and today, more than seventy years after its discovery, its existence and accomplishments remain largely unknown to the general public outside the subcontinent — and inside, too.

In fact, almost everything about the Harappan civilization appears mysterious at first sight : Who were its inhabitants ? What language did they speak ? What beliefs and culture did they have ? What type of government was able to hold it together ? What caused its decline ? Why were its great cities abandoned ? Did great natural calamities take place, or should we blame wars or invoke some invasions ? And also : What connection is there between this ancient civilization and those that followed on Indian soil, in the plains of the Ganga, for example ? Is there a complete break between the two, as some Western scholars assert, or can what we call Indian civilization be traced all the way back to the Indus valley ?

Archaeologists, historians and experts from other fields have been largely unable to agree on these fundamental questions. One reason for this is the persisting lack of unanimity on the various decipherments proposed for the Indus script, found on thousands of seals and pottery pieces excavated from Harappan towns and cities. So their inhabitants remain dumb to us, their thoughts and culture unfathomable — we are left to admire their material skills, while scholars indulge in “educated guesses” on the significance of the statues unearthed, the figures engraved on the seals, the modes of burial, of government, and virtually every aspect of Harappan life. Another reason is the very small number of sites excavated, one to two per cent of all sites identified as Harappan ; this means we have barely scratched the surface, and many major findings are awaiting us a few metres underground. To give just two examples, the site of Ganweriwala, in the Cholistan region of Pakistan, is estimated to cover eighty hectares, while that of Lakhmirwala, in India’s Punjab, is thought by the Indian archaeologist J.P. Joshi to exceed 225 hectares — but neither has been excavated. A third reason has been the nineteenth-century hypothesis of an Aryan invasion into India, which insisted on placing the origins of Indian civilization somewhere in Central Asia, and therefore left the discovery in the 1920s of the Indus Valley civilization wrapped in a cloud of confusion.

As a result, till a few years ago, the Harappan world was mostly presented as anonymous and rather disembodied, with little to excite our imagination in the way Egypt’s pyramids do. As one of those general books I mentioned puts it, “The birth, life and death of the Indus civilization remain three enigmas.”^[1] Not very encouraging. But the scene is fast changing : a lot of path-breaking excavations have taken place in recent years, for example at Mehrgarh and Harappa, both now in Pakistan, and in India at Dholavira and Rakhigarhri. Also, in the last three years or so, a number of excellent new studies have appeared on the Indus Valley civilization, written by Indian, American and British archaeologists.^[2] Scholars from other disciplines^[3] have joined them — sometimes also challenged them — some old misconceptions are giving way, and a clearer picture is slowly emerging. In a few years from now, we can expect this civilization to take its rightful place as one of the greatest of the ancient world, with most of its “enigmas” dispelled. Today, let us just try to take stock.



Some of the main sites of the Harappan civilization.

Note the concentration along the dry bed of the Sarasvati.

Physical Data

The most physical data about the Harappan civilization are clear enough : As of last year, it was said to comprise more than 1,500 settlements, most of them small villages or towns, with only a few large cities. Some of the “villages” covered more than twenty hectares ; the cities, in comparison, often extended over some eighty hectares — Mohenjo-daro up to 250 hectares, about the size of the

entire I.I.T. campus where we are gathered tonight. However, new sites are added every week or month, and the U.S. archaeologist Gregory L. Possehl, in a just published monumental study,[4] gives a detailed list of 2,600 Harappan sites ! What the final figure will be is anyone's guess.

The total area encompassed was huge : over one million square kilometres — more than ancient Egypt and Mesopotamia put together, or, if you prefer, eight times the size of Tamil Nadu. The southern limit was between the Tapti and the Godavari rivers, while the northern limit was some 1,400 kilometres away in Kashmir (at Manda) — though one site, Shortughai, is found still farther up, in Afghanistan ; as of now, the easternmost settlement stands at Alamgirpur in Western Uttar Pradesh, and the western limits were the Arabian sea and the whole Makran coast, almost all the way to the present Pakistan-Iran border.

If this civilization was named after the Indus, it is because the first major settlements, Mohenjo-daro and Harappa, were found along that river and its tributary, the Ravi. However, in recent decades, exploration on both sides of the Indo-Pakistan border has brought to light hundreds of sites along the dry bed of a huge river in the Ghaggar-Hakra valley.[5] This lost river is now widely recognized to have been the legendary Sarasvati praised in the Rig-Veda (which also mentioned the Indus, or "Sindhu," and all other major rivers of Punjab). The course of the Sarasvati, south of and broadly parallel to that of the Indus, has been studied and plotted in some detail not only by geological exploration, but also by satellite photography and recently by radioisotope dating of the water still found under the river's dry bed in the Rajasthan desert.[6] Since the sites found along the Sarasvati far outnumber those in the Indus basin, some scholars have made the point that the Harappan civilization would be better named the "Indus-Sarasvati civilization." For instance, the giant sites of Ganweriwala and Lakhmirwala which I mentioned earlier are located on the course of the Sarasvati, as are the better known settlements of Kalibangan and Banawali. Of course, the name "Indus-Sarasvati civilization" still leaves out a number of sites in Gujarat, such as Lothal, but it stresses the importance of the Sarasvati river as the major lifeline of this civilization, the Indus coming a close second.

Whatever its name, when we speak of this civilization, we usually mean its "mature phase" (also called "integration era"), during which the great cities such as Mohenjo-daro, Harappa, Ganweriwala, Rakhigahri, Dholavira and others flourished. That phase is now usually dated 2600-1900 BC. But it was of course not born in a day : it was preceded by a long phase called "early Harappan" or "regionalization era," during which villages kept developing and started interacting, and also many technologies (pottery, metallurgy, farming etc.) were perfected ; that early phase is now dated by Jonathan Mark Kenoyer, a U.S. archaeologist who has worked on many Indus sites, 5000-2600 BC. It was itself the result of a long evolution between 7000 and 5000 BC, which saw the emergence of the first village farming communities and pastoral camps (as in many other regions of the world) : Mehrgarh, at the foot of the Bolan Pass in the Kachi plain of Baluchistan, is the best known example ; according to its excavator, the French archaeologist Jean-François Jarrige, "The site covers an area of about 500 acres [200 hectares] with only pre-Harappan remains" and shows "evidence of continuous occupation for more than three millennia prior to the Harappan civilization." [7]

The end of the mature phase is usually dated 1900 BC, when most of the cities were gradually abandoned ; their remarkable civic organization broke down, forcing people to go back to the villages. The most probable cause was a series of natural catastrophes — earthquakes, drastic changes in river courses, consequent depletion of the Sarasvati, floods, but also a long drought over the whole region (including West Asia), all of which ravaged agriculture, and perhaps also excessive deforestation to supply wood to kilns and furnaces. Another likely factor is a sharp reduction in external trade, especially with Mesopotamia. But, while earlier generations of scholars spoke of a total break in Indian civilization as a result of this decline, archaeologists now agree that another phase, called post-Harappan, post-urban or also "localization era," and dated about

1900-1300 BC, followed, and went on to provide a smooth transition to the first historical states in the Ganga region.



Drains from individual houses empty into a covered collective drain in Mohenjo-daro.

The Cities

What impressed the first discoverers of Harappan cities most was their sophistication, which displayed town-planning of a level that would be found only 2000 years later in Europe. Geometrically designed, the towns had fortifications (for protection against both intruders and floods), several distinct quarters, assembly halls, and manufacturing units of various types ; some bigger cities had furnaces for the production of copper tools, weapons or ornaments ; public baths (probably often part of temples), private baths for most inhabitants, sewerage through underground drains built with precisely laid bricks, and an efficient water management with numerous reservoirs and wells show that the ordinary inhabitant was well taken care of.

Mohenjo-daro, for instance, is thought to have had over 700 wells, some of them fifteen metres deep, built with special trapezoid bricks (to prevent collapse by the pressure of the surrounding soil), and maintained for several centuries. Quite a few of those wells were found in private houses. Dholavira had separate drains to collect rain water and six or seven dams built across nearby rivers.

“The fact that even smaller towns and villages had impressive drainage systems,” remarks Kenoyer, “indicates that removing polluted water and sewage was an important part of the daily concerns of the Indus people.”^[8] I am sure that many of our villages in today’s rural India would be quite happy with such an infrastructure — maybe the candidates at present roaming our dusty roads in search of votes should study Harappan public amenities !

The well-known Indian archaeologist, B. B. Lal, writes in a recent comprehensive study of this civilization :


Well-regulated streets [were] oriented almost invariably along with the cardinal directions, thus forming a grid-iron pattern. [At Kalibangan] even the widths of these streets were in a set ratio, i.e. if the narrowest lane was one unit in width, the other streets were twice, thrice and so on. [...] Such a town-planning was unknown in contemporary West Asia.^[9]



Map of one area of Mohenjo-daro (“HR area”), as an example of complex town-planning 4,500 years ago.

The houses were almost always built with mud bricks (sometimes fired in kilns), which followed a standard ratio of 4 :2 :1, though the actual sizes varied : bricks for houses, for instance, might be 28 x 14 x 7 cm, while for fortification walls they could be 36 x 18 x 9 cm or even bigger. Walls were on average seventy centimetres thick (which I suppose would be nearly three times the thickness of your hostel walls), and many houses were at least two storeys high. A few houses, perhaps those of rulers or wealthy traders, were particularly large, with up to seven rooms, but they might be found right next to a craftsman’s modest house.

A number of big buildings, such as that around Mohenjo-daro’s “Great Bath,” seem to have served a community purpose, sometimes perhaps that of temples. Dholavira, in Kutch, even boasts a huge maidan. It also has massive fortification walls, some of them as thick as eleven metres, built in the earliest stage of the city ; apart from standardized bricks, stones were also used there on a large scale, undressed as well as dressed (note that stones were perfectly dressed with just copper tools : iron was not yet known).



A probable ancestor of the game of chess (in terracotta, from Lothal).

Arts and Crafts

The Harappans were expert craftsmen. They made beads of carnelian, agate, amethyst, turquoise, lapis lazuli, etc. ; they manufactured bangles out of shells, glazed faience and terracotta ; they carved ivory and worked shells into ornaments, bowls and ladles ; they cast copper (which they mined themselves in Baluchistan and Rajasthan) and bronze for weapons, all types of tools, domestic objects and statues (such as the famous “dancing girl”) ; they also worked silver and gold with great skill, specially for ornaments.

Of course, they baked pottery in large quantity — to the delight of archaeologists, since the different shapes, styles, and painted motifs are among the best guides in the evolution of any civilization (let us remember that most objects made of cloth, wood, reed, palm leaves etc., usually vanish without a trace, especially in hot climates).

We also know that the Harappans excelled at stone-carving, complex weaving and carpet-making, inlaid woodwork and decorative architecture. And, of course, they engraved with remarkable artistry their famous seals, mostly in steatite (or soapstone) ; those seals, over 3,000 of which have been found, seem to have served various purposes : some commercial, to identify consignments to be shipped, and some ritual or spiritual, to invoke deities.

Dancing, painting, sculpture, and music (there is evidence of drums and of stringed instruments) were all part of their culture. Possibly drama and puppet shows too, judging from a number of masks. Statues are not abundant, but refined, whether in stone, bronze or terracotta. **An ancestor of the game of chess has been unearthed at Lothal.** Children too were not forgotten, judging from the exquisite care with which toys were fashioned.

Trade, Shipping, Agriculture & Technology

In addition to a considerable internal trade in metals, stones and all kinds of goods, the Harappans had a flourishing overseas trade with Oman, Bahrain, and Sumer ; exchanges with the Sumerians went on for at least seven centuries, and merchant colonies were established in Bahrain and the

Euphrates-Tigris valley. Of course, none of this would have been possible without high skills in ship-making and sailing, and several representations of ships have been found on seals, while many massive stone anchors have come up at Lothal and other sites of Saurashtra. For navigation, compasses carved out of conch shells appear to have been used to measure angles between stars. A voyage from Lothal to Mesopotamia to sell the prized Harappan carnelian beads, which the kings and queens of Ur were so fond of, meant at least 2,500 kilometres of seafaring ; of course there would have been halts along the shore on the way, but still, 4,500 years ago this must have ranked among the best sailing abilities.

The other, perhaps the chief mainstay of Harappan prosperity was agriculture. It was practised on a wide scale, with hundreds of rural settlements and extensive networks of canals for irrigation ; wheat, barley, rice, a number of vegetables, and cotton were some of the common crops. Mehrgarh, for instance, shows “a veritable agricultural economy solidly established as early as 6000 BC.”^[10]

Kalibangan even yielded a field ploughed with two perpendicular networks of furrows, in which higher crops (such as mustard) were grown in the spaced-out north-south furrows, thus casting shorter shadows, while shorter crops (such as gram) filled the contiguous east-west furrows. As B. B. Lal has shown, this is a technique still used today in the same region.

Any society capable of town-planning, shipping, refined arts and crafts, writing, sustained trading, necessarily has to master a good deal of technology. This was also the case here. Craftsmen often used standardized tools and techniques, especially for the more complex productions. A highly standardized system of stone weights, unique in the ancient world, was found not only throughout the Harappan settlements, but also two thousand years later in the first kingdoms of the Ganga plains. (The weights were mostly cubes, but sometimes also truncated spheres.)

The first seven weights in the system followed a geometrical progression, with ratios of 1 : 2 : 4 : 8 : 16 (by which time the weight had reached 13.7g) : 32 : 64, after which the increments switched to a decimal system and went 160, 200, 320, 640, 1600, 3200, 6400, 8000 and 12,800. The largest weight found in Mohenjo-daro is 10,865 grams. Now, if you divide its corresponding ratio of 12,800 by the ratio 16, you get 800 ; multiply this figure by the weight of 13.7 g found for the 16th ratio, and you get a theoretical weight of 10,960g — a difference of only 95g with the actual weight, or less than 0.9% ! I don't think the weights used today in our markets reach such precision, not to speak of those traders who get their weights tailor-made !

In fact, the Harappans very much seem to be the inventors of the first decimal system for measurement. Their town-planning, which makes much use of geometry, partly relied on this decimal system. Let me quote from S. R. Rao, an Indian archaeologist famous for his excavations at Lothal and his undersea discoveries at Dwaraka and Poompuhar ; he comments here on an ivory scale found at Lothal, engraved with nearly thirty divisions regularly spaced every 1.704 mm :

It is the smallest division ever recorded on a scale of the Bronze Age. The width of the wall of the Lothal dock is 1.78 m [i.e. 1,000 such divisions ... and] the length of the east-west wall of the dock is twenty times its width. Obviously the Harappan engineers followed the decimal division of measurement for all practical purposes...^[11]

I should point out that apart from the continuance of the Indus weight system or agricultural methods into the historic period, archaeologists have often highlighted how traditional craftsmen today in Sindh, Punjab, Rajasthan or Gujarat still use techniques — in bead-making or shell-working, for instance — very similar to those evolved in Harappan times more than 4,500 years ago. Even some buildings techniques are still in use, as B. B. Lal has pointed out.

But however impressive those technological achievements may be (and there are many others), we should remember that they were not separate activities, but always blended with the cultural life of the Harappan world. As Kenoyer remarks,

Symbols of Indus religion and culture were incorporated into pottery, ornaments and everyday tools in a way that helped to unite people within the urban centers and link them with distant rural communities.[12]

Government and Social Evolution

What we have seen so far, and very briefly, is only the most visible features of the Indus-Sarasvati civilization. The internal and external mechanics of such a society are infinitely complex, and will no doubt keep archaeologists racking their brains for some more time. For example, while a few of them see the Harappan political organization as an empire, with Mohenjo-daro as the seat of the emperor and a number of “governors” in the regional capitals, others are in favour of regional states, in view of the difficulty posed by a single central authority over such vast distances without our modern communications. Those regional states would have had identities of their own (as evidenced from regional variations in arts and crafts), but they would all have been united by a common culture, and also by a common language (regardless of possible regional dialects). B. B. Lal, for instance, brings a parallel between the Harappan society and the Sixteen States or Mahajanapadas of later Buddhist times. This hypothesis is strengthened by the lack of any glorification or even representation of rulers on the seals ; even the few sculptures of human figures found at Mohenjo-daro cannot be said to represent rulers with any great certainty.

Whatever the truth may be, a few clear points stand out and meet with general agreement :

First, a remarkable civic organization, which allowed streets in big cities to be free from any encroachment for centuries together (can our present Indian cities claim the same for just a few weeks ?). And let us remember that Mohenjo-daro is thought to have sheltered at least 50,000 inhabitants — almost a megalopolis for those times.

Secondly, a complete absence of any evidence of armies or warfare or slaughter or man-made destruction in any settlement and at any point of time, even as regards the early phase. **Not a single seal depicts a battle or a captive or a victor.** True, there were fortifications and weapons (the latter rather few), but those were probably to guard against local tribes or marauders rather than against people from other cities and villages. Fortifications were also often protections against floods, and weapons must have been used mostly for hunting. So far as the archaeological record shows, major disruptions in the cities’ life were caused by natural calamities. **In no other ancient civilization is warfare so absent, and over such a long period of time ; by contrast, other civilizations of the time consistently recorded and glorified war feats.** And our own modern “civilization,” I need not remind you, is the bloodiest ever : a few days ago, a United Nations report lamented the existence of more than 500 million small arms in circulation — that means one gun or semi-automatic weapon for every ten of us....

Thirdly, archaeologists now agree that the origins of the Indus-Sarasvati civilization are to be found on the subcontinent itself. It no doubt had extensive cultural and commercial contacts with other civilizations, but its identity was distinct. In the words of Jim G. Shaffer, a U.S. archaeologist who has worked on many Indus sites :

It is time to view the archaeological data for what it is, and not what one thinks it is. Recent studies are just beginning to indicate the real importance of Harappan studies, showing that in South Asia, a unique experiment in the development of urban, literate culture, was under way. Such a culture was highly attuned to local conditions and not a mirror of Mesopotamia's urban experiment....^[13]

The Indus-Sarasvati civilization thus represented a long indigenous evolution, spanning almost 6,000 years, and with no visible break or disruption from outside. By any standard, this is a unique achievement in human history.

But let us not forget that no society can survive long without a culture to cement its members together and make their lives meaningful. The very fact that the Indus-Valley civilization was able to hold together for three millennia (if we include its early phase), over an immense stretch of land, and with all the signs of social harmony and stability, shows that it must have had a deep and strong culture as its foundation. Let us now try to catch a glimpse of it.

The Aryan Problem

The relationship of the Indus-Sarasvati civilization with the later Indian civilization remains a subject of debate. Most of you probably learned at school that the Harappan towns were destroyed by semi-barbarian Aryans rushing down from Central Asia on their horse chariots, and that the survivors among their inhabitants, assumed to have been Dravidians, were driven to South India by the invaders. Passages from the Rig-Veda were twisted and sometimes mistranslated to show a record of such a physical and cultural clash. In many respects, this is still the “official” theory, although, since the 1960s, when the U.S. archaeologist G. F. Dales demolished all supposed evidence of such attacks and slaughter, the theory has limited itself to saying that the supposed Aryans, or Indo-Aryans or Indo-Europeans, to use the present terminology, entered North India after the collapse of the Harappan civilization.

But you may be surprised to learn that most archaeologists now reject this invasion or migration theory, as they cannot find the slightest trace of it on the ground, and it is unthinkable that the supposed Aryans could have conquered most of India and imposed on it their Vedic culture without leaving any physical evidence of any sort. Even respected archaeologists of the old school of thought, such as Raymond and Bridget Allchin, now admit that the arrival of Indo-Aryans in Northwest India is “scarcely attested in the archaeological record, presumably because their material culture and life-style were already virtually indistinguishable from those of the existing population.”^[14] We are very far from the bloody invasion and cultural war envisaged by Max Müller and other nineteenth-century scholars.

But even this tempered view is no longer acceptable to the “new school,” whose foundation can be said to have been laid in 1984 by Jim Shaffer. He wrote :

Current archaeological data do not support the existence of an Indo-Aryan or European invasion into South Asia any time in the pre- or protohistoric periods. Instead, it is possible to document archaeologically a series of cultural changes reflecting indigenous cultural developments from prehistoric to historic periods.^[15]

Kenoyer, whom I quoted earlier, concludes in his recent beautiful book :

Many scholars have tried to correct this absurd theory [of an Aryan invasion], by pointing out misinterpreted basic facts, inappropriate models and an uncritical reading of Vedic texts. However, until recently, these scientific and well-reasoned arguments were unsuccessful in rooting out the misinterpretations entrenched in the popular literature.

[...] But there is no archaeological or biological evidence for invasions or mass migrations into the Indus Valley between the end of the Harappan Phase, about 1900 BC and the beginning of the Early Historic period around 600 BC.[16]

I could quote similar opinions from many respected Indian archaeologists such as B. B. Lal, S. R. Rao, S. P. Gupta, Dilip K. Chakrabarty, K. M. Srivastava, M. K. Dhavalikar, R. S. Bisht and others. The point is that the theory of an Aryan invasion or even migration into India finds no evidence on the ground and has no scientific basis whatsoever.

The biological evidence Kenoyer refers to relies on the detailed examination of skeletons found in Harappan settlements. Kenneth A. R. Kennedy, a U.S. expert who has extensively studied such skeletal remains, observes :

Biological anthropologists remain unable to lend support to any of the theories concerning an Aryan biological or demographic entity [...]. What the biological data demonstrate is that no exotic races are apparent from laboratory studies of human remains excavated from any archaeological sites [...]. All prehistoric human remains recovered thus far from the Indian subcontinent are phenotypically identifiable as ancient South Asians. [...] In short, there is no evidence of demographic disruptions in the north-western sector of the subcontinent during and immediately after the decline of the Harappan culture.[17]

I hope you understand the implication : No invasion or migration caused or followed the collapse of the urban phase of the Indus-Sarasvati civilization around 1900 BC. What is still taught in our textbooks about so-called Aryans is no more than imagination. The Harappans were just Northwestern Indians of the time and continued to live there even after the end of the urban phase (with some of them migrating towards the Ganga plains in search of greener pastures). In fact, archaeologists and anthropologists now reject the old notion of race altogether. To quote from Possehl's recent book which I mentioned earlier :

Race as it was used in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries has been totally discredited as a useful concept in human biology. [...] There is no reason to believe today that there ever was an Aryan race that spoke Indo-European languages and was possessed with a coherent and well-defined set of Aryan or Indo-European cultural features.[18]

In simple terms, this means that, for science, there is no such thing as an Aryan race, or a Dravidian race for that matter. Nor is there for Indian tradition, in which the word "Arya" never meant a race, but a quality of true nobility, culture and refinement. And so, if no Aryan people invaded or entered into India, it stands to reason that the Vedic culture was also native to the subcontinent, and not an import. In fact, quite a few scholars and archaeologists today see a number of clear Vedic traits in the Harappan culture.

To cite a few : the presence of fire-altars, an essential element of Vedic rituals ; the symbol of a bull engraved on hundreds of seals, a Vedic symbol par excellence ; the cult of a mother-goddess, of a Shiva-like deity, the depiction of yogic postures, and of yogis or sages (judging from his deeply contemplative appearance, the so-called “priest-king” was more likely a yogi or a rishi than a priest). The famous Unicorn and the three-headed creature, both depicted on many Indus seals, are mentioned in the Mahabharata as aspects of Krishna, as N. Jha, an Indian epigraphist, has shown.

Indeed, quite a few symbols used in later Indian culture, such as the trishul or the swastika, the pipal tree or the endless-knot design, are found in the Indus-Saraswati cities. Even its town-planning with three main distinct areas is consistent with Rig-Vedic descriptions, as the Indian archaeologist R. S. Bisht has argued.[19] So are trade and shipping, also extensively mentioned in the Rig-Veda.



(Clockwise from top left :) A terracotta figurine from Harappa, in a yoga posture; seals depicting a Shiva-like deity, a unicorn, and a bull.

Moreover, let us remember the hundreds of settlements along the Sarasvati, a river praised in the Rig-Veda, which confirms again the identification between Harappans and Vedic people.

The decipherment of the Indus script would of course be the ultimate test. I will just mention here that while attempts to read some proto-Dravidian language into it have failed and are now abandoned, there has been progress among those who see the language thus written to be related to Sanskrit. N. Jha’s decipherment, proposed recently, appears to be the most promising, simple and consistent, and once a major study of it is published shortly,[20] we can expect a lively debate among scholars to decide its value.

I am not touching here on a number of related issues, such as the linguistic problem posed by a deep similarity between Sanskrit and most European languages, since the verdict of archaeological evidence is, to my mind, quite sufficient. Let me recommend to those interested a brilliant study by a young Belgian scholar and expert on India, Koenaad Elst, just published in India under the title Update on the Aryan Invasion Debate. In it, he discusses most of those issues threadbare and shows in particular that this linguistic affinity can very well be explained without any sort of Aryan invasion.

One more remark before I conclude : Archaeological evidence in no way contradicts Indian tradition, rather it broadly agrees with it (except for its chronology). Whether from North or South India, tradition never mentioned anything remotely resembling an Aryan invasion into India. Sanskrit scriptures make it clear that they regard the Vedic homeland to be the Saptasindhu, which is precisely the core of the Harappan territory. As for the Sangam tradition, it is equally silent about any northern origin of the Tamil people ; its only reference is to a now submerged island to the south of India, Kumari Kandam, and initial findings at Poompuhar show that, without our having to accept this legend literally, we may indeed find a few submerged cities along Tamil Nadu's coast ; only more systematic explorations, especially at Poompuhar and Kanyakumari, where fishermen have long reported submerged structures, can throw more light on this tradition.

Not only Indian tradition, but a number of Indians with a far better understanding of Vedic texts than that of Western scholars, for example Swami Vivekananda, Swami Dayananda Saraswati, Sri Aurobindo, B. R. Ambedkar and many others, have vigorously dismissed the Aryan invasion as a groundless conjecture intended to divide Indians for colonial motives. They have correctly argued that the Indian people have no memory or record of any such outside origin, and archaeology is now increasingly confirming their insights.

Conclusion

I will end where I began. Would it be “chauvinistic” (to use a word our modern Indian intellectuals are so fond of) to attribute the greatness of the Indus-Sarasvati civilization to the Indian genius ? I do not think so. Apart from its striking cultural continuity with subsequent developments of Indian civilization, which makes up a total thread of 9,000 years, it exhibits traits typical of the Indian temperament : a bold enterprising spirit, a remarkable adaptability to changing conditions, a cultural and spiritual content in the smallest everyday activities, and, most importantly, a capacity for a broader view, without which this huge area could not have had such a cultural homogeneity free from major conflicts. Even its remarkable civic sense, so lacking in today's India, is yet part of the Indian character ; I have observed that Indians are quite capable of it, but contrary to well-disciplined Western peoples (the British or the Germans, for instance), Indians will accept collective discipline only once their hearts have been conquered ; mere authority and rules cannot get it out of them.

All said and done, the people of the Indian subcontinent can justifiably claim this ancient civilization as a central and inspiring part of their heritage. But they should not forget to learn from it the great lesson of the cycles of birth, life, decay, and rebirth of Indian civilization, a lesson we need to keep in our minds especially at the present moment.

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Michel Danino - A profile

Born in 1956 at Honfleur (France) into a Jewish family recently emigrated from Morocco, from the age of fifteen Michel Danino was drawn to India, some of her great yogis, and soon to Sri Aurobindo and Mother and their view of evolution which gives a new meaning to our existence on this earth. In 1977, dissatisfied after four years of higher scientific studies, he left France for India, where he has since been living.

Michel Danino participated in the English translation and publication of *Mother's Agenda* (13 volumes, Mother's record of her yoga in the depths of the body consciousness) and several books by Satprem (Mother's confidant and recipient of *Mother's Agenda*). Michel Danino also edited, among other titles, *India's Rebirth* (a selection from Sri Aurobindo's works about India, [available online](#)); first published in 1993, now in its 3rd edition, translated into nine Indian languages) and *India the Mother* (a selection from Mother's words, 1998).

Studying India's culture and ancient history in the light of both Sri Aurobindo's pioneering work and archaeological research, in 1996 Michel Danino authored *The Invasion That Never Was*, a brief study of the Aryan invasion theory. Intended primarily for the educated non-specialist Indian public, the book has also been well received in scholarly circles. A second, extensively revised and enlarged edition was brought out in 2000; a third is scheduled for late 2003.

Over the last few years, Michel Danino has given lectures at various official, academic and cultural forums on issues confronting Indian culture and civilization in today's world; some of them have been published under the titles *Sri Aurobindo and Indian Civilization* (1999), *The Indian Mind Then and Now* (2000), *Is Indian Culture Obsolete ?* (2000), and *Kali Yuga or the Age of Confusion* (2001). Delving into the roots of Indian civilization, Michel Danino has argued that its essential values remain indispensable in today's India and in fact for all humanity in this critical phase of global deculturization and dehumanization. Many of those lectures and a few new ones are available on this homepage.

Michel Danino's other fields of activity include Nature conservation; his action for the preservation of an important pocket of native tropical rainforest in the Nilgiris led to the creation of Tamil Nadu's first 'watchdog' committee in which concerned citizens actively collaborated with both the Forest Department and local villagers in conservation work, also involving local teachers and hundreds of students.

In 2001, Michel Danino convened the [International Forum for India's Heritage](#) (IFIH) with over 160 eminent founder members, whose mission is to promote the essential values of India's heritage in every field of life.

CHAPTER VII

1. I will declare the duties of kings, (and) show how a king should conduct himself, how he was created, and how (he can obtain) highest success.
2. A Kshatriya, who has received according to the rule the sacrament prescribed by the Veda, must duly protect this whole (world).
3. For, when these creatures, being without a king, through fear dispersed in all directions, the Lord created a king for the protection of this whole (creation).
4. Taking (for that purpose) eternal particles of Indra, of the Wind, of Yama, of the Sun, of Fire, of Varuna, of the Moon, and of the Lord of wealth (Kubera).
5. Because a king has been formed of particles of those lords of the gods, he therefore surpasses all created beings in lustre;
6. And, like the sun, he burns eyes and hearts; nor can anybody on earth even gaze on him.
7. Through his (supernatural) power he is Fire and Wind, he Sun and Moon, he the Lord of justice (Yama), he Kubera, he Varuna, he great Indra.
8. Even an infant king must not be despised, (from an idea) that he is a (mere) mortal; for he is a great deity in human form.
9. Fire burns one man only, if he carelessly approaches it, the fire of a king's (anger) consumes the (whole) family, together with its cattle and its hoard of property.
10. Having fully considered the purpose, (his) power, and the place and the time, he assumes by turns many (different) shapes for the complete attainment of justice.
11. He, in whose favour resides Padma, the goddess of fortune, in whose valour dwells victory, in whose anger abides death, is formed of the lustre of all (gods).
12. The (man), who in his exceeding folly hates him, will doubtlessly perish; for the king quickly makes up his mind to destroy such (a man).
13. Let no (man), therefore, transgress that law which favourites, nor (his orders) which inflict pain on those in disfavour.

14. For the (king's) sake the Lord formerly created his own son, Punishment, the protector of all creatures, (an incarnation of) the law, formed of Brahman's glory.

15. Through fear of him all created beings, both the immovable and the movable, allow themselves to be enjoyed and swerve not from their duties.

16. Having fully considered the time and the place (of the offence), the strength and the knowledge (of the offender), let him justly inflict that (punishment) on men who act unjustly.

17. Punishment is (in reality) the king (and) the male, that the manager of affairs, that the ruler, and that is called the surety for the four orders' obedience to the law.

18. Punishment alone governs all created beings, punishment alone protects them, punishment watches over them while they sleep; the wise declare punishment (to be identical with) the law.

19. If (punishment) is properly inflicted after (due) consideration, it makes all people happy; but inflicted without consideration, it destroys everything.

20. If the king did not, without tiring, inflict punishment on those worthy to be punished, the stronger would roast the weaker, like fish on a spit;

21. The crow would eat the sacrificial cake and the dog would lick the sacrificial viands, and ownership would not remain with any one, the lower ones would (usurp the place of) the higher ones.

22. The whole world is kept in order by punishment, for a guiltless man is hard to find; through fear of punishment the whole world yields the enjoyments (which it owes).

23. The gods, the Danavas, the Gandharvas, the Rakshasas, the bird and snake deities even give the enjoyments (due from them) only, if they are tormented by (the fear of) punishment.

24. All castes (varna) would be corrupted (by intermixture), all barriers would be broken through, and all men would rage (against each other) in consequence of mistakes with respect to punishment.

25. But where Punishment with a black hue and red eyes stalks about, destroying sinners, there the subjects are not disturbed, provided that he who inflicts it discerns well.

26. They declare that king to be a just inflicter of punishment, who is truthful, who acts after due consideration, who is wise, and who knows (the respective value of) virtue, pleasure, and wealth.

27. A king who properly inflicts (punishment), prospers with respect to (those) three (means of happiness); but he who is voluptuous, partial, and deceitful will be destroyed, even through the (unjust) punishment (which he inflicts).

28. Punishment (possesses) a very bright lustre, and is hard to be administered by men with unimproved minds; it strikes down the king who swerves from his duty, together with his relatives.

29. Next it will afflict his castles, his territories, the whole world together with the movable and immovable (creation), likewise the sages and the gods, who (on the failure of offerings) ascend to the sky.

30. (Punishment) cannot be inflicted justly by one who has no assistant, (nor) by a fool, (nor) by a covetous man, (nor) by one whose mind is unimproved, (nor) by one addicted to sensual pleasures.

31. By him who is pure (and) faithful to his promise, who acts according to the Institutes (of the sacred law), who has good assistants and is wise, punishment can be (justly) inflicted.

32. Let him act with justice in his own domain, with rigour chastise his enemies, behave without duplicity towards his friends, and be lenient towards Brahmanas.

33. The fame of a king who behaves thus, even though he subsist by gleaning, is spread in the world, like a drop of oil on water.

34. But the fame of a king who acts in a contrary manner and who does not subdue himself, diminishes in extent among men like a drop of clarified butter in water.

35. The king has been created (to be) the protector of the castes (varna) and orders, who, all according to their rank, discharge their several duties.

36. Whatever must be done by him and by his servants for the protection of his people, that I will fully declare to you in due order.

37. Let the king, after rising early in the morning, worship Brahmanas who are well versed in the threefold sacred science and learned (in polity), and follow their advice.

38. Let him daily worship aged Brahmanas who know the Veda and are pure; for he who always worships aged men, is honoured even by Rakshasas.

39. Let him, though he may already be modest, constantly learn modesty from them; for a king who is modest never perishes.

40. Through a want of modesty many kings have perished, together with their belongings; through modesty even hermits in the forest have gained kingdoms.

41. Through a want of humility Vena perished, likewise king Nahusha, Sudas, the son of Pigavana, Sumukha, and Nemi.

42. But by humility Prithu and Manu gained sovereignty, Kubera the position of the Lord of wealth, and the son of Gadhi the rank of a Brahmana.

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43. From those versed in the three Vedas let him learn the threefold (sacred science), the primeval science of government, the science of dialectics, and the knowledge of the (supreme) Soul; from the people (the theory of) the (various) trades and professions.
44. Day and night he must strenuously exert himself to conquer his senses; for he (alone) who has conquered his own senses, can keep his subjects in obedience.
45. Let him carefully shun the ten vices, springing from love of pleasure, and the eight, proceeding from wrath, which (all) end in misery.
46. For a king who is attached to the vices springing from love of pleasure, loses his wealth and his virtue, but (he who is given) to those arising from anger, (loses) even his life.
47. Hunting, gambling, sleeping by day, censoriousness, (excess with) women, drunkenness, (an inordinate love for) dancing, singing, and music, and useless travel are the tenfold set (of vices) springing from love of pleasure.
48. Tale-bearing, violence, treachery, envy, slandering, (unjust) seizure of property, reviling, and assault are the eightfold set (of vices) produced by wrath.
49. That greediness which all wise men declare to be the root even of both these (sets), let him carefully conquer; both sets (of vices) are produced by that.
50. Drinking, dice, women, and hunting, these four (which have been enumerated) in succession, he must know to be the most pernicious in the set that springs from love of pleasure.
51. Doing bodily injury, reviling, and the seizure of property, these three he must know to be the most pernicious in the set produced by wrath.
52. A self-controlled (king) should know that in this set of seven, which prevails everywhere, each earlier-named vice is more abominable (than those named later).
53. (On a comparison) between vice and death, vice is declared to be more pernicious; a vicious man sinks to the nethermost (hell), he who dies, free from vice, ascends to heaven.
54. Let him appoint seven or eight ministers whose ancestors have been royal servants, who are versed in the sciences, heroes skilled in the use of weapons and descended from (noble) families and who have been tried.
55. Even an undertaking easy (in itself) is (sometimes) hard to be accomplished by a single man; how much (harder is it for a king), especially (if he has) no assistant, (to govern) a kingdom which yields great revenues.
56. Let him daily consider with them the ordinary (business, referring to) peace and war, (the four subjects called) sthana, the revenue, the (manner of)

protecting (himself and his kingdom), and the sanctification of his gains (by pious gifts).

57. Having (first) ascertained the opinion of each (minister) separately and (then the views) of all together, let him do what is (most) beneficial for him in his affairs.

58. But with the most distinguished among them all, a learned Brahmana, let the king deliberate on the most important affairs which relate to the six measures of royal policy.

59. Let him, full of confidence, always entrust to that (official) all business; having taken his final resolution with him, let him afterwards begin to act.

60. He must also appoint other officials, (men) of integrity, (who are) wise, firm, well able to collect money, and well tried.

61. As many persons as the due performance of his business requires, so many skilful and clever (men), free from sloth, let him appoint.

62. Among them let him employ the brave, the skilful, the high-born, and the honest in (offices for the collection of) revenue, (e.g.) in mines, manufactures, and storehouses, (but) the timid in the interior of his palace.

63. Let him also appoint an ambassador who is versed in all sciences, who understands hints, expressions of the face and gestures, who is honest, skilful, and of (noble) family.

64. (Such) an ambassador is commended to a king (who is) loyal, honest, skilful, possessing a good memory, who knows the (proper) place and time (for action, who is) handsome, fearless, and eloquent.

65. The army depends on the official (placed in charge of it), the due control (of the subjects) on the army, the treasury and the (government of) the realm on the king, peace and its opposite (war) on the ambassador.

66. For the ambassador alone makes (kings') allies and separates allies; the ambassador transacts that business by which (kings) are disunited or not.

67. With respect to the affairs let the (ambassador) explore the expression of the countenance, the gestures and actions of the (foreign king) through the gestures and actions of his confidential (advisers), and (discover) his designs among his servants.

68. Having learnt exactly (from his ambassador) the designs of the foreign king, let (the king) take such measures that he does not bring evil on himself.

69. Let him settle in a country which is open and has a dry climate, where grain is abundant, which is chiefly (inhabited) by Aryans, not subject to epidemic diseases (or similar troubles), and pleasant, where the vassals are obedient and his own (people easily) find their livelihood.

70. Let him build (there) a town, making for his safety a fortress, protected by a desert, or a fortress built of (stone and) earth, or one protected by water or trees, or one (formed by an encampment of armed) men or a hill-fort.

71. Let him make every effort to secure a hill-fort, for amongst all those (fortresses mentioned) a hill-fort is distinguished by many superior qualities.

72. The first three of those (various kinds of fortresses) are inhabited by wild beasts, animals living in holes and aquatic animals, the last three by monkeys, men, and gods respectively.

73. As enemies do not hurt these (beings, when they are) sheltered by (their) fortresses, even so foes (can) not injure a king who has taken refuge in his fort.

74. One bowman, placed on a rampart, is a match in battle for one hundred (foes), one hundred for ten thousand; hence it is prescribed (in the Sastras that a king will possess) a fortress.

75. Let that (fort) be well supplied with weapons, money, grain and beasts of burden, with Brahmanas, with artisans, with engines, with fodder, and with water.

76. Let him cause to be built for himself, in the centre of it, a spacious palace, (well) protected, habitable in every season, resplendent (with whitewash), supplied with water and trees.

77. Inhabiting that, let him wed a consort of equal caste (varna), who possesses auspicious marks (on her body), and is born in a great family, who is charming and possesses beauty and excellent qualities.

78. Let him appoint a domestic priest (purohita) and choose officiating priests (ritvig); they shall perform his domestic rites and the (sacrifices) for which three fires are required.

79. A king shall offer various (Srauta) sacrifices at which liberal fees (are distributed), and in order to acquire merit, he shall give to Brahmanas enjoyments and wealth.

80. Let him cause the annual revenue in his kingdom to be collected by trusty (officials), let him obey the sacred law in (his transactions with) the people, and behave like a father towards all men.

81. For the various (branches of business) let him appoint intelligent supervisors; they shall inspect all (the acts) of those men who transact his business.

82. Let him honour those Brahmanas who have returned from their teacher's house (after studying the Veda); for that (money which is given) to Brahmanas is declared to be an imperishable treasure for kings.

83. Neither thieves nor foes can take it, nor can it be lost; hence an imperishable store must be deposited by kings with Brahmanas.

84. The offering made through the mouth of a Brahmana, which is neither spilt, nor falls (on the ground), nor ever perishes, is far more excellent than Agnihotras.

85. A gift to one who is not a Brahmana (yields) the ordinary (reward; a gift) to one who calls himself a Brahmana, a double (reward); a gift to a well-read Brahmana, a hundred-thousandfold (reward); (a gift) to one who knows the Veda and the Angas (Vedaparaga, a reward) without end.

86. For according to the particular qualities of the recipient and according to the faith (of the giver) a small or a great reward will be obtained for a gift in the next world.

87. A king who, while he protects his people, is defied by (foes), be they equal in strength, or stronger, or weaker, must not shrink from battle, remembering the duty of Kshatriyas.

88. Not to turn back in battle, to protect the people, to honour the Brahmanas, is the best means for a king to secure happiness.

89. Those kings who, seeking to slay each other in battle, fight with the utmost exertion and do not turn back, go to heaven.

90. When he fights with his foes in battle, let him not strike with weapons concealed (in wood), nor with (such as are) barbed, poisoned, or the points of which are blazing with fire.

91. Let him not strike one who (in flight) has climbed on an eminence, nor a eunuch, nor one who joins the palms of his hands (in supplication), nor one who (flees) with flying hair, nor one who sits down, nor one who says 'I am thine;'

92. Nor one who sleeps, nor one who has lost his coat of mail, nor one who is naked, nor one who is disarmed, nor one who looks on without taking part in the fight, nor one who is fighting with another (foe);

93. Nor one whose weapons are broken, nor one afflicted (with sorrow), nor one who has been grievously wounded, nor one who is in fear, nor one who has turned to flight; (but in all these cases let him) remember the duty (of honourable warriors).

94. But the (Kshatriya) who is slain in battle, while he turns back in fear, takes upon himself all the sin of his master, whatever (it may be);

95. And whatever merit (a man) who is slain in flight may have gained for the next (world), all that his master takes.

96. Chariots and horses, elephants, parasols, money, grain, cattle, women, all sorts of (marketable) goods and valueless metals belong to him who takes them (singly) conquering (the possessor).

97. A text of the Veda (declares) that (the soldiers) shall present a choice portion (of the booty) to the king; what has not been taken singly, must be distributed by the king among all the soldiers.

98. Thus has been declared the blameless, primeval law for warriors; from this law a Kshatriya must not depart, when he strikes his foes in battle.

99. Let him strive to gain what he has not yet gained; what he has gained let him carefully preserve; let him augment what he preserves, and what he has augmented let him bestow on worthy men.

100. Let him know that these are the four means for securing the aims of human (existence); let him, without ever tiring, properly employ them.

101. What he has not (yet) gained, let him seek (to gain) by (his) army; what he has gained, let him protect by careful attention; what he has protected, let him augment by (various modes of) increasing it; and what he has augmented, let him liberally bestow (on worthy men).

102. Let him be ever ready to strike, his prowess constantly displayed, and his secrets constantly concealed, and let him constantly explore the weaknesses of his foe.

103. Of him who is always ready to strike, the whole world stands in awe; let him therefore make all creatures subject to himself even by the employment of force.

104. Let him ever act without guile, and on no account treacherously; carefully guarding himself, let him always fathom the treachery which his foes employ.

105. His enemy must not know his weaknesses, but he must know the weaknesses of his enemy; as the tortoise (hides its limbs), even so let him secure the members (of his government against treachery), let him protect his own weak points.

106. Let him plan his undertakings (patiently meditating) like a heron; like a lion, let him put forth his strength; like a wolf, let him snatch (his prey); like a hare, let him double in retreat.

107. When he is thus engaged in conquest, let him subdue all the opponents whom he may find, by the (four) expedients, conciliation and the rest.

108. If they cannot be stopped by the three first expedients, then let him, overcoming them by force alone, gradually bring them to subjection.

109. Among the four expedients, conciliation and the rest, the learned always recommend conciliation and (the employment of) force for the prosperity of kingdoms.

110. As the weeder plucks up the weeds and preserves the corn, even so let the king protect his kingdom and destroy his opponents.

111. That king who through folly rashly oppresses his kingdom, (will), together with his relatives, ere long be deprived of his life and of his kingdom.

112. As the lives of living creatures are destroyed by tormenting their bodies, even so the lives of kings are destroyed by their oppressing their kingdoms.

113. In governing his kingdom let him always observe the (following) rules; for a king who governs his kingdom well, easily prospers.

114. Let him place a company of soldiers, commanded (by a trusty officer), the midst of two, three, five or hundreds of villages, (to be) a protection of the kingdom.

115. Let him appoint a lord over (each) village, as well as lords of ten villages, lords of twenty, lords of a hundred, and lords of a thousand.

116. The lord of one village himself shall inform the lord of ten villages of the crimes committed in his village, and the ruler of ten (shall make his report) to the ruler of twenty.

117. But the ruler of twenty shall report all such (matters) to the lord of a hundred, and the lord of a hundred shall himself give information to the lord of a thousand.

118. Those (articles) which the villagers ought to furnish daily to the king, such as food, drink, and fuel, the lord of one village shall obtain.

119. The ruler of ten (villages) shall enjoy one kula (as much land as suffices for one family), the ruler of twenty five kulas, the superintendent of a hundred villages (the revenues of) one village, the lord of a thousand (the revenues of) a town.

120. The affairs of these (officials), which are connected with (their) villages and their separate business, another minister of the king shall inspect, (who must be) loyal and never remiss;

121. And in each town let him appoint one superintendent of all affairs, elevated in rank, formidable, (resembling) a planet among the stars.

122. Let that (man) always personally visit by turns all those (other officials); let him properly explore their behaviour in their districts through spies (appointed to) each.

123. For the servants of the king, who are appointed to protect (the people), generally become knaves who seize the property of others; let him protect his subjects against such (men).

124. Let the king confiscate the whole property of those (officials) who, evil-minded, may take money from suitors, and banish them.

125. For women employed in the royal service and for menial servants, let him fix a daily maintenance, in proportion to their position and to their work.

126. One pana must be given (daily) as wages to the lowest, six to the highest, likewise clothing every six months and one drona of grain every month.

127. Having well considered (the rates of) purchase and (of) sale, (the length of) the road, (the expense for) food and condiments, the charges of securing the goods, let the king make the traders pay duty.

128. After (due) consideration the king shall always fix in his realm the duties and taxes in such a manner that both he himself and the man who does the work receive (their due) reward.

129. As the leech, the calf, and the bee take their food little by little, even so must the king draw from his realm moderate annual taxes.

130. A fiftieth part of (the increments on) cattle and gold may be taken by the king, and the eighth, sixth, or twelfth part of the crops.

131. He may also take the sixth part of trees, meat, honey, clarified butter, perfumes, (medical) herbs, substances used for flavouring food, flowers, roots, and fruit;

132. Of leaves, pot-herbs, grass, (objects) made of cane, skins, of earthen vessels, and all (articles) made of stone.

133. Though dying (with want), a king must not levy a tax on Srotriyas, and no Srotriya, residing in his kingdom, must perish from hunger.

134. The kingdom of that king, in whose dominions a Srotriya pines with hunger, will even, ere long, be afflicted by famine.

135. Having ascertained his learning in the Veda and (the purity of) his conduct, the king shall provide for him means of subsistence in accordance with the sacred law, and shall protect him in every way, as a father (protects) the lawful son of his body.

136. Whatever meritorious acts (such a Brahmana) performs under the full protection of the king, thereby the king's length of life, wealth, and kingdom increase.

137. Let the king make the common inhabitants of his realm who live by traffic, pay annually some trifle, which is called a tax.

138. Mechanics and artisans, as well as Sudras who subsist by manual labour, he may cause to work (for himself) one (day) in each month.

139. Let him not cut up his own root (by levying no taxes), nor the root of other (men) by excessive greed; for by cutting up his own root (or theirs), he makes himself or them wretched.

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140. Let the king, having carefully considered (each) affair, be both sharp and gentle; for a king who is both sharp and gentle is highly respected.
141. When he is tired with the inspection of the business of men, let him place on that seat (of justice) his chief minister, (who must be) acquainted with the law, wise, self-controlled, and descended from a (noble) family.
142. Having thus arranged all the affairs (of) his (government), he shall zealously and carefully protect his subjects.
143. That (monarch) whose subjects are carried off by robbers (Dasyu) from his kingdom, while they loudly call (for help), and he and his servants are (quietly) looking on, is a dead and not a living (king).
144. The highest duty of a Kshatriya is to protect his subjects, for the king who enjoys the rewards, just mentioned, is bound to (discharge that) duty.
145. Having risen in the last watch of the night, having performed (the rite of) personal purification, having, with a collected mind, offered oblations in the fire, and having worshipped Brahmanas, he shall enter the hall of audience which must possess the marks (considered) auspicious (for a dwelling).
146. Tarrying there, he shall gratify all subjects (who come to see him by a kind reception) and afterwards dismiss them; having dismissed his subjects, he shall take counsel with his ministers.
147. Ascending the back of a hill or a terrace, (and) retiring (there) in a lonely place, or in a solitary forest, let him consult with them unobserved.
148. That king whose secret plans other people, (though) assembled (for the purpose), do not discover, (will) enjoy the whole earth, though he be poor in treasure.
149. At the time of consultation let him cause to be removed idiots, the dumb, the blind, and the deaf, animals, very aged men, women, barbarians, the sick, and those deficient in limbs.
150. (Such) despicable (persons), likewise animals, and particularly women betray secret council; for that reason he must be careful with respect to them.
151. At midday or at midnight, when his mental and bodily fatigues are over, let him deliberate, either with himself alone or with his (ministers), on virtue, pleasure, and wealth,
152. On (reconciling) the attainment of these (aims) which are opposed to each other, on bestowing his daughters in marriage, and on keeping his sons (from harm),
153. On sending ambassadors, on the completion of undertakings (already begun), on the behaviour of (the women in) his harem, and on the doings of his spies.

154. On the whole eightfold business and the five classes (of spies), on the goodwill or enmity and the conduct of the circle (of neighbours he must) carefully (reflect).

155. On the conduct of the middlemost (prince), on the doings of him who seeks conquest, on the behaviour of the neutral (king), and (on that) of the foe (let him) sedulously (meditate).

156. These (four) constituents (prakriti, form), briefly (speaking), the foundation of the circle (of neighbours); besides, eight others are enumerated (in the Institutes of Polity) and (thus) the (total) is declared to be twelve.

157. The minister, the kingdom, the fortress, the treasury, and the army are five other (constituent elements of the circle); for, these are mentioned in connexion with each (of the first twelve; thus the whole circle consists), briefly (speaking, of) seventy-two (constituent parts).

158. Let (the king) consider as hostile his immediate neighbour and the partisan of (such a) foe, as friendly the immediate neighbour of his foe, and as neutral (the king) beyond those two.

159. Let him overcome all of them by means of the (four) expedients, conciliation and the rest, (employed) either singly or conjointly, (or) by bravery and policy (alone).

160. Let him constantly think of the six measures of royal policy (guna, viz.) alliance, war, marching, halting, dividing the army, and seeking protection.

161. Having carefully considered the business (in hand), let him resort to sitting quiet or marching, alliance or war, dividing his forces or seeking protection (as the case may require).

162. But the king must know that there are two kinds of alliances and of wars, (likewise two) of both marching and sitting quiet, and two (occasions for) seeking protection.)

163. An alliance which yields present and future advantages, one must know to be of two descriptions, (viz.) that when one marches together (with an ally) and the contrary (when the allies act separately).

164. War is declared to be of two kinds, (viz.) that which is undertaken in season or out of season, by oneself and for one's own purposes, and (that waged to avenge) an injury done to a friend.

165. Marching (to attack) is said to be twofold, (viz. that undertaken) by one alone when an urgent matter has suddenly arisen, and (that undertaken) by one allied with a friend.

166. Sitting quiet is stated to be of two kinds, (viz. that incumbent) on one who has gradually been weakened by fate or in consequence of former acts, and (that) in favour of a friend.

167. If the army stops (in one place) and its master (in another) in order to effect some purpose, that is called by those acquainted with the virtues of the measures of royal policy, the twofold division of the forces.

168. Seeking refuge is declared to be of two kinds, (first) for the purpose of attaining an advantage when one is harassed by enemies, (secondly) in order to become known among the virtuous (as the protege of a powerful king).

169. When (the king) knows (that) at some future time his superiority (is) certain, and (that) at the time present (he will suffer) little injury, then let him have recourse to peaceful measures.

170. But when he thinks all his subjects to be exceedingly contented, and (that he) himself (is) most exalted (in power), then let him make war.

171. When he knows his own army to be cheerful in disposition and strong, and (that) of his enemy the reverse, then let him march against his foe.

172. But if he is very weak in chariots and beasts of burden and in troops, then let him carefully sit quiet, gradually conciliating his foes.

173. When the king knows the enemy to be stronger in every respect, then let him divide his army and thus achieve his purpose.

174. But when he is very easily assailable by the forces of the enemy, then let him quickly seek refuge with a righteous, powerful king.

175. That (prince) who will coerce both his (disloyal) subjects and the army of the foe, let him ever serve with every effort like a Guru.

176. When, even in that (condition), he sees (that) evil is caused by (such) protection, let him without hesitation have recourse to war.

177. By all (the four) expedients a politic prince must arrange (matters so) that neither friends, nor neutrals, nor foes are superior to himself.

178. Let him fully consider the future and the immediate results of all undertakings, and the good and bad sides of all past (actions).

179. He who knows the good and the evil (which will result from his acts) in the future, is quick in forming resolutions for the present, and understands the consequences of past (actions), will not be conquered.

180. Let him arrange everything in such a manner that no ally, no neutral or foe may injure him; that is the sum of political wisdom.

181. But if the king undertakes an expedition against a hostile kingdom, then let him gradually advance, in the following manner, against his foe's capital.

182. Let the king undertake his march in the fine month Margasirsha, or towards the months of Phalguna and Kaitra, according to the (condition of his) army.

183. Even at other times, when he has a certain prospect of victory, or when a disaster has befallen his foe, he may advance to attack him.

184. But having duly arranged (all affairs) in his original (kingdom) and what relates to the expedition, having secured a basis (for his operations) and having duly dispatched his spies;

185. Having cleared the three kinds of roads, and (having made) his sixfold army (efficient), let him leisurely proceed in the manner prescribed for warfare against the enemy's capital.

186. Let him be very much on his guard against a friend who secretly serves the enemy and against (deserters) who return (from the enemy's camp); for such (men are) the most dangerous foes.

187. Let him march on his road, arraying (his troops) like a staff (i.e. in an oblong), or like a waggon (i.e. in a wedge), or like a boar (i.e. in a rhombus), or like a Makara (i.e. in two triangles, with the apices joined), or like a pin (i.e. in a long line), or like a Garuda (i.e. in a rhomboid with far-extended wings).

188. From whatever (side) he apprehends danger, in that (direction) let him extend his troops, and let him always himself encamp in an array, shaped like a lotus.

189. Let him allot to the commander-in-chief, to the (subordinate) general, (and to the superior officers) places in all directions, and let him turn his front in that direction whence he fears danger.

190. On all sides let him place troops of soldiers, on whom he can rely, with whom signals have been arranged, who are expert both in sustaining a charge and in charging, fearless and loyal.

191. Let him make a small number of soldiers fight in close order, at his pleasure let him extend a large number in loose ranks; or let him make them fight, arranging (a small number) in the needle-array, (and a large number) in the thunderbolt-array.

192. On even ground let him fight with chariots and horses, in water-bound places with boats and elephants, on (ground) covered with trees and shrubs with bows, on hilly ground with swords, targets, (and other) weapons.

193. (Men born in) Kurukshetra, Matsyas, Pankalas, and those born in Surasena, let him cause to fight in the van of the battle, as well as (others who are) tall and light.

194. After arranging his troops, he should encourage them (by an address) and carefully inspect them; he should also mark the behaviour (of the soldiers) when they engage the enemy.

195. When he has shut up his foe (in a town), let him sit encamped, harass his kingdom, and continually spoil his grass, food, fuel, and water.

196. Likewise let him destroy the tanks, ramparts, and ditches, and let him assail the (foe unawares) and alarm him at night.

197. Let him instigate to rebellion those who are open to such instigations, let him be informed of his (foe's) doings, and, when fate is propitious, let him fight without fear, trying to conquer.

198. He should (however) try to conquer his foes by conciliation, by (well-applied) gifts, and by creating dissension, used either separately or conjointly, never by fighting, (if it can be avoided.)

199. For when two (princes) fight, victory and defeat in the battle are, as experience teaches, uncertain; let him therefore avoid an engagement.

200. (But) if even those three before-mentioned expedients fail, then let him, duly exerting himself, fight in such a manner that he may completely conquer his enemies.

201. When he has gained victory, let him duly worship the gods and honour righteous Brahmanas, let him grant exemptions, and let him cause promises of safety to be proclaimed.

202. But having fully ascertained the wishes of all the (conquered), let him place there a relative of the (vanquished ruler on the throne), and let him impose his conditions.

203. Let him make authoritative the lawful (customs) of the (inhabitants), just as they are stated (to be), and let him honour the (new king) and his chief servants with precious gifts.

204. The seizure of desirable property which causes displeasure, and its distribution which causes pleasure, are both recommendable, (if they are) resorted to at the proper time.

205. All undertakings (in) this (world) depend both on the ordering of fate and on human exertion; but among these two (the ways of) fate are unfathomable; in the case of man's work action is possible.

206. Or (the king, bent on conquest), considering a friend, gold, and land (to be) the triple result (of an expedition), may, using diligent care, make peace with (his foe) and return (to his realm).

207. Having paid due attention to any king in the circle (of neighbouring states) who might attack him in the rear, and to his supporter who opposes the latter, let (the conqueror) secure the fruit of the expedition from (the prince whom he attacks), whether (he may have become) friendly or (remained) hostile.

208. By gaining gold and land a king grows not so much in strength as by obtaining a firm friend, (who), though weak, (may become) powerful in the future.

209. A weak friend (even) is greatly commended, who is righteous (and) grateful, whose people are contented, who is attached and persevering in his undertakings.

210. The wise declare him (to be) a most dangerous foe, who is wise, of noble race, brave, clever, liberal, grateful, and firm.

211. Behaviour worthy of an Aryan, knowledge of men, bravery, a compassionate disposition, and great liberality are the virtues of a neutral (who may be courted).

212. Let the king, without hesitation, quit for his own sake even a country (which is) salubrious, fertile, and causing an increase of cattle.

213. For times of need let him preserve his wealth; at the expense of his wealth let him preserve his wife; let him at all events preserve himself even by (giving up) his wife and his wealth.

214. A wise (king), seeing that all kinds of misfortunes violently assail him at the same time, should try all (the four) expedients, be it together or separately, (in order to save himself.)

215. On the person who employs the expedients, on the business to be accomplished, and on all the expedients collectively, on these three let him ponder and strive to accomplish his ends.

216. Having thus consulted with his ministers on all these (matters), having taken exercise, and having bathed afterwards, the king may enter the harem at midday in order to dine.

217. There he may eat food, (which has been prepared) by faithful, incorruptible (servants) who know the (proper) time (for dining), which has been well examined (and hallowed) by sacred texts that destroy poison.

218. Let him mix all his food with medicines (that are) antidotes against poison, and let him always be careful to wear gems which destroy poison.

219. Well-trying females whose toilet and ornaments have been examined, shall attentively serve him with fans, water, and perfumes.

220. In like manner let him be careful about his carriages, bed, seat, bath, toilet, and all his ornaments.

221. When he has dined, he may divert himself with his wives in the harem; but when he has diverted himself, he must, in due time, again think of the affairs of state.

222. Adorned (with his robes of state), let him again inspect his fighting men, all his chariots and beasts of burden, the weapons and accoutrements.

223. Having performed his twilight-devotions, let him, well armed, hear in an inner apartment the doings of those who make secret reports and of his spies.

224. But going to another secret apartment and dismissing those people, he may enter the harem, surrounded by female (servants), in order to dine again.

225. Having eaten there something for the second time, and having been recreated by the sound of music, let him go to rest and rise at the proper time free from fatigue.

226. A king who is in good health must observe these rules; but, if he is indisposed, he may entrust all this (business) to his servants.

<http://www.sacred-texts.com/hin/manu.htm>

CHAPTER X.

1. Let the three twice-born castes (varna), discharging their (prescribed) duties, study (the Veda); but among them the Brahmana (alone) shall teach it, not the other two; that is an established rule.
2. The Brahmana must know the means of subsistence (prescribed) by law for all, instruct the others, and himself live according to (the law)
3. On account of his pre-eminence, on account of the superiority of his origin, on account of his observance of (particular) restrictive rules, and on account of his particular sanctification the Brahmana is the lord of (all) castes (varna).
4. Brahmana, the Kshatriya, and the Vaisya castes (varna) are the twice-born ones, but the fourth, the Sudra, has one birth only; there is no fifth (caste).
5. In all castes (varna) those (children) only which are begotten in the direct order on wedded wives, equal (in caste and married as) virgins, are to be considered as belonging to the same caste (as their fathers)
6. Sons, begotten by twice-born man on wives of the next lower castes, they declare to be similar (to their fathers, but) blamed on account of the fault (inherent) in their mothers.
7. Such is the eternal law concerning (children) born of wives one degree lower (than their husbands); know (that) the following rule (is applicable) to those born of women two or three degrees lower.
8. From a Brahmana a with the daughter of a Vaisya is born (a son) called an Ambashtha, with the daughter of a sudra a Nishada, who is also called Parasava.
9. From a Kshatriya and the daughter of a Sudra springs a being, called Ugra, resembling both a Kshatriya and a Sudra, ferocious in his manners, and delighting in cruelty.

10. Children of a Brahmana by (women of) the three (lower) castes, of a Kshatriya by (wives of) the two (lower) castes, and of a Vaisya by (a wife of) the one caste (below him) are all six called base-born (apasada).

11. From a Kshatriya by the daughter of a Brahmana is born (a son called) according to his caste (gati) a Suta; from a Vaisya by females of the royal and the Brahmana (castes) spring a Magadha and a Vaideha.

12. From a Sudra are born an Ayogava, a Kshattri, and a Kandala, the lowest of men, by Vaisya, Kshatriya, and Brahmana) females, (sons who owe their origin to) a confusion of the castes.

13. As an Ambashtha and an Ugra, (begotten) in the direct order on (women) one degree lower (than their husbands) are declared (to be), even so are a Kshattri and a Vaidehaka, though they were born in the inverse order of the castes (from mothers one degree higher than the fathers).

14. Those sons of the twice-born, begotten on wives of the next lower castes, who have been enumerated in due order, they call by the name Anantaras (belonging to the next lower caste), on account of the blemish (inherent) in their mothers.

15. A Brahmana begets on the daughter of an Ugra an Avrita, on the daughter of an Ambashtha an Abhira, but on a female of the Ayogava (caste) a Dhigvana.

16. From a Sudra spring in the inverse order (by females of the higher castes) three base-born (sons, apasada), an Ayogava, a Kshattri, and a Kandala, the lowest of men;

17. From a Vaisya are born in the inverse order of the castes a Magadha and a Vaideha, but from a Kshatriya a Suta only; these are three other base-born ones (apasada).

18. The son of a Nishada by a Sudra female becomes a Pukkasa by caste (gati), but the son of a Sudra by a Nishada female is declared to be a Kukkutaka.

19. Moreover, the son of by Kshattri by an Ugra female is called a Svapaka; but one begotten by a Vaidehaka on an Ambashtha female is named a Vena.

20. Those (sons) whom the twice-born beget on wives of equal caste, but who, not fulfilling their sacred duties, are excluded from the Savitri, one must designate by the appellation Vratyas.

21. But from a Vratya (of the) Brahmana (caste) spring the wicked Bhriggakantaka, the Avantya, the Vatadhana, the Pushpadha, and the Saikha.
22. From a Vratya (of the) Kshatriya (caste), the Ghalla, the Malla, the Likkhivi, the Nata, the Karana, the Khasa, and the Dravida.
23. From a Vratya (of the) Vaisya (caste) are born a Sudhanvan, an Akarya, a Karusha, a Viganman, a Maitra, and a Satvata.
24. By adultery (committed by persons) of (different) castes, by marriages with women who ought not to be married, and by the neglect of the duties and occupations (prescribed) to each, are produced (sons who owe their origin) to a confusion the castes.
25. I will (now) fully enumerate those (sons) of mixed origin, who are born of Anulomas and of Pratilomas, and (thus) are mutually connected.
26. The Suta, the Vaidehaka, the Kandala, that lowest of mortals, the Magadha, he of the Kshatri caste (gati), and the Ayogava,
27. These six (Pratilomas) beget similar races (varna) on women of their own (caste), they (also) produce (the like) with females of their mother's caste (gati), and with females (of) higher ones.
28. As a (Brahmana) begets on (females of) two out of the three (twice-born castes a son similar to) himself, (but inferior) on account of the lower degree (of the mother), and (one equal to himself) on a female of his own race, even so is the order in the case of the excluded (races, vahya).
29. Those (six mentioned above) also beget, the one on the females of the other, a great many (kinds of) despicable (sons), even more sinful than their (fathers), and excluded (from the Aryan community, vahya).
30. Just as a Sudra begets on a Brahmana female a being excluded (from the Aryan community), even so (a person himself) excluded pro creates with (females of) the four castes (varna, sons) more (worthy of being) excluded (than he himself).
31. But men excluded (by the Aryans, vahya), who approach females of higher rank, beget races (varna) still more worthy to be excluded, low men (hina) still lower races, even fifteen (in number).

32. A Dasyu begets on an Ayogava (woman) a Sairandhra, who is skilled in adorning and attending (his master), who, (though) not a slave, lives like a slave, (or) subsists by snaring (animals).
33. A Vaideha produces (with the same) a sweet-voiced Maitreyaka, who, ringing a bell at the appearance of dawn, continually. praises (great) men.
34. A Nishada begets (on the same) a Margava (or) Dasa, who subsists by working as a boatman, (and) whom the inhabitants of Aryavarta call a Kaivarta.
35. Those three base-born ones are severally begot on Ayogava women, who wear the clothes of the dead, are wicked, and eat reprehensible food.
36. From a Nishada springs (by a woman of the Vaideha caste) a Karavara, who works in leather; and from a Vaidehaka (by women of the Karavara and Nishada castes), an Andhra and a Meda, who dwell outside the village.
37. From a Kandala by a Vaideha woman is born a Pandusopaka, who deals in cane; from a Nishada (by the same) an Ahindika.
38. But from a Kandala by a Pukkasa woman is born the sinful Sopaka, who lives by the occupations of his sire, and is ever despised by good men.
39. A Nishada woman bears to a Kandala a son (called) Antyavasayin, employed in burial-grounds, and despised even by those excluded (from the Aryan community).
40. These races, (which originate) in a confusion (of the castes and) have been described according to their fathers and mothers, may be known by their occupations, whether they conceal or openly show themselves.
41. Six sons, begotten (by Aryans) on women of equal and the next lower castes (Anantara), have the duties of twice-born men; but all those born in consequence of a violation (of the law) are, as regards their duties, equal to Sudras.
42. By the power of austerities and of the seed (from which they sprang), these (races) obtain here among men more exalted or lower rank in successive births.
43. But in consequence of the omission of the sacred rites, and of their not consulting Brahmanas, the following tribes of Kshatriyas have gradually sunk in this world to the condition of Sudras;

44. (Viz.) the Paundrakas, the Kodas, the Dravidas, the Kambogas, the Yavanas, the Sakas, the Paradas, the Pahlavas, the Kinas, the Kiratas, and the Daradas.

45. All those tribes in this world, which are excluded from (the community of) those born from the mouth, the arms, the thighs, and the feet (of Brahman), are called Dasyus, whether they speak the language of the Mlekkhas (barbarians) or that of the Aryans.

46. Those who have been mentioned as the base-born (offspring, apasada) of Aryans, or as produced in consequence of a violation (of the law, apadhvamsaga), shall subsist by occupations reprehended by the twice-born.

47. To Sutas (belongs) the management of horses and of chariots; to Ambashthas, the art of healing; to Vaidehakas, the service of women; to Magadhas, trade;

48. Killing fish to Nishadas; carpenters' work to the Ayogava; to Medas, Andhras, Kunkus, and Madgus, the slaughter of wild animals;

49. To Kshattris, Ugras, and Pukkakas, catching and killing (animals) living in holes; to Dhigvanas, working in leather; to Venas, playing drums.

50. Near well-known trees and burial-grounds, on mountains and in groves, let these (tribes) dwell, known (by certain marks), and subsisting by their peculiar occupations.

51. But the dwellings of Kandalas and Svapakas shall be outside the village, they must be made Apatratras, and their wealth (shall be) dogs and donkeys.

52. Their dress (shall be) the garments of the dead, (they shall eat) their food from broken dishes, black iron (shall be) their ornaments, and they must always wander from place to place.

53. A man who fulfils a religious duty, shall not seek intercourse with them; their transactions (shall be) among themselves, and their marriages with their equals.

54. Their food shall be given to them by others (than an Aryan giver) in a broken dish; at night they shall not walk about in villages and in towns.

55. By day they may go about for the purpose of their work, distinguished by marks at the king's command, and they shall carry out the corpses (of persons) who have no relatives; that is a settled rule.

56. By the king's order they shall always execute the criminals, in accordance with the law, and they shall take for themselves the clothes, the beds, and the ornaments of (such) criminals.

57. A man of impure origin, who belongs not to any caste, (varna, but whose character is) not known, who, (though) not an Aryan, has the appearance of an Aryan, one may discover by his acts.

58. Behaviour unworthy of an Aryan, harshness, cruelty, and habitual neglect of the prescribed duties betray in this world a man of impure origin.

59. A base-born man either resembles in character his father, or his mother, or both; he can never conceal his real nature.

60. Even if a man, born in a great family, sprang from criminal intercourse, he will certainly possess the faults of his (father), be they small or great.

61. But that kingdom in which such bastards, sully (the purity of) the castes, are born, perishes quickly together with its inhabitants.

62. Dying, without the expectation of a reward, for the sake of Brahmanas and of cows, or in the defence of women and children, secures beatitude to those excluded (from the Aryan community, vahya.)

63. Abstention from injuring (creatures), veracity, abstention from unlawfully appropriating (the goods of others), purity, and control of the organs, Manu has declared to be the summary of the law for the four castes.

64. If (a female of the caste), sprung from a Brahmana and a Sudra female, bear (children) to one of the highest caste, the inferior (tribe) attains the highest caste within the seventh generation.

65. (Thus) a Sudra attains the rank of a Brahmana, and (in a similar manner) a Brahmana sinks to the level of a Sudra; but know that it is the same with the offspring of a Kshatriya or of a Vaisya.

66. If (a doubt) should arise, with whom the preeminence (is, whether) with him whom an Aryan by chance begot on a non-Aryan female, or (with the son) of a Brahmana woman by a non-Aryan,

67. The decision is as follows: 'He who was begotten by an Aryan on a non-Aryan female, may become (like to) an Aryan by his virtues; he whom an Aryan (mother) bore to a non-Aryan father (is and remains) unlike to an Aryan.'

68. The law prescribes that neither of the two shall receive the sacraments, the first (being excluded) on account of the lowness of his origin, the second (because the union of his parents was) against the order of the castes.

69. As good seed, springing up in good soil, turns out perfectly well, even so the son of an Aryan by an Aryan woman is worthy of all the sacraments.

70. Some sages declare the seed to be more important, and others the field; again others (assert that) the seed and the field (are equally important); but the legal decision on this point is as follows:

71. Seed, sown on barren ground, perishes in it; a (fertile) field also, in which no (good) seed (is sown), will remain barren.

72. As through the power of the seed (sons) born of animals became sages who are honoured and praised, hence the seed is declared to be more important.

73. Having considered (the case of) a non-Aryan who acts like an Aryan, and (that of) an Aryan who acts like a non-Aryan, the creator declared, 'Those two are neither equal nor unequal.'

74. Brahmanas who are intent on the means (of gaining union with) Brahman and firm in (discharging) their duties, shall live by duly performing the following six acts, (which are enumerated) in their (proper) order.

75. Teaching, studying, sacrificing for himself, sacrificing for others, making gifts and receiving them are the six acts (prescribed) for a Brahmana.

76. But among the six acts (ordained) for him three are his means of subsistence, (viz.) sacrificing for others, teaching, and accepting gifts from pure men.

77. (Passing) from the Brahmana to the Kshatriya, three acts (incumbent on the former) are forbidden, (viz.) teaching, sacrificing for others, and, thirdly, the acceptance of gifts.

78. The same are likewise forbidden to a Vaisya, that is a settled rule; for Manu, the lord of creatures (Pragapati), has not prescribed them for (men of) those two (castes).

79. To carry arms for striking and for throwing (is prescribed) for Kshatriyas as a means of subsistence; to trade, (to rear) cattle, and agriculture for Vaisyas; but their duties are liberality, the study of the Veda, and the performance of sacrifices.
80. Among the several occupations the most commendable are, teaching the Veda for a Brahmana, protecting (the people) for a Kshatriya, and trade for a Vaisya.
81. But a Brahmana, unable to subsist by his peculiar occupations just mentioned, may live according to the law applicable to Kshatriyas; for the latter is next to him in rank.
82. If it be asked, 'How shall it be, if he cannot maintain himself by either (of these occupations?' the answer is), he may adopt a Vaisya's mode of life, employing himself in agriculture and rearing cattle.
83. But a Brahmana, or a Kshatriya, living by a Vaisya's mode of subsistence, shall carefully avoid (the pursuit of) agriculture, (which causes) injury to many beings and depends on others.
84. (Some) declare that agriculture is something excellent, (but) that means of subsistence is blamed by the virtuous; (for) the wooden (implement) with iron point injures the earth and (the beings) living in the earth.
85. But he who, through a want of means of subsistence, gives up the strictness with respect to his duties, may sell, in order to increase his wealth, the commodities sold by Vaisyas, making (however) the (following) exceptions.
86. He must avoid (selling) condiments of all sorts, cooked food and sesamum, stones, salt, cattle, and human (beings),
87. All dyed cloth, as well as cloth made of hemp, or flax, or wool, even though they be not dyed, fruit, roots, and (medical) herbs
88. Water, weapons, poison, meat, Soma, and perfumes of all kinds, fresh milk, honey, sour milk, clarified butter, oil, wax, sugar, Kusa-grass;
89. All beasts of the forest, animals with fangs or tusks, birds, spirituous liquor, indigo, lac, and all one-hoofed beasts.
90. But he who subsists by agriculture, may at pleasure sell unmixed sesamum grains for sacred purposes, provided he himself has grown them and has not kept them long.

91. If he applies sesamum to any other purpose but food, anointing, and charitable gifts, he will be born (again) as a worm and, together with his ancestors, be plunged into the ordure of dogs.
92. By (selling) flesh, salt, and lac a Brahmana at once becomes an outcast; by selling milk he becomes (equal to) a Sudra in three days.
93. But by willingly selling in this world other (forbidden) commodities, a Brahmana assumes after seven nights the character of a Vaisya.
94. Condiments may be bartered for condiments, but by no means salt for (other) condiments; cooked food (may be exchanged) for (other kinds of) cooked food, and sesamum seeds for grain in equal quantities.
95. A Kshatriya who has fallen into distress, may subsist by all these (means); but he must never arrogantly adopt the mode of life (prescribed for his) betters.
96. A man of low caste who through covetousness lives by the occupations of a higher one, the king shall deprive of his property and banish.
97. It is better (to discharge) one's own (appointed) duty incompletely than to perform completely that of another; for he who lives according to the law of another (caste) is instantly excluded from his own.
98. A Vaisya who is unable to subsist by his own duties, may even maintain himself by a Sudra's mode of life, avoiding (however) acts forbidden (to him), and he should give it up, when he is able (to do so).
99. But a Sudra, being unable to find service with the twice-born and threatened with the loss of his sons and wife (through hunger), may maintain himself by handicrafts.
100. (Let him follow) those mechanical occupations and those various practical arts by following which the twice-born are (best) served.
101. A Brahmana who is distressed through a want of means of subsistence and pines (with hunger), (but) unwilling to adopt a Vaisya's mode of life and resolved to follow his own (prescribed) path, may act in the following manner.
102. A Brahmana who has fallen into distress may accept (gifts) from anybody; for according to the law it is not possible (to assert) that anything pure can be sullied.

103. By teaching, by sacrificing for, and by accepting gifts from despicable (men) Brahmanas (in distress) commit not sin; for they (are as pure) as fire and water.

104. He who, when in danger of losing his life, accepts food from any person whatsoever, is no more tainted by sin than the sky by mud.

105. Agigarta, who suffered hunger, approached in order to slay (his own) son, and was not tainted by sin, since he (only) sought a remedy against famishing.

106. Vamadeva, who well knew right and wrong, did not sully himself when, tormented (by hunger), he desired to eat the flesh of a dog in order to save his life.

107. Bharadvaga, a performer of great austerities, accepted many cows from the carpenter Bribu, when he was starving together with his sons in a lonely forest.

108. Visvamitra, who well knew what is right or wrong, approached, when he was tormented by hunger, (to eat) the haunch of a dog, receiving it the hands of a Kandala.

109. On (comparing) the acceptance (of gifts from low men), sacrificing (for them), and teaching (them), the acceptance of gifts is the meanest (of those acts) and (most) reprehensible for a Brahmana (on account of its results) in the next life.

110. (For) assisting in sacrifices and teaching are (two acts) always performed for men who have received the sacraments; but the acceptance of gifts takes place even in (case the giver is) a Sudra of the lowest class.

111. The guilt incurred by offering sacrifices for teaching (unworthy men) is removed by muttering (sacred texts) and by burnt offerings, but that incurred by accepting gifts (from them) by throwing (the gifts) away and by austerities.

112. A Brahmana who is unable to maintain himself, should (rather) glean ears or grains from (the field of) any (man); gleaning ears is better than accepting gifts, picking up single grains is declared to be still more laudable.

113. If Brahmanas, who are Snatakas, are pining with hunger, or in want of (utensils made of) common metals, or of other property, they may ask the king for them; if he is not disposed to be liberal, he must be left.

114. (The acceptance on an untilled field is less blamable than (that of) a tilled one; (with respect to) cows, goats, sheep, gold, grain, and cooked food, (the acceptance of) each earlier-named (article is less blamable than of the following ones).

115. There are seven lawful modes of acquiring property, (viz.) inheritance, finding or friendly donation, purchase, conquest, lending at interest, the performance of work, and the acceptance of gifts from virtuous men.

116. Learning, mechanical arts, work for wages, service, rearing cattle, traffic, agriculture, contentment (with little), alms, and receiving interest on money, are the ten modes of subsistence (permitted to all men in times of distress).

117. Neither a Brahmana, nor a Kshatriya must lend (money at) interest; but at his pleasure (either of them) may, in times of distress when he requires money) for sacred purposes, lend to a very sinful man at a small interest.

118. A Kshatriya (king) who, in times of distress, takes even the fourth part (of the crops), is free from guilt, if he protects his subjects to the best of his ability.

119. His peculiar duty is conquest, and he must not turn back in danger; having protected the Vaisyas by his weapons, he may cause the legal tax to be collected;

120. (Viz.) from Vaisyas one-eighth as the tax on grain, one-twentieth (on the profits on gold and cattle), which amount at least to one Karshapana; Sudras, artisans, and mechanics (shall) benefit (the king) by (doing) work (for him).

121. If a Sudra, (unable to subsist by serving Brahmanas,) seeks a livelihood, he may serve Kshatriyas, or he may also seek to maintain himself by attending on a wealthy Vaisya.

122. But let a (Sudra) serve Brahmanas, either for the sake of heaven, or with a view to both (this life and the next); for he who is called the servant of a Brahmana thereby gains all his ends.

123. The service of Brahmanas alone is declared (to be) an excellent occupation for a Sudra; for whatever else besides this he may perform will bear him no fruit.

124. They must allot to him out of their own family (-property) a suitable maintenance, after considering his ability, his industry, and the number of those whom he is bound to support.

125. The remnants of their food must be given to him, as well as their old clothes, the refuse of their grain, and their old household furniture.

126. A Sudra cannot commit an offence, causing loss of caste (pataka), and he is not worthy to receive the sacraments; he has no right to (fulfil) the sacred law (of the Aryans, yet) there is no prohibition against (his fulfilling certain portions of) the law.

127. (Sudras) who are desirous to gain merit, and know (their) duty, commit no sin, but gain praise, if they imitate the practice of virtuous men without reciting sacred texts.

128. The more a (Sudra), keeping himself free from envy, imitates the behaviour of the virtuous, the more he gains, without being censured, (exaltation in) this world and the next.

129. No collection of wealth must be made by a Sudra, even though he be able (to do it); for a Sudra who has acquired wealth, gives pain to Brahmanas.

130. The duties of the four castes (varna) in times of distress have thus been declared, and if they perform them well, they will reach the most blessed state.

131. Thus all the legal rules for the four castes have been proclaimed; I next will promulgate the auspicious rules for penances.

The Moral Basis of a Backward Society

by

Edward C. Banfield

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In such condition, there is no place for industry, because the fruit is uncertain: and consequently no culture of the earth; no navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by sea; no commodious building; no instruments of moving, and removing, such things as require much force; no knowledge of the face of the earth; no account of time; no arts; no letters; no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.

-Hobbes

Introduction

In democratic countries the science of association is the mother of Science; the progress of all the rest depends upon the progress it has made.

-Tocqueville

Most of the people of the world live and die without ever achieving membership in a community larger than the family or tribe. Except in Europe and America, the concerting of behavior in political associations and corporate organization is a rare and recent thing.

Lack of such association is a very important limiting factor in the way of economic development in most of the world. Except as people can create and maintain corporate organization, they cannot have a modern economy. To put the matter positively: the higher the level of living to be attained, the greater the need for organization. Inability to maintain organization is also a barrier to political progress. Successful self-government depends, among other things, upon the possibility of concerting the behavior of large numbers of people in matters of public concern. The same factors that stand in the way of effective association for economic ends stand in the way of association for political ones too. "The most democratic country on the face of the earth," Tocqueville observed, "is that in which men have, in our time, carried to the highest perfection the art of pursuing in common the object of their common desires and have applied this new science to the greatest number of purposes."¹

We are apt to take it for granted that economic and political associations will quickly arise wherever technical conditions and natural resources permit. If the state of the technical arts is such that large gains are possible by concerting the activity of many people, capital and organizing skill will appear from somewhere, and organizations will spring up and grow. This is the comfortable assumption that is often made.

The assumption is wrong because it overlooks the crucial importance of culture. People live and think in very different ways, and some of these ways are radically inconsistent with the requirements of formal organization. One could not, for example, create a powerful organization in a place where everyone could satisfy his aspirations by reaching out his hand to the nearest coconut. Nor could one create a powerful organization in a place where no one would accept orders or direction.

There is some reason to doubt that the non-Western cultures of the world will prove capable of creating and maintaining the high degree of organization without which a modern economy and a democratic political order are impossible. There seems to be only one important culture - the Japanese - which is both radically different from our own and capable of maintaining the necessary degree of organization. If there is to be more than a superficial overlay of industrialization in China, India, and the other underdeveloped countries, their ethos must be such as to allow the establishment of corporate forms of action.

The ability of a culture to maintain organization cannot meaningfully be measured simply in number or size of organizations. An organization may have many members and cover a large area and yet do very little. In appraising the capacity of a culture to maintain organization, it is necessary to consider not only numbers and size of organizations but their efficiency, i.e. the rate at which they convert valued input to valued output. In doing this, one must ask how exacting are the purposes or values being served: obviously it is less of a feat to be efficient in the attainment of a purpose which imposes few demands than in the attainment of one which imposes many. That a culture is able to maintain an effective military force, for example, does not imply that it can succeed in the infinitely more difficult task of creating an industrial society in which human values are preserved and improved. If these most difficult and important purposes are taken as the standard, it is even more difficult to see how most cultures of the non-Western world can attain a high level of organization unless they are changed drastically or potentialities now latent in them find expression.

While it is easy to see that culture may be the limiting factor, which determines the amount and character of organization, and therefore of progress in the less developed parts of the world, it is not obvious what are the precise incompatibilities between particular cultures, or aspects of culture, and particular forms or levels of organization. Even with respect to our own society we know very little about such matters. What, for example, is the significance for organization of various class, ethnic, or sexual attributes within our own culture.

This book is a study of the cultural, psychological, and moral conditions of political and other organization. The approach is that of detailed examination of factors, which impede corporate action in a culture, which, although not radically foreign to ours, is nevertheless different from it, and in some respects closely similar to that of the Mediterranean and Levantine worlds.

The book is about a single village in southern Italy, the extreme poverty and backwardness of which is to be explained² largely (but not entirely) by the inability of the villagers to act together for their common good or, indeed, for any end transcending the immediate, material interest of the nuclear family. This inability to concert activity beyond the immediate family arises from an ethos³ - that of "amoral familism" - which has been produced by three factors acting in combination: a high death rate, certain land tenure conditions, and the absence of the institution of the extended family.

Our family- my wife and I and our children, then eight and ten years old - lived among the peasants of Montegrano (the name of fictitious, as are all local ones) for nine months in 1954 and 1955. With the help of an Italian student, my wife interviewed about 70 persons, most of them peasants. (My own knowledge of the language was non-existent to start with and rudimentary later.) In addition, we gathered data from census schedules and other official sources, from record books and autobiographies kept by peasants at our request, and from thematic apperception tests.

It was not practical to employ sophisticated sampling techniques. (To have done so would have left no time for interviewing.) Therefore, we do not know how representative our interviews were; our impression is, however, that they were highly representative of that part of the population, which lives in the town and reasonably representative of the nearby country dwellers. We are not competent to say how representative Montegrano is of southern Italy as a whole; there is some evidence, however, that in the respects relevant to this study, Montegrano is fairly the "typical" south, viz., the rest of Lucania, the regions of Abruzzi and Calabria, the interior of Campania, and the coasts of Catania, Messina, Palermo, and Trapani.⁴

Since our intention is not to "prove" anything, but rather to outline and illustrate a theory, which may be rigorously tested by any who care to do so, we think our data - meager though they are - are sufficient. There are enough data, at least, to justify systematic inquiry along these lines. Until such inquiry has been made, the argument made here must be regarded as highly tentative.

Some readers may feel that amoral familism, or something very much akin to it, exists in every society, the American no less than the southern Italian. Our answer to this is that amoral familism is a pattern or syndrome; a society exhibiting *some* of the constituent elements of the syndrome is decisively different from one exhibiting *all* of them together. Moreover, the matter is one of degree: no matter how selfish or unscrupulous most of its members may be, a society is not amorally individualistic (or familistic) if there is somewhere in it a significant element of public spiritedness or even of "enlightened" self interest.

CHAPTER 5

A PREDICTIVE HYPOTHESIS

A very simple hypothesis will make intelligible all of the behavior about which questions have been raised and will enable an observer to predict how the Montagraneesi act in concrete circumstances. The hypothesis is that the Montagraneesi act as if they were following this rule:

Maximize the material, short-run advantage of the nuclear family; assume all others will do likewise

1. *In a society of amoral familists no one will further the interest of the group or community except as it is to his private advantage to do so.*
2. *In a society of amoral familists only officials will concern themselves with public affairs, for only they are paid to do so. For a private citizen to take a serious interest in a public problem will be regarded as abnormal and even improper.*
3. *In a society of amoral familists there will be few checks on officials, for checking on officials will be the business of other officials only.*
4. *In a society of amoral familists, organization (i.e., deliberately concerted action) will be difficult to achieve and maintain. The inducements, which lead people to contribute their activity to organizations, are to an important degree unselfish (e.g., identification with the purpose of the organization) and they are often non-material (e.g., the intrinsic interest of the activity as a "game"). Moreover, it is a condition of successful organization that members have some trust in each other and some loyalty to the organization. In an organization with high morale it is taken for granted that they will make small sacrifices, and perhaps even larger ones, for the sake of the organization.*
5. *In a society of amoral familists, office-holders, feeling no identification with the purpose of the organization, will not work harder than is necessary to keep their places or (if such is within the realm of possibility) to earn promotion. Similarly, professional people and educated people generally lack a sense of mission or calling. Indeed, official position and special training will be regarded by their possessors as weapons to be used against others for private advantage.*
6. *In a society of amoral familists, the law will be disregarded when there is no reason to fear punishment. Therefore individuals will not enter into agreements, which depend upon legal processes for their enforcement unless it is likely that the*

- law will be enforced and unless the cost of securing enforcement will not be so great as to make the undertaking unprofitable.*
7. *The amoral familist who is an office-holder will take bribes when he can get away with it. But whether he takes bribes or not, it will be assumed by the society of amoral familists that he does.*
 8. *In a society of amoral familists the weak will favor a regime, which will maintain order with a strong hand.*
 9. *In a society of amoral familists, the claim of any person or institution to be inspired by zeal for public rather than private advantage will be regarded as fraud.*
 10. *In a society of amoral familists there will be no connection between abstract political principle (i.e., ideology) and concrete behavior in the ordinary relationships of every day life.*
 11. *In a society of amoral familists there will be no leaders and no followers. No one will take the initiative in outlining a course of action and persuading others to embark upon it (except assist any be to his private advantage to do so) and , if one did offer leadership , the group would refuse it out of distrust.*
 12. *The amoral familist will use his ballot to secure the greatest material gain in the short run. Although he may have decided views as to his long terms interest, his class interest, or the public interest, these will not effect his vote if the family's short-run, material advantage is any way involved.*
 13. *The amoral familist will value gains accruing to the community only insofar as he and his are likely to share them. In fact, he will vote against measures which will help the community without helping him because, even though his position is unchanged in absolute terms, he consider himself worse off if his neighbors' position changes for the better. Thus it may happen that measures which are of decided general benefit will be provoke a protest vote from those who feel that they have not shared in them or have not shared in them sufficiently.*
 14. *In a society of amoral familists the voter will place little confidence in the promises of the parties. He will be apt to use his ballot to pay for favors already received (assuming, of course, that more are in the prospect) rather than for favors which are merely promised.*
 15. *In a society of amoral familists it will be assumed that whatever group is in power is self-serving and corrupt. Hardly will an election be over before the voters will conclude that the new officials are enriching themselves at their expense and that they have no intention of keeping the promises they have made. Consequently, the self-serving voter will use his ballot to pay the incumbents not for benefits but for injuries , i.e., he will use it to administer punishment.*

16. *Despite the willingness of voters to sell their votes, there will be no strong or stable political machines in a society of amoral familists. This will be true for at least three reasons: (a) the ballot being secret, the amoral voter cannot be depended upon to vote as he has been paid to vote; (b) there will not be enough short-run material gain from a machine to attract investments it ;, and (c) for reasons explained above, it will be difficult to maintain formal organization of nay kind whatever.*

17. *In a society of amoral familists, party workers will sell their services to the highest bidder. Their tendency to change sides will make for sudden shifts in strength of the parties at the polls.*

¹ *Democracy in America*, Knopf edition, Vol. II, p.107

² An explanation, someone has said, is a place where the mind comes to rest. Some of the explanations discussed (Chapter Two) or offered (Chapter Eight) in this book are casual, i.e., they are places where the mind comes to rest when it looks for conditions antecedent to an event and necessary to its occurrence. Others (Chapter Five) are at least superficial of a different sort: they are places where the mind comes to rest when it looks for a principle of identify in seemingly unrelated facts.

³ The concept "ethos" is used in Sumner's sense: "the sum of the characteristic usages, ideas, standards and codes by which a group is differentiated and individualized in character from other groups." *Folkways*, p.36

⁴ An Australian demographer, J.S. McDonald, has shown that emigration rates in these areas "where economic aspirations were integrated only with the welfare of the individual's nuclear family" have been higher than in other rural districts (i.e., the Veneto, Centre, Emilia-Romagna, Tuscany, Umbria, and Marches) "where aspirations for material betterment were expressed in board associative behavior." "Italy's Rural Social Structure and Emigration," *Occidente*, Vol. XII, No. 5 (September-October 1956), pp. 437-455.

The new liberal imperialism

<http://www.observer.co.uk/worldview/story/0,11581,680095,00.html>

Senior British diplomat Robert Cooper has helped to shape British Prime Minister Tony Blair's calls for a new internationalism and a new doctrine of humanitarian intervention which would place limits on state sovereignty. This article contains the full text of Cooper's essay on "the postmodern state", written in a personal capacity, an extract from which appears in the print edition of The Observer today. Cooper's call for a new liberal imperialism and admission of the need for double standards in foreign policy have outraged the left but the essay offers a rare and candid unofficial insight into the thinking behind British strategy on Afghanistan, Iraq and beyond You can join the online debate here.

Observer Worldview

Sunday April 7, 2002

In 1989 the political systems of three centuries came to an end in Europe: the balance-of-power and the imperial urge. That year marked not just the end of the Cold War, but also, and more significantly, the end of a state system in Europe which dated from the Thirty Years War. September 11 showed us one of the implications of the change.

To understand the present, we must first understand the past, for the past is still with us. **International order used to be based either on hegemony or on balance. Hegemony came first. In the ancient world, order meant empire. Those within the empire had order, culture and civilisation. Outside it lay barbarians, chaos and disorder. The image of peace and order through a single hegemonic power centre has remained strong ever since.** Empires, however, are ill-designed for promoting change. Holding the empire together - and it is the essence of empires that they are diverse - usually requires an authoritarian political style; innovation, especially in society and politics, would lead to instability. Historically, empires have generally been static.

In Europe, a middle way was found between the stasis of chaos and the stasis of empire, namely the small state. The small state succeeded in establishing sovereignty, but only within a geographically limited jurisdiction. Thus domestic order was purchased at the price of international anarchy. The competition between the small states of Europe was a source of progress, but the system was also constantly threatened by a relapse into chaos on one side and by the hegemony of a single power on the other. The solution to this was the balance-of-power, a system of counter-balancing alliances which became seen as the condition of liberty in Europe. Coalitions were successfully put together to thwart the hegemonic ambitions firstly of Spain, then of France, and finally of Germany.

But the balance-of-power system too had an inherent instability, the ever-present risk of war, and it was this that eventually caused it to collapse. German unification in 1871 created a state too powerful to be balanced by any European alliance; technological changes raised the costs of war to an unbearable level; and the development of mass

society and democratic politics, rendered impossible the amoral calculating mindset necessary to make the balance of power system function. Nevertheless, in the absence of any obvious alternative it persisted, and what emerged in 1945 was not so much a new system as the culmination of the old one. The old multi-lateral balance-of-power in Europe became a bilateral balance of terror worldwide, a final simplification of the balance of power. But it was not built to last. The balance of power never suited the more universalistic, moralist spirit of the late twentieth century.

The second half of the twentieth Century has seen not just the end of the balance of power but also the waning of the imperial urge: in some degree the two go together. A world that started the century divided among European empires finishes it with all or almost all of them gone: the Ottoman, German, Austrian, French , British and finally Soviet Empires are now no more than a memory. **This leaves us with two new types of state: first there are now states - often former colonies - where in some sense the state has almost ceased to exist a 'premodern' zone where the state has failed and a Hobbesian war of all against all is underway (countries such as Somalia and, until recently, Afghanistan). Second, there are the post imperial, postmodern states who no longer think of security primarily in terms of conquest. And thirdly, of course there remain the traditional "modern" states who behave as states always have, following Machiavellian principles and raison d'état (one thinks of countries such as India, Pakistan and China).**

The postmodern system in which we Europeans live does not rely on balance; nor does it emphasise sovereignty or the separation of domestic and foreign affairs. **The European Union has become a highly developed system for mutual interference in each other's domestic affairs, right down to beer and sausages. The CFE Treaty, under which parties to the treaty have to notify the location of their heavy weapons and allow inspections, subjects areas close to the core of sovereignty to international constraints. It is important to realise what an extraordinary revolution this is. It mirrors the paradox of the nuclear age, that in order to defend yourself, you had to be prepared to destroy yourself. The shared interest of European countries in avoiding a nuclear catastrophe has proved enough to overcome the normal strategic logic of distrust and concealment. Mutual vulnerability has become mutual transparency.**

The main characteristics of the postmodern world are as follows:

- **The breaking down of the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs.**
- **Mutual interference in (traditional) domestic affairs and mutual surveillance.**
- **The rejection of force for resolving disputes and the consequent codification of self-enforced rules of behaviour.**
- **The growing irrelevance of borders: this has come about both through the changing role of the state, but also through missiles, motor cars and satellites.**

• **Security is based on transparency, mutual openness, interdependence and mutual vulnerability.**

The conception of an International Criminal Court is a striking example of the postmodern breakdown of the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs. In the postmodern world, *raison d'état* and the amorality of Machiavelli's theories of statecraft, which defined international relations in the modern era, have been replaced by a moral consciousness that applies to international relations as well as to domestic affairs: hence the renewed interest in what constitutes a just war.

While such a system does deal with the problems that made the balance-of-power unworkable, it does not entail the demise of the nation state. While economy, law-making and defence may be increasingly embedded in international frameworks, and the borders of territory may be less important, identity and democratic institutions remain primarily national. Thus traditional states will remain the fundamental unit of international relations for the foreseeable future, even though some of them may have ceased to behave in traditional ways.

What is the origin of this basic change in the state system? The fundamental point is that "the world's grown honest". A large number of the most powerful states no longer want to fight or conquer. It is this that gives rise to both the pre-modern and postmodern worlds. Imperialism in the traditional sense is dead, at least among the Western powers.

If this is true, it follows that we should not think of the EU or even NATO as the root cause of the half century of peace we have enjoyed in Western Europe. The basic fact is that Western European countries no longer want to fight each other. NATO and the EU have, nevertheless, played an important role in reinforcing and sustaining this position. NATO's most valuable contribution has been the openness it has created. NATO was, and is a massive intra-western confidence-building measure. It was NATO and the EU that provided the framework within which Germany could be reunited without posing a threat to the rest of Europe as its original unification had in 1871. Both give rise to thousands of meetings of ministers and officials, so that all those concerned with decisions involving war and peace know each other well. Compared with the past, this represents a quality and stability of political relations never known before.

The EU is the most developed example of a postmodern system. It represents security through transparency, and transparency through interdependence. The EU is more a transnational than a supra-national system, a voluntary association of states rather than the subordination of states to a central power. The dream of a European state is one left from a previous age. It rests on the assumption that nation states are fundamentally dangerous and that the only way to tame the anarchy of nations is to impose hegemony on them. But if the nation-state is a problem then the super-state is certainly not a solution.

European states are not the only members of the postmodern world. Outside Europe, Canada is certainly a postmodern state; Japan is by inclination a postmodern state, but its location prevents it developing more fully in this direction. The USA is the more doubtful case since it is not clear that the US government or Congress accepts either the necessity or desirability of interdependence, or its corollaries of openness, mutual surveillance and mutual interference, to the same extent as most European governments now do. Elsewhere, what in Europe has become a reality is in many other parts of the world an aspiration. ASEAN, NAFTA, MERCOSUR and even OAU suggest at least the desire for a postmodern environment, and though this wish is unlikely to be realised quickly, imitation is undoubtedly easier than invention.

Within the postmodern world, there are no security threats in the traditional sense; that is to say, its members do not consider invading each other. Whereas in the modern world, following Clausewitz' dictum war is an instrument of policy in the postmodern world it is a sign of policy failure. But while the members of the postmodern world may not represent a danger to one another, both the modern and pre-modern zones pose threats.

The threat from the modern world is the most familiar. Here, the classical state system, from which the postmodern world has only recently emerged, remains intact, and continues to operate by the principles of empire and the supremacy of national interest. If there is to be stability it will come from a balance among the aggressive forces. It is notable how few are the areas of the world where such a balance exists. And how sharp the risk is that in some areas there may soon be a nuclear element in the equation.

The challenge to the postmodern world is to get used to the idea of double standards. Among ourselves, we operate on the basis of laws and open cooperative security. But when dealing with more old-fashioned kinds of states outside the postmodern continent of Europe, we need to revert to the rougher methods of an earlier era - force, pre-emptive attack, deception, whatever is necessary to deal with those who still live in the nineteenth century world of every state for itself. Among ourselves, we keep the law but when we are operating in the jungle, we must also use the laws of the jungle. In the prolonged period of peace in Europe, there has been a temptation to neglect our defences, both physical and psychological. This represents one of the great dangers of the postmodern state.

The challenge posed by the pre-modern world is a new one. The pre-modern world is a world of failed states. Here the state no longer fulfils Weber's criterion of having the monopoly on the legitimate use of force. Either it has lost the legitimacy or it has lost the monopoly of the use of force; often the two go together. Examples of total collapse are relatively rare, but the number of countries at risk grows all the time. Some areas of the former Soviet Union are candidates, including Chechnya. All of the world's major drug-producing areas are part of the pre-modern world. Until recently there was no real sovereign authority in Afghanistan; nor is there in upcountry Burma or in some parts of South America, where drug barons threaten the state's monopoly on force. All over Africa countries are at risk. No area of the world is without its dangerous cases. In such areas chaos is the norm and war is a

way of life. In so far as there is a government it operates in a way similar to an organised crime syndicate.

The premodern state may be too weak even to secure its home territory, let alone pose a threat internationally, but it can provide a base for non-state actors who may represent a danger to the postmodern world. If non-state actors, notably drug, crime, or terrorist syndicates take to using premodern bases for attacks on the more orderly parts of the world, then the organised states may eventually have to respond. If they become too dangerous for established states to tolerate, it is possible to imagine a defensive imperialism. It is not going too far to view the West's response to Afghanistan in this light.

How should we deal with the pre-modern chaos? To become involved in a zone of chaos is risky; if the intervention is prolonged it may become unsustainable in public opinion; if the intervention is unsuccessful it may be damaging to the government that ordered it. But the risks of letting countries rot, as the West did Afghanistan, may be even greater.

What form should intervention take? The most logical way to deal with chaos, and the one most employed in the past is colonisation. But colonisation is unacceptable to postmodern states (and, as it happens, to some modern states too). It is precisely because of the death of imperialism that we are seeing the emergence of the pre-modern world. Empire and imperialism are words that have become a form of abuse in the postmodern world. Today, there are no colonial powers willing to take on the job, though the opportunities, perhaps even the need for colonisation is as great as it ever was in the nineteenth century. Those left out of the global economy risk falling into a vicious circle. Weak government means disorder and that means falling investment. In the 1950s, South Korea had a lower GNP per head than Zambia: the one has achieved membership of the global economy, the other has not.

All the conditions for imperialism are there, but both the supply and demand for imperialism have dried up. And yet the weak still need the strong and the strong still need an orderly world. A world in which the efficient and well governed export stability and liberty, and which is open for investment and growth - all of this seems eminently desirable.

What is needed then is a new kind of imperialism, one acceptable to a world of human rights and cosmopolitan values. We can already discern its outline: an imperialism which, like all imperialism, aims to bring order and organisation but which rests today on the voluntary principle.

Postmodern imperialism takes two forms. First there is the voluntary imperialism of the global economy. This is usually operated by an international consortium through International Financial Institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank - it is characteristic of the new imperialism that it is multilateral. These institutions provide help to states wishing to find their way back into the global economy and

into the virtuous circle of investment and prosperity. In return they make demands which, they hope, address the political and economic failures that have contributed to the original need for assistance. Aid theology today increasingly emphasises governance. If states wish to benefit, they must open themselves up to the interference of international organisations and foreign states (just as, for different reasons, the postmodern world has also opened itself up.)

The second form of postmodern imperialism might be called the imperialism of neighbours. Instability in your neighbourhood poses threats which no state can ignore. Misgovernment, ethnic violence and crime in the Balkans poses a threat to Europe. The response has been to create something like a voluntary UN protectorate in Bosnia and Kosovo. It is no surprise that in both cases the High Representative is European. Europe provides most of the aid that keeps Bosnia and Kosovo running and most of the soldiers (though the US presence is an indispensable stabilising factor). In a further unprecedented move, the EU has offered unilateral free-market access to all the countries of the former Yugoslavia for all products including most agricultural produce. It is not just soldiers that come from the international community; it is police, judges, prison officers, central bankers and others. Elections are organised and monitored by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Local police are financed and trained by the UN. As auxiliaries to this effort - in many areas indispensable to it - are over a hundred NGOs.

One additional point needs to be made. It is dangerous if a neighbouring state is taken over in some way by organised or disorganised crime - which is what state collapse usually amounts to. But Usama bin Laden has now demonstrated for those who had not already realised, that today all the world is, potentially at least, our neighbour.

The Balkans are a special case. Elsewhere in Central and Eastern Europe the EU is engaged in a programme which will eventually lead to massive enlargement. In the past empires have imposed their laws and systems of government; in this case no one is imposing anything. Instead, a voluntary movement of self-imposition is taking place. While you are a candidate for EU membership you have to accept what is given - a whole mass of laws and regulations - as subject countries once did. But the prize is that once you are inside you will have a voice in the commonwealth. If this process is a kind of voluntary imperialism, the end state might be describes as a cooperative empire. 'Commonwealth' might indeed not be a bad name.

The postmodern EU offers a vision of cooperative empire, a common liberty and a common security without the ethnic domination and centralised absolutism to which past empires have been subject, but also without the ethnic exclusiveness that is the hallmark of the nation state - inappropriate in an era without borders and unworkable in regions such as the Balkans. A cooperative empire might be the domestic political framework that best matches the altered substance of the postmodern state: a framework in which each has a share in the government, in which no single country dominates and in which

the governing principles are not ethnic but legal. The lightest of touches will be required from the centre; the 'imperial bureaucracy' must be under control, accountable, and the servant, not the master, of the commonwealth. Such an institution must be as dedicated to liberty and democracy as its constituent parts. Like Rome, this commonwealth would provide its citizens with some of its laws, some coins and the occasional road.

That perhaps is the vision. Can it be realised? Only time will tell. The question is how much time there may be. In the modern world the secret race to acquire nuclear weapons goes on. In the premodern world the interests of organised crime - including international terrorism - grow greater and faster than the state. There may not be much time left.

Robert Cooper is a senior serving British diplomat, and writes in a personal capacity. This article is published as The post-modern state in the new collection Reordering the World: the long term implications of September 11, published by The Foreign Policy Centre.

You can send your views on the piece to the author via The Foreign Policy Centre at info@fpc.org.uk. If you would like to respond to the piece, or contribute to Observer Worldview, please write to Observer site editor Sunder Katwala at observer@guardianunlimited.co.uk.

An Enquiry into the Nature and Causes of Wealth of Nations - Adam Smith

(Extract)

The expence of defending the society, and that of supporting the dignity of the chief magistrate, are both laid out for the general benefit of the whole society. It is responsible, therefore, that they should be defrayed by the general contribution of the whole society, all the different members contributing, as nearly as possible, in proportion to their respective abilities.

The expence of the administration of justice too, may, no doubt, be considered as laid out for the benefit of the whole society. There is no impropriety, therefore, in its being defrayed by the general contribution of the whole society. The persons, however, who give occasion to this expence are those who, by their injustice in one way or another, make it necessary to seek redress or protection from the courts of justice. The persons again most immediately by this expence, are those whom the courts of justice either restore to their rights, or maintain in their rights. The expence of the administration of justice, therefore, may very properly be defrayed by the particular contribution of one or other, or both of those two different sets of persons, according as different occasions may require, that is, by the fees of court. It cannot be necessary to have recourse to the general contribution of the whole society, except for the conviction of those criminals who have not themselves any estate or fund sufficient for paying those fees.

Those local or provincial expences of which the benefit is local or provincial (what is laid out, for example, upon the police of a particular town or district) ought to be defrayed by a local or provincial revenue, and ought to be no burden upon the general revenue of the society. It is unjust that the whole society should contribute towards an expence of which the benefit is confined to a part of the society.

The expence of maintaining good roads and communications is, no doubt, beneficial to the whole society, and may, therefore, without any injustice, be defrayed by the general contribution of the whole society. This expence, however, is most immediately and directly beneficial to those who travel or carry goods. The turnpike tolls in England, and the duties called peages in other countries, lay it altogether upon those two different sets of people, and thereby discharge the general revenue of the society from a very considerable burden.

The expence of the institutions for education and religious instruction, is likewise, no doubt, beneficial to the whole society, and may, therefore, without injustice, be defrayed by the general contribution of the whole society. This expence, however, might perhaps with equal propriety, and even with some advantages, be defrayed altogether by those who receive the immediate benefit of such

education and instruction, or by the voluntary contribution of those who think they have occasion for either the one or the other.

When the institutions or public works which are beneficial to the whole society, either cannot be maintained altogether, or are not maintained altogether by the contribution of such particular members of the society as are most immediately benefited by them, the deficiency must in most cases be made up by the general contribution of the whole society. The general revenue of the society, and of supporting the dignity of the chief magistrate, must make up for the deficiency of many particular branches of revenue. The sources of this general or public revenue, I shall endeavour to explain in the following chapter.

An Enquiry into the Nature and Causes of Wealth of Nations - Adam Smith

The Modern Library, New York, 1937

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The Aryan Issue

A presentation by Michel Danino
(revised August 2017)

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- This presentation offers a brief introduction to the topic and has been designed as an educational module. It claims no completeness, and the student wishing to study the topic further is invited to consult the resources listed at the end.
- Credits for images have been supplied as far as possible; suggestions for additions or corrections are welcome.
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Introduction

The pioneering Orientalist William Jones, founder in Calcutta of the Asiatic Society, was among the first Europeans to master Sanskrit and translate Sanskrit texts into English. In his famous praise of the language (1786), he found it to be “of wonderful structure, more perfect than the Greek, more copious than the Latin, and more exquisitely refined than either. ... [All three must] have sprung from some common source.”



The linguistic kinship between Sanskrit and European languages (which was actually noted by a few Jesuit scholars before Jones) gave rise to the concept of an Indo-European language family, and consequently to the search for its “common source” — later called “Proto-Indo-European” — and its “original homeland”. In the 19th century, numerous homeland theories were proposed, from India to Nordic regions, from the Russian steppes to Germany....



Sanskritist and philologist Friedrich Max Müller produced the first complete edition of the Rig-Veda. He regarded the *āryas* as a conquering race and romanticized “how the [British] descendants of the same [Aryan] race, to which the first conquerors and masters of India belonged, return ... to accomplish the glorious work of civilization, which had been left unfinished by their Aryan brethren.” (1847)

This confusion between language and “race”, which Max Müller himself later rejected, persisted for a long time (and still persists in India). It was exploited not only by the British, who portrayed their colonial rule of India as one more Aryan wave, but also by rising German nationalism in the 19th and early 20th centuries. It eventually became an ideological foundation of Nazism, which claimed that Germans were the purest descendants of the “Aryan race”.

The Aryan theory in a nutshell

- A new people / conquering race, speaking an early form of Sanskrit, entered India around 1500 BCE, subjugated indigenous populations, making them adopt its language, its Vedic culture and a caste-based social order.
- The Aryans “were generally fair, the indigenous people dark in complexion. The colour of the skin may have been an important mark of their identity.” (D.N. Jha, *Ancient India in Historical Outline*, 1998)
- Depicted in the Veda as “dark-skinned”, “stub-nosed” *Dasyus* or *Dāsas*, the indigenous people have been variously identified with ancestors of tribals, Shudras, Dalits, Dravidians, or (later) with the Harappans.
- In older versions of the theory, the invading Aryans destroyed the Indus cities; in softer versions, they migrated peacefully into the subcontinent, possibly in several waves. More recent versions have abandoned the race concept, keeping only the arrival of “Indo-Aryan speakers”.
- The Aryans settled in the Indus and Sarasvati valleys, composed the Rig-Veda around 1200 BCE, and moved into the Ganges Valley, whose thick forest cover they cleared with their iron tools.


Seven approaches to the Aryan issue

1. **Literary:** What do the texts actually say?
2. **Geographical:** What was the Aryans' geography?
3. **Archaeological:** Has archaeology found traces of their invasion / migration?
4. **Cultural:** Is there a cultural break between pre- and post-Aryan?
5. **Anthropological & genetic:** Can an Aryan "race" or ethnic entity be defined and identified?
6. **Astronomical:** Is there astronomical data to date early Sanskrit texts?
7. **Linguistic:** Does linguistics demand or depend on the Aryan scenario?

1. The Literary Evidence

- **Several Indian figures and scholars pointed out that the Rig-Veda (the earliest Sanskrit text) does not mention an original homeland.**
- **Swami Vivekananda: “According to some, they came from Central Tibet, others will have it that they came from Central Asia. ... Of late, there was an attempt made to prove that the Aryans lived on the Swiss lakes. I should not be sorry if they had been all drowned there, theory and all. Some say now that they lived at the North Pole. Lord bless the Aryans and their habitations! As for the truth of these theories, there is not one word in our scriptures, not one, to prove that the Aryan ever came from anywhere outside India....” (1897)**
- **“And what your European Pandits say about the Aryans swooping down from some foreign land snatching away the land of aborigines and settling in India by exterminating them, is all pure nonsense, foolish talk. ... And all these monstrous lies are being taught to our boys!” (1901)**





- **Sri Aurobindo: “Race is a thing much more obscure and difficult to determine than is usually imagined. In dealing with it the trenchant distinctions current in the popular mind are wholly out of place.”**
- **“[The racial identification of supposed Aryans and non-Aryans is] “a conjecture supported only by other conjectures ... a myth of the philologists.”**
- **“There is no actual mention of such an invasion [in the Rig-Veda].... There is no reliable indication of any racial difference [between Aryans and Dasyus].” (1914–16)**
- **Sri Aurobindo rejected the European scholars’ historical interpretation of the Rig-Veda; he argued that the Veda could not be understood unless the symbolic language of the hymns was unravelled. In his view, most of the Vedic hymns reflect the Rishis’ quest for light and immortality and their struggle to defend the cosmic order (*ritam*) threatened by forces of darkness. This is in line with other mythologies of the ancient world.**

➤ **B.R. Ambedkar: “The theory of [Aryan] invasion is an invention. ... The theory is based upon nothing but pleasing assumptions and the inferences based on such assumptions. ... The theory is a perversion of scientific investigation. It is not allowed to evolve out of facts. On the contrary, the theory is preconceived and facts are selected to prove it. It falls to the ground at every point. ...**



- 1. The Vedas do not know any such race as the Aryan race.**
- 2. There is no evidence in the Vedas of any invasion of India by the Aryan race and its having conquered the Dasas and Dasyus supposed to be the natives of India.**
- 3. There is no evidence to show that the distinction between Aryans, Dasas and Dasyus was a racial distinction.**
- 4. The Vedas do not support the contention that the Aryas were different in colour from the Dasas and Dasyus.” (*Who Were the Shudras*, 1946, Chapters 4 & 5)**

➤ **“From this it follows that if the Brahmins are Aryans the Untouchables are also Aryans.” (*The Untouchables*, 1948, Chapter 7)**

Does the Veda refer to “dark-skinned”, “stub-nosed” aboriginals living in “forts”?

- Phrases such as “wrapped in darkness / a dark envelope” (*krishnagarbhā*, *krishnā tvac*, 2.20.7 etc.) are consistent with the conflict between forces of light and forces of darkness at the centre of most world mythologies. Sri Aurobindo emphasized the Rig-Veda’s quest for the light: light of truth (*ritasya jyotis*), immortal light (*jyotir amritam*), Aryan light (*jyotir āryam*), etc. (1.23.5, 7.76.1, 6.9.4, 10.43.4)
- Maria Schetelich: “If ... *krsnā tvac* is translated with ‘dark cloth, dark cover’ but not with ‘dark skin’ in the sense of ‘dark complexion’ it fits better into the habits of thinking of the Rgvedic poets, rather than the rather trivial translation current till now.” (1990)
- Thomas R. Trautmann: “The [Dasyus’] image of the ‘dark-skinned savage’ is only imposed on the Vedic evidence with a considerable amount of text-torturing. ... Why project an alien [racial] discourse onto the distant Indian past?” (1997)

- **George Erdosy:** “Evidence for the characterization of *Dāsas* and *Dasyus* as black is tenuous in the extreme. Even apparently clear indications of historical struggles between dark aborigines and Arya conquerors turn out to be misleading.... The hymns neither use language or race as markers of ethnic affiliation, nor refer (explicitly) to a home outside South Asia. ... Instead of such traits, it is adherence to social and religious norms which were required of *āryas*.” (1994)
- **H.H. Hock:** “Closer examination suggests an alternative interpretation of the terms ‘black’ or ‘dark’ as referring to the dark world of the *dāsas* / *dasyus* in contrast with the light world of the *āryas*, an interpretation which is in perfect agreement with the contrast between good / light and evil / dark forces that pervades the Vedas (and has parallels in many, perhaps most other traditions around the world). ... The evidence of the Rig-Vedic passages just examined thus does not establish a difference in race or phenotype between *āryas* and *dāsas* / *dasyus*.” (2005)


- The word *anāsa* occurs only once (5.29.10) in the Rig-Veda. It has been interpreted as stub-nosed (*a-nāsa*, according to Max Müller), and seen as a reference to South Indians, or as “mouthless” (*an-āsa*, according to the Vedic commentator Sāyana). The second meaning is more consistent with depictions of Dasyus as those who do not utter mantras correctly (*mrdhravācah*). The difference between *ārya* and *dasyu* in the Rig-Veda is cultural, as most scholars now accept. In any case, South Indians are neither “noseless” nor “stub-nosed”.
- The Dasyus’ so-called *purs* have been variously interpreted as massive stone fortresses or cities (T. Burrow) or as small temporary circular structures made of palisades, mud and stones (H. Zimmer, W. Rau). Neither view works: gods (Agni, Maruts) and rivers (Sarasvati) are also invoked as *purs*, and the Aryans also have *purs*.
- A.A. Macdonell & A.B. Keith: “[*Pur* is] probably only metaphorical” (*Vedic Index*). Erdosy: “It is clear that the ‘forts’ belong to the realm of mythology.” Nicholas Kazanas: “[*Pur* refers to] a supernatural, occult or magical protective force or field.”
- In summary, the Rig-Veda does not support forced colonial and racial readings of “dark-skinned”, “stub-nosed” aborigines living in “forts”.

Tamil Sangam literature (first centuries BCE/CE)

- The earliest Tamil literature goes back to 200 or 300 BCE according to some scholars; 100 CE according to others. We would expect it to have mythologized a clash with incoming Aryans and a southward migration.
- There is no reference to either event. T.R. Sessa Iyengar : “In the oldest extant Tamil classics there are no traditions pointing to a home outside the Tamilakam [Tamil land].” (1925)
- On the other hand, Tamil Sangam poems and texts often praise Vedic and classical Hindu gods and goddesses, the Vedas, the chanting of Vedic hymns, Vedic sacrifices, fire rituals, etc. For instance, the *Puranānūru*, one of the oldest collections, invokes Shiva, Vishnu, Lakshmi (Tiru or Shrī), and mentions Indra, Arundhatī, the Pāndavas and the Kauravas, Rāma and Sītā.
- K.A. Nilakanta Sastri: “There does not exist a single line of Tamil literature written before the Tamils came into contact with, and let us add accepted with genuine appreciation, the Indo-Aryan culture of North Indian origin.” This would hardly be the case if the two cultures had clashed brutally as the result of an Aryan invasion.

2. Geography, Ocean and Rivers

- The *Rig-Veda* has numerous references to the ocean (*samudra*), ships, sailing, storms, waves, “treasures of the ocean”, pearls, shell, etc. Bhujyu is repeatedly mentioned as having been saved by the Ashvins from a storm at sea. Such an intimacy with the sea seems incompatible with recent immigrants from Central Asia.
- The *Rig-Veda*’s geography is the *Saptasindhava*: the Indus, its five tributaries, and the Sarasvatī. It also knows *Irina*, identified with the Rann of Kachchh. Such an extensive geography is also not easily compatible with what a few nomadic tribes entering the subcontinent a couple of centuries earlier would be familiar with.




(Map by Michel Danino)

- The *Saptasindhava* based on the *Nadistuti Sūkta*. Why should immigrating Aryans list rivers from east to west?
- Why should they praise the Sarasvatī as a river flowing “from the mountain to the sea” when it had dried up by 1900 BCE? (see Module on Sarasvati River)

3. Archaeology

(Map by Michel Danino)



Mature Harappan (urban) phase: 2600–1900 BCE, about 1 million km², over 1,200 sites. Note the density of sites in the Sarasvati basin (see Module on Sarasvati River).

Decline of the Urban Order

By 1900 BCE, most of the Harappan cities ceased to be functional; some were abandoned while others reverted to a rural lifestyle, with no planning or standardization. The following factors have been suggested as having contributed to the decline of the urban order:

- **Invasions?** Now discounted, see further below.
- **Geographical overstretch?** May have contributed to instability.
- **Economic decline?** Trade with Mesopotamia ends around 2000 BCE.
- **A great drought from 2200 BCE** (see Module on Sarasvati River), which may have strained agricultural resources.
- **Overuse of resources?** The Harappans may have accelerated the region's ecological degradation through deforestation: their brick, copper, seal, stone-bead industries required huge quantities of firewood; much fodder was also extracted for their cattle.
- **Drying-up of the Sarasvatī** around 1900 BCE (see Module on Sarasvati River).

Mortimer Wheeler and Mohenjo-daro's skeletons



Mortimer Wheeler, then director general of Archaeological Survey of India, spoke of a “final massacre” at Mohenjo-daro, basing himself on 33 skeletons found in a few streets: “Indra stands accused.” (1947)

(Photos courtesy ASI)



But ...

- **U.S. archaeologist George Dales in 1964 called Wheeler's thesis a "mythical massacre" and showed that the skeletons probably did not belong to the same epoch (the Indian archaeologist B.B. Lal raised the same objection). Dales proposed they were the result of a "sloppy burial". He asked, "Where are the burned fortresses, the arrowheads, weapons, pieces of armor, the smashed chariots and bodies of the invaders and defenders?"**
- **In the 1980s, U.S. bioanthropologist Kenneth A.R. Kennedy found that most of the so-called "injuries" either were the result of post-mortem erosion or had actually healed well before death.**
- **The Indian archaeologist S.P. Gupta proposed that "they were victims of repeated floods which the city experienced from the Indus. They belonged to different periods of time and they are found embedded in silt and clay." (1999)**
- **The skeletons have nothing to do with a "final massacre" by invading Aryans; Wheeler's theory is now abandoned (although some history textbooks still swear by it).**

Is there any evidence of the arrival of a new material culture around 1500 BCE?

- **Jim G. Shaffer: “Current archaeological data do not support the existence of an Indo-Aryan or European invasion into South Asia any time in the pre- or protohistoric periods.” (1984)**
- **J.-F. Jarrige: “Nothing, in the present state of archaeological research ... enables us to reconstruct convincingly invasions that could be clearly attributed to Aryan groups.” (1995)**
- **B.B. Lal: There is no “evidence of ‘invaders,’ represented either by weapons of warfare or even of cultural remains left by them.” (1997)**
- **J.M. Kenoyer: There is no “archaeological ... evidence for invasions or mass migrations into the Indus Valley between the end of the Harappan Phase, about 1900 B.C. and the beginning of the Early Historic period around 600 B.C.” (1998)**
- **Dilip K. Chakrabarti: “A purely archaeological history of the subcontinent can be written without reference to the idea of Aryan invasions.” (2006)**
- **The time gap between 1900 (end of Indus civilization) and 1500 BCE (supposed arrival of the Aryans) shows that, in any case, the latter could not have been the cause of the Harappan decline.**



(courtesy J.M. Kenoyer)

The Late Harappan Phase or Localization Era saw many regional cultures of a rural nature, some of which have been tentatively associated with incoming Aryans.



(courtesy ASI)

For instance, the Cemetery H culture (*left: motifs on pottery*) first identified at Harappa:


- V. Gordon Childe: the Cemetery H intruders “may belong to the Aryan invaders” (1934).
- D.D. Kosambi: Cemetery H culture is “undoubtedly Aryan” (1962).
- B. & R. Allchin felt “tempted to associate [Cemetery H pottery] with the arrival of Indo–Aryans.” (1982)
- D.N. Jha: “Cemetery H ... is believed to have belonged to an alien people who destroyed the older Harappa”; he identifies those “aliens” as Aryan “barbarians”. (1998)
- So is Cemetery H an “Aryan” culture?

But ...

- **Typical Cemetery H designs — bulls, gazelles, peacocks and pipal leaves, stars and fishes, etc. — are actually classic Mature motifs; they are not innovations. “The painted decoration ... shows overwhelming craft continuity with that of the preceding period” (B. & R. Allchin, 1982)**
- **Cemetery H culture “may reflect only a change in the focus of settlement organization from that which was the pattern of the earlier Harappan phase and not cultural discontinuity, urban decay, invading aliens, or site abandonment, all of which have been suggested in the past” (J.M. Kenoyer, 1991). “The Punjab Late Harappan (Cemetery H) shows continuity from the Mature Harappan” (M. Rafique Mughal, 1992).**
- **Thus, if the Cemetery H culture is “Aryan”, so is the preceding Mature phase.**

- It was similarly proposed that the Jhukar culture (parts of Sindh and Baluchistan), the Gandhara Grave culture (northwest Pakistan) or the Pirak culture (plains of Baluchistan) were the relics of the arrival of the Aryans. But as with Cemetery H, recent research has shown those cultures to be in continuity with the preceding Mature phase. Archaeological evidence runs against a cultural break that the arrival of a new people would have caused.
- Various other post-Harappan cultures outside the subcontinent (see next slide) have been assumed to be “Aryan”, with no agreement among scholars.
- The real question is, How to materially define and identify an “Aryan culture”? The choice of criteria is arbitrary.
- French archaeologist J.-M. Casal: “Until now, Aryans have eluded all archaeological definition. So far, no type of artefact, no class of pottery has been discovered that would enable us to say: “Aryans came this way; here is a typically Aryan sword or goblet!’ ” (1969)

(courtesy Wikipedia)



A few cultures have been associated by various scholars with Indo-European migrations, with no consensus. (BMAC = Bactria-Margiana Archaeological Complex, an urban culture dated c. 2100–1500 BCE).

The horse issue: the argument

- The Rig-Veda constantly invokes *ashva*, the horse, horse-drawn chariots, etc. The horse is “central to Vedic culture” (R.S. Sharma) and is supposed to have been brought into the subcontinent by the invading / migrating Aryans. (*Below: fanciful depictions in textbooks used in Tamil Nadu of Aryans entering the subcontinent or — right — Indus cities in horse-drawn carts.*)
- However, no horse remains were found in Indus cities and the horse is never depicted in Harappan art.
- Therefore Harappan culture cannot be Vedic.



However, at least 12 Harappan sites (also a few Neolithic and pre-Harappan sites) have yielded remains of horse bones and teeth according to experienced archaeozoologists.

Right: Bone remains of the domesticated horse from Surkotada (Gujarat); these and a few teeth were identified as such by the Indian archaeologist A.K. Sharma and confirmed by the late Hungarian archaeozoologist Sándor Bökönyi, an authority on the prehistory of the horse.



(Courtesy ASI)

Mortimer Wheeler: “The bones of a horse occur at a high level at Mohenjodaro, and from the earliest (doubtless pre-Harappan) layer at Rana Ghundai in northern Baluchistan both horse and ass are recorded. It is likely enough that camel, horse and ass were in fact all a familiar feature of the Indus caravans.” (1968)



(Above) Figurine from Lothal: opinions are divided, but note the bushy tail.

(Right) Statuette of a horse at Mohenjo-daro, identified as such by Ernest Mackay (1930s).

It is true that the horse is not depicted on Harappan seals. But nor are the lion, the cow, the camel, the wolf, the cat, the jackal, all of which were known to the Harappans: non-depiction is a cultural choice, not a proof of non-existence.

(Courtesy ASI)



Methodological issues with the argument

- In the Aryan scenario, we should see an increase of horse remains and depictions after 1500 BCE. However, many early historical sites have yielded few or no horse remains; a few clear horse figurines do appear (at Pirak, Hastinapura and Atranjikhhera), but the horse is rarely depicted in India until the Mauryan age. There is no radical change between pre-1500 and post-1500 BCE.
- In the Rig Veda, the adversaries (*dasyus* and *panis*) also have “horses” (e.g., 1.83.4, 3.34.9, 4.28.5, 7.18.19, 10.108). If the horse is taken as a cultural marker, it should also be accepted as a marker for the Aryans’ adversaries. The equation horse = Aryan is invalid.
- In Vedic hymns to the dawn, Ushas is praised as “*gomati ashvavati*”— literally “full of cows and horses”. Sri Aurobindo (c. 1915): *ashva* often does not refer to the animal, but is used as a metaphor for energy and speed, just as *go* (cow) is often a metaphor for “light”: Ushas is thus “full of light (*go*) and energy (*asva*)”. If so, the horse *as an animal* is not “central to Vedic culture”.
- We need to “stop thinking of the Rig Veda as a garbled history book” (E. Leach) and look at it afresh.

- **British anthropologist Edmund Leach: “The prominent place given to horses and chariots in the Rig Veda ... , if anything, suggests that in the real society (as opposed to its mythological counterpart), horses and chariots were a rarity, ownership of which was a mark of aristocratic or kingly distinction.” (1990)**
- **If the horse was a “rarity”, then the Harappan civilization cannot be excluded from candidates to a Vedic culture on grounds of the horse argument alone.**


4. Cultural Break or Continuum?

The Harappan legacy

- **With the fading away of the Harappan civilization, urbanism seems to disappear; seals and script fall into disuse; long-distance trade networks break down.**
- **In the Aryan paradigm, the Ganga-Vindhya civilization was seen as completely disconnected from the Harappan, with a “Dark Age” or “Vedic Night” separating them.**
- **Recent archaeological evidence has however led to a growing perception of a substantial Harappan legacy, both tangible and intangible. The following slides offer a brief review of some aspects of the Harappan legacy.**


Urbanism and Architecture

A large Harappan house, with rooms centred around a yard: this design will become common in rural India, up to present times. (ASI)







Wells with trapezoid bricks (to prevent inward collapse) will survive in the Ganges plains, although the technique of terracotta rings will become more widespread. (Courtesy J.M. Kenoyer)



1


2

The concept of auspicious proportions: Mohenjo-daro's acropolis, with a length double the breadth.
(Courtesy M. Jansen)



Proportions in Mohenjo-daro's acropolis: non-utilitarian in nature, they must have had a cultural value of auspiciousness.


(Adapted from ASI plans)



A major building in Mohenjo-daro's lower town. (Adapted from ASI)

**Dimensions:
18.9 x 15.3 m
ratio = 1.24
(or 5:4 within 0.9%)**


(Courtesy J.M. Kenoyer)




The same 5:4 ratio in Harappa's so-called "granary": 51.2 x 40.8 m (= 1.255).
Individual chambers follow a precise ratio of 5:2.

DHOLAVIRA : HARAPPAN CITY
1990 - 98

50 0 50 100 meters



Dholavira in the Rann of Kachchh: all major structures follow simple ratios (study by R.S. Bisht; M. Danino).




Most Harappan structures follow simple ratios : a deliberate choice, not a random distribution.

(Research & graph by M. Danino)



$$\frac{30}{24} = 1.25$$

The *mahāvedi* connecting earth and heaven: an “increase” of 1.25 or 5:4, a ratio widely used by the Harappans too (see previous slides).



Possible continuity with *Vāstu-Vidya* of classical times

- **Varāhamihira:** “The length of a king’s palace is greater than the breadth by a quarter [$1 + 1/4 = 5:4$].... The length of the house of a commander-in-chief exceeds the width by a sixth [$1 + 1/6 = 7:6$].” (Chapter 53 of *Brhat Samhitā*). These are the proportions of Dholavira’s “Castle” and “Middle Town” respectively. Coincidence or legacy?
- ***Mānasāra*,** a text of Hindu architecture, specifies that “the length of the mansion [to be built] should be ascertained by commencing with its breadth, or increasing it by one-fourth [$5:4$], one-half [$3:2$], three-fourth [$7:4$], or making it twice [$2:1$], or greater than twice by one-fourth [$9:4$], one-half [$5:2$] or three-fourths [$11:4$], or making it three times [$3:1$].” (35.18-20) All these ratios are found at Dholavira and other Harappan settlements.
- **Other transmissions in town-planning:** fortifications (detailed study by Piotr Eltsov), sanitation (partly), some construction techniques.

Metrology




(Courtesy ASI)

- Lothal's measuring scale (*above*, 27 graduation lines spanning 46mm): 1 unit = 1.77 mm. Metrologist V. Mainkar: 10 Lothal units come close to the value of the *angula* in *Arthashastra*, 1.778 cm in his estimate (1984).
- Mohan Pant & Shuji Funo, studying dimensions of cluster blocks at Mohenjo-daro, Sirkap (Taxila) and later historical towns, proposed an *angula* of 1.78 cm (2005).
- A rough terracotta scale at Kalibangan yielded a unit of 1.75 cm (R. Balasubramaniam & J.P. Joshi, 2008).
- M. Danino's independent calculations at Dholavira pointed to an *angula* of 1.76 cm (2008).
- A continuous tradition of metrology? (However, scale-like objects at Mohenjo-daro and Harappa do not fit in this system.)

The Harappan standardized weight system

- A first sequence growing in geometric progression:
1 (= 0.86 g), 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64
- A second sequence consisting of multiples of the previous series:
160, 200, 320, 640, 1,600, 3,200, 6,400, 8,000, 12,800.



- **John E. Mitchiner compared Harappan and traditional Indian weights and found they followed the same pattern (1978):**

Harappan Weights							
Unity	1	2	4	8	16	32	64
Value in grams	0.8525	1.705	3.41	6.82	13.64	27.28	54.56
Traditional Indian Weights							
'Rattis'	8	16	32	64	128	256	512
'Karshas'	1	2	4	8	16		
Value in grams	0.8375	1.675	3.35	6.70	13.40	26.80	53.60

- **Measuring thousands of punch-marked coins from Taxila, D.D. Kosambi found “every likelihood of the earlier Taxila hoard being weighed on much the same kind of balances and by much the same sort of weights, as at Mohenjo-daro some two thousand years earlier” (1941).**
- **The Harappan origin of India’s traditional weights is accepted by many archaeologists.**

(Courtesy ASI)




Traditional ornaments such as bangles or anklets were used in the Indus civilization. (Above) Fragment of a bronze figurine, Mohenjo-daro. (Right) The “dancing girl,” bronze figurine from Mohenjo-daro.



(Above) Figurine from Nausharo (2800 BCE) with *sindūr* (vermilion) at the parting of the hair, a living tradition in India.

(Courtesy ASI)



(adapted from J.M. Kenoyer)

(Left) Gamesmen from Lothal: a possible ancestor of the game of chess, according to S.R. Rao.

(Above) Modern-looking dice from Harappa.

(Right) Conch shell used for trumpeting, with its tip sawn off.
(Bottom) Conch shell with its mouth cut open, probably used to pour libations (note the incised grooves filled with red pigment, suggesting a ritual use). These two objects are still in use for the same purposes.



(adapted from J.M. Kenoyer)



(Courtesy ASI)



Agriculture


Harappan agriculture was largely dependent on barley and wheat. Harappans also grew rice at a few sites, pulses, millets and various vegetables, and domesticated cattle, sheep, goats and fowls.

Kalibangan: (Above) A field with perpendicular furrows, c. 2800 BCE. (Right) A nearby field in the 1960s, with a similar pattern. This is an effective intercropping system for winter crops, with taller plants in the long north-south furrows and shorter crops in the east-west furrows. An at least 4,800-year-long tradition!



Iconography

There is a strong case for considerable legacy in iconography: symbols, designs, art styles and conventions, etc. A few examples.



The “endless knot” on a Mohenjo-daro copper plate (*left*, ASI), in a Gujarati inscription (Dhruva II of Gujarat Rashtrakuta dynasty, 884 CE, *centre*, from H. Sarkar & B.M. Pande), and at Fatehpur Sikri (1569-1584 CE, *right*, from R.S. Bisht). Whether the symbol was one of royalty in Harappan times, as it was later, is unknown, but the transmission seems clear.



The *swastika* was depicted on numerous tablets (*left*) and is found on Painted Grey Ware (*right*, c.1000 BCE). It will become a sacred symbol in Hinduism, Buddhism and Jainism.



A tree on a raised platform on an Harappan tablet (*left*). The iconography survives on punch-marked coins (*right*, c. 500 BCE).

Tree motif on punch-marked coins



(Images on left courtesy J.M. Kenoyer; motifs on right adapted from ASI)

(Courtesy ASI)




(Left) The “Pashupati” seal:

- Three faces / heads, a classic motif in Hindu-Buddhist iconography.
- Yogic posture (*mūlabandhāsana* in later terminology).
- Seated on a platform with two antelopes beneath.

(Right) A statue of Buddha (Ajanta Caves) seated on a platform with two deer beneath, suggestive of iconographic legacy.



(photo M. Danino)



Decorated arches: (top left) a deity standing below an arch on a Harappan tablet; (top centre) standing Shiva below an arch of fire.

Note the pipal leaves (green circles, also right): the pipal (*ashvattha* in Sanskrit, *Ficus religiosa*) was revered by the Harappans; it is also a sacred tree in the Rig-Veda and often depicted in classical Indian art.





Mother goddess
(terracotta from Harappa, c. 2600 BC)



Mother goddess
(terracotta,
Mathura style,
c. 200 BC)

Both styles of mother-goddess figurines depict a headdress of huge flowers, big ear-rings, necklace, pendant, belt. (The main difference is the loss of lateral cups connected to the head, which with Harappan figurines served as oil lamps, and the fan-like top.)

Religion

(courtesy J.M. Kenoyer)




**(Top) A *linga* from Kalibangan. (ASI)
(Right) A broken seal depicting a trident or *trishūla*.**


These two images not only point to iconographic legacy, but also suggest Harappan roots of later Indian religions, as noted by many scholars.



(courtesy J.M. Kenoyer)



**A terracotta tablet depicting the ritual slaying of a buffalo:
an antecedent of Durga as Mahishasuramardini?**



(Courtesy M. Jansen)

Mohenjo-daro's Great Bath: a king's pleasure bath or a *pushkarini* (D.D. Kosambi) for purificatory rituals?

(photos courtesy ASI)



The above structure at Lothal (Gujarat) was located in a street; it is too large for cooking purposes (at 2.7 m square); the large jar suggests offerings. The apsidal structure at Banawali (Haryana, *right*) housed an apsidal altar “full of fine loose ash” (R.S. Bisht); fire worship seems the best explanation for it. Neither structure contained bones, which would be expected from regular cooking or animal sacrifice.

The existence of fire altars in the Indus-Sarasvati civilization has been regarded as controversial as it is suggestive of Vedic culture. Yet the evidence at several sites is substantial.



(Right) Seven hearths in a row in the upper town of Kalibangan (Rajasthan), containing ash and charcoal. They were identified as fire altars by excavator B.B. Lal and accepted as such by Raymond Allchin. (ASI)



(courtesy ASI)



(courtesy V.H. Sonawane)

Fire altars at Vagad, Saurashtra, according to excavator V.H. Sonawane.



Archaeologists have interpreted such figurines as evidence for some Harappan practice of “yoga”. The so-called “priest-king” (*below right*) is depicted in contemplation. (Note also the cloth thrown over the left shoulder and the bead holders in the middle of the forehead and on the right arm.)



Summary of the Harappan legacy

- **Transmission of concepts and practices of urbanism, technologies and crafts.**
- **Survival of symbols and iconographic motifs, ornaments, etc.**
- **Many aspects common to popular Hinduism: tree worship (including the pipal tree), mother-goddess worship, animal sacrifice, etc.**
- **Probable presence of fire worship (in the Sarasvati region and Gujarat).**
- **Possible *linga* worship.**
- **Hints to a tradition of yoga and meditation.**

A cultural continuum

- **John Marshall:** “The [Harappan] religion is so characteristically Indian as hardly to be distinguished from still living Hinduism.” (1931)
- **Jim Shaffer:** “The previous concept of a ‘Dark Age’ in South Asian archaeology is no longer valid.” (1992)
- **Jean-François Jarrige:** “This famous vacuum that was sometimes called Vedic night ... has been filling up more and more thanks to numerous findings. ... [The transition is best understood] within the framework of a continuity with the preceding millennia, without any radical break of the sort too often proposed earlier.” (1995)
- **Jonathan M. Kenoyer:** “Current studies of the transition between the two early urban civilizations claim that there was no significant break or hiatus.” (1998)
- **The Harappan cities disappear but the culture lives on, some of it transmitted to the Ganges civilization of the 1st millennium BCE.**

5. Bioanthropology & Genetics

Despite early warnings, considerable confusion between race and language has been a hallmark of the Aryan theory. This confusion has been especially persistent in India and is still found in textbooks.

- **British archaeologist Isaac Taylor rejected this association and found the theory of a single Aryan migration out of Asia “extremely shadowy ... [resting] on no solid grounds whatever.” (1890)**
- **French archaeologist Salomon Reinach : “To speak of an Aryan race existing three thousand years ago is to put forward a gratuitous hypothesis; to speak of it as though it still existed today is quite simply to talk nonsense.” (1892)**
- **Yet in India, colonial ethnology set about dividing “native” populations into imaginary “races” — 43 of them described by H.H. Risley for the 1901 Census of India. Tribals and some low castes were said to be “aboriginals”, while higher castes were assumed to be relics of the Aryan race. In the 20th century (and especially after World War II), bioanthropology rejected all such classifications.**


- **Indian sociologist Bhupendra Nath Datta: “We have no right to identify the Vedic Aryans with a particular biotype.” (1936)**
- **U.S. anthropologist Franz Boas: “Anatomical type, language and culture have not necessarily the same fates; ... a people may remain constant in type and language, and change in culture; ... it may remain constant in type, but change in language; or ... it may remain constant in language, and change in type and culture. ... The assumption that a certain definite people whose members have always been related by blood must have been the carriers of this [Aryan] language throughout history; and the other assumption, that a certain cultural type must have always belonged to peoples speaking Aryan languages are purely arbitrary ones, and not in accord with the observed facts.” (1938)**
- **U.S. anthropologist Ashley Montagu: “The term ‘race’ itself, as it is generally applied to man, is scientifically without justification and ... as commonly used the term corresponds to nothing in reality. ... Let us be human beings first and put the dangerous myth of ‘race’ in its proper place in the Museum of Ugly Human Errors.” (1942)**

Recent research based on studies of hundreds of skeletons

- **Indian anthropologist Pratap C. Dutta found “a genetic continuum between the Harappans and the present-day people of the region.” (1984) In other words, Harappans were the ancestors of today’s Haryanvis, Punjabis, Rajasthanis, Sindhis and Gujaratis.**
- **U.S. bioanthropologist Kenneth A.R. Kennedy: “Biological anthropologists remain unable to lend support to any of the theories concerning an Aryan biological or demographic entity. ... All prehistoric human remains recovered thus far from the Indian subcontinent are phenotypically identifiable as ancient South Asians. ... In short, there is no evidence of demographic disruptions in the north-western sector of the subcontinent during and immediately after the decline of the Harappan culture.” (1995)**
- **Brian Hemphill & John Lukacs (1991, 1997) found two discontinuities in the populations of the western and northern fringes of the Indus Valley: “The first occurs between 6000 and 4500 BC... [with] another discontinuity at some point after 800 BC but before 200 BC.” A biological continuity from 4500 to 800 BCE leaves no room for any mass immigration around 1500 BCE.**

Archaeogenetics or genetics of ancient populations is a relatively new discipline, based on the study of Y-DNA (transmitted from father to son) and mtDNA or mitochondrial DNA (transmitted by the mother alone). DNA molecules undergo random mutations, which are transmitted to descendants. Genetics cannot define “races”, only “haplogroups” of people having common sets of genetic mutations. It can measure the genetic proximity or distance between ethnic groups (roughly, by how many or how few genetic mutations they share).

- **After Africa, the Indian subcontinent has the greatest genetic diversity in the world. The first genetic studies (in the 1990s) found “evidence” of an Indo-Aryan immigration, but this was simply circular evidence: the migration theory was accepted in the first place. (A few recent studies dividing Ancestral North Indians and Ancestral South Indians are based on the same circularity.)**
- **A 2003 study (next slide) showed the complexity of Indian populations: one of those nearest to Central Asia (from where the Aryans are supposed to have come) is the Chenchus, Dravidian-speaking tribals from Andhra Pradesh. Punjabis and Konkani Brahmins should have been close to Central Asia, but are distant.**



Genetic distances between eight Indian and seven western Eurasian populations, calculated for 16 Y-DNA haplogroups

(adapted from T. Kivisild et al., "The Genetic Heritage of the Earliest Settlers Persists Both in Indian Tribal and Caste Populations").

- **Toomas Kivisild et al.: “We believe that there are now enough reasons not only to question a ‘recent Indo-Aryan invasion’ into India some 4000 BP, but alternatively to consider India as a part of the common gene pool ancestral to the diversity of human maternal lineages in Europe.” (2000)**
- **“The Indian mtDNA tree in general [is] not subdivided according to linguistic (Indo-European, Dravidian) or caste affiliations. ... [There is] a lack of clear distinction between Indian castes and tribes.” (2003) This important observation runs against the Aryan scenario.**
- **Mait Metspalu et al.: “Language families present today in India, such as Indo-European, Dravidic and Austro-Asiatic, are all much younger than the majority of indigenous mtDNA lineages found among their present-day speakers at high frequencies. It would make it highly speculative to infer, from the extant mtDNA pools of their speakers, whether one of the listed above linguistically defined group in India should be considered more ‘autochthonous’ than any other in respect of its presence in the subcontinent.” (2004)**

	North castes	South castes	Reduced tribes	NE-E tribes	Turkey	Central Asia	Mongols /Buryats	SE Asia	Iran	Iraq	East Europe	Russia	West Europe
North castes	0.00												
South castes	0.07	0.00											
Reduced tribes	0.06	0.05	0.00										
NE-E tribes	0.21	0.20	0.19	0.00									
Turkey	0.11	0.14	0.13	0.21	0.00								
Central Asia	0.07	0.12	0.10	0.19	0.05	0.00							
Mongols/Buryats	0.26	0.27	0.26	0.32	0.21	0.12	0.00						
Southeast Asia	0.26	0.27	0.26	0.21	0.22	0.19	0.30	0.00					
Iran	0.09	0.12	0.11	0.22	0.01	0.06	0.24	0.24	0.00				
Iraq	0.16	0.19	0.17	0.26	0.04	0.10	0.27	0.27	0.02	0.00			
East Europe	0.08	0.23	0.19	0.33	0.16	0.11	0.34	0.34	0.18	0.23	0.00		
Russia	0.08	0.20	0.16	0.29	0.11	0.06	0.28	0.30	0.13	0.18	0.03	0.00	
West Europe	0.26	0.29	0.25	0.35	0.14	0.17	0.36	0.36	0.22	0.23	0.28	0.19	0.00

Genetic distances between populations estimated from Y-haplogroup frequencies
 (from Sanghamitra Sahoo et al., "A prehistory of Indian Y chromosomes: Evaluating demic diffusion scenarios")

- The above 2006 study by Sanghamitra Sahoo et al. confirms the genetic proximity between castes in north and south India, also between castes and tribes: "The caste populations of 'north' and 'south' India are not particularly more closely related to each other than they are to the tribal groups ... Southern castes and tribals are very similar to each other in their Ychromosomal haplogroup compositions. ... It was not possible to confirm any of the purported differentiations between the caste and tribal pools."
- The study also found "overwhelming support for an Indian origin of Dravidian speakers".

- **Several more studies have reached similar conclusions, ruling out a major addition to the Indian gene pool in the 2nd millennium BCE and thus negating the old invasion theory.**
- **The colonial concept of *ādivāsi* (original inhabitant) is rooted in discredited 19th-century race theories and has no scientific basis. As of now, genetics cannot determine which Indian populations are “*ādi*”. Most of them appear to have been settled in the subcontinent for 50,000 years or more.**
- **Similarly, the colonial concepts of an “Aryan race” or a “Dravidian race” have no scientific foundation.**
- **Skin colour, in particular, is not an indication of “race”. It is caused by melanin, a pigment which, all over the world, increases in latitudes closer to the tropics or equator so as to protect the skin from increased sunlight (e.g., an Italian has a darker skin than a Swede; a Mexican than a Canadian).**
- **Archaeogenetics is a fast evolving discipline, so caution is required.**

6. Archaeoastronomy

Archaeoastronomy is the study of astronomy in ancient cultures. Because of the precession of equinoxes (a spin-top motion of the earth's axis which shifts the equinoctial points westward along the ecliptic by 1° in about 72 years; 25,800 years for a full rotation), the celestial longitudes of constellations observed, say, 3,000 years ago, have shifted by $3,000 / 72 = 42^\circ$ today. For over 200 years, scholars have used this “clock” to date astronomical configurations in ancient Indian texts. A few examples:


- **The Indian scholar and freedom-fighter Bal Gangadhar Tilak and the German Indologist Hermann Jacobi independently interpreted in 1893 certain Rig-Vedic hymns as referring to the vernal (spring) equinox in the *nakshatra** *Mrigashīrsha* (part of Orion) and the start of the rainy season in *Phalgunī* (a double-star constellation in Leo): this points to a time between 4500 and 3500 BCE.**
- **Jacobi also pointed out that the Polestar referred to in *Grihya Sūtras* cannot be today's Polestar: the texts date to about 500 BCE and because of the precession, there was no Polestar then. They must have preserved a memory of the previous Polestar, Alpha Draconis, pointing to about 2800 BCE. (Recently R.N. Iyengar, analyzing the Dhruva myth, reached the same conclusion.)**

* See next slide.

- The Yajur-Veda lists 27 *nakshatras* (or lunar mansions mapping the Moon's path seen from the Earth). It begins with *Krittikā* (Pleiades); the *Shatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, a Vedic commentary, states that *Krittikā* “does not deviate from the east ... all other *nakshatras* do”, which points to 2400–2900 BCE. (By the time of the *Sūrya Siddhānta* in the classical period, *Krittikā* has moved to the 3rd position in the list of *nakshatras*.)
- India's oldest text of astronomy, the *Vedāṅga Jyotiṣa*, deals mostly with time division and calendar making. It records the location of the summer and winter solstices in the middle of the *nakshatra Āshleshā* (in Hydrae) and the beginning of *Dhanishthā* (in Delphinus): this points to about 1400 BCE.
- More such references have been proposed, all of them pointing to a high antiquity incompatible with a composition of the Rig-Veda around 1200 BCE as demanded by the Aryan scenario. The counter-argument has been either to dismiss these references as meaningless (yet they are precise and present a consistent picture), or to suggest that the Vedic texts somehow preserved the memory of much more ancient astronomical events — but why, then, could they not also record contemporary events of 1200–800 BCE?

7. Linguistics


(Right) Map of India's linguistic families, dominated by the Indo-European (IE) and the Dravidian. The former's origins and evolution were extensively studied by linguists in the 19th century, leading to the reconstruction of a "Proto-Indo-European" language (PIE).



Indo-European Language Tree

Part 1: Centum Languages

Languages marked with a dagger (†) are extinct




The “western” part of the Indo-European family. (Courtesy D.M. Short)

Indo-European Language Tree

Part 2: Satem Languages

Languages marked with a dagger (†) are extinct




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The “eastern” part of the Indo-European family. The “family tree” thus has 11 main branches. (Courtesy D.M. Short)

Too many *Urheimats*

- Most linguistic theories assumed that PIE was spoken by a defined people (“Proto-Indo-Europeans”) in a defined homeland (*Urheimat* in German). However, linguists have been unable to agree on the homeland’s location. Over 20 of them were proposed at different times, from the Baltic region to Bactria in central Asia. A few recent theories:
 - Northern Europe (Lothar Kilian)
 - Central Europe (Igor Diakonov, Pedro Bosch-Gimpera)
 - The Uralic-Volgan steppes of southern Russia (Marijas Gimbutas, J.P. Mallory)
 - Various parts of Anatolia (Colin Renfrew, Aron Dolgopolsky, Thomas V. Gamkrelidze, Vjaceslav V. Ivanov)
 - Bactria (Johanna Nichols)
- Such wide divergence does not inspire confidence. U.S. Indologist Edwin Bryant: “The minute one tries to further narrow this vast Indo-European-speaking area, one enters the quagmire of speculation and disagreement that has been characteristic of the Indo-European homeland quest since its inception.” (2001)



(Map courtesy Wikipedia)

Marija Gimbutas's Kurgan hypothesis. However the actual migrations in Europe have been archaeologically disputed, as the evidence for them is meagre.



Colin Renfrew's Anatolian hypothesis associates the spread of IE languages with the spread of agriculture: it has been extensively disputed; among other reasons, agriculture has multiple origins.

The issue of PIE's date

- **Dominant theories propose about 4000 BCE for PIE's date. But.**
- **Sanskritist Thomas Burrow: “We have already remarked on the deep divergences between the various European members of the family, and this can only be accounted for by pushing back the period of original division to a period much earlier than is usually assumed.” (1955)**
- **One recent model by New Zealand scholars Russell Gray et Quentin Atkinson, based on a genetic view of language evolution, argues in favour of an early dispersal of PIE out of Anatolia from c. 7000 BCE.**
- **Australian linguist R.M.W. Dixon: “Why couldn't proto-Indo-European have been spoken about 10,500 years ago? ... Surely the only really honest answer to questions about dating a proto-language is ‘We don't know’. The received opinion of a date of around 6000 bp [Before Present] for proto-Indo-European — with dates for other proto-languages being calibrated on this scale — is an ingrained one. ... Yet it does seem to be a house of cards.” (1997)**
- **British linguist James Clackson: “The Indo-Europeanist's data and method do not allow the question ‘When was PIE spoken?’ to be answered in any really meaningful or helpful way.” (2000)**

Underlying theoretical issues of IE linguistics

- Linguist Johannes Schmidt (19th century) proposed a “wave model” of linguistics as a substitute for the mainstream “tree model”.
- N.S. Trubetskoy, a founder of modern linguistics, proposed a model based on convergence, rather than divergence as implied in the tree model: “The homeland, the race and the culture of a supposed Proto-Indo-European population has been discussed, a population which may possibly never have existed. ... The idea of an Indo-European protolanguage is not absurd, but it is not necessary, and we can do very well without it.” (1930s)
- Linguist Ernst Pulgram: “It must be conceded that such a reconstruction [of PIE] is something of a fiction ... The uniformity which reconstructed Proto-Indo-European exhibits is not representative of a reality.” (1959)
- Italian linguist Angela Marcantonio: “Data contradicting the IE theory ... are ignored, minimalized, or justified at any cost ... It is time to call into question the validity of the IE theory, because ... it has not been scientifically founded — contrary to common belief.” (2013)

- **U.S. Linguist Johanna Nichols “suggests that language spreads are not mainly the results of migration, but involve a substantial amount of language shift”: “... no major migrations are required to explain the distribution of IE languages at any stage in their history up to the colonial period of the last few centuries ... The locus of the IE spread was ... somewhere in the vicinity of ancient Bactria-Sogdiana.” (1997)**
- **James Clackson: “... the potential pitfalls for any attempt to relate the Indo-European languages to pre-historic objects and events, and to locate pre-historic movements or migrations of peoples. The reconstructed proto-language is far too removed from actual spoken languages of the type we are familiar with to make that possible. ... From the linguistic data alone, without taking into account the evidence of archaeology or early texts, it is not possible to draw definite conclusions about the homeland of the speakers or Proto-Indo-European, or even the age of the language family. The Indo-European model, as a model of language relationships and of linguistic descent, tells us nothing certain about the origin of the Indic civilization.” (2012)**

More alternatives

- The “broad PIE homeland theory”: a PIE homeland, if it existed, need not have been confined to a small region. But if the principle is accepted, such a homeland could also be located further east: for instance, from the Caspian Sea to northwest India.
- Italian scholar Mario Alinei’s Palaeolithic Continuity Theory pushes the date for PIE languages into the Palaeolithic (1996, supported by prehistorian archaeologists such as Marcel Otte).
- French archaeologist Jean-Paul Demoule challenged the concept of Indo-European (from the 1980s), both on archaeological and linguistic grounds.
- India is generally excluded because of the “centre of gravity” argument: it is thought to be too far on the periphery of the IE family. However, a few scholars (e.g., Koenraad Elst, Nicholas Kazanas, Shrikant Talageri) have proposed an “Out-of-India theory”, in which the IE model is reversed, with PIE originating from India.



A pre-Sanskritic substratum?

It is often argued that the presence of Dravidian or other non-IE words in the Rig-Veda proves the existence of a “Dravidian substratum”. However, there is no agreement on such a vocabulary. Scholars have proposed:

- 500 words (T. Burrow)
- 380 words (F.B.J. Kuiper)
- 1 word (M.B. Emeneau)
- 0 word (P. Thieme)
- 100 “para-Munda” words (M. Witzel)
- H.H. Hock finds all proposals unconvincing.
- No language lives in isolation; the presence of non-Sanskritic words in the Rig-Veda may just as well indicate long-standing exchange and borrowing, not necessarily posteriority.

The case of Brahui

- **Brahui, a Dravidian language spoken in parts of Baluchistan, is taken as a Harappan relic in the region and proof that the Harappan language was Dravidian.**
- **Brahui, however, has been shown to be a recent import into the region, going back no more than 1,000 years (J. Bloch, M.B. Emeneau, H.H. Hock, J. Elfenbein). Its presence has nothing to do with an assumed linguistic relic from Harappan times.**
- **Linguistic pockets prove nothing without a historical perspective: the presence of an Anglo-Indian community in the Nilgiris of Tamil Nadu does not indicate that Tamil Nadu's earliest language was English!**

Evidence of hydronymy

- Hydronymy (river names) is known to be conservative: pre-European names such as Mississippi, Missouri, Mohawk, Potomac, etc., have survived in the U.S.
- River names in northwest India are Indo-Aryan (a few below, from *Nadīstuti sūkta*, with Greek and English equivalents). This would not be the case with a peaceful migration; it must be the result either of a massive and brutal invasion or of a long-standing presence in the region.

Sanskrit	Greek	English
<i>Gangā</i>	Gange/Ganges	Ganges
<i>Yamunā</i>	Diamouna/Jomanes	Yamuna
<i>Shutudrī</i> (later <i>Shatadru</i>)	Zaradros/Hesudrus	Sutlej
<i>Vipāsh</i>	Hyphasis	Beas
<i>Parushnī</i> (later <i>Irāvati</i>)	Hydraotes/Hyarotis	Ravi
<i>Asiknī</i>	Akesines	Chenab
<i>Vitastā</i>	Hydaspes	Jhelum
<i>Sindhu</i>	Indos	Indus
<i>Kubhā</i>	Kophen	Kabul

Summing up ...

The question of numbers: massive migration or a 'trickle'?

- **Indian historian R.S. Sharma: “The Indo-Aryan immigrants seem to have been numerous and strong enough to continue and disseminate much of their culture.” (2001)**
- **Indian historian Romila Thapar: “I would like to suggest that it was not in fact a massive migration.” (1999)**
- **From invasion to migration to “trickle in” theory. U.S. Sanskritist Michael Witzel: “Just one ‘Afghan’ Indo-Aryan tribe that did not return to the highlands but stayed in their Panjab winter quarters in spring was needed to set off a wave of acculturation in the plains, by transmitting its ‘status kit’ to its neighbors.” (2001).**
- **R.S. Sharma’s large-scale invasion is undetected in archaeology, bioanthropology and genetics. R. Thapar and M. Witzel avoid this obstacle, but would a small-scale or “trickle in” migration have sufficed to overturn the subcontinent’s cultural and linguistic landscape so radically? Even substantial invasions of Persians, Greeks, Scythians, Kushanas, Hunas could not effect such a change.**

- **The Aryan invasion or migration theory finds no support from literary, archaeological, anthropological or genetic evidence: the so-called “Aryans” remain elusive on the ground. The same problem confronts supposed migrations of Indo-European speakers in Iran, central Asia or Europe.**
- **Even in its sub-themes, such as Aryans bringing iron (already present in the Ganges plains by 1800 BCE) or clearing the Gangetic forests (which were only pockets), the Aryan scenario has failed.**
- **The persistent conflation between race, language and culture is misleading and dangerous. The only legitimate use of the term “Aryan” today is linguistic (a better term is “Indo-Aryan speakers”) or cultural (a better term is “Vedic”).**
- **A final answer may come from an accumulation of archaeological and genetic evidence, or the decipherment of the Indus script.**
- **Political uses of the Aryan scenario are wholly illegitimate and unnecessarily divisive; they are an extension of the colonial agenda.**

“Even today, 44 years after the death of Hitler ... the Aryan invasions of the second millennium BC are still treated as if they were an established fact of history.... Why do serious scholars persist in believing in the Aryan invasions?... Who finds it attractive? Why has the development of early Sanskrit come to be so dogmatically associated with an Aryan invasion?... The details of this theory fit in with [the] racist framework.... The origin myth of British colonial imperialism helped the elite administrators ... to see themselves as bringing ‘pure’ civilization to a country in which civilization of the most sophisticated (but ‘morally corrupt’) kind was already nearly 6,000 years old. ... The Aryan invasions never happened at all. Of course, no one is going to believe that.”

**— British anthropologist
Edmund Leach (1989)**

Further reading

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Interventionism: The Myth of the "Third-way"

by Ludwig Von Mises

<http://www.capmag.com/article.asp?ID=2760>

Summary: The idea that there is a third system--between socialism and capitalism, as its supporters say--a system as far away from socialism as it is from capitalism but that retains the advantages and avoids the disadvantages of each--is pure nonsense.

I want to refer, in a few words, to another example, and that is rent control. If the government controls rents, one result is that people who would otherwise have moved from bigger apartments to smaller ones when their family conditions changed, will no longer do so. For example, consider parents whose children left home when they came into their twenties, married or went into other cities to work. Such parents used to change their apartments and take smaller and cheaper ones. This necessity disappeared when rent controls were imposed.

In Vienna, Austria, in the early twenties, where rent control was well-established, the amount of money that the landlord received for an average apartment under rent control was not more than twice the price of a ticket for a ride on the city-owned street cars. You can imagine that people did not have any incentive to change their apartments. And, on the other hand, there was no construction of new houses. Similar conditions prevailed in the United States after the Second World War and are continuing in many cities to this day.

One of the main reasons why many cities in the United States are in such great financial difficulty is that they have rent control and a resulting shortage of housing. So the government has spent billions for the building of new houses. But why was there such a housing shortage? The housing shortage developed for the same reasons that brought milk shortages when there was milk price control. That means: when the government interferes with the market, it is more and more driven towards socialism.

And this is the answer to those people who say: "We are not socialists, we do not want the government to control everything. We realize this is bad. But why should not the government interfere a little bit with the market? Why shouldn't the government do away with some things which we do not like?"

These people talk of a "middle-of-the-road" policy. What they do not see is that the isolated interference, which means the interference with only one small part of the economic system, brings about a situation which the government itself--and the people who are asking for government interference--find worse than the conditions they wanted to abolish: the people who are asking for rent control are very angry when they discover there is a shortage of apartments and a shortage of housing.

But this shortage of housing was created precisely by government interference, by the establishment of rents below the level people would have had to pay in a free market.

The idea that there is a third system--between socialism and capitalism, as its supporters say--a system as far away from socialism as it is from capitalism but that retains the advantages and avoids the disadvantages of each--is pure nonsense. People who believe there is such a mythical system can become really poetic when they praise the glories of interventionism. One can only say they are mistaken. The government interference, which they praise, brings about conditions, which they themselves do not like.

One of the problems I will deal with later is protectionism. The government tries to isolate the domestic market from the world market. It introduces tariffs which raise the domestic price of a commodity above the world market price, making it possible for domestic producers to form cartels. The cartels are then attacked by the government declaring: "Under these conditions, anti-cartel legislation is necessary."

This is precisely the situation with most of the European governments. In the United States, there are yet other reasons for antitrust legislation and the government's campaign against the specter of monopoly.

It is absurd to see the government--which creates by its own intervention the conditions making possible the emergence of domestic cartels--point its finger at business, saying: "There are cartels, therefore government interference with business is necessary." It would be much simpler to avoid cartels by ending the government's interference with the market--an interference which makes these cartels possible.

The idea of government interference as a "solution" to economic problems leads, in every country, to conditions, which, at the least, are very unsatisfactory and often quite chaotic. If the government does not stop in time, it will bring on socialism.

Nevertheless, government interference with business is still very popular. As soon as someone does not like something that happens in the world, he says: "The government ought to do something about it. What do we have a government for? The government should do it." And this is a characteristic remnant of thought from past ages, of ages preceding modern freedom, modern constitutional government, before representative government or modern republicanism.

For centuries there was the doctrine--maintained and accepted by everyone--that a king, an anointed king, was the messenger of God; he had more wisdom than his subjects, and he had supernatural powers. As recently as the beginning of the nineteenth century, people suffering from certain diseases expected to be cured by the royal touch, by the hand of the king. Doctors were usually better; nevertheless, they had their patients try the king.

This doctrine of the superiority of a paternal government, of the supernatural and superhuman powers of the hereditary kings gradually disappeared--or at least we thought

so. But it came back again. There was a German professor named Werner Sombart (I knew him very well), who was known the world over, who was an honorary doctor of many universities and an honor-ary member of the American Economic Association. That professor wrote a book, which is available in an English translation, published by the Princeton University Press. It is available also in a French translation, and probably also in Spanish--at least I hope it is available, because then you can check what I am saying. In this book, pub-lished in our century, not in the Dark Ages, Werner Sombart, a professor of economics, simply says: "The Führer, our Führer"--he means, of course, Hitler--"gets his orders directly from God, the Führer of the Universe."

I spoke of this hierarchy of the führers earlier, and in this hierarchy. I mentioned Hitler as the "Supreme Führer"... But there is, according to Werner Sombart, a still higher Führer, God, the Führer of the universe. And God, he wrote, gives His orders directly to Hitler. Of course, Professor Sombart said very modestly: "We do not know how God communicates with the Führer. But the fact cannot be denied."

Now, if you hear that such a book can be published in the German language, the language of a nation which was once hailed as "the nation of philosophers and poets," and if you see it translated into English and French, then you will not be astonished at the fact that even a little bureaucrat considers himself wiser and better than the citizens and wants to interfere with everything, even though he is only a poor little bureaucrat, and not the famous Professor Werner Sombart, honorary member of everything.

Is there a remedy against such happenings? I would say, yes, there is a remedy. And this remedy is the power of the citizens; they have to prevent the establishment of such an autocratic regime that arrogates to itself a higher wisdom than that of the average citizen. This is the fundamental difference between freedom and serf-dom.

The socialist nations have arrogated to themselves the term democracy. The Russians call their own system a People's Democracy; they probably maintain that the people are represented in the person of the dictator. I think that one dictator, Juan Perón here in Argentina, was given a good answer when he was forced into exile in 1955. Let us hope that all other dictators, in other nations, will be accorded a similar response.

This article is serialized from Economic Policy: Thoughts for Today and Tomorrow, a book based on six lectures delivered in Buenos Aires in 1959 on Capitalism, Socialism, Interventionism, Inflation, Foreign Investment, and Politics and Ideas by the great 20th century economist who was too good to receive a Noble Prize: Ludwig von Mises (1881-1973). Copyright (c) 1995 by Bettina Bien Greaves. All rights reserved.

We must build states and not nations
By Carl Bildt
Financial Times; Jan 16, 2004

It is time to abandon the illusion of nation building and develop the instrument of state building. Not long ago, the term "nation building" seemed the incarnation of international naivety, particularly in the US. But now, the US seems determined to retain command of the mother of such efforts in the ancient lands of Mesopotamia. From the high plateaux of Asia to the swamps of Africa, similar efforts proliferate.

Of course, the way ahead is not about nation building. The very term is profoundly misleading, perhaps deliberately so. It was invented to discredit such efforts rather than give guidance about their nature. The task is not about "building nations" but building states, very often in areas where several nations and nationalities have to coexist within one framework.

State building, as we see in the real world from Bosnia in the northwest to Basra in the southeast, is often about transcending nations and overcoming nationalism. Much the same applies in Afghanistan and certainly in the problem areas of Africa.

The problems of fragile, failing or failed states have rightly attracted new attention in the post-September 11 world. The marriage between ancient hatreds and modern technologies makes indifference to chaos and disorder increasingly dangerous to us all.

The new European Security Strategy identified state failure as a serious threat. And the US National Security Strategy notes that we are now often more threatened by weak states than by strong ones. But it is one thing to recognise this in theory and another to deal with it in practice.

Yugoslavia and Iraq were both created from the debris of empire and have both faced similar strains. Yet the reluctance to deal early and decisively with the structural issues of Iraq, notably the Kurdish question, is astonishing in view of what we should have learnt. It is also astonishing how little is being done to develop the policies and instruments of state building.

In the US, the think-tank community is now busy producing studies that attempt to learn from the past. The Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad seems to be an on-site crash course, although many leave before learning even the core lessons.

Nato, meanwhile, is developing into a somewhat more robust equivalent of the UN's peace-keeping operations department. In Bosnia and Kosovo, it has built up valuable experience that can now be applied to Afghanistan. Sooner or later, it

will have to widen its role in the Middle East. Without a secure environment, serious state building efforts there have no chance of success.

Recent Nato efforts have been directed at creating a Rapid Reaction Force for quick, hard strikes. While certainly useful at times, forces for long-endurance stability operations will be even more in demand. That is where we really need a revolution in military affairs - the high-technology enemies are mostly gone.

State building, however, requires skills across a far wider range than a purely security-focused organisation can provide. It remains an essentially political and economic task, not a military one. Thus, leadership must rest with institutions that can command a wide range of resources.

Important as the UN will remain, its available tools need developing. A review of UN peacekeeping operations dealt vaguely with what it called "peace building", but stopped short of addressing issues of state building and improving the UN's role in it. It is time to rectify this.

The European Union often claims it can bring together the different instruments of conflict resolution and peace building. That might be true in theory, but must yet be demonstrated in practice.

One step might be to set up a European Institute of Peace to bring together Europe's expertise and experience on these issues. Such an initiative would increase the EU's readiness to take part, or even lead complete state building operations.

In 2003, we learnt again that it is far easier to win a war than to build a peace. To build new and stable regimes is extraordinarily demanding. There are no quick fixes, early exits or purely military solutions. In the new security environment, state building efforts are as important as nuclear deterrence was in the past. It is imperative to improve our instruments for this.

The writer is former prime minister of Sweden and was an EU and UN representative on the Balkans; he is now a board member of the Centre for European Reform

Ernst Renan (1823-92) studied law and theology. He wrote several influential histories of religion including his popular "Life of Jesus." Renan's essay on the nation is the classical text of "civic" nationalism, the French counterpoint to the "ethnic" nationalism of German writers like Fichte and Herder.

What is a Nation?

Ernst Renan

http://web.archive.org/web/20110827065548/http://www.cooper.edu/humanities/core/hss3/e_renan.html

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What I propose to do today is to analyse with you an idea which, though seemingly clear, lends itself to the most dangerous misunderstandings. [Consider] the vast agglomerations of men found in China, Egypt or ancient Babylonia, the tribes of the Hebrews and the Arabs, the city as it existed in Athens or Sparta, the assemblies of the various territories in the Carolingian Empire, those communities which are without a patrie = and are maintained by a religious bond alone, as is the case with the Israelites and the Parsees, nations, such as France, England and the majority of the modern European sovereign states, confederations, such as exist in Switzerland or in America, and ties, such as those that race, or rather language, establishes between the different branches of the German or Slav peoples. Each of these groupings exist, or have existed, and there would be the direst of consequences if one were to confuse any one of them with any other. At the time of the French Revolution, it was commonly believed that the institutions proper to small, independent cities, such as Sparta and Rome, might be applied to our large nations, which number some thirty or forty million souls. Nowadays, a far graver mistake is made: race is confused with nation and a sovereignty analogous to that of really existing peoples is attributed to ethnographic or, rather linguistic groups.

I want now to try and make these difficult questions somewhat more precise, for the slightest confusion regarding the meaning of words, at the start of an argument, may in the end lead to the most fatal of errors. It is a delicate thing that I propose to do here, somewhat akin to vivisection; I am going to treat the living much as one ordinarily treats the dead. I shall adopt an absolutely cool and impartial attitude.

Since the fall of the Roman Empire or, rather, since the disintegration of Charlemagne's empire, western Europe has seemed to us to be divided into nations, some of which, in certain epochs, have sought to wield a hegemony over the others, without ever enjoying any lasting success. It is hardly likely that anyone in the future will achieve what Charles V. Louis XIV and Napoleon I failed to do. The founding of a new Roman Empire or of a new Carolingian empire would now be impossible. Europe is so divided that any bid for universal domination would very rapidly give rise to a coalition, which would drive any too ambitious nation back to its natural frontiers. A kind of equilibrium has long been established. France, England, Germany and Russia will, for centuries to come, no matter what may befall them, continue to be individual historical units, the crucial pieces on a chequerboard whose squares will forever vary in importance and size but will never be wholly confused with each other.

Nations, in this sense of the term, are something fairly new in history. Antiquity was unfamiliar with them; Egypt, China and ancient Chaldea were in no way nations. They were flocks led by a Son of the Sun or by a Son of Heaven. Neither in Egypt nor in China were there citizens as such. Classical antiquity had republics, municipal kingdoms, confederations of local republics and empires, yet it can hardly be said to have had nations in our understanding of the term. Athens, Sparta, Tyre and Sidon were small centres imbued with the most admirable patriotism, but they were [simply] cities with a relatively restricted territory. Gaul, Spain and Italy, prior to their absorption by the Roman Empire, were collections of clans, which were often allied among themselves but had no central institutions and no dynasties. The Assyrian Empire, the Persian Empire and the empire of Alexander the Great were not patries either. There never were any Assyrian patriots, and the Persian Empire was nothing but a vast feudal structure. No nation

traces its origins back to Alexander the Great's momentous adventure, fertile though it was in consequences for the general history of civilization.

The Roman Empire was much more nearly a *patrie*. Roman domination, although at first so harsh, was soon loved, for it had brought about the great benefit of putting an end to war. The empire was a huge association, and a synonym for order, peace and civilization. In its closing stages, lofty souls, enlightened bishops, and the educated classes had a real sense of the *Pax Romana*, which withstood the threatening chaos of barbarism. But an empire twelve times larger than present-day France cannot be said to be a state in the modern sense of the term. The split between the eastern and western (empires) was inevitable, and attempts at founding an empire in Gaul, in the third century AD, did not succeed either. It was in fact the Germanic invasions which introduced into the world the principle which, later, was to serve as a basis for the existence of nationalities.

What in fact did the German peoples accomplish, from their great invasions in the fifth century AD up until the final Norman conquests in the tenth century? They effected little change in the racial stock, but they imposed dynasties and a military aristocracy upon the more or less extensive parts of the old empire of the west, which assumed the names of their invaders. This was the origin of France, Burgundy, and Lombardy, and, subsequently, Normandy. The Frankish Empire so rapidly extended its sway that, for a period, it re-established the unity of the west, but it was irreparably shattered around the middle of the ninth century; the partition of Verdun outlined divisions which were in principle immutable and, from then on, France, Germany, England, Italy, and Spain made their way, by often circuitous paths and through a thousand and one vicissitudes, to their full national existence, such as we see it blossoming today.

What in fact is the defining feature of these different states? It is the fusion of their component populations. In the above mentioned countries, there is nothing analogous to what you will find in Turkey, where Turks, Slavs, Greeks, Armenians, Arabs, Syrians, and Kurds are as distinct today as they were upon the day that they were conquered. Two crucial circumstances helped to bring about this result. First, the fact that the Germanic peoples adopted Christianity as soon as they underwent any prolonged contact with the Greek or Latin peoples. When conqueror or conquered have the same religion or, rather, when the conqueror adopts the religion of the conquered, the Turkish system - that is, the absolute distinction between men in terms of their religion - can no longer arise. The second circumstance was the forgetting, by the conquerors, of their own language. The grandsons of Clovis, Alaric, Gundebald, Alboin, and Roland were already speaking the Roman tongue. This fact was itself the consequence of another important feature, namely, the fact that the Franks, Burgundians, Goths, Lombards, and Normans had very few women of their own race with them. For several generations, the chiefs only married German women; but their concubines were Latin, as were the wet-nurses of their children; the tribe as a whole married Latin women; which meant that, from the time the Franks and the Goths established themselves on Roman territory, the *lingua francica* and the *lingua gothica* did not last too long.

This was not how it was in England, for the invading Saxons undoubtedly brought women with them; the Celtic population took flight, and, besides, Latin was no longer, or rather had never been, dominant in Britain. If Old French had been generally spoken in Gaul in the fifth century Clovis and his people would not have abandoned German for Old French.

The crucial result of all this was that, in spite of the extreme violence of the customs of the German invaders, the mould which they imposed became, with the passing centuries, the actual mould of the nation. 'France' became quite legitimately the name of a country to which only a virtually imperceptible minority of Franks had come. In the tenth century, in the first *chansons de geste*, which are such a perfect mirror of the spirit of the times, all the inhabitants of France are French. The idea, which had seemed so obvious to Gregory of Tours, that the population of France was composed of different races, was in no way apparent to French writers and poets after Hugh Capet. The difference between noble and serf was as sharply drawn as possible, but it was in no sense presented as an ethnic difference; it was presented rather as a difference in courage, customs, and education, all of which were transmitted hereditarily; it did not occur to anyone that the origin of all this was a conquest. The spurious system according to which nobility owed its origin to a privilege conferred by the king for services rendered to the nation, so that

every noble was an ennobled person, was established as a dogma as early as the thirteenth century. The same thing took place after almost all the Norman conquests. After one or two generations, the Norman invaders no longer distinguished themselves from the rest of the population, although their influence was not any less profound because of this fact; they had given the conquered country a nobility, military habits, and a patriotism that they had not known before.

Forgetting, I would even go so far as to say historical error, is a crucial factor in the creation of a nation, which is why progress in historical studies often constitutes a danger for the principle of] nationality. Indeed, historical enquiry brings to light deeds of violence which took place at the origin of all political formations, even of those whose consequences have been altogether beneficial. Unity is always effected by means of brutality; the union of northern France with the Midi was the result of massacres and terror lasting for the best part of a century. Though the king of France was, if I may make so bold as to say, almost the perfect instance of an agent that crystallized (a nation) over a long period; though he established the most perfect national unity that there has ever been, too searching a scrutiny had destroyed his prestige. The nation which he had formed has cursed him, and, nowadays, it is only men of culture who know something of his former value and of his achievements.

It is [only] by contrast that these great laws of the history of western Europe become perceptible to us. Many countries failed to achieve what the King of France, partly through his tyranny, partly through his justice, so admirably brought to fruition. Under the Crown of Saint Stephen, the Magyars and the Slavs have remained as distinct as they were 800 years ago. Far from managing to fuse the diverse [ethnic] elements to be found in its domains, the House of Hapsburg has kept them distinct and often opposed the one to the other. In Bohemia [for instance], the Czech and German elements are superimposed, much like oil and water in a glass. The Turkish policy of separating nationalities according to their religion has had much graver consequences, for it brought about the downfall of the east. If you take a city such as Salonika or Smyrna, you will find there five or six communities each of which has its own memories and which have almost nothing in common. Yet the essence of a nation is that all individuals have many things in common; and also that they have forgotten many things. No French citizen knows whether he is a Burgundian, an Alan, a Taifale, or a Visigoth, yet every French citizen has to have forgotten the massacre of Saint Bartholomew, or the massacres that took place in the Midi in the thirteenth century. There are not ten families in France that can supply proof of their Frankish origin, and any such proof would anyway be essentially flawed, as a consequence of countless unknown alliances which are liable to disrupt any genealogical system.

The modern nation is therefore a historical result brought about by a series of convergent facts. Sometimes unity has been effected by a dynasty, as was the case in France; sometimes it has been brought about by the direct will of provinces, as was the case with Holland, Switzerland, and Belgium; sometimes it has been the work of a general consciousness, belatedly victorious over the caprices of feudalism, as was the case in Italy and Germany. These formations always had a profound *raison d'être*. Principles, in such cases, always emerge through the most unexpected surprises. Thus, in our own day, we have seen Italy unified through its defeats and Turkey destroyed by its victories. Each defeat advanced the cause of Italy; each victory spelled doom for Turkey; for Italy is a nation, and Turkey, outside of Asia Minor, is not one. France can claim the glory for having, through the French Revolution, proclaimed that a nation exists of itself. We should not be displeased if others imitate us in this. It was we who founded the principle of nationality. But what is a nation? Why is Holland a nation, when Hanover, or the Grand Duchy of Parma, are not? How is it that France continues to be a nation, when the principle which created it has disappeared? How is it that Switzerland, which has three languages, two religions, and three or four races, is a nation, when Tuscany, which is so homogeneous, is not one? Why is Austria a state and not a nation? In what ways does the principle of nationality differ from that of races? These are points that a thoughtful person would wish to have settled, in order to put his mind at rest. The affairs of this world can hardly be said to be ruled by reasonings of this sort, yet diligent men are desirous of bringing some reason into these matters and of unravelling the confusions in which superficial intelligences are entangled:

If one were to believe some political theorists, a nation is above all a dynasty, representing an earlier conquest, one which was first of all accepted, and then forgotten by the mass of the people. According to the above-mentioned theorists, the grouping of provinces effected by a dynasty, by its wars, its marriages, and its treaties, ends with the dynasty which had established it. It is quite true that the majority of modern nations were made by a family of feudal origin, which had contracted a marriage with the soil and which was in some sense a nucleus of centralization. France's frontiers in 1789 had nothing either natural or necessary about them. The wide zone that the House of Capet had added to the narrow strip of land granted by the partition of Verdun was indeed the personal acquisition of this House. During the epoch when these acquisitions were made, there was no idea of natural frontiers, nor of the rights of nations, nor of the will of provinces. The union of England, Ireland, and Scotland was likewise a dynastic fact. Italy only tarried so long before becoming a nation because, among its numerous reigning houses, none, prior to the present century, constituted itself as the centre of [its] unity. Strangely enough, it was through the obscure island of **Sardinia, a land that was scarcely Italian**, that [the house of Savoy] assumed a royal title. Holland, which - through an act of heroic resolution - created itself, has nevertheless contracted an intimate marriage with the House of Orange, and it will run real dangers the day this union is compromised.

Is such a law, however, absolute? It undoubtedly is not. Switzerland and the United States, which have formed themselves, like conglomerates, by successive additions, have no dynastic basis. I shall not discuss this question in relation to France, for I would need to be able to read the secrets of the future in order to do so. Let me simply say that so loftily national had this great French royal principle been that, on the morrow of its fall, the nation was able to stand without her. Furthermore, the eighteenth century had changed everything. Man had returned, after centuries of abasement, to the spirit of antiquity, to [a sense of] respect for himself, to the idea of his own rights. The words *patrie* and *citizen* had recovered their former meanings. Thus it was that the boldest operation ever yet put into effect in history was brought to completion, an operation which one might compare with the attempt, in physiology, to restore to its original identity a body from which one had removed the brain and the heart.

It must therefore be admitted that a nation can exist without a dynastic principle, and even that nations which have been formed by dynasties can be separated from them without therefore ceasing to exist. The old principle, which only takes account of the right of princes, could no longer be maintained; apart from dynastic right, there is also national right. Upon what criterion, however, should one base this national right? By what sign should one know it? From what tangible fact can one derive it?

Several confidently assert that it is derived from race. The artificial divisions, resulting from feudalism, from princely marriages, from diplomatic congresses are, [these authors assert], in a state of decay. It is a population's race which remains firm and fixed. This is what constitutes a right, a legitimacy. The Germanic family, according to the theory I am expounding here, has the right to reassemble the scattered limbs of the Germanic order, even when these limbs are not asking to be joined together again. The right of the Germanic order over such-and-such a province is stronger than the right of the inhabitants of that province over themselves. There is thus created a kind of primordial right analogous to the divine right of kings; an ethnographic principle is substituted for a national one. This is a very great error, which, if it were to become dominant, would destroy European civilization. The primordial right of races is as narrow and as perilous for genuine progress as the national principle is just and legitimate.

In the tribes and cities of antiquity, the fact of race was, I will allow, of very real importance. The tribe and the city were then merely extensions of the family. At Sparta and at Athens all the citizens were kin to a greater or lesser degree. The same was true of the Beni-Israelites; this is still the case with the Arab tribes. If we move now from Athens, Sparta, and the Israelite tribe to the Roman Empire the situation is a wholly different one. Established at first through violence but subsequently preserved through [common] interest, this great agglomeration of cities and provinces, wholly different from each other, dealt the gravest of blows to the idea of race. Christianity, with its universal and absolute character, worked still more effectively in the same direction; it formed an intimate alliance with the Roman Empire and, through the impact of these two incomparable unificatory agents, the ethnographic argument was debarred from the government of human affairs for centuries.

The barbarian invasions were, appearances notwithstanding, a further step along this same path. The carving out of the barbarian kingdoms had nothing ethnographic about them, their [shape] was determined by the might or whim of the invaders. They were utterly indifferent to the race of the populations which they had subdued. What Rome had fashioned, Charlemagne refashioned in his own way, namely, a single empire composed of the most diverse races; those responsible for the partition of Verdun, as they calmly drew their two long lines from north to south, were not in the slightest concerned with the race of the peoples to be found on the right or left of these lines. Frontier changes put into effect, as the Middle Ages wore on, likewise paid no heed to ethnographic divisions. If the policies pursued by the House of Capet by and large resulted in the grouping together, under the name of France, of the territories of ancient Gaul, this was only because these lands had a natural tendency to be joined together with their fellows. Dauphine, Bresse, Provence, and Franche-Comte no longer recalled any common origin. All Gallic consciousness had perished by the second century AD, and it is only from a purely scholarly perspective that, in our own days, the individuality of the Gallic character has been retrospectively recovered.

Ethnographic considerations have therefore played no part in the constitution of modern nations. France is [at once] Celtic, Iberic, and Germanic. Germany is Germanic, Celtic and Slav. Italy is the country where the ethnographic argument is most confounded. Gauls, Etruscans, Pelasgians, and Greeks, not to mention many other elements, intersect in an indecipherable mixture. The British isles, considered as a whole, present a mixture of Celtic and Germanic blood, the proportions of which are singularly difficult to define.

The truth is that there is no pure race and that to make politics depend upon ethnographic analysis is to surrender it to a chimera. The noblest countries, England, France, and Italy, are those where the blood is the most mixed. Is Germany an exception in this respect? Is it a purely Germanic country? This is a complete illusion. The whole of the south was once Gallic; the whole of the east, from the river Elbe on, is Slav. Even those parts which are claimed to be really pure, are they in fact so? We touch here on one of those problems in regard to which it is of the utmost importance that we equip ourselves with clear ideas and ward of misconceptions.

Discussions of race are interminable, because philologically- minded historians and physiologically- minded anthropologists interpret the term in two totally different ways.' For the anthropologists, race has the same meaning as in zoology; it serves to indicate real descent, a blood relation. However, the study of language and of history does not lead to the same divisions as does physiology. Words such as brachycephalic or dolichocephalic have no place in either history or philology. In the human group which created the Aryan languages and way of life, there were already [both] brachycephalics and dolichocephalics. The same is true of the primitive group which created the languages and institutions known as Semitic. In other words, the zoological origins of humanity are massively prior to the origins of culture, civilization, and language. The primitive Aryan, primitive Semitic, and primitive Touranian groups had no physiological unity. These groupings are historical facts, which took place in a particular epoch, perhaps 15,000 or 20,000 years ago, while the zoological origin of humanity is lost in impenetrable darkness. What is known philologically and historically as the Germanic race is no doubt a quite distinct family within the human species, but is it a family in the anthropological sense of the term? Certainly not. The emergence of an individual Germanic identity occurred only a few centuries prior to Jesus Christ. One may take it that the Germans did not emerge from the earth at this epoch. Prior to this, mingled with the Slavs in the huge indistinct mass of the Scythians, they did not have their own separate individuality. An Englishman is indeed a type within the whole of humanity. However, the type of what is quite improperly called the Anglo-Saxon race" is neither the Briton of Julius Caesar's time, nor the Anglo-Saxon of Hengist's time, nor the Dane of Canute's time, nor the Norman of William the Conqueror's time; it is rather the result of all these [elements]. A Frenchman is neither a Gaul, nor a Frank, nor a Burgundian. Rather, he is what has emerged out of the cauldron in which, presided over by the King of France, the most diverse elements have together been simmering. A native of Jersey or Guernsey differs in no way, as far as his origins are concerned, from the Norman population of the opposite coast. In the eleventh century, even the sharpest eye would have seen not the slightest difference in those living on either side of the Channel. Trifling circumstances meant that Philip Augustus did not seize these islands together

with the rest of Normandy. Separated from each other for the best part of 700 years, the two populations have become not only strangers to each other but wholly dissimilar. Race, as we historians understand it, is therefore something which is made and unmade. The study of race is of crucial importance for the scholar concerned with the history of humanity. It has no applications, however, in politics. The instinctive consciousness which presided over the construction of the map of Europe took no account of race, and the leading nations of Europe are nations of essentially mixed blood.

The fact of race, which was originally crucial, thus becomes increasingly less important. Human history is essentially different from zoology, and race is not everything, as it is among the rodents or the felines, and one does not have the right to go through the world fingering people's skulls, and taking them by the throat saying: 'You are of our blood; you belong to us!' Aside from anthropological characteristics, there are such things as reason, justice, the true, and the beautiful, which are the same for all. Be on your guard, for this ethnographic politics is in no way a stable thing and, if today you use it against others, tomorrow you may see it turned against yourselves. Can you be sure that the Germans, who have raised the banner of ethnography so high, will not see the Slavs in their turn analyse the names of villages in Saxony and Lusatia, search for any traces of the Wiltzes or of the Obotrites, and demand recompense for the massacres and the wholesale enslavements that the Ottos inflicted upon their ancestors? It is good for everyone to know how to forget.

I am very fond of ethnography, for it is a science of rare interest; but, in so far as I would wish it to be free, I wish it to be without political application. In ethnography, as in all forms of study, systems change; this is the condition of progress. States' frontiers would then follow the fluctuations of science. Patriotism would depend upon a more or less paradoxical dissertation. One would come up to a patriot and say: 'You were mistaken; you shed your blood for such-and-such a cause; you believed yourself to be a Celt; not at all, you are a German.' Then, ten years later, you will be told that you are a Slav. If we are not to distort science, we should exempt it from the need to give an opinion on these problems, in which so many interests are involved. You can be sure that, if one obliges science to furnish diplomacy with its first principles, one will surprise her many times in flagrant delit. She has better things to do; let us simply ask her to tell the truth.

What we have just said of race applies to language too. Language invites people to unite, but it does not force them to do so. The United States and England, Latin America and Spain, speak the same languages yet do not form single nations. Conversely, Switzerland, so well made, **since she was made** with the consent of her different parts, numbers three or four languages. There is something in man which is superior to language, namely, the will. The will of Switzerland to be united, in spite of the diversity of her dialects, is a fact of far greater importance than a similitude often obtained by various vexatious measures.

An honourable fact about France is that she has never sought to win unity of language by coercive measures. Can one not have the same sentiments and the same thoughts, and love the same things in different languages? I was speaking just now of the disadvantages of making international politics depend upon ethnography; they would be no less if one were to make it depend upon comparative philology. Let us allow these intriguing studies full freedom of discussion; let us not mix them up with **matters which would undermine their** serenity. The political importance attaching to languages derives from their being regarded as signs of race. Nothing could be more false. Prussia, where only German is now spoken; spoke Slav a few centuries ago; in Wales, English is spoken; Gaul **and Spain speak the primitive dialects of Alba** Longa; Egypt speaks **Arabic; there are** countless other examples one could quote. Even if you go back to origins, similarity of language did not presuppose similarity of race. Consider, for example the proto-Aryan or proto-Semitic tribe: there one found slaves speaking the same language as their masters, and **yet the slave was often enough a different race to that** of his master. Let me repeat that these divisions of the Indo-European, Semitic, or other languages, created with such admirable sagacity by comparative philology, do not coincide with the divisions established by anthropology. Languages are historical formations, which tell us very little about the blood of those who speak them and which, in any case, could not shackle human liberty when it is a matter of deciding the family with which one unites oneself for life or for death.

This exclusive concern with language, like an excessive preoccupation with race, has its dangers and its drawbacks. Such exaggerations enclose one within a specific culture, considered as national; one limits oneself, one hems oneself in. One leaves the heady air that one breathes in the vast field of humanity in order to enclose oneself in a conventicle with one's compatriots. Nothing could be worse for the mind; nothing could be more disturbing for civilization. Let us not abandon the fundamental principle that man is a reasonable and moral being, before he is cooped up in such and such a language, before he is a member of such and such a race, before he belongs to such and such a culture. Before French, German, or Italian culture there is human culture. Consider the great men of the Renaissance; they were neither French, nor Italian, nor German. They had rediscovered, through their dealings with antiquity, the secret of the genuine education of the human spirit, and they devoted themselves to it body and soul. What an achievement theirs was!

Religion cannot supply an adequate basis for the constitution of a modern nationality either. Originally, religion had to do with the very existence of the social group, which was itself an extension of the family. Religion and the rites were family rites. The religion of Athens was the cult of Athens itself, of its mythical founders, of its laws and its customs; it implied no theological dogma. This religion was, in the strongest sense of the term, a state religion. One was not an Athenian if one refused to practise it. This religion was, fundamentally, the cult of the Acropolis personified. To swear on the altar of Aglauros" was to swear that one would die for the patrie. This religion was the equivalent of what the act of drawing lots [for military service], or the cult of the flag, is for us. Refusing to take part in such a cult would be the equivalent, in our modern societies, of refusing military service. It would be like declaring that one was not Athenian. From another angle, it is clear that such a cult had do meaning for someone who was not from Athens; there was also no attempt made to proselytize foreigners and to force them to accept it; the slaves of Athens did not practise it. Things were much the same in a number of small medieval republics. One was not considered a good Venetian if one did not swear by Saint Mark; nor a good Amalfitan if one did not set Saint Andrew higher than all the other saints in paradise. In these **SM211** societies, what subsequently was regarded as persecution or tyranny was legitimate and was of no more consequence than our custom of wishing the father of a family happy birthday or a Happy New Year.

The state of affairs in Sparta and in Athens already no longer existed in the kingdoms which emerged from Alexander's conquest, still less in the Roman Empire. The persecutions unleashed by Antiochus Epiphanes in order win the east for the cult of Jupiter Olympus, those of the Roman Empire designed to maintain a supposed state religion were mistaken, criminal, and absurd. In our own time, the situation is perfectly clear. There are no longer masses that believe in a perfectly uniform manner. Each person believes and practises in his own fashion what he is able to and as he wishes. There is no longer a state religion; one can be French, English, or German, and be either Catholic, Protestant, or orthodox Jewish, or else practise no cult at all. Religion has become an individual matter; it concerns the conscience of each person. The division of nations into Catholics and Protestants no longer exists. Religion, which, fifty two years ago, played so substantial a part in the formation of Belgium, preserves all of its [former] importance in the inner tribunal of each; but it has ceased almost entirely to be one of the elements which serve to define the frontiers of peoples.

A community of interest is assuredly a powerful bond between men. Do interests, however, suffice to make a nation? I do not think so. Community of interest brings about trade agreements, but nationality has a sentimental -side to it; it is both soul and body at once; a *Zollverein'* is not a *patrie*.

Geography, or what are known as natural frontiers, undoubtedly plays a considerable part in the division of nations. Geography is one of the crucial factors in history. Rivers have led races on; mountains have brought them to a halt. The former have favoured movement in history, whereas the latter have restricted it. Can one say, however, that as some parties believe, a nation's frontiers are written on the map and that this nation has the right to judge what is necessary to round off certain contours, in order to reach such and such a mountain and such and such a river, which are thereby accorded a kind of a *priori* limiting faculty? I know of no doctrine which is more arbitrary or more fatal, for it allows one to justify any or every violence. First of all, is it the mountains or the rivers that we should regard as fanning these so-called natural frontiers? It is indisputable that the mountains separate, but the rivers tend rather to

unify. Moreover, all mountains cannot divide up states. Which serve to separate and which do not? From Biarritz to Tornea, there is no one estuary which is more suited than any other to serving as a boundary marker. Had history so decreed it, the Loire, the Seine, the Meuse, the Elbe, or the Oder could, just as easily as the Rhine, have had this quality of being a natural frontier, such as has caused so many infractions of the most fundamental right, which is men's will. People talk of strategic grounds. Nothing, however, is absolute; it is quite clear that many concessions should be made to necessity. But these concessions should **not be taken** too far. Otherwise, everybody would lay claim to their military conveniences, and one would have unceasing war. No, it is no more soil than it is race which makes a nation. The soil furnishes the substratum, the field of struggle and of labour; man furnishes the soul. Man is everything in the formation of this sacred thing which is called a people. Nothing [purely] material suffices for it. A nation is a spiritual principle, the outcome of the profound complications of history; it is a spiritual family not a group determined by the shape of the earth. We have now seen what things are not adequate for the creation of such a spiritual principle, namely, race, language, material interest, religious affinities, geography, and military necessity. What more then is required? As a consequence of what was said previously, I will not have to detain you very much longer.

III

A nation is a soul, a spiritual principle. Two things, which in truth are but one, constitute this soul or spiritual principle. One lies in the past, one in the present. One is the possession in common of a rich legacy of memories; the other is present-day consent, the desire to live together, the will to perpetuate the value of the heritage that one has received in an undivided form. Man, Gentlemen, does not improvise. The nation, like the individual, is the culmination of a long past of endeavours, sacrifice, and devotion. Of all cults, that of the ancestors is the most legitimate, for the ancestors have made us what we are. A heroic past, great men, glory (by which I understand genuine glory), this is **the social capital** upon which one bases a national idea. To have common glories in the past and to have a common will in the present; to have performed great deeds together, to wish to perform still more - these are the essential conditions for being a people. **One loves in proportion to the sacrifices to which one has consented, and in proportion to the ills that one has suffered. One loves the house that one has built and that one has handed down. The Spartan song -"We are what you were; we will be what you are" 13 - is, in its simplicity, the abridged hymn of every patrie.**

More valuable by far than common customs posts and frontiers conforming to strategic ideas is the fact of sharing, in the past, a glorious heritage and regrets, and of having, in the future, a shared programme to put into effect, or the fact of having suffered, enjoyed, and hoped together. These are the kinds of things that can be understood in spite of differences of race and language. I spoke just now of 'having suffered together' and, indeed, suffering in common unifies more than joy does. Where national memories are concerned, griefs are of more value than triumphs, for they impose duties, and require a common effort.

A nation is therefore a large-scale solidarity, constituted by the feeling of the sacrifices that one has made in the past and of those that one is prepared to make in the future. **It presupposes a past; it is summarized, however, in the present by a tangible fact, namely, consent, the clearly expressed desire to continue a common life. A nation's existence is, if you will pardon the metaphor, a daily plebiscite, just as an individual's existence is a perpetual affirmation of life. That, I know full well, is less metaphysical than divine right and less brutal than so-called historical right. According to the ideas that I am outlining to you, a nation has no more right than a king does to say to a province: 'You belong to me, I am seizing you.'** A province, as far as I am concerned, is its inhabitants; if anyone has the right to be consulted in such an affair, it is the inhabitant. A nation never has any real interest in annexing or holding on to a country against its will. **The wish of nations is, all in all, the sole legitimate criterion, the one to which one must always return.**

We have driven metaphysical and theological abstractions out of politics. What then remains? Man, with his desires and his needs. The secession, you will say to me, and, in the long term, the disintegration of nations will be the outcome of a system which places these old organisms at the mercy of wills which are often none too enlightened. It is clear that, in such matters, no principle must be pushed too far. Truths of

this order are only applicable as a whole in a very general fashion. Human wills change, but what is there here below that does not change? The nations are not something eternal. They had their beginnings and they will end. A European confederation will very probably replace them. But such is not the law of the century in which we are living. At the present time, the existence of nations is a good thing, a necessity even. Their existence is the guarantee of liberty, which would be lost if the world had only one law and only one master.

Through their various and often opposed powers, nations participate in the common work of civilization; each sounds a note in the great concert of humanity, which, after all, is the highest ideal reality that we are capable of attaining. Isolated, each has its weak point. I often tell myself that an individual who had those faults which in nations are taken for good qualities, who fed off vainglory, who was to that degree jealous, egotistical, and quarrelsome, and who would draw his sword on the smallest pretext, would be the most intolerable; of men. Yet all these discordant details disappear in the overall context. Poor humanity, how you have suffered! How many trials still await you! May the spirit of wisdom guide you, in order to preserve you from the countless dangers with which your path is strewn!

Let me sum up, Gentlemen. Man is a slave neither of his race nor his language, nor of his religion, nor of the course of rivers nor of the direction taken by mountain chains. A large aggregate of men, healthy in mind and warm of heart, creates the kind of moral conscience which we call a nation. So long as this moral consciousness gives proof of its strength by the sacrifices which demand the abdication of the individual to the advantage of the community, it is legitimate and has the right to exist. If doubts arise regarding its frontiers, consult the populations in the **areas under** dispute. They undoubtedly have the right to a say in the matter. This recommendation will bring a smile to the lips of the transcendents of politics, these infallible beings who spend their lives deceiving themselves and who, from the height of their superior principles, **take pity upon our mundane** concerns. `Consult the **populations, for heaven's sake! How naive! How naive!** A fine example of those wretched French **ideas which claim to replace diplomacy and war** by childishly simple **methods.** **Wait a while, Gentlemen; let the reign of the transcendents pass; bear the scorn of the powerful with patience. It may be that, after many fruitless gropings, people will revert to our more modest empirical solutions.** The best way of being right in the future is, in certain periods, to know how to resign oneself to being out of fashion.

Notes

(Notes followed by an asterisk are the translator's.)

A lecture delivered at the Sorbonne, 11 March 1882. 'Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?', *Oeuvres Completes* (Paris, 1947-61), vol. I, pp. 887-907. An earlier translation, which I have consulted, is in A. Zimmern (ed.), *Modern Political Doctrines* (London, 1939), pp. 186-205.

2* I have left *patrie* in the original French because it seems to me that to translate it into another European (or, indeed, non-European) language would be to eliminate the kinds of association the term had, in a very large number of countries, throughout the epoch of liberal-democratic nationalism. *Parrie* draws with it a whole cluster of complex and interlocking references to the values of the patria of classical republicanism. For an observer like Marx, these values were destroyed forever in the black farce of 1848. In another sense, as Marx's arguments in *The Eighteenth Brumaire* allow, they continued to influence the leaders of liberal, nationalist revolutions throughout the nineteenth century - although, obviously, if one were to phrase it in Italian terms, the Cavourian moderate rather than the Mazzinian or Garibaldian radical wing. It may be worth noting that, in the domain of scholarship, Fustel de Coulanges' *The Ancient City* (1864), a study which profoundly influenced Emile Durkheim and which Renan himself had very probably read, shattered the vision of classical republicanism which men such as Robespierre and Saint Just had entertained.

The doctrine of natural frontiers was given its definitive formulation in the course of the French Revolution, and was subsequently applied to other European countries, such as Germany or Italy; it was

this doctrine that fuelled the irredentist movements of the second half of the nineteenth century. Justification of territorial claims often rested upon the interpretation of classical texts, such as Tacitus's *Germania* or Dante's *Commedia*.

4* The partition of Verdun (AD 843) ended a period of civil war within the Frankish Empire, during which the grandsons of Charlemagne had fought each other. Two of the newly created kingdoms, that of Charles the Bald (843-77) and that of Louis the German (843-76), bear some resemblance, in territorial terms, to modern France and modern Germany. Furthermore, much has been made of the linguistic qualities of the Oaths of Strasbourg, sworn by Louis and Charles to each other's armies, in Old French and Old High German respectively. This has often been regarded as the first text in a Romance language (as distinct from Latin) and, by extension, as the first symbolic appearance of the French (and German) nations.

5* Gregory of Tours (c. X39-94) was a Gallo-Roman and Bishop of Tours from 573 to 594. His *History of the Franks* is an account of life in Merovingian Gaul.

6* Upon the occasion of the massacre of Saint Bartholomew, in 1572, many thousands of Huguenots were killed. This was an event with momentous repercussions for the history of France in general, and for the development of political theory in particular.

7 The House of Savoy owes its royal title to its acquisition of Sardinia (1720).

8* The Etruscans were believed, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, to have been the original inhabitants of Italy.

9 I enlarged upon this point in a lecture, which is analysed in the *Bulletin of the Association scientifique de France*, 10 March 1878, 'Des services rendus aux Sciences historiques par la Philologie'.

10 Germanic elements are not more considerable in the United Kingdom than when they were in France, when she had possession of Alsace and Metz. If the Germanic language has dominated in the British isles, it was simply because Latin had not wholly replaced the Celtic languages, as it had done in Gaul.

11 Aglauros, who gave her life to save her *patris*, represents the Acropolis itself.

12* Zollverein is the German word for customs union. Both participants in bourgeois, national revolutions and later commentators emphasize the relation between the nationalist cause and free trade within a single territory. However, E.J. Hobsbawm's comments, on pp. 166-8 of *The Age of Revolution* (London, 1962), shed some light upon Renan's aphorism, in that the vanguard of European nationalism in the 1830s and 1840s was not so much the business class as 'the lower and middle professional, administrative and intellectual strata, in other words, the educated classes'. At another level, Renan's observation reflects his shock at the defeat of France by Prussia in the Franco-Prussian war, which is expressed in both major and occasional writings.

13* Such epitaphs were part of the habitual repertoire of early-nineteenth century nationalism, as Leopardi's 'patriotic' canzoni make plain

What is a Nation?

George Kennan

George Kennan, "Around the Cragged Hill: A Personal and Political Philosophy", W W Norton: New York , 1993. PP.75-81

What after all, is a "nation"? On the basis of what criteria do we call a body of people a nation? This question has always defied the lexicographers. For here a number of factors may play a role: among them, history, tradition, geography, religion, and, above all, language. Not all of them are present in any individual case; and even where some of them are, the mix is never the same.

Furthermore, things have not always been this way. Nations existed before there was any such thing as a national state, and before people thought of the national framework as the be-all and end-all of political organization and government

The emergence of the National state

A hundred and fifty years ago, things looked different. The international community was then composed of a few great empires and kingdoms, ruled by emperors and kings who alone were generally entitled to the designation "sovereign"; and then, beyond and under them, a great heterogeneity of smaller and weaker political entities, the very variety of whose titles reflected the wide variety of status they enjoyed in the eyes of the remainder of the world. There were, among others and just to mention few, principalities, duchies, grand duchies, tributary states, protectorates, confederacies, personal unions, condominiums, paramountcies, suzerainties, sultanates, emirates, palatinates, colonies and dominions. The only quality these political entities had in common was their subordination in one form or another to one or another of the great imperial or royal sovereigns of the time. In many instances they enjoyed a high level of internal autonomy; but there were certain things, usually taxes and military support, that they owed to the great imperial center, and certain benefits, usually military protection and the privileged access to that center, that they derived from that connection.

In a number of instances these subordinate entities consisted of what we would probably today regard as "nations". But it was not considered to be normal that all political power should be concentrated within the national context. A great part of it was always exercised by the imperial center, to which in a sense, these 'nations' belonged. And it was through the intermediary of that center that they related to the world outside the limits of the empire in question.

While signs of change were becoming evident even prior to the end of the eighteenth century, it was the French Revolution that produced the idea of the concentration of all power within the nation, and

the appearance of the world scene of the nation-state as an independent and sovereign entity. And an essential part of that concept, as it emerged from the French Revolution, was the voluntaristic quality of this new sovereign entity – its connections, that is, with the modern concept of self-government and democracy. We are talking, and then of a concept - that of the nation-state – the emergence of which as the normal and prevailing form of independent political organization was roughly coincident with, and not unimportantly influenced by, the establishment of our own independence (which preceded the revolution in France).

Nationalism

The recognition of the national state in the quality of it that we have just observed, and the sense of belonging to such an entity – of giving it one's loyalty and indeed of accepting citizenship in it a part of one's own identity – these attitudes, in combination, make up the frame of mind that we now refer to as nationalism. It offers a very powerful way of looking at one's identity, at one's center of loyalty, and the source of the governmental discipline one accepts.

In the course of the two centuries that have passed since its emergence, nationalism has developed into the greatest emotional-political force of the age. In the western world, and part elsewhere as well, all other forms of collective self-identification, including those based on religion or class or dynastic loyalties, have been swept before it. It has triumphed most decisively, in particular, over the radical Marxism that loomed so large as an emotional-political force for a time in the early decades of this century. And even more moderate and humane socialism has been able to come to terms with it only by associating itself with it politically.

But it is mark of the emotional intensity of nationalist feeling that it has divided people very sharply, largely on the basis of their respective temperaments, in point of their reactions to it. At the cost of a certain amount of oversimplification (because people sometimes vacillate between the two outlooks and there are always the normal individual peculiarities of feeling), one might say that nationalistic reactions fall into two categories, highly different and usually clearly distinguishable one from another. We could call them two different ways of looking at one's country and defining one's relation to it.

The first, which I shall call natural and legitimate nationalism, could also be called patriotism, but only in the best sense of this latter term. An outstanding feature of it is, together with the acceptance of the national framework as the definitive determinant of civic identity, a genuine affection for the country in question.

This is sometimes an *amused* affection, born out familiarity with the country's failings as well as with its virtues. The moderate nationalist knows what to expect of his country; and there is a unique sense of reassurance in the fact of those expectations. He sees its absurdities as well as its strengths. The strengths enlist his pride; the absurdities, his understanding, sometimes his pity. But whatever these feelings are, he relates to the country for what it is – and for what it is to itself, and on its own terms, not for what he would like it to appear to others to be. He is not obsessed with efforts to compare it with other countries. He hopes that others will perceive its virtues together with its faults; but his feelings towards it are as little affected by their admiration as by their contempt. He hopes that his

country will bear itself decently and generously in its relations with others. He is proud when it does and saddened when it doesn't. But the balance of wisdom and folly that he sees in its behavior is only part of a larger picture; and his views do not stand or fall with any of the details. He is not ashamed of belonging to this particular country, but he does not feel himself greatly enlarged in his own eyes, or entitled to enlargement in the eyes of others, by the mere fact of his membership in it. He may view with regret and even sadness his country's occasional military involvements, seeing in them the culmination of many misconceptions and errors; but if asked by decision of elected public authority or by his own conscience to march with the others, he does not decline to do so, aware that for better or for worse, this being the country he belongs to, he must shoulder the burden of its mistakes as well as its achievements. What we are talking about, in short, is a brand of national feeling that responds to a natural need, brings harm to no one else, and deserves the adjectives- "natural" and "legitimate" – that I have ventured to apply to it. Let us call it, simply, love of country.

The other of the two possible attitudes of the citizen toward his nation is something decidedly different from what has just been described. It takes its departure from the latter, to be sure, and tries wherever it can to borrow from it something of its legitimacy and respectability; but actually it is a pathological form of it – a mass emotional exaltation to which many millions of people, particularly in democratic societies, appear to be highly susceptible. It could be called chauvinism, and this would not be wrong. But the term fails to bring out the full complexity of the frame of mind in question. It is sometimes referred to as romantic nationalism: and for this there is some reason, for it represents the carrying over into the collective national dimension of the self-idealization of the individual that was a striking feature of the philosophy of the romantic cultural movement of Europe in the early nineteenth century. Where the cultural romanticist glorified the individual human personality (glorified it, in fact, to the point of absurdity which, being himself humorless, he was unable to perceive), the political romanticist performs a similar distortion on the national society, building it up imaginatively into a state of grandiloquence that is usually as ridiculous as it is unreal.

In many ways, this pathological form of nationalism is the exact opposite of the normal one described above. Where the normal nationalist, the proper patriot, sees absurdities of his society as well as its strengths, the chauvinist sees only the latter. Where the view of the former combines the pride with the pity, the chauvinist experiences only the pride, and this in an exaggerated form. Where the normal nationalist sees his country simply for what it is to itself, the chauvinist – always self-conscious, always posing – sees it primarily in its relationship to others, in the competitive and comparative aspects of its qualities. He is in fact extremely sensitive to this aspect of it. It is not enough for him to affirm the superiority of his own nation; others must be brought to acknowledge it. The same sense of insecurity that prevents the individual romanticist from having confidence in himself, and compels him to rely on outward deference of others to establish his personal self-regard, arises here once more to determine his attitude toward the collectivity; for it is in the membership of this collectivity, and here alone, that he finds reassurance as to his own worth. If his own view of himself is to find enlargement, it can only be, as he sees it, through the enlargement of the collectivity of which he claims to be a part.

Hence many facets of his behavior. Hence the frequent demonstrational quality of his patriotism: the flag-waving, the sententious oratory, the endless reminders of the country's greatness, the pious

incantation of the oath of allegiance, and the hushed, pseudo-religious atmosphere of national ceremony. Hence the self-righteous intolerance toward those who decline to share in these various ritualistic enactments. Hence the extreme national touchiness, the preoccupation with the outward symbols of national honor, the truculent sensitivity to the views of others. Hence, finally, and more serious than all the rest, the fondness for seeing the country's superiority made manifest and confirmed by military posture or, if possible, on the field of battle. Hence all that goes with that frame of mind in real war or in cold war: the demonization of real or imaginary opponent; the hysterical search for secret agents of the opponents in one's own midst; the subordination of all other values to military ones; and the fatuous dream that at the end of this sacrifice of the cream of one's own youth – and the enemy's – there will, or can, be such a thing as a glorious 'victory'.

What we are dealing with in this morbid form of nationalism, and have had to deal with periodically over the past century and a half of the development of Western civilization, is a real and terrible disease of the human spirit. The damage it has done is appalling. It is one of the two fundamental causes of the First World War (the other being the failure of statesmen and educated opinion generally to recognize how modern industry and technology were affecting the usefulness of war as an instrument of national policy). And the First World War was the great formative catastrophe of the European civilization of this century, not only impoverishing in the most serious way the societies of the principal participants but also becoming the true source of the two great totalitarian movements of midcentury – Soviet Communism and the Nazi. But beyond that, nationalism of this sort has, in combination with militarism it encourages, eaten deeply, down to the present day, into the spirit and the consciousness of millions of people, distorting their images of external reality and of themselves, sowing a foolish and suicidal destructiveness among peoples – peoples who are now going to require the greatest of their resources of strength to confront successfully, even in the absence of any military effort and sacrifice, the social and environmental dangers by which their civilization is now assailed.

It would be wrong to assert that this diseased form of nationalism is the inevitable product of the modern national *state* as an institution. But the two are closely connected. It is a disease of the national society, not an essential concomitant of it. But it is an illness to which members of the modern national community are peculiarly and dangerously susceptible. It is comforting to note that in certain of the greater European countries, where a century ago this disease raged in its most virulent form (in France and Germany, in particular), it has markedly declined in the decades since the Second World War. It seems to be the smaller and newer countries of eastern and central Europe, particularly those who have acquired, or are acquiring, their national identity in the present century, that are now most susceptible to it. But even in the larger and older countries, where the spirit of this unhealthy nationalism seems happily to be on the decline, dangerous remnants of it remain in the addiction of their economies to the maintenance of large armed establishments, in the continued cultivation and proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction, and the truly senseless, vicious, and indefensible massive export of arms to other parts of the world.

The susceptibility of western societies to this diseased form of national spirit is not a reason for wishing to abolish the national state entirely; indeed we have nothing with which to replace it. But it is something to be borne in mind when we consider the future of the central entity in the organization of

international life, particularly in the light of the rather unreal theories of total equality and total sovereignty on which the concept of the national state has been allowed to rest. Let us hope that as these exaggerated concepts of national dignity and these excesses of collective self-admiration decline, there will decline with them the dangers that this particular form of political association has carried with it.

Speech

State and Market: Altering the Boundaries and Emerging New Balances*

Y. V. Reddy

I am delighted to be here among many affectionate friends. I am thankful to my college-mate, batch-mate, cadre-mate and a very affectionate friend, V.K. Srinivasan for giving me this opportunity. The Chairman, Mr. Reddy, has given an excellent overview of what I intend covering in this address today viz., the changing contours of borders between State and market.

The altering of the boundaries between State and market encompasses, what is variously described as, realigning government, structural reforms towards liberalisation or deregulation, and changing mix of the mixed economy. To enable an appreciation of this changing mix between State and market in India, a combination of descriptive and analytical approaches is adopted in this address, with a focus on what may be described as relevant functions, processes and balances. The presentation is arranged in five sections. The first section describes how the mix of the mixed economy was in the process of changing in India from the commencement of Planning in the fifties up to the current reform period. The second section describes, by applying a functional approach to the role of the State, how the boundaries between State and market in the mixed economy are currently being altered in the reform period. The third section narrates the process of altering such boundaries, illustratively at Federal (Central) Government level, and at Provincial (State) level. Since reforms in external and financial sectors have been covered extensively in some of the earlier addresses in the recent past, they are not discussed now. The fourth section explores the new balances that are emerging in our country as a result of such altering of boundaries between State and market. Analysts are advised, in light of these developments to focus their attention on the emerging new balances in order to appreciate the reform process and its outlook. The final section briefly mentions the response of the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) to some of the emerging new balances. It needs to be clarified at the outset that the word State is used here broadly to reflect the Government sector in totality, i.e., the Central, Provincial and Local Governments, encompassing legislative, executive and judicial branches. For convenience, the word Central is used for the constitutional expression, "Union Government" and similarly Provincial for "State Government". Further, the term, public sector is used broadly to signify aggregate of Government and public enterprise sector, and public enterprise signifies non-financial publicly owned corporate entities - whether under a separate statute or a Government company under Companies Act. Where publicly owned public enterprises of financial sector are included in the broad public sector, this fact is specially mentioned.

Mix of Mixed Economy : Uni-directional

There was a virtual consensus, at the time of independence, on three basic tenets for free-India, viz., democracy, federalism, and a strong role for Government in economic development or what came to be evolved into the concept of mixed economy. Mixed economy generally meant active and direct participation of the Government in economic life, combined with Government's direction of market forces, to subserve the goal of development and social justice. The mixed economy approach held sway over the mainstream economic thought and political debate

(barring a right wing political party called Swatantra Party active for a while under the leadership of Rajaji) for four decades, i.e. fifties, sixties, seventies and eighties. During this period, the mix between State and market was characterised by two features. First, the role of State expanded, i.e. mix was moving unidirectionally, and there was seldom a retreat. Second, the pace of expansion of State was not uniform and in fact, there were many occasions of uncertainty and doubt on the role of State, but seldom was decisive action taken towards retreat of State *vis-à-vis* market, till the balance of payments crisis of 1991. These features are best illustrated by some periodisation, though any attempt at periodisation has some subjectivity.

1951-61 represents ascendancy of State, with an overwhelming consensus in favour of an active role for State, and such a role was sanctified by Directive Principles of State Policy, and operationalised through a process of planned development. The control apparatus of Government imposed during Second World War provided a readymade framework for legal and institutional instruments for State intervention. International consensus was broadly supportive of India's approach, to the extent that this approach combined democracy and liberal values. The constitutional provisions, legal framework, and interpretations of the judiciary were supportive of such a domineering role for State, mainly as a result of the Directive Principles of State Policy enshrined in the Constitution.

However, in the mid-sixties, following war and droughts combined with industrial recession, a "Plan-Holiday" had to be declared. Uncertainties, in particular, political compulsions, led to the nationalisation of major banks, providing the Government relatively easy access to household savings in order to finance its activities. Soon, the first oil shock affected international sentiment on capital flows to developing countries and some aid-weariness also set in. Overall, therefore, the period 1967 to 1977, could be treated as a period of uncertainty and mixed signals, but expansion of State did occur in spurts, particularly in the plethora of legislative actions.

By 1977 it was clear that, the Plan strategies were not paying rich dividends and a period of introspection started in 1977, lasting till 1984. A number of high level official Committees were appointed to examine physical controls, monetary policy, trade policy, public enterprises, etc. Each one of them recognised the need for a review of the mix between the State and market and recommended a definitive tilt towards marketisation of the mix. However, no tangible policy action was forthcoming, perhaps due to inadequate political consensus.

The next phase, from 1984 onwards, came to be described as New Economic Policy and was essentially an attempt to break the stalemate in State action and introduce market orientation. The new policy aimed at higher growth, but given the unwillingness to impose necessary fiscal discipline, significant acceleration of growth and growth-led exports were achieved at considerable cost, namely, relatively unsustainable levels of fiscal deficit, current account deficit and external debt, especially short-term debt. In fact, inadequate productivity from the use of resources, while first and second tranche of Extended Fund Facility from the IMF were drawn, also resulted in strains of repayment to IMF during the late eighties. Since higher growth was attempted without breaking what has been described by the author in the late 'eighties, as the "stalemate in State action", there was fertile ground for a crisis.

In brief, there was a changing mix, but it tended to be unidirectional, with varying pace but

generally in favour of State, and often in spurts though during the latter period, with serious doubts.

Mix of Mixed Economy : Bi-directional

The year 1990-91 saw the Gulf war, which triggered a balance of payments crisis. The seriousness of the crisis, especially the dramatic act of sale and repurchase of Government's gold through the State Bank of India and pledge of the RBI's gold, did evoke a national consensus on stabilising the economy and undertaking appropriate reform. The crisis provided justification for a serious effort to break the stalemate in State action. In other words, the unidirectional nature of changing mix between State and market since 1950 was virtually for the first time reversed in 1990-91. However, it was not merely the crisis, but the prevailing economic scene on the eve of reform, which enabled initiation of reform. The features of the scene may be summarised as follows:

First, there was an intellectual recognition of systemic problems, particularly in the areas of fiscal, public enterprises and overall competitive strength of industry.

Second, while there was respectable, if not impressive growth of over 5 per cent in the eighties, compared to the "Hindu rate of growth" of 3 to 3.5 per cent previously, it was clear to the policy makers that such growth was financed by unsustainable fiscal as well as trade deficits, and growth lacked institutional underpinning to take the economy to a higher growth path or ensure social justice.

Third, while the policies were originally aimed at protecting labour force, incentive mechanisms got distorted and institutional rigidities crept in, resulting in what has been termed by the author as "tyranny of ten per cent" - ten per cent being the share of organised labour (both in public and private), select industrial houses and a rentier class encouraged by the political system. What was described as a soft State, tended over a period to be so soft to the 'ten per cent', that to promote the interests of this ten per cent, the State ended up being a hard State on the 90 per cent of labour force. This large workforce started becoming restive, being tired of promises of elimination of poverty not backed by delivery, and therefore, this large segment had to be pacified with what have been described as "populist schemes". It was no longer easy for the policy makers to be both soft on organised work force and, provide succour to the large unorganised sector.

Fourth, the educated constitute the most articulate section in our country, as in many other developing societies. In the fifties and sixties, and to some extent in the seventies, the flow of a significant portion of educated was absorbed through employment in the growing Government sector, the public enterprises and to a very limited extent, the private corporate sector. With a larger output of educated youth, and a deceleration in the growth of employment in organised sector, there was an increasingly larger pool of educated, self-employed or unemployed, outside the "ten per cent". Politically, it was possible to counter, however feebly, the aggressive stance of the "ten per cent" since a significantly large part, almost the whole of the educated class coming out of high schools and universities were left out of employment in the organised sector and were thus outside of the "ten per cent".

Fifth, it was clear that the delivery of Government services had become costly and was generally perceived to be very indifferent and inefficient - be it schools, hospitals, or public utilities like water supply and sanitation. The legal and institutional set up gave rights to the stakeholders in the public sector even if these rights were to the detriment of the citizen. The stakeholders were not only employees, but also contractors or suppliers, or retail agents, etc. In fact, many felt that these stakeholders pre-empted financial resources sometimes at the cost of the original purpose of employing them. So, there were schools with teachers and no buildings, or teaching materials and hospitals with no medicines, electricity or water. Incidentally, the salaries of the public sector had assumed implicit productivity increases, viz., annual increments in addition to inflation indexation and any shortfall in assumed productivity increases worsened the situation.

The managers in the public sector including the financial sector often complained about the inflexibility introduced through inherited rights and work practices, resulting in erosion of scope for productivity increases to match salary increases.

Sixth, there was an emerging parallel economy not only in money, called black money, but in most public services (private schools, private hospitals and bottled drinking water rather than tap water becoming the preferred options). Further, there was resentment about delivery of services in public systems even among the 'ten per cent', when somebody else was supposed to deliver the service.

Seventh, given the fiscal situation, the public enterprises which saw the fiscal support drying up started clamouring for market access, autonomy and even some privatisation.

Eighth, the private sector, including corporate sector, realised that the capacity of Government to support them was getting eroded due to fiscal compulsions, while regulatory and other demands from Government continued to be perceived as a burden on them. In the absence of fiscal support from Government, they found it worthwhile to seek deregulation and liberalisation, arguing against what has been described as over-regulation and under-governance.

Ninth, there was a widespread realisation that the basic assumption of efficiency and effectiveness of State *vis-à-vis* market appear to be less valid than before, mainly due to technological progress and institutional characteristics of public sector. The success of alternate models in other countries, in achieving both higher growth and social justice was impressive and sustained, and was too apparent to be ignored by the public opinion in India.

Finally, it was widely believed that reform was on the cards even by late eighties. However, the Gulf war, which triggered the crisis, enabled projection of external factors as the main cause of the crisis. Thus, economic compulsions for reforms were clear for at least a decade before reforms commenced, but the issue was mobilising political support and evolving a consensus on detail of reforms in a democratic-federal set up - a problem for which a favourable environment emerged with the Gulf crisis.

Functional Approach to Altering the Boundaries

In the functional approach to the role of the State indicated by the author in the late 'eighties, it was argued that altering the boundaries between State and market could be analysed in terms of different roles of State. State's role in economic activity can be broadly classified into that of Producer-State, i.e. producer of commercial goods and services; Regulatory-State, involving setting and enforcing of rules that govern, encourage or discourage economic activities of market participants; Facilitator-State, involving provision of public goods such as police, judiciary, street lighting; and Welfare State, ensuring provision of a wide variety of merit goods such as education and health. In the functional approach, the process of altering the boundaries between State and market, are tracked, with reference to each of the four functions mentioned.

Retreat as Producer State

The process of retreat of State as a producer of goods and services involves exercise of several options in a variety of areas. As a producer of commercial goods and services, the major option exercised by the Government was to permit entry of private sector in activities that were reserved for public ownership. This option does not necessarily involve retreat of State in absolute terms though in relative terms, it amounts to a retreat. Currently, except for sectors such as defence, entry for private sector is permitted, and in many, in fact, encouraged. These include oil exploration, power production, telecom services, etc. The change was operationalised through a series of Statements on Industrial Policy. Second, exit of public enterprises in terms of closure, is technically permitted under the aegis of Sick Industrial Companies Act, which was amended to bring public enterprises within its jurisdiction. Third, exit of workers in public enterprises was also enabled and encouraged through adoption of voluntary retirement schemes and creation of National Reconstruction Fund. Fourth, some public enterprises were corporatised (that is converted into companies under Companies Act) and in many public enterprises, private equity holders brought in. Public enterprise sector which was invariably a 100 per cent Government-owned enterprise earlier became one in which there were some enterprises with diversified ownership, although in many cases, majority ownership continues with Government. Fifth, significant autonomy in functioning of public enterprises has been announced and some attempts have also been made in this direction. Sixth, in a few cases, Government took up financial restructuring of enterprises to enable these enterprises to compete with private enterprises and meet the threat of imports under a liberalised trade regime. Seventh, compared to the past, a hard budget constraint has been imposed on the public enterprises. Eighth, preferential treatment to public enterprises through exclusivity or price preference in purchases or sales within public sector has been formally dispensed with. Ninth, privatisation involving transfer of majority ownership to private sector and change of control was conspicuous by its absence.

It is possible to argue that the entry of private sector has been insignificant in some sectors, possibly due to incomplete process of regulatory reform; that, in reality extension of jurisdiction of BIFR to public enterprises has not yet served any purpose; that impact of VRS or labour-flexibility has been very marginal; that diversified ownership was merely a process of revenue generation for Government, often by shuffling of portfolio in public sector either through 'cross-holding' among public enterprises or directed-holding by Government owned All India Financial Institutions; that revenue generation in a few cases was obtained by assuring the investors of a monopoly-status for a number of years thus undermining competition; that autonomy was not really exercisable in practice; that financial restructuring was done at enormous cost to

Government and only to dress up an enterprise to avoid reference to BIFR or privatisation; that Disinvestment Commission had been ignored; and that institutional rigidities still remain in actual reform of State as producer of commercial goods and services. In particular, it is argued that unbundling of so-called natural monopolies has not been given attention while diversifying ownership. Notwithstanding the above criticisms, a workable framework for reform has been initiated and undoubtedly further progress requires significant thrust.

Regulatory State

While there were attempts to reduce role of State as a 'producer', correspondingly, there has been deregulation in some and expansion of State in other as a regulator. Dismantling of industrial licensing and liberalisation of trade are best examples of retreat of a Regulatory State. But, in many other areas, there has been expansion. For example, in Telecommunication, in the area of Ports and Electricity, national level regulatory authorities under appropriate statutes have been established. Similar initiatives are being considered in some other sectors also. The regulatory authorities are expected to exercise independence from the ministries or a public or private enterprise concerned and provide a framework for entry and operating conditions, especially tariff, in a way that would ensure assurances and protections to investors and consumers, whose interests often conflict in a monopoly like situation.

Though at a macro-level there has been deregulation, it is often argued that there are still a plethora of regulatory clearances that are required, thus undermining the full impact of deregulation. The process of expanding regulatory role is sometimes described as incomplete, if not inadequate, on the ground that the constitution of regulatory authorities is not necessarily apolitical or designed to counter political cycles; that they are being undermined by Ministries concerned either on account of narrow interests of public enterprises or to serve what the Ministry perceives to be larger public interest, and that the regulatory authorities are inadequately provided for, in regard to physical, financial or human resources, to perform their task efficiently and effectively. However, it is undeniable that, a basic framework for a more transparent, accountable and, expanded role of State as a regulator has been put in place in many crucial sectors, though a focussed attention to the strengthening of these authorities may be necessary. More important, there may be many other areas, in particular, an overall competition policy, customer-protection (especially inadequately compensating the customers for negligence of producers of goods or services in public or private sector) setting minimum acceptable levels of standards in services sector, restrictive practices adopted by trade unions affecting consumer interests, etc., that need to be pursued further.

Facilitator State

In its role as a facilitator State in India, the major thrust is to redefine what constitutes a true public-good and then find means by which such a public good is funded and provided for in an adequate and equitable measure. It is also possible to unbundle an existing public good into its true public good and commercial component. It is ensuring provision of a public-good that is relevant and not necessarily whether State does it on its own or through use of private sector.

The evidence available on review of scope and coverage of public goods by Central Government

is rather limited except perhaps in the context of roads and bridges where toll charges have been introduced. A detailed framework for review of what are public goods, how to assess adequacy, how to ensure provision and means of adequate financing need to be addressed by the State as markets cannot respond to these questions. For example, there can be a policy decision to treat a way of delivery of a good as a public good as distinct from another way. Further, water supply in a street tap may be a 'public good' while water supply in a tap at home is a pure commercial good. It must also be recognised that a significant part of provision of public goods falls in the jurisdiction of Provincial Governments and not in Central Government. Overall, there is a significant scope and a need for review of role as facilitator.

Welfare Provider

While in some developed countries, major source of fiscal stress and consequently major area of reform has been revamping or cutting down on role of State as a Welfare State, in India there is a large consensus on expanding rather than contracting role of State in provision of welfare. The consensus covers entitlements such as primary education and medical attention as also old age pensions. In fact, Constitution of India mentions compulsory primary education as a Directive Principle of State Policy, though actual performance of State has admittedly been inadequate. A study of the process of providing welfare, say though primary schools may provide some insights into the current meshing of State and market. The approach so far has been for Government to build and run most of the schools, often in a centralised fashion from Provincial headquarters, prescribe syllabus, print, subsidise and distribute text books on a Government monopoly basis; recognise and often fund, to a substantive degree, some private sector institutions also. In some cases, mid-day meals are provided to children in elementary schools while in a few cases, cash in respect of female students are being provided. Reform process in this regard has not been uniform among the Provinces though recent initiatives relate to provision of adequate buildings and teaching material, increasing number of teachers in Government sector and in a few Provincial Governments encouraging local initiatives in starting or running the school.

While there has been a widely expressed discomfort at the relatively low level of expenditures on education, it has also been pointed out most recently by Dr. C. Rangarajan that the level of Government expenditure on education in India, is comparable to Sri Lanka or China and hence the inadequacy is not in the level of public expenditure on education. It has also been recognised in various empirical studies that, in some States, two thirds of primary school teachers in Government schools do not attend the school and in many Provinces, text books are made available in the midyear only. There is a marked preference for private schools among most parents and a few studies show that literacy is increasing in India on a demand driven basis rather than utilisation of supply created in Government sector. While it is possible to argue that those who can afford, should be persuaded to pay school fees, often, Government schools are not preferred by those who can pay. Similarly, while efforts are made to regulate the fee structure in private schools, they are often circumvented. The relative roles of Government, local Panchayat and private initiative in regard to setting standards of physical environment, academic requirements, funding, provision, etc., are yet to be addressed. In brief, the role of State relative to the private sector continues to be inadequate and ill-defined in most parts of India, in regard to spread and quality of education, especially at primary level. Similar logic can be applied to

health or medical facilities or sanitation.

The major constraint for adequate provision of services is the *de facto* country wide phenomenon of priority to entitlements of instruments of welfare provision (employees, contractors, etc.) over the purpose (schools, dispensaries) or entitlements of the people to whom welfare is sought to be provided. Some Provinces are attempting to overcome this through effective decentralisation of initiatives and management.

Notwithstanding the above, there are some Provinces which have progressed significantly while new initiatives are being attempted in some other Provinces. An all-India framework, such as in operations blackboard, for a review of relative roles of public, private, local, and non-Governmental organisations, in terms of different combinations of funding and provisioning is yet to emerge. Similarly, regulatory framework in these areas especially medical and health services, is being developed in select Provinces since private funding and provision is expanding rapidly. Improvements in what has been termed as inefficient provision by public sector and a regulatory framework to govern unbridled private sector in addition to evolving appropriate mix of funding and provision by public and private sources appear to be the reform agenda for the future in the realm of State as Welfare provider.

Provincial Level Reforms

Significant attention has been paid in both academic circles and in public debate about the challenges posed in reforms at Provincial level. These include fiscal, power, irrigation, roads and road-traffic, education, health and water supply. Different Provinces have adopted a variety of approaches.

On the fiscal front, apart from revenue raising, cost recovery for services and traditional expenditure-containment, measures include, statutory limit on guarantees, limits on public employment, and establishment of Sinking Fund. It is necessary to recognise the fact that initiatives on fiscal front, both statutory and non-statutory are far more impressive in some Provinces than the Centre. In fact, substantial part of recent fiscal stress is perhaps justifiably attributed by Provinces to the recent liberal pay hike by the Centre. Though, legally Provinces are not bound by Centre's decision, during 'seventies and 'eighties socio-political compulsions and centralising tendencies in public systems made Centre's decisions *de facto* binding on Provinces. It is necessary to recognise that inspite of impressive initiatives in some Provinces, the fiscal stress at Provincial level is acute.

In the area of power, measures relate to private sector entry in power generation; reorganisation of power monoliths into separate corporates for generation, transmission, distribution; privatisation of assets; and, statutory steps for establishment of regulatory/tariff authorities. There are still many Provinces, which subsidise power heavily and overall, power sector is still far away from total cost recovery. Yet, in terms of organisational restructuring and legislative actions, some Provinces have progressed significantly, and well ahead of Central Government in respect of similar activities (say, power supply or passenger transport by road in urban areas).

In the area of irrigation, stress has been on decentralisation of water management especially

participative approaches, and upward revision of water rates. Different Provinces have adopted varying systems, but overall, however reasonable, cost recovery is yet to be seriously attempted. While progress in regard to cost recovery is tardy in most cases, the progress in institutional improvements for decentralised and user involved management has been impressive in a few Provinces. Similar approach towards decentralisation is yet to be demonstrated in Central Government.

In regard to education, bringing primary education under panchayat system and local involvement in setting up and part-funding of such schools have been some of the initiatives in a few Provinces. There is no evidence of any such initiatives, as yet, in respect of a large number of secondary schools under the aegis of Central Government.

In respect of health facilities, a few Provinces have been contemplating legislation to regulate private health care facility.

As regards public enterprises at Provincial level, there have been almost universal attempts to review the portfolio and identify non-viable enterprises. While attempts to privatise have been made, there have been only a few successful cases. The public enterprises at Provincial level, other than in power, road, transport and industrial financing, are relatively of smaller magnitude in most Provinces. However, many Provinces have attempted a systematic evaluation of public enterprises, and hard budget constraint has been quite severe in almost all Provinces. The variety of options by several Provinces in dealing with State level public enterprises is impressive.

Features of Reform Process

The major features of reform process of nineties in India, can thus be summarised as follows:

First, the expectations from reforms in India is not in terms of across the board retreat of State in favour of market but, in terms of enhancing States' capacity to permit efficiency-gains and expand availability of public and merit goods.

Second, while State is retreating in some areas, such as pure commercial goods or services, it is both retreating and expanding in other areas such as regulation and is expected to expand further in public and merit goods.

Third, a variety of options have been initiated by the Central Government to redefine the role of State *vis-a-vis* market and the framework is comprehensive, though a significant ground is yet to be covered. In general, the direction of reform is retreat as a Producer State and retreat combined with expansion as a Regulatory State.

Fourth, at a Provincial level, while there is some marginal retreat as a Producer State, substantive expansion and redefining of the role of State as a Facilitator and Welfare-provider appears to be in order. A variety of options have been exercised by different Provinces, though significant progress is required if the fiscal sustainability is to be combined with an expanded role for the State, at Provincial level.

Fifth, the differences in the pace and direction of reforms in different Provinces are perhaps explicable by the political management of the process, technical capability to design measures, institutional underpinning to implement them and nature of support from Central Government.

Sixth, there is evidence to show that, even in areas where State has to expand, mainly at the Provincial level and as a welfare provider, decentralisation of initiatives and management away from Provincial head quarters down to local levels seems to be a preferred option. This would imply that State may reorient and expand, by changing degree of centralisation.

New Balances

The descriptive account of the evolution of the mix between State and market in India, with special reference to process of recent reforms, reveals many interesting aspects, especially on the nature of changing mix relevant to us, as also the variety of options exercised. It also reveals the significant progress yet to be made, though a preliminary framework is available. However, to assess the dynamics of the changing mix, it would be useful to track what may be termed as new balances that are emerging as both causes and consequences of a changing mix between State and market. The changing balance between State and market does not happen in isolation, but is related to other balances also. An attempt is made here to track these new balances in a somewhat exploratory fashion or even as conjectures. These balances are vertically between Centre and Provinces; horizontally between Provinces; within Governments, both Centre and Provinces; between public and private sectors; funding and provision in delivery of services; old and new industrial houses; poor and non-poor, organised employment and self employment; and finally rural and urban.

Vertical : Centre and Provinces

As the reform progresses, it appears that the relative balance between Centre and Provinces tends to tilt in favour of Provinces for a number of reasons.

First, the most important areas for the Central Government's responsibilities are in international trade, financial sector, telecommunications, aviation, and especially banking and corporate law/practices. In most of these areas, factors such as multilateral agreements (say, WTO), globalisation, and recommended best practices of the world, tend to circumscribe, over a period, the discretionary power available in normal times to Central Government.

Second, the capacity of Centre to reach tax levels as well as tax regimes, very different from international practices (customs, excise, corporate or income tax) also tend to get constrained, over a period, since the free and rapid flow of commodities, skills and finances among the countries would require us to be not too much out of alignment.

Third, major thrust-areas needing expansion of State are in physical infrastructure such as road, waterworks, power and social infrastructure, such as, schools and hospitals. Whether it is direct intervention or indirect intervention, the regime that governs funding and provision in these areas is to be determined by Provincial Governments. Thus, relative to Centre, Provinces are currently in the expansionary modules of State in the State-market mix. Provincial Governments currently

have more freedom to access resources for financing economic growth from the market both from domestic and in some ways, global sources. Hence, the proportion of net official flows from Centre to Provinces as a proportion of total capital flows to Provinces tend to get reduced.

Fourth, Provinces could also seek advice on growth strategies not only from Planning Commission as in the past, but also institutions like Institute of Public Finance and Policy; or Asian Development Bank or the World Bank.

Horizontal Inter-Provincial Imbalance

The balance, especially, economic balance among Provinces is also likely to be affected to the extent the overall Governments' role in allocation of resources tilts in favour of markets. Thus, Provinces will be competing more intensely than before, in market place for resources in future and, Provinces may find it somewhat difficult to place a significant responsibility on the Centre for their relative performances.

Second, with growth in communications, especially on economic and financial issues, people will tend to benchmark economic performance of States. There may be a slow beginning but the momentum could pick up, as evidenced by varying capacities (both in terms of amounts and interest rates) to raise financial resources for Provincial level public enterprises, on the basis of their guarantees.

Third, there are a variety of options for managing change which are adopted by different Provinces. For example, a single Electricity Board for each State was an earlier model, while now each Province is looking its own model of combination of institutional arrangements as well as transition path. There are plenty of opportunities to learn from each other's experiences and make modifications. Thus, inter-Provincial interaction tends to be more intensive, by themselves or through institutional consultants, who may be interacting with several Provinces.

Fourth, there is, in this decentralised scenario, a potential for increasing the divergence in levels of income among Provinces or even intra-Province. To this extent, there may be pressure from less developed Provinces on the Centre to play a more active role in countering market's possible neglect of less developed Provinces.

Fifth, there could be competition among Provinces to benchmark, perform and excel but, the new balance will have to ensure healthy competition.

Within Governments

The balance between the Ministries representing the combination of political executive and Government bureaucracies *visa-vis* exercise of ownership functions as well as regulatory functions may also change somewhat adverse to Ministries. The process of privatisation, diversified ownership and autonomy of public enterprises may erode the discretionary element of the Ministries. Once separate regulatory bodies on statutory basis are established and strengthened, they are meant to be semi-autonomous. Often, their membership need not coincide with political cycles and thus may impart greater stability to regulatory regime. Increasing role

of semi-autonomous regulatory bodies tilts the balance away from the Ministries and in favour of less volatility in policies.

Further, experience at Provincial level in some areas has shown that the preferred route to enlarging the role of, and efficiency in functioning of State is decentralisation in Government. For example, in primary schools or water management, the approach in some Provinces seems to be through decentralisation or localised water management users' committees or village panchayats. This may also involve emerging new balances between Ministries or departments at Provincial headquarters and local bodies, in favour of the latter.

Public and Private Enterprises

The relationship among public enterprises and between public and private enterprises could be subject to new balances in several ways.

Firstly, a large public enterprise sector may continue but it will have to reckon with growing competition from private sector.

Second, regulatory agencies may insist on level playing field between public and private sector.

Third, the public enterprises faced with hard budget constraint, threat of private sector entry and accountability to the private shareholders where they exist, may have to carve out new pattern of relationships with the Government and within the organisation.

Fourth, strategic cooperation and cross holdings between public and private sectors are inevitable, thus replacing water tight compartmentalisation between the public and private sectors. Infact, this process may necessitate the termination of the concept of Government Companies under Companies Act.

Finally, the managerial and other highly skilled people, who were concentrated significantly in public enterprises may find alternate and attractive avenues in private sector; and consequently their clout within public enterprises may tend to improve. The emerging flexible market for talent could indeed alter balances, between and within enterprises.

Funding and Provision of Services

There can be several permutations and combinations of public funding, private funding, mandatory cross-subsidisation in private funding, private provision, public provision and mandatory provisions by private to meet public interest, etc. A recent example of private funding and private provision with some elements of public-funding and regulation has been evolved by the Supreme Court of India, in respect of private engineering colleges in Karnataka. The scheme covered fees chargeable, mix between merit *vis-a-vis* discretionary seats in admission, local *vis-a-vis* non-resident Indian quotas, etc., and mandatory loaning by public sector banks at concessional interest rates. While the decision of the highest Court provided a framework in a specific category, there are large areas, in drinking water supply, education and healthcare, where public-private mix is entering new balances, in regard to ownership, funding provision,

official recognition and governmental regulation. The traditional water tight division between Government or public and private sector each combining within itself funding and provision may get blurred and larger scope realised for intermingling of the two. Further, such intermingling may involve nonGovernmental organisation as well as local initiatives. These are perhaps in nascent stage but evolution of new balances between public and private sectors is clearly in the horizon.

Old and New Industrial Houses

The traditional core industries in the tradeable sector, especially sectors which enjoyed high levels of protection in the past, are currently under pressure of competition and they tend to be apprehensive of rapid reform. They are often balanced by the newly emerging internationally competitive industrialists, in areas such as drugs, pharmaceuticals, software, chemical industries, etc. As the latter improve in strength and importance, the balance will tend to tilt in favour of more rapid reform. There is evidence of a tilting balance even now. Even within the traditional industrial houses, one can see changing balances in the composition of activities, boards and management.

Poor and Non-poor

A major issue of concern in the context of reform is whether the poor will be worse off than before in absolute terms due to the reform and whether the balance between poor and non-poor, in relative terms, will worsen as a result of reform. In the pre-reform period, there were programmes in the name of the poor but their reach and benefits were often questioned. Given the stalemate in State action that has been explained, the poor may not be worse off than before and may even be able to articulate their needs better in the absence of bureaucratically determined services, though commercialisation of services may tend to give a sense of relative deprivation to poor. Perhaps this is an emerging area of new balances, with significant social dimension that needs to be analysed and feedback utilised in policy actions.

Organised employment and self-employment

In fifties, sixties and onto seventies, the major segment of engineers, doctors or other skilled professionals coming out of colleges found jobs in Government or public enterprise or publicly owned financial sector. However, since the eighties a larger and larger percentage of the skilled and the articulate tend to be in self-employed category as against employees-category. The growing services sector also adds to this trend. Indeed, leasing of goods and services, contracting out or outsourcing instead of in-house provision are considered to be more suited to changing times. In democratic systems, these changing balances between job-orientation and work-orientation tend to exercise a strong influence on the policies relating to employment in the organised corporate sector.

Rural-Urban

Contrary to the generally held fear that reforms would lead to markets holding sway and thus metropolitan or large centres would thrive to the disadvantage of rural areas, there is evidence

that rural prosperity has been improving significantly in the recent years. The rural-urban continuum would perhaps assert itself, but in any case, rural-urban, as well as agro-industry linkages are set to get strengthened especially when the services sector is growing rapidly. Briefly stated, there may be new balances replacing the traditional rural-urban divide or dichotomy.

Role of RBI

Before concluding, it is useful to place on record how RBI is responding to the emerging new balances. This will be illustrated by RBI's recognition of the fact that finances at the

Provincial level are critical to the realignment of the role of the State and market.

First, the RBI has started a close and more intensive interaction with the Finance Secretaries of Provincial Governments on a regular basis, and on a wide range of relevant subjects.

Second, a Committee of Provincial Finance Secretaries have with the active involvement of the RBI, recommended limits on Government guarantees. Some Provinces, such as Karnataka have already legislated on this subject.

Third, the system of Ways and Means advances to Governments has recently been revised by the RBI in consultation with the Provinces to introduce better incentives with regard to financial and cash management.

Fourth, with support from the RBI a Committee of Finance Secretaries of Provincial Governments is presently working on the issue of improvements in transparency of the Budgetary system.

Fifth, Provinces have been encouraged by the RBI recently to access the market for a part of their market borrowings. These include, Andhra Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh and Punjab which have raised funds directly from the market

Sixth, in view of this development, the issue of monitoring of the financial health and other relevant parameters of the Provincial Governments by the market assumes greater significance. A Committee of the Finance Secretaries of Provinces is currently acting in an advisory capacity to oversee the indicators of financial parameters being developed by RBI.

Finally, the RBI is actively advising the Provincial Governments in areas such as cash management and funds management.

Conclusion

To conclude, the concept of mixed economy that we adopted was the right one. What is called for is a dynamic and bidirectional movement between State and Market. Indeed, growth in technology has recently led to drastic redefining of the relative roles of State and market and such a redefinition need not be a unidirectional retreat or an across-the-board expansion. The reform process in India has been able to capture the basic elements of this complex reality and

there is, at least, at a conceptual level, a pragmatic framework. More importantly, there are emerging new balances and a dynamism has to be located in these new balances. Analysts need to have an appropriate understanding of these emerging new balances to appreciate the stability and pace of economic reform.

*** Address by Dr. Y.V. Reddy, Deputy Governor, RBI at Indian Institute of Economics, Hyderabad, on August 16, 1999.**

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